


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HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

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With Maps and Plans.



Napier's History of the Peninsular
War, 1807-1810.

Napier's History of the Peninsular
War, 1812-1814.

HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN THE PENINSULA
AND IN THE
SOUTH OF FRANCE,
FROM THE YEAR 1807 TO THE YEAR 1814.

By W. F. P. NAPIER, C.B.,

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MEMBER OF THE ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF MILITARY SCIENCES.

WITH MAPS AND PLANS.

1810—1812.

LONDON:
GEORGE ROUTLEDGE AND SONS,
BROADWAY, LUDGATE HILL.
GLASGOW, MANCHESTER, AND NEW YORK.

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NOTICE.

The manuscript authorities consulted for this volume consist of original papers and correspondence of the Duke of Wellington, Marshal Soult, King Joseph, Mr. Stuart,* General Graham,† General Pelet,‡ General Campbell,§ Captain Codrington,|| and Colonel Cox,¶ together with many private journals and letters of officers employed during the war.

In addition to the manuscript authorities used for the former volumes, several memoirs, journals, and notes of officers employed in the different operations have been consulted for this volume. Amongst others, the journal of General Harvey, of the Portuguese service, and some original papers supplied by Sir Howard Douglas.

* Afterward Lord Stuart de Rothesay.

† Afterward Lord Lynedoch.

‡ Afterward first Aide-de-Camp to Marshal Massena.

§ Afterward Lieutenant-Governor of Gibraltar.

|| Afterward Admiral Sir Edward Codrington.

¶ Afterward Governor of Almeida.

HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

BOOK IX.

CHAPTER I.

WHEN Galicia was delivered by the campaign of Talavera, the Asturias became the head of a new line of operation threatening the enemy's principal communication with France. But this advantage was feebly used. Kellerman's division at Valladolid, and Bonet's at San Andero, sufficed to hold both Asturians and Gallicians in check; and the sanguinary operations in the valley of the Tagus, were collaterally, as well as directly, unprofitable to the allies. In other parts the war was steadily progressive in favour of the French; yet their career was one of pains and difficulties.

Hitherto Biscay had been tranquil, and Navarre so submissive, that the artillery employed against Zaragoza was conveyed by the country people, without an escort, from Pampeluna to Tudela. But when the battle of Belchite terminated the regular warfare in Aragon, the guerilla system commenced in those parts; and as the chiefs acquired reputation at the moment when Blake was losing credit by defeats, the dispersed soldiers flocked to their standards; hoping thus to cover past disgrace, and to live with a greater license, because the regular armies suffered under the restraints without enjoying the benefits of discipline, while the irregulars purveyed for themselves.

Zaragoza is surrounded by rugged mountains, and every range became the mother of a guerilla brood; nor were the regular Partizan corps less numerous than the Partidas. On the left of the Ebro, the Catalanian colonels, Baget, Perena, Pedroza, and the chief Theobaldo, brought their Miguelettes to the Sierra de Guara, overhanging Huesca and Barbastro. In this position, commanding the sources of the Cinca and operating on both sides of that river, they harassed the communication between Zaragoza and the French outposts; and maintained an intercourse with the governor of Lerida, who directed the movements and supplied the wants of all the bands in Aragon.

On the right of the Ebro, troops raised in the district of Molina, were united to the corps of Gayan, and that officer, taking possession of the mountains of Montalvan, the valley of the Xiloca, and the town of Daroca, pushed his advanced guards even to the plain of Zaragoza, and occupied Nuestra Senora del Aguilar. This convent, situated on the top of a high rock, near Carineña, he made a depôt of provisions and ammunition, and surrounded the building with an entrenched camp for 3000 men.

On Gayan's left, General Villa Campa, a man of talent and energy, established himself at Calatayud, with the regular regiments of Soria and La Princessa, and making fresh levies, rapidly formed a large force, with which he cut the direct line of communication between Zaragoza and Madrid.

Beyond Villa Campa's positions the circle of war was continued by other bands; which, descending from the Moncayo mountains, infested the districts of

Tarazona and Borja, and intercepted the communications between Tudela and Zaragoza.

The younger Mina, called the student, vexed all the country between Tudela and Pampeluna; and the inhabitants of the high Pyrenean valleys of Roncal, Salazar, Anso, and Echo, were also in arms, and commanded by Renovalles. This general officer, taken at Zaragoza, was, by the French, said to have broken his parole; but he, pleading a previous breach of the capitulation, fled to Lerida, and from thence passing with some regular officers into the valleys, took the command of the insurrection, and succeeded in surprising several French detachments. His principal post was at the convent of San Juan de la Pena, which is built on a rock, remarkable in Spanish history as a place of refuge maintained with success against the Moorish conquerors. The bodies of twenty-two kings of Aragon rested in the church, and the whole rock was held in veneration by the Aragonese, and supposed to be invulnerable. From this post Saraza, acting under Renovalles, continually menaced Jaca, and communicating with Baget, Pedroza, and Father Theobaldo, completed, as it were, the investment of the third corps.

All these bands, amounting to, at least, 20,000 armed men, commenced their operations at once, cutting off isolated men, intercepting convoys and couriers, and attacking the weakest parts of the French army. Meanwhile Blake having rallied his fugitives at Tortosa, abandoned Aragon to its fate, and proceeding to Taragona, endeavoured to keep the war alive in Catalonia.

Suchet, in following up his victory at Belchite, had sent detachments as far as Morella, on the borders of Valencia, and pushed his scouting parties close up to Tortosa; but finding the dispersion of Blake's troops complete, he posted Meusnier's division on the line of the Guadalupe, with orders to repair the castle of Alcanitz, so as to form a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro. Then crossing that river at Caspe with the rest of the army, he made demonstrations against Mequinenza, and even menaced Lerida, obliging the governor to draw in his detachments, and close the gates. Suchet, however, continued his march by Fraga, recrossed the Cinca, and leaving Habert's division to guard that line, returned himself in the latter end of June to Zaragoza by the road of Monzon.

Having thus dispersed the regular Spanish forces and given full effect to his victory; the French general sought to fix himself firmly in the positions he had gained. Sensible that arms may win battles, but cannot render conquest permanent, he projected a system of civil administration which enabled him to support his troops, and yet to offer some security of property to those inhabitants who remained tranquil. But, as it was impossible for the people to trust to any system, or to avoid danger, while the mountains swarmed with the Partidas, Suchet resolved to pursue the latter without relaxation, and to put down all resistance in Aragon before he attempted to enlarge the circle of his conquests. Foreseeing that while he thus laid a solid base for further operations, he should also form an army capable of executing any enterprise.

He commenced on the side of Jaca, and having dislodged the Spaniards from their positions near that castle, in June, supplied it with ten months' provisions. After this operation, Almunia and Carineña, on the right of the Ebro, were occupied by his detachments; and having suddenly drawn together four battalions and a hundred cuirassiers at the latter point, he surrounded Nuestra Senora del Aguilar, during the night of the 19th, destroyed the entrenched camp, and sent a detachment in pursuit of Gayan. On the same day, Pedrosa was repulsed on the other side of the Ebro, near Barbastro, and General Habert defeated Perena.

The troops sent in pursuit of Gayan dispersed his corps at Uzed, and Daroca was occupied by the French. The vicinity of Calatayud and the mountains of Moncayo were then scoured by detachments from Zaragoza, one of which took possession of the district of Cinco Villas. Meanwhile Jaca was continually menaced by the Spaniards at St. Juan de la Pena, and Saraza, descending from thence by the valley of the Gallego, on the 23rd of August, surprised and slew a detachment of 70 men close to Zaragoza. On the 26th, however, five French battalions stormed the sacred rock, and penetrated up the valleys of Anso and Echo in

pursuit of Renovalles. Nevertheless, that chief, retiring to Roncal, obtained a capitulation for the valley without surrendering himself.

These operations having, in a certain degree, cleared Aragon of the bands on the side of Navarre and Castile, the French general proceeded against those on the side of Catalonia. Baget, Perena, and Pedrosa, chased from the Sierra de Guarra, rallied between the Cinca and the Noguerra, and were joined by Renovalles, who assumed the chief command; but on the 23rd of September, the whole being routed by General Habert, the men dispersed, and the chiefs took refuge in Lerida and Mequinenza.

Suchet, then occupied Fraga, Candanos, and Monzon, established a flying bridge on the Cinca, near the latter town, raised some field-works to protect it, and that done, resolved to penetrate the districts of Venasques and Benevarres, the subjection of which would have secured his left flank, and opened a new line of communication with France. The inhabitants, having notice of his project, assembled in arms, and being joined by the dispersed soldiers of the defeated Partizans, menaced a French regiment posted at Graus. Colonel La Peyrolerie, the commandant, marched the 17th of October, by Roda, to meet them; and having reached a certain distance up the valley, was surrounded, yet he broke through in the night, and regained his post. During his absence the peasantry of the vicinity came down to kill his sick men, but the townsmen of Graus would not suffer this barbarity; and Marshal Suchet affirms that such humane conduct was not rare in Aragonese towns.

While this was passing in the valley of Venasque, the governor of Lerida caused Caspe, Fraga, and Candanos to be attacked, and some sharp fighting took place. The French maintained their posts, but the whole circle of their cantonments being still infested by the smaller bands, petty actions were fought at Belchite, and on the side of Molino, at Arnedo, and at Soria. Mina also still intercepted the communications with Pampeluna; and Villa Campa, quitting Calatayud, rallied Gayan's troops, and gathered others on the rocky mountain of Tremendal, where a large convent and church once more furnished as a citadel for an entrenched camp. Against this place Colonel Henriod marched in November from Daroca, with from 1500 to 2000 men and three pieces of artillery, and driving back some advanced posts from Ojos Negros to Origuella, came in front of the main position at eleven o'clock in the morning of the 25th.

COMBAT OF TREMENDAL.

The Spaniards were on a mountain, from the centre of which a tongue of land shooting out, overhung Origuella, and on the upper part of this tongue stood the fortified convent of Tremendal. To the right and left the rocks were nearly perpendicular, and Henriod, seeing that Villa Campa was too strongly posted to be beaten by an open attack, imposed upon his adversary by skirmishing and making as if he would turn the right of the position by the road of Albaracin. Villa Campa was thus induced to mass his forces on that side. In the night, the fire of the bivouacs enabled the Spaniards to see that the main body of the French troops and the baggage were retiring, and, at the same time, Henriod, with six chosen companies and two pieces of artillery, coming against the centre, suddenly drove the Spanish outposts into the fortified convent, and opened a fire with his guns, as if to cover the retreat. The skirmish soon ceased, and Villa Campa, satisfied that the French had retired, was thrown completely off his guard, when Henriod's six companies, secretly scaling the rocks of the position, rushed amongst the sleeping Spaniards, killed and wounded 500, and put the whole army to flight. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Ebro, a second attempt was made against the valley of Venasque, which being successful, that district was disarmed.

Petty combats still continued to be fought in other parts of Aragon, but the obstinacy of the Spaniards gradually gave way. In the month of December, Suchet (assisted by General Milhaud, with a movable column from Madrid), took the towns of Albaracin and Teruel, the insurgent junta fled to Valencia, and the subjection of Aragon was in a manner effected. The interior was disarmed and quieted, and the Partidas, which still hung upon the frontiers, were recruited, as well as supplied, from other provinces, and acted chiefly on the defensive. The Aragonese

also were so vexed by the smaller bands, now dwindling into mere banditti, that a smuggler of Barbastro raised a Spanish corps, with which he chased and suppressed many of them.

Reinforcements were now pouring into Spain, and enabled the French general to prepare for extended operations. The original Spanish army of Aragon was reduced to about 8000 men; of which, a part were wandering with Villa Campa, a part were in Tortosa, and the rest about Lerida and Mequinenza. Those fortresses were, indeed, the only obstacles to a junction of the 3rd and 7th corps; and in them the Spanish troops who still kept the field took refuge, when closely pressed by the invaders.

The policy of the Supreme Junta was, however, always to form fresh corps upon the remnants of their beaten armies. Hence Villa Campa, keeping in the mountains of Albaracin, recruited his ranks, and still infested the western frontier of Aragon: Garcia Navarro, making Tortosa his base of operations, lined the banks of the Algas, and menaced Alcanitz: and Perena, trusting to the neighbourhood of Lerida for support, posted himself between the Noguera and the Segre. But the activity of the French gave little time to effect any considerable organization.

Suchet's positions formed a circle round Zaragoza; and Tudela, Jaca, and the castle of Aljaferia were garrisoned; but his principal forces were on the Guadalupe and the Cinca, occupying Alcanitz, Caspe, Fraga, Monzon, Barbastro, Benevarres, and Venasque; of which the first, third, and fourth were places of strength; and certainly, whether his situation be regarded in a political, or a military light, it was become most important. One year had sufficed, not only to reduce the towns and break the armies, but in part to conciliate the feelings of the Aragonese—confessedly the most energetic portion of the nation—and to place the 3rd corps, with reference to the general operations of the war, in a most formidable position.

1. The fortified castle of Alcanitz formed a head of cantonments on the right bank of the Ebro; and being situated at the entrance of the passes leading into Valencia, it also furnished a base, from which Suchet could invade that rich province; and by which also, he could place the Catalanian army between two fires, whenever the 7th corps should again advance beyond the Llobregat.


2. Caspe secured the communication between the wings of the 3rd corps, while Fraga and its wooden bridge over the Cinca, offered the means of passing that uncertain river at all seasons.

3. Monzon, a regular fortification, in some measure balanced Lerida; and its flying bridge over the Cinca enabled the French to forage all the country between Lerida and Venasques; moreover a co-operation of the garrison of Monzon, the troops at Barbastro, and those at Benevarres, could always curb Perena.

4. The possession of Venasques permitted Suchet to communicate with the movable columns (appointed to guard the French frontier), while the castle of Jaca rendered the 3rd corps in a manner independent of Pampeluna and St. Sebastian. In fine, the position on the Cinca and the Guadalupe, menacing alike Catalonia and Valencia, connected the operations of the 3rd with the 7th corps; and henceforward we shall find these two armies gradually approximating until they form but one force, acting upon a distinct system of invasion against the south.

Suchet's projects were, however, retarded by insurrections in Navarre, which, at this period, assumed a serious aspect. The student Mina, far from being quelled by the troops sent at different periods in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and, by hardy and sudden enterprises, kept the Navarrese in commotion. The Duke of Mahon, one of Joseph's Spanish adherents, appointed viceroy of Navarre, was at variance with the military authorities; and all the disorders attendant on a divided administration and a rapacious system, ensued. General D'Agoult, the Governor of Pampeluna, was accused of being in Mina's pay. His suicide during an investigation seems to confirm the suspicion, but it is also abundantly evident, that the whole administration of Navarre was oppressive, venal, and weak.

To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France, the emperor directed Suchet to repair there with a part of the 3rd corps. That general soon restored order in Pampeluna, and eventually captured Mina himself; but he was unable to suppress the system of the Partidas. "Espoz y Mina" took his nephew's



place ; and from that time to the end of the war, the communications of the French were troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by this celebrated man—undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the Partida chiefs. And here it may be observed how weak and inefficient this guerilla system was to deliver the country, and that, even as an auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced by the evils.

It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that it commenced. It was in those provinces that it could effect the greatest injury to the French cause ; and it was precisely in those provinces that it was conducted with the greatest energy, although less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain : a fact leading to the conclusion, that ready and copious succours may be hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were. When so assisted, men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own exertions. But however this may be, it is certain that the Partidas of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, although they amounted at one time to above 30,000 men, accustomed to arms, and often commanded by men of undoubted enterprise and courage, never occupied half their own number of French at one time ; never absolutely defeated a single division ; never prevented any considerable enterprise ; never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras, to be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the operations of a single "corps d'armée."

It is true, that if a whole nation will but persevere in such a system, it must in time destroy the most numerous armies. But no people will thus persevere ; the aged, the sick, the timid, the helpless, are all hinderers of the bold and robust. There will, also, be a difficulty to procure arms, for it is not on every occasion that so rich and powerful a people as the English, will be found in alliance with insurrection ; and when the invaders follow up their victories by a prudent conduct, as was the case with Suchet and some others of the French generals, the result is certain. The desire of ease natural to mankind, prevails against the suggestions of honour ; and although the opportunity of covering personal ambition with the garb of patriotism may cause many attempts to throw off the yoke, the bulk of the invaded people will gradually become submissive and tranquil. It is a fact that, notwithstanding the violent measures resorted to by the Partida chiefs to fill their ranks, deserters from the French and even from the British formed one-third of their bands.

To raise a whole people against an invader may be easy, but to direct the energy thus aroused is a gigantic task, and, if misdirected, the result will be more injurious than advantageous. That it was misdirected in Spain was the opinion of many able men of all sides, and to represent it otherwise, is to make history give false lessons to posterity. Portugal was thrown completely into the hands of Lord Wellington ; but that great man, instead of following the example of the supreme junta, and encouraging independent bands, enforced military organization upon totally different principles. The people were, indeed, called upon and obliged to resist the enemy, but it was under a regular system, by which all classes were kept in just bounds, and the whole physical and moral power of the nation rendered subservient to the plan of the general-in-chief. To act differently is to confess weakness : it is to say that the government being unequal to the direction of affairs permits anarchy.

The Partida system in Spain was the offspring of disorder, and disorder in war is weakness accompanied by ills the least of which is sufficient to produce ruin. It is in such a warfare that habits of unbridled license, of unprincipled violence, and disrespect for the rights of property are quickly contracted, and render men unfit for the duties of citizens ; and yet it has with singular inconsistency been cited as the best and surest mode of resisting an enemy, by politicians, who hold regular armies in abhorrence, although a high sense of honour, devotion to the cause of the country, temperance, regularity, and decent manners are of the very essence of the latter's discipline.

Regular armies have seldom failed to produce great men, and one great man is sufficient to save a nation : but when every person is permitted to make war in the manner most agreeable to himself ;—for one that comes forward with

patriotic intentions, there will be two to act from personal interest ; in short, there will be more robbers than generals. One of the first exploits of Espoz y Mina was to slay the commander of a neighbouring band, because, under the mask of patriotism, he was plundering his own countrymen : nay, this the most fortunate of all the chiefs, would never suffer any other Partida than his own to be in his district ; he also, as I have before related, made a species of commercial treaty with the French, and strove earnestly and successfully to raise his band to the dignity of a regular force. Nor was this manner of considering the guerilla system confined to the one side. The following observations of St. Cyr, a man of acknowledged talents, show that, after considerable experience of this mode of warfare, he also felt that the evil was greater than the benefit.

"Far from casting general blame on the efforts made by the Catalans, I admire them ; but, as they often exceed the bounds of reason, their heroism was detrimental to their cause. Many times it caused the destruction of whole populations without necessity and without advantage."

"When a country is invaded by an army stronger than that which defends it, it is beyond question that the population should come to the assistance of the troops, and lend them every support ; but, without an absolute necessity, the former should not be brought on to the field of battle."—"It is inhuman to place their inexperience in opposition to hardened veterans."

"Instead of *exasperating* the people of Catalonia, the leaders should have endeavoured to *calm* them, and have directed their ardour so as to second the army on great occasions. But they excited them without cessation, led them day after day into fire, fatigued them, harassed them, forced them to abandon their habitations, to embark if they were on the coast, if inland to take to the mountains and perish of misery within sight of their own homes, thus abandoned to the mercy of a hungry and exasperated soldiery. The people's ardour was exhausted daily in partial operations, and hence, on great occasions, when they could have been eminently useful, they were not to be had.

"Their goodwill had been so often abused by the folly of their leaders, that many times their assistance was called for in vain. The peasantry, of whom so much had been demanded, began to demand in their turn. They insisted that the soldiers should fight always to the last gasp, were angry when the latter retreated, and robbed and ill-used them when broken by defeat.

"They had been so excited, so exasperated against the French, that they became habitually ferocious, and their ferocity was often as dangerous to their own party as to the enemy. The atrocities committed against their own chiefs disgusted the most patriotic, abated their zeal, and caused the middle classes to desire peace as the only remedy of a system so replete with disorder. Numbers of distinguished men, even those who had vehemently opposed Joseph at first, began to abandon Ferdinand ; and it is certain that, but for the expedition to Russia, that branch of the Bourbons which reigns in Spain, would never have remounted the throne.

"The cruelties exercised upon the French military were as little conformable to the interest of the Spaniards. Those men were but the slaves of their duty, and of the state ; certain of death a little sooner or a little later, they, like the Spaniards, were victims of the same ambition. The soldier naturally becomes cruel in protracted warfare ; but the treatment experienced from the Catalans brought out this disposition prematurely ; and that unhappy people were themselves the victims of a cruelty, which either of their own will or excited by others, they had exercised upon those troops that fell into their power ; and this without any advantage to their cause, while a contrary system would, in a little time, have broken up the 7th corps,—seeing that the latter was composed of foreigners, naturally inclined to desert. But the murders of all wounded, and sick, and helpless men, created such horror, that the desertion, which at first menaced total destruction, ceased entirely."

Such were St. Cyr's opinions ; and, assuredly, the struggle in Catalonia, of which it is now the time to resume the relation, was not the least successful in Spain.

CHAPTER II.

OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.

THE narrative of the Catalonian affairs was broken off at the moment when St. Cyr, having established his quarters at Vich, received intelligence of the Austrian war, and that Barcelona had been relieved by the squadron of Admiral Comaso.* His whole attention was then directed towards Gerona; and with a view to hastening General Reille's preparation for the siege of that place, a second detachment, under Lecchi, proceeded to the Ampurdan.

During this time Coupigny continued at Tarragona, and Blake made his fatal march into Aragon; but those troops which, under Milans and Wimphen, had composed Reding's left wing, were continually skirmishing with the French posts in the valley of Vich, and the Partizans, especially Claros and the doctor Rovira, molested the communications in a more systematic manner than before.

Lecchi returned about the 18th of May, with intelligence that Napoleon had quitted Paris for Germany, that General Verdier had replaced Reille in the Ampurdan, and that Marshal Augereau had reached Perpignan in his way to supersede St. Cyr himself in the command of the 7th corps. The latter part of this information gave St. Cyr infinite discontent. In his "Journal of Operations," he asserts that his successor earnestly sought for the appointment, and his own observations on the occasion are sarcastic and contemptuous of his rival.

Augereau, who having served in Catalonia during the war of the revolution, imagined that he had then acquired an influence which might be revived on the present occasion, framed a proclamation that vied with the most inflated of Spanish manifestoes. But the latter, though turgid, were in unison with the feelings of the people, whereas, Augereau's address, being at utter variance with those feelings, was a pure folly. This proclamation he sent into Catalonia, escorted by a battalion; but even on the frontier, the Miguelette colonel, Porta, defeated the escort, and tore down the few copies that had been posted.

The French marshal, afflicted with the gout, remained at Perpignan, and St. Cyr continued to command; but reluctantly, because (as he affirms) the officers and soldiers were neglected, and himself exposed to various indignities, the effects of Napoleon's ill-will. The most serious of these affronts was permitting Verdier to correspond directly with the minister of war in France, and the publishing of his reports in preference to St. Cyr's. For these reasons, the latter contented himself with a simple discharge of his duty. Yet, after the conspiracy in the 2nd corps, Napoleon cannot be justly blamed for coldness towards an officer, who however free himself from encouraging the malcontents in the French army, was certainly designed for their leader. It is rather to be admired that the emperor discovered so little jealousy; when a man has once raised himself to the highest power, he must invariably give offence to his former comrades, for as all honours and rewards flowing from him, are taken as personal favours, so all checks and slights, or even the cessation of benefits, are regarded as personal injuries. Where the sanction of time is wanting to identify the sovereign with the country, the discontented easily convince themselves that revenge is patriotism.

While St. Cyr was preparing for the siege of Gerona, Joseph, as we have seen, directed him to march into Aragon, to repel Blake's movement against Suchet.† This order he refused to obey, and with reason; for it would have been a great error to permit Blake's false movement to occupy two "Corps d'Armée," and so retard the siege of Gerona, to the infinite detriment of the French affairs in Catalonia. Barcelona was never safe while Hostalrich and Gerona were in the Spaniard's possession. St. Cyr was well aware of this, but the evils of a divided command are soon felt. He who had been successful in all his operations, was urgent, for many reasons, to commence the siege without delay, but Verdier, who had failed at Zaragoza, was cautious in attacking a town which had twice baffled Duhesme, and when pressed to begin, complained that he could not, after placing

* See vol. i. p. 260.

† See vol. i. p. 241.

garrisons in Rosas and Figueras, bring 10,000 men before Gerona ; which, seeing the great extent of the works, were insufficient.

St. Cyr, disregarding the works, observed that the garrison did not exceed 3000 men, that it could not well be increased, and that expedition was of more consequence than numbers. Nevertheless, considering that a depôt of provisions, established for the service of the siege at Figueras, and which it was unlikely Napoleon would replenish, must, by delay, be exhausted, as well as the supplies which he had himself collected at Vich : he sent all his own cannoneers, sappers, and artillery horses, two squadrons of cavalry, and six battalions of infantry to the Ampurdan, and having thus increased the number of the troops there to 18,000 men, again urged Verdier to be expedite.

These reinforcements marched the 22nd of May, and the covering army, diminished to about 12,000 men under arms, continued to hold the valley of Vich until the middle of June. During this time, the Miguelettes often skirmished with the advanced posts, but without skill or profit ; and the inhabitants of the town always remained in the high mountains unsheltered and starving, yet still firm of resolution not to dwell with the invaders. This may be attributed partly to fear, but more to that susceptibility to grand sentiments, which distinguishes the Spanish peasants. Although little remarkable for hardihood in the field, their Moorish blood is attested by their fortitude ; and, men and women alike, they endure calamity with a singular and unostentatious courage. In this they are truly admirable. But their virtues are passive, their faults active, and continually instigated by a peculiar arrogance, they are perpetually projecting enterprises which they have not sufficient vigour to execute, although at all times they are confident and boasting more than becomes either wise or brave men.

Early in June, St. Cyr, having consumed nearly all his corn, resolved to approach Gerona, and secure the harvest which was almost ripe in that district ; but, previous to quitting Vich, he sent his sick and wounded men, under a strong escort, to Barcelona, and disposed his reserves in such a manner that the operation was effected without loss. The army loaded with as much grain as the men could carry, then commenced crossing the mountains which separate Vich from the districts of Gerona and Hostalrich. This march, conducted by the way of Folgarolas, San Saturnino, Santa Hillario, and Santa Coloma de Farnes, lasted two days ; and, the 21st of June, the head-quarters being fixed at Caldas de Malavella, the Fort of St. Felieu de Quixols was stormed, and the Spanish privateers driven to seek another harbour. The French army was then distributed in a half circle, extending from St. Felieu to the Oña river. Intermediate posts were established at St. Grace, Vidreras, Mallorquinas, Rieu de Arenas, Santa Coloma de Farnes, Castaña, and Bruñola ; thus cutting off the communications between Gerona and the districts occupied by Coupigny, Wimphen, the Milans, and Claros.

During the march from Vich, the French defeated three Spanish battalions, and captured a convoy, coming from the side of Martorel, and destined for Gerona. St. Cyr calls them the forerunners of Blake's army ; a curious error, for Blake was, on that very day being defeated at Belchite, 200 miles from Santa Coloma. Strictly speaking, there was, at this period, no Catalanion army, the few troops that kept the field were acting independently, and Coupigny, the nominal commander-in-chief, remained at Tarragona. He and the other authorities, more occupied with personal quarrels and political intrigues than with military affairs, were complaining and thwarting each order. Thus the Spanish and French operations were alike weakened by internal divisions.

Verdier was slow, cautious, and more attentive to the facilities afforded for resistance than to the number of regular soldiers within the works ; he, or rather Reille, had appeared before Gerona on the 6th of May, but it was not till the 4th of June that, reinforced with Lecchi's division, he completed the investment of the place on both sides of the Ter. On the 8th, however, ground was broken ; and thus, at the very moment when Blake, with the main body of his army, was advancing against Zaragoza, in other words, seeking to wrest Aragon from the French, Catalonia was slipping from his own hands.

THIRD SIEGE OF GERONA.

When this memorable siege commenced, the relative situations of the contending parties were as follows:—18,000 French held the Ampurdan, and invested the place. Of this number, about 4000 were in Figueras, Rosas, and the smaller posts of communication; and it is remarkable that Verdier asserted that the first-named place, notwithstanding its great importance, was *destitute of a garrison*, when he arrived there from France. A fact consistent with Lord Collingwood's description of the Catalan warfare, but irreconcilable with the enterprise and vigour attributed to them by others.

St. Cyr, the distribution of whose forces has been already noticed, covered the siege with 12,000 men; and Duhesme, having about 10,000, including sick, continued to hold Barcelona. 40,000 French were, therefore, disposed between that city and Figueras; while, on the Spanish side, there was no preparation. Blake was still in Aragon; Coupigny, with 6000 of the worst troops, was at Tarragona; the Milans watched Duhesme; Wimphen, with a few thousand, held the country about the upper Llobregat. Juan Claros and Rovira kept the mountains on the side of Olot and Ripol; and in the higher Catalonia, small bands of Miguelettes were dispersed under different chiefs. The Somatenes, however, continuing their own system of warfare, not only disregarded the generals, as in the time of Reding, but fell upon and robbed the regular troops, whenever a favourable opportunity occurred.

The Spanish privateers, dislodged from St. Felieu, now resorted to Palamos Bay, and the English fleet, under Lord Collingwood, watched incessantly to prevent any French squadron, or even single vessels, from carrying provisions by the coast. But from Gerona, the governor did not fail to call loudly on the generals, and even on the "Supreme Central Junta," for succours; yet his cry was disregarded; and when the siege commenced, his garrison did not exceed 3000 regular troops: his magazines and hospitals were but scantily provided, and he had no money. Alvarez Mariano was, however, of a lofty spirit, great fortitude, and in no manner daunted.

The works of Gerona, already described,* were little changed since the first siege; but there, as in Zaragoza, by a mixture of superstition, patriotism, and military regulations, the moral as well as physical force of the city had been called forth. There, likewise, a sickness, common at a particular season of the year, was looked for to thin the ranks of the besiegers, and there also women were enrolled, under the title of the Company of Sta. Barbara, to carry off the wounded, and to wait upon the hospitals, and at every breath of air, says St. Cyr, their ribbons were seen to float amidst the bayonets of the soldiers! To evince his own resolution, the governor forbade the mention of a capitulation under pain of death; but severe punishments were only denounced, not inflicted upon faint-hearted men. Alvarez, master of his actions, and capable of commanding without frenzy, had recourse to no barbarous methods of enforcing authority; obstinate his defence was, and full of suffering to the besieged, yet free from the stain of cruelty, and rich in honour.

On the 4th of June the siege was begun, and, on the 12th, a mortar-battery, from the heights of Casen Rocca, on the left of the Ter, and two breaching-batteries, established against the outworks of Fort Monjoui, being ready to play, the town was summoned in form. The answer was an intimation that henceforth all flags of truce would be fired upon; the only proceeding indicative of the barbarian in the conduct of Alvarez.

The 13th, the small suburb of Pedreto was taken possession of by the French, and early on the morning of the 14th, the batteries opened against Monjoui, while the town was bombarded from the Casen Rocca.

The 17th, the besieged drove the enemy from Pedreto, but were finally repulsed with the loss of above 100 men.

The 19th, the stone towers of St. Narcis and St. Louis, forming the outworks of Monjoui, being assaulted, the besieged, panic-stricken, abandoned them and the tower of St. Daniel also. The French immediately erected breaching-batteries,

* See vol. i. p. 32.

400 yards from the northern bastion of Monjouic. Tempestuous weather retarded their works, but they made a practicable opening by the 4th of July, and with a strange temerity resolved to give the assault, although the flank fire of the works was not silenced, nor the glacis crowned, nor the covered way or counterscarp injured, and that a half moon, in a perfect state, covered the approaches to the breach. The latter was proved by the engineers, in a false attack, on the night of the 4th, and the resolution to assault was then adopted; yet the storming-force drawn from the several quarters of investment was only assembled in the trenches on the night of the 7th; and during these four days, the batteries ceasing to play, the Spaniards retrenched, and barricaded the opening.

At four o'clock in the morning of the 8th, the French column, jumping out of the trenches, rapidly cleared the space between them and the fort, descended the ditch, and mounted to the assault with great resolution; but the Spaniards had so strengthened the defences that no impression could be made, and the assailants taken in flank and rear by the fire from the half moon, the covered way, and the eastern bastion, were driven back. Twice they renewed the attempt, but the obstacles were insurmountable, and the assault failed, with a loss of 1000 men killed and wounded. The success of the besieged was however mitigated by an accidental explosion, which destroyed the garrison of the small fort of St. Juan, situated between Monjouic and the city.

About the period of this assault which was given without St. Cyr's knowledge, the latter finding that Claros and Rovira interrupted the convoys coming from Figueras to Gerona, withdrew a brigade of Souham's division from Santa Coloma de Farnes, and posted it on the left of the Ter, at Bañolas. The troops on the side of Hostalrich were thus reduced to about 8000 men under arms, although an effort to raise the siege was to be expected. For letters from Alvarez, urgently demanding succours of Blake, had been intercepted, and the latter, after his defeat in Aragon, was, as I have said, collecting men at Tarragona.

Meanwhile, to secure the coast-line from Rosas to Quixols before Blake could reach the scene of action, St. Cyr resolved to take Palamos. To effect this, General Fontanes marched from St. Felieu, on the 5th of July, with an Italian brigade, six guns, and some squadrons of dragoons. Twice he summoned the place, and the bearer being each time treated with scorn, the troops moved on to the attack; but in passing a flat part of the coast near Torre Valenti, they were cannonaded by six gun-boats so sharply, that they could not keep the road until the artillery had obliged the boats to sheer off.

STORMING OF PALAMOS.

This town having a good roadstead, and being only one march from Gerona, was necessarily a place of importance; and the works, although partly ruined, were so far repaired by the Catalans as to be capable of some defence. Twenty guns were mounted; and the town, built on a narrow rocky peninsula had but one front, the approach to which was over an open plain, completely commanded from the left by some very rugged hills, where a considerable number of Somatenes were assembled, with their line touching upon the walls of the town.

Fontanes drove the Somatenes from this position, and a third time summoned the place to surrender. The bearer was killed, and the Italians immediately stormed the works. When the Spaniards flying towards the shore endeavoured to get on board their vessels, the latter put off to sea, and some of Fontanes' troops having turned the town during the action, intercepted the fugitives, and put all to the sword.

Scarcely had Palamos fallen when Wimphen and the Milans, arriving near Hostalrich, began to harass Souham's outposts at Santa Coloma, hoping to draw St. Cyr's attention to that side, while a reinforcement for the garrison of Gerona should pass through the left of his line into the city. The French general was not deceived; but the Spaniards nevertheless sent 1500 chosen men, under the command of one Marshal, an Englishman, to penetrate secretly through the enemy's posts at Llagostera. They were accompanied by an aide-de-camp of Alvarez, called Rich, apparently an Englishman also, and they succeeded on the 9th in passing General Pino's posts unobserved. A straggler, however, was taken, and

St. Cyr being thus informed of the march, and judging that the attempt to break the line of investment would be made in the night and by the road of Casa de Selva, immediately placed one body of men in ambush near that point, and sent another in pursuit of the succouring column.

As the French general had foreseen, the Spaniards continued their march through the hills at dusk, but being suddenly fired upon by the ambuscade, hastily retired, and the next day fell in with the other troops, when 1000 men were made prisoners: the rest dispersing, escaped the enemy, yet were ill-used and robbed of their arms by the Somatenes. St. Cyr says that Marshal, having offered to capitulate, fled during the negotiation, and thus abandoned his men; but the Spanish General Coupigny affirmed that the men abandoned Marshal, and refused to fight, that Rich ran away before he had seen the enemy, and that both he and the troops merited severe punishment. It is also certain that Marshal's flight was to Gerona, where he afterwards fell, fighting gallantly.

This disappointment was sensibly felt by Alvarez. Sickness and battle had already reduced his garrison to 1500 men, and he was thus debarred of the best of all defences, namely, frequent sallies as the enemy neared the walls. His resolution was unshaken, but he did not fail to remonstrate warmly with Coupigny, and even denounced his inactivity to the supreme junta. That general excused himself on the ground of Blake's absence, the want of provisions, and the danger of carrying the contagious sickness of Tarragona into Gerona; and finally adduced Colonel Marshal's unfortunate attempt, as proof that due exertion had been made. Yet he could not deny that Gerona had been invested two months, had sustained 40 days of open trenches, a bombardment and an assault without any succour, and that during that time, he himself remained at Tarragona, instead of being at Hostalrich with all the troops he could collect.

From the prisoners taken the French ascertained that neither Coupigny nor Blake had any intention of coming to the relief of Gerona until sickness and famine, which pressed as heavily on the besiegers as on the besieged, should have weakened the ranks of the former; and this plan receives unqualified praise from St. Cyr, who seems to have forgotten that with an open breach, a town requiring 6000 men to man the works, and having but 1500, might fall at any moment.

After the failure of the assault at Monjouic, Verdier recommenced his approaches in due form, opened galleries for a mine, and interrupted the communication with the city by posting men in the ruins of the little fort of St. Juan. But his operations were retarded by Claros and Rovira, who captured a convoy of powder close to the French frontier. To prevent a recurrence of such events, the brigade of Souham's division was pushed from Bañolas to St. Lorenzo de la Muja; and, on the 2nd of August, the fortified convent of St. Daniel, situated in the valley of the Galligan, between the Constable fort and Monjouic, was taken by the French, who thus entirely intercepted the communication between the latter place and the city.

On the 4th of August, the glacis of Monjouic being crowned, the counterscarp blown in, and the flank defences ruined, the ditch was passed, and the half moon in front of the curtain carried by storm, but no lodgment was effected. During the day, Alvarez made an unsuccessful effort to retake the ruins of St. Juan; and at the same time, 200 Spaniards who had come from the sea-coast with provisions, and penetrated to the convent of St. Daniel, thinking that their countrymen still held it, were made prisoners.

On the 5th, the engineers having ascertained that the northern bastion being hollow, the troops would, after storming it, be obliged to descend a scarp of 12 or 14 feet, changed the line of attack, and commenced new approaches against the eastern bastion. A second practical breach was soon opened, and preparations made for storming on the 12th, but in the night of the 11th, the garrison blew up the magazines, spiked the guns, and, without loss, regained Gerona. Thus the fort fell, after 37 days of open trenches and one assault.

CHAPTER III.

VERDIER, elated by the capture of Monjouic, boasted, in his despatches, of the difficulties that he had overcome, and they were unquestionably great, for the rocky nature of the soil had obliged him to raise his trenches instead of sinking them, and his approaches had been chiefly carried on by the flying sap. But he likewise expressed his scorn of the garrison, held their future resistance cheap, and asserted that 15 days would suffice to take the town; in which he was justified neither by past nor succeeding facts; for the Spaniards indignant at his undeserved contempt, redoubled their exertions and falsified all his predictions; and while these events were passing close to Gerona, Claros and Rovira, at the head of 2500 Miguelletes, attacked Bascara a post between Figueras and Gerona at the moment when a convoy, escorted by a battalion had arrived there from Belgarde. The commandant of Figueras indeed, uniting some *gens d'armes* and convalescents to a detachment of his garrison, succoured the post on the 6th; but, meanwhile, the escort of the convoy had fallen back on France and spread such terror, that Augereau applied to St. Cyr for 3000 men to protect the frontier. That general refused this ill-timed demand, and, in his Memoirs, takes occasion to censure the system of movable columns, as more likely to create than to suppress insurrections, as being harassing to the troops, weakening to the main force, and yet ineffectual, seeing that the peasantry must always be more movable than the columns, and better informed of their marches and strength. There is great force in these observations, and if an army is in such bad moral discipline that the officers commanding the columns cannot be trusted, it is unanswerable. It must also be conceded that this system, at all times requiring a nice judgment, great talents, and excellent arrangement, was totally inapplicable to the situation and composition of the 7th corps. Yet, with good officers and well-combined plans, it is difficult to conceive any more simple or efficient mode of protecting the flanks and rear of an invading army than that of movable columns supported by small fortified posts; and it is sufficient that Napoleon was the creator of this system, to make a military man doubtful of the soundness of St. Cyr's objections. The emperor's views, opinions, and actions, will in defiance of all attempts to lessen them, go down with a wonderful authority to posterity.

A few days after the affair of Bascara, 800 volunteers, commanded by two officers, named Foxa and Cantera, quitted Olot, and making a secret march through the mountains, arrived in the evening of the 10th upon the Ter, in front of Angeles; but being baffled in an attempt to pass the river there, descended the left bank in the night, pierced the line of investment, and, crossing at a ford near St. Pons, entered Gerona at daybreak. This hardy exploit gave fresh courage to the garrison; yet the enemy's approaches hourly advanced, pestilence wasted the besieged, and the Spanish generals outside the town still remained inactive.

In this conjuncture, Alvarez and his council were not wanting to themselves; while defending the half-ruined walls of Gerona with inflexible constancy, they failed not to remonstrate against the cold-blooded neglect of those who should have succoured them; and the supreme junta of Catalonia forwarded their complaints to the central junta at Seville, with a remarkable warmth and manliness of expression.

"The generals of our army," they said, "have formed no efficient plan for the relief of Gerona; not one of the three lieutenant-generals here has been charged to conduct an expedition to its help; they say that they act in conformity to a plan approved by your Majesty. Can it be true that your Majesty approves of abandoning Gerona to her own feeble resources! If so, her destruction is inevitable; and should this calamity befall, will the other places of Catalonia and the Peninsula have the courage to imitate her fidelity, when they see her temples and houses ruined, her heroic defenders dead, or in slavery? And if such calamities should threaten towns in other provinces, ought they to reckon upon Catalonian assistance, when this most interesting place can obtain no help from them? Do you not see the consequences of this melancholy reflection, which is sufficient to freeze the ardour, to desolate the hearts of the most zealous defenders of our just cause? Let

this bulwark of our frontier be taken, and the province is laid open, our harvests, treasures, children, ourselves, all fall to the enemy, and the country has no longer any real existence."

In answer to this address, money was promised, a decree was passed to lend Catalonia every succour, and Blake received orders to make an immediate effort to raise the siege. How little did the language of the Spaniards agree with their actions! Blake, indeed, as we shall find, made a feeble effort to save the heroic and suffering city; but the supreme central junta were only intent upon thwarting and insulting the English general, after the battle of Talavera, and this was the moment that the junta of Catalonia, so eloquent, so patriotic with the pen, were selling, to foreign merchants, the arms supplied by England for the defence of their country!

Towards the end of August, when the French fire had opened three breaches in Gerona, and the bombardment had reduced a great part of the city to ashes, Blake commenced his march from Tarragona with a force of 8000 or 10,000 regulars. Proceeding by Martorel, El Valles, and Granollers, he reached Vich, and from thence crossed the mountains to St. Hillario, where he was joined by Wimphen and the Milans; and as he had free communication with Rovira and Claros, he could direct a body of not less than 20,000 men against the circle of investment. His arrival created considerable alarm among the French. The pestilence which wasted the besieged was also among the besiegers, and the hospitals of Figueras and Perpignan contained many thousand patients. The battalions in the field could scarcely muster a third of their nominal strength. Even the generals were obliged to rise from sick beds to take the command of the brigades; and the covering army, inferior in number to the Spanish force, was extended along more than 30 miles of mountainous wooded country, intersected by rivers, and every way favourable for Blake's operations.

Verdier was filled with apprehension, lest a disastrous action should oblige him to raise the long-protracted siege, notwithstanding his foreboasts to the contrary. But it was on such occasions that St. Cyr's best qualities were developed. A most learned and practised soldier, and of a clear methodical head, he was firm in execution, decided and prompt in council; and, although, apparently wanting in those original and daring views which mark the man of superior genius, seems to have been perfectly fitted for struggling against difficulties. So far from fearing an immediate battle, he observed, "that it was to be desired, because his men were now of confirmed courage. Blake's inaction was the thing to be dreaded, for, notwithstanding every effort, not more than two days' provisions could be procured to supply the troops when together, and it would be necessary after that period to scatter them again in such a manner that scarcely 2000 would be disposable at any given point. The Spaniards had already commenced skirmishing in force on the side of Bruñola, and as Blake expected no reinforcements, he would probably act immediately. Hence it was necessary to concentrate as many men as possible, in the course of the night and next day, and deliver battle, and there were still 10,000 good troops under arms, without reckoning those that might be spared from the investing corps."

On the other hand, Blake, with an army, numerous indeed but by no means spirited, was from frequent defeat, become cautious without being more skilful. He resolved to confine his efforts to the throwing supplies of men and provisions into the town; forgetting that the business of a relieving army is not to protract, but to raise a siege, and that to save Gerona was to save Catalonia.

He had collected and loaded with flour about 2000 beasts of burthen, and placed them in the mountains, on the side of Olot, under an escort of 4000 infantry and 500 cavalry. García Conde, an ambitious and fiery young man of considerable promise, undertook to conduct them to Gerona, by the flat ground between the Ter and the Oña, precisely opposite to that of the French attack. To facilitate this attempt, Blake caused Colonel Henry O'Donnel to fall upon Souham's posts, near Bruñola, on the evening of the 31st of August, supporting this attack with another detachment under General Logoyri. At the same time he directed Colonel Landen to collect the Miguelletes and Somatenes on the side of Palamos, and

take possession of "N.S. de los Angeles," a convent, situated on a high mountain behind Monjouic. Claros and Rovira also received directions to attack the French on the side of Casen Rocca. Thus the enemy were to be assailed in every quarter, except that on which the convoy was to pass.

O'Donnel, commencing the operations, attacked and carried a part of the position occupied by one of Souham's battalions at Bruñola, but the latter, with an impetuous charge, again recovered the ground. The Spanish general, being joined by Logoyri, renewed the skirmish, but could make no further impression on the enemy. Meanwhile, St. Cyr, having transferred his head-quarters to Fornels, was earnestly advised to concentrate his troops on the left of the Ter, partly, that it was thought Blake would attempt to penetrate on that side; partly that, being so close to the Spanish army, the French divisions might, if ordered to assemble on their actual centre, be cut off in detail during their march. But he argued that his opponent must be exceedingly timid, or he would have attacked Souham with all his forces, and broken the covering line at once; and, seeing that such an opportunity was neglected, he did not fear to concentrate his own troops, on the Oña, by a flank march close under the beard of his unskilful adversary.

Souham's division, falling back in the night, took post the 1st of September, on the heights of San Dalmaz, reaching to Hostalnou, and at eight o'clock the head of Pino's division entered this line, prolonging it, by the left, in rear of the village of Rieudellot. At twelve o'clock, these two divisions were established in position, and at the distance of four miles in their rear, Verdier with a strong detachment of the besieging corps, was placed in reserve on the main road to Gerona. Lechi was sick, and his troops, commanded by Millosewitz, took post at Salt, guarding the bridge and the flat ground about St. Eugenio; having also instructions to cross the Ter and march against Rovira and Claros, if they should press the Westphalian division which remained at San Pons. The trenches under Monjouic were guarded. The mortar battery of Casa Rocca was disarmed, and the Westphalians had orders, if attacked, to retire to Sarria, and look to the security of the parc and the trenches. A thick fog and heavy rain interrupted the view, and both armies remained apparently quiet until the middle of the day, when the weather clearing, St. Cyr rode to examine the Spanish positions; for the heads of Blake's columns were disposed as if he would have penetrated at once, by Bruñola, Coloma de Farnés, Vidreras, and Mallorquinas. Scarcely had the French general quitted Fornels, when Garcia Conde, who, under cover of the mist had been moving down the mountains, crossed the Ter at Amer, and descended the heights of Bañolas with his convoy. He was now on the flat ground, where there was no other guard than the 2000 men under Millosewitz, placed, as I have said, at Salt to watch the garrison and the movements of Rovira and Claros; and consequently, with their rear to the advancing convoy.

Verdier's reserve, the nearest support, was six miles distant, and separated from Millosewitz by considerable heights, and the Spanish columns, coming into the plain without meeting a single French post, advanced unperceived close to the main body, and, with one charge, put the whole to flight. The fugitives, in their panic, at first took the direction of the town; but being fired upon, turned towards the heights of Palau, made for Fornels, and would have gone straight into Blake's camp, if they had not met St. Cyr on his return from viewing that general's positions. Rallying and reinforcing them with a battalion from Pino's division, he instantly directed them back again upon Salt, and at the same time sent Verdier orders to follow Garcia Conde with the reserve; but the latter had already conducted his convoy safely into the town. Alvarez, also, sallying forth, had destroyed the French works near St. Eugenio, and thinking the siege raised, had immediately sent 500 sick men out of the town, into the convent of St. Daniel, which place had been abandoned by the French two days before.

Verdier after causing some trifling loss to Conde, passed the bridge of Salt, and marched down the left of the Ter to Sarria, to save his parcs, which were threatened by Rovira and Claros; for when those two Partizans skirmished with the Westphalian troops, the latter retired across the Ter, abandoning their camp and two dismounted mortars. Thus the place was succoured for a moment; but, as Blake

made no further movement, Alvarez was little benefitted by the success. The provisions received did not amount to more than seven or eight days' consumption; and the reinforcement, more than enough to devour the food, was yet insufficient to raise the siege by sallies.

While Millosewitz's troops were flying on the one side of the Ter, the reports of Claros and Rovira, exaggerating their success on the other side of that river, had caused Alvarez to believe that Blake's army was victorious, and the French in flight. Hence, he refrained from destroying the bridge of Salt, and Verdier, as we have seen, crossed it to recover his camp at Sarria. But for this error, the garrison, reinforced by Conde's men, might have filled the trenches, razed the batteries, and even retaken Moniouic before Verdier could have come to their support.

St. Cyr having but one day's provisions left, now resolved to seek Blake, and deliver battle; but the Spanish general retired up the mountains, when he saw the French advancing, and his retreat enabled St. Cyr again to disseminate the French troops. Thus ended the first effort to relieve Gerona. It was creditable to Garcia Conde, but so contemptible, with reference to the means at Blake's disposal, that Alvarez believed himself betrayed; and, trusting thenceforth only to his own heroism, permitted Conde's troops to go back, or to remain as they pleased; exacting, however, from those who stopped, an oath not to surrender. Renewing the edict against speaking of a capitulation, he reduced the rations of the garrison first to one half, and afterwards to a fourth of the full allowance, a measure which caused some desertions to the enemy; but the great body of the soldiers and citizens were as firm as their chief, and the townsmen freely sharing their own scanty food with the garrison, made common cause in everything.

Garcia Conde's success must be attributed partly to the negligence of St. Cyr's subordinates; but the extended cantonments, occupied in the evening of the 31st, gave Blake, as the French general himself acknowledges, an opportunity of raising the siege without much danger or difficulty: nor were St. Cyr's dispositions for the next day perfectly combined. It is evident that giving Blake credit for sound views, he was himself so expectant of a great battle that he forgot to guard against minor operations. The flat country between the left of the Oña and the Ter was the natural line for a convoy to penetrate to the town; hence it was a fault to leave 2000 men in that place, with their front to the garrison, and their rear to the relieving army, when the latter could steal through the mountains until close upon them. Cavalry posts at least should have been established at the different inlets to the hills, and beacons raised on convenient eminences. The main body of the army appears also to have been at too great a distance from the town; the firing that took place in the plain of Salt was disregarded by Verdier's reserve; and the first information of the attack was brought to Fornels by the fugitives themselves.

St. Cyr says that his generals of division were negligent, and so weakened by sickness as to be unable to look to their outposts; that he had recommended to Verdier the raising of field-works at the bridge of Salt and in the passes of the hills, and, when his advice was disregarded, forbore, from the peculiar situation in which he himself was placed by the French government, to enforce his undoubted authority. But St. Cyr avows that his soldiers answered honestly to every call he made; and he was bound, while he retained the command, to enforce every measure necessary for maintaining their honour. In other respects, his prudence and vigilance were such as beseeemed his great reputation. It was not so with Blake. The whole of his operations proved that he had lost confidence, and was incapable of any great enterprise. He should have come up with a resolution to raise the siege or to perish. He contented himself with a few slight skirmishes, and the introduction of a small convoy of provisions; and then, notwithstanding the deep suffering of this noble city, turned away, with a cold look, and a donation that mocked its wants.

When the siege was resumed, St. Cyr withdrew the French posts from Palau and Monte Livio, leaving the way apparently open on that side for the return of Garcia Conde, who, deceived by this wile, came out at daybreak on the 3rd of September, with 1500 men and the beasts of burthen. Halting for a little time just beyond the gate, he examined the country in front with his glass; everything

appeared favourable, and his troops were beginning to move forward, when the noise of drums beating to arms gave notice that an ambuscade was placed behind Palau. St. Cyr had, indeed, posted a brigade there in the hope of surprising the Spaniards, but the French forgetting the ambush, were performing the regular service of the camp at daylight, and a cry of astonishment burst from the Spanish column as it hastily retreated again into the town.

Baffled by this ridiculous mistake, and concluding that the next attempt would be by Castellar and La Bispal, St. Cyr placed Mazzuchelli's brigade (the same that had been behind Palau) in the valley of the Ofia in such a manner that it could fall upon Conde's rear when the latter should again come forth. He also put a battalion on the hills in a position to head the Spanish column, and drive it back either upon Mazzuchelli's brigade or upon La Bispal, where he also posted three battalions and a squadron of Pino's division.

The 4th of September 1000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 1100 mules again came out of Gerona, and ascending the heights in which the fort of the Capuchin was situated, pushed in single files along a by-path, leading to Castellar da Selva. Mazzuchelli saw them plainly, but did not attack, waiting for the fire of the battalion ahead, and that battalion did not fire because Mazzuchelli did not attack, and it was supposed the Spaniards were part of his brigade. Garcia Conde quickly perceived their double error, and with great readiness filing off to his left, turned the right of the battalion in his front, and gained Castellar without hurt, although the French in Monjouic observing all that passed, played their guns upon the rear of his column. Being informed by the peasants at Castellar, that troops were also waiting for him at La Bispal, he made for Caza de Selva, and General Pino having notice of his approach, directed two battalions to seize the summit of a ridge which crossed the Spanish line of march, but the battalions took a wrong direction; the Spaniards moved steadily on, and although the rear was attacked by Pino's personal escort, and that 50 men and some mules were captured, the main body escaped with honour.

There were now four open breaches in Gerona; Mazzuchelli's brigade and the troops at La Bispal were added to the investing corps, and the immediate fall of the city seemed inevitable, when the French store of powder failed, and ten days elapsed before a fresh supply could be obtained. Alvarez profited by this cessation, to retrench and barricade the breaches in the most formidable manner. Verdier had retaken the convent of St. Daniel in the valley of Galligan, and obliged the 500 sick men to return to the town on the 4th; but Landen, the officer sent by Blake, on the 31st of August, to seize the convent of Madona de los Angeles, had fortified that building, and introduced small supplies of provisions; thus reviving, in the mind of Alvarez, a plan for taking possession of the heights beyond those on which the Capuchin and Constable forts were situated, by which, in conjunction with the post at Madona de los Angeles and with the assistance of Blake's army, he hoped to maintain an open communication with the country. A bold and skilful conception, but he was unable to effect it; for making a sally from the Capuchins on the 6th with 1800 men, he was beaten by a single French regiment; and the same day Mazzuchelli's Italians stormed Madona de los Angeles, and put the garrison to the sword.

During these events, Verdier marched against Claros and Rovira who were posted at St. Gregorio, near Amer. He was repulsed with loss, and the French General Joba was killed. Meanwhile the batteries having recommenced their fire on the 13th, Alvarez made a general sally by the gates of San Pedro, beat the guards from the trenches, and spiked the guns in one of the breaching batteries. The 18th, however, Verdier thinking the breaches practicable, proposed to give the assault, and required assistance from St. Cyr, but disputes between the generals or the covering and the investing forces were rife. The engineers of the latter declared the breaches practicable, those of the former asserted that they were not, and that while the fort of Calvary, outside the walls, although in ruins was in possession of the Spaniards, no assault should be attempted.

Either from negligence, or the disputes between St. Cyr and Augereau, above 5000 convalescents capable of duty were retained in a body at Perpignan, and



Verdier could not produce so many under arms for the assault, nor even for this number were there officers to lead, so wasting was the sickness. The covering army was scarcely better off, and Blake had again taken the position of St. Hilario. Howbeit, St. Cyr, seeing no better remedy, consented to try the storm provided Calvary were first taken.

Souham's division was appointed to watch Blake, Pino was directed to make a false attack on the opposite quarter to where the breaches were established, and, on the 19th, Verdier's troops, in three columns, advanced rapidly down the valley of Galligan to the assault. But the fort of Calvary had not been taken, and its fire swept the columns of attack along the whole line of march. Two hundred men fell before they reached the walls, and just as the summit of the largest breach was gained, the French batteries, which continued to play on the Spanish retrenchments, brought down a large mass of wall upon the head of the attacking column. The besieged resisted manfully, and the besiegers were completely repulsed from all the breaches with a loss of 600 men. Verdier accused his soldiers of cowardice, and blamed St. Cyr for refusing to bring the covering troops to the assault; but that general, asserting that the men behaved perfectly well, called a council of war, and proposed to continue the operations with as much vigour as the nature of the case would permit. His persevering spirit was not partaken by the council, and the siege was turned into a blockade.

Blake now advanced with his army, and from the 20th to the 25th, made as if he would raise the blockade; but his object was merely to introduce another convoy. St. Cyr, divining his intention and judging that he would make the attempt on the 26th, resolved to let him penetrate the covering line, and then fall on him before he could reach the town. In this view, Souham's division was placed behind Palau and Pino's division at Casa de Selva, and Lecchi's division of the investing troops was directed to meet the Spaniards in front, while the two former came down upon their rear.

Blake assembled his troops on the side of Hostalrich, then made a circuitous route to La Bispal, and, taking post on the heights of St. Sadurni, detached 10,000 men, under Wimphen, to protect the passage of the convoy, of which Henry O'Donnel led the advanced guard. At daybreak, on the 26th, O'Donnel fell upon the rear of the French troops at Castellar, broke through them, and reached the fort of the Constable with the head of the convoy; but the two French battalions which he had driven before him, rallying on the heights of San Miguel to the right of the Spanish column, returned to the combat, and at the same time St. Cyr in person, with a part of Souham's division came upon the left flank of the convoy, and, pressing it strongly, obliged the greater part to retrograde. When Pino's division, running up from Casa de Selva, attacked the rear-guard under Wimphen, the route was complete, and Blake made no effort to save the distressed troops. O'Donnel, with a thousand men and about two hundred mules, got safely into the town, but the remainder of the convoy was taken. The Italians gave no quarter, and three thousand of the Spaniards were slain.

After this action, some troops being sent towards Vidreras, to menace Blake's communications with Hostalrich, he retired by the side of St. Felieu de Quixols, and Gerona was again abandoned to her sufferings, which were become almost insupportable. Without money, without medicines, without food; pestilence within the walls, the breaches open. "If," said Alvarez, "the captain-general be unable to make a vigorous effort, the whole of Catalonia must rise to our aid, or Gerona will soon be but a heap of carcases and ruins, the memory of which will afflict posterity!"

St. Cyr now repaired to Perpignan to make arrangements for future supply, but finding Augereau in a good state of health, obliged that marshal to assume the command. Then, he says, everything needful was bestowed with a free hand upon the 7th corps, because he himself was no longer in the way; but a better reason is to be found in the state of Napoleon's affairs. Peace had been concluded with Austria, the English expeditions to the Scheldt and against Naples had failed, and all the resources of the French government becoming disposable, not only the 7th, but every "corps d'armée" in Spain was reinforced.

Augereau, escorted by the 5000 convalescents from Perpignan, reached the camp before Gerona, the 12th of October. In the course of the following night, O'Donnel, issuing from the town, on the side of the plain, broke through the guards, fell upon Souham's quarters, obliged that general to fly in his shirt, and finally effected a junction with Milans at Santa Coloma; having successfully executed as daring an enterprise as any performed during this memorable siege. Augereau, however, pressed the blockade, and thinking the spirit of the Spaniards reduced, offered an armistice for a month, with the free entry of provisions, if Alvarez would promise to surrender unless relieved before the expiration of that period. Such, however, was the steady virtue of this man and his followers, that, notwithstanding the grievous famine, the offer was refused.

Blake, on the 29th of October, took possession once more of the heights of Bruñola. Souham, with an inferior force put him to flight, and this enabled Augereau to detach Pino against the town of Hostalrich, which was fortified with an old wall and towers, defended by 2000 men, and supported by the fire of the castle. It was carried by storm, and the provisions and stores laid up there captured, although Blake with his army was only a few miles off. This disaster was, however, more than balanced by an action off the coast. Rear-Admiral Baudin, with a French squadron, consisting of three ships of the line, two frigates, and 16 large store-ships, having sailed from Toulon for Barcelona, about the 20th of October, was intercepted by Admiral Martin on the 23rd. During the chase several of the smaller vessels were burnt by the enemy, the rest were driven on shore at different places, and two of the line of battle ships were set on fire by their own crews. The store-ships and some of the armed vessels, taking refuge at Rosas, put up boarding nettings, and protecting their flanks by Rosas and the Trinity fort, presented a formidable front, having above 20 guns on board disposed for defence, besides the shore batteries. On the 31st of November, however, Captain Hallowell appeared in the bay with a squadron; and the same evening, sending his boats in, destroyed the whole fleet, in despite of a very vigorous resistance which cost the British 70 men killed and wounded.

Meanwhile the distress of Gerona increased, desertions became frequent, and ten officers having failed in a plot to oblige the governor to capitulate, went over in a body to the enemy. During November, famine and sickness increased within the city, and the French stores of powder were again exhausted; but on the 6th of December, ammunition having arrived, the suburb of Marina, that of Girondella, the fort of Calvary and all the other towers beyond the walls, were carried by the besiegers; and the besieged, confined to the circuit of the walls, were cut off from the Capuchin and Constable forts. Alvarez, who had been ill for some days, roused himself for a last effort; and, making a general sally, on the 7th, retook the suburb of Girondella and the redoubts; and opening a way to the outworks of the Constable, carried off the garrison. The next day, overcome by suffering, he became delirious. A council of war assembled, and after six months of open trenches, Gerona yielded on the 10th. The garrison marched out with the honours of war, the troops were to be exchanged in due course, the inhabitants were to be respected, and none but soldiers were to be considered prisoners. Such was the termination of a defence which eclipsed the glory of Zaragoza.

French and Spanish writers alike affirm that Augereau treated Alvarez with a rigour and contumely that excited every person's indignation; and that in violation of the capitulation, the monks were, by an especial order of Napoleon, sent to France. This last accusation admits, however, of dispute; the monks had during the siege formed themselves into a regular corps, named the Crusaders; they were disciplined and clothed in a sort of uniform; and being to all intents soldiers, it can hardly be said that to constitute them prisoners was a violation, although it was undoubtedly a harsh interpretation of the terms.

Alvarez died at Figueras in his way to France; but so long as virtue and courage are esteemed in the world, his name will be held in veneration; and if Augereau forgot what was due to this gallant Spaniard's merit, posterity will not forget to do justice to both.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. In this siege, the constancy with which the Geronans bore the most terrible sufferings accounts for the protracted resistance ; but constancy alone could not have enabled them to defy the regular progress of the engineer ; as I have before observed, the combinations of science are not to be defied with impunity. But the French combinations were not scientific ; and this, saving the right of Gerona to the glory she earned so hardly, was the secret of the defence.

2. General St. Cyr, after observing that the attack on Montjoui was ill judged and worse executed, says, " The principal approaches should have been conducted against the Marcadel, because the soil there was easy to work in, full of natural hollows and clefts, and the defences open in flank and rear to batteries on the Monte Livio and the Casen Rocca. Whereas on the side of Montjoui, the approaches, from the rocky nature of the soil, could only be carried forward by the flying sap, with great loss and difficulty." If however, the Marcadel had fallen, the greatest part of the city would still have been covered by the Oña, and Montjoui, and the forts of the Constable and Capuchin (regular places complete in themselves), would have remained to be taken, unless it can be supposed that a governor who defended the feeble walls of the town after those outworks fell, would have surrendered all because a lodgment was made in an isolated quarter. These things are, however, ordinarily doubtful ; and certainly it must always be a great matter with a general to raise the moral confidence of his own army, or to sink that of his adversary, even though it should be by a momentary and illusive success.

3. The faulty execution of the attack on Montjoui is less doubtful than the choice of direction. The cessation of the breaching fire for four days previous to the assault, and the disregard of the rules of art already noticed, amply account for failure ; and it is to be observed, that this failure caused the delay of a whole month in the progress of the siege ; that during that month disease invaded the army, and the soldiers, as they will be found to do in all protracted operations, became careless and disinclined to the labours of the trenches.

4. The assault on the body of the place was not better conducted than that against Montjoui ; and considering these facts, together with the jealousy and disputes between the generals, the mixture of Germans, Italians, and French in the army, and the mal-administration of the hospitals, by which so many men were lost, and so many more kept from their duty, it is rather surprising that Gerona was taken at all.

5. The foregoing conclusions in nowise affect the merits of the besieged, because the difficulties and errors of their adversaries only prolonged their misery. They fought bravely ; they endured unheard-of sufferings with constancy ; and their refusal to accept the armistice offered by Augereau, is as noble and affecting an instance of virtue as any that history has recorded. Yet how mixed are good and evil principles in man ; how dependent upon accidental circumstances is the development of his noble or base qualities ! Alvarez, so magnanimous, so firm, so brave, so patriotic at Gerona, was the same Alvarez who, one year before, surrendered the Barcelona Montjoui, on the insolent summons of Duhesme ! At that period, the influence of a base court, degraded public feeling, and what was weak in his character came to the surface ; but in times more congenial to virtuous sentiments, all the nobility of the man's nature broke forth.

6. When the siege of Gerona is contrasted with that of Zaragoza, it may shake the opinion of those who regard the wild hostility of the multitude as superior to the regulated warfare of soldiers. The number of enemies that came against the latter was rather less than those who came against the former city. The regular garrison of Zaragoza was above 30,000 ; that of Gerona about 3000. The armed multitude in the one amounted to at least 25,000 ; in the other they were less than 6000. Cruelty and murder marked every step in the defence of Zaragoza ; the most horrible crimes were necessary to prolong the resistance ; above 40,000 persons perished miserably, and the town was taken within three months. In Gerona there was nothing to blush for ; the fighting was more successful ; the actual loss inflicted upon the enemy greater ; the suffering within the walls neither wantonly produced nor useless ; the period of its resistance doubled that of

Zaragoza ; and every proceeding tended to raise instead of sinking the dignity of human nature. There was less of brutal rule, more of reason, and consequently more real heroism, more success at the moment, and a better example given to excite the emulation of generous men.

7. With reference to the general posture of affairs, the fall of Gerona was a reproach to the Spanish and English cabinets. The latter having agents in Catalonia, and such a man as Lord Collingwood in the Mediterranean, to refer to, were yet so ignorant, or so careless of what was essential to the success of the war, as to let Gerona struggle for six months, when half the troops employed by Sir John Stuart to alarm Naples, if carried to the coast of Catalonia, and landed at Palamos, would have raised the siege. It was not necessary that this army should have been equipped for a campaign, a single march would have effected the object. An engineer and a few thousand pounds would have rendered Palamos a formidable post ; and that place being occupied by English troops, and supported by a fleet, greater means than the French could have collected in 1809 would not have reduced Gerona. The Catalans, indeed, were not more tractable nor more disposed than others to act cordially with their allies ; but the natural sterility of the country, the condensed manufacturing population, the number of strong posts and large fortified towns in their possession, and, above all, the long and difficult lines of communication which the French must have guarded for the passage of their convoys, would have rendered the invaders' task most difficult.

8. From the commencement of the Spanish insurrection, the policy of the Valencians had been characterized by a singular indifference to the calamities that overwhelmed the other parts of Spain. The local junta in that province, not content with asserting their own exclusive authority, imagined that it was possible to maintain Valencia independent, even though the rest of the Peninsula should be conquered. Hence the siege of Zaragoza passed unheeded, and the suffering of Gerona made no impression on them. With a regular army of above 10,000 men, more than 30,000 armed irregulars, and a large fleet at Carthagea, the governors of this rich province, so admirably situated for offensive operations, never even placed the fortified towns of their own frontier in a state of defence, and carelessly beheld the 7th and 3rd corps gradually establishing, at the distance of a few days' march from Valencia itself, two solid bases for further invasion ! But it is now time to revert to the operations of the " Central Supreme Junta," that it may be fully understood how the patriotism, the constancy, the lives, and the fortunes of the Spanish people were sported with by those who had so unhappily acquired a momentary power in the Peninsula.

CHAPTER IV.

WHEN Sir Arthur Wellesley retired to the frontier of Portugal, the calumnies propagated in Andalusia, relative to the cause of that movement, were so far successful that no open revolt took place ; but the public hatred being little diminished, a design was formed to establish a better government, as a preliminary to which, measures were secretly taken to seize the members of the junta, and transport them to Manilla. The old junta of Seville being the chief movers of this sedition, no good could be expected from the change, otherwise, such an explosion, although sure to be attended with slaughter and temporary confusion, was not unlikely to prove advantageous to the nation at large, it being quite obvious that some violent remedy was wanting to purge off the complicated disorders of the state.

"Spain," said Lord Wellesley, "has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is untrue to herself."—"Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain."—"No alliance can protect her from the results of internal disorders and national infirmity."

This evident discontent of the British ambassador led the conspirators to impart their designs to him, in the hopes of assistance ; but he being accredited to the

existing government, apprised it of the danger, concealing, however, with due regard to humanity, the names of those engaged in the plot. The junta, in great alarm, immediately sought to mitigate the general hatred; but still averse to sacrificing any power, projected a counter scheme. They had, for the public good according to some, for private emolument according to others, hitherto permitted trading, under licenses, with the towns occupied by the enemy. This regulation and some peculiarly heavy exactions they now rescinded, and, as a final measure of conciliation, appointed, with many protestations of patriotism, commissioners to prepare a scheme of government which should serve until the fit period for convoking the Cortes arrived.

But the commissioners, principally chosen from amongst the members of the junta, soon made manifest the real designs of that body. They proposed that five persons should form a supreme executive council, every member of the existing junta, in rotation, to have a place; the colonies to be represented as an integral part of the empire; and the council so composed, to rule until the Cortes should meet, and then to preside in that assembly. Thus under the pretence of resigning their power, by a simple change of form, the present and the future authority of the junta were to be confirmed, and even the proposal, in favour of the colonies, was, following the opinion of Lord Wellesley, a mere expedient to obtain a momentary popularity, and entirely unconnected with enlarged or liberal views of policy and government.

This project was foiled by Romana, who, being of the commission, dissented from his colleagues; and it was on this occasion that he drew up that accusatory paper, quoted in another part of this history, and the bad acts therein specified, although sufficiently heinous, were not the only charges made at this period. It was objected to some amongst the junta, that having as merchants, contracted for supplying the army, they in their public capacity, raised the price to be paid by the treasury for the articles; and that the members generally were venal in their patronage, difficult of access, and insolent of demeanour.

Romana proposed a council of regency, to be composed of five persons, not members of the junta. This council to be assisted by a fresh chosen junta, also composed of five members and a procurator-general, and to be styled "The Permanent Deputation of the Realm." One of this body to be a South American, and the whole to represent the Cortes, until the meeting of that assembly, which, he thought, could not be too soon. His plan, introduced by misplaced declarations in favour of arbitrary power, and terminated by others equally strong in favour of civil liberty, was not well considered. The "Permanent Deputation," being to represent the Cortes, it was obvious that it must possess the right of controlling the Regency; but the numbers and dignity of both being equal, and their interests opposed, it was as obvious that a struggle would commence, in which the latter, having the sole distribution of honours and emoluments, could not fail to conquer, and no Cortes would be assembled.

Some time before this, when the terror caused by Sir Arthur Wellesley's retreat from Spain, was fresh, Don Martin de Garay had applied to Lord Wellesley for advice, as to the best form of government, and that nobleman also recommended a "Council of Regency," and, like Romana, proposed a second council; but with this essential difference, that the latter were only to arrange the details for electing the members of Cortes, a proclamation for the convocation of which was to be immediately published, together with a list of grievances, "a Bill of Rights" founded on an enlarged conciliatory policy and having equal regard for the interests of the colonies as for those of the mother country. Garay approved of this advice while danger menaced the junta; but when the arrangement for the command of the armies had been completed, and the first excitement had subsided, his solicitude for the improvement of the government ceased. It must, however, be acknowledged, that Lord Wellesley condemned the existing system, as much for its democratic form as for its inefficiency; because the English cabinet never forgot that they were the champions of privilege, nor that the war was essentially, less for the defence of Spain, than the upholding of the aristocratic system of Europe.

To evade Romana's proposition, the junta, on the 28th of October, announced

that the National Cortes should be convoked on the 1st of January, 1810, and assembled for business on the 1st of March following. Having thus, in some measure, met the public wishes, they joined to this announcement a virulent attack on the project of a Regency, affirming, and not without some foundation as regarded Romana's plan, that such a government would disgust the colonies, trample on the king's rights, and would never assemble the Cortes; moreover that it would soon be corrupted by the French. Then enlarging on their own merits in a turgid declamatory style, they defended their past conduct by a tissue of misrepresentations, which deceived nobody; for, to use the words of Lord Wellesley, "no plan had been adopted for any effectual redress of grievances, correction of abuses, or relief from exactions, and the administration of justice, the regulation of revenue, finance, commerce, the security of persons and property, and every other great branch of government, were as defective as the military establishments."

However, the promise of assembling the Cortes sufficed to lull the public wrath; and the junta resolved to recommence offensive military operations, which they fondly imagined would, at once, crush the enemy, and firmly establish their own popularity and power. They were encouraged by a false, but general impression throughout Andalusia, that Austria had broken off negotiations with France; and in September and October, fresh levies, raised in Estremadura and Andalusia, were incorporated with the remains of Cuesta's old army; the whole forming a body of more than 60,000 soldiers, of which nearly 10,000 were cavalry. Nor was the assembling and equipment of this force a matter of great difficulty; for owing to the feeble resistance made against the invaders, the war had hitherto drawn so little on the population, that the poorer sort never evaded a call for personal service; and the enormous accumulation of English stores and money at Cadiz and Seville, was sufficient for every exigency.

In October, Eguia advanced with this army a short way into La Mancha; but when the French, unwilling to lose the resources of that fertile province made a movement towards him, he regained the Sierra Morena on the 16th, taking post, first at St. Elena, and finally at La Carolina. The 1st and 4th corps then occupied the whole of La Mancha, with advanced posts at the foot of the mountains; the 2nd and 5th corps were established in the valley of the Tagus and at Toledo; and the reserve at Madrid. During these movements, Bassecour, who commanded in Estremadura, detached 800 horsemen to reinforce the Duke Del Parque, and quartered the rest of his forces behind the Guadiana. Thus in the latter end of October, there were 60,000 men, under Eguia, covering Seville by the line of La Mancha; 10,000 under Bassecour on the line of Estremadura, and about 6000 employed as guards to the junta and in the service of the depôts behind the Morena.

In the north, the Spanish army of the left was concentrated near Ciudad Rodrigo. For when Beresford marched down the Portuguese frontier to the Tagus, the Duke Del Parque, reinforced with the 800 cavalry from Estremadura, and with the Gallician divisions of Mendizabel and Carrera (amounting to 13,000 men, completely equipped from English stores, brought out to Coruña in July), made a movement into the rugged country, about the Sierra de Francia, and sent his scouting parties as far as Baños. At the same time General Santocildes, marching from Lugo with 2000 men, took possession of Astorga, and menaced the rear of the 6th corps, which after forcing the pass of Baños, had been quartered between the Tormes and the Esla.* In this situation, a French detachment attempted to surprise one of the gates of Astorga, on the 9th of October, and, being repulsed, returned to their cantonments. Soon afterwards Ballasteros, having again collected about 8000 men in the Asturias, armed and equipped them from English stores, and, coming down to Astorga, crossed the Esla, and attempted to storm Zamora. Failing in this, he entered Portugal by the road of Miranda, and from thence proceeded to join the Duke Del Parque. Thus the old armies of Galicia and the Asturias being broken up, those provinces were ordered to raise fresh forces; but there was in Galicia a general disposition to resist the authority of the central junta.

Del Parque, eager to act against the 6th corps, demanded, through Perez Castro,

* See vol. i.

the Spanish envoy at Lisbon, that the Portuguese army should join him ; but this being referred to Sir Arthur Wellesley, he gave it a decided negative, grounding his refusal upon reasons which I shall insert at large, as giving a clear and interesting view of the military state of affairs at this period.

"The enemy, he said, were superior to the allies, including those which Beresford might bring into the field, not only in numbers, but (adverting to the composition of the Spanish armies, the want of cavalry in some, of artillery in others, of clothing, ammunition, and arms, and the deficiency of discipline in all) superior in efficiency even to a greater degree than in numbers. These circumstances, and the absolute deficiency in means, were the causes why, after a great victory at Talavera, the armies had been obliged to recur to the defensive, and nothing had altered for the better since.

"But, besides these considerations, the enemy enjoyed peculiar advantages from his central position, which enabled him to frustrate the Duke Del Parque's intended operations. He could march a part, or the whole of his forces to any quarter, whereas the operation of the different corps of the allies must necessarily be isolated, and each for a time exposed to defeat. Thus there was nothing to prevent the enemy from throwing himself upon the Duke Del Parque and Beresford, with the whole corps of Ney, which was at Salamanca, of Soult, which was at Placencia, and with the force under Kellerman, which was near Valladolid, in which case, even if he, Sir Arthur, had the inclination, he had not the means of marching in time to save them from destruction.

"In the same manner the British army, if it took an advanced position, would be liable to a fatal disaster ; so likewise would the Spanish army of La Mancha. It followed, then, that if any one of these armies made a forward movement, the whole must co-operate, or the single force in activity would be ruined ; but the relative efficiency and strength of the hostile forces, as laid down in the commencement of the argument, forbade a general co-operation with any hopes of solid success ; and the only consequence that could follow would be, that, after a battle or two, some brilliant actions performed by a part, and some defeats sustained by others, and after the loss of many valuable officers and soldiers, the allies would be forced again to resume those defensive positions, which they ought never to have quitted.

"Satisfied that this was the only just view of affairs, he, although prepared to make an effort to prevent Ciudad Rodrigo from falling into the enemy's hands, was resolved not to give the Duke Del Parque any assistance to maintain his former position, and he advised the Portuguese government, not to risk Beresford's army in a situation which could only lead to mischief. The proposed operation of the Duke Del Parque was not the mode to save Ciudad Rodrigo. The only effectual one was to post himself in such a situation as that the enemy could not attack and defeat him without a long previous preparation, which would give time for aid to arrive, and a march in which the enemy himself might be exposed to defeat. To expose those troops to defeat which were ultimately to co-operate in defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, was not the way of preventing the success of an attempt of that fortress. The best way was to place the Spanish force in such a post that it could not be attacked without risk to the enemy, and from whence it could easily co-operate with the other corps, which must be put in motion if Ciudad was to be saved ; and although he would not take upon himself to point out the exact position which the Duke Del Parque ought to occupy, he was certain that in his present forward one, although joined by Beresford, he could not avoid defeat. Ciudad Rodrigo would be lost, and other misfortunes would follow, none of which could occur under any other probable, or even possible, concurrence of circumstances. In fine, that he had long been of opinion that the war must necessarily be defensive on the part of the allies, and that Portugal at least, if not Spain, ought to avail herself of the short period which the enemy seemed disposed to leave her in tranquillity, to organize, and equip, and discipline her armies. Those objects could not be accomplished unless the troops were kept quiet, and yet they were much more important to all parties than any desultory successful operations against the French troops about Salamanca ; but any success was doubtful, and certain to be temporary, because the enemy would immediately collect in numbers

sufficient to crush the allies, who must then return, having failed in their object, lost a number of men, and, what was worse, time, which would have been more usefully employed in preparing for a great and well-combined effort."

This reasoning, solid, clear, convincing, made no impression upon the Spanish junta or their general. Castro replied to it by demanding a positive and definitive answer, as to when the Portuguese army would be in a condition to co-operate with the Spaniards in the Spanish territories. "When there is a Spanish army with which the Portuguese can co-operate on some defined plan, which all parties will have the means, and will engage to carry into execution, as far as any person can engage to carry into execution a military operation." "When means shall be pointed out, and fixed, for the subsistence of the Portuguese troops while they remain in Spain, so that they may not starve, and be obliged to retire for want of food, as was the case when lately in that country." "When decided answers shall be given upon those points, I shall be enabled to tell the governors of Portugal that their excellencies have an army in a state to be sent into Spain." This was Sir Arthur's reply, which ended the negotiation, and the Duke Del Parque commenced operations by himself.

To favour the junction of Ballasteros, his first movement was towards Ledesma. General Marchand immediately drew together, at Salamanca, 11,000 men and 14 guns, and marched to meet him. Thereupon, the duke, without having effected his junction, fell back to Tamames; taking post half-way up a mountain of remarkable strength, where he awaited the enemy, with 1000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry, of which the Galicians only could be accounted experienced soldiers.

BATTLE OF TAMAMES.

General Losada commanded the Spanish right, Count Belvidere the reserve, Martin Carrera the left, which being on the most accessible part of the mountain was covered and flanked by the cavalry. Marchand, desirous of fighting before Ballasteros could arrive, moved rapidly, reached the foot of the mountain early on the 18th of October, and immediately fell upon Del Parque's left. The Spanish cavalry fled rather hastily; the French horsemen followed closely, the infantry surprised in the midst of an evolution, were thrown into disorder, and the artillery was taken. Carrera, Mendizabel, and the duke, rallied the troops on the higher ground, reinforced them from the reserve, and coming down with a fresh impetus, recovered the guns, and discomfited the French with the loss of an eagle, one cannon, and several hundred men. During this brilliant combat on the left, the right and centre were felt by the French skirmishers; but the ground was too strong to make any impression. Marchand, seeing his men repulsed in all quarters with loss, and fearing to be enclosed by Ballasteros in that disordered state, retreated to Salamanca.

Del Parque did not venture to follow up his victory until the 21st, when, being joined by Ballasteros, he pushed with nearly 30,000 men for Ledesma; crossed the Tormes there on the 23rd, turned Salamanca by a night march, and early in the morning of the 24th crowned the heights of San Cristoval in rear of that city, hoping to cut off Marchand's retreat. But that general had timely information, and was already at Toro, behind the Douro. Meanwhile, the news of the defeat at Tamames reached Madrid. Dessolles' division was detached through the Puerto Pico to reinforce the sixth corps; and Kellerman was directed to advance from Valladolid and take the command of the whole.

When the Duke Del Parque heard of this reinforcement, he fell back, not to Ciudad Rodrigo, but by the way of Alba de Tormes to Bejar, which latter place he reached on the 8th of November. And while these events were taking place in Castile, the central junta having finally concocted their schemes, were commencing an enterprise of unparalleled rashness on the side of La Mancha.

CHAPTER V.

IN the arrangement of warlike affairs, difficulties being always overlooked by the Spaniards, they are carried on from one phantasy to another so swiftly, that the first conception of an enterprise is immediately followed by a confident anticipa-

tion of complete success, which continues until the hour of battle ; and then, when it might be of use, generally abandons them. Now the central junta having, to deceive the people, affirmed that Sir Arthur Wellesley retreated to the frontiers of Portugal at the very moment the French might have been driven to the Pyrenees, came very soon to believe this their own absurd calumny, and resolved to send the army at Carolina headlong against Madrid : nay, such was their pitch of confidence, that for naming the civil and military authorities, they arranged a provisional system for the future administration of the capital, with a care that they denied to the army which was to put them in possession.

Eguia was considered unfit to conduct this enterprise, and Albuquerque was distasteful to the junta ; wherefore, casting their eyes upon General Areizaga, they chose him, whose only recommendation was that at the petty battle of Alcanitz, Blake had noticed his courage. He was then at Lerida, but reached La Carolina in the latter end of October ; and being of a quick lively turn, and as confident as the junta could desire, readily undertook to drive the French from Madrid.

This movement was to commence early in November, and at first only Villa Campa, with the bands from Aragon, were to assist. But when Areizaga, after meeting the enemy, began to lose confidence, the Duke of Albuquerque, successor to Bassecour in Estremadura, received instructions to cause a diversion by marching on Arzobispo and Talavera de la Reyna. The Duke Del Parque, coming by the pass of Baños, was to join him there ; and thus nearly 90,000 men were to be put in motion against Madrid, but precisely on that plan which Sir Arthur Wellesley had just denounced as certain to prove disastrous. Indeed, every chance was so much in favour of the French, that taking into consideration the solid reasons for remaining on the defensive, Areizaga's irruption may be regarded as an extreme example of military rashness ; and the project of uniting Del Parque's forces with Albuquerque's, at Talavera, was also certain to fail ; because the enemy's masses were already in possession of the point of junction, and the sixth corps could fall on Del Parque's rear.

Partly to deceive the enemy, partly because they would never admit of any opposition to a favourite scheme, the junta spread a report that the British army was to co-operate ; and permitted Areizaga to march, under the impression that it was so. Yet nothing could be more untrue. Sir Arthur Wellesley being at this period at Seville, held repeated conversations with the Spanish ministers and the members of the junta, and reiterating all his former objections to offensive operations, warned his auditors that the project in question was peculiarly ill-judged, and would end in the destruction of their army. The Spanish ministers, far from attending to his advice, did not even *officially inform him of Areizaga's march until the 18th of November*, the very day before the fatal termination of the campaign. Yet, *on the 16th they had repeated their demand for assistance*, and with a vehemence, deaf to reason, required that the British should instantly co-operate with Albuquerque and Del Parque's forces.* Sir Arthur, firm to his first views, never gave the slightest hopes that his army would so act ; and he assured the junta that the diversion proposed would have no effect whatever.

OPERATIONS IN LA MANCHA.

Areizaga, after publishing an address to the troops on the 3rd of November, commenced his march from La Carolina, with 60 pieces of artillery, and from 50,000 to 60,000 men, of which about 8000 were cavalry. Several British officers and private gentlemen, and the Baron Crossard, an Austrian military agent, attended the head-quarters, which was a scene of gaiety and boasting ; for Areizaga, never dreaming of misfortune, gave a free scope to his social vivacity. The army marched by the roads of Manzanares and Damiel, with scarcely any commissariat preparation, and without any military equipment save arms ; but the men were young, robust, full of life and confidence ; and being without impediments of any kind, made nearly 30 miles each day. They moved, however, in a straggling manner, quartering and feeding as they could in the villages on their route, and with so little propriety, that the peasantry of La Mancha universally abandoned their dwellings, and carried off their effects.

* Appendix No. 2., section I.

Although the French could not at first give credit to the rumours of this strange incursion, they were aware that some great movement was in agitation, and only uncertain from what point and for what specific object the effort would be made. Jourdan had returned to France; Soult was major-general of the French armies, and under his advice, the king, who was inclined to abandon Madrid, prepared to meet the coming blow. But the army was principally posted towards Talavera; for the false reports had in some measure succeeded in deceiving the French as to the approach of the English; and it was impossible at once to conceive the full insanity of the junta.

The 2nd corps, commanded by General Heudelet, being withdrawn from Placencia, was, on the 5th of November, posted at Oropesa and Arzobispo, with an advanced guard at Calzada, and scouting parties watching Naval Moral, and the course of the Tietar.

The 5th corps, under Mortier, was concentrated at Talavera.

Of the 4th corps, half a division garrisoned Madrid in the absence of Dessolles' troops; and the other half, under General Liger Belair, was behind the Tajuna, guarding the eastern approaches to the capital. The remaining divisions, commanded by Sebastiani, were, the one at Toledo, the other with Milhaud's cavalry at Ocaña.

The 1st corps, about 21,000 strong, and commanded by Marshal Victor, was at Mora and Yebeles, a day's march in advance of Toledo, but the cavalry of this corps under the command of Latour Maubourg occupied Consuegra and Madriplejos, on the road to the Sierra Morena. The whole army, including the French and Spanish guards, was above 80,000 fighting men, without reckoning Dessolles' division, which was on the other side of the Guadarama mountains.

In the night of the 6th, information reached the king, that 6000 Spanish horsemen, supported by 2000 foot, had come down upon Consuegra from the side of Herencia, and that a second column likewise composed of cavalry and infantry, had passed the Puerto de Piche, and fallen upon the outposts at Madriplejos. All the prisoners taken in the skirmishes agreed that the Spanish army was about 50,000 strong, and the Duke of Belluno immediately concentrated the first corps at Yebeles, but kept his cavalry at Mora, by which he covered the roads leading from Consuegra and Madriplejos upon Toledo. On the 8th, there were no Spaniards in front of the 1st corps, yet officers sent towards Ocaña were chased back by cavalry; and Soult judged what was indeed the truth, that Areizaga continuing his reckless march, had pushed by Tembleque towards Aranjuez, leaving the 1st corps on his left flank. The division of the 4th corps was immediately moved from Toledo by the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez, from whence Sebastiani carried it to Ocaña, thus concentrating about 8000 infantry and 1500 cavalry at that point on the 9th; and the same day Victor retired with the 1st corps to Ajofrin.

On the 10th, Gazan's division of the 5th corps was ordered to march from Talavera to Toledo; and the 1st corps, which had reached the latter town, was directed to move up the right bank of the Tagus to Aranjuez to support Sebastiani, who holding fast at Ocaña, sent six squadrons to feel for the enemy towards Guardia. The Spanish continuing their movement, met those squadrons and pursued them towards Ocaña.

COMBAT OF DOS BARRIOS.

Areizaga ignorant of what was passing around him, and seeing only Sebastiani's cavalry on the table-land between the town of Dos Barrios and Ocaña, concluded that they were unsupported, and directed the Spanish horse to charge them without delay. The French thus pressed, drew back behind their infantry which was close at hand, and unexpectedly opened a brisk fire on the Spanish squadrons, which were thrown into confusion, and being charged in that state by the whole mass of the enemy's cavalry, were beaten, with the loss of 200 prisoners and two pieces of cannon. Areizaga's main body was, however, coming up, and Sebastiani fell back upon Ocaña. The next morning he took up a position on some heights lining the left bank of the Tagus, and covering Aranjuez, the Spaniards entered Dos Barrios, and their impetuous movement ceased. They had come down from the Morena

like a stream of lava ; and burst into La Mancha with a rapidity that scarcely gave time for rumour to precede them. But this swiftness of execution, generally so valuable in war, was here but an outbreak of folly. Without any knowledge of the French numbers or position, without any plan of action, Areizaga rushed like a maniac into the midst of his foes, and then suddenly stood still, trembling and bewildered.

From the 10th to the 13th he halted at Dos Barrios, and informed his government of Sebastiani's stubborn resistance, and of the doubts which now for the first time assailed his own mind. It was then the Junta changing their plans, eagerly demanded the assistance of the British army, and commanded the Dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque to unite at Talavera. Albuquerque commenced his movement immediately, and the Junta did not hesitate to assure both their generals and the public that Sir Arthur was also coming on.

Thus encouraged, and having had time to recover from his first incertitude, Areizaga, on the 14th, made a flank march by his right to Santa Cruz la Zarza, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, turn the French left, and penetrate to the capital by the eastern side ; but during his delay at Dos Barrios the French forces had been concentrated from every quarter.

South of Ocaña, the ground is opened and undulating, but on the north, the ramifications of the Cuenca mountains, leading down the left bank of the Tagus, presented, at Santa Cruz, ridges which stretching strong and rough towards Aranjuez, afforded good positions for Sebastiani to cover that place. Soult was awake to his adversary's projects, yet could not believe that he would dare such a movement unless certain of support from the British army ; and therefore kept the different corps quiet on the 11th, waiting for Heudelet's report from Oropesa. In the night it arrived, stating that rumours of a combined Spanish and English army being on the march, were rife, but that the scouts could not discover that the allied force was actually within several marches.

Soult, now judging that although the rumours should be true, a central position would enable him to defeat Areizaga and return by the way of Toledo in time to meet the allies in the valley of the Tagus, put all his masses again into activity. The 1st corps was directed to hasten its march to Aranjuez ; the 5th corps to concentrate at Toledo ; the 2nd corps to abandon Oropesa, Calzada, and Arzobispo, and replacing the 5th corps at Talavera, to be in readiness to close upon the main body of the army. Finally, information being received of the Duke Del Parque's retreat from Salamanca to Bejar and of the re-occupation of Salamanca by the 6th corps, Dessolles' division was recalled to Madrid.

During the 12th, while the 1st, 2nd, and 5th corps were in march, General Liger Belair's brigade continued to watch the banks of the Tajuna, and the 4th corps preserved its offensive positions on the height in the front of Aranjuez, having 1500 men in reserve at the bridge of Bayona. The 14th, the general movement was completed. Two corps were concentrated at Aranjuez to assail the Spaniards in front ; one at Toledo to cross the Tagus and fall upon their left flank, and the king's guards at Madrid formed a reserve for the 4th and 1st corps. The 2nd corps was at Talavera, and Dessolle's division was in the Guadarama on its return to the capital. In fine, all was prepared for the attack of Dos Barrios, when Areizaga's flank march to Santa Cruz la Zarza occasioned new combinations.

In the evening of the 15th, it was known that the Spaniards had made a bridge at Villa Maurique, and passed two divisions and some cavalry over the Tagus. The Duke of Belluno was immediately ordered to carry the 1st and 4th corps (with the exception of a brigade left in Aranjuez) up the left bank of the Tagus, operating, to fix Areizaga, and force him to deliver battle ; and, with a view of tempting the Spaniard by an appearance of timidity, the bridges of La Reyna and Aranjuez were broken down.

While these dispositions were making on the French side, the Spanish general commenced a second bridge over the Tagus ; and part of his cavalry, spreading in small detachments, scoured the country, and skirmished on a line extending from Arganda to Aranjuez. The Partidas also, being aided by detachments from the army, obliged the French garrison to retire from Guadalaxara upon Arganda, and

occupied the former town on the 12th. But, in the night of the 13th, eight French companies and some troops of light cavalry, by a sudden march, surprised them, killed and wounded 200 or 300 men, and took 80 horses and a piece of artillery.

The 16th, the infantry of the first and fourth corps was at Morata and Bayona, the cavalry at Perales and Chinchon, and, during this time, the 5th corps, leaving a brigade of foot and one of horse at Toledo, marched by Illescas towards Madrid, to act as a reserve to the Duke of Belluno.

The 17th, Areizaga continued his demonstrations on the side of the Tajuna, and hastened the construction of his second bridge; but on the approach of the Duke of Belluno with the 1st corps, he stayed the work, withdrew his divisions from the right bank of the Tagus, and on the 18th (the cavalry of the 1st corps having reached Villarejo de Salvanes), he destroyed his bridges, called in his parties, and drew up for battle on the heights of Santa Cruz de la Zarza.

Hitherto the continual movements of the Spanish army, and the unsettled plans of the Spanish general, rendered it difficult for the French to fix a field of battle; but now Areizaga's march to St. Cruz had laid his line of operations bare. The French masses were close together, the Duke of Belluno could press on the Spanish front with the 1st corps, and the king, calling the 4th corps from Bayona, could throw 25,000 or 30,000 men on Areizaga's rear, by the road of Aranjuez and Ocaña. It was calculated that no danger could arise from this double line of operations, because a single march would bring both the king and Victor upon Areizaga; and if the latter should suddenly assail either, each would be strong enough to sustain the shock. Hence, when Soult knew that the Spaniards were certainly encamped at Santa Cruz, he caused the 5th corps, then in march for Madrid, to move during the night of the 17th upon Aranjuez. The 4th corps received a like order. The king himself, quitting Madrid, arrived there on the evening of the 18th, with the Royal French Guards, two Spanish battalions of the line, and a brigade of Dessolles' division which had just arrived; in all about 10,000 men. The same day, the Duke of Belluno concentrated the 1st corps at Villarejo de Salvanes, intending to cross the Tagus at Villa Maurique, and attack the Spanish position on the 19th.

A pontoon train, previously prepared at Madrid, enabled the French to repair the broken bridges near Aranjuez in two hours, and about one o'clock on the 18th, a division of cavalry, two divisions of infantry of the 4th corps, and the advanced guard of the 5th corps, passed the Tagus, part at the bridge of La Reyna, and part at a ford. General Milhaud, with the leading squadrons, immediately pursued a small body of Spanish horsemen; and was thus led to the table-land between Antigua and Ocaña, where he suddenly came upon a front of 1500 cavalry supported by 3000 more in reserve. Having only 1200 dragoons, he prepared to retire; but at that moment General Paris arrived with another brigade, and was immediately followed by the light cavalry of the 5th corps; the whole making a reinforcement of about 2000 men. With these troops Sebastiani came in person, and took the command at the instant when the Spaniards, seeing the inferiority of the French, were advancing to the charge.

CAVALRY COMBAT AT OCAÑA.

The Spaniards came on at a trot, but Sebastiani directed Paris, with a regiment of light cavalry and the Polish lancers, to turn and fall upon the right flank of the approaching squadrons, which being executed with great vigour, especially by the Poles, caused considerable confusion in the Spanish ranks, and their general endeavoured to remedy it by closing to the assailed flank. But to effect this he formed his left and centre in one vast column. Sebastiani charged headlong into the midst of it with his reserves, and the enormous mass yielding to the shock, got into confusion, and finally gave way. Many were slain, several hundred wounded, and 80 troopers and above 500 horses were taken. The loss of the French bore no proportion in men, but General Paris was killed, and several superior officers were wounded.

This unexpected encounter with such a force of cavalry, led Soult to believe that the Spanish general, aware of his error, was endeavouring to recover his line of operations. The examination of the prisoners confirmed this opinion; and in the night, information from the Duke of Belluno, and the reports of officers sent towards

Villa Maurique arrived, all agreeing that only a rear-guard was to be seen at Santa Cruz de la Zarza. It then became clear that the Spaniards were on the march, and that a battle could be fought the next day. In fact Areizaga had retraced his steps by a flank movement through Villa Rubia and Noblejas, with the intention of falling upon the king's forces as they opened out from Aranjuez. He arrived on the morning of the 19th at Ocaña; but judging from the cavalry fight, that the enemy could attack first, drew up his whole army on the same plain, in two lines, a quarter of a mile asunder.

Ocaña is covered on the north by a ravine, which commencing gently half a mile eastward of the town, runs deepening and with a curve, to the west, and finally connects itself with gullies and hollows, whose waters run off to the Tagus. Behind the deepest part of this ravine was the Spanish left, crossing the main road from Aranjuez to Dos Barrios. One flank rested on the gullies, the other on Ocaña. The centre was in front of the town, which was occupied by some infantry as a post of reserve, but the right wing stretched in the direction of Noblejas along the edge of a gentle ridge *in front* of the shallow part of the ravine. The cavalry was on the flank and rear of the right wing. Behind the army there was an immense plain, but closed in and fringed towards Noblejas with rich olive woods, which were occupied by infantry to protect the passage of the Spanish baggage, still filing by the road from Zarza. Such were Areizaga's dispositions.

Joseph passed the night of the 18th in reorganizing his forces. The whole of the cavalry, consisting of nine regiments, was given to Sebastiani. Four divisions of infantry, with the exception of one regiment, left at Aranjuez to guard the bridge, were placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who was also empowered, if necessary, to direct the movements of the cavalry. The artillery was commanded by General Senarmont. The royal guards remained with the king, and Marshal Soult directed the whole of the movements.

Before daybreak, on the 19th, the monarch marched with the intention of falling upon the Spaniards wherever he could meet with them. At Antiguella his troops quitting the high road, turned to their left, gained the table land of Ocaña somewhat beyond the centre of the Spanish position, and discovered Areizaga's army in order of battle. The French cavalry instantly forming to the front, covered the advance of the infantry, which drew up in successive lines as the divisions arrived on the plain. The Spanish outposts fell back, and were followed by the French skirmishers, who spread along the hostile front and opened a sharp fire.

About 45,000 Spanish infantry, 7000 cavalry, and 60 pieces of artillery were in line. The French force was only 24,000 infantry, 5000 sabres and lances, and 50 guns, including the battery of the royal guard. But Areizaga's position was miserably defective. The whole of his left wing, 15,000 strong, was paralyzed by the ravine; it could neither attack nor be attacked: the centre was scarcely better situated, and the extremity of his right wing was uncovered, save by the horse, who were, although superior in number, quite dispirited by the action of the preceding evening. These circumstances dictated the order of the attack.

BATTLE OF OCAÑA.

At ten o'clock, Sebastiani's cavalry gaining ground to his left, turned the Spanish right. General Leval, with two divisions of infantry in columns of regiments, each having a battalion displayed in front, followed the cavalry, and drove General Zayas from the olive-woods. General Girard, with his division arranged in the same manner, followed Leval in second line; and at the same moment, General Dessolles menaced the centre with one portion of his troops, while another portion lined the edge of the ravine to support the skirmishers and awe the Spanish left wing. The king remained in reserve with his guards. Thus the French order of battle was in two columns: the principal one, flanked by the cavalry, directed against and turning the Spanish right, the second keeping the Spanish centre in check; and each being supported by reserves.

These dispositions were completed at 11 o'clock; at which hour, Senarmont, massing 30 pieces of artillery, opened a shattering fire on Areizaga's centre. Six guns, detached to the right, played at the same time across the ravine against the left; and six others swept down the deep hollow, to clear it of the light troops.

The Spaniards were undisciplined and badly commanded, but discovered no appearance of fear ; their cries were loud and strong, their skirmishing fire brisk ; and, from the centre of their line, 16 guns opened with a murderous effect upon Leval's and Girard's columns, as the latter were pressing on towards the right. To mitigate the fire of this battery, a French battalion, rushing out at full speed, seized a small eminence close to the Spanish guns, and a counter battery was immediately planted there. Then the Spaniards gave back : their skirmishers were swept out of the ravine by a flanking fire of grape ; and Senarmont, immediately drawing the artillery from the French right, took Ocaña as his pivot, and, prolonging his fire to the left, raked Areizaga's right wing in its whole length.


During this cannonade, Leval, constantly pressing forward, obliged the Spaniards to change their front, by withdrawing the right wing *behind* the shallow part of the ravine, which, as I have before said, was in its rear when the action commenced. By this change, the whole army, still drawn up in two lines, at the distance of a quarter of a mile asunder, was pressed into somewhat of a convex form with the town of Ocaña in the centre, and hence Senarmont's artillery tore their ranks with a greater destruction than before. Nevertheless, encouraged by observing the comparatively feeble body of infantry approaching them, the Spaniards suddenly retook the offensive ; their fire, redoubling, dismounted two French guns ; Mortier himself was wounded slightly, Leval severely ; the line advanced, and the leading French divisions wavered and gave back.

The moment was critical, and the Duke of Treviso lost no time in exhortations to Leval's troops, but, like a great commander, instantly brought up Girard's division through the intervals of the first line, and displayed a front of fresh troops, keeping one regiment in square on the left flank : for he expected that Areizaga's powerful cavalry, which still remained in the plain, would charge for the victory. Girard's fire soon threw the Spanish first line into disorder ; and meanwhile, Dessolles, who had gained ground by an oblique movement left in front, seeing the enemy's right thus shaken, seized Ocaña itself, and issued forth on the other side.

The light cavalry of the king's guard, followed by the infantry, then poured through the town ; and, on the extreme left, Sebastiani, with a rapid charge, cut off 6000 infantry, and obliged them to surrender. The Spanish cavalry, which had only suffered a little from the cannonade, and had never made an effort to turn the tide of battle, now drew off entirely : the second line of infantry gave ground as the front fell back upon it in confusion ; and Areizaga, confounded and bewildered, ordered the left wing, which had scarcely fired a shot, to retreat, and then quitted the field himself.

For half an hour after this, the superior officers who remained, endeavoured to keep the troops together in the plain, and strove to reach the main road leading to Dos Barrios ; but Girard and Dessolles' divisions being connected after passing Ocaña, pressed on with steady rapidity, while the Polish lancers and a regiment of chasseurs, outflanking the Spanish right, continually increased the confusion : finally, Sebastiani, after securing his prisoners, came up again like a whirlwind, and charged full in the front with five regiments of cavalry. Then the whole mass broke, and fled each man for himself across the plain ; but, on the right of the routed multitude, a deep ravine leading from Yepes to Dos Barrios, in an oblique direction, continually contracted the space ; and the pursuing cavalry arriving first at Barrios, headed nearly 10,000 bewildered men, and forced them to surrender. The remainder turned their faces to all quarters ; and such was the rout, that the French were also obliged to disperse to take prisoners, for, to their credit, no rigorous execution was inflicted ; and hundreds, merely deprived of their arms, were desired, in raillery, " to return to their homes, and abandon war as a trade they were unfit for." This fatal battle commenced at 11 o'clock ; 30 pieces of artillery, 120 carriages, 25 stand of colours, three generals, 600 inferior officers, and 18,000 privates were taken before two o'clock, and the pursuit was still hot. Seven or eight thousand of the Spaniards, however, contrived to make away towards the mountain of Tarancon ; others followed the various routes through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena ; and many saved themselves in Valencia and Murcia.

Meanwhile, the 1st corps, passing the Tagus by a ford, had re-established the



bridge at Villa Maurique before 10 o'clock in the morning, and finding Santa Cruz de la Zarza abandoned, followed Areizaga's traces ; at Villatobas, the light cavalry captured 1200 carriages, and a little farther on, took 1000 prisoners from the column which was making for Tarancon. Thus informed of the result of the battle, the Duke of Belluno halted at Villatobas, but sent his cavalry forward. At La Guardia they joined Sebastiani's horsemen ; and the whole continuing the pursuit to Lillo, made 500 more prisoners, together with 300 horses. This finished the operations of the day : only 1800 cannon-shot had been fired, and an army of more than 50,000 men had been ruined. The French lost 1700 men, killed and wounded ; the Spaniards 5000 : and, before nightfall, all the baggage and military carriages, 3000 animals, 45 pieces of artillery, 30,000 muskets, and 26,000 captives were in the hands of the conquerors !

Areizaga reached Tembleque during the night, and La Carolina the third day after. On the road, he met General Benar with 1000 dragoons that had been detached to the rear before the battle commenced ; this body he directed on Madrilegos to cover the retreat of the fugitives ; but so strongly did the panic spread that when Sebastiani approached that post on the 20th, Benar's men fled, without seeing an enemy, as fearfully as any who came from the fight. Even so late as the 24th, only 400 cavalry, belonging to all regiments, could be assembled at Manzanares ; and still fewer at La Carolina.

CHAPTER VI.

JOSEPH halted at Dos Barrios, the night of the battle, and the next day directed Sebastiani, with all the light cavalry and a division of infantry, upon Madrilegos and Consuegra ; the 1st corps, by St. Juan de Vilharta, upon the Sierra Morena, and the 5th corps, by Tembleque and Mora, upon Toledo. One division of the 4th corps guarded the spoil and the prisoners at Ocaña. A second division, reinforced with a brigade of cavalry, was posted, by detachments, from Aranjuez to Consuegra.

The monarch himself, with his guards and Dessolles' 1st brigade, returned, on the 20th, to Madrid.

Three days had sufficed to dissipate the storm on the side of La Mancha, but the Duke Del Parque still menaced the 6th corps in Castile, and the reports from Talavera again spoke of Albuquerque and the English being in motion. The second brigade of Dessolles' division had returned from Old Castile on the 19th, and the uncertainty with respect to the British movements, obliged the king to keep all his troops in hand. Nevertheless, fearing that, if Del Parque gained upon the 6th corps, he might raise an insurrection in Leon, Gazan's division of the 5th corps was sent from Toledo through the Puerto Pico, to Marchand's assistance, and Kellerman was again directed to take the command of the whole.

During these events, the British army remained tranquil about Badajos ; but Albuquerque, following his orders, had reached Peralada de Garbin, and seized the bridge of Arzobispo, in expectation of being joined by the Duke Del Parque. That general, however, who had above 30,000 men, thought, when Dessolle's division was recalled to Madrid, that he could crush the 6th corps, and therefore advanced from Bejar towards Alba de Tormes on the 17th, two days before the battle of Ocaña. Thus, when Albuquerque expected him on the Tagus, he was engaged in serious operations beyond the Tormes, and having reached Alba the 21st, sent a division to take possession of Salamanca, which Marchand had again abandoned. The 22nd he marched towards Valladolid, and his advanced guard and cavalry entered Fresno and Carpio. Meanwhile Kellerman, collecting all the troops of his government, and being joined by Marchand, moved upon Medina del Campo, and the 23rd, fell with a body of horse upon the Spaniards at Fresno. The Spanish cavalry fled at once ; but the infantry stood firm, and repulsed the assailants.

The 24th the duke carried his whole army to Fresno, intending to give battle ; but on the 26th imperative orders to join Albuquerque having reached him, he commenced a retrograde movement. Kellerman, without waiting for the arrival of Gazan's division, instantly pursued, and his advanced guard of cavalry overtook

and charged the Spanish army at the moment when a part of their infantry and all their horse had passed the bridge of Alba de Tormes ; being repulsed, it retired upon the supports, and the duke, seeing that an action was inevitable, brought the remainder of his troops, with the exception of one division, back to the right bank.

BATTLE OF ALBA DE TORMES.

Scarcely was the line formed, when Kellerman came up with two divisions of dragoons and some artillery, and, without hesitating, sent one division to outflank the Spanish right, and, with the other, charged fiercely in upon the front. The Spanish horsemen, flying without a blow, rode straight over the bridge, and the infantry of the right being thus exposed, were broken and sabred ; but those on the left stood fast and repulsed the enemy. The duke rallied his cavalry on the other side of the river, and brought them back to the fight, but the French were also reinforced, and once more the Spanish horse fled without a blow. By this time it was dark, and the infantry of the left wing, under Mendizabel and Carrera, being unbroken, made good their retreat across the river, yet not without difficulty, and under the fire of some French infantry, which arrived just in the dusk. During the night the duke retreated upon Tamames unmolested, but at daybreak a French patrol coming up with this rear, his whole army threw away their arms and fled outright. Kellerman, having meanwhile entered Salamanca, did not pursue, yet the dispersion was complete.

After this defeat, Del Parque rallied his army in the mountains behind Tamames, and, in ten or twelve days, again collected about 20,000 men ; they were, however, without artillery, scarcely any had preserved their arms, and such was their distress for provisions, that two months afterwards, when the British arrived on the northern frontier, the peasantry still spoke with horror of the sufferings of these famished soldiers. Many actually died of want, and every village was filled with sick. Yet the mass neither dispersed nor murmured ! For Spaniards, though hasty in revenge and feeble in battle, are patient to the last degree in suffering.

This result of the Duke Del Parque's operation amply justified Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice to the Portuguese regency. In like manner the battle of Ocaña, and the little effect produced by the Duke of Albuquerque's advance to Arzobispo, justified that which he gave to the central junta. It might be imagined that the latter would have received his after-counsels with deference ; but the course of that body was never affected by either reason or experience. Just before the rout of Alba de Tormes, Sir Arthur Wellesley proposed that 10,000 men, to be taken from the Duke Del Parque, should *reinforce Albuquerque, that the latter might maintain the strong position of Meza d' Ibor, and cover Estremadura for the winter.* Meanwhile Del Parque's force, thus reduced one-third, could be more easily fed, and might keep aloof from the enemy until the British army should arrive on the northern frontier of Portugal, a movement long projected, and, as he informed them, only delayed *to protect Estremadura until the Duke of Albuquerque had received the reinforcement.* The only reply of the junta was an order, directing Albuquerque *immediately to quit the line of the Tagus, and take post at Llerena, behind the Guadiana.* Thus abandoning Estremadura to the enemy, and exposing his own front in a bad position to an army coming from Almaraz, and his right flank and rear to an army coming from La Mancha.

This foolish and contemptuous proceeding being followed by Del Parque's defeat, which endangered Ciudad Rodrigo, Sir Arthur at once commenced his march for the north. He knew that 20,000 Spanish infantry and 6000 mounted cavalry were again collected in La Carolina ; that the troops (8000), who escaped from Ocaña, on the side of Tarancon, were at Cuença, under General Echevaria ; and as the numbers re-assembled in the Morena were (the inactivity of the French after the battle of Ocaña considered) sufficient to defend the passes and cover Seville for the moment, there was no reason why the British army should remain in unhealthy positions to aid people who would not aid themselves. Albuquerque's retrograde movement was probably a device of the junta to oblige Sir Arthur to undertake the defence of Estremadura ; but it only hastened his departure. It did not comport with his plans to engage in serious operations on that side ; yet to have retired when that province was actually attacked, would have been disreputable

for his arms, wherefore, seizing this unhappily favourable moment to quit Badajos, he crossed the Tagus, and marched into the valley of the Mondego, leaving General Hill, with a mixed force of 10,000 men, at Abrantes.

The Guadiana pestilence had been so fatal that many officers blamed him for stopping so long ; but it was his last hold on Spain, and the safety of the southern provinces was involved in his proceedings. It was not his battle of Talavera, but the position maintained by him on the frontier of Estremadura, which, in the latter part of 1809, saved Andalusia from subjection ; and this is easy of demonstration, for, Joseph having rejected Soult's project against Portugal, dared not invade Andalusia, by Estremadura, with the English army on his right flank ; neither could he hope to invade it by the way of La Mancha, without drawing Sir Arthur into the contest. But Andalusia was, at this period, the last place where the intrusive king desired to meet a British army. He had many partisans in that province, who would necessarily be overawed if the course of the war carried Sir Arthur beyond the Morena ; nor could the junta, in that case, have refused Cadiz, as a place of arms, to their ally. Then the whole force of Andalusia and Murcia would have rallied round the English forces behind the Morena ; and as Areizaga had 60,000 men, and Albuquerque 10,000, it is no exaggeration to assume that 100,000 could have been organized for defence, and the whole of the troops in the south of Portugal would have been available to aid in the protection of Estremadura. Thus, including 30,000 English, there would have been a mass of at least 100,000 soldiers, disposable for active operations, assembled in the Morena.

From La Carolina to Madrid is only ten marches, and while posted at the former, the army could protect Lisbon as well as Seville, because a forward movement would oblige the French to concentrate round the Spanish capital. Andalusia would thus have become the principal object of the invaders ; but the allied armies, holding the passes of the Morena, their left flank protected by Estremadura and Portugal, their right by Murcia and Valencia, and having rich provinces and large cities behind them, and a free communication with the sea, and abundance of ports, could have fought a fair field for Spain.

It was a perception of these advantages that caused Sir John Moore to regret the ministers had not chosen the southern instead of the northern line for his operations. Lord Wellesley, also, impressed with the importance of Andalusia, urged his brother to adopt some plan of this nature, and the latter, sensible of its advantages, would have done so, but for the impossibility of dealing with the central junta. Military possession of Cadiz and the uncontrolled command of a Spanish force were the only conditions upon which he would undertake the defence of Andalusia ; conditions they would not accede to, but, without which, he could not be secured against the caprices of men whose proceedings were one continued struggle against reason. This may seem inconsistent with a former assertion, that Portugal was the true base of operations for the English ; but political as well as physical resources and moral considerations weighed in that argument.

For the protection, then, of Andalusia and Estremadura, during a dangerous crisis of affairs, Sir Arthur persisted, at such an enormous sacrifice of men, to hold his position on the Guadiana. Yet it was reluctantly, and more in deference to his brother's wishes than his own judgment, that he remained after Areizaga's army was assembled. Having proved the junta by experience, he was more clear sighted, as to their perverseness, than Lord Wellesley ; who, being in daily intercourse with the members, obliged to listen to their ready eloquence in excuse for past errors, and more ready promises of future exertion, clung longer to the notion that Spain could be put in the right path, and that England might war largely in conjunction with the united nations of the Peninsula, instead of restricting herself to the comparatively obscure operation of defending Lisbon. He was finally undeceived, and the march from Badajos for ever released the British general from a vexatious dependence on the Spanish government.

Meanwhile the French, in doubt of his intentions, appeared torpid. Kellerman remained at Salamanca, watching the movements of the Duke Del Parque ; and Gazan returned to Madrid. Milhaud, with a division of the 4th corps, and some cavalry, was detached against Echevaria ; but on his arrival at Cuença,

finding that the latter had retreated by Toboado, to Hellin, in Murcia, combined his operations with General Suchet, and, as I have before related, assisted to reduce the towns of Albaracin and Teruel. Other movements there were none, and as the Spanish regiments of the guard fought freely against their countrymen, and many of the prisoners, taken at Ocaña, offered to join the invaders' colours, the king conceived hopes of raising a national army. French writers assert that the captives at Ocaña made a marked distinction between Napoleon and Joseph. They were willing to serve the French emperor, but not the intrusive king of Spain. Spanish authors, indeed, assume that none entered the enemy's ranks save by coercion and to escape; and that many did so with that view, and were successful, must be supposed, or the numbers said to have re-assembled in the Morena, and at Cuença, cannot be reconciled with the loss sustained in the action.

The battles of Ocaña and Alba de Tormes terminated the series of offensive operations which the Austrian war, and the re-appearance of a British army in the Peninsula, had enabled the allies to adopt, in 1809. Those operations had been unsuccessful; the enemy again took the lead, and the fourth epoch of the war commenced.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Although certain that the British army would not co-operate in this short campaign, the junta openly asserted that it would join Albuquerque in the valley of the Tagus. The improbability of Areizaga's acting, without such assistance, gave currency to the fiction, and an accredited fiction is, in war, often more useful than the truth; in this, therefore, they are to be commended; but, when deceiving their own general, they permitted Areizaga to act under the impression that he would be so assisted, they committed not an error but an enormous crime. Nor was the general much less criminal for acting upon the mere assertion that other movements were combined with his, when no communication, no concerting of the marches, nor understanding with the allied commander as to their mutual resources and intentions had taken place.

2. A rushing wind, a blast from the mountains, tempestuous, momentary, such was Areizaga's movement on Dos Barrios, and assuredly it would be difficult to find its parallel. There is no post so strong, no town so guarded that by a fortunate stroke may not be carried; but who, even on the smallest scale, acts on this principle unless aided by some accidental circumstance applicable to the moment? Areizaga obeyed the orders of his government; but no general is bound to obey orders (at least without remonstrance) which involve the safety of his army; to that he should sacrifice everything but victory: and many great commanders have sacrificed even victory rather than appear to undervalue this vital principle.

3. At Dos Barrios the Spanish general, having first met with opposition, halted for three days, evidently without a plan, and ignorant both of the situation of the first corps on his left flank, and of the real force in his front: yet this was the only moment in which he could hope for the slightest success. If, instead of a feeble skirmish of cavalry, he had borne forward, with his whole army, on the 11th, Sebastiani must have been overpowered and driven across the Tagus, and Areizaga, with 50,000 infantry and a powerful cavalry, would, on the 12th, have been in the midst of the separated French corps, for their movement of concentration was not completely effected until the night of the 14th. But such a stroke was not for an undisciplined army, and this was another reason against moving from Morena at all, seeing that the calculated chances were all against Areizaga, and his troops not such as could improve accidental advantages.

4. The flank march, from Dos Barrios to Santa Cruz, although intended to turn the French left and gain Madrid, was a circuitous route of at least a hundred miles, and, as there were three rivers to cross, namely, the Tagus, the Tajuña, and Henares, only great rapidity could give a chance of success; but Areizaga was slow. So late as the 15th, he had passed the Tagus with only two divisions of infantry. Meanwhile the French moving on the inner circle, got between him and Madrid, and the moment one corps out of the three approached, he re-crossed the Tagus, and concentrated again on the strong ground of Santa Cruz de la Zarza. The king by the way of Aranjuez had, however, already cut his line of retreat, and then

Areizaga who, on the 10th, had shrunk from an action with Sebastiani, when the latter had only 8000 men, now sought a battle, on the same ground with the king, who was at the head of 30,000; the first corps being also in full march upon the Spanish traces and distant only a few miles. Here it may be remarked that Victor, who was now to the eastward of the Spaniards, had been on the 9th to the westward at Yébenes and Mora, having moved in ten days, on a circle of 150 miles, completely round this Spanish general, who pretended to treat his adversaries as if they were blind men.

5. Baron Crossand, it is said, urged Areizaga to entrench himself in the mountains, to raise the peasantry, and to wait the effect of Albuquerque's and Del Parque's operations. If so, his military ideas do not seem of a higher order than Areizaga's, and the proposal was but a repetition of Mr. Frere's former plan for Albuquerque; a plan founded on the supposition that the rich plains of La Mancha were rugged mountains. In taking a permanent position at Santa Cruz or Tarancon, Areizaga must have resigned all direct communication with Andalusia, and opened a fresh line of communication with Valencia, which would have been exposed to the 3rd corps from Aragon. Yet without examining whether either the Spanish general or army were capable of such a difficult operation as adopting an accidental line of operations, the advice, if given at all, was only given on the 18th, and on the 19th, the 1st corps, the 4th, the greatest part of the 5th, the reserve and the royal guards, forming a mass of more than 50,000 fighting men, would have taught Areizaga that men and not mountains decide the fate of a battle. But in fact, there were no mountains to hold; between Zarza and the borders of Valencia the whole country is one vast plain; and on the 18th, there was only the alternative of fighting the weakest of the two French armies, or retreating by forced marches through La Mancha. The former was chosen, Areizaga's army was destroyed; and in the battle he discovered no redeeming quality. His position was ill chosen, he made no use of his cavalry, his left wing never fired a shot, and when the men undismayed by the defeat on the right, demanded to be led into action, he commanded a retreat, and quitted the field himself at the moment when his presence was most wanted.

6. The combinations of the French were methodical, well arranged, effectual, and it may seem misplaced to do aught but commend movements so eminently successful. Yet the chances of war are manifold enough to justify the drawing attention to some points of this short campaign. Areizaga's burst from the mountains was so unexpected and rapid, that it might well make his adversaries hesitate; and hence, perhaps, the reason why the first corps circled round the Spanish army, and was singly to have attacked the latter in front at Zarza, on the 19th; whereas, reinforced with the division of the fourth corps from Toledo, it might have fallen on the rear and flank from Mora a week before; that is, during the three days Areizaga remained at Dos Barrios, from whence Mora is only four hours' march.

7. The 11th, the king knew the English army had not approached the valley of the Tagus; Areizaga only quitted Dos Barrios the 13th, and he remained at Zarza until the 18th. During eight days, therefore, the Spanish general was permitted to lead, and had he been a man of real enterprise he would have crushed the troops between Dos Barrios and Aranjuez on the 10th or 11th. Indeed, the boldness with which Sebastiani maintained his offensive position beyond Aranjuez, from the 9th to the 14th, was a masterpiece. It must, however, be acknowledged that Soult could not at once fix a general, who marched 50,000 men about like a patrol of cavalry, without the slightest regard to his adversary's positions or his own line of operations.

8. In the battle, nothing could be more scientific than the mode in which the French closed upon and defeated the right and centre, while they paralysed the left of the Spaniards. The disparity of numbers engaged, and the enormous amount of prisoners, artillery, and other trophies of victory prove it to have been a fine display of talent. But Andalusia was laid prostrate by this sudden destruction of her troops; why, then, was the fruit of victory neglected? Did the king, unable to perceive his advantages, control the higher military genius of his advising general,

or was he distracted by disputes amongst the different commanders? or, did the British army at Badajos alarm him? An accurate knowledge of these points is essential in estimating the real share Spain had in her own deliverance.

9. Sir Arthur Wellesley absolutely refused to co-operate in this short and violent campaign. He remained a quiet spectator of events at the most critical period of the war; and yet on paper the Spanish projects promised well. Areizaga's army exceeded 50,000 men, Albuquerque's 10,000, and 30,000 were under Del Parque, who, at Tamames, had just overthrown the best corps in the French army. Villa Campa also, and the Partida bands on the side of Cuenca, were estimated at 10,000; in fine, there were 100,000 Spanish soldiers ready. The British army at this period, although much reduced by sickness, had still 20,000 men fit to bear arms, and the Portuguese under Beresford were near 30,000, making a total of 150,000 allies. Thirty thousand to guard the passes of the Sierra de Gredos and watch the 6th corps, 120,000 to attack the 70,000 French covering Madrid! Why, then, was Sir Arthur Wellesley, who only four months before so eagerly undertook a like enterprise with fewer forces, now absolutely deaf to the proposals of the junta? "Because moral force is to physical force, as three to one in war." He had proved the military qualities of Spaniards and French, had foresaw, to use his own expressions, "after one or two battles, and one or two brilliant actions by some, and defeats sustained by others, that all would have to retreat again;" yet this man, so cautious, so sensible of the enemy's superiority, was laying the foundation of measures that finally carried him triumphant through the Peninsula. False, then, are the opinions of those, who, asserting Napoleon might have been driven over the Ebro in 1808-9, blame Sir John Moore's conduct. Such reasoners would as certainly have charged the ruin of Spain on Sir Arthur Wellesley, if at this period the chances of war had sent him to his grave. But in all times the wise and brave man's toil has been the sport of fools!

Alba de Tormes ended the great military transactions of 1809. In the beginning, Napoleon broke to atoms and dispersed the feeble structure of the Spanish insurrection, but after his departure the invasion stagnated amidst the bickerings of his lieutenants. Sir Arthur Wellesley turned the war back upon the invaders for a moment, but the jealousy and folly of his ally soon obliged him to retire to Portugal. The Spaniards then tried their single strength, and were trampled underfoot at Ocaña, and notwithstanding the assistance of England, the offensive passed entirely from their hands. In the next book we shall find them everywhere acting on the defensive, and everywhere weak.

BOOK X.

CHAPTER I.

NAPOLÉON, victorious in Germany, and ready to turn his undivided strength once more against the Peninsula, complained of the past inactivity of the king, and Joseph prepared to commence the campaign of 1810 with vigour. His first operations, however, indicated great infirmity of purpose. When Del Parque's defeat on one side, and Echevaría's on the other, had freed his flanks, and while the British army was still at Badajos, he sent the 4th corps towards Valencia, but immediately afterwards recalled it, and also the 1st corps, which, since the battle of Ocaña, had been at Santa Cruz de Mudela. The march of this last corps through La Mancha had been marked by this peculiarity, that, for the first time since the commencement of the war, the peasantry, indignant at the flight of the soldiers, guided the pursuers to the retreats of the fugitives.

Joseph's vacillation was partly occasioned by the insurrection in Navarre, under Renobajles and Mina. But Lord Wellington, previous to quitting the Guadiana,

had informed the junta of Badajos, as a matter of courtesy, that he was about to evacuate their district; and his confidential letter being published in the town Gazette, and ostentatiously copied into the Seville papers, Joseph naturally suspected it to be a cloak to some offensive project. However, the false movements of the 1st and 4th corps distracted the Spaniards, and emboldened the French partizans, who were very numerous both in Valencia and Andalusia. The troubles in Navarre were soon quieted by Suchet; the distribution of the British army in the valley of the Mondego became known, and Joseph seriously prepared for the conquest of Andalusia. This enterprise, less difficult than an invasion of Portugal, promised immediate pecuniary advantages, which was no slight consideration to a sovereign whose ministers were reduced to want from the non-payment of their salaries, and whose troops were 13 months in arrears of pay.* Napoleon, a rigid stickler for the Roman maxim, that "War should support war," paid only the corps near the frontiers of France, and rarely recruited the military chest.

Both the military and political affairs of Andalusia were now at the lowest ebb. The calm produced by the promise to convoke the National Cortes had been short lived. The disaster of Ocaña revived all the passions of the people, and afforded the old junta of Seville, the council of Castile, and other enemies of the central junta, an opportunity to pull down a government universally obnoxious; and the general discontent was increased by the measures adopted to meet the approaching crisis. The Marquis of Astorga had been succeeded by the Archbishop of Laodicea, under whose presidency the junta published a manifesto, assuring the people that there was no danger,—that Areizaga could defend the Morena against the whole power of France,—that Albuquerque would, from the side of Estremadura, fall upon the enemy's rear,—and that a second Baylen might be expected. But, while thus attempting to delude the public, they openly sent property to Cadiz, and announced that they would transfer their sittings to that town on the 1st of February.

Meanwhile, not to seem inactive, a decree was issued for a levy of 100,000 men, and for a forced loan of half the jewels, plate, and money belonging to individuals; sums left for pious purposes were also appropriated to the service of the state.

To weaken their adversaries, the junta offered Romana the command of the army in the Morena,—sent Padre Gil on a mission to Sicily, and imprisoned the Conde de Montijo and Francisco Palafox. The Marquis of Lazan, accused of being in league with his brother, was also confined in Pensicola, and the Conde de Tilly, detected in a conspiracy to seize the public treasure and make for America, was thrown into a dungeon, where his infamous existence terminated. Romana refused to serve, and Blake, recalled from Catalonia, was appointed to command the troops re-assembled at La Carolina; but most of the other generals kept aloof, and in Galicia the Conde de Noronha, resigning his command, issued a manifesto against the junta. Hence the public hatred increased, and the partizans of Palafox and Montijo, certain that the people would be against the government under any circumstances, only waited for a favourable moment to commence violence. Andalusia generally, and Seville in particular, were but one remove from anarchy, when the intrusive monarch reached the foot of the Morena with a great and well organized army.

The military preparation of the junta was in harmony with their political conduct. The decree for levying 100,000 men, issued when the enemy was but a few marches from the seat of government, was followed by an order to distribute 100,000 poniards, as if assassination were the mode in which a great nation could or ought to defend itself, especially when the regular forces at the disposal of the junta, were still numerous enough, if well directed, to have made a stout resistance. Areizaga had 25,000 men in the Morena; Echevaria, with 8000, was close by, at Hellin; 5000 or 6000 were spread over Andalusia, and Albuquerque had 15,000 behind the Guadiana. The troops at Carolina were, however, dispirited and disorganized. Blake had not arrived, and Albuquerque, distracted with contradictory orders transmitted almost daily by the junta, could contrive no reasonable plan of action, until the movements of the enemy enabled him to disregard all

* Appendix No. 4, section 1.

instructions. Thus, amidst a whirlpool of passions, intrigues, and absurdities, Andalusia, although a mighty vessel, and containing all the means of safety, was destined to sink.

This great province, composed of four kingdoms, namely, Jaen and Cordoba in the north, Grenada and Seville in the south, was protected on the right by Murcia and on the left by Portugal. The northern frontier only was accessible to the French, who could attack it either by La Mancha or Estremadura; but, between those provinces, the Toledo and Guadalupe mountains forbade all military communication until near the Morena, when, abating somewhat of their surly grandeur, they left a space through which troops could move from one province to the other in a direction parallel to the frontier of Andalusia.

Towards La Mancha, the Morena was so savage that only the royal road to Seville was practicable for artillery. Entering the hills, a little in advance of Santa Cruz de Mudela, at a pass of wonderful strength, called the Despenas Perros, it led by La Carolina and Baylen to Andujar. On the right, indeed, another route passed through the Puerto del Rey, but fell into the first at Navas Toloza, a little beyond the Despenas Perros; and there were other passes also, but all falling again into the main road, before reaching La Carolina. Santa Cruz de Mudela was therefore a position menacing the principal passes of the Morena from La Mancha.



To the eastward of Santa Cruz the town of Villa Nueva de los Infantes presented a second point of concentration for the invaders. From thence roads, practicable for cavalry and infantry, penetrated the hills by La Venta Quemada and the Puerto de San Esteban, conducting to Baeza, Ubeda, and Jaen.

In like manner, on the westward of Santa Cruz, roads, or, rather, paths, penetrated into the kingdom of Cordoba. One, entering the mountains, by Fuen Caliente, led upon Montoro; a second, called the La Plata, passed by La Conquista to Adamuz, and it is just beyond these roads that the ridges, separating La Mancha from Estremadura, begin to soften down, permitting military ingress to the latter, by the passes of Mochuello, Almaden de Azogues, and Agudo. But the barrier of the Morena still shut in Andalusia from Estremadura, the military communication between those provinces being confined to three great roads, namely, one from Medellin, by Llerena, to Guadalcanal; another from Badajos to Seville, by the defiles of Monasterio and Ronquillo; and a third by Xeres de los Caballeros, Fregenal, and Araceña. From Almaden, there was also a way, through Belalcazar, to Guadalcanal; and all these routes, except that of Araceña, whether from La Mancha or Estremadura, after crossing the mountains, led into the valley of the Guadalquivir, a river whose waters, drawn from a multitude of sources, at first roll westward, washing the foot of the Morena as far as the city of Cordoba, but then, bending gradually towards the south, flow by Seville, and are finally lost in the Atlantic.

To defend the passage of the Morena, Areizaga posted his right in the defiles of San Esteban and Montizon, covering the city of Jaen, the old walls of which were armed. His left occupied the passes of Fuen Caliente and Mochuello, covering Cordoba. His centre was established at La Carolina and in the defiles of the Despenas Perros and Puerto del Rey, which were entrenched, but with so little skill and labour as to excite the ridicule rather than the circumspection of the enemy. And here it may be well to notice an error relative to the strength of mountain-defiles, common enough even amongst men who, with some experience, have taken a contracted view of their profession.

From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes, in which the greatest multitudes may be resisted. But, without stopping to prove that local strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned by other roads, we may be certain that there are few positions so difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man can climb another can, and a good and numerous infantry, crowning the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon oblige the defenders to retreat, or to fight upon equal terms. If this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the whole of the beaten army are obvious.

Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around which an



army should operate freely in defence of more exposed positions, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops are posted, not in the middle, but behind a bridge, to defend the passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest advantages from the strength of mountain-passes. The practice of some great generals may, indeed, be quoted against this opinion; nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war to place detachments in defiles, and keep the main body in some central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy's columns as they issue from the gorges of the hills.

Pierced by many roads, and defended by feeble dispirited troops, the Morena presented no great obstacle to the French; but, as they came up against it by the way of La Mancha only, there were means to render their passage difficult. If Albuquerque, placing his army either at Almaden de Azogues, or Agudo, had operated against their right flank, he must have been beaten, or masked by a strong detachment, before Areizaga could have been attacked. Nor was Andalusia itself deficient of interior local resources for an obstinate defence.

Parallel to the Morena, and at the distance of about 100 miles, the Sierra Nevada, the Apulxaras, and the Sierra Ronda, extend from the borders of Murcia to Gibraltar, cutting off a narrow tract of country along the coast of the Mediterranean; and the intermediate space between these sierras and the Morena is broken by less extensive ridges, forming valleys which, gradually descending and widening, are finally lost in the open country about Seville. Andalusia may therefore be considered as presenting three grand divisions of country:—1. The upper, or rugged, between the Sierra Morena and the Sierra Nevada. 2. The lower, or open country, about Seville. 3. The coast-tract between the Nevada and Ronda, and the Mediterranean. This last is studded, in its whole length, with seaport towns and castles, such as Malaga, Velez-Malaga, Motril, Ardra, Marbella, Estipona, and an infinity of smaller places.

No important line of defence is offered by the Guadalquivir. An army, after passing the Morena, would follow the course of its waters to gain the lower parts of Andalusia, and, thus descending, the advantage of position would be with the invaders. But to reach the Mediterranean coast, not only the ridges of the Nevada or Ronda must be crossed but most of the minor parallel ridges enclosing the valleys, whose waters run towards the Atlantic. Now, all those valleys contain great towns, such as Jaen and Cordoba, Ubeda, Grenada, and Alcala Real, most of which, formerly fortified, and still retaining their ancient walls, were capable of defence; wherefore the enemy could not have approached the Mediterranean, nor Grenada, nor the lower country about Seville, without first taking Jaen, or Cordoba, or both. The difficulty of besieging those places, while a Spanish army was stationed at Alcala Real, or Ecija, while the mountains, on both flanks and in the rear, were filled with insurgents, and while Albuquerque hung upon the rear at Almada, is apparent. Pompey's sons, acting upon this system, nearly baffled Cæsar, although that mighty man had friends in the province, and, with his accustomed celerity, fell upon his youthful adversaries before their arrangements were matured.

But in this, the third year of the war, the junta were unprovided with any plan of defence beyond the mere occupation of the passes in the Morena. Those, once forced, Seville was open, and from that great city, the French could penetrate into all parts, and their communication with Madrid became of secondary importance, because Andalusia abounded in the materials of war, and Seville, the capital of the province, and, from its political position, the most important town in Spain, was furnished with arsenals, cannon-foundries, and all establishments necessary to a great military power.

INVASION OF ANDALUSIA.

The number of fighting-men destined for this enterprise was about 65,000. Marshal Soult directed the movements; but the king was disposed to take a more prominent part in the military arrangements than a due regard for his own interest would justify. To cover Madrid, and to watch the British army, the 2nd corps was posted between Talavera and Toledo, with strong detachments pushed into the

valley of the Tagus. Two thousand men, drawn from the reserve, garrisoned the capital ; as many were in Toledo, and two battalions occupied minor posts, such as Arganda and Guadalaxara. Gazan's division was recalled from Castile, Milhauds' from Aragon ; and the 1st, 4th, and 5th corps, the king's guards, and the reserve, increased by some reinforcements from France, were directed upon Andalusia.

During the early part of January, 1810, the troops, by easy marches, gained the foot of the Morena, and there Milhaud's division, coming by the way of Benillo, rejoined the 4th corps. A variety of menacing demonstrations, made along the front of the Spanish line of defence, between the 14th and 17th, caused Areizaga to abandon his advanced positions and confine himself to the passes of the Morena ; but, on the 18th, the king arrived in person at Santa Cruz de Mudela, and the whole army was collected in three distinct masses.

In the centre, the artillery, the king's guards, the reserve, and the 5th corps, under Marshal Mortier, were established at Santa Cruz and Elviso, close to the mouths of the Despenas Perros and the Puerto del Rey.

On the left, Sebastiani, with the 4th corps, occupied Villa Nueva de los Infantes, and prepared to penetrate, by Venta Quemada and Puerto San Esteban, into the kingdom of Jaen.

On the right, the Duke of Belluno, placing a detachment in Agudo, to watch Albuquerque, occupied Almaden de Azogues, with the 1st corps, pushed an advanced guard into the pass of Mochuelo, and sent patrols through Benalcazar and Hinojosa towards Guadalcanal. By these dispositions, Areizaga's line of defence in the Morena, and Albuquerque's line of retreat from Estremadura, were alike threatened.

On the 20th, Sebastiani, after a slight skirmish, forced the defiles of Esteban, making a number of prisoners ; and when the Spaniards rallied behind the Guadalén, one of the tributary torrents of the Guadalquivir, he again defeated them, and advancing into the plains of Ubeda, secured the bridges over the Guadalquivir.

In the centre Dessolles carried the Puerto del Rey without firing a shot, and Gazan's division crowning the heights right and left of the Despenas Perros, turned all the Spanish works in that pass, which was abandoned. Mortier, with the main body and the artillery, then poured through, reached La Carolina in the night, and the next day took possession of Andujar, having passed in triumph over the fatal field of Baylen ; more fatal to the Spaniards than to the French, for the foolish pride, engendered by that victory, was one of the principal causes of their subsequent losses.

Meanwhile the Duke of Belluno pushed detachments to Montoro, Adamuz, and Pozzoblanco, and his patrols appeared close to Cordoba. His and Sebastiani's flanking parties communicated also with the 5th corps at Andujar ; and thus, in two days, by skilful combinations upon an extent of 50 miles, the lofty barrier of the Morena was forced, and Andalusia beheld the French masses portentously gathered on the interior slopes of the mountains.

In Seville all was anarchy : Palafox and Montijo's partizans were secretly preparing to strike, and the ancient junta openly discovered a resolution to resume their former power. The timid, and those who had portable property, endeavoured to remove to Cadiz ; but the populace opposed this, and the peasantry came into the city so fast that above 100,000 persons were within the walls, and the streets were crowded with multitudes that, scarcely knowing what to expect or wish, only wanted a signal to break out into violence. The central junta fearing alike, the enemy, and their own people, prepared to fly, yet faithful to their system of delusion, while their packages were actually embarking for Cadiz, assured the people that the enemy had indeed forced the pass of Almaden, leading from La Mancha into Estremadura, but that no danger could thence arise ; because the Duke, Del Parque was in full march to join Albuquerque ; and those generals when united being stronger than the enemy would fall upon his flank, while Areizaga would co-operate from the Morena and gain a great victory.

It was on the 20th of January, and at the very moment when the Morena was being forced at all points, that this deluding address was published, it was not until

the day after that the junta despatched orders for the Duke Del Parque (who was then in the mountains beyond Ciudad Rodrigo) to effect that junction with Albuquerque from which such great things were expected ! Del Parque received the despatch on the 24th, and prepared to obey. Albuquerque, alive to all the danger of the crisis, had left General Contreras at Medellin, with 4500 men, destined to form a garrison for Badajos, and marched himself on the 22nd, with about 9000, towards Agudo, intending to fall upon the flank of the 1st corps ; but he had scarcely commenced his movement, when he learned that Agudo and Almaden were occupied, and that the French patrols were already at Benalcazar and Hinojosa, within one march of his own line of retreat upon Seville.

In this conjuncture, sending Contreras to Badajos, and his own artillery through the defile of Monasterio, he marched with his infantry to Guadalcanal. During the movement, he continued to receive contradictory and absurd orders from the junta, some of which he disregarded, and others he could not obey ; but conforming to circumstances, when the Morena was forced, he descended into the basin of Seville, crossed the Guadalquivir a few leagues from that city, at the ferry of Cantillana, reached Carmona on the 24th, and immediately pushed with his cavalry for Ecija to observe the enemy's progress. Meanwhile the storm, so long impending over the central junta, burst at Seville.

Early on the 24th a great tumult arose. Mobs traversing all the quarters of the city, called out, some for the deposition of the junta, others for the heads of the members. Francisco Palafox and Montijo were released, and the junta of Seville being re-established by acclamation, the central junta committed to their hands the defence of Andalusia, and endeavoured themselves to reach Cadiz, each as he could ; but with the full intention of re-uniting and resuming their authority. On the road, however, some of them were cast into prison by the people, some were like to be slain at Xerez, and the junta of Seville had no intention that the central junta should ever revive. Saavedra, the president of the former, by judicious measures calmed the tumult in the city, restored Romana to the command of his old army, which was now under the Duke Del Parque, made some other popular appointments, and in conjunction with his colleagues sent a formal proposition to the junta at Badajos, inviting them to take into consideration the necessity of constituting a regency, which was readily acceded to. But the events of war crowding on, overlaid their schemes ; and three days after the flight of the central junta, treason and faction being busy amongst the members of the Seville junta, they also disbanded, some remaining in the town ; others, and amongst them Saavedra, repairing to Cadiz. The tumults were then renewed with greater violence, and Romana was called upon to assume the command and defend the city ; but he evaded this dangerous honour, and proceeded to Badajos.

Thus abandoned to themselves, the people of Seville discovered the same disposition as the people of other towns in the Peninsula had done upon like occasions. If men like the Tios of Zaragoza, had assumed command, they might have left a memorable tale and a ruined city, but there were none so firm, or so ferocious ; and finally, a feeling of helplessness produced fear in all, and Seville was ready to submit to the invaders.

When the passage of the mountains was completely effected, the French corps again received their artillery, but the centre and right wing of the army remained stationary, and a detachment of the 1st corps, which had approached Cordoba, returned to Montoro. Areizaga rallied his troops at Jaen, but Sebastiani marching from Ubeda, drove him upon Alcala Real, and Jaen surrendered with 46 guns mounted on the walls. The Spanish general made one more stand ; but being again beaten, and all his artillery captured, his army dispersed. Five thousand infantry and some squadrons of cavalry throwing away their arms escaped to Gibraltar ; and Areizaga himself, with a remnant of horse, flying into the kingdom of Murcia, was there superseded by Blake. Meanwhile, Sebastiani marched upon Grenada, and entering it the 28th of January, was received with apparent joy, so entirely had the government of the central junta extinguished the former enthusiasm of the people.

As the capture of Jaen secured the left flank of the French, the king with the

centre and right, moved on Cordoba the 27th, and there also, as at Jaen and Grenada, the invaders were received without any mark of aversion,* and thus the upper country was conquered. But the projects of Joseph were not confined to Andalusia; he had opened a secret communication with Valencia, where his partisans undertook to raise a commotion whenever a French force should appear before the city. Hence, judging that no serious opposition would be made in Andalusia, he directed Sebastiani to cross the Sierra Nevada, and seize the Grenadan coast, an operation that would enable him with greater facility to act against Valencia. To ensure the success of the latter enterprise, he wrote from Cordoba to Suchet, urging him to make a combined movement from Aragon, and promising a powerful detachment from Andalusia, to meet him under the walls of Valencia.

Dessolles, with the reserve, occupied Cordoba and Jaen; but the 1st and 5th corps, followed by the king's guards, proceeded without delay towards Ecija, where it will be remembered, Albuquerque's cavalry had been posted since the night of the 24th. As the French approached, the duke fell back upon Carmona, from whence he could retreat either to Seville, or Cadiz, the way to the latter being through Utrera. But from Ecija there was a road through Moron to Utrera, shorter than that leading through Carmona, and along this road the cavalry of the 1st corps was pushed on the 27th.

Albuquerque now despairing for Seville, resolved to make for Cadiz, and lest the enemy should reach Utrera before him, gained that town with great expedition, and thence moving through Lebrija and Xeres, by long marches, journeying day and night, reached Cadiz on the 3rd of February. Some French cavalry overtook and skirmished with his rear at Utrera; but he was not pursued further, save by scouting parties; for the king had altered the original plan of operations, and ordered the 1st corps which was then pushing for Cadiz, to change its direction and march by Carmona against Seville, and the 30th, the advanced guards came on that city.

Some entrenchments and batteries had been raised for defence, and the mob still governing, fired upon the bearer of the first French summons, and announced in lofty terms a resolution to fight. Besides the populace, there were about 7000 troops, composed partly of fugitives from the Morena, partly of the original garrison

* Dupont's proceedings at Cordoba, as related in the first volume, have been commented upon in a publication, entitled "*Annals of the Peninsular Campaign.*"

Upon the authority of General Foy, the author asserts that Cordoba was sacked, calls it "*a gratuitous atrocity,*" and "*an inhuman butchery,*" and no doubt, taking for fiction the stories of Agathocles, Marius, Sylla, and a thousand others, gravely affirms, that *capacity and cruelty are rarely united*; that *Dupont was a fool*, and that *Napoleon did not poison him in a dungeon*, but that he must have "*dragged on a miserable existence exposed to universal scorn and hatred.*"

Unfortunately for the application of this nursery philosophy, Dupont, although a bad officer, was a man of acknowledged talents, and became minister of war at the restoration of the Bourbons, a period fixed by the author of the "*Annals,*" as *the era of good government in France*. But I rejected Foy's authority, first, because his work, unfinished and posthumous, discovered more of the orator than the impartial historian, and he was politically opposed to Dupont; second, because he was not an eye-witness, and his relation at variance with the "*official journal of Dupont's operations!*" was also contradicted by the testimony of a *British general of known talents and accuracy, who obtained his information on the spot a few months subsequent to the event.*

"Some time after the victory, order was restored, pillage was forbidden under pain of death, and the chosen companies maintained the police."—"Journal of Operations."

Cordoba was not pillaged, being one of the few places where the French were well received. — "Letters from a British General to Colonel Napier."

On this point, therefore, I am clear; but the author of the "*Annals,*" after contrasting my account with Foy's, thus proceeds, "It is only necessary to add, that the preceding statement is given by Colonel Napier *without any quotation of authority.*"

A less concise writer might have thought it right to add that, *six months* previous to the publication of the "*Annals,*" Colonel Napier, hearing that some of his statements appeared inconclusive to the author of that work, *because there was no quotation of authority*, transmitted through a mutual friend an assurance that he had authority for every statement, and that he would willingly furnish the author with any or all of them: no notice was taken of this offer!

of the town ; nevertheless, the city, after some negotiation, surrendered on the 31st, with all its stores, foundries, and arsenals complete, and on the 1st of February the king entered in triumph. The lower country was thus conquered, and there remained only Cadiz, and the coast tract lying between the Mediterranean and the Sierra de Nevada to subdue.

The 1st corps was immediately sent against Cadiz, and the 5th against Estremadura ; and Sebastiani having placed 1500 men in the Alhambra, and incorporated among his troops a Swiss battalion composed of those who had abandoned the French service in the battle of Baylen, seized Antequera. He was desirous to establish himself firmly in those parts before he crossed the Nevada, but his measures were precipitated by unexpected events. At Malaga, the people had imprisoned the members of the local junta, and headed by a Capuchin friar, resolved to fight the French, and a vast multitude armed in all manners took post above Antequera and Alhama, where the road from Grenada enters the hills.

As this insurrection was spreading, not only in the mountains, but through the plains of Grenada, Sebastiani resolved to fall on at once, lest the Grenadans having Gibraltar on the one flank, Murcia on the other, and in their own country many sea-ports and fortified towns, should organize a regular system of resistance. The 5th of February, after a slight skirmish at Alhama, he penetrated the hills, driving the insurgents upon Malaga ; but near that place they rallied, and an engagement, with the advanced guard of the French, under General Milhaud, taking place, about 500 Spaniards fell, and the conquerors entered the town fighting. A few of the vanquished took refuge on board some English ships of war ; the rest submitted, and more than 100 pieces of heavy and about 20 pieces of field artillery with ammunition, stores, and a quantity of British merchandise, became the spoil of the conquerors. Velez-Malaga opened its gates the next day, Motril was occupied, and the insurrection was quelled ; for in every other part, both troops and peasantry were terrified and submissive to the last degree.

Meanwhile, Victor followed the traces of Albuquerque with such diligence, as to reach Chiclana on the 5th of February, and it is generally supposed that he might have rendered himself master of Leon, for the defensive works at Cadiz and the Isla were in no way improved, but rather deteriorated since the period of Sir George Smith's negotiation. The bridge of Zuazo was indeed broken, and the canal of Santa Petri a great obstacle ; but Albuquerque's troops were harassed, dispirited, ill clothed, badly armed, and in every way inefficient ; the people of Cadiz were apathetic, and the authorities, as usual, occupied with intrigues and private interests. In this state, 8000 Spanish soldiers could scarcely have defended a line of ten miles against 25,000 French, if a sufficient number of boats could have been collected to cross the canal.

Venegas was governor of Cadiz ; but when it was known that the central junta had been deposed at Seville, a municipal junta, chiefly composed of merchants, was elected by general ballot. This body, as inflated and ambitious of power as any that had preceded it, would not suffer the fugitive members of the central junta to assume any authority ; and the latter, maugre their extreme reluctance, were obliged to submit, but, by the advice of Jovellanos, appointed a regency, composed of men not taken from amongst themselves. The municipal junta vehemently opposed this proceeding, but finally, the judicious intervention of Mr. Bartholomew Frere induced them to acquiesce ; and the 29th of January, the Bishop of Orense, General Castaños, Antonio de Escaño, Saavedra, and Fernandez de Leon, were appointed regents, until the Cortes could be assembled. Leon was afterwards replaced by one Lardizabal, a native of New Spain.

The council of Castile, which had been reinstated before the fall of Seville, now charged the deposed junta, and truly, with usurpation—the public voice added speculation and other crimes ; and the regency, which they had themselves appointed, seized their papers, sequestered their effects, threw some of the members into prison, and banished others to the provinces : thus completely extinguishing this at once odious, ridiculous, and unfortunate oligarchy. Amongst the persons composing it, there were undoubtedly, some of unsullied honour and fine talents,

ready and eloquent of speech, and dexterous in argument ; but it is not in Spain only, that men possessing all the "grace and ornament" of words have proved to be mean and contemptible statesmen.

Albuquerque, elected president of the municipal junta, and commander of the forces, endeavoured to place the Isla de Leon in a state to resist a sudden attack ; and the French, deceived as to its strength, after an ineffectual summons, proceeded to gird the whole bay with works. Meanwhile, Marshal Mortier, leaving a brigade of the 5th corps at Seville, pursued a body of 4000 men, that, under the command of the Visconde de Gand, had retired from that town towards the Morena ; they evaded him, and fled to Ayamonte, yet were like to be destroyed, because the Bishop of Algarve, from national jealousy, would not suffer them to pass the Portuguese frontier. Mortier disregarding these fugitives, passed the Morena, by Ronquillos and Monasterio, and marching against Badajos, summoned it, the 12th of February. Contreras's detachment had, however, arrived there on the 26th of January, and Mortier, finding, contrary to his expectation, that the place was in a state of defence, retired to Merida.

This terminated the first series of operations in the fourth epoch of the war ; operations which, in three weeks, had put the French in possession of Andalusia and Southern Estremadura, with the exception of Gibraltar and Cadiz in the one, and of Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque in the other province. Yet, great as were the results of this memorable irruption, more might have been obtained ; and the capture of Cadiz would have been a fatal blow to the Peninsula.

From Andujar to Seville is only 100 miles, yet the French took ten days to traverse that space ; a tardiness for which there appears no adequate cause. The king, apparently elated at the acclamations and seeming cordiality with which the towns, and even villages, greeted him, moved slowly. He imagined that Seville would open her gates at once ; and thinking that the possession of that town would produce the greatest moral effect in Andalusia, and all over Spain, changed the first judicious plan of campaign, and marched thither in preference to Cadiz. The moral influence of Seville was, however, transferred, along with the government, to Cadiz ; and Joseph was deceived in his expectations of entering the former city as he had entered Cordoba. When he discovered his error there was still time to repair it by a rapid pursuit of Albuquerque, but he feared to leave a city with 100,000 people in a state of excitement upon his flank ; and resolving first to reduce Seville, he met indeed with no formidable resistance, yet so much of opposition, as left him only the alternative of storming the town or entering by negotiation. The first his humanity forbade ; the latter cost him time, which was worth his crown, for Albuquerque's proceedings were only secondary ; the ephemeral resistance of Seville was the primary cause of the safety of Cadiz.

The march by which the Spanish duke secured the Isla de Leon, is only to be reckoned from Carmona. Previous to his arrival there, his movements, although judicious, were more the result of necessity than of skill. After the battle of Ocaña, he expected that Andalusia would be invaded ; yet, either fettered by his orders or ill-informed of the enemy's movements, his march upon Agudo was too late, and his after-march upon Guadalcanal was the forced result of his position ; he could only do that, or abandon Andalusia and retire to Badajos.

From Guadalcanal, he advanced towards Cordoba on the 23rd, and he might have thrown himself into that town ; yet the prudence of taking such a decided part was dependent upon the state of public sentiment, of which he must have been a good judge. Albuquerque, indeed, imagined that the French were already in possession of the place, whereas they did not reach it until four days later ; but they could easily have entered it on the 24th : and as he believed that they had done so, it is apparent that he had no confidence in the people's disposition. In this view, his determination to cross the Guadalquivir, and take post at Carmona, was the fittest for the occasion. It was at Carmona he first appears to have considered Seville a lost city ; and when the French approached, we find him marching, with a surprising energy, towards Cadiz, yet he was again late in deciding ; for the enemy's cavalry, moving by the shorter road to Utrera, overtook his rear-guard : and the infantry would assuredly have entered the Island of

Leon with him, if the king had not directed them upon Seville. The ephemeral resistance of that city therefore saved Albuquerque; and he, in return, saved Cadiz.

CHAPTER II.

LORD WELLINGTON'S plans were deeply affected by the invasion of Andalusia: but before treating of the stupendous campaign he was now meditating, it is necessary once more to revert to the operations in the other parts of the Peninsula, tracing them up to a fixed point; because, although bearing strongly on the main action of the war, to recur to them chronologically, would totally destroy the unity of narrative indispensable to a just handling of the subject.

OPERATIONS IN NAVARRE, ARAGON, AND VALENCIA.

Suchet, being ordered to quell the disorders in Navarre, repaired to Pampeluna, but previously directed an active pursuit of the student Mina, who, availing himself of the quarrel between the military governor and the viceroy, was actually master of the country between that fortress and Tudela, and was then at Sangüessa. General Harispe, with some battalions, marched straight against him from Zaragoza, while detachments from Tudela and Pampeluna endeavoured to surround him by the flanks, and a fourth body moving into the valleys of Ainsa and Mediano, cut him off from the Cinca river.

Harispe quickly reached Sangüessa, but the column from Pampeluna being retarded, Mina, with surprising boldness, crossed its line of march, and attacked Tafalla, thus cutting the great French line of communication; the garrison, however, made a strong resistance, and Mina disappeared the next day. At this period, however, reinforcements from France were pouring into Navarre, and a division under Loison was at Logroño, wherefore Harispe having, in concert with this general and with the garrison of Pampeluna occupied Sangüessa, Sos, Lodosa, Puente de Reyna, and all the passages of the Arga, Aragon, and Ebro rivers, launched a number of movable columns, that continually pursued Mina, until chased into the high parts of the Pyrenees, cold and hunger obliged his band to disperse. The enterprising chief himself escaped with seven followers, and when the French were tracking him from house to house, he, with a romantic simplicity, truly Spanish, repaired to Olite, that he might see Suchet pass on his way from Zaragoza to Pampeluna.

But that general, while seemingly occupied with the affairs of Pampeluna, was secretly preparing guns and materials, for a methodical war of invasion beyond the frontiers of Aragon, and when General Reynier, coming soon afterwards from France, with troops intended to form an 8th corps, was appointed governor of Navarre, Suchet returned to Zaragoza. During his absence, some petty actions had taken place, but his general arrangements were not disturbed, and the emperor having promised to increase the 3rd corps to 30,000 men, with the intention of directing it at once against Valencia, all the stores befitting such an enterprise were collected at Terruel in the course of January. The resistance of Gerona, and other events in Catalonia having, however, baffled Napoleon's calculations, this first destination of the 3rd corps was changed. Suchet was ordered to besiege Tortosa or Lerida; the 8th corps, then forming at Logroño, was directed to cover his rear, and the 7th corps to advance to the Lower Ebro and support the siege. Nor was this arrangement definite; fresh orders sent the 8th corps towards Castile, and just at this moment Joseph's letter from Cordoba, calling upon Suchet to march against Valencia, arrived, and gave a new turn to the affairs of the French in Spain.

A decree of the emperor, dated the 8th of January, and constituting Aragon a particular government, rendered Suchet independent of the king's orders, civil or military. But this decree, together with a renewed order to commence the siege of Lerida, had been intercepted, and the French general, doubtful of Napoleon's real views, undertook the enterprise against Valencia. Desirous, however, of first intimidating the partisans hanging on the borders of Aragon, he detached Laval against Villa Campa, and the latter being defeated on the side of Cuenca, his troops dispersed for the moment.

Suñet then fortified a post at Terruel, to serve as a temporary base of operations, and drew together at that place 12 battalions of infantry, a regiment of cuirassiers, several squadrons of light cavalry, and some field artillery, and, at the same time, caused six battalions and three squadrons of cavalry to be assembled at Alcaniz, under General Habert. The remainder of the 3rd corps was distributed on the line of the Cinca, and on the right bank of the Ebro. The castles of Zaragoza, Alcaniz, Monzon, Venasque, Jace, Tudela, and other towns were placed in a state of defence, and 4000 men newly arrived from France, were pushed to Daroca, to link the active columns to those left in Aragon. These arrangements occupied the whole of February, and on the 1st of March, a duplicate of the order directed Suñet to commence the siege of Lerida, reached Terruel. But as Habert's column having marched on the 27th, by the road of Morella, was already committed in the province of Valencia, the operation went on.

INCURSION TO VALENCIA.

The first day brought Suñet's column in presence of the Valencian army, for Ventura Caro, captain general of that province, was in march to attack the French at Terruel, and his advanced guard of 5000 or 6000 regulars, accompanied by armed peasants, was drawn up on some high ground behind the river Mingares, the bed of which is a deep ravine so suddenly sunk as not to be perceived until close upon it. The village and castle of Alventoza, situated somewhat in advance of the Spaniards' centre, were occupied, and commanded a bridge over the river. Their right rested on the village and bridge of Puenseca, and their left on the village of Manzunera, where the ground was rather more practicable.

Suñet, judging that Caro would not fight so far from Valencia, while Habert's column was turning his right, sent a division before daylight, on the 2nd, to turn the left of the position, and cut off the retreat; but, although the French after a skirmish crossed the ravine, the Spaniards retired with little loss upon Segorbe, and Caro fell back to the city of Valencia. Suñet entered Segorbe the 3rd, and on the 4th was at Murviedro, the ancient Saguntum, four leagues from Valencia. At the same time, Habert, who had defeated a small corps at Morella, arrived at Villa Real on the sea coast. The country between their lines of march was mountainous and impracticable, but after passing Saguntum, the Huerta, or garden of Valencia, the richest and most delightful part of Spain, opened, the two columns united, and arriving before the city on the 5th of March, seized the suburb Seranos, and the harbour called the Grao.

Suñet's spies at first confirmed the hopes of an insurrection within the walls, but the treason was detected, the leader, a Baron Pozzo Bianco, publicly executed, and the archbishop and many others imprisoned; in fine, the plan had failed, the populace were in arms, and there was no movement of French troops on the side of Murcia. Five days the French general remained before the city, vainly negotiating, and then, intrigue failing, and his army being inadequate to force the defences, he resolved to retire. In the night of the 10th he commenced his retreat in one column by Segorbe and Terruel. Meanwhile the Spanish partisans were gathering on his rear. Combats had already taken place at Leiria and Castellon de la Plana, and General Villa Campa, who had re-assembled his dispersed troops, captured four guns, with their ammunition and escort, between Terruel and Daroca; cut off another detachment of 100 men left at Alventoza, and having invested the post at Terruel, on the 7th, by a bold and ready-witted attempt, nearly carried the castle. The 12th, however, the head of Suñet's column came in sight, Villa Campa retired, and the 17th the French general reached Zaragoza.

During his absence, Perella had invested Monzon, and when the garrison of Fraga marched to its relief, the Spaniards from Lerida entered the latter town, and destroyed the bridge and French entrenchments. Mina, also, was again become formidable, and although several columns were sent in chase of him, it is probable that they would have done no more than disperse his band for the moment, but for an accident, which threw him into their hands a prisoner.

Suñet's failure at Valencia was more hurtful to the French than would at first sight appear. It happened at the moment when the National Cortes, so long desired, was at last directed to assemble; and as it seemed to balance the mis-

fortunes of Andalusia, it was hailed by the Spaniards as the commencement of a better era. But the principal military advantage was the delaying of the sieges of Lerida and Mequinenna, whereby the subjection of Catalonia was retarded: and although Suchet laboured, and successfully, to show that he was drawn into this enterprise by the force of circumstances, Napoleon's avowed discontent was well founded. The operations in Catalonia were so hampered by the nature of the country, that it was only at certain conjunctures any progress could be made, and one of the most favourable of those conjunctures was lost for want of the co-operation of the 3rd corps: but to understand this, the military topography of Catalonia must be well considered.

That province is divided in its whole length by shoots from the Pyrenees, which, with some interruptions, run to the Atlantic shores: for the sierras separating Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia from the central parts of Spain are but continuations of these shoots. The Ebro, forcing its way transversely through the ridges, parts Catalonia from Valencia, but the hills, thus broken by the river, push their rocky heads southward to the sea, cutting off Tarragona from Tortosa, and enclosing what may be called the eastern region of Catalonia, which contains Reus, Gerona, Hostalrich, Vich, Barcelona, Manresa, Tarragona, Reus, and many more towns. The torrents, the defiles, and other military features of this region have been before described. The western portion of Catalonia lying beyond the principal spine, is bounded partly by Aragon, partly by Valencia; and, like the eastern region, it is an assemblage of small plains and ragged valleys, each the bed of a river, descending towards the Ebro from the Pyrenees. It contains the fortresses of Balaguer, Lerida, Mequinenna, Cervera, and near the mouth of the Ebro, Tortosa, which, however, belongs in a military view rather to Valencia than Catalonia.

Now the mountain ridge, parting the eastern from the western region of Catalonia, could only be passed by certain routes, for the most part impassable for artillery, and those practicable leading upon walled towns at both ends of the defiles. Thus Cervera is situated on the principal and direct line from Lerida to Barcelona; Balaguer, Cardena, and Montserrat, on another and more circuitous road to the same city. Between Lerida and Tarragona, stands Monsalvad, and between Tarragona and Tortosa, the Fort St. Felipe blocks the Col de Foinquier. All these places were in the hands of the Spaniards, and a number of smaller fortresses or outposts, such as Urgel, Berga, and Solsona, served as rallying points, where the warlike Somatenes of the higher valleys took refuge from the movable columns, and from whence, supplied with arms and ammunition, they sallied to harass the flanks and rear of both the French corps.

In the eastern region, the line of operations for the 7th corps was between the mountains and the sea-coast, and parallel with both; hence, the Spanish irregular forces, holding all the communications, and the high valleys on both sides of the great dividing spine, could at all times descend upon the rear and flanks of the French, while the regular troops, opposed to them on a narrow front and supported by the fortresses of Gerona, Hostalrich, and Tarragona, could advance or retire as circumstances dictated. And upon this principle, the defence of Catalonia was conducted.

Detachments and sometimes the main body of the Spanish army, passing by the mountains, or by sea from Tarragona, harassed the French flanks, and when defeated, retired on Vich, Manresa, Montserrat, or Cervera, and finally to Tarragona. From this last the generals communicated with Tortosa, Valencia, Gibraltar, the Balearic Isles, and even Sicily, and drew succours of all kinds from these places, and meanwhile the bands in the mountains continued to vex the French communications; and it was only during the brief period of lassitude in the Spanish army, following any great defeat, that the 7th corps could chase these mountaineers. Nor, until Gerona and Hostalrich fell, was it easy to make any but sudden and short incursions towards Tarragona, because the Miguelotes from the higher valleys, and detachments from the army at Tarragona, again passing by the hills or by sea, joined the garrisons, and interrupted the communications: and thus obliged the French to retire, because the country beyond the Llobregat could never feed them long.

But when Barcelona could not be succoured by sea, it was indispensable to conduct convoys by land, and to insure their arrival, the whole army was obliged to make frequent movements in advance, retiring again when the object was effected; and this being often renewed, offered many opportunities for cutting off minor convoys, detachments, and even considerable bodies isolated by the momentary absence of the army. Thus, during the siege of Gerona, Blake passed through the mountains and harassed the besiegers. When the place fell, he retired again to Tarragona, and Augereau took the occasion to attack the Miguelletes, and Somatenes, in the high valleys; but in the midst of this operation Admiral Baudin's squadron was intercepted by Admiral Martin; and the insatiable craving of Barcelona obliged Augereau to re-assemble his army, and conduct a convoy there by land. Yet he was soon obliged to return again, lest he should himself consume the provisions he brought for the city. This retreat, as usual, drew on the Spaniards, who were again defeated; and Augereau once more advanced, in the intention of co-operating with the 3rd corps, which, he supposed, would, following the Emperor's design, be before Lerida or Tortosa. However, when Augereau thus advanced, Suchet was on the march to Valencia; and Henry O'Donnel who had succeeded Blake in the command recommenced the warfare on the French communications, and forced Augereau again to retire to Gerona, at the moment when Suchet, having returned to Aragon, was ready to besiege Lerida; thus, like unruly horses in a chariot dragging different ways, the French impeded each other's movements. I shall now briefly narrate the events touched upon above.

OPERATIONS OF THE 7TH CORPS.

Gerona having fallen, General Souham with a division scoured the high valleys, beating the Miguelletes of Claros and Rovira, at Besalu, Olot, Ribas, and Campredon; and at Ripoll he destroyed a manufactory for arms. Being afterwards reinforced with Pino's division, he marched from Olot, by the road of Esteban and Manlieu; the Somatenes disputed the defiles near the last point, but the French forcing the passage, again took possession of Vich. Meanwhile Blake having been called to Andalusia, the provincial junta of Catalonia, rejecting the Duke Del Parque, took upon themselves to give the command to Henry O'Donnel, whose courage during the siege of Gerona had gained him a high reputation. He was now with the remains of Blake's army at Vich, and as the French approached that town he retired to the pass of Col de Sespina, from whence he had a free retreat upon Moya and Manresa. Souham's advanced guard pursued, and at Tona captured some baggage, but the Spaniard turned on finding his rear pressed, and when the pursuers mounted the heights of Sespino, charged with a shock that sent them headlong down the hills again. Souham rallied the beaten troops in the plain, and the next day offered battle; but O'Donnel continued his retreat, and the French general returned to Vich.

During these events, Augereau, leaving a detachment in Hostalrich to blockade the castle, marched to Barcelona, by the road of Cardedieu, having previously ordered Duhesme to post three battalions and five squadrons of cuirassiers, with some guns, near the junction of the roads of Cardedieu and Manresa, to watch O'Donnel. Colonel Guery commanding this detachment, placed one battalion at Granollers, a second at Santa Perpetua, and with the remainder occupied Mollet, taking, however, no military precautions; and O'Donnel, who had been joined by Campo Verde, from the side of Cervera, sent him to fall upon the French posts. Campo Verde, passing by Tarrassa and Sabadel, surprised and put to the sword or captured all the troops at Santa Perpetua and Mollet; but those at Granollers threw themselves into a large building, and defended it for three days, when by the approach of Augereau they were relieved. The marshal finding the streets of Mollet strewn with French carcases, ordered up the division of Souham from Vich, but passed on himself to Barcelona. When there, he became convinced how oppressive Duhesme's conduct had been, and sent him to France in disgrace; after which, unable to procure provisions without exhausting the magazines of Barcelona, he resumed his former position at Gerona, and Souham, passing the defiles of Garriga, returned to Vich.

All this time the blockade of Hostalrich continued; but the retreat of Augereau,

and the success of Campo Verde's enterprise produced extraordinary joy over all Catalonia. The prisoners taken were marched from town to town, and the action everywhere exaggerated: the decree for enrolling a fifth of the male population was enforced with vigour, and the execution entrusted to the Baron d'Erolles, a native of Talarn, who afterwards obtained considerable celebrity. The army, in which there was still a large body of Swiss troops, was thus reinforced; the confidence of the people increased hourly, and a local junta was established at Arenys de Mar, to organize the Somatenes on the coast, and to direct the application of succours from the sea. The partisans, also re-assembling their dispersed bands in the higher valleys, again vexed the Ampurdan, and incommoded the troops blockading the citadel of Hostalrich.

O'Donnel himself, moving to Manresa, called the Miguelettes from the Lerida side, to his assistance; and soon formed a body of more than 12,000 fighting-men, with which he took post at Moya, in the beginning of February, and harassed the French in front of Vich, while, in the rear of that town, Rovira occupied the heights above Roda. Souham, seeing the crests of the hills thus swarming with enemies, and having but 5000 men of all arms to oppose to them, demanded reinforcements; but Augereau paid little attention to him; and on the 20th, O'Donnel, descending the mountain of Centellas, entered the plains in three columns, and the French general had scarcely time to draw up his troops a little in front of the town, ere he was attacked with a vigour hitherto unusual with the Spaniards.

COMBAT OF VICH.

Rovira commenced the action by driving the enemy's posts, on the side of Roda, back upon the town, and soon afterwards O'Donnel, coming close up on the front of the French position, opened all his guns, and, throwing out skirmishers along the whole of the adverse line, filed his cavalry, under cover of their fire, to the right, intending to outflank Souham's left; but the latter general, leaving a battalion to hold Rovira in check, encouraged his own infantry, and sent his dragoons against the Spanish horsemen, who, at the first charge, were driven back in confusion. The foot then fell in on the French centre, but, failing to make any serious impression, the Spanish general, whose great superiority of numbers enabled him to keep heavy masses in reserve, endeavoured to turn both flanks of the enemy at the same time. Souham was now hard pressed, his infantry were few, his reserves all engaged, and himself severely wounded in the head. O'Donnel, who had rallied his cavalry, and brought up his Swiss regiments, was full of confidence, and in person fiercely led the whole mass once more against the left; but at this critical period, the French infantry, far from wavering, firmly closed their ranks, and sent their volleys more rapidly into the hostile ranks, while the cavalry, sensible that the fate of all (for there was no retreat) hung upon the issue of their charge, met their adversaries with such a full career that horse and man went down before them, and the Swiss, being separated from the rest, surrendered. Rovira was afterwards driven away, and the Spanish army returned to the hills, having lost a full fourth of its own numbers, and killed or wounded 1200 of the enemy.

O'Donnel's advance had been the signal for all the irregular bands to act against the various quarters of the French; they were, however, with the exception of a slight succour, thrown into Hostalrich, unsuccessful, and, being closely pursued by the movable columns, dispersed. Thus the higher valleys were again subdued, the junta fled from Arenys de Mar, Campo Verde returned to the country about Cervera, and O'Donnel, quitting the Upper Llobregat, retired by Taraza, Martorel, and Villa Franca to the camp of Tarragona, leaving only an advanced guard at Ordal.

It was at this moment, when Upper Catalonia was in a manner abandoned by the Spanish general, that the emperor directed the 7th corps upon the Lower Ebro, to support Suchet's operations against Lerida and Mequinenza. Augereau, therefore, leaving a detachment under Verdier, in the Ampurdan, and 2000 men to blockade Hostalrich, ordered his brother and General Mazzucchelli (the one commanding Souham's, and the other Pino's division) to march upon Manresa, while he himself, with the Westphalian division, repaired once more to Barcelona, and from thence directed all the subsequent movements.

General Augereau, passing by Col de Sespina, entered Manreza the 16th of March, and there joined Mazzucchelli; but the inhabitants abandoned the place, and General Swartz was sent with a brigade, from Moncada, to take possession, while the two divisions continued their movement, by Montserrat, upon Molino del Rey. The 21st they advanced to Villa Franca, and the Spaniards retired from Ordal towards Tarragona. But the French, acting under orders from Barcelona, left 1000 men in Villa Franca, and after scouring the country on the right and left, passed the Col de San Cristina, and established their quarters about Reus, by which the Spanish army at Tarragona was placed between them and the troops at Villa Franca.

O'Donnel, whose energy and military talents were superior to his predecessors', saw, and instantly profited from this false position. By his orders, General Juan Caro marched, with 6000 men against the French in Villa Franca, and, on the 28th, killed many and captured the rest, together with some artillery and stores; but, being wounded himself, resigned the command to General Gasca, after the action. Augereau, alarmed for Manreza, detached troops, both by Olesa and Montserrat, to reinforce Swartz. The first reached their destinations, but the others, 1200 strong, were intercepted by Gasca, and totally defeated at Esparaguera on the 3rd of April. Campo Verde then, coming down from the side of Cervera, took the chief command, and proceeded against Manreza, by Montserrat, while Milans de Boch, and Rovira, hemmed in the French on the opposite side, and the Somatenes gathered on the hills to aid the operations. Swartz evacuated the town in the night, and thinking to baffle the Spaniards by taking the road of Taraza and Sabadel, was followed closely and beaten, by Rovira and Milans, on the 5th of April, and with great difficulty and the loss of all his baggage, reached Barcelona.

These operations having insulated the French divisions at Reus, an officer was despatched, by sea, with orders to recall them to Barcelona. Meanwhile Count Severoli, who had taken the command of them, and whose first instructions were to co-operate with Suchet, feared to pass the mountains between Reus and the Ebro, lest he should expose his rear to an attack from Tarragona, and perhaps fail of meeting the 3rd corps at last. Keeping, therefore, on the defensive at Reus, he detached Colonel Villatte, at the head of two battalions and some cavalry, across the hills, by Dos Aguas and Falcet, to open a communication with the 3rd corps, a part of which had just seized Mora and Flix, on the Lower Ebro. Villatte accomplished his object, and returned with great celerity, fighting his way through the Somatenes, who were gathering round the defiles in his rear. He regained Reus, just as Severoli, having received the order of recall, was commencing his march for Barcelona.

In the night of the 6th, this movement took place, but in such confusion, that from Tarragona, O'Donnel perceived the disorder; and sending a detachment, under Colonel Orry, to harass the French, followed himself with the rest of his army. Nevertheless, Severoli's rear guard covered the retreat successfully until a position was attained near Villa Franca; and there Orry, pressing on too closely, was wounded and taken, and his troops rejoined their main body. As these divisions arrived, Campo Verde fell back to Cervera, Severoli reached Barcelona, and Augereau retired to Gerona, having lost more than 3000 men, by a series of most unskilful movements. The situation in which he voluntarily placed himself was precisely such as a great general would rejoice to see his adversary choose.

Barcelona, the centre of his operations, was encircled by mountains, to be passed only at certain defiles; now Reus and Manresa were beyond those defiles, and several days' march from each other. Rovira and Milans being about San Cugat, cut the communication between Manresa and Barcelona; and O'Donnel, at Tarragona, was nearer to the defiles of Cristina than the French divisions at Reus. His communication with Campo Verde was open by Valls, Pla, and Santa Coloma de Querault; and with Milans and Rovira, by Villa Franca, San Sadurni, and Igualada.

Augereau, indeed, placed a battalion in Villa Franca, but this only rendered his situation worse; for what could 600 men effect in a mountainous country against three considerable bodies of the enemy? The result was inevitable. The battalion,

at Villa Franca was put to the sword ; Swartz only saved a remnant of his brigade by a timely flight ; the divisions at Reus with difficulty made good their retreat ; and O'Donnel, who, one month before, had retired from the battle of Vich, broken and discomfited by only 5000 French, now, with that very beaten army, baffled Augereau, and obliged him, although at the head of more than 20,000 men, to abandon Lower Catalonia, and retire to Gerona with disgrace : a surprising change, yet one in which fortune had no share.

Augereau's talents for handling small corps in a battle have been recorded by a master hand. There is a vast difference between that and conducting a campaign ; but the truth is, that Catalonia had, like Aragon, been declared a particular government, and Augereau, afflicted with gout, remained in the palace of Barcelona, affecting the state of a viceroy when he should have been at the head of his troops in the field. On the other hand, his opponent, a hardy resolute man, excited by a sudden celebrity, was vigilant, indefatigable, and eager. He merited the success he obtained ; and with better and more experienced troops that success would have been infinitely greater. Yet if the expedition to Valencia had not taken place, O'Donnel distracted by a double attack, would have remained at Tarragona ; and neither the action of Vich, nor the disasters at Mollet, Villa Franca, and Esparraguera, would have taken place.

Napoleon, discontented, as he well might be, with these operations, appointed M'Donald, Duke of Tarentum, to supersede Augereau ; but, in the mean time, the latter, having reached Gerona, disposed his troops in the most commodious manner to cover the blockade of Hostalrich, giving Severoli the command.

FALL OF HOSTALRICH CASTLE.

This citadel was invested early in January. Situated on a high rock, armed with 40 guns, well garrisoned, and commanded by a brave man, it was nearly impregnable ; and the French at first endeavoured to reduce it by a simple blockade : but, towards the middle of February, commenced the erection of mortar batteries. Severoli also pressed the place more vigorously than before, and although O'Donnel, collecting convoys on the side of Vich and Mattaro, caused the blockading troops to be attacked at several points by the Miguelettes, every attempt to introduce supplies failed. The garrison was reduced to extremity, and honourable terms were offered, but the governor, Julian Estrada, rejected them, and prepared to break through the enemy's line, an exploit always expected from a good garrison in Turenne's days, and, as Napoleon has shown by numerous examples, generally successful.

O'Donnel, who could always communicate with the garrison, being aware of their intention, sent some vessels to Arenys de Mar, and made demonstrations from thence, and from the side of St. Celoni, to favour the enterprise ; and in the night of the 12th, Estrada, leaving his sick behind, came forth with about 1400 men. He first made as if for St. Celoni, but afterwards turning to his right, broke through on the side of St. Felieu de Buxalieu and pushed for Vich ; but the French closing rapidly from the right and left, pursued so closely, that Estrada himself was wounded, and taken, together with about 300 men ; many also were killed, the rest dispersed in the mountains, and 800 reached Vich in safety. This courageous action was therefore successful. Thus, on the 14th of May, after four months of blockade and ten weeks of bombardment, the castle fell, the line of communication with Barcelona was completed, and the errors committed by Duhesme were partly remedied, but at an expense of two years of field operations, many battles, and four sieges.

Two small islands called Las Medas, situated at the mouth of the Ter, and affording a safe anchorage, were next seized, and this event which facilitated the passage of the French vessels, stealing from port to port with provisions or despatches, finished Augereau's career. It had been the very reverse of St. Cyr's. The latter, victorious in the field, was humane afterwards ; but Augereau endeavouring to frighten those people into submission whom he had failed to beat, erected gibbets along the high-roads, upon which every man taken in arms was hung up without remorse, producing precisely the effect that might be expected. The Catalans more animated by their successes than daunted by

this barbarous severity, became incredibly savage in their revenge, and thus, all human feeling lost, both parties were alike steeped in blood and loaded with crimes.

CHAPTER III.

WHILE Augereau lost, in Barcelona, the fruits of his success at Gerona, Suchet, sensible how injurious the expedition to Valencia had proved, was diligently repairing that error. Reinforcements from France had raised his fighting men to about 23,000 and of these he drew out 13,000 to form the siege of Lerida; the remainder were required to maintain the forts in Aragon, and to hold in check the Partizans, principally in the higher valleys of the Pyrenees. Villa Campa, however, with from 3000 to 4000 men, still kept about the lordship of Molina, and the mountains of Albaracin.

Two lines of operation were open to Suchet, the one, short and direct, by the high-road leading from Zaragoza through Fraga to Lerida; the other, circuitous, over the Sierra de Alcubierre, to Monzon, and from thence to Lerida. The first was inconvenient, because the Spaniards, when they took Fraga, destroyed the bridge over the Cinca. Moreover, the fortress of Mequinenza, the Octogesa of Cæsar, situated at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, was closed on the right flank, and might seriously incommode the communications with Zaragoza, whereas the second route, although longer, was safer, and less exhausted of forage and provisions.

Monzon was already a considerable military establishment; the battering train consisting of 40 pieces, with 700 rounds of ammunition attached to each, was directed there, and placed under the guard of Habert's division which occupied the line of the Cinca. Leval, leaving General Chlopiski with a brigade at Daroca, to observe Villa Campa, drew nearer to Zaragoza with the rest of his division. Musnier marched with one brigade to Alcanitz, and was there joined by his second brigade, which had been conducted to that point from Terruel, across the Sierra de Gudar. And while these movements were executing, the castles of Barbastro, Huesca, Ayerbe, Zuera, Pina, Bujarola, and other points on the left of the Ebro, were occupied by detachments.

The right bank of that river, being guarded by Leval's division, and the country on the left bank, secured by a number of fortified posts, there remained two divisions of infantry, and about 900 cavalry, disposable for the operations against Lerida. On the Spanish side, Campo Verde was with O'Donnel at Manreza, and Garcia Novaro at Tarragona, having small detachments on the right bank of the Ebro to cover Tortosa; Perenna with five battalions occupied Balaguer on the Upper Segre.

Such were the relative situations of both parties, when General Musnier, quitting Alcanitz towards the end of March, crossed the Guadalupe, drove Novarro's detachments within the walls of Tortosa, and then remounting the Ebro, seized some boats, and passing that river at Mora and at Flix, communicated, as I have before related, with Colonel Villatte of the 7th corps. And while this was passing on the Ebro, General Habert crossed the Cinca in two columns, one of which moved straight upon Balaguer, while the other passed the Segre at Camarasa. Perenna, fearing to be attacked on both sides of that river, and not wishing to defend Balaguer, retired down the left bank, and using the Lerida bridge, remounted the right bank to Corbins, where he took post behind the Noguerra, at its confluence with the Segre.

Suchet himself repaired to Monzon the 10th of April, and placed a detachment at Candanos to cover his establishments from the garrison of Mequinenza, and the 13th he advanced with a brigade of infantry, and all his cavalry, by Almacellas, against Lerida; meanwhile Habert, descending the right bank of the Segre, forced the passage of the Noguerra, and obliged Perenna to retire within the place. The same day Musnier came up from Flix, and the town being thus encompassed, the operations of the 7th and 3rd corps were connected. Suchet's line of operations from Aragon, was short, direct, and easy to supply, because the produce of that

province was greater than the consumption ; but Augereau's line was long and unsafe, and the produce of Catalonia was at no time equal to the consumption.

Lerida, celebrated in ancient and modern times, contained about 18000 inhabitants. Situated upon the high-road from Zaragoza to Barcelona, and about 65 miles from each ; it possessed a stone bridge over the Segre, and was only a short distance from the Ebro and the Cinca rivers ; its strategic importance was therefore great, and the more so, that it in a manner commanded the plains of Urgel, called the granary of Catalonia. The regular governor was named Gonzalez, but Garcia Conde had been appointed chief commandant, to appease his discontent at O'Donnel's elevation ; and the troops he brought with him had increased the garrison to 9000 regulars, besides the armed inhabitants.

The river Segre covered the town on the south-east, and the head of the bridge was protected on the left bank by a rampart and ditch enclosing a square stone building. The body of the place on the north side was defended by a wall, without either ditch or covered way, but strengthened and flanked by bastions, and by towers. This wall on the east was joined to a rocky hill more than 250 feet high, the top of which sustained the citadel, an assemblage of huge solid edifices, clustered about a castle of great height, and surrounded by an irregular work flanked by good bastions with ramparts from 40 to 50 feet high.

The descent from this rock into the town was gentle, and the works were there strengthened by ditches ; on the other parts, the walls could be seen to their base ; yet the great height of the rock rendered it impossible to breach them, and the approaches were nearly inaccessible. Between the citadel-rock and the river the town was squeezed out about 200 or 300 yards, and the salient part was secured by an entrenchment, and by two bastions called the Carmen and the Magdalen.

To the westward of the town, at the distance of 700 or 800 yards, the hill, on which Afranius and Petricus encamped to oppose Cæsar, was crowned, on the end next to Lerida, by Fort Garden, which was again covered by a large hornwork, with ditches above 20 feet deep ; and at the farthest extremity of the Afranian hill, two large redoubts called the Pilar and San Fernando, secured the whole of the flat summit. All the works of Lerida were in good condition, and armed with more than 100 pieces of artillery ; the magazines were full, and the people enthusiastic. A local junta also had been formed to excite public feeling ; and two officers of artillery had already been murdered and their heads nailed to the gates of the town.

The siege was to be a joint operation by the 3rd and 7th corps, but the information derived from Colonel Villatte, and the appearance of Spanish Partizans on the lower Ebro, led Suchet to suspect that the 7th corps had already retired, and that the burthen would rest on him alone, wherefore he still kept his battering train at Monzon, intending to wait until O'Donnel's plans should be clearly indicated, before he commenced the siege. Meanwhile, he established a communication across the Segre, by means of a rope ferry, one league above Lerida, and after closely examining the defences, prepared materials for the construction of batteries.

Two battalions of the investing troops had been left at Monzon and Balaguer, but the remainder were thus distributed. On the left bank of the Segre, at Alcoteleje, 4000 men, including the cavalry, which was composed of a regiment of cuirassiers and one of hussars, were stationed as a corps of observation ; and Harispe, with three battalions, invested the bridge-head of Lerida. By this disposition, the ferry-boat was protected, and all danger from the sudden rising of the Segre obviated, because the stone bridge of Balaguer furnished a certain communication. The rest of the troops occupied different positions, on the roads to Monzon, Fraga, and Corbins, but as the number was insufficient to complete the circle of investment round Fort Garden, that part was continually scoured by patrols.

Scarcely were these arrangements completed when a Spanish officer, pretending to bear propositions for an exchange of prisoners, was stopped on the left bank of the Segre, and the French general detained him, suspecting his real object was to gain information ; for rumours obtained that O'Donnel was collecting troops at Mombanch, that Campo Verde was at Cervera, and that the Somatenes of the high valleys were in arms on the upper Segre. Suchet, anxious to ascertain the truth of these reports, reinforced Harispe with 300 hussars on the 19th of April,

and carried the corps of observation to Balaguer. The Governor of Lerida took that opportunity to make a sally, but was repulsed, and the 21st, the French general, to strengthen his position at Balaguer, caused the bridge of Camarasa, above that town, to be broken, and then advanced as far as Tarrega, 40 miles on the road to Barcelona, to obtain intelligence; for he was still uncertain of Augereau's movements, and like every other general, French or English, found it extremely difficult to procure authentic information. On this occasion, however, by a happy fortune, he ascertained that O'Donnel, with two divisions, was at Momblanch, ready to descend the mountains and succour Lerida; wherefore returning by one forced march to Balaguer, he directed Musnier to resume his former position at Alcoteletge. This rapidity was well-timed, for O'Donnel had passed the defiles of Momblanch, with 8000 chosen infantry, and 600 cavalry, and encamped at Vinaxa, about 25 miles from Lerida, on the 22nd. There a note from Garcia Conde, saying that, the French reserve being drawn off, the investing force was weak, reached him, and he being willing to seize the favourable moment, immediately pushed forward, reached Juneda, 14 miles from Lerida, by ten o'clock in the morning of the 23rd, and, after a halt of two hours, resumed his march with the cavalry and one division of infantry, leaving the other to follow more leisurely.

COMBAT OF MARGALEF.

Four miles from Juneda stood the ruined village of Margalef, and from thence to Lerida was an open country, on which O'Donnel could perceive no covering force. Hence, trusting implicitly to Conde's information (already falsified by Suchet's activity), the Spanish general descended the hills, and crossed the plain in three columns, one following the high-road and the other two marching on the right and left. The centre outstripping the flankers, soon beat back the advanced posts of Harispe; but that general charged with his 300 hussars upon the Spanish column so suddenly, that it was thrown into confusion, and fled towards Margalef, to which place the flank columns also retreated, yet in good order. During this skirmish, the garrison sallied over the bridge, but the French infantry stood firm, and the besieged, seeing the rout of O'Donnel's column, returned to the town.

Meanwhile, Musnier, hearing the firing, guessed the real state of affairs, and marched at once with his infantry and 400 cuirassiers from Alcoteletge across the plain towards Margalef, hoping to cut off the Spaniards' retreat. O'Donnel had, however, rallied his troops, and was already in line of battle, the artillery on the right and the cavalry on the left, his second division being, however, still in the rear. The French cuirassiers and a battery of light artillery came up at a quick pace, a cannonade commenced, and the Spanish cavalry rode forward, but the cuirassiers, commanded by General Boussard, charged hotly, and forced them back on the line of battle in such a manner that the latter wavered, when Boussard, observing the confusion, came with a rude shock upon the flank of the infantry. The Walloon guards made an effort to form square, but the confusion was extreme, and nearly all the Spanish infantry threw down their arms or were sabred. The cuirassiers, elated with their success, then met and overthrew a Swiss regiment, forming the advanced guard of the second Spanish division; but the main body of the latter checked their fury, and O'Donnel retreated in good order, and without further loss to the defile of Momblanch.

This action, although not discreditable to O'Donnel, was very unfortunate. The plain was strewn with carcasses; three Spanish guns, one general, eight colonels, and above 5000 men were captured; and the next day the prisoners, being first ostentatiously marched under the walls of the town, were shown to the Spanish officer who had been detained on the 19th, after which he was dismissed by the road of Cervera, that he might spread the news of the defeat.

Suchet wishing to profit from the effect of this victory upon the besieged, attempted, the night after the battle, to storm the redoubts of San Fernando and Pilar. He was successful with the latter, and the assailants descended into the ditch of San Fernando, from whence the Spaniards, only 50 in number and unprovided with hand grenades, could not drive them, and a parley ensuing it was agreed that the French should retire without being molested. Thus the Pilar was also saved, for being commanded by San Fernando, it was necessarily evacuated.

Previous to this attempt, Suchet had summoned the city to surrender, offering safe conduct for commissioners to count the dead on the field of Margalef, and to review the prisoners ; but Garcia Conde replied, "*that Lerida never looked for external succour in her defences.*"

SIEGE OF LERIDA.

The absolute retreat of Augereau was now fully ascertained, yet the victory of Margalef, and the apathy of the Valencians, encouraged Suchet to commence the siege in form. The prisoners were sent to France by the way of Jaca ; the battering train was brought up from Monzon, and all the other necessary preparations being completed, the Spanish outposts were driven within the walls between the 26th and 27th. The following night, under the direction of General Haxo, ground was broken 300 yards from the bastions of the Carmen and Magdalen ; the Spaniards threw some fire-balls and opened a few guns, but without interrupting the workmen, and when day broke, the besiegers were well covered in the trenches.

In the night of the 30th the first parallel was completed. Breaching and counter batteries were commenced, six 16-pounders were destined to batter the left face of the Carmen, four long 12-pounders to ruin the defences of the Magdalen, and four mortars of eight inches to throw shells into the citadel. The weather was rainy and the labour heavy, yet the works advanced rapidly, and on the 2nd of May, a fourth battery, armed with two mortars and two 16-pounders, was raised against the Carmen. Meanwhile the Spanish musqueteers incommoded the trenches from the left bank of the Segre, which obliged the French to contract the circle of investment on that side.

In the evening of the 4th of May, 600 Spaniards, sallying from the Carmen, carried the fourth battery and all the left of the trenches, while another body, coming from the Magdalen, menaced the right of the French works. The French guards held the latter in check, and the reserves finally drove the former back into the town, but after this attack, a ditch and rampart, to serve as a place of arms, was carried from the battery which had been taken, down to the river, and as the light troops still continued to ply the trenches from the other side of the Segre, ground was broken there, close to the water, and a battery of two guns was constructed to answer six Spanish field-pieces, posted on the bridge itself. The parallel of the main attack was also extended on the right, embracing a part of the northern front of the citadel, and two mortars were placed at this extremity.

All the French batteries opened at daybreak on the 7th, the mortars played into the town and citadel, and four Spanish guns were dismounted in the Carmen. Nevertheless, the counter fire silenced three French batteries, the dismounted guns were replaced, and 300 men stealing out at dusk by the Puerta Nueva, fell upon the right of the parallels, took the two mortars, and penetrated as far as the approaches against the Magdalen. This sally was repulsed by the French reserves, but the latter pursuing too far, suffered from grape, and in the night a violent storm, with rain, damaged the batteries and overflowed the trenches. From the 8th to the 11th the French only laboured at the works, and opened a second parallel 150 yards in advance of the first, with the intention of forming fresh batteries, that being closer under the citadel-rock, would be less exposed to its plunging fire. More guns, and of a larger size, were also mounted ; three new batteries were constructed ; and marksmen were planted to harass the Spanish cannoncers.

On the 12th the besiegers recommenced their fire from eight batteries, containing 15 guns and 19 mortars. The besieged replied at first sharply, but in a little time stammered in their answers, and the French artillery taking the ascendant, the walls of the Carmen and Magdalen crumbled under their salvos, and a portable magazine blew up in the citadel. Towards evening two breaches in the Carmen and one in the Magdalen appeared practicable, and after dark, some Swiss deserters coming out through the openings, brought intelligence that the streets of the town behind the breaches were retrenched and defended by batteries.

Suchet's hopes of an early termination to the siege now rose high. He had from the first supposed, that the vehemence of the citizens, and of the armed peasantry who had entered the place, would oblige the governor to fight the town

to the last, instead of reserving his efforts for the defence of the citadel. He knew that armed mobs easily excited, are as easily discouraged, and he projected to carry the breaches briskly, and, with one sweep, to force all the inhabitants into the citadel, being well assured that they would hamper, if not entirely mar, the defence of that formidable fortress : but he resolved first, to carry the forts of San Fernando and the Pilar and the horn-work of Fort Garden, lest the citizens, flying from the assault of the breaches, should take refuge on that side. To effect this, three columns, provided with ladders and other necessary implements, simultaneously mounted the hill of Afranius that night ; one marched against the redoubts, and the others were ordered to storm the horn-work on two sides. The Pilar was carried without difficulty, and the garrison flying towards Fort Garden, fell in with the second French column, which arrived with the fugitives at the ditch of the horn-work, and being there joined by the third column, which had taken a wrong direction, the whole mass entered the place fighting. The Spaniards saved themselves in Fort Garden, and meanwhile the people in Fernando resisted desperately, and that redoubt was not taken until two-thirds of the defendants were put to the sword. Thus the French effected their object with the loss of 100 men.

During this operation the great batteries only played into the citadel, but at daybreak renewed their fire on the breaches ; steps were also cut in the parallel, to facilitate the advance of the troops to the assault ; and all the materials necessary to effect a solid lodgment on the walls were conveyed into the trenches. On the other hand, the Spaniards were preparing a grand sally, to retake the horn-work of Fort Garden, but the French arrangements being first completed, at seven o'clock in the evening of the 13th, four shells were thrown as a signal, and the storming-parties, jumping out of the trenches, rushed towards the breaches, two advancing against the Carmen, a third attacking the Magdalen, and a fourth, moving close by the river, endeavouring to break in on that side. The Spaniards, unexpected of the attack, at first permitted the French to mount the breaches unmolested ; but soon recovering, poured such a fire of musketry and artillery upon the head of the principal columns that they staggered, yet, being encouraged by General Habert, finally forced their way into the town ; and, at the same moment, the troops on the right and left being also successful, turned all the retrenchments in the streets. On the other side of the river, General Harispe carried the bridge, and Suchet himself, with the reserve, followed close upon the steps of the storming-parties ; the Spaniards were thus overpowered, and the regular troops commenced a retreat into the citadel.

It was now that the French general put his design in execution. Harispe's brigade passing the bridge, made for the gate of St. Anthony, looking towards Fort Garden, and cut off all egress from the town ; and this done, the French columns advanced from every side, in a concentric direction, upon the citadel, and, with shouts, and stabs, and musketry, drove men, women, and children before them, while the guns of the castle smote friends and foes alike. Then, flying up the ascent, the shrieking and terrified crowds rushed into the fortress with the retiring garrison, and crowded the summit of the rock ; but all that night the French shells fell amongst the hapless multitude, and at daylight the fire was redoubled, and the carnage swelled, until Garcia Conde, overpowered by the cries and sufferings of the miserable people, hoisted the white flag.

At twelve o'clock the horrible scene terminated, and the capitulation that followed was honourable in terms to the besieged ; but Fort Garden being included, Suchet became master of Lerida, with its immense stores and near 8000 prisoners, for the whole loss of the garrison had been only 1200 men.

Thus suddenly was this powerful fortress reduced by a proceeding, politic indeed, but scarcely to be admitted within the pale of civilized warfare. For though a town taken by assault be considered the lawful prey of a licentious soldiery, this remnant of barbarism, disgracing the military profession, does not warrant the driving of unarmed helpless people into a situation where they must perish from the fire of the enemy unless a governor fail in his duty. Suchet justifies it on the ground that he thus spared a great effusion of blood which must necessarily have attended a protracted siege ; and the fact is true. But this is to spare soldiers' blood

at the expense of women's and children's, and had Garcia Conde's nature been stern, he, too, might have pleaded expediency, and the victory would have fallen to him who could longest have sustained the sight of mangled infants and despairing mothers.

CHAPTER IV.

WHEN Lerida fell, Conde was accused of treachery, but there seems no foundation for the charge ; the cause stated by Suchet is sufficient for the effect ; yet the defence was very unskilful. The walls on the side of the attack could not be expected, and scarcely did, offer an impediment to the French general ; hence the citadel should have been the better prepared, and as the besiegers' force, the corps of observation being deducted, did not exceed the garrison in number, it might have baffled Suchet's utmost efforts. Engineers require that the relative strength of besiegers and besieged should not be less than four to one ; yet here the French invested a force equal to themselves, and in a short time reduced a great fortress in the midst of succouring armies, for Lerida had communications : 1. With the armed population of the high valleys ; 2. With O'Donnel's corps of 14,000 ; 3. With Cervera, where Campo Verde was posted with 4000 men ; 4. With Tortoza, where the Marquis of Lazan, now released from his imprisonment, commanded from 5000 to 6000 ; 5. With Valencia, in which province there was a disposable army of 15,000 regular and more than 30,000 irregular soldiers.

It is evident that if all these forces had been directed with skill and concert upon Lerida, not only the siege would have been raised, but the very safety of the 3rd corps endangered ; and it was to obviate this danger that Napoleon directed the 7th corps to take such a position on the Lower Ebro as would keep both O'Donnel and the Valencians in check ; but Augereau, as we have seen, failed to do this ; and St. Cyr asserts that the 7th corps could never safely venture to pass the mountains, and enter the valley of the Ebro. On the other hand, Suchet affirms that Napoleon's instructions could have been obeyed without difficulty. St. Cyr himself, under somewhat similar circumstances, blockaded Tarragona for a month ; Augereau, who had more troops and fewer enemies, might have done the same, and yet spared 6000 men to pass the mountains ; Suchet would then have been tranquil with respect to O'Donnel, and would have had a covering-army to protect the siege, and these troops, fed from the resources of Aragon, would have relieved Catalonia.

Augereau has been justified, on the ground that the blockade of Hostalrich would have been raised while he was on the Ebro. The danger of this could not have escaped the emperor, yet his military judgment, unerring in principle, was often false in application, because men measure difficulties by the standard of their own capacity, and Napoleon's standard only suited the heroic proportions. One thing is, however, certain, that Catalonia presented the most extraordinary difficulties to the invaders. The powerful military organization of the Miguelettes and Somatenes,—the well-arranged system of fortresses,—the ruggedness and sterility of the country,—the ingenuity and readiness of a manufacturing population thrown out of work, and finally, the aid of an English fleet, combined to render the conquest of this province a gigantic task. Nevertheless, the French made progress, each step planted slowly indeed and with pain, but firmly, and insuring the power of making another.

Hostalrich and Lerida fell on the same day. The acquisition of the first consolidated the French line of communication with Barcelona ; and by the capture of the second, Suchet obtained large magazines, stores of powder, 10,000 muskets, the command of several dangerous rivers, easy access to the higher valleys, and a firm footing in the midst of the Catalonian strongholds ; and he had taken or killed 15,000 Spanish soldiers. Yet this was but the prelude to greater struggles. The Miguelettes supplied O'Donnel with abundance of men, and neither his courage nor his abilities were at fault. Urgel, Cardona, Berga, Cervera, Mequinenza, Tarragona, San Felipe Balaguer, and Tortoza, the link of connection between Valencia and Catalonia, were still to be subdued, and during every great operation, the Partizans, being unmolested, recovered strength.

Thus while the siege of Lerida was going on, the Marquis of Lazan entered the town of Alcanitz with 5000 men, and would have carried the castle, but that General Leval despatched 2000 men from Zaragoza, to its succour, when the Spaniards, after a skirmish in the streets, retired; and while this was passing at Alcanitz, Villa Campa intercepted 400 men conducting a convoy of provisions from Calatayud to Zaragoza. Colonel Petit, the commander, being attacked in the defile of Frasno, was forced to abandon his convoy, and, under a continued fire, to fight his way for ten miles, until his detachment, reduced to 180 wounded men, passed the Xalon river, and, at the village of Arandiza, finally repulsed the assailants. The remainder of this desperate band were taken or killed, and Petit himself, wounded, a prisoner, and sitting in the midst of several Spanish officers, was basely murdered the evening after the action. Villa Campa put the assassin to death, but, at the same time, suffered the troops to burn alive the Alcalde of Frasno, an old man taken among the French.

This action happened the day Lerida fell; and, the next day, Chlopiski, following Villa Campa's march from Daroca, reached Frasno. The Spaniards were no longer there, and Chlopiski, dividing his forces, pursued them, by the routes of Calatayud and Xarava, to Molina, where he destroyed a manufactory for arms, and so pressed the Spanish general, that his troops disbanded, and several hundred retired to their homes. At the same time, an attack, made from the side of Navarre, on the garrison of Ayerbe, was repulsed.

But these petty events, while they evinced the perseverance of the Spaniards, proved also the stability of Suchet's power in Aragon. His system was gradually sapping the spirit of resistance in that province. In Lerida his conduct was as gentle and moderate as the nature of this unjust war would permit; and, however questionable the morality of the proceeding by which he reduced the citadel, it must be acknowledged that his situation required most decided measures, for the retreat of the 7th corps set free not only O'Donnel's army but Campo Verde's and all the irregular bands. The Somatenes of the high valleys appeared in force on the Upper Segre the very day of the assault; 800 Miguelettes attacked Venasque three days after; and Campo Verde, marching from Cervera, by Agramunt, took post in the mountains of Lliniana, above Talarn and Tremp, where great bodies of the Somatenes also assembled.

Their plans were disconcerted by the sudden fall of Lerida; the Miguelettes were repulsed from Venasque; the Somatenes defeated at Tremp; and General Habert, marching from Balaguer, cut off Campo Verde from Cervera, and forced him to retreat upon Cardona. But, if the citadel of Lerida had held out, and O'Donnel, less hasty, had combined his march, at a later period, with these Somatenes and with Campo Verde, the 3rd corps could scarcely have escaped a disaster; whereas, now the plain of Urgel and all the fertile valleys opening upon Lerida fell to the French, and Suchet, after taking measures to secure them, turned his arms against Mequinenza, which, by its situation at the confluence of the Segre and the Ebro, just where the latter begins to be navigable, was the key to further operations. The French general could not advance in force against Tortosa, nor avail himself of the water-carriage, until Mequinenza should fall.

Suchet's activity was extreme; one detachment, sent the day after the assault of Lerida, by the left bank of the Segre, was already before the place, and General Musnier's division, descending the right bank of that river, drove in some of the outposts and commenced the investment on the 20th of May.

Mequinenza, built on an elbow of land formed by the meeting of the Segre and Ebro, was fortified by an old Moorish wall, and strengthened by modern batteries, especially on the Fraga road, the only route by which artillery could approach. A shoot from the Sierra de Alcubierre filled the space between the two rivers, and narrowing as they closed, ended in a craggy rock, 700 feet high, and overhanging the town, which was built between its base and the water.

This rock was crowned by a castle, with a rampart, which being inaccessible on two sides from the steepness, and covered on a third by the town, could only be assailed on the fourth, along a high neck of land, 300 yards wide, that joined the rock to the parent hills, and the rampart on that side was bastioned, lined

with masonry, and protected by a ditch, counterscarp, and covered way with palisades.

No guns could be brought against this fort, until the country people, employed by Suchet, had opened a way from Torriente, over the hills, and this occupied the engineers until the 1st of June. Meanwhile the brigade, which had defeated Lazan, at Alcanitz, arrived on the right bank of the Ebro, and completed the investment. The 30th of May, General Rogniat, coming from France with a reinforcement of engineer officers, and several companies of sappers and miners, also reached the camp, and taking the direction of the works, contracted the circle of investment, and commenced active operations.

SIEGE OF MEQUINENZA.

The Spaniards made an ineffectual sally the 31st; and, the 2nd of June, the French artillery, consisting of 18 pieces, of which six were 24-pounders, being brought over the hills, the advanced posts of the Spaniards were driven into the castle, and during the night ground was broken 200 yards from the place, under a destructive fire of grape. The workmen suffered severely; and, while this was passing on the height, approaches were made against the town, in the narrow space between the Ebro and the foot of the rock. Strong infantry posts were also entrenched, close to the water, on the right bank of that river, to prevent the navigation; yet eleven boats, freighted with inhabitants and their property, quitted the town, and nine effected their escape.

In the night of the 3rd, the parallels on the rock were perfected, the breaching-batteries commenced, and parapets of sand-bags were raised, from behind which the French infantry plied the embrasures of the castle with musketry. The works against the town were also advanced; but, in both places, the nature of the ground greatly impeded the operations. The trenches above, being in a rocky soil, were opened chiefly by blasting; those below were in a space too narrow for batteries, and, moreover, searched by a plunging fire, both from the castle, and from a gun mounted on a high tower in the town wall. The troops on the right bank of the Ebro, however, opened their musketry with such effect on the wall, that a part of the garrison quitted it; both it and the tower were then escalated without difficulty; and the Spaniards all retired to the castle. The French placed a battalion in the houses, and put those next the rock in a state of defence; and although the garrison of the castle rolled down large stones from above, they killed more of the inhabitants than of the enemy.

The 6th, the French batteries on the rock, three in number, were completed; and, in the night, 40 grenadiers carried by storm a small outwork called the horse-shoe. The 7th, Suchet, who had been at Zaragoza, arrived in the camp; and, on the 8th, 16 pieces of artillery, of which four were mortars, opened on the castle. The Spaniards answered with such vigour that three French guns were dismounted; yet the besiegers acquired the superiority, and, at nine o'clock in the morning, the place was nearly silenced, and the rampart broken in two places. The Spaniards endeavoured to keep up the defence with musketry, while they mounted fresh guns, but the interior of the castle was so severely searched by the bombardment, that, at ten o'clock, the governor capitulated. Fourteen hundred men became prisoners of war; 45 guns, large stores of powder and of cast iron were captured, and provisions for three months were found in the magazines.

Two hours after the fall of Mequinenza, General Mont-Marie, commanding the troops on the right bank of the Ebro, marched, with his brigade, against Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia, and took it on the 13th of June; for the Spaniards, with a wonderful negligence, had left that important fortress, commanding one of the principal entrances into the kingdom of Valencia, without arms or a garrison. When it was lost, General O'Donoju, with a division of the Valentian army, advanced to retake it, but Mont-Marie defeated him. The works were then repaired, and Morella became a strong and important place of arms.

By these rapid and successful operations Suchet secured, 1. A fortified frontier against the regular armies of Catalonia and Valencia; 2. Solid bases for offensive operations, and free entrance to those provinces; 3. The command of several fertile tracts of country and of the navigation of the Ebro; 4. The co-operation

of the 7th corps, which, by the fall of Lerida, could safely engage beyond the Llobregat. But to effect the complete subjugation of Catalonia, it was necessary to cut off its communications by land with Valencia, and to destroy O'Donnel's base. The first could only be attained by taking Tortosa, the second by capturing Tarragona. Hence the immediate sieges of those two great places, the one by the 3rd, and the other by the 7th corps, were ordered by the emperor.

Suchet was ready to commence his part, but many and great obstacles arose : the difficulty of obtaining provisions, in the eastern region of Catalonia, was increased by O'Donnel's measures, and that general, still commanding above 20,000 men, was neither daunted by past defeats, nor insensible to the advantages of his position. His harsh manners and stern sway rendered him hateful to the people, but he was watchful to confirm the courage, and to excite the enthusiasm of his troops by conferring rewards and honours on the field of battle ; and, being of singular intrepidity himself, his exhortations had more effect.

Two years of incessant warfare had also formed several good officers, and the full strength and importance of every position and town were, by dint of experience, becoming known. With these helps O'Donnel long prevented the siege of Tortosa, and found full employment for the enemy during the remainder of the year. Nevertheless, the conquest of Catalonia advanced, and the fortified places fell one after another, each serving, by its fall, to strengthen the hold of the French, in the same proportion that it had before impeded their progress.

The foundations of military strength were, however, deeply cast in Catalonia. There the greatest efforts were made by the Spaniards, and 10,000 British soldiers, hovering on the coast, ready to land on the rear of the French, or to join the Catalans in an action, would at any period of 1809 and 1810, have paralyzed the operations of the 7th corps, and saved Gerona, Hostalrich, Tortosa, Tarragona, and even Lerida. While those places were in the hands of the Spaniards and their hopes were high, English troops from Sicily were reducing the Ionian Islands or loitering on the coast of Italy, but when all the fortresses of Catalonia had fallen, when the regular armies were nearly destroyed, and when the people were worn out with suffering, a British army which could have been beneficially employed elsewhere, appeared, as if in scorn of common sense, on the eastern coast of Spain.

Notwithstanding the many years of hostility with France, the English ministers were still ignorant of every military principle ; and yet too arrogant to ask advice of professional men ; for it was not until after the death of Mr. Perceval, and when the decisive victory of Salamanca showed the giant in his full proportions, that even Wellington himself was permitted the free exercise of his judgment, although he was more than once reminded by Mr. Perceval, whose narrow views continually clogged the operations, that the whole responsibility of failure would rest on his head.

CHAPTER V.

SUCHET's preparations equally menaced Valencia and Catalonia, and the authorities in the former province, perceiving, although too late, that an exclusive and selfish policy would finally bring the enemy to their own doors, resolved to co-operate with the Catalonians, while the Murcians, now under the direction of Blake, waged war on the side of Grenada, and made excursions against the 4th corps. The acts of the Valencians shall be treated of when the course of the history leads me back to Catalonia, but those of the Murcian army belong to the

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA.

During the month of February, the 1st corps was before Cadiz, the 4th in Grenada, Dessolles' division at Cordoba, Jaen, and Ubeda, and the 5th corps (with the exception of six battalions and some horses left at Seville) in Estremadura. The king, accompanied by Marshal Soult, moved with his guards and a brigade of cavalry to different points, and received from all the great towns assurances of their adhesion to his cause. But as the necessities of the army demanded immediate and heavy contributions, both of money and provisions, movable columns were employed to collect them, especially for the 4th corps, and with so little attention to discipline as soon to verify the observations of St.

Cyr, that they were better calculated to create than to suppress insurrections. The people, exasperated by disorders and violence, and at the same time excited by the agents of their own and the British government, suddenly rose in arms, and Andalusia, like other parts of Spain, became the theatre of a petty and harassing warfare.

The Grenadans of the Alpujarras were the first to resist, and this insurrection spreading on the one hand through the Sierra de Ronda, and on the other, towards Murcia, received succours from Gibraltar, and was aided by the troops and armed peasantry under the command of Blake. The communication between the 1st and 4th corps across the Sierra de Ronda was maintained by a division of the former posted at Medina Sidonia, and by some infantry and hussars of the latter quartered in the town of Ronda. From this place the insurgents, principally smugglers, drove the French, while at the other extremity Blake, marching from Almeria, took Ardra and Motril. The mountaineers of Jaen and Cordoba at the same time interrupted Dessolles' communications with La Mancha.

These movements took place in the beginning of March, and the king and Soult being then in the city of Grenada, sent one column across the mountain by Orgiva to fall upon the flank of Blake at Motril, while a second moving by Guadix and Ohanes upon Almeria, cut off his retreat. This obliged the Murcians to disperse, and at the same time Dessolles defeated the insurgents on the side of Ubeda; and the garrison of Malaga, consisting of three battalions, marched to restore the communication with the 1st corps. Being joined by the detachment beaten at Ronda, they retook that post on the 21st of March; but during their absence, the people from the Alpujarras entered Malaga, killed some of the inhabitants as favourers of the enemy, and would have done more, but that another column from Grenada came down on them, and the insurrection was thus strangled in its birth. It had, however, sufficed to prevent the march of the troops designed to co-operate with Suchet at Valencia, and it was of so threatening a character, that the 5th corps was recalled from Estremadura, and all the French troops at Madrid, consisting of the garrison, and a part of the 2nd corps were directed upon Almagro in La Mancha, the capital itself being left in charge of some Spanish battalions in the invader's service. The king then repaired to La Mancha, fearing an offensive movement by the Valencian and Murcian armies, but after a time returned to Madrid. The Duke of Dalmatia then remained chief commander of Andalusia, and proceeded to organize a system of administration so efficacious, that neither the efforts of the Spanish government, nor of the army in Cadiz, nor the perpetual incursions of Spanish troops issuing from Portugal and supported by British corps on that frontier, could seriously shake his hold, but this will be better shown hereafter; at present, it is more convenient to notice

THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

Marshal Victor declining, as we have seen, an assault on the Isla, spread his army round the margin of the bay, and commenced works of contravallation on an extent of not less than 25 miles. The towns, the islands, castles, harbours, and rivers, he thus enclosed are too numerous, and in their relative bearings too intricate, for minute description; yet, looking as it were from the French camps, I shall endeavour to point out the leading features.

The blockade was maintained in three grand divisions or entrenched positions, namely, Chiclana, Puerto Real, and Santa Maria. The first, having its left on the sea coast near the Torre Bermeja, was from thence carried across the Almanza and the Chiclana rivers to the Zuraque on a line of eight miles, traced along a range of thickly-wooded hills, and bordering a marsh from one to three miles broad. This marsh, traversed in its breadth by the above-mentioned rivers, and by a number of navigable watercourses or creeks, was also cut in its whole length by the Santi Petri, a natural channel connecting the upper harbour of Cadiz with the open sea. The Santi Petri, nine miles long, from 200 to 300 yards wide, and of depth to float a seventy-four, received the waters of all the creeks crossing the marsh, and was the first Spanish line of defence. In the centre, the bridge Zuazo, by which the only road to Cadiz passes, was broken and defended by batteries on both sides. On the right hand, the Caraccas, or royal arsenal, situated on an island just in the harbour mouth of the channel, and on account of the marsh unattackable, save

by water or by bombardment, was covered with strong batteries and served as an advanced post. On the left hand, the castle of Santi Petri also built on an island, defended the sea mouth of the channel.

Beyond the Santi Petri was the Isla de Leon, in form a triangular island, the base of which rests on that channel, the right side on the harbour, the left on the open sea, and the apex points towards Cadiz. All this island was a salt marsh, except one high and strong ridge in the centre about four miles long, upon which the large town of La Isla stands, and which being within cannon shot of the Santi Petri, offered the second line of defence.

From the apex, called the Torre Gardo, a low and narrow isthmus, about five miles long, connected the island with the rocks upon which Cadiz stood, and across the centre of this narrow isthmus, a cut called the Cortadura, defended by the large unfinished fort of Fernando, offered a third line of defence. The fourth and final line was the land front of the city itself, regularly and completely fortified.

On the Chiclana side, therefore, the hostile forces were only separated by the marsh; and although the Spaniards commanded the Santi Petri, the French having their chief depôts in the town of Chiclana, could always acquire the mastery in the marsh and might force the passage of the channel, because the Chiclana, Zuraque, and Almanza creeks were navigable above the lines of contravallation. The thick woods behind, also afforded the means of constructing an armed flotilla, and such was the nature of the ground bordering the Santi Petri itself, on both sides, that off the high-road it could only be approached by water, or by narrow footpaths, leading between the salt-pans of the marsh.

The central French or Puerto Real division extending from the Zuraque on the left, to the San Pedro, a navigable branch of the Guadalete on the right, measured about seven miles. From the Zuraque to the town of Puerto Real, the line was traced along a ridge skirting the marsh, so as to form with the position of Chiclana a half circle. Puerto Real itself was entrenched, but a tongue of land four miles long projected from thence perpendicularly on to the narrow isthmus of Cadiz. This tongue, cloven in its whole length by the creek or canal of Trocadero, separated the inner from the outward harbour, and at its extreme points stood the village of Trocadero, and the fort of Matagorda; opposed to which there was on the isthmus of Cadiz a powerful battery called the Puntales. From Matagorda to the city was above 4000 yards, but across the channel to Puntales was only 1200; it was the nearest point to Cadiz and to the isthmus, and was infinitely the most important post of offence. From thence the French could search the upper harbour with their fire, and throw shells into the Caraccas and the fort of Fernando, while their flotilla, safely moored in the Trocadero creek, could make a descent upon the isthmus, and thus turn the Isla, and all the works between it and the city. Nevertheless, the Spaniards dismantled and abandoned Matagorda.

The third or Santa Maria division of blockade, followed the sweep of the bay, and reckoning from the San Pedro, on the left, to the castle of Santa Catalina the extreme point of the outer harbour, on the right, was about five miles. The town of Santa Maria, built at the mouth of the Guadalete in the centre of this line, was entrenched and the ground about Santa Catalina was extremely rugged.

Besides these lines of blockade which were connected by a covered way, concealed by thick woods, and when finished armed with 300 guns, the towns of Rota and San Lucar de Barameda were occupied. The first, situated on a cape of land opposite to Cadiz, was the northern point of the great bay or roadstead. The second commanded the mouth of Guadalquivir. Behind the line of blockade, Latour Maubourg, with a covering division, took post at Medina Sidonia, his left being upon the upper Guadalete, and his advanced posts watching the passes of the Sierra de Ronda. Such was the position of the 1st corps. I shall now relate the progress of events within the blockaded city.

The fall of the central junta, the appointment of the regency and the proclamation for convoking the national Cortes have been already touched upon. Albuquerque, hailed as a deliverer, elected governor, commander-in-chief, and president of the junta, appeared to have unlimited power; but in reality, possessed no authority except over his own soldiers, and he did not meddle with the administra-

tion. The regency appointed provisionally and composed of men without personal energy or local influence, was obliged to bend and truckle to the junta of Cadiz ; and that imperious body, without honour, talents, or patriotism, sought only to obtain the command of the public revenue for dishonest purposes, and meanwhile, privately trafficked with the public stores.

Albuquerque's troops were in a deplorable state ; the whole had been long without pay, and the greater part were without arms, accoutrements, ammunition, or clothes. When he demanded supplies, the junta declared that they could not furnish them ; but the duke affirming this to be untrue, addressed a memorial to the regency, and the latter, anxious to render the junta odious, yet fearing openly to attack them, persuaded Albuquerque to publish his memorial. The junta replied by an exposition, false as to facts, base and ridiculous in reasoning ; for although they had elected the duke president of their own body, they accused him amongst other things, with retreating from Carmona too quickly ; and they finished with an intimation that, supported by the populace of Cadiz, they were able and ready to wreak their vengeance on all enemies. Matters being thus brought to a crisis, both Albuquerque and the regency gave way, and the former being sent ambassador to England, died in that country some months after of a frenzy brought on, as it is said, by grief and passion at the unworthy treatment he received.

But the misery of the troops, the great extent of the positions, the discontent of the seamen, the venal spirit of the junta, the apathy of the people, the feebleness of the regency, the scarcity of provisions, and the machinations of the French, who had many favourers and those amongst the men in power, all combined to place Cadiz in the greatest jeopardy ; and this state of affairs would have led to a surrender, if England had not again filled the Spanish storehouses, and if the regency had not consented to receive British troops into the city.

At the same time, General Colin Campbell (who had succeeded Sir John Cradock as governor of Gibraltar) performed a great service to his country, for, by persevering negotiation, he obtained that an English garrison should likewise enter Ceuta, and that the Spanish lines of San Roque, and the forts round the harbour of Algeiras should be demolished. Both measures were very essential to the present and permanent interests of England ; but the first especially, because it cleared the neighbourhood of the fortress, and gave it a secure harbour. Gibraltar, at this time, contained a mixed and disaffected population of more than 12,000 persons, and merchandise to the value of 2,000,000 sterling, which could have been easily destroyed by bombardment ; and Ceuta, which was chiefly garrisoned by condemned troops, and filled with galley slaves, and its works miserably neglected, had only six days' provisions, and was at the mercy of the first thousand French that could cross the straits. The possession of it would have availed the enemy in many ways, especially in obtaining provisions from Barbary, where his emissaries were exceedingly active.

General William Stewart arrived in Cadiz, on the 11th of February, with 2000 men, 1000 more joined him from Gibraltar, and the whole were received with an enthusiasm, that proved Sir George Smith's perception to have been just, and that Mr. Frere's unskilful management of the central junta, had alone prevented a similar measure the year before. The 17th of February, a Portuguese regiment, 1300 strong, was also admitted into the city, and Spanish troops came in daily in small bodies. Two ships of war, the *Euthalion* and *Undaunted*, arrived from Mexico with six millions of dollars ; and another British battalion, a detachment of artillery, and more native troops, having joined the garrison, the whole force assembled behind the Santi Petri was not less than 4000 Anglo-Portuguese, and 14,000 Spaniards. Yet there was little of enthusiasm amongst the latter ; and in all this time, not a man among the citizens had been enrolled or armed, or had volunteered, either to labour or to fight. The ships recovered at Ferrol had been transferred to Cadiz, so there were in the bay, 23 men of war, of which four of the line and three frigates were British ; and thus, money, troops, and a fleet, in fine, all things necessary to render Cadiz formidable, were collected, yet to little purpose, because procrastination, jealousy, ostentation, and a thousand absurdities, were the invariable attendants of Spanish armies and governments.

General Stewart's first measure was to recover Matagorda. In the night of the 22nd, a detachment consisting of 50 seamen and marines, 25 artillerymen, and 67 of the 94th regiment, the whole under the command of Captain M'Lean, pushed across the channel during a storm, and taking possession of the dismantled fort, before morning effected a solid lodgment, and although the French cannonaded the work with field-artillery all the next day, the garrison, supported by the fire of Puntales, was immovable.

The remainder of February passed without any event of importance, yet the people suffered from the want of provisions, especially fresh meat; and from the 7th to the 10th of March, a continued tempest, beating upon the coast, drove three Spanish and one Portuguese sail of the line, and a frigate and from 30 to 40 merchantmen, on shore, between San Lucar and St. Mary's. One ship of the line was taken, the others burnt and part of the crews brought off by boats from the fleet; but many men, and amongst others a part of the 4th English regiment, fell into the hands of the enemy, together with an immense booty.

Early in March, Mr. Henry Wellesley, minister plenipotentiary, arrived, and on the 24th of that month, General Graham coming from England assumed the chief command of the British, and immediately caused an exact military survey of the Isla to be made. It then appeared, that the force hitherto assigned for its defence, was quite inadequate, and that to secure it against the utmost efforts of the enemy, 20,000 soldiers, and a system of redoubts, and batteries, requiring the labour of 4000 men for three months, were absolutely necessary.* Now, the Spaniards had only worked beyond the Santi Petri, and that without judgment; their batteries in the marsh were ill-placed, their entrenchments on the tongue of land at the sea mouth of that channel were of contemptible strength, and the Caraccas which they had armed with 150 guns, being full of dry timber could be easily burned by carcasses. The interior defences of the Isla were quite neglected, and while they had abandoned the important posts of Matagorda and the Trocadero, they had pushed their advanced batteries to the junction of the Chiclana road with the Royal-causeway, in the marsh, that is to say, one mile and a half beyond the bridge of Zuazo, and, consequently exposed, without support, to flank attacks both by water and land.

It was in vain that the English engineers presented plans, and offered to construct the works; the Spaniards would never consent to pull down a house, or destroy a garden; their procrastination paralyzed their allies, and would have lost the place, had the enemy been prepared to press it vigorously. Nor were the English works (when the Spaniards would permit any to be constructed) well and rapidly completed, for the junta furnished bad materials, there was a paucity of engineer-officers, and, from the habitual negligence of the ministerial departments at home, neither the proper stores nor implements had been sent out. Indeed, an exact history, drawn from the private journals of commanders of British expeditions, during the war with France, would show an incredible carelessness of preparation on the part of the different cabinets. The generals were always expected to "make bricks without straw," and thus the laurels of the British army were for many years blighted. Even in Egypt, the success of the venerable hero, Abercrombie, was due, more to his perseverance and unconquerable energy before the descent, than to his daring operations afterwards.

Additional reinforcements reached Cadiz the 31st of March, and both sides continued to labour, but the allies slowly and without harmony, and, the supplies being interrupted, scarcity increased, many persons were forced to quit Cadiz, and 2000 men were sent to Ayamonte to collect provisions on the Guadiana. But now Matagorda, which, though frequently cannonaded, had been held 55 days, impeded the completion of the enemy's works at the Trocadero point. This small fort, of a square form, without a ditch, with bomb-proofs insufficient for the garrison, and with one angle projecting towards the land, was little calculated for resistance, and, as it could only bring seven guns to bear, a Spanish seventy-four and an armed flotilla were moored on the flanks, to co-operate in the defence. The French had, however, raised great batteries behind some houses on the Trocadero, and, as daylight

* Appendix, No. 3, section 1.

broke, on the 21st of April, a hissing shower of heated shot, falling on the seventy-four, and in the midst of the flotilla, obliged them to cut their cables and take shelter under the works of Cadiz. Then the fire of 48 guns and mortars, of the largest size, was concentrated upon the little fort of Matagorda, and the feeble parapet disappeared in a moment before this crashing flight of metal. The naked rampart and the undaunted hearts of the garrison remained, but the troops fell fast, the enemy shot quick and close, a staff, bearing the Spanish flag, was broken six times in an hour, and the colours were at last fastened to the angle of the work itself, while the men, especially the sailors, besought the officers to hoist the British ensign, attributing the slaughter to their fighting under a foreign flag. Thirty hours the tempest lasted, and 64 men out of 140 were down, when General Graham, finding a diversion he had projected impracticable, sent boats to carry off the survivors. The bastion was then blown up, under the direction of Major Lefebvre, an engineer of great promise, and he also fell, the last man whose blood wetted the ruins thus abandoned. Here I must record an action of which it is difficult to say whether it were most feminine or heroic. A sergeant's wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded men, when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the well of the fort; seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and, although a shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered the vessel, and fulfilled her mission.*

After the evacuation of Matagorda, the war languished at Cadiz; but Sebastiani's cavalry infested the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and he himself entered the capital of Murcia, on the 23rd of April, when Blake retired upon Alicante and Carthagena. Meanwhile the French covered Matagorda point with batteries; but they were pressed for provisions, and General Campbell, throwing a detachment into Tarifa, drove their foragers from that vicinity, which abounds with cattle. The Spaniards at San Roque promised to reinforce this detachment, but their tardiness enabled the enemy to return with 400 foot and some cavalry, and although the former were repulsed, the horse foraged the country, and drove off several herds of cattle during the action. General Campbell then increased the detachment to 500 men, joining some guns, and placing the whole under the command of Major Brown, of the 28th.

In May the French prisoners, cutting the cables of two hulks, drifted in a heavy gale to the French side of the bay; and the boats sent against them being beat off, by throwing cold shot from the decks, above 1500 men saved themselves, in despite of the fire from the allied fleet, and from Puntales, which was continued after the vessels had grounded, although the miserable creatures, thus struggling for life, had been treated with horrible cruelty, and being all of Dupont's or Vedel's corps, were prisoners only by a dishonourable breach of faith. Meanwhile, in Cadiz, disorder was daily increasing. The regency having recalled Cuesta to their military councils, he published an attack on the deposed central junta, and was answered so as to convince the world that the course of all parties had been equally detrimental to the state. Thus fresh troubles were excited. The English general was hampered by the perverse spirit of the authorities, and the Spanish troops were daily getting more inefficient from neglect, when the departure of Albuquerque enabled Blake to take the chief command in the Isla, and his presence produced some amelioration in the condition and discipline of the troops. At his instance, also, the municipal junta consented, although reluctantly, that the British engineers should commence a regular system of redoubts for the defence of the Isla.

English reinforcements continued to arrive, and 4000 Spaniards, from Murcia, joined the garrison, or rather, army now within the lines; but such was the state of the native troops, and the difficulty of arranging plans, that hitherto the taking of Matagorda had been the only check given to the enemy's works. It was, however, necessary to do something; and, after some ill-judged plans of the regency had been rejected by Graham, General Lacy was embarked, with 3000 infantry and

* An interesting account of this noble-minded woman is to be found in a small volume, entitled, "Sketches of a Soldier's Life in Ireland," by the author of "The Eventful Life of a Soldier." This last work was erroneously designated, in my first volume, as "The Life of a Sergeant."

200 cavalry, to aid the armed peasants, or Serranos, of the Ronda. These people had been excited to arms, and their operations successfully directed by Captain Cowley and Mr. Mitchel, two British artillery-officers, sent from Gibraltar, and General Campbell offered to reinforce Lacy, from Gibraltar, if he would attack Malaga, where there were 20,000 males fit to carry arms. The French were only 2000, and cooped in the citadel, a Moorish castle, containing but 12 guns, and dependent for water on the town, which was itself only supplied by aqueducts from without. Lacy rejected this enterprise, but demanded that 800 men, from Gibraltar, should make a diversion to the eastward, while he, landing at Algesiras, moved on Ronda; and, this being assented to, the English armament sailed under the command of General Bowes. Lacy made good his movement upon Ronda the 18th of June; but the French, having fortified it, were too strong at that point, or, rather, Lacy, a man of no enterprise, durst not act, and, when he was joined by many thousand mountaineers, he arrested their leaders for some offence, which so disgusted the men that they disbanded. The enemy, alarmed by these operations, which were seconded from the side of Murcia, and by an insurrection at Baeza, put all their disposable troops in motion; but the insurrection at Baeza was quickly crushed, and General Rey, marching from Seville, against Lacy, entirely defeated and cut him off from Gibraltar, so that he was forced to re-embark with a few men at Estipona, and returned to Cadiz in July.

Here it is impossible not to reflect on the little use made of the naval power, and the misapplication of the military strength in the southern parts of Spain. The British, Portuguese, and Spanish soldiers, at Cadiz, were, in round numbers, 30,000, the British in Gibraltar 5000, in Sicily 16,000, forming a total of more than 50,000 effective troops, aided by a great navy, and favourably placed for harassing that immense, and, with the exception of the Valencian and Murcian coasts, uninterrupted French line of operations, which extended from the south of Italy to Cadiz, for, even from the bottom of Calabria, troops and stores were brought to Spain. Yet a Neapolitan rabble, under Murat, in Calabria, and from 15,000 to 20,000 French around Cadiz, were allowed to paralyse this mighty power.

It is true that vigilance, temper, and arrangement, and favourable localities, are all required in the combined operations of a fleet and army, and troops disembarking also require time to equip for service. But Minorca offered a central station, and a place of arms for the army, and a spacious port for the fleet; the operations would always have been short, and independent of the Spanish authorities, and Lord Collingwood was fitted, by his talents, discretion, zeal, experience, and accurate knowledge of those coasts, successfully to direct such a floating armament. What coast siege, undertaken by the 7th or 3rd corps, could have been successfully prosecuted, if the garrison had been suddenly augmented with 15,000 or 20,000 men from the ocean? After one or two successful descents, the very appearance of a ship of war would have checked the operations of a siege, and obliged the enemy to concentrate: whereas, the slight expeditions of this period were generally disconcerted by the presence of a few French companies.

In July, the British force in Cadiz was increased to 8500 men, and Sir Richard Keats arrived to take the command of the fleet. The enemy, intent upon completing his lines, and constructing flotillas at Chiclana, Santa Maria, and San Lucar de Barameda, made no attacks, and his works have been much censured, as ostentatiously extended, and leading to nothing. This is, however, a rash criticism; for the Chiclana camp was necessary to blockade the Isla, and, as the true point for offensive operations was at the Trocadero, the lines of Puerto Real and Santa Maria were necessary to protect that position, to harass the fleet, to deprive the citizens of good water, which, in ordinary times, was fetched from Puerto Maria, and finally to enable the flotilla, constructing at San Lucar, to creep round the coast. The chances from storms, as experience proved, almost repaid the labour, and it is to be considered that Soult contemplated a serious attack upon Cadiz, not with a single corps, generally weaker than the blockaded troops, but, when time should ripen, with a powerful army. Events in other parts of the Peninsula first impeded, and finally frustrated this intention, yet the lines were, in this view, not unnecessary or ostentatious.

Neither was it a slight political advantage that the Duke of Dalmatia should hold sway in Seville for the usurper's government, while the National Cortes and the regency were cooped up in a narrow corner of the province. Moreover the preparations at Matagorda constantly and seriously menaced Cadiz, and a British division was necessarily kept there, for the English generals were well assured, that otherwise, some fatal disaster would befall the Spaniards. Now if a single camp of observation at Chiclana had constituted all the French works, no mischief could have been apprehended, and Graham's division, consisting of excellent soldiers, would have been set free, instead of being cooped up, without any counterbalance in the number of French troops at the blockade ; for the latter aided indirectly, and at times directly, in securing the submission of Andalusia, and if not at Cadiz, they must have been covering Seville as long as there was an army in the Isla.

CHAPTER VI.

WHILE the blockade of Cadiz proceeded, Seville scarcely required a garrison, and in March, 600 infantry, under Colonel Remond, and 200 cavalry, commanded by the Duke D'Aremberg, were despatched from thence, against the Viscount De Gand, who was still at Ayamonte, vainly demanding refuge in Portugal. He had 4000 troops, but declining an engagement, passed by his left through Gibroleon into the Sierra de Aroche, bordering on the Condado de Niebla. The French then occupied Moguer and Huelva, towns situated at the mouths of the Odiel and Tinto rivers, from whence Cadiz had hitherto drawn supplies, and the viscount returning to Ayamonte, sailed with his troops to Cadiz, being replaced by General Copons, who came with 2000 men to gather provisions on the lower Guadiana, and in the Tinto and Odiel districts.

On the other side of Seville, Sebastiani had an uneasy task. The vicinity of Gibraltar and of the Murcian army, the continued descents on the coast, and the fierceness of the Moorish blood, rendered Grenada the most disturbed portion of Andalusia, and a great part of that fine province, visited by the horrors of insurrectional war, was ravaged and laid waste.

In the northern parts of Andalusia, about Jaen and Cordoba, Dessolles reduced the struggle to a trifling guerilla warfare ; but it was not so in La Mancha, where the Partidas became so numerous and the war so onerous, that one of Joseph's ministers, writing to a friend, described that province as peopled with beggars and brigands. Meanwhile Estremadura was the scene of various complicated movements and combats, producing no great results, indeed, but important as being connected with and bearing on the defence of Portugal.

The Spanish and Portuguese line of frontier, south of the Tagus, may be divided into three parts.

1. From the Tagus to Badajos, on the Guadiana.
2. From Badajos to the Morena.
3. From the Morena to the sea.

Each of these divisions is about 60 miles. Along the first, two-thirds of which is mountainous and one-third undulating plains and thick woods, a double chain of fortresses guard the respective frontiers. Alcantara, Valencia de Alcantara, Albuquerque, and Badajos are the Spanish ; Montalvaio, Castello de Vide, Marvaio, Aronches, Campo Mayor, and Elvas, the Portuguese places. The three first on either side are in the mountains, the others in the open country, which spreads from the Guadiana to Portalegre, a central point, from whence roads lead to all the above-named fortresses.

From Badajos to the Morena, forms the second division of the country ; it is rugged and the chain of fortresses continued. On the Portuguese side, Juramenha, Mourao and Moura ; on the Spanish, Olivenza (formerly Portuguese), Xeres de los Cavalleros, and Aroche.

From the Morena to the sea, the lower Guadiana separates the two kingdoms. The Spanish side, extremely rugged, contained the fortresses of San Lúcar de Guadiana, Lepe, and Ayamonte ; the Portuguese frontier, Serpa, Mertola, Alcontin, and Castro Marin ; and although the greater number of these places were dismantled, the walls of all were standing, some in good repair, and those of Portugal for the most part garrisoned by militia and ordenanza.

When Mortier attempted Badajos, on the 12th of February, Romana was near Truxillo, and the place was so ill provided that a fortnight's blockade would have reduced it; but the French general, who had only brought up 8000 infantry and a brigade of cavalry, could not invest it in face of the troops assembling in the vicinity, and therefore retired to Zafra, leaving his horsemen near Olivenza. In this position he remained until the 19th of February, when his cavalry was surprised at Valverde, and the commander Beauregard slain. Romana returned to Badajos the 20th and 27th, and Mortier then leaving some troops in Zafra, marched to Merida, to connect himself with the 2nd corps, which had arrived at Montijo, on the Guadiana.

It will be remembered that this corps, commanded by General Mermet, occupied the valley of the Tagus in its whole length during the invasion of Andalusia, and communicating with the 6th corps through the pass of Baños, formed an intermediate reserve between Mortier and Kellerman. The latter was at Bejar, and Miranda de Castanar, watching the Duke Del Parque, in the early part of January; but withdrew to Salamanca, when the British army arrived in the valley of the Mondego, and the Duke Del Parque, leaving Martin Carrera with a weak division in the Sierra de Gata, marched with 13,000 men, through the pass of Perales, crossed the Tagus at Barca de Alconete on the 10th of February, and on the 12th, the day Mortier summoned Badajos, was in position with his right at Albuquerque and his left on the Guadiana.

When Mermet, whose advanced guard was at Placencia, knew of this movement, he first detached 3000 men across the Tagus, by Seradillo, to observe Del Parque, and soon afterwards Soult's brother, with 4000 men from Talavera, crossed the bridge of Arzobispo, and advancing by Caceres, surprised some Spanish troops at Villa del Rey, and reaching Montijo, pushed patrols close to Badajos. The remainder of the 2nd corps arrived at Caceres by degrees; General Reynier then took the command, and, as I have said, was joined by Mortier, who immediately commenced defensive works at Merida, and prepared gabions and fascines as if to besiege Badajos.

These demonstrations attracted the notice of General Hill, who advanced with 10,000 men from Abrantes, to Portalegre, and Romana, finding himself, by the junction of the Duke Del Parque's army, at the head of 25,000 men, resolved to act against the communications of the French.

His first division, commanded by Charles O'Donnel, brother to the Catalan general, occupied Albuquerque. The second, under Mendizabel, was posted near Castello de Vide. The third, consisting of 5000 Asturians, was sent, under Ballasteros, to Olivenza, and the fourth remained at Badajos. The fifth, under Contreras, was detached to Monasterio, with orders to interrupt Mortier's communication with Seville.

Contreras reached Xeres de los Cavalleros, the 1st of March, but a detachment from Zafra soon drove him thence, and Romana retired to Campo Mayor with three divisions, leaving Ballasteros with the fourth at Olivenza. On the other hand, Mortier, uneasy about Contreras' movements, repaired to Zafra, leaving the 2nd corps at Merida, and the 10th, Romana advanced again towards Albuquerque; but having pushed a detachment beyond the Salor river, it was surprised by General Foy. The 14th, O'Donnel endeavoured to surprise Foy, but the latter, with very inferior numbers, fought his way through the Puerto de Trasquillon, and the Spaniards took possession of Caceres.

At this period the insurrections in Grenada, the movements of the Murcian army, and the general excitement of Valencia, in consequence of Suchet's retreat, caused Joseph to recall Mortier for the defence of Andalusia, and the latter, after holding a council of war with Reynier, destroyed the works at Merida, the 19th of March, and retired to Seville, leaving Gazan's division at Monasterio. Reynier having sent his stores to Truxillo, drove the Spaniards out of Caceres the 20th, and followed them to the Salor, but afterwards took post at Torremachó, and O'Donnel returned to Caceres.

There are two routes leading from Merida and Badajos to Seville: 1. The Royal Causeway, which passes the Morena by Zafra, Los Santos, Monasterio, and

Ronquillo. 2. A shorter, but more difficult road, which, running westward of the causeway, passes the mountains by Xeres de los Cavalleros, Fregenal, and Araceña. These parallel routes have no cross communications in the Morena, but on the Estremaduran side, a road runs from Xeres de los Cavalleros to Zafra, and on the Andalusian side, from Araceña to Ronquillo. When, therefore, Mortier retired, Ballasteros marched from Olivenza to Xeres de los Cavalleros, and being joined by Contreras, their united corps, amounting to 10,000 men, gained the Royal Causeway by Zafra, and, on the evening of the 29th of March, came up with Gazan, and fought an undecided action; but the next day, the Spaniards being repulsed, Ballasteros retired to Araceña and Contreras to the high mountains above Ronquillo. From Araceña, Ballasteros marched to Huerva, within a few leagues of Seville, but Gerard's division drove him back to Araceña, and defeated him there; yet again entering the Condado de Niebla, he established himself at Zalamea de Real on the Tinto river.

Meanwhile, Romana detached a force to seize Merida, and cut the communication of the 5th corps with Reynier, but that general, marching with 8000 men from Torremocha, passed through to Medellin before the Spaniards arrived, and pushed troops, the 2nd of April, into the Morena, intending to take Contreras in rear, while Gazan attacked him in front; and this would have happened, but that O'Donnel immediately threatened Merida, and so drew Reynier back. Nevertheless, Contreras was attacked by Gazan, at Pedroche, and so completely defeated that he regained Zafra in the night of the 14th, with only 2000 men, and Ballasteros also, assailed by a detachment from Seville, retired to Araceña. The 20th, Reynier marched to Montijo, and O'Donnel retired from Caceres, but his rear-guard was defeated at La Rocca the 21st, and his division would have been lost, if Mendizabel and Hill also had not come to his aid, when Reynier declining a general action, retired to Merida. The insurrection in the Alpujaras was now quelled, the Valencians remained inactive, Joseph re-entered Madrid, Soult assumed the government of Andalusia, and Mortier returned to Estremadura. While on the Spanish side, Contreras was displaced, and Imas, his successor, advanced to Ronquillo, in Mortier's rear; Ballasteros remained at Aroche; Hill returned to Portalegre; and Romana encamped, with 14,000 men, near Badajos, where a Spanish plot was formed to assassinate him. It was discovered, but the villain who was to have executed the atrocious deed escaped.

Notwithstanding Romana's presence, Reynier and the younger Soult passed the Guadiana below Badajos, with only 400 cavalry, and closely examined the works of that fortress, in despite of the whole Spanish army; and at the same time Mortier's advanced guards arrived on the Guadiana, and a reinforcement of 4000 men joined the 2nd corps from Toledo. But as the want of provisions would not permit the French to remain concentrated, Mortier returned to the Morena, to watch Imas. The 14th of May, a French detachment again came close up to Badajos, then took the road to Olivenza, and would have cut off Ballasteros, if Hill had not by a sudden march to Elvas, arrested their movements. Meanwhile, Ballasteros again menaced Seville, and was again driven back upon Aroche, with a loss of 300 men.

To check these frequent incursions, the French threatened the frontier of Portugal by the Lower Guadiana; sometimes appearing at Gibrleon and Villa Blanca, sometimes towards Serpa, the possession of which would have lamed Ballasteros' movements, yet the advantages were still chequered. A Portuguese flotilla intercepted, at the mouth of the Guadiana, a convoy of provisions going to the 1st corps; and O'Donnel having made an attempt during Reynier's absence to surprise Truxillo, was repulsed, and regained Albuquerque with great difficulty. It would be perplexing to trace in detail all the movements on the line from Badajos to Ayamonte, yet two circumstances there were of historical importance. In the beginning of July, when Lacy was in the Sierra de Ronda, Ballasteros near Aroche, and Copons in the Condado Niebla, the French marched against Lacy, leaving Seville garrisoned solely by Spaniards in Joseph's service; and while this example was furnished by the enemy, the Portuguese and Spanish troops on the frontier, complaining, the one of inhospitality, and the other of robbery and violence, would, but

for the mediation of the British authorities, have come to blows, for the mutual spirit of hatred extended to the governments on both sides.

Hitherto, Hill had not meddled in the Spanish operations, save when Romana was hardly pressed, but the latter's demands for aid were continual, and most of his projects were ill-judged, and contrary to Lord Wellington's advice. On the 26th of June, however, Reynier passing the Guadiana, foraged all the country about Campo Mayor, and then turned by Montijo to Merida; it was known that his corps belonged to the army assembling in Castile for the invasion of Portugal, and that he had collected mules and other means of transport in Estremadura; and the spies asserted that he was going to cross the Tagus. Hill, therefore, gathered his divisions well in hand, ready to move as Reynier moved, to cross the Tagus if he crossed it, and by parallel operations to guard the frontier of Beira. The march of the 2nd corps was, however, postponed, and the after-operations belonging to greater combinations, will be treated of in another place.

Although apparently complicated, the movements in Estremadura were simple in principle. The valley of the Guadiana as far as Badajos is separated from the valley of the Tagus by a range of heights, connecting the Guadalupe mountains with those of Albuquerque, and the country between those hills and the Tagus contained fertile valleys and considerable towns; such as Valencia de Alcantara and Caceres. To profit from their resources was an object to both parties. Reynier, whose base was at Truxillo, could easily make incursions as far as Caceres, but beyond that town the Salor presented a barrier from behind which the Spaniards, supported by the Fort of Albuquerque, could observe whether the incursion was made in force, and act accordingly; hence O'Donnel's frequent advances and retreats.

Reynier could not operate seriously unless in unison with the 5th corps, and by the valley of the Guadiana; and, therefore, Merida, on account of its stone bridge, was the key of his movements; but Mortier's base of operations being in Andalusia, his front was spread from Zafra to Merida, to cover his line of retreat and to draw provisions from about Lerena; but the road of Xeres de los Cavalleros was open to the Spaniards, and the frequent advances of Ballasteros and Contreras were to harass Mortier's line of communication. The clue of affairs was this: Romana, holding Badajos, and being supported by Hill, acted on both flanks of the French, and the Portuguese frontier furnished a retreat from every part of his lines of operation; but as his projects were generally vague and injudicious, Lord Wellington forbade Hill to assist, except for definite and approved objects.

To put an end to the Spanish system, Mortier had only to unite the two corps and give battle, or, if that was refused, to besiege Badajos, which, from its influence, situation, and the advantage of its stone bridge, was the key to the Alemtejo; and this he ardently desired. Soult, however, would not permit him to undertake any decisive operation while Andalusia was exposed to sudden insurrections and descents from Cadiz, and to say that either marshal was wrong would be rash, because two great interests clashed.* Mortier and Reynier united could have furnished 20,000 infantry, 50 guns, and more than 3000 cavalry, all excellent troops. Romana having garrisoned Badajos, Olivenza, and Albuquerque, could not bring more than 15,000 men into line, and must have joined Hill. But with a mixed force and divided command, the latter could not have ventured a battle in the plain country beyond Portalegre. A defeat would have opened Lisbon to the victor, and Lord Wellington must then have detached largely from the north, the king and Soult could have reinforced Mortier, and the ultimate consequences are not to be assumed.

On the other hand, Soult judging that ere farther conquests were attempted, the great province of Andalusia should be rendered a stronghold and independent of extraneous events, bent all his attention to that object. An exact and economical arrangement provided for the current consumption of his troops; vast reserve magazines were filled without overwhelming the people; and the native municipal authorities, recognized and supported in matters of police and supply, acted zealously, yet without any imputation upon their patriotism; for those who see and

* Appendix, No. 5, section 1.

feel the miseries flowing from disorderly and wasting armies, may honestly assist a general labouring to preserve regularity. Yet all this could not be the work of a day, and meanwhile the marshals under Soult's orders, being employed only in a military capacity, desired the entire control of their own corps, and to be engaged in great field operations, because thus only could they be distinguished; whereas the Duke of Dalmatia while contributing to the final subjugation of Spain, by concentrating the elements of permanent strength in Andalusia, was also well assured that in fixing a solid foundation for future military operations he should obtain reputation as an able administrator and pacificator of a conquered country.

His views, however, clashed, not more with those of the generals, than with the wishes of the king, whose poverty forced him to grasp at all the revenues of Andalusia, and who, having led the army in person across the Morena, claimed both as monarch and conqueror. But he who wields the sword will always be first served. Soult, guided by the secret orders of Napoleon, resisted the king's demands, and thus excited the monarch's hatred to an incredible degree; nevertheless, the Duke of Dalmatia never lost the emperor's confidence, and his province, reference being had to the nature of the war, was admirably well governed. The people were gradually tranquilized; the military resources of the country drawn forth, and considerable bodies of native troops raised, and even successfully employed, to repress the efforts of the Partizan chiefs. The arsenal of construction at Seville was put into full activity; the mines of lead at Linares were worked; the copper of the river Tinto gathered for the supply of the foundries, and every provision for the use of a large army collected; privateers also were fitted out, a commerce was commenced with neutral nations in the ports of Grenada, and finally, a secret but considerable traffic carried on with Lisbon itself, demonstrated the administrative talents of Soult. Andalusia soon became the most powerful establishment of the French in Spain.

Both marshals appear to have entertained sound views, and the advantages of either plan being considered, leads to the reflection that they might have been reconciled. A reinforcement of 25,000 men in Estremadura, during the months of June and July, would have left scarcely a shadow of defence for Portugal; and it would seem that Napoleon had an eye to this, as we find him directing Suchet, in July, to co-operate with 15,000 men in the invasion, whenever Tortosa should fall. The application of this reasoning will, however, be better understood as the narrative advances; and whether Napoleon's recent marriage with the Austrian princess drew him away from business, or that absorbed by the other many and great interests of his empire he neglected Spanish affairs, or whether deceived by exaggerated accounts of successes, he thought the necessity for more troops less than it really was, I have not been able to ascertain. Neither can I find any good reason why the king, whose army was increased to 20,000 men before the end of June, made no movement to favour the attack on Portugal. It is, however, scarcely necessary to seek any other cause than the inevitable errors that mar all great military combinations not directed by a single hand.

CHAPTER VII.

THE operations, south of the Tagus, having been described, those which occurred, north of that river, shall now be traced; for previous to the invasion of Portugal, the French, stretching in one great line across the Peninsula, from Cadiz to Gihon, eagerly discussed the remnants of the Spanish armies.

It will be remembered, that the Duke Del Parque left Martin Carrera in the Gata mountains, to interrupt the communication between the Salamanca country and the valley of the Tagus. Julian Sanchez also, issuing from time to time out of Ciudad Rodrigo, cut off the French foragers in the open country between the Agueda and the Douro; and beyond the Douro, the Gallician army, under Garcia (in number about 10,000), occupied Puebla de Senabria, Puente Ferrada, Villa Franca, and Astorga, and menaced the right flank and rear of the 6th corps. Mahi was organizing a second army at Lugo, and in the Asturias, the Captain-General D'Arco commanded 7000 men, 3000 of which were posted at Cornellana,

under General Ponte. Thus an irregular line of defence, 600 miles long, was offered to the invaders, but without depth or substance, save at Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, behind which the British and Portuguese troops were lying.

On the other hand, the French, holding the interior line, kept their masses only on the principal routes, communicating by movable columns, and thus menacing all the important points without scattering their forces. The influx of fresh troops from France, continually added to their solidity, especially in Old Castile, where Ney had resumed the command, and was supported by Kellerman with the force of his government, and by an 8th corps under the Duke of Abrantes.

The invasion of Andalusia was the signal for a general movement of all the French in Spain ; and while Victor and Mortier menaced Cadiz and Badajoz, Ney summoned Ciudad Rodrigo, and Bonet, entering the Asturias, threatened Galicia by the Concijsa d'Ibas. At the same time, Loison, with 8000 fresh men, occupied Leon and Medina del Campo, and the advanced guard of the 8th corps passed Valladolid. Loison gave out that he would invade Galicia by Puebla de Senabria, and on the 15th of February, his cavalry cut to pieces 500 Spanish troops at Alcanizas, but he finally marched against Astorga, and, at the same time, Bonet destroyed Ponte's force at Potes de Sierra, and advanced to Nava de Suarna. These movements alarmed the Spaniards. Garcia, menaced at once by Bonet and by Loison, and fearing equally for Astorga and Lugo, threw two-thirds of his army into the former, and carried the remainder to Villa Franca, to support Mahi.

Ney, however, made only a feint of escalading Ciudad Rodrigo, and Loison, although supported by the men from Leon, who advanced to Puente Orbijo, was repulsed from Astorga. Junot then concentrated the 8th corps at Benevente, intending to besiege Astorga in form ; but he was suddenly called towards Madrid, lest disorders should arise in the capital during the king's absence, and Mahi and Garcia being apprised of this, immediately brought up the new levies to the edge of the mountains, thinking that they might relieve the Asturians by threatening an irruption into the plains of Leon. But as Loison still remained at Benevente, they were unable to effect their object, and, after drawing off 5000 men from Astorga, retired to Villa Franca. Bonet, however, did not pass Nava de Suarna, and when General Arco had rallied the Asturian fugitives at Louarca, Garcia, leaving Mahi to command in Galicia, marched himself with the remnant of the old army of the left, to join Romana at Badajoz. Meanwhile Kellerman advanced to Alba de Tormes, and detachments from his and Ney's force chased Carrera from the Gata and Bejar mountains, driving him sometimes over the Alagon, sometimes into Portugal. But it is unnecessary to trace all these movements, for the French, while preparing for greater operations, were continually spreading false reports, and making demonstrations in various directions to mislead the allies, and to cover their own projects.

Those projects were at first obscure. It is certain that the invasion of Portugal by the northern line, was not finally arranged until a later period, yet it seems probable that, while Bonet drew the attention of the Gallician army towards Lugo, the Duke of Abrantes designed to penetrate by Puebla Senabria, not as Loison announced, for the invasion of Galicia, but to turn the Tras os Montes and descend by the route of Chaves upon Oporto, while Ney, calling the 2nd corps to the aid of the 6th, should invest Ciudad Rodrigo. But whatever designs might have been contemplated, they were frustrated partly by the insurrection in Grenada and the failure of Suchet against Valencia, partly by disunion amongst the generals, for here also Ney and Junot complained reciprocally, and everywhere it was plainly seen that the French corps d'armée, however formidable in themselves, would not, in the absence of Napoleon, act cordially in a general system.

When the commotions in the south subsided, Junot returned to Old Castile, Loison joined the 6th corps on the Tormes, Kellerman retired to Valladolid, detachments, placed on the Douro, maintained the communications between Ney and Junot, and the latter, having drawn a reinforcement from Bonet, invested Astorga with 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, 18 field-guns, six 24-pounders, and two mortars. His covering-divisions were placed, one at Benevente, to watch the road of Mombuey, one near Puebla de Senabria, and one at Puente Ferrada. Mahi immediately concentrated the Gallician army at Villa Franca and Fonceabadon,

and detached 1500 men, under Echevaria, to Mombuey and Puebla, to harass the flank and rear of the investing army ; yet his force was weak. The Gallician authorities had frequently assured Lord Wellington that it amounted to 20,000 well-organized troops ; but it now appeared that only 8000 were in the field, and those ill provided, and prone to desertion.

SIEGE OF ASTORGA.

Santocildes, governor of this place, was an officer of courage ; his garrison consisted of 2500 infantry, besides cannoneers and armed peasantry, and the Moorish ramparts had been strengthened by fresh works ; but there was little ammunition, scarcely 20 days' rations, and nothing outside the walls capable of seriously disturbing the enemy. The town stood in an open plain, and had three suburbs : Puerto de Hierro, to the north ; St. Andreas, to the east ; and Retebia, to the west. On the two last Junot made false attacks, but conducted his real approaches, against the front, between Puerto de Hierro and Retebia. The place was invested the 22nd of March ; and Puerto de Hierro was carried by storm, two sallies repulsed, and the trenches opened before the end of the month. A breach was then commenced, but the battering-guns soon became unserviceable, and the line of approach was flanked by the houses of Retebia, which were filled with Spanish infantry. Nevertheless, the town suffered from shells, and the wall was so much broken on the 20th of April, that an assault was ordered. A previous attack on Retebia had failed ; but Santocildes was distressed for ammunition, and, during the preparations for storming, offered to capitulate.

Junot refused the terms demanded, and at five o'clock in the evening of the 21st, some picked troops ran up to the breach ; but it was well retrenched and stockaded, and defended with great obstinacy, and the flank fire from Retebia stopped the supporting columns. The storming party, thus abandoned to its own exertions, was held at bay on the summit of the breach ; and being plied on both flanks, and in front with shot from the houses of the town, and in rear by the musketry from Retebia, would have been totally destroyed but for the scarcity of ammunition, which paralyzed the Spanish defence. Three hundred French fell on the breach itself, but the remainder finally effected a lodgment in the ruins, and during the night a second attack on Retebia proving successful, a communication was opened from the parallels to the lodgment, and strong working parties were sent forward, who cut through the stockade into the town, when the governor surrendered.

Mahi, who had advanced to the edge of the mountains, as if he would have succoured the place, hearing of this event, retired to Bemibre, where his rear was overtaken and defeated by General Clausel on the 24th. He then fell back to Lugo, and recalled his detachment from Mombuey ; but the French from Benevente were already in that quarter, and on the 25th totally defeated Echevaria at Castro Contrijo. Meanwhile, Junot placed garrisons in Astorga and Leon, and restored Bonet his division. That general, who had retired to Santander during the siege, then re-occupied Oviedo and Gihon, defeated the Asturians, and once more menaced Galicia by the road of Concija, and by that of Sales ; several slight actions ensued ; but the French did not penetrate farther, and the junta of Galicia reinforced the Asturians with 3000 men.

During the siege of Astorga, the 6th corps was concentrated at Salamanca, a strong detachment of Kellerman's troops seized the pass of Baños, and Martin Carrera, quitting the hills, joined the English light division near Almeida. In fine, the great operations were commencing, and the line of communication with France was encumbered with the advancing reinforcements. A large battering train, collected from Segovia, Burgos, and Pampeluna, arrived at Salamanca ; General Martineau, with 10,000 men for the 8th corps, reached Valladolid ; General Drouet passed the Pyrenees with a 9th corps, composed of the 4th battalions of regiments already in Spain ; and these were followed by 17,000 of the imperial guards, whose presence gave force to the rumour, that the emperor himself was coming to take the chief command.

Fortunately for the allies, this report, although rife amongst all parties, and credited both by Joseph's ministers and the French ambassador at Madrid, proved groundless ; and a leader for the projected operations was still to be named. I

have been informed that Marshal Ney resumed the command of the 6th corps, under the impression that he was to conduct the enterprise against Portugal, that the intrigues of Marshal Berthier, to whom he was obnoxious, frustrated his hopes, and that Napoleon, fatigued with the disputes of his lieutenants, had resolved to repair in person to the peninsula : that his marriage, and some important political affairs, diverted him from that object, and that Massena, Prince of Esling, was finally chosen, partly for his great name in arms, and partly that he was of higher rank than the other marshals, and a stranger to all the jealousies and disputes in the peninsula. His arrival was known in May amongst the allies, and Lord Wellington had no longer to dread the formidable presence of the French emperor.

That Massena's base of operations might not be exposed to the interference of any other authority in Spain, the four military governments of Salamanca, Valladolid, Asturias, and St. Andero were placed under his temporary authority, which thus became absolute in the northern provinces. But previous to taking the command of the troops, he repaired to Madrid, to confer with the king ; and it would seem that some hesitation as to the line of invasion still prevailed in the French councils, because in the imperial muster-rolls the head-quarters of the army of Portugal are marked as being at Caceres in Estremadura, and the imperial guards are returned as part of that army, yet during the month of April only ; a circumstance strongly indicating Napoleon's intention to assume the command himself. The northern line was, however, definitely adopted ; and, while the Prince of Esling was still in the capital, the 8th corps passed the Tormes, and Ney commenced the

FIRST SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

This fortress had been commanded, in the beginning of the year, by a person whose conduct had been so suspicious that Lord Wellington demanded his removal. But Don Andreas Herrasti, the actual governor, was a veteran of 50 years' service, whose silver hairs, dignified countenance, and courteous manners excited respect ; and whose courage, talents, and honour were worthy of his venerable appearance. His garrison amounted to 6000 fighting men, besides the citizens ; and the place, built on a height overhanging the northern bank of the Agueda river, was amply supplied with artillery and stores of all kinds. The works were, however, weak, consisting of an old rampart, nearly circular, about 30 feet in height, and without other flanks than a few projections containing some light guns : a second wall, about 12 feet high, called a *fausse braie*, with a ditch and covered way, surrounded the first ; but was placed so low on the hill as scarcely to offer any cover to the upper rampart. There were no bomb-proofs, even for the magazine, and Herrasti was forced to place his powder in the church, which he secured as he might.

Beyond the walls, and totally severed from the town, the suburb of Francisco, defended by an earthen entrenchment, and strengthened by two large convents, formed an outwork to the north-east of the place. The convent of Santa Cruz served a like purpose on the north-west ; and between these posts there was a ridge called the Little Teson, which, somewhat inferior in height to the town, was only 150 yards from the body of the place. There was also a Greater Teson, which, rising behind the lesser at the distance of 600 yards from the walls, overlooked the ramparts, and saw into the bottom of the ditch.

The country immediately about Ciudad Rodrigo, although wooded, was easy for troops ; especially on the left bank of the Agueda, to which the garrison had access by a stone bridge within pistol-shot of the castle gate. But the Agueda itself, rising in the Sierra de Francia, and running into the Douro, is subject to great and sudden floods ; and six or seven miles below the town, near San Felices, the channel deepens into one continued and frightful chasm, many hundred feet deep, and overhung with huge desolate rocks.

During February and March, the French departed as lightly as they had advanced against Ciudad Rodrigo ; but, on the 25th of April, a camp was pitched upon a lofty ridge five miles eastward of the city ; and in a few days, a second, and then a third, arose : and these portentous clouds continued to gather on the hills until June, when 50,000 fighting men came down into the plain, and throwing two bridges over the Agueda, begirt the fortress.

This multitude, composed of the 6th and 8th corps, and a reserve of cavalry, was led by Ney, Junot, and Montbrun. The 6th corps invested the place; the 8th occupied San Felices Grande, and other points, and the cavalry swarmed on both sides of the river; but the battering train and a great escort was still two days' march in the rear; for the rains inundating the flat country between the Águeda and the Tormes, rendered the roads impassable. The bridges were established on the 2nd and 7th of June; the one above, the other below the town; and on the 13th, ground was broken on the Greater Teson. The 22nd, the artillery arrived, and preparations were made to contract the circle of investment on the left bank of the Águeda, which had hitherto been but slightly watched. But that night, Julian Sanchez, with 200 horsemen, passed silently out of the castle gate, and crossing the river, fell upon the nearest French posts, pierced their line in a moment, and reached the English light division, then behind the Azava, six miles from Ciudad Rodrigo. This event induced Ney to reinforce his troops on the left bank, and a movement, to be hereafter noticed, was directed against General Crawford the 25th, on which day also the French batteries opened.

Ney's plan was to breach the body of the place without attending to the Spanish fire. Salvos, from 46 guns constantly directed on one point, soon broke the old masonry of the ramparts; but the besieged, who could bring 24 guns to bear on the Teson, shot so well that three magazines blew up at once in the trenches, and killed above 100 of the assailants. On the 27th, the Prince of Esling arrived in the camp and summoned the governor to surrender. Herrasti answered in the manner to be expected from so good a soldier; and the fire was resumed until the 1st of July, when Massena, sensible that the mode of attack was faulty, directed the engineers to raise counter-batteries to push their parallels to the Lesser Teson, work regularly forward, blow in the counterscarp and pass the ditch in form. Meanwhile, to facilitate the progress of the new works, the convent of Santa Cruz on the right flank was carried after a fierce resistance; and on the left the suburb was attacked, taken, and retaken by a sally, in which great loss was inflicted on the French. Howbeit, the latter remained masters of everything beyond the walls.

During the cessation of fire, consequent upon the change in the French dispositions, Herrasti removed the ruins from the foot of the breach, and strengthened his flank defences: but on the 9th of July, the besiegers' batteries being established on the Lesser Teson, re-opened with a terrible effect. In 24 hours the fire of the Spanish guns was nearly silent, part of the town was in flames, a reserve magazine exploded on the walls, the counterscarp was blown in by a mine on an extent of 36 feet, the ditch filled by the ruins, and a broad way made into the place. At this moment, three French soldiers of heroic courage, suddenly running out of the ranks, mounted the breach, looked into the town, and having thus, in broad daylight proved the state of affairs, discharged their muskets, and with matchless fortune, retired unhurt to their comrades.

The columns of assault immediately assembled. The troops, animated by the presence of Ney, and excited by the example of the three men who had so gallantly proved the breach, were impatient for the signal. A few moments would have sent them raging into the midst of the city, when the white flag waved on the rampart, and the venerable governor was seen standing alone on the ruins, and signifying by his gestures, that he desired to capitulate. He had stricken manfully, while reason warranted hope, and it was no dishonour to his silver hairs that he surrendered when resistance could only lead to massacre and devastation.

Six months had now elapsed since the French, resuming the plan of conquest interrupted by the Austrian war and by the operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley, had retaken the offensive. Battle after battle they had gained, fortress after fortress they had taken, and sent the Spanish forces, broken and scattered to seek for refuge in the most obscure parts: solid resistance there was none; and the only hope of deliverance for the Peninsula rested upon the British general. How he realized that hope shall be related in the next book. Meanwhile, the reader should bear in mind that the multifarious actions related in the foregoing chapters were contemporaneous; and that he has been led as it were round the margin of a lake, whose turbulent waters spread on every side. Tedious to read, and trifling many

of the circumstances must appear, yet, as a whole, they form what has been called the Spanish military policy : and, without accurate notions on that head, it would be impossible to appreciate the capacity of the man, who, like Milton's phantom, paved a broad way through the chaotic warfare.

I have been charged with incompetence to understand, and, most unjustly, with a desire to underrate the Spanish resistance ; but it is the province of history to record foolish as well as glorious deeds, that posterity may profit from all ; and neither will I mislead those who read my work, nor sacrifice the reputation of my country's arms to shallow declamation upon the unconquerable spirit of independence. To expose the errors is not to undervalue the fortitude of a noble people ; for in their constancy, in the unexampled patience with which they bore the ills inflicted alike by a ruthless enemy, and by their own sordid government, the Spaniards were truly noble : but shall I say that they were victorious in their battles, or faithful in their compacts ; that they treated their prisoners with humanity ; that their juntas were honest or wise ; their generals skilful ; their soldiers firm ? I speak but the bare truth, when I assert, that they were incapable of defending their own cause ! Every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years that the war lasted, rise up in support of this fact ; and to assume that an insurrection so conducted did, or could possibly baffle the prodigious power of Napoleon is an illusion. Spain baffle him ! Her efforts were amongst the very smallest causes of his failure. Portugal has far greater claims to that glory. Spain furnished the opportunity ; but it was England, Austria, Russia, or rather fortune, that struck down that wonderful man. The English, more powerful, more rich, more profuse, perhaps more brave than the ancient Romans ; the English, with a fleet, for grandeur and real force never matched, with a general equal to any emergency, fought as if for their own existence. The Austrians brought 400,000 good troops to arrest the conqueror's progress, the snows of Russia destroyed 300,000 of his best soldiers ; and finally, when he had lost half a million of veterans, not one of whom died on Spanish ground, Europe, in one vast combination, could only tear the Peninsula from him, by tearing France along with it. What weakness then, what incredible delusion to point to Spain, with all her follies, and her never-ending defeats, as a proof that a people fighting for independence must be victorious ! She was invaded, because she adhered to the great European aristocracy ; she was delivered, because England enabled that aristocracy to triumph for a moment over the principles of the French Revolution.

BOOK XI.

CHAPTER I.

THE defence of Portugal was not the result of any fortuitous combination of circumstances, nor was Lord Wellington moved thereto by any hasty ambition to magnify his own reputation, but calmly and deliberately formed his resolution, after a laborious and cautious estimate of the difficulties and chances of success. Reverting then to the period when, by retreating upon Badajos, he divorced his operations from the folly of Spain, I shall succinctly trace his military and political proceedings up to the moment, when, confident in the soundness of his calculations, he commenced his project, unmoved by the power of his enemy, the timidity of his friends, the imprudence of his subordinates, or the intrigues of discontented men, who secretly, and with malignant perseverance, laboured to thwart his measures and to ruin his designs.

After the retreat from Spain in 1809, he repaired to Seville, partly to negotiate with the central junta, upon matters touching the war, but principally to confer with his brother, ere the latter quitted the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley's departure was caused by the state of politics in England, where a change in the administration

was about to take place,—a change, sudden indeed, but not unexpected ; because the ineptitude of the government was, in private, acknowledged by many of its members, and the failure of the Walcheren expedition was only the signal for a public avowal of jealousies and wretched personal intrigues, which had rendered the cabinet of St. James's the most inefficient, Spain excepted, of any in Europe. Mr. Canning, the principal mover of those intrigues, had secretly denounced Lord Castlereagh to his colleagues as a man incapable of conducting the public affairs, and exacted from them a promise to dismiss him. Nevertheless, he permitted that nobleman, ignorant of the imputation on his abilities, to plan, and conduct the fitting out of the most powerful armament that ever quitted England. But when it became evident that only loss and ruin waited on this unhappy expedition, Mr. Canning claimed the fulfilment of the promise, and the intrigue thus becoming known to Lord Castlereagh, was by him characterized as "a breach of every principle of good faith, both public and private." This was followed by a duel ; and by the dissolution of the administration. Mr. Perceval and Lord Liverpool were then empowered to form another cabinet ; and after a fruitless negotiation with Lord Grey and Lord Grenville, assumed the lead themselves, and offered the department of foreign affairs to Lord Wellesley.

Contrary to the general expectation, he accepted it. His brother had opened to him those great views for the defence of Portugal, which were afterwards so gloriously realized, but which could never have been undertaken with confidence by the general, unless secure of some powerful friend in the administration, imbued with the same sentiments, bound by a common interest, and resolute to support him when the crisis of danger arrived. It was therefore wise and commendable in Lord Wellesley to sacrifice something of his own personal pretensions to be enabled to forward projects, promising so much glory to the country and his own family, and the first proceedings in parliament justified his policy.

Previous to the change in the cabinet, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been created Baron Douro and Viscount Wellington ; but those honours, although well deserved, were undoubtedly conferred as much from party as from patriotic feeling, and greatly excited the anger of the opposition members, who, with few exceptions, assailed the general personally, and with an acrimony not to be justified. His merits, they said, were nought ; his actions silly, presumptuous, rash ; his campaign one deserving not reward, but punishment. Yet he had delivered Portugal, cleared Galicia and Estremadura, and obliged 100,000 French veterans to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid !

Lord Grey opposing his own crude military notions to the practised skill of Sir Arthur, petulantly censured the latter's dispositions at Talavera ; others denied that he was successful in that action ; and some, forgetting that they were amenable to history, even proposed to leave his name out of the vote of thanks to the army ! That battle, so sternly fought, so hardly won, they would have set aside with respect to the commander, as not warranting admission to a peerage always open to venal orators ; and the passage of the Douro, so promptly, so daringly, so skilfully, so successfully executed, that it seemed rather the result of inspiration than of natural judgment, they would have cast away as a thing of no worth !

This spirit of faction was, however, not confined to one side : there was a ministerial person at this time who, in his dread of the opposition, wrote to Lord Wellington complaining of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that would excite a public sensation : *anything provided blood was spilt*. A calm but severe rebuke, and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the general's abhorrence of this detestable policy ; but when such passions were abroad, it is evident that Lord Wellesley's accession to the government was essential to the success of Lord Wellington's projects.

Those projects delivered the Peninsula, and changed the fate of Europe ; and every step made towards their accomplishment merited attention as much from the intrinsic interest of the subject as that it has been common to attribute his success to good fortune and to the strenuous support he received from the cabinet at home. Now it is far from my intention to deny the great influence of fortune in war, or that the Duke of Wellington has always been one of her peculiar favourites ;

but I will make it clearly appear, that if he met with great success, he had previously anticipated it, and upon solid grounds; that the cabinet did not so much support him as it was supported by him; and finally, that his prudence, foresight, and firmness were at least as efficient causes as any others that can be adduced.

Immediately after the retreat from Jaraceijo, and while the ministers were yet unchanged, Lord Castlereagh brought, by continual reverses, to a more sober method of planning military affairs, had demanded Lord Wellington's opinion upon the expediency, the chance of success, and the expense of defending Portugal. This letter reached the general on the 14th of September, 1803; but the subject required many previous inquiries and a careful examination of the country; and, at that period, any plan for the defence of Portugal was necessarily to be modified, according to the energy or feebleness of the Spaniards in Andalusia. Hence it was not until after his return from Seville, a few days previous to the defeat at Ocaña, that Lord Wellington replied to Lord Liverpool, who, during the interval, had succeeded Lord Castlereagh in the war department.

Adverting to the actual state of the French troops in the Peninsula, he observed, that, unless the Spanish armies met with some great disaster, the former could not then make an attack upon Portugal; yet, if events should enable them to do so, that the forces at that moment in the latter might defend it. "But the peace in Germany," he said, "might enable France to reinforce her armies in Spain largely, when the means of invading Portugal would be increased, not only in proportion to the additional troops then poured in, but also in proportion to the effect which such a display of additional strength would necessarily have upon the spirit of the Spaniards. Even in that case, until Spain should have been conquered and rendered submissive, the French would find it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, provided England employed her armies in defence of that country, and that the Portuguese military service was organized to the full extent of which it was capable. But the number of British forces employed should not be less than 30,000 effective men; although the Portuguese regular force, actually enrolled, consisted of 39,000 infantry, 3000 artillery, and 3000 cavalry; and the militia amounted to 45,000, exclusive of the *ordenanças*."

The next point of consideration was the probable expense. "The actual yearly cost of the British army in Portugal, exclusive of the hire of transport vessels, was about £1,800,000, being only half a million sterling more than they would cost if employed in England. Hence the most important consideration was the expense of renovating and supporting the Portuguese military and civil services. The British government had already subsidised the Portuguese regency at the rate of £600,000 yearly, being the expense of 20,000 men, which the latter were bound by treaty to place at the service of the English commander-in-chief.

"But this was far from sufficient to render the Portuguese army efficient for the impending contest. The revenue of Portugal was between eight and nine millions of dollars, the expenses between fourteen and fifteen millions, leaving a deficiency of more than six millions of dollars. Hence, for that year, the most pressing only of the civil and military demands had been paid, and the public debt and the salaries of the public servants were in arrear. The advances already made by Great Britain amounted to two millions of dollars; there remained a deficiency of four millions of dollars, which, after a careful inquiry, it appeared could not be made good by Portugal; and it was obvious that the administration would, when distressed, gradually appropriate the subsidy to support the civil authorities to the detriment of the military service. Nay, already money from the English military chest had been advanced to prevent the Portuguese army from disbanding from want of food.

"It was impossible to diminish the expenses of the regency, and yet the French invasion and the emigration to the Brazils had so impoverished the country that it was impossible to raise the revenue or obtain money by loans. The people were unable to pay the taxes already imposed, and the customs, which formed the principal branch of Portuguese revenue, were reduced to nothing by the transfer of the Brazilian trade from the mother country to Great Britain. This transfer, so

profitable to the latter, was ruinous to Portugal, and, therefore, justice as well as policy required that England should afford pecuniary assistance to the regency.

"Without it nothing could be expected from the Portuguese army. The officers of that army had for many years done no duty, partly that their country having been, with some trifling exceptions, at peace nearly half a century, they continued in the same garrison, and lived with their families; and to these advantages added others arising from abuses in the service. Now, the severe but necessary discipline introduced by Marshal Beresford had placed the Portuguese officers in a miserable situation. All abuses had been extirpated, additional expenses had been inflicted, and the regular pay was not only insufficient to support them in a country where all the necessaries of life were enormously dear, but it was far below the pay of the English, Spanish, and French officers, with whom, or against whom they were to fight.

"If, therefore, the war was to be carried on, it was advisable to grant a subsidy of £130,000 yearly, to enable the regency to increase the pay of the Portuguese officers; and to this sum, for the reasons before mentioned, should be added a further subsidy of about £300,000, to supply the actual deficiency in the Portuguese revenues. Or, if the English cabinet preferred it, they might take 10,000 more Portuguese troops into pay, which could be done at the expense of £250,000. With such assistance the difficulties of the moment might be overcome; but without it, he, Lord Wellington, felt assured that the whole financial and military system of the Portuguese would break down at once; all the expense hitherto incurred would be cast away, and all hopes of defending the country extinguished. It was for the ministers to decide.

"There remained two other points to consider—the re-embarkation of the British army in the event of failure, and the chances of the Portuguese nation continuing the contest alone. As to the first, he could carry off everything safely, except the horses of the cavalry and artillery, those could not be carried off if the embarkation took place after a lost battle; and, if under other circumstances, the expense of horse-transports would be more than the worth of the animals. As to the second point, if the British army evacuated Portugal, under any circumstances, he could not give hopes that the contest could be prolonged effectually by the natives. Although I," he said, "consider the Portuguese government and army as the principals in the contest for their own independence, and that their success or failure must depend principally upon their own exertions and the bravery of their army, and that I am sanguine in my expectations of both, when excited by the example of British officers and troops, I have no hope of either if his majesty should now withdraw the army from the Peninsula, or if it should be obliged to evacuate it by defeat. There is no doubt that the immediate consequences will be the possession of Lisbon by the enemy, probably without a contest; and other consequences will follow affecting the state of the war, not only in Portugal but Spain. If, therefore, it should be thought advisable now to withdraw, or if, eventually the British army should be obliged to withdraw from Portugal, I would recommend a consideration of the means of carrying away such of the Portuguese military as should be desirous of emigrating, rather than continue, by their means, the contest in this country."

Peniche and Setuval offered secure points of embarkation in the event of failure, but neither were likely to come within the scope of the operations, and Lord Wellington's opinion as to the facility of carrying off the army from Lisbon was founded chiefly upon Admiral Berkeley's assurances that the embarkation would not take longer than four hours, during which time, even though the left bank of that river should be occupied by the enemy, the ships of war could sustain the fire and at the same time sweep with their own guns all the ground above Passo d'Arcos, which, from the circumstance of its having no surf, was thought preferable to St. Julian's for an embarkation. But the admiral's views, as I shall have occasion to observe hereafter, were erroneous; the fleet could not remain in the Tagus, if the enemy were in possession of the left bank.

Although alarmed at the number of men demanded, a number which, from the recent loss sustained on the Walcheren expedition, they truly observed,

would, in case of disaster, endanger the safety of England, the ministers assented to Lord Wellington's proposals, undertook to pay 10,000 additional Portuguese troops, and to advance money for the increased stipends to the officers; but thus pledging themselves to an annual subsidy of nearly one million, they with justice required that the Portuguese regency, under pain of the subsidy being stopped, should keep all that part of the military establishment which remained under their own direction in a state of complete efficiency.

Thus supported, Lord Wellington proceeded with vigorous intelligence to meet the impending contest. His troops removed from the Guadiana, took healthy cantonments on the north-eastern frontier of Portugal, and he expected a reinforcement of 5000 infantry and a regiment of cavalry from England. Smaller detachments had already reached him, and the army when it commenced its march from the Guadiana was numerically 30,000 strong; but those actually under arms scarcely amounted to 20,000; 9000 were in hospital, and many in the ranks were still tottering from the effects of past illness.

The 20th of January, the head-quarters, and the artillery parks, were established at Viseu, in Upper Beira. The cavalry was quartered, by single regiments, at Golegao, Punhete, Torres Novas, Celerico, and Santarem. General Hill was left with 5000 British, and a like number of Portuguese at Abrantes, and the remainder of the infantry (one regiment, forming the garrison of Lisbon, excepted) was distributed along the valley of the Mondego.

The plans of the English general, were—at first, grounded upon the supposition that the French would follow the right or northern line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations, against the peninsula, that is, *attack Portugal from the side of Old Castile*, rather than *Andalusia from the side of La Mancha*. In this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon, his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every part of the peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms. Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left, scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment Seville was opening her gates, Lord Wellington demanded fresh instructions, reiterating the question whether *Portugal should be defended at all*, but at the same time transmitting one of those clear and powerful statements which he invariably drew up for the ministers' information previous to undertaking any great enterprise; statements, in which, showing the bearings of past and present events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has attributed to fortune, and the favour of the cabinet, successes which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness.

"The enemy," he said, "aimed at conquering the south; he would no doubt obtain Seville with all its resources, and the defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any action in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however, be lost and the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partizans would continue; Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the central junta even exist within its walls; but it would be without authority, because the French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs left Portugal untouched; but it was chiefly to that country he wished to draw the ministers' attention.

"They already knew its military situation and resources. If arms could be supplied to the militia, a gross force of 90,000 men, regularly organized, could be calculated upon, exclusive of the armed population and of the British army. Much had been done within the last nine months for the enrolment, organization, and equipment of this great force; but much remained to be done, and with very insufficient means, before the 50,000 men composing the militia could possibly contend with the enemy; and although this should be effected, the whole army would still want that confidence in themselves and in their officers, which is only to be acquired by military experience.

"When the affairs of Spain should, as before supposed, be brought to that pass, that a regular resistance would cease, no possibility existed of the contest in that country being renewed on such a scale as to afford a chance of success, although the possession of each part might be precarious, depending upon the strength of the French force holding it, and that the whole might prove a burden rather than an advantage to the French government. Thence arose this question, 'Will the continuation of the contest in Portugal afford any reasonable prospect of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to the allies?'

"It was impossible to calculate upon any certain grounds the degree of assistance to be expected from the Portuguese troops. For the regulars everything that discipline could effect had been done, and they had been armed and equipped as far as the means of the country would go. The militia also had been improved to the extent which the expense of keeping them embodied would permit. The Portuguese had confidence in the British nation and army; they were loyal to their Prince; detested the French government, and were individually determined to do everything for the cause. Still they were not to be certainly calculated upon until inured to war, because the majority of their officers were of an inferior description and inexperienced in military affairs."

Under these circumstances, and adverting to the approaching subjection of Spain, he demanded to know whether "the enemy, bending the greatest part of his force against Portugal, that country should be defended, or measures taken to evacuate it, carrying off all persons, military and others, for whose conveyance means could be found. But, under any circumstances (he said), the British army could always be embarked in despite of the enemy."

Such being the view taken of this important subject by Lord Wellington, it may seem proper here to notice an argument which, with equal ignorance and malice, has often been thrust forward in disparagement of Sir John Moore, namely, that he declared Portugal could not be defended, whereas Lord Wellington did defend that country. The former general, premising that he was not prepared to answer a question of such magnitude, observed that the frontier, being, although rugged, open, could not be defended against a superior force; yet that Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baraçal, Celerico, Viseu, might be occupied as temporary positions to check the advance of an enemy, and cover the embarkation of stores, etc., which could only be made at Lisbon, that the Portuguese in their own mountains would be of much use, and that he hoped that they could alone defend the *Tras os Montes*.^{*} That, if the French succeeded in Spain, it would be vain to resist them in Portugal "*because the latter was without a military force*," and if it were otherwise, from the experience of Rorica and Vimiero, no reliance was to be placed on their troops. But this opinion, hastily given, had reference only to the state of affairs existing at that moment, being expressly founded on the miserable condition and unpromising character of the Portuguese military, Spain also being supposed conquered.

Lord Wellington, after two campaigns in the country; after the termination of the anarchy which prevailed during Sir John Cradock's time; after immense subsidies had been granted to Portugal, her whole military force reorganized, and her regular troops disciplined, paid, and officered by England; after the war in Germany had cost Napoleon 50,000 men, the campaign in the peninsula at least 50,000 more; in fine, after mature consideration, and when Spain was still fighting, when Andalusia, Catalonia, Murcia, Valencia, Galicia, and the Asturias, were still uninvaded; when Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, most important posts with reference to this question, were still in possession of the Spaniards, and prepared for defence, Lord Wellington, I say, came to the conclusion that Portugal might be defended against the enemy then in the peninsula, provided an enormous additional subsidy and a powerful auxiliary army were furnished by England, and that one earnest and devoted effort was made by the whole Portuguese nation. And when Andalusia fell, he warned his government, that although success could only be expected from the devotion and ardour of the Portuguese, their army could not

^{*} Appendix, No. 2, section 12.

even then be implicitly trusted, Lisbon also he considered as the only secure point of resistance, and he occupied Viseu, Guarda, Almeida, Belmonte, and Celerico, as temporary posts. But in all things concerning this war there was between those generals a remarkable similarity of opinion and plan of action.

"The French," said Sir John Moore, "will find the Spaniards troublesome subjects, but in the first instance they will have little more than a march to subdue the country."

"The defeat and dispersion of the Spanish armies will be," said Lord Wellington, "the probable consequence of any action in which either imprudence, necessity, or even expediency, may lead them to engage. The armies may be lost, the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partizans will probably continue."

And when the edge of the sword was, in 1810, as in 1808, descending on the unguarded front of Andalusia, Lord Wellington, on the first indication of Joseph's march, designed to make a movement similar in principle to that executed by Sir John Moore on Sahagun, that is, by an irruption into Castile, to threaten the enemy's rear, in such sort that he should be obliged to return from Andalusia or suffer his forces in Castile to be beaten.* Nor was he at first deterred from this project by the knowledge that fresh troops were entering Spain. The junta, indeed, assured him that only 8000 men had reinforced the French; but, although circumstances led him to doubt this assertion, he was not without hopes to effect his purpose before the reinforcements, whatever they might be, could come into line. He had even matured his plan, as far as regarded the direction of the march, when other considerations obliged him to relinquish it, and these shall be here examined, because French and Spanish writers then, and since, have accused him of looking on with indifference, if not with satisfaction, at the ruin of the central junta's operation, as if it only depended upon him to render them successful.

Why he refused to join in the Spanish projects has been already explained. He abandoned his own—

1. Because the 5000 men promised from England had not arrived, and his hospitals being full, he could not, including Hill's division, bring more than 20,000 British soldiers into the field. Hill's division, however, could not be moved without leaving the rear of the army exposed to the French in the south,—a danger, which success in Castile, by recalling the latter from Andalusia, would only increase.

2. The Portuguese had suffered cruelly during the winter from hunger and nakedness, the result of the scarcity of money before mentioned. To bring them into line was to risk a total disorganization, destructive alike of present and future advantages. On the other hand, the French in Castile, consisting of the 6th corps and the troops of Kellerman's government, Lord Wellington knew to be at least 30,000 strong, of which 20,000 were in one mass; and, although the rest were dispersed from Burgos to Avila, and from Zamora to Valladolid, they could easily have concentrated in time to give battle, and would have proved too powerful. That this reasoning was sound shall now be shown.

Mortier's march from Seville would not have terminated at Badajos, if the British force at Abrantes, instead of advancing to Portalegre, had been employed in Castile. The invasion of Andalusia was only part of a general movement throughout Spain; and when the king placed himself at the head of the army, to force the Morena, Kellerman marched from Salamanca to Miranda del Castanar and Bejar, with the 6th corps, and thus secured the defiles leading into the valley of the Tagus, and at the same time, the 2nd corps coming down that valley, communicated with the 6th by the pass of Banos, and with the 5th by Seradillo and Caceres. Hence, without losing hold of Andalusia, three *corps d'armée*, namely, the 6th, 2nd, and 5th, amounting to 50,000 men, could, on an emergency, be brought together to oppose any offensive movement of Lord Wellington's. Nor was this the whole of the French combinations; for, in rear of all these forces, Napoleon was crowding the Peninsula with fresh armies, and not 8000, as the central junta asserted, but 100,000 men, rendered disposable by the peace with Austria and the evacuation of Walcheren, were crossing, or to cross, the western Pyrenees.

* Appendix, No. 2, section 3.

Of these, the first detachments reinforced the divisions in the field, but the succeeding troops formed an 8th and 9th corps, and the former, under the command of the Duke of Abrantes, advancing gradually through Old Castile, was actually in the plains of Valladolid, and would, in conjunction with Kellerman, have overwhelmed the British army; but for that sagacity, which the French, with derisive but natural anger, and the Spaniards, with ingratitude, have termed "*The selfish caution of the English system.*"

Truly, it would be a strange thing, to use so noble and costly a machine as a British army, with all its national reputation to support, as lightly as those Spanish multitudes, collected in a day, dispersed in an hour, re-assembled again without difficulty, incapable of attaining, and consequently, incapable of losing, any military reputation.

CHAPTER II.

THE greatness of the French reinforcements having dispelled the idea of offensive operations, Lord Wellington turned his whole attention to Portugal, and notwithstanding the unfavourable change of circumstances, the ministers consented that he should undertake its defence; the majority yielding to the influence of his brother, rather than to their own conviction of its practicability, and throwing the responsibility entirely on the shoulders of the general. The deep designs, the vast combinations, and the mighty efforts, by which he worked out the deliverance of that country, were beyond the compass of their policy; and even now, it is easier to admire than to comprehend, the moral intrepidity which sustained him under so many difficulties, and the sagacity which enabled him to overcome them; for he had an enemy with a sharp sword to fight, the follies and fears of several weak cabinets to correct, the snares of unprincipled politicians to guard against, and finally to oppose public opinion. Failure was everywhere anticipated, and there were but few who even thought him serious in his undertaking. But having now brought the story of the war down to the period, when not Spain nor Portugal, but England was to contend with France; before I enter upon the narrative of this memorable contest, it will be well to take a survey of the respective conditions and plans of the belligerents, and to show how great the preparations, how prodigious the forces on both sides, and with what a power each was impelled forward to the shock.

State of the French.—France victorious, and in a state of the highest prosperity, could with ease furnish double the number of men required to maintain the struggle in the Peninsula for many years. But the utmost strength of the Spaniards having been proved, it was evident that if the French could crush the British armies, disorder and confusion might indeed be prolonged for a few years, yet no effectual resistance made, and as in the war of succession, the people would gradually accommodate themselves to the change of dynasty, especially as the little worth of Ferdinand was now fully demonstrated, by an effort to effect his release. The agent, a Baron Kolli being detected, and his place supplied by one of the French police to ascertain the intentions of the captive king, the latter, influenced by personal fears alone, not only refused to make the attempt, but dishonourably denounced Kolli to the French government. The only real obstacles then to the entire conquest of the Peninsula were Cadiz and Portugal. The strength of the former was precarious, and the enormous forces assembled to subdue the latter appeared to be equal to the task. Yet in war there are always circumstances, which, though extraneous to the military movements, influence them as much as the wind influences the sailing of a ship, and amongst the most important of these, must be reckoned the conduct of the intrusive king.

Joseph was a man of so amiable a nature, that even the Spaniards never accused him of anything worse than being too convivial; but it is evident that he was unequal to his task and mistook his true situation, when, resisting Napoleon's policy, he claimed the treatment of an independent king. He should have known that he was a tool, and in Spain could only be a tool of the emperor's. To have refused a crown, like his brother Lucien, would have been heroic firmness, but like his brother Louis, first to accept, and then to resist the hand that conferred it, was

a folly that, without ameliorating the condition of the Spaniards, threw fatal obstacles in Napoleon's path. Joseph's object was to create a Spanish party for himself by gentle and just means, but the scales fell from the hands of justice when the French first entered the Peninsula, and while the English supported Spain, it was absurd to expect even a sullen submission, much less attachment from a nation so abused, neither was it possible to recast public feeling, until the people had passed through the furnace of war. The French soldiers were in Spain for conquest, and without them the intrusive monarch could not keep his throne.

Now Joseph's Spanish ministers were men who joined him upon principle, and who, far from showing a renegade zeal in favour of the French, were as ardently attached to their own country as any of those who shouted for Ferdinand VII. ; and whenever Spanish interests clashed (and that was constantly) with those of the French armies, they as well as the king invariably supported the former ; and so strenuously, that in Paris it was even supposed that they intended to fall on the emperor's troops.* Thus civil contention weakened the military operations, and obliged Napoleon either to take the command in person, or to adopt a policy which however defective, will upon inspection prove, perhaps, to have been the best adapted to the actual state of affairs.

He suffered, or as some, eager to lower a great man's genius to their own level, have asserted, he fomented, disputes between the marshals and the king, but the true question is, could he prevent those disputes? A wise policy does not consist in pushing any one point to the utmost perfection of which it may be susceptible, but in regulating and balancing opposing interests in such a manner that the greatest benefit shall arise from the working of the whole.

To arrive at a sound judgment of Napoleon's measures, it would be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political position, but there are not sufficient materials yet before the world to do this correctly, and we may be certain, that his situation with respect both to foreign and domestic policy required extraordinary management. It must always be remembered, that he was not merely a conqueror, but the founder of a political structure too much exposed to storms from without to bear any tampering with its internal support. If money be the sinew of war, it is the vital stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon's policy than the care with which he handled financial matters ; avoiding as he would the plague, that fictitious system of public credit, so fatuitously cherished in England. He could not without hurting France transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the only resource left was to make "the war maintain the war."

But Joseph's desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers, were much opposed to this system ; nor were the proceeds always applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy ; yet openly to declare the king of no consideration would have been impolitic in the highest degree. The emperor adopted an intermediate course, and formed what were called "particular military governments," such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia ; in which the marshal, or general, named governor possessed both the civil and military power : in short, he created viceroys as he had threatened to do when at Madrid ; † and though many disadvantages attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon's measures. The principal disadvantages were, that it mortally offended the king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party ; that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, and attentive only to their own situation, without regarding the general objects of the war ; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it as a step towards dismembering Spain, and especially with respect to the provinces beyond the Ebro ; and, indeed, the annexing those parts to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the emperor.‡

On the other hand, experience proved that Joseph was not a general equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits that at this period the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of the French armies, and introduced a horrible license, while the military

* Appendix No. 4, section 1.

† See Vol. I. p. 174.

‡ Appendix, No. 4, sections 2 and 3.

movements were feebly pushed. Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the resources of Spain for the troops, with least devastation, was to make the success of each *corps d'armée*, and the reputation of its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it was fighting. And although some of the governors had neither the sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation; others, such as Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, and yet provided all necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly not have been attained under the supreme government of the king, because he knew nothing of war, loved pleasure, was of an easy, obliging disposition, and had a court to form and maintain.

I am aware that the first-named generals, especially Soult, were included by Joseph amongst those who by oppressing the people extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result of personal enmity; and facts derived from less interested quarters, as well as the final results, proved that those officers had a longer reach in their policy than the king could understand.

There is yet another view in which the matter may be considered. Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy common to the small states of that country might be broken, and the whole rendered amenable and ready to assimilate when he judged the time ripe to re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the military governments of Spain. The marshal's sway, however, wisely adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and violence, must of necessity be onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula once subdued, this system would have been replaced by the peaceful government of the king, who would then have been regarded as a deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war only could introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the constitution of Bayonne.

Nevertheless, the first effects of the decree establishing this system were injurious to the French cause. Fresh contributions were exacted to supply the deficiency occasioned by the cessation of succours from France; and to avoid these, men who would otherwise have submitted tranquilly, fled from the military governments. The *Partidas* also suddenly and greatly increased, and a fresh difficulty arose about their treatment when prisoners. These bodies, although regardless of the laws of war themselves, claimed all the rights of soldiers from their adversaries, and their claim was supported by the Spanish government. Thus, when Soult, as major-general for the king, proclaimed that military execution would be done on the bands in Andalusia as assassins, and beyond the pale of military law, the regency answered by a retaliatory declaration; and both parties had strong grounds for what they did; the junta, because the defence of the country now rested chiefly on the *Partidas*; Joseph, because the latter, while claiming the usages of war, did not act upon them, and were by the junta encouraged in assassination. Mina, and indeed all the chiefs put all their prisoners to death whenever it became inconvenient to keep them; and Saraza publicly announced his hope of being able to capture Madame Suchet when she was pregnant, that he might destroy the mother and the infant together! And such things were common during this terrible war. The difficulties occurring in argument were, however, overcome in practice; the question of the treatment of the prisoners was generally decided by granting no quarter on either side.

Joseph, incensed at the edict establishing the governments, sent the Marquis of Almenara to Paris to remonstrate with his brother, and to complain of the violence and the injustice of the French generals, especially Ney and Kellerman; he denounced one act of the latter, which betrayed the most wanton contempt of justice and propriety; namely, the seizure of the national archives at Simancas; by which infinite confusion was produced, and the utmost indignation excited, without obtaining the slightest benefit, political or military.* Another object of Almenara's mission was to ascertain if there was really any intention of seizing the

* Appendix No. 4, section 2.

provinces beyond the Ebro; and this gave rise to a curious intrigue; for his correspondence, being intercepted, was brought to Mr. Stuart, the British envoy, and he, in concert with Romana and Cabanes, the Spanish historian, simulated the style and manner of Napoleon's state-papers, and composed a counterfeit *senatus consultum* and decree for annexing the provinces beyond the Ebro to France, and transmitted them to Joseph, whose discontent and fears were thereby greatly increased. Meanwhile, his distress for money was extreme; and his ministers were at times actually destitute of food.*

These political affairs impeded the action of the armies, but the intrinsic strength of the latter was truly formidable; for, reckoning the king's French guards, the force in the Peninsula was not less than 370,000 men, and 80,000 horses. Of these, 48,000 men were in hospital, 4000 prisoners, and 29,000 detached; leaving nearly 280,000 fighting men actually under arms, ready either for battle or siege: and, moreover, a fresh reserve, 18,000 strong, was in march to enter Spain.† In May this prodigious force had been re-organized; and in July was thus distributed:—

Governments or Armies in the 2nd Line.

| | | | Total Strength. |
|--|--|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. Catalonia | Seventh corps | Duke of Tarento | 55,647 |
| 2. Aragon | Third corps | General Suchet | 33,007 |
| 3. Navarre | { Detachments and a division of the imperial guards | General Reille | 21,887 |
| 4. Biscay | | General Caffarelli ... | 6,570 |
| 5. Old Castile, comprising Burgos, Aranda, and Soria | { Divisions of the imperial guards and cavalry | General Dorsenne ... | 10,303 |
| 6. Valladolid, etc. | | General Kellerman ... | 6,474 |
| 7. Asturias | One division | General Bonet | 9,898 |
| Total for the governments..... | | | 143,786 |

Armies in the 1st Line.

| | |
|---|---------|
| <i>Army of the South</i> , composed of the first, fourth, and fifth corps, under the command of Soult..... | 72,769 |
| <i>Army of the Centre</i> , composed of the royal guards, two divisions of infantry, and two of cavalry, under the personal command of the king | 24,187 |
| <i>Army of Portugal</i> , composed of a reserve of cavalry and the second, sixth, and eighth corps, under the command of Massena | 86,896 |
| The ninth corps, commanded by General Drouet, distributed, by divisions, along the great line of communication from Vittoria to Valladolid | 23,815 |
| A division under General Serras, employed as a movable column to protect the rear of the army of Portugal..... | 10,605 |
| | 218,272 |

Thus the plan of invasion was determined in three distinct lines; namely, the 3rd and 7th corps on the left; the army of the south in the centre; the army of Portugal on the right. But the interior circle was still held by the French; and their lines of communication were crowded with troops.

State of Spain.—On the right, the armies of Valencia and Catalonia, were opposed to the 3rd and 7th corps; but the utmost efforts of the last could only retard, not prevent the sieges of Tarragona and Tortosa. In the centre, the Murcian troops and those assembled at Cadiz, were only formidable by the assistance of the British force under General Graham. On the left, Romana, supported by the frontier fortresses, maintained a partisan warfare from Albuquerque to Ayamonte, but looked to Hill for safety, and to Portugal for refuge. In the north, the united forces of Galicia and Asturia did not exceed 15,000 men; and Mahi declared his intention of retiring to Coruña if Bonet advanced beyond the frontiers. Indeed, the Gallicians were so backward to join the armies, that, at a

* Appendix, No. 4, section 5.

† Appendix, No. 1, section 1.

later period, Contreras was used to send through the country movable columns, attended by an executioner, to oblige the villages to furnish their quota of men. Yet, with all this severity, and with money and arms continually furnished by England, Galicia never was of any signal service to the British operations.

But, as in the human body livid spots and blotches appear as the vital strength decays, so, in Spain, the *Partidas* suddenly and surprisingly increased as the regular armies disappeared. Many persons joined these bands as a refuge from starvation; others from a desire to revenge the licentious conduct of the marauding French columns; and, finally, the regency, desirous of pushing the system to its utmost extent, established secret guerilla juntas in each province, enjoining them diligently to collect stores and provisions in secure places. District inspectors and paymasters, selected by the nearest general officer in command of regular troops, were also appointed, as superintendents of details relative to the discipline and payment of the *Partidas*, and particular tracts were charged with the supplies, each according to its means. Lastly, every province was divided into three parts, each part, following its population, being to furnish seven, eight, or nine squadrons of this irregular force; and the whole, whenever circumstances required it, to unite and act in mass.

The first burst of these bands occasioned the French considerable loss, impeded their communications, and created great alarm. It was a second insurrection in the whole country. The Murcians, in concert with the peasants of Grenada and Jaen, waged war in the mountains of Andalusia; Franquissette and Palarea beset the neighbourhood of Ciudad Real and Toledo in La Mancha. El Principe, Saornil, and Juan Abril, descending from the Carpentino mountains, sometimes on the side of Segovia, sometimes on the side of Madrid, carried off small French posts close to the capital, and slew the governor of Segovia, at the very gates of that town.

On the other side of Madrid, the *Empecinado*, with 1200 cavalry and infantry, kept the hills above Guadalaxara, and ventured sometimes to give battle in the plain. Espoz y Mina was formidable in Navarre. Longa and Campillo, at the head of 2000 men, harassed Biscay and the neighbourhood of Vittoria, and the chain of communication between these great bands and the *Empecinado* was maintained by Amor, Merina, and the friar Sapia, the two first acting about Burgos, and the third holding the mountains above Soria. In the Asturias, Escadron, continually hanging upon the flanks and rear of Bonet, between St. Andero and Oviedo, acted in concert with Campillo on one side, and with Porlier on the other, and this last chief, sometimes throwing himself into the mountains on the borders of Galicia, and sometimes sailing from Coruña, constantly troubled the Asturias by his enterprises. To curb these bands, the French fortified all their own posts of communication and correspondence, slew numbers of the guerillas, and suppressed others. Many were robbers who, under the pretence of acting against the enemy, merely harassed their own countrymen; and few were really formidable, though all were vexatious. Enough, however, has been said upon this point.

But, while reduced to this irregular warfare for preventing the entire submission of Old Spain, the regency, with inconceivable folly and injustice, were alienating the affections of their colonies, and provoking civil war; as if the terrible struggle in the Peninsula were not sufficient for the ruin of their country. The independence of Spain was, with them, of subordinate interest to the continuance of oppression in South America. Money, arms, and troops, were withdrawn from the Peninsula to subdue the so-called rebellious colonists; nor was any reflection made on the inconsistency of expecting Napoleon's innumerable hosts to be beaten close to their own doors by guerilla operations, and yet attempting, with a few divisions, to crush whole nations acting in the same manner at 3000 miles distance. Such being the state of French and Spanish affairs, it remains to examine the condition of England and Portugal, as affecting the war in the Peninsula.

England.—The contentions of party were vehement, and the ministers' policy resolved itself into three principal points: first, the fostering the public inclination for the war; secondly, the furnishing money for the expenses; and, thirdly, the recruiting of the armies. The last was provided for by an act passed in the

early part of 1809, which offered eleven guineas bounty to men passing from the militia to the line, and ten guineas bounty to recruits for the militia; this was found to furnish about 24,000 men in the year; but the other points were not so easily disposed of. The opposition in parliament was powerful, eloquent, and not very scrupulous. The desperate shifts which formed the system of the ministers were, indeed, justly attacked, but when particulars touching the contest in Portugal were discussed, faction was apparent. The accuracy of Beresford's report of the numbers and efficiency of the native forces was most unjustly questioned, and the notion of successful resistance assailed by arguments and by ridicule, until gloom and doubt were widely spread in England, and disaffection wonderfully encouraged in Portugal; nor was the mischief thus caused one of the smallest difficulties encountered by the English general.

On the other side, the ministers, trusting to their majorities in parliament, reasoned feebly and ignorantly, yet wilfully, and like men expecting that fortune would befriend them, they knew not why or wherefore, and they dealt also more largely than their adversaries in misrepresentations to mislead the public mind. Every treasury newspaper teemed with accounts of battles which were never fought, plans which were never arranged, places taken which were never attacked, and victories gained where no armies were. The plains of the Peninsula could scarcely contain the innumerable forces of the Spaniards and Portuguese; cowardice, weakness, treachery, and violence were the only attributes of the enemy; if a battle was expected, his numbers were contemptible; if a victory was gained his host was countless. Members of parliament related stories of the enemy which had no foundation in truth, and nothing that consummate art of intrigue could bring to aid party spirit, and to stifle reason, was neglected.

But the great and permanent difficulty was to raise money. The country, inundated with bank-notes, was destitute of gold; Napoleon's continental system burthened commerce, the exchanges were continually rising against England, and all the evils which sooner or later are the inevitable result of a fictitious currency, were too perceptible to be longer disregarded in parliament. A committee appointed to investigate the matter, made early in the following session a report in which the evils of the existing system, and the causes of the depreciation, were elaborately treated, and the necessity of returning to cash payments enforced: but the authors did not perceive, or at least did not touch upon the injustice, and the ruin, attending a full payment in coin of sterling value, of debts contracted in a depreciated paper currency. The celebrated writer, William Cobbett, did not fail, however, to point out this very clearly, and subsequent experience has confirmed his views. The government endeavoured to stave off the discussion of the bullion question, but Lord King, by demanding gold from those of his tenants whose leases were drawn before the depreciation of bank-notes, proved the hollowness of the system, and drove the ministers to the alternative of abandoning the prosecution of the war, or of denying the facts adduced in the bullion report. They adopted the latter; and at the instance of Vansittart, the chancellor of the exchequer, the house voted in substance, that a pound-note and a shilling were equal in value to a golden guinea of full weight, at the moment when light guineas were openly selling at 28s. This vote, although well calculated to convince the ministers' opponents, that no proposition could be too base, or absurd, to meet with support in the existing parliament, did not, however, remove the difficulties of raising money, and no resource remained but that of the desperate spendthrift, who never intending to pay, cares not on what terms he supplies his present necessities. The peculiar circumstances of the war, had, however, given England a monopoly of the world's commerce by sea, and the ministers, affirming that the country was in a state of unexampled prosperity, began a career of expense, the like of which no age or nation had ever seen; yet without one sound or reasonable ground for expecting ultimate success, save the genius of their general, which they but half appreciated, and which the first bullet might have extinguished for ever.

State of Portugal.—In this country, three parties were apparent:—That of the people ready to peril body and goods for independence; that of the *fidalgos*, who thought to profit from the nation's energy without any diminution of ancient abuses;

That of the *disaffected*, who desired the success of the French ; some as thinking that an ameliorated government must follow, some from mere baseness of nature. This party looked to have Alorna, Pamplona, and Gomez Freire, as chiefs if the enemy triumphed ; for those noblemen, in common with many others, had entered the French service in Junot's time, under the authority of the Prince Regent's edict to that effect. Freire, more honourable than his companions, refused to bear arms against his country, but the two others had no scruples, and Pamplona even sketched a plan of invasion, which is at this day in the military archives at Paris.

The great body of the people, despising both their civil governors and military chiefs, relied on the British general and army ; but the *fidalgos*, or caste of nobles, working in unison with, and supported by, the regency, were a powerful body, and their political proceedings after the departure of Sir John Cradock demand notice. The patriarch, formerly Bishop of Oporto, the Monteiro Mor, and the Marquess of Das Minas, composed the regency, and they and every other member of the government were jealous of each other, exceedingly afraid of their superiors in the Brazils, and, with the exception of the secretary, Miguel Forjas, unanimous in support of abuses ; and as the military organization carried on by Beresford, was only a restoration of the ancient institutions of the country, it was necessarily hateful to the regency, and to the *fidalgos*, who profited by its degeneracy. This, together with the unavoidable difficulties in finance, and other matters, retarded the progress of the regular army towards efficiency during 1809, and rendered the efforts to organize the militia, and *ordenança*, nearly nugatory. Nevertheless, the energy of Lord Wellington and of Beresford, and the comparatively zealous proceedings of Forjas, proved so disagreeable to Das Minas, who was in bad health, that he resigned, and immediately became a centre, round which all discontented persons, and they were neither few, nor inactive, gathered. The times obliged the government to permit an unusual freedom of discussion in Lisbon ; it naturally followed that the opinions of designing persons were most obtruded, and those opinions being repeated in the British parliament, were printed in the English newspapers, and re-echoed in Lisbon. Thus a picture of affairs was painted in the most glaring colours of misrepresentation, at the moment when the safety of the country depended upon the devoted submission of the people.

After Das Minas's resignation, four new members were added to the regency, namely, Antonio, commonly called Principal Souza, the Conde de Redondo, the Marquis de Olhao, and Doctor Nogueira. The two last were men of some discretion, but the first, daring, restless, irritable, indefatigable, and a consummate intriguer, created the utmost disorder, seeking constantly to thwart the proceedings of the British generals. He was strenuously assisted by the patriarch, whose violence and ambition were no way diminished, and whose influence amongst the people was still very considerable.

An exceedingly powerful cabal was thus formed, whose object was to obtain the supreme direction, not only of the civil, but military affairs, and to control both Wellington and Beresford. The Conde Linhares, head of the Souza family, was Prime Minister in the Brazils ; the Principal was in the regency at Lisbon ; the Chevalier Souza was envoy at the British court, and a fourth of the family, Don Pedro de Souza, was in a like situation near the Spanish regency ; so that playing into each others' hands, and guided by the subtle Principal, they were enabled to concoct very dangerous intrigues ; and their proceedings, as might be expected, were at first supported with a high hand by the cabinet of Rio Janerio. Lord Wellesley's energetic interference reduced the latter, indeed, to a reasonable disposition, yet the cabal secretly continued their machinations, and what they durst not attempt by force, they sought to attain by artifice.

In the latter end of the year 1809, Mr. Villiers was replaced as envoy by Mr. Charles Stuart, and this gentleman, well experienced in the affairs of the Peninsula, and disdaining the petty jealousies which had hitherto marked the intercourse of the principal political agents with the generals, immediately applied his masculine understanding and resolute temper to forward the views of Lord Wellington. It is undoubted, that the dangerous political crisis which followed his arrival, could

not have been sustained if a diplomatist less firm, less able, or less willing to support the plans of the commander had been employed.

To resist the French was the desire of two of the three parties in Portugal, but with the *fidalgos*, it was a question of interest more than of patriotism. Yet less sagacious than the clergy, the great body of which perceiving, at once that they must stand or fall with the English army, heartily aided the cause, the *fidalgos* clung rather to the regency. Now the caballers in that body, who were the same people that had opposed Sir Hew Dalrymple, hoped not only to beat the enemy, but to establish the supremacy of the northern provinces (of which they themselves were the lords) in the administration of the country, and would therefore consent to no operations militating against this design.

Another spring of political action was the hatred and jealousy of Spain common to the whole Portuguese nation. It created difficulties during the military operations, but it had a visibly advantageous effect upon the people, in their intercourse with the British. For when the Spaniards showed a distrust of their allies, the Portuguese were more minded to rely implicitly on the latter, to prove that they had no feeling in common with their neighbours.

Yet, notwithstanding this mutual dislike, the Princess Carlotta, wife to the Prince Regent, and sister to Ferdinand, claimed not only the succession to the throne of Spain in the event of her brother's death or perpetual captivity, but the immediate government of the whole Peninsula as hereditary regent; and to persuade the tribunals to acknowledge her claims was the object of Pedro Souza's mission to Cadiz. The council of Castile, always ready to overthrow the Spanish regency, readily recognized Carlotta's pretensions in virtue of the decision of the secret cortes of 1789 which abolished the *salique* law of Philip the Fifth: but the regents would pay no attention to them, yet Souza renewing his intrigues when the cortes assembled, by corruption obtained an acknowledgment of the princess's claim. His further progress was, however, promptly arrested by Lord Wellington, who foresaw that his success would not only affect the military operations in Portugal, by placing them under the control of the Spanish government, but the policy of England afterwards, if power over the whole Peninsula was suffered thus to centre in one family. Moreover, he judged it a scheme, concocted at Rio Janeiro, to embarrass himself and Beresford; for it was at first kept secret from the British cabinet, and it was proposed that the princess should reside at Madeira, where, surrounded by the contrivers of this plan, she could only have acted under their directions. Thus it is plain that arrogance, deceit, and personal intrigues, were common to the Portuguese and Spanish governments; and why they did not produce the same fatal effects in the one as in the other country, will be shown in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER III.

WHEN Lord Wellington required 30,000 British troops to defend Portugal, he considered the number that could be fed rather than what was necessary to fight the enemy; and hence it was that he declared success would depend upon the exertions and devotion of the native forces. Yet knowing, from his experience in Spain, how passions, prejudices, and abuses would meet him at every turn, he would trust neither the simple enthusiasm of the people, nor the free promises of their governors, but insisted that his own authority as *marshal-general of Portugal* should be independent of the local government, and absolute over all arrangements concerning the English and Portuguese forces, whether regulars, militia, or "*ordenanças*;" for his designs were vast, and such as could only be effected by extraordinary means.*

Armed with this power, and with the influence derived from the money supplied by England, he first called upon the regency to revive and enforce the ancient military laws of the realm, by which all men were to be enrolled, and bear arms. That effected, he demanded that the people should be warned and commanded to destroy their mills, to remove their boats, break down their bridges, lay waste their

* Appendix, No. 5, section 9.

fields, abandon their dwellings, and carry off their property, on whatever line the invaders should penetrate: and that this might be deliberately and effectually performed, he designed at the head of all the allied regular forces, to front the enemy, in such sort that, without bringing on a decisive battle, the latter should yet be obliged to keep constantly in a mass, while the whole population, converted into soldiers, and closing on the rear and flanks, should cut off all resources save those carried in the midst of the troops.

But it was evident that if the French could find or carry supplies sufficient to maintain themselves until the British commander, forced back upon the sea, should embark or giving battle be defeated, the whole of this system must necessarily fall to pieces, and the miserable ruined people submit without further struggle. To avoid such a calamitous termination, it was necessary to find a position, covering Lisbon, where the allied forces could neither be turned by the flanks, nor forced in front by numbers, nor reduced by famine, and from which a free communication could be kept up with the irregular troops closing round the enemy. The mountains filling the tongue of land upon which Lisbon is situated, furnished this key-stone to the arch of defence. Accurate plans of all the positions had been made under the directions of Sir Charles Stuart, in 1799, and, together with the French Colonel Vincent's minutes, showing how they covered Lisbon, were in Lord Wellington's possession; and from those documents the original notion of the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras are said to have been derived; but the above-named officers only contemplated such a defence as might be made by an army in movement, before an equal or a greater force. It was Lord Wellington who first conceived the design of turning those vast mountains into one stupendous and impregnable citadel, wherein to deposit the independence of the whole Peninsula.

Hereafter the lines shall be described more minutely; at present it must suffice to observe that intrenchments, inundations, and redoubts secured more than 500 square miles of mountainous country lying between the Tagus and the ocean. Nor was this the most gigantic part of the English general's undertaking. He was a foreigner, ill supported by his own government, and holding power under that of Portugal by a precarious tenure; he was vehemently opposed by the local authorities, by the ministers, and by the nobility of that country; and yet, in this apparently weak position, he undertook at one and the same time, to overcome the abuses engendered by centuries of misgovernment, and to oblige a whole people, sunk in sloth, to arise in arms, to devastate their own lands, and to follow him to battle against the most formidable power of modern times.

Notwithstanding the secret opposition of the regency, and of the *fidalgos*, the ancient military laws were revived, and so effectually, that the returns for the month of May gave a gross number of more than 430,000 men in arms, of which about 50,000 were regular troops, 55,000 militia, and the remainder "ordenanças;" but this multitude was necessarily subject to many deductions. The "capitans mor," or chiefs of districts, were at first exceedingly remiss in their duty, the total number of "ordenanças" really assembled fell far short of the returns, and all were ill-armed. This also was the case with the militia, only 32,000 of which had muskets and bayonets: and deserters were so numerous, and the native authorities connived at absence under false pretences to such an extent, that scarcely 26,000 men ever remained with their colours. Of the regular troops, the whole were in good condition, and 30,000 being in the pay of England, were completely equipped, clothed, disciplined, and for the most part commanded by British officers; but, deduction being made for sick men and recruits, the actual number under arms did not exceed 24,000 infantry, 3500 cavalry, and 3000 artillery. Thus the disposable native force was about 56,000 men, one half of which were militia.

At this period, the British troops employed in the Peninsula, exclusive of the garrison of Gibraltar, somewhat exceeded 38,000 men of all arms, but 6000 were in hospital or detached, and above 7000 were in Cadiz. The latter city was protected by an allied force of nearly 30,000 men, while the army, on whose exertions the fate of the Peninsula rested, was reduced to 25,000 British; such was the policy of the English cabinet; for this was the minister's and not the general's arrangement.

The ordenanças being set aside, the actual force at the disposition of Lord Wellington, cannot be estimated higher than 80,000 men, and the frontier to defend, reckoning from Braganza to Ayamonte, 400 miles long. The great military features, and the arrangements made to take advantage of them in conformity with the general plan of defence, shall now be described.

The Portuguese land frontier presents four great divisions open to invasion :—

1. The northern line of the Entre Minho and the Tras os Montes, extending from the mouth of the Minho, to Miranda on the Douro.
2. The eastern line of the Tras os Montes following the course of the Douro from Miranda to Castel Rodrigo.
3. The frontier of Beira from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminal on the Tagus.
4. The Alemtejo and the Algarve frontiers stretching in one line from the Tagus to the mouth of the Guadiana.

But these divisions may be simplified with respect to the military aspect of the country ; for Lisbon taken as the centre, and the distance from thence to Oporto as the radius, a sweep of the compass to Rosaminal will trace the frontier of Beira ; and the space lying between this arc, the Tagus, and the sea-coast, furnished the main body of the defence. The southern and northern provinces being considered as the wings, were rendered subservient to the defence of the whole, but had each a separate system for itself, based on the one general principle that the country should be wasted, and the best troops opposed to the enemy without risking a decisive action, while the irregular forces closed round the flanks and rear of the invaders.

The northern and southern provinces have been already described, Beira remains to be noticed. Separated by the Douro from the Entre Minho and Tras os Montes, it cannot well be invaded on that line, except one or both of those provinces be first subdued ; but from Castel Rodrigo to Rosaminal, that is from the Douro to the Tagus, the frontier touches upon Spain, and perhaps the clearest method to describe the conformation of the country will be to enter the camp of the enemy.

An invading army, then, would assemble at Ciudad Rodrigo, or at Coria, or at both those places. In the latter case, the communications could be maintained directly over the Gata mountains by the pass of Perales, or circuitously, by Placencia and the pass of Baños, and the distance being by Perales not more than two marches, the corps could either advance simultaneously, or unite and force their way at one point only. In this situation the frontier of Beira between the Douro and the Tagus, would offer them an opening of 90 miles against which to operate. But in the centre, the Sierra de Estrella, lifting its snowy peaks to the clouds and stretching out its gigantic arms, would seem to grasp and claim the whole space ; the summit is impassable, and streaming down on either hand, numerous rivers cleaving deeply amidst ravines and bristled ridges, continually oppose the progress of an army. Nevertheless, the invaders could penetrate to the right and left of this mountain in the following directions :—

From Ciudad Rodrigo.—1. By the valley of the Douro.—2. By the valley of the Mondego.—3. By the valley of the Zezere.

From Coria.—1. By Castello Branco and the valley of the Tagus ; and, 2. By the mountains of Sobreira Formosa.

To advance by the valley of the Douro, would be a flank movement through an extremely difficult country, and would belong rather to an invasion of the northern provinces than of Beira, because a fresh base must be established at Lamego or Oporto, before the movement could be prosecuted against Lisbon.

To gain the valley of the Mondego there are three routes. The first passing by Almeida and Celerico, the second by Trancoso and Viseu, the third by Alfayates and Guarda over the high ridges of the Estrella. To gain the valley of the Zezere, the march is by Alfayates, Sabugal, and Belmonte, and whether to the Zezere or the Mondego, these routes, although rugged, are practicable for artillery ; but between Guarda and Belmonte some high table-land offers a position where an army could seal the passage on either side of the mountain, except by the Trancoso road. In fact, the position of Guarda may be called the breast-plate of the Estrella.

On the side of Coria, an invading army must first force or turn the passages of

the Elga and Ponçul rivers, to reach Castello Branco, and that done, proceed to Abrantes by the valley of the Tagus or over the savage mountain of Sobreira Formosa. But the latter is impracticable for heavy artillery, even in summer, the ways broken and tormented by the deep channels of the winter torrents, the country desert, and the positions, if defended, nearly impregnable. Nor is the valley of the Tagus to be followed, save by light corps, for the villages are few, the ridges not less steep than those of Sobreira, and the road quite impracticable for artillery of any calibre.

Such, and so difficult, being the lines of invasion through Beira, it would seem that a superior enemy might be met with advantage on the threshold of the kingdom; but it is not so. For, first, the defending army must occupy all the positions on this line of 90 miles, while the enemy, posted at Ciudad Rodrigo and Coria, could, in two marches, unite and attack on the centre, or at either extremity, with an overwhelming force. Secondly, the weakness of the Beira frontier consists in this, *the Tagus along its whole course is, from June to December, fordable as low down as Salvatierra, close under the lines.* A march through the Alemtejo and the passage of the river at any place below Abrantes would, therefore, render all the frontier positions useless; and although there were no enemy on the borders of the Alemtejo itself, the march from Ciudad Rodrigo by Perales, Coria, and Alcantara, and thence by the southern bank to the lowest ford in the river, would be little longer than the route by the valley of the Mondego or that of the Zezere. For these reasons *the frontier of Portugal must be always yielded to superior numbers.*

Both the conformation of the country, and the actual situation of the French corps, led Lord Wellington to expect that the principal attacks would be by the north of Beira and by the Alemtejo, while an intermediate connecting corps would move by Castello Branco upon Abrantes, and under this impression he made the following dispositions. Elvas, Almeida, and Valença, in the first, and Peniche, Abrantes, and Setuval, in the second line of fortresses, were garrisoned with native troops, part regulars, part militia.

General Baccellar, having Silveira and the British colonels, Trant, Miller, and J. Wilson, under his orders, occupied the provinces beyond the Douro, with 21 regiments of militia, including the garrison of Valença, on the Minho.

The country between Penamacor and the Tagus, that is to say, the lines of the Elga and the Ponçul, was guarded by ten regiments of militia, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Lusitanian legion. In the Alemtejo, including the garrisons, four regiments of militia were stationed, and three regiments held the fortresses of the Algarves. There remained in reserve 12 regiments of the 50 composing the whole militia force, and these were distributed in Estremadura on both sides of the Tagus, but principally about Setuval. The regular Portuguese troops, deducting those in garrison at Almeida Elvas and Cadiz, were at Thomar and Abrantes.

But the British, organized in five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, were distributed as follows:—

| | | | | | Men. |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------------------------|
| 1st division | ... | ... | ... | ... | General Spencer, about 6000 |
| 2nd division, including the 13th dragoons | ... | ... | ... | ... | General Hill, 5000 |
| 3rd division | ... | ... | ... | ... | General Picton, 3000 |
| 4th division | ... | ... | ... | ... | General Cole, 4000 |
| Light division | ... | ... | ... | ... | Robert Crawford, 2400 |
| The cavalry | ... | ... | ... | ... | General Cotton, 3000 |
| | | | | | Valley of Mondego. |
| Total | | | | | 23,400 under arms. |

Thus the wings of the defence were composed solely of militia and ordenança, and the whole of the regular force was in the centre. The Portuguese at Thomar, and the four British divisions of infantry posted at Viseu, Guarda, Pinhel, and Celerico, formed a body of 38,000 men, the greater part of which could, in two marches, be united either at Guarda or between that position and the Douro. On the other side Beresford and Hill could, in as short a period, unite by the boat-

bridge of Abrantes and thus 32,000 men would be concentrated on that line. If the enemy should attempt the passage of the Elga either direct from Coria, or by a flank movement of the 2nd corps from Estremadura, across the Tagus, Beresford could succour the militia by moving over the Sobreira Formosa to Castello Branco, while Hill could reach that place much quicker than General Reynier, in consequence of an arrangement which merits particular attention.

It has been already said that the march from Abrantes to Castello Branco is over difficult mountains; to have repaired the roads between these places would have been more useful to the enemy than to the allies as facilitating a passage for superior numbers to penetrate by the shortest line to Lisbon. But Lord Wellington, after throwing boat-bridges over the Tagus and the Zezere, and fortifying Abrantes, established between the latter and Castello Branco a line of communication by the left bank of the Tagus, through Niza, to the pass of Vilha Velha, where, by a flying bridge, the river was re-crossed, and from thence a good road led to Castello Branco. Now the pass of Vilha Velha is prodigiously strong for defence, and the distance from Abrantes to Castello Branco being nearly the same by Niza as by the other bank of the river, the march of troops was yet much accelerated, for the road near Vilha Velha being reconstructed by the engineers, was excellent.

Thus all the obstacles to an enemy's march by the north bank were preserved, and the line by Vilha Velha enabled not only Hill to pass from Portalegre or Abrantes to Castello Branco by a flank movement in less time than Reynier, but it also provided a lateral communication for the whole army, which we shall hereafter find of vital importance in the combinations of the English general, supplying the loss of the road by Alcantara and the pass of Perales, which otherwise would have been adopted.

The French, also, in default of a direct line of communication between Estremadura and the Ciudad Rodrigo country, were finally forced to adopt the circuitous road of Almaraz and the pass of Baños, and it was in allusion to this inconvenience that I said both parties sighed over the ruins of Alcantara.

But, notwithstanding this facility of movement and of concentration, the allies could not deliver a decisive battle near the frontier, because the enemy could unite an overwhelming force in the Alemtejo, before the troops from the north could reach that province, and a battle lost there would, in the dry season, decide the fate of Lisbon. To have concentrated the whole army in the south would have been to resign half the kingdom and all its resources to the enemy; but to save those resources for himself, or to destroy them, was the very basis of Lord Wellington's defence, and all his dispositions were made to oblige *the French to move in masses*, and to *gain time himself*, time to secure the harvests, time to complete his lines, time to perfect the discipline of the native troops, and to give full effect to the arming and organization of the ordenança, and, above all things, time to consolidate that moral ascendancy over the public mind which he was daily acquiring. A closer examination of his combinations will show that they were well adapted to effect these objects.

1. The enemy durst not advance, except with *concentrated masses*, because, on the weakest line of resistance, he was sure to encounter above 20,000 men.

2. If, choosing the Alemtejo, he suddenly dispersed Romana's troops and even forced back Hill's, the latter passing the Tagus at Abrantes, and uniting with Beresford, could dispute the passage of the Tagus until the arrival of the army from the north; and no regular and sustained attempt could be made on that side without first besieging Badajos or Elvas to form a place of arms.

3. A principal attack on the central line could not be made without sufficient notice being given by the collection of magazines at Coria, and by the passage of the Elga and Ponçul, Beresford and Hill could then occupy the Sobreira Formosa. But an invasion on this line, save by a light corps in connection with other attacks, was not to be expected: for, although the enemy should force the Sobreira and reach Abrantes, he could not besiege the latter, in default of heavy artillery. The Zezere, a large and exceedingly rapid river, with rugged banks, would be in his front, the Tagus on his left, the mountains of Sobreira in his rear, and the troops from Guarda and the valley of the Mondego would have time to fall back.



4. An attack on Guarda could always be resisted long enough to gain time for the orderly retreat of the troops near Almeida to the valley of the Mondego, and, moreover, the road from Belmonte towards Thomar by the valley of the Zezere was purposely broken and obstructed.

The space between Guarda and the Douro, an opening of about 30 miles leading into the valley of the Mondego, remains to be examined. Across this line of invasion, the Agueda, the Coa, and the Pinel, run in almost parallel directions from the Sierra de Francia and Sierra de Estrella, into the Douro, all having this peculiarity, that as they approach the Douro their channels invariably deepen into profound and gloomy chasms, and there are few bridges. But the principal obstacles were the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, both of which it was necessary to take before an invading army could establish a solid base of invasion. After this the lines of the Douro and of the Mondego would be open; if the French adopted the second, they could reach it by Guarda, by Alverca, and by Trancoso, concentrating at Celerico, when they would have to choose between the right and the left bank. If the latter, they must march between the Mondego and the Estrella mountains until they reached the Alva, a river falling at right angles into the Mondego, and behind which they would find the allied army in a position of surprising strength. If, to avoid that, they marched by the right of the Mondego upon Coimbra, there were other obstacles to be hereafter noticed; but, in either case, the allied forces, having *interior lines of communication*, could, as long as the Belmonte road was sealed, concentrate in time behind the Alva, or in front of Coimbra. Hence it was on the side of the Alemtejo that danger was most to be apprehended; and it behoved General Hill to watch vigilantly and act decisively in opposition to General Reynier; for the latter having necessarily the lead in the movements, might, by skilful evolutions and rapid marches, either join the 6th and 8th corps before Hill was aware of his design, and thus overwhelm the allied divisions on the Mondego, or drawing Hill across the Tagus, furnish an opportunity for a corps from Andalusia to penetrate by the southern bank of that river.

In these dispositions the English general had regard only to the enemy's actual situation, and expecting the invasion in summer; but in the winter season the rivers and torrents being full, and the roads deteriorated, the defence would be different; fewer troops would then suffice to guard the Tagus and the Zezere, the Sobreira Formosa would be nearly impassable, a greater number of the allied troops could be collected about Guarda, and a more stubborn resistance made on the northern line.

Every probable movement being thus previously well considered, Lord Wellington trusted that his own military quickness and the valour of the British soldiers could baffle any unforeseen strokes during the retreat, and once within the lines (the Portuguese people and the government doing their part), he looked confidently to the final result. He judged that, in a wasted country, and with 30 regiments of militia in the mountains on the flank and rear of the enemy, the latter could not long remain before the lines, and his retreat would be equivalent to a victory for the allies. There were, however, many hazards. The English commander, sanguine and confident as he was, knew well how many counter-combinations were to be expected; in fine, how much fortune was to be dreaded in a contest with 80,000 French veterans having a competent general at their head. Hence, to secure embarkation in the event of disaster, a third line of entrenchments was prepared, and 24,000 tons of shipping were constantly kept in the river to receive the British forces; measures were also taken to procure a like quantity for the reception of the Portuguese troops, and such of the citizens as might wish to emigrate. It only remained to feed the army.

In the Peninsula generally, the supplies were at all times a source of infinite trouble on both sides, and this, not as some have supposed, because Spain is incapable of supplying large armies; there was throughout the war an abundance of food in that country, but it was unevenly distributed; some places were exhausted, others overflowing, the difficulty was to transport provisions, and in this the allies enjoyed a great advantage; their convoys could pass unmolested, whereas

the French always required strong guards, first to collect food, and then to bring it up to their armies. In Portugal there was, however, a real deficiency, even for the consumption of the people, and after a time scarcely any food for man or beast (some cattle and straw from the northern provinces excepted), was to be obtained in that country : nay, the whole nation was at last in a manner fed by England. Every part of the world accessible to ships and money was rendered subservient to the cravings of this insatiable war, and even thus, it was often a doubtful and a painful struggle against famine while near the sea, but at a distance from that nurse of British armies, the means of transport necessarily regulated the extent of the supply. Now wheel-carriage was scarce and bad in Portugal, and for the most part the roads forbade its use ; hence the only resource for the conveyance of stores was water-carriage to a certain distance, and afterwards beasts of burthen.

Lisbon, Abrantes, and Belem Castle, on the Tagus ; Figueras and Raiva de Pena Cova, on the Mondego ; and, finally, Oporto and Lamego, on the Douro, were the principal depôts formed by Lord Wellington, and his magazines of consumption were established at Viseu, Celerico, Condeixa, Leiria, Thomar, and Almeida. From those points 400 miserable bullock-cars and about 12,000 hired mules, organized in brigades of 60 each, conveyed the necessary warlike stores and provisions to the armies ; when additional succours could be obtained, it was eagerly seized, but this was the ordinary amount of transport.

With such means and with such preparations was the defence of Portugal undertaken, and it must be evident to the most superficial observer, that, amidst so many difficulties, and with such a number of intricate combinations, Lord Wellington's situation was not one in which a general could sleep, and that, due allowance being made for fortune, it is puerile to attribute the success to aught but his talents and steel-hardened resolution.

In the foregoing exposition of the political and military force of the powers brought into hostile contact, I have only touched, and lightly, upon the points of most importance, designing no more than to indicate the sound and the diseased parts of each. The unfavourable circumstances for France would appear to be the absence of the emperor,—the erroneous views of the king,—the rivalry of the marshals,—the impediments to correspondence,—the necessity of frequently dispersing from the want of magazines,—the iniquity of the cause, and the disgust of the French officers, who, for the most part, spoiled by a rapid course of victories on the continent, could not patiently endure a service replete with personal dangers, over and above the ordinary mishaps of war, yet promising little ultimate reward.

For the English, the quicksands were—the memory of former failures on the continent,—the financial drain,—a powerful and eloquent opposition pressing a cabinet so timid and selfish that the general dared not risk a single brigade, lest an accident should lead to a panic amongst the ministers which all Lord Wellesley's vigour would be unable to stem,—the intrigues of the Souza party,—and the necessity of persuading the Portuguese to devastate their country for the sake of defending a *European cause*. Finally, the babbling of the English newspapers, from whose columns the enemy constantly drew the most certain information of the strength and situation of the army.

On the other side, France had possession of nearly all the fortified towns of the Peninsula, and, while her enormous army threatened to crush every opponent, she offered a constitution, and recalled to the recollection of the people that it was but a change of one French dynasty for another. The church started from her touch, but the educated classes did not shrink less from the British government's known hostility to all free institutions. What, then, remained for England to calculate upon ? The extreme hatred of the people to the invaders, arising from the excesses and oppressions of the armies,—the chances of another continental war,—the complete dominion of the ocean with all its attendant advantages,—the recruiting through the militia, which was in fact, a conscription with two links in the chain instead of one ; and, not least, the ardour of the troops to measure themselves with the conquerors of Europe, and to raise a rival to the French emperor. And here, as General Foy has been at some pains to misrepresent the character of the British

soldiers, I will set down what many years' experience gives me the right to say is nearer the truth than his dreams.

That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe, and, notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue, and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat with incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are required to accomplish this, his port is lofty, and his movements free; the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing, nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not, indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although he may perceive them; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril.

It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle is the result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy; no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen; his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore! Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, and, with incredible energy overthrow every opponent, at all times proving that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him!

The result of a hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial writers of different nations have given the first place, amongst the European infantry, to the British; but, in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world.

CHAPTER IV.

IN resuming the thread of military events, it is necessary to refer back to the commencement of the year, because the British operations on the frontier of Beira were connected, although not conducted, in actual concert with those of the Spaniards; and here I deem it right to notice the conduct of Miguel Alava that brave, generous, and disinterested Spaniard, through whom this connexion was kept up. Attached to the British head-quarters, as the military correspondent of the junta, he was too sagacious not to perceive the necessity of zealously seconding the English general; yet, in the manner of doing it, he never forgot the dignity of his own country, and as he was too frank and honest for intrigues, his intercourse was always honourable to himself and advantageous to both nations.

It will be remembered that in February, Ney threatened Ciudad Rodrigo at the same time that Mortier menaced Badajos, and that Hill advanced from Abrantes to Portalegre; Lord Wellington immediately reinforced the line between Pinhel and Guarda, and sent the light division across the Coa to observe the enemy's proceedings. The Portuguese regency were alarmed, and demanded more British troops; but Lord Wellington, replying that the numbers already fixed would be as great as he could feed, took occasion to point out that the measures agreed upon, with respect to the native forces, were neither executed with vigour nor impartiality, and that the carriages and other assistance required for the support of the British soldiers then in the country were not supplied.* These matters he urgently advised them to amend before they asked for more troops; and, at the same time, as the regency in the hope of rendering him unpopular with the natives, intimated a wish that he should take the punishment of offenders into his own hands, he informed them that although he advised the adoption of severe measures, he would not be made the despotic punisher of the people, while the actual laws were sufficient for the purpose.

* Appendix, No. 5. section 1.

When the siege of Astorga was commenced by the French, the Portuguese army was brought up to Cea and Viseu, and the militia in the northern provinces were ordered to concentrate at Braganza to guard the *Tras os Montes*. Ciudad Rodrigo, being soon afterwards seriously menaced, Lord Wellington sent a brigade of heavy cavalry to Belmonte, and transferred his own quarters to Celerico, intending to succour Ciudad if occasion offered; but the conduct of the Portuguese regency cramped his operations. The resources of the country were not brought forward, and the English general could scarcely maintain his actual position, much less advance; yet the regency treated his remonstrances lightly, exactly following the system of the Spanish central junta during the campaign of Talavera: Lord Wellington was, however, in a different situation.

Writing sharply, he told them that "their conduct was evasive and frivolous; that the army could never move forward nor remain without food; that the time was one which would not admit of idle or hollow proceedings, or partiality, or neglect of public for private interests; that the resources were in the country, could be drawn forth, and must be so if the assistance of England was desired; finally, that punishment should follow disobedience, and, to be effectual, must begin with the higher classes." * Then, issuing a proclamation, he pointed out the duties and the omission of both magistrates and people, and by this vigorous conduct procured some immediate relief for his troops.

Meanwhile, Crawford commenced a series of remarkable operations. His three regiments of infantry were singularly fitted for any difficult service; they had been for several years under Sir John Moore, and being carefully disciplined in the peculiar school of that great man, came to the field with such a knowledge of arms that in six years of real warfare, no weakness could be detected in their system. But the enemy's posts on the Agueda rendered it impossible for the light division to remain without cavalry beyond the Coa, unless some support was at hand nearer than Guarda or Celerico. Crawford proposed that while he advanced to the Agueda, Cole, with the 4th division, should take up the line of the Coa. But that general would not quit his own position at Guarda; and Lord Wellington approving, and yet desirous to secure the line of the Coa with a view to succour Ciudad Rodrigo, brought up the 3rd division to Pinhel, and reinforcing Crawford with the 1st German hussars (consisting of 400 excellent and experienced soldiers), and with a superb troop of horse-artillery, commanded by Captain Ross, gave him the command of all the outposts, ordering Picton and Cole to support him, if called upon.

In the middle of March, Crawford lined the bank of the Agueda with his hussars from Escalhon on the left, to Navas Frias on the right, a distance of 25 miles, following the course of the river. The infantry were disposed in small parties in the villages between Almeida and the lower Agueda; the artillery was at Fort Concepcion, and two battalions of Portuguese *caçadores* soon afterwards arrived, making a total of 4000 men, and six guns. The French at this period were extended in divisions from San Felices to Ledesma and Salamanca, but they did not occupy the pass of Perales; and Carrera's Spanish division being at Coria, was in communication with Crawford, whose line, although extended, was very advantageous. From Navas Frias to the Douro, the Agueda was rendered unfordable by heavy rain, and only four bridges crossed it on that whole extent, namely, one at Navas Frias; one at Villar, about a league below the first; one at Ciudad Rodrigo; and one at San Felices, called the bridge of Barba del Puerco. While, therefore, the hussars kept a good watch at the two first bridges which were distant, the troops could always concentrate under Almeida before the enemy could reach them from that side; and on the side of Barba del Puerco, the ravine was so profound that a few companies of the 95th were considered capable of opposing any numbers.

This arrangement sufficed while the Agueda was swollen; but that river was capricious, often falling many feet in a night without apparent reason: when it was fordable, Crawford always withdrew his outposts, and concentrated his division; and his situation demanded a quickness and intelligence in the troops,

the like of which has never been surpassed. Seven minutes sufficed for the division to get under arms in the middle of the night ; and a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to the alarm-posts, with the baggage loaded and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear. And this not upon a concerted signal, or as a trial, but at all times and certain.

The 29th of March, General Ferey, a bold officer, either to create a fear of French enterprise at the commencement of the campaign, or to surprise the division, collected 600 grenadiers close to the bridge of San Felices, and just as the moon rising behind him cast long shadows from the rocks, and rendered the bottom of the chasm dark, he silently passed the bridge, and with incredible speed ascending the opposite side, bayoneted the sentries and fell upon the piquet so fiercely that friends and enemies went fighting into the village of Barba del Puerco while the first shout was still echoing in the gulf below. So sudden was the attack, and so great the confusion, that the British companies could not form, but each soldier encountering the nearest enemy, fought hand to hand ; and their colonel, Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by his lofty stature and daring actions, a man capable of rallying a whole army in flight, urged the contest with such vigour that, in a quarter of an hour, the French column was borne back and pushed over the edge of the descent.

This skirmish proved that, while the Agueda was swollen, the enemy could gain nothing by slight operations ; but it was difficult to keep in advance of the Coa : the want of money had reduced the whole army to straits, and Crawford, notwithstanding his prodigious activity, being unable to feed his division, gave the reins to his fiery temper and seized some church plate, with a view to the purchasing of corn. For this impolitic act he was immediately rebuked, and such redress granted that no mischief followed ; and the proceeding itself had some effect in procuring supplies, as it convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned.

When the 6th corps again approached Ciudad Rodrigo in the latter end of April, Lord Wellington, as I have before said, moved his head-quarters to Celerico, and Carrera took post at St. Martin Trebeja, occupying the pass of Perales ; being, however, menaced there by Kellerman's troops, he came down, in May, from the hills to Ituero on the Azava river, and connected his left with the light division, which was then posted at Gallegos Espeja and Barba del Puerco. Crawford and he then agreed that, if attacked, the British should concentrate in the wood behind Espeja, and, if unable to maintain themselves there, unite with the Spaniards at Nava d'Aver, and finally retire to Villa Mayor, a village covering the passage of the Coa by the bridge of Seceira, from whence there was a sure retreat to Guarda.

It was at this period that Massena's arrival in Spain became known to the allies ; the deserters, for the first time, ceased to speak of the emperor's commanding in person ; yet all agreed that serious operations would soon commence. Howbeit, as the river continued unfordable, Crawford maintained his position ; but, towards the end of May, certain advice of the march of the French battering-train was received through Andreas Herrasti : and, the 1st of June, Ney, descending upon Ciudad Rodrigo, threw a bridge on trestles over the Agueda at the convent of Caridad, two miles above, and a few days afterwards a second at Carboneras, four miles below the fortress. As this concentration of the French relieved the northern provinces of Portugal from danger, 16 regiments of militia were brought down from Braganza to the Lower Douro ; provisions came by water to Lamego, and the army was enabled to subsist.

The 8th of June, 4000 French cavalry crossed the Agueda, Crawford concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja, and the Spaniards occupied the wood behind the last-named village. It was at this moment, when Spain was overwhelmed, and when the eye could scarcely command the interminable lines of French in his immediate front, that Martin Carrera thought fit to invite Marshal Ney to desert !

Nothing could be more critical than Crawford's position. From the Agueda to the Coa the whole country, although studded with woods and scooped into hollows, was free for cavalry and artillery, and there were at least 6000 horsemen and 50 guns within an hour's march of his position. His right was at Espeja, where thick

woods in front rendered it impossible to discover an enemy until close upon the village; while wide plains behind almost precluded hope in a retreat before the multitude of French cavalry and artillery. The confluence of the Azava with the Agueda offered more security on his left, because the channel of the former river there became a chasm, and the ground rose high and rugged at each side of the bridge of Marialva, two miles in front of Gallegos. Nevertheless, the bank on the enemy's side was highest, and to obtain a good prospect it was necessary to keep posts beyond the Azava; moreover the bridge of Marialva could be turned by a ford, below the confluence of the streams. The 10th, the Agueda became fordable in all parts, but as the enemy occupied himself raising redoubts, to secure his bridge at Carboneras, and making preparations for the siege of Rodrigo, Crawford, trusting to his own admirable arrangements and to the surprising discipline of his troops, still maintained his dangerous position: thus encouraging the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and protecting the villages in the plain between the Azava and the Coa from the enemy's foraging parties.

On the 18th, the 8th corps was seen to take post at San Felices, and other points; and all the villages, from the Sierra de Francia to the Douro, were occupied by the French army. The 23rd, Julian Sanchez, breaking out of Ciudad, came into Gallegos. On the 25th, the French batteries opened against the fortress, their cavalry closed upon the Azava, and Crawford withdrew his outposts to the left bank. The 26th, it was known that Herrasti had lost 150 killed and 500 wounded; and, the 29th, a Spaniard, passing the French posts, brought Carrera a note, containing these words: *O venir luego! luego! luego! a secorrer esta plaza.* ("Oh! come, now! now! now! to the succour of this place.") And, on the 1st of July, the gallant old man repeated his "*Luego, luego, luego, por ultimo vez.*"

Meanwhile, Lord Wellington (hoping that the enemy, by detaching troops, would furnish an opportunity of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo) transferred his quarters to Alverca, a village half way between Almeida and Celerico. The Spaniards supposed he would attack; and Romana, quitting Badajos, came to propose a combined movement for carrying off the garrison. This was a trying moment! The English general had come from the Guadiana with the avowed purpose of securing Rodrigo; he had in a manner pledged himself to make it a point in his operations; his army was close at hand; the garrison brave and distressed; the governor honourably fulfilling his part. To permit such a place to fall without a stroke struck, would be a grievous disaster, and a more grievous dishonour to the British arms; the troops desired the enterprise; the Spaniards demanded it as a proof of good faith; the Portuguese to keep the war away from their own country: finally, policy seemed to call for an effort, lest the world might deem the promised defence of Portugal a heartless and a hollow boast. Nevertheless, Romana returned without his object. Lord Wellington absolutely refused to venture even a brigade; and thus proved himself a truly great commander, and of a steadfast mind.

It was not a single campaign but a terrible war that he had undertaken. If he lost but 5000 men his own government would abandon the contest; if he lost 15,000 he must abandon it himself. His whole disposable force did not exceed 56,000 men: of these, 12,000 were with Hill, and one half of the remainder were untried and raw. But this included all, even to the Portuguese cavalry and garrisons. All could not, however, be brought into line, because Reynier, acting in concert with Massena, had at this period collected boats, and made demonstrations to pass the Tagus and move upon Coria; French troops were also crossing the Morena, in march towards Estremadura, which obliged Lord Wellington to detach 8000 Portuguese to Thomar, as a reserve, and these and Hill's corps being deducted, not quite 25,000 men were available to carry off the garrison in the face of 60,000 French veterans. This enterprise would also take the army two marches from Guarda, and Coria was scarcely more distant from that place, hence a division must have been left at Guarda, lest Reynier, deceiving Hill, should reach it first.

Twenty thousand men of all arms remained, and there were two modes of using them. 1. In an open advance and battle. 2. In a secret movement and surprise. To effect the last, the army might have assembled in the night upon the

Azava, and filed over the single bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo with a view of capturing the battering train, by a sally, or of bringing off the garrison. But, without dwelling on the fact that Massena's information was so good that he knew, in two days after it occurred, the object of Romana's visit, such a movement could scarcely have been made unobserved, even in the early part of the siege, and certainly not towards the end, when the enemy were on the Azava.*

An open battle a madman only would have ventured. The army, passing over a plain, in the face of nearly three times its own numbers, must have exposed its flanks to the enemy's bridges on the Agueda, because the fortress was situated in the bottom of a deep bend of the river, and the French were on the convex side. What hope, then, for 20,000 mixed soldiers cooped up between two rivers, when 8000 cavalry and 80 guns should come pouring over the bridges on their flanks, and 50,000 infantry followed to the attack? What would even a momentary success avail? Five thousand undisciplined men brought off from Ciudad Rodrigo, would have ill supplied the 10,000 or 12,000 good troops lost in the battle, and the temporary relief of the fortress would have been a poor compensation for the loss of Portugal. For what was the actual state of affairs in that country?—The militia deserting in crowds to the harvest, the regency in full opposition to the general, the measures for laying waste the country not perfected, and the public mind desponding! The enemy would soon have united his whole force and advanced to retrieve his honour, and who was to have withstood him?

Massena, sagacious and well understanding his business, only desired that the attempt should be made. He held back his troops, appeared careless, and in his proclamations taunted the English general that he was afraid!—that the sails were flapping on the ships prepared to carry him away—that he was a man, who, insensible to military honour, permitted his ally's towns to fall without risking a shot to save them, or to redeem his plighted word! But all this subtlety failed; Lord Wellington was unmoved, and abided his own time. "If thou art a great general, Marius, come down and fight! If thou art a great general, Silo, make me come down and fight!"

Ciudad Rodrigo left to its fate, held out yet a little longer, and meanwhile the enemy pushing infantry on to the Azava; Carrera retired to the Dos Casas river, and Crawford, reinforced with the 16th and 14th light dragoons, placed his cavalry at Gallegos, and concentrated his infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear. From thence he could fall back, either to the bridge of Almeida by San Pedro or to the bridge of Castello Bom by Villa Formosa. Obstinate, however, not to relinquish a foot of ground that he could keep either by art or force, he disposed his troops in single ranks on the rising grounds, in the evening of the 2nd of July, and then sending some horsemen to the rear to raise the dust, marched the ranks of infantry in succession, and slowly, within sight of the enemy, hoping that the latter would imagine the whole army was come up to succour Ciudad Rodrigo. He thus gained two days; but, on the 4th of July, a strong body of the enemy assembled at Marialva, and a squadron of horse, crossing the ford below that bridge, pushed at full speed towards Gallegos driving back the piquets. The enemy then passed the river, and the British retired skirmishing upon Alameda, leaving two guns, a troop of British and a troop of German hussars to cover the movement. This rear-guard drew up a hill half-cannon shot from a streamlet with marshy banks, which crossed the road to Alameda; in a few moments a column of French horsemen was observed coming on at a charging pace, diminishing its front as it approached the bridge, but resolute to pass, and preserving the most perfect order, notwithstanding some well-directed shots from the guns. Captain Kraüchenberg, of the hussars, proposed to charge. The English officer did not conceive his orders warranted it; and the gallant German rode full speed against the head of the advancing columns with his single troop, and with such a shock that he killed the leading officers, overthrew the front ranks, and drove the whole back. Meanwhile the enemy crossed the stream at other points, and a squadron coming close up to Alameda was driven off by a volley from the third caçadores.

This skirmish not being followed up by the enemy, Crawford took a fresh post

with his infantry and guns in a wood near Fort Conception. His cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and Carrera's divisions, were disposed higher up on the Duas Casas, and the French withdrew behind the Azava, leaving only a piquet at Gallegos. Their marauding parties, however, entered the villages of Barquillo and Villa de Puerco for three nights successively; and Crawford, thinking to cut them off, formed an ambuscade in a wood near Villa de Puerco with six squadrons, another of three squadrons near Barquillo, and disposed his artillery, five companies of the 95th, and the 3rd caçadores in reserve, for the enemy were again in force at Gallegos and even in advance of it.

A little after daybreak, on the 11th, two French parties were observed, the one of infantry near Villa de Puerco, the other of cavalry at Barquillo. An open country on the right would have enabled the six squadrons to get between the infantry in Villa de Puerco and their point of retreat. This was circuitous, and Crawford preferred pushing straight through a stone enclosure as the shortest road: the enclosure proved difficult, the squadrons were separated, and the French, 200 strong, had time to draw up in square on a rather steep rise of land; yet so far from the edge as not to be seen until the ascent was gained. The two squadrons which first arrived, galloped in upon them, and the charge was rough and pushed home, but failed. The troopers received the fire of the square in front and on both sides, and in passing saw and heard the French Captain Guache and his sergeant-major exhorting the men to shoot carefully.

Scarcely was this charge over when the enemy's cavalry came out of Barquillos, and the two squadrons riding against it, made 29 men and two officers prisoners, a few being also wounded. Meanwhile Colonel Talbot, mounting the hill with four squadrons of the 14th dragoons, bore gallantly in upon Captain Guache; but the latter again opened such a fire that Talbot himself and 14 men went down close to the bayonets, and the stout Frenchman made good his retreat; after which Crawford returned to the camp, having had 32 troopers, besides the colonel, killed or wounded in this unfortunate affair. That day Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, and the Spanish troops, grieved and irritated, separated from the light division, and marching by the pass of Perales, rejoined Romana; but Crawford assumed a fresh position, a mile and a half from Almeida, and demanded a reinforcement of two battalions. Lord Wellington replied that he would give him two divisions, if he could hold his ground, but that he could not do so; yet, knowing the temper of the man, he repeated his former orders *not to fight beyond the Coa*.

On the 21st, the enemy's cavalry again advanced, Fort Conception was blown up, and Crawford fell back to Almeida, apparently disposed to cross the Coa. Yet nothing was further from his thoughts. Braving the whole French army, he had kept with a weak division, for three months, within two hours' march of 60,000 men, appropriating the resources of the plains entirely to himself; but this exploit, only to be appreciated by military men, did not satisfy his feverish thirst of distinction. Hitherto he had safely affronted a superior power, and forgetting that his stay beyond the Coa was a matter of sufferance, not real strength, with headstrong ambition, he resolved, in defiance of reason and of the reiterated orders of his general, to fight on the right bank.

COMBAT OF THE COA.

Crawford's whole force under arms consisted of 4000 infantry, 1100 cavalry, and six guns, and his position, one mile and a half in length, extended in an oblique line towards the Coa. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in his front, his right on some broken ground, and his left resting on an unfinished tower, 800 yards from Almeida, was defended by the guns of that fortress; but his back was on the edge of the ravine forming the channel of the Coa, and the bridge was more than a mile distant, in the bottom of the chasm.

A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched with rain, were under arms before daylight, expecting to retire, when a few pistol shots in front, followed by an order for the cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy's approach: and as the morning cleared 24,000 French infantry, 5000 cavalry, and 30 pieces of artillery were observed marching beyond the Turones. The British line was immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the

ravine ; but meanwhile Ney, who had observed Crawford's false disposition, came down with the swoop of an eagle. Four thousand horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the plain. The allied cavalry gave back, and Loison's division coming up at a charging pace, made towards the centre and left of the position.

While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes were made on the English side ; part of the troops were advanced, others drawn back, and the 43rd most unaccountably placed within an enclosure of solid masonry, at least ten feet high, situated on the left of the road with but one narrow outlet about half-musket shot down the ravine. While thus imprisoned the firing in front redoubled, the cavalry, the artillery, and the *caçadores* successively passed by in retreat, and the sharp clang of the 95th rifle was heard along the edge of the plain above. A few moments later, and the 43rd would have been surrounded ; but that here, as in every other part of this field, the quickness and knowledge of the battalion officers remedied the faults of the general. One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones, a powerful effort burst the enclosure, and the regiment, reformed in column of companies, was the next instant up with the riflemen ; there was no room to array the line, no time for anything but battle, every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and joining as he could with the 95th or 52nd, the whole presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no regular command ; yet each confident in the courage and discipline of those on his right and left, and all regulating their movements by a common discretion, and keeping together with surprising vigour.

It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers. It is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what vehemence the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire they waste a field of battle. At this moment, with the advantage of ground and numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns ranged along the summit played hotly with grape, and their hussars, galloping over the glacis of Almeida, poured down the road, sabring everything in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow this movement with the whole of the French cavalry, and so cut off the troops from the bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge him on, and so mixed were friends and enemies at the moment that only a few guns of the fortress durst open, and no courage could have availed against such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed an independent command, and, as the attack was made without Massena's knowledge, he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves from their perilous situation. For falling back slowly, and yet stopping and fighting whenever opportunity offered, they made their way through a rugged country tangled with vineyards, in despite of their enemies, who were so fierce and eager, that even the horsemen rode in amongst the enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the walls or scrambled over the rocks.

As the retreating troops approached the river, they came upon a more open space ; but the left wing being harder pressed, and having the shortest distance, arrived while the bridge was still crowded and some of the right wing distant. Major M'Leod, of the 43rd, seeing this, rallied four companies on a hill just in front of the passage, and was immediately joined by a party of the 95th, and at the same time, two other companies were posted by Brigade-Major Rowan, on another hill flanking the road ; these posts were thus maintained until the enemy, gathering in great numbers, made a second burst, when the companies fell back. At this moment the right wing of the 52nd was seen marching towards the bridge, which was still crowded with the passing troops, M'Leod, a very young man, but with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse round, called to the troops to follow, and, taking off his cap, rode with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing, and the distinguished action of the man, produced the effect he designed ; a mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole army had been at their backs, and the enemy's skirmishers, astonished at this unexpected movement, stopped short. Before they could recover from their surprise, the 52nd crossed the river, and M'Leod, following at full speed, gained the other side also without a disaster.

As the regiments passed the bridge, they planted themselves in loose order on

the side of the mountain. The artillery drew up on the summit, and the cavalry were disposed in parties on the roads to the right, because two miles higher up the stream there were fords, and beyond them the bridge of Castello Bom, and it was to be apprehended that, while the 6th corps was in front, the reserves, and a division of the 8th corps, then on the Agueda, might pass at those places and get between the division and Celerico. The river was, however, rising fast from the rains, and it was impossible to retreat farther.

The French skirmishers, swarming on the right bank, opening a biting fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke, rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole chasm, and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and thickly; his columns were discovered forming behind the high rocks, and a dragoon was seen to try the depth of the stream above, but two shots from the 52nd killed horse and man, and the carcasses, floating between the hostile bands, showed that the river was impassable. The monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard, and in another instant the head of a noble column was at the long narrow bridge. A drummer and an officer in a splendid uniform leaped forward together, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the ravine at first deceived the soldiers' aim, and two-thirds of the passage was won ere an English shot had brought down an enemy; yet a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of the leading French section fell as one man! Still the gallant column pressed forward, but no foot could pass that terrible line; the killed and wounded rolled together until the heap rose nearly even with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than gave back.

The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently answered, and, in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude was again torn, shattered, dispersed, and slain; ten or twelve men only succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing was renewed, and a French surgeon coming down to the very foot of the bridge, waved his handkerchief and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was his appeal unheeded: every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt. The impossibility of forcing the passage, was, however, become too apparent, and this last effort, made with feebleness and less energy, failed almost as soon as it commenced.

Nevertheless, the combat was unnecessarily continued; by the French, as a point of honour, to cover the escape of those who had passed the bridge; by the English, from ignorance of their object. One of the enemy's guns was dismantled, a powder-magazine blew up, and many continued to fall on both sides until about four o'clock, when a heavy rain causing a momentary cessation of fire, the men amongst the rocks returned, unmolested, to their own party, the fight ceased, and Crawford retired behind the Pinhel river. Forty-four Portuguese, 272 British, including 28 officers, were killed, wounded, or taken, and it was at first supposed that Lieutenant Dawson and half a company of the 52nd, which had been posted in the unfinished tower, were also captured: but that officer kept close until the evening, and then, with great intelligence, passed all the enemy's posts, and, crossing the Coa at a ford, rejoined his regiment.

In this action the French lost above 1000 men; the slaughter at the bridge was fearful to behold; but Massena claimed to have taken two pieces of artillery, and it was true; for the guns intended to arm the unfinished tower, near Almeida, were lying dismounted at the foot of the building. They, however, belonged to the garrison of Almeida, not to the light division, and that they were not mounted and the tower garrisoned was a great negligence; the enemy's cavalry could not otherwise have fallen so dangerously on the left of the position, and the after-investment of Almeida would have been retarded. In other respects, the governor, severely censured by Crawford, at the time, for not opening his fire sooner and more vigorously, was unblameable; the whole affair had been so mismanaged by



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the general himself, that friends and enemies were mingled together from the first, and the shots from the fortress would have killed both.

During the fight, General Picton came up alone from Pinhel, Crawford desired the support of the 3rd division; it was refused; and, excited by some previous disputes, the generals separated after a sharp altercation. Picton was decidedly wrong, because Crawford's situation was one of extreme danger; he durst not retire, and Massena might undoubtedly have thrown his reserves, by the bridge of Castello Bom, upon the right flank of the division, and destroyed it, between the Coa and the Pinhel rivers. Picton and Crawford were, however, not formed by nature to act cordially together. The stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine complexion, caustic speech, and austere demeanour of the first promised little sympathy with the short thick figure, dark flashing eyes, quick movements, and fiery temper of the second; nor, indeed, did they often meet without a quarrel. Nevertheless, they had many points of resemblance in their characters and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in command, both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire submission from inferiors, and they were alike ambitious and craving of glory. They both possessed decided military talents, were enterprising and intrepid, yet neither was remarkable for skill in handling troops under fire. This, also, they had in common, that both, after distinguished services, perished in arms, fighting gallantly, and being celebrated as generals of division while living, have, since their death, been injudiciously spoken of as rivalling their great leader in war.

That they were officers of mark and pretension is unquestionable, and Crawford more so than Picton, because the latter never had a separate command, and his opportunities were necessarily more circumscribed; but to compare either to the Duke of Wellington displays ignorance of the men and of the art they professed. If they had even comprehended the profound military and political combinations he was conducting, the one would have carefully avoided fighting on the Coa, and the other, far from refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support.

CHAPTER V.

DURING the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, Mahi, coming down from the Gallician mountains, menaced Astorga, and a detachment of his army, under Toboado Gil, occupied Puebla de Senabria, acting in concert with Silveira; and an expedition sailing from Coruña, under Porlier, seized Santona, and dismantled that and other points on the coast, near Santander. Mahi's movements could not be well opposed by either Kellerman or Serras, during the siege, because the former had a strong detachment in Baños, and the troops of the latter were spread over too great an extent of ground; but when the place fell, the 8th corps, being detached beyond the Tormes, to gather provisions, enabled Serras to act against the Gallicians. The latter were driven into the mountains, and Toboado Gil, removing his stores from Puebla Senabria, drew closer to Silveira, in expectation of an attack; but Serras, only placing a Swiss battalion and 60 dragoons at Puebla, fell back to Zamora, and the 8th corps re-occupied the country between the Tormes and the Agueda.

Bonet defeated the Spaniards at Sales, and entered Castropol, on the frontier of Galicia, but returned to Oviedo, on hearing of the expedition to Santona. The Spaniards then re-embarked for Coruña, the project of a larger armament, to be directed against Santander itself, was adopted, and Mahi affirmed that, if more arms and ammunition were sent to him from England, he would clear the plains of Leon, as far as the Esla river. His demands were complied with; Sir Home Popham was appointed to superintend the naval expeditions against the coast of the Asturias and Biscay, and a serious interruption of the French communications was planned but never realized.

Meanwhile, General Reynier passed the Tagus with the 2nd corps, but it appears that this movement should have been executed in June; for boats were collected at Barca de Alconete, in the middle of that month, and the French only waited for a detachment from Andalusia, when Mendizabel, taking the road of Zafra, attacked that detachment, at Los Santos, on the 23rd, and Reynier immediately moved to its succour with one division of infantry and all his cavalry.

But, at this period, the insurrection caused by Lascy's expedition to the Ronda, had drawn all the troops of the 5th corps from Seville to that side, the Duke of Aremberg and General Remond had fallen back behind the river Tinto, and Copons had advanced to collect provisions on the Odiel. In this threatening state of affairs, instead of returning to Merida, Reynier endeavoured to surprise Imas, at Xeres de los Cavalleros, and failing in that, pushed across the Morena against Ballasteros, the latter being at Campo Frio, beyond Aracena, and, ignorant that Imas had retreated, could only save himself by a hasty flight across the frontier of Portugal. Meanwhile, Lascy was beaten in the Ronda, the 5th corps retired to Seville, D'Aremberg and Remond re-occupied Huelva and Moguer; and Reynier, going back to Merida, resumed his design of passing the Tagus.

His boats were still at Alconete, for the Spaniards had neglected this opportunity of destroying them; but, as it was necessary to cover the operations both from Hill's division which was concentrated at Campo Mayor, and from the Portuguese troops behind the Elga river, a strong rear-guard was placed on the Salor to watch the former, and the French division at Banos advanced to Coria to awe the latter. Reynier then quitting Merida the 10th of July, marched by Truxillo and Caceres, upon Alconete and Almaraz, and effected the passage; his rear-guard following on the 16th.

This cautious operation saved him from an attack meditated by Hill, who had received orders to unite with Romana, and drive the 2nd corps back, with a view to gather the harvest for the victualling of Badajos and the other frontier fortresses. But the passage of the Tagus being thus effected by the French, General Hill made a parallel movement, which on his part only required 36 hours; and meanwhile, Lord Wellington assembled a reserve at Thomar, under the command of General Leith, consisting of 8000 Portuguese and 2000 British infantry, just arrived from England.

Soon after Reynier had reached Coria, he detached a force, by Perales, upon Sabugal, but recalled it when he found that Hill, having crossed the Tagus by Vilha Velha, was at Castello Branco on the 21st. The two generals then faced each other. Hill, joined by a strong body of Portuguese cavalry, under General Fane, encamped with 16,000 men and 18 guns, at Sarzedas, just in front of the Sobreira Formosa; his advanced guard in Castello Branco; his horsemen on the line of the Ponçul; and a brigade of Portuguese infantry at Fundao, to keep up the communication with Guarda, and to cover the Estrada Nova. Behind him, Leith occupied the line of the Zezere: and thus 26,000 men, besides the militia, were in observation between the Estrella and the Tagus.

Reynier first made demonstrations on the side of Salvatierra; but being repulsed by some Portuguese cavalry, divided his forces between Penamacor and Zarza Mayor, established a post of 150 men on the left bank of the Tagus, near the mouth of the Rio Del Monte, and by continual movements, rendered it doubtful whether he meant to repass the Tagus or to advance upon Sarzedas, or to join Massena. Meanwhile Ballasteros returned to Aracena, Imas to Xeres de los Cavalleros, O'Donnel entered Truxillo, and Carlos d'Espana cut off the French post on the Rio del Monte. Romana was, however, soon obliged to concentrate his troops again; for Mortier was on the Guadalquivir, with a view to re-enter Estremadura. Such was the situation of the armies in the beginning of August; and when Massena was assured that Reynier had crossed the Tagus, he directed the 6th corps and the cavalry upon Almeida, which led, as we have seen, to the combat on the Coa; during which Loison imagining the governor to be a native, pressed him to desert the cause of the English: "that vile people whose object was to enslave the Portuguese."

Lord Wellington's situation was critical. Ciudad Rodrigo furnished the French with a place of arms; they might disregard Almeida: and their tardy investment of it, viewed in conjunction with the great magazines collecting at Ciudad Rodrigo, indicated an intention of so doing. But Massena's dispositions were such as rendered his true designs difficult to be discovered. The 6th corps and the reserve cavalry were indeed around Almeida; but by telegraphic intercourse with the garrison, it was known that the investment was not real, and the heads of the

columns pointed towards Celerico. Loison's advanced guard was in Pinhel the day after Crawford's action; the 2nd corps, divided between Zara Mayor and Penamacor, and with boats near Alcantara on the Tagus, menaced equally the line of that river and the line of the Zezere; and it was as likely that Massena would join Reynier as that Reynier would join Massena. The 8th corps and the divisions of Serras and Kellerman were between the Tormes and the Esla, and might break into the northern provinces of Portugal, while the 6th and 2nd corps should hold the allies in check: and this was undoubtedly the surest course; because the taking of Oporto would have furnished many resources, stricken the natives with terror, opened the great coast-road to Lisbon, and enabled Massena to avoid all the difficult country about the Mondego. The English general must then have retired before the 2nd and 6th corps, unless he attacked Ney; an unpromising measure because of the enemy's strength in horse: in fine, Massena had 116,000 men and the initial operations in his power, and Lord Wellington was obliged to wait upon his movements.

The actual position of the allies was too extended and too forward; yet to retire at once would have seemed timid: hence Lord Wellington remained quiet during the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, although the enemy's posts were thickening on the Pinhel river. But the 28th, the British cavalry advanced to Frexadas, and the infantry withdrew behind the Mondego, except the fourth division, which remained at Guarda. The light division occupied Celerico; the other divisions were posted at Penhancos, Carapichina, and Fornos; the Portuguese troops being a day's march behind; the sick and wounded men transferred daily to the rear, and the line of retreat kept free from encumbrance. The enemy then made a demonstration towards St. Joa de Pesquera, and defeated some militia at Fosboa, on the Douro, but finally retired across the Coa, and after a few skirmishes with the garrison on the 3rd of August, left the communication with Almeida again free. At the same time a detachment of Reynier's horse was encountered at Atalaya, near Fundao, and beaten by the Portuguese cavalry and ordenança, with a loss of 50 killed or taken.

On the side of Galicia, Kellerman advanced from Benevente to Castro Contrijo, and detachments from Serras's division penetrated towards Monterey, ordering provisions for 10,000 men on the road to Braganza. But Silveira marching on Senabria, defeated the enemy's cavalry there on the 6th; invested the Swiss on the 7th; and on the 10th, obliged them to capitulate at the moment when Serras was coming to their relief. Five hundred men and an eagle were taken, and Silveira, who did not lose a man, would have given battle to Serras also, if Beresford, alarmed at such rashness, had not sent him imperative orders to retreat; an operation he effected with some difficulty.

This advantage in the north was balanced by a disaster in Estremadura. The Spanish generals never much disposed to respect Lord Wellington's counsels, were now less so than before, from the discontent engendered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. He had pressed upon Romana the policy of avoiding battles; had procured permission that Campo Mayor should be given to him as a place of arms, with leave to retire into Portugal when overmatched by the enemy; and he had shown him that Hill's departure greatly augmented the necessity of caution. Nevertheless, Romana joined Ballasteros; and as their united force amounted to 14,000 infantry and 1500 horse, the English general immediately foresaw that they would offer battle, be defeated, and lay open the whole frontier of the Alemtejo; he therefore directed Hill to send Madden's brigade of Portuguese cavalry to their assistance.

Madden reached Campo Mayor the 14th of August, but Romana's advanced guard had been already intercepted at Benvenida, and having lost 600 men, was going to lay down its arms, when fortunately Carrera arrived with the Spanish cavalry and disengaged them. The whole then retreated across the Morena to Monte Molin and Fregenal, but the French pursued and slew or took 400 more. The following day Mortier entered Zafra, and Romana retired to Almendralejos. The enemy did not, however, press this advantage, because Lascey with 3000 men from Cadiz, convoyed by Captain Cockburn of the British navy, had landed near Moguer and driven the Duke of Arenberg towards Seville, while Copons drove

Remond upon Zalamea ; and although the French soon rallied and obliged Lascy to re-embark, Mortier was withdrawn towards the Morena, and Romana again advanced to Zafra. This affair at Moguer was very trifling, but a tumid description in Cockburn's despatches obtained for it a momentary celebrity.

It would appear that Massena had been waiting for Mortier's movements to develop his own plans, for on the day that the latter entered Zafra, the 6th corps formally invested Almeida ; and Lord Wellington, immediately bringing up the Portuguese, recrossed the Mondego ; the British being at Pinhel, Frexadas, and Guarda, and the Portuguese at Celerico, Govea, Melho, and Trancoso. In this situation expecting a vigorous defence from Almeida, he had good hopes to delay the enemy for six weeks or two months, when the rains setting in would give him additional advantages in the defence of the country. He had intended to keep the light division on the Cabeça Negro, overhanging the bridge of the Coa, and thus secure a communication with the garrison, or force the French to invest the place with their whole army : Crawford's rashness marred this plan, and he himself was so dispirited by the action on the 24th, that the commander-in-chief did not think it prudent to renew the project. Yet Massena's tardiness and the small force with which he finally invested the place, led Lord Wellington to think of assembling secretly a large and chosen body of men behind the Cabeça Negro, with the view of suddenly forcing the bridge and the fords and taking the French battering train, or at least bringing off the garrison ; but while revolving this great stroke in his mind, an unexpected and terrible disaster broke his measures.

SEIGE OF ALMEIDA.

This fortress although regularly constructed with six bastions, ravelins, an excellent ditch, and covered way, was extremely defective. The ramparts were too high for the glacis, and from some near ground on the side of the attack the bottom of the ditch might be seen. An old square castle, built on a mound in the centre of the town, contained three bomb proofs, the doors of which were not secure ; but with the exception of some damp casements in one bastion, there was no other magazine for the powder. Colonel Cox was governor, and his garrison, composed of one regular and two militia regiments, a body of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, amounted to about 4000 men.

On the 18th, the trenches were begun under cover of a false attack, and in the morning of the 26th (the second parallel being commenced) 65 pieces of artillery mounted in ten batteries opened at once. Many houses were soon in flames and the garrison was unable to extinguish them ; the counter fire was, however, briskly maintained, little military damage was sustained, and towards evening the cannonade slackened on both sides ; but just after dark the ground suddenly trembled, the castle bursting into 1000 pieces, gave vent to a column of smoke and fire, and with a prodigious noise the whole town sunk into a shapeless ruin ! Treason or accident had caused the magazines to explode, and the devastation was incredible. The ramparts were breached, the greatest part of the guns thrown into the ditch, 500 people were struck dead on the instant, and only six houses left standing ; the stones thrown out hurt 40 of the besiegers in the trenches, and the surviving garrison, aghast at the horrid commotion, disregarded all exhortations to rally. Fearing that the enemy would take the opportunity to storm the ramparts, the governor beat to arms, and running to the walls, with the help of an artillery officer, fired off the few guns that remained ; but the French shells fell thickly all the night, and in the morning of the 27th, two officers appeared at the gates with a letter from Massena, offering terms.

Cox, sensible that further resistance was impossible, still hoped that the army would make a movement to relieve him, if he could impose upon the enemy for two or three days ; and he was in act of refusing the Prince of Esling's offer, when a mutiny, headed openly by the lieutenant-governor, one Bernardo Costa, and secretly by José Bareiros, the chief of artillery, who had been for some time in secret correspondence with the French, obliged him to yield. The remainder of the native officers, disturbed by fear, or swayed by the influence of those two, were more willing to follow than to oppose their dishonourable proceedings, and Costa expressed his resolution to hoist the white flag. The governor seeing no remedy by force,

endeavoured to procrastinate, and, being ignorant of Bareiros's treason, sent him to the enemy with counter propositions. Bareiros immediately informed Massena of the true state of the garrison, and never returned ; and the final result was a surrender upon agreement that the militia should retire to their homes, and the regulars remain prisoners of war.

While the treaty was pending and even after the signature of the articles, in the night of the 27th, the French bombarded the place. This act, unjustifiable and strange, because Massena's aide-de-camp, Colonel Pelet, was actually within the walls when the firing commenced, was excused, on the ground of an error in the transmission of orders ; it, however, lasted during the whole night, and Cox also asserts that the terms of the capitulation with respect to the militia were violated. Pelet indignantly denies this, affirming that when the garrison, still amounting to 3000 men, perceived the Marquis d'Alorna amongst the French generals, the greatest part immediately demanded service, and formed a brigade under General Pamplona. Yet, so easily are men's minds moved by present circumstances, that the greater number deserted again, when they afterwards saw the allied armies.

Bareiros, having joined the enemy, escaped punishment, but De Costa, being tried, was afterwards shot as a traitor, by the orders of Marshal Beresford. His cowardice and mutiny merited this chastisement, yet the principal evidence against him was an explanatory letter, written to Lord Liverpool, by Cox, while a prisoner at Verdun.

The explosion, the disappearance of the steeple, and cessation of fire, proclaimed the misfortune of Almeida in the allied camp ; but the surrender was first ascertained by Lord Wellington on the 29th, when, with a telescope, he observed many French officers on the glacis of the place. The army then withdrew to its former position behind the Mondego ; and while these things were passing on the Coa, the powder magazine in Albuquerque, being struck with lightning, also exploded and killed 400 men ; and, on the 1st of September, General Reynier, after several demonstrations towards Castello Branco, in one of which he lost a squadron of horse, suddenly reached Sabugal. The British piquets on the Pinhel were attacked the following day by the horsemen of the 6th corps ; the enemy's plans seemed to be ripe for execution ; and Lord Wellington, transferring his quarters to Govea, withdrew his infantry behind Celerico, and fixed his cavalry at that place with posts of observation at Guarda and at Trancoso. Reynier, however, suddenly returned to Zarza Mayor, and, throwing a bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, again involved the French projects in obscurity.

Massena experienced considerable difficulty in feeding his forces, and he seemed at first either disinclined to commence the invasion or undecided as to the mode. Two months had elapsed since the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida had only resisted for ten days, the French army was still behind the Coa, and it would seem, by an intercepted letter, dictated by Napoleon, in September, that he expected further inaction : " Lord Wellington," he observed to Massena, " has only 18,000 men, Hill has only 6000 ; and it would be ridiculous to suppose that 25,000 English can balance 60,000 French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall boldly on after having *well observed where the blow may be given*. You have 12,000 cavalry, and four times as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave 6000 cavalry and a proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, and with the rest commence operations. The emperor is too distant, and the positions of the enemy change too often, to direct how you should attack ; but it is certain that the utmost force the English can muster, including the troops at Cadiz, will be 28,000 men."

This letter was accurate as to the numbers of the English army, but Napoleon was ignorant how strongly Lord Wellington was thrusting Portugal forward in the press.

Massena had commenced the invasion before these instructions reached him ; but to understand his operations it is essential to have a clear idea of the country in which they were conducted. The advanced positions of the allies extended from Almeida over the Sierra de Estrella, by Guarda to Fundao, Sarzedas, and Castello Branco : no enemy could penetrate that line unless by force, and a serious attack on any one point was to be the signal for a gradual retreat of the whole, in con-

centric directions towards the lines. But, if Guarda were evacuated, the enemy while menacing Celerico, could move either by Belmonte or Covilhao and separate General Hill from Lord Wellington, the distance between those generals being twice as great as the enemy's perpendicular line of march would be.

To balance this disadvantage, the road from Covilhao was broken up, a Portuguese brigade placed in Fundao, and General Leith's corps was stationed at Thomar, between two entrenched positions, which formed the second temporary line of resistance. The first of those positions was behind the Zezere, extending from the Barca de Codies to the confluence of that river with the Tagus. The second behind the Alva, a strong and swift stream descending from the Estrella, and falling into the Mondego some miles above Coimbra. Both were strong, the rivers deep and difficult of access, and the Sierra de Murcella closely hugs the left bank of the Alva.

Hill's line of retreat from Sarzedas to the Zezere has been already noticed, and from that river to the Alva, there was a military road constructed through the mountains to Espinhal. But the country from Celerico to the Murcella, a distance of about 60 miles, is one long defile, lying between the Sierra Estrella and the Mondego. The ridge upon which Celerico stands, being a shoot from the Estrella, and encircled by a sweep of the Mondego, closes this defile in front. In like manner the Sierra Murcella, covered by the Alva river, closes it in the rear, and the intermediate parts are but a succession of smaller streams and lower ridges. The principal road was repaired and joined to the road of Espinhal, and a branch was also carried across the Mondego to Coimbra. Thus an internal communication was established for the junction of all the corps. Nevertheless, between Celerico and the Alva, the country was not permanently tenable, because, from Guarda and Covilhao, there were roads over the Estrella to Gouvea, Cea, and Gallices, towns in rear of Celerico; and the enemy could also turn the whole tract by moving through Trancoso and Viseu, and so down the right bank of the Mondego to Coimbra.

But Lord Wellington keeping the head of his army one march behind Celerico, in observation of the routes over the Estrella, and his rear close to the Alva, was master of his retreat; and as the Mondego was fordable in summer and bridged at several points, he could pass it by a flank movement in a few hours. Now the right bank was also one great defile, lying between the river and the Sierra de Alcoba or Caramula. This mountain stretching with some breaks from the Douro to Coimbra, separates the valley of the Mondego from the coast line, and in approaching Coimbra sends out a lofty transverse shoot, called the Sierra de Busaco, exactly in a line with the Sierra de Murcella, and barring the way on the right bank of the Mondego in the same manner that the latter Sierra bars it on the left bank. Moreover, this route to Coimbra was the worst in Portugal, and crossed by several deep tributaries of the Mondego, the most considerable of which were the Criz and Dao. The Vouga, however, opened a passage through the Alcoba near Viseu, and that way the French could gain the great road from Oporto, and so continue their movement upon Coimbra.

Such being the ground on both sides of the Mondego, the weakest point was obviously towards the Estrella, and Lord Wellington kept the mass of his forces there. But Messina was ill-acquainted with the military features, and absolutely ignorant of the lines of Torres Vedras. Indeed, so circumspectly had those works been carried on, that only vague rumours of their existence reached the bulk of the English army; and many British officers imagined that the campaign was only to cloak the general's intention of embarking when he reached Lisbon. In England the opposition asserted that he would do so: the Portuguese dreaded it; the French army universally believed it; and the British ministers seem to have entertained the same opinion; for at this time an officer of engineers arrived at Lisbon, whose instructions, received personally from Lord Liverpool, were unknown to Lord Wellington, and commenced thus:—"As it is probable that the army will embark in September."

CHAPTER VI.

THIRD INVASION OF PORTUGAL.

MASSENA's command extended from the banks of the Tagus to the Bay of Biscay, from Almeida to Burgos, and the number of his troops present under arms exceeded 110,000 men. From these must be deducted 13,000 in the Asturias and province of Santander, 4000 in the government of Valladolid, 8000 under Serras at Zamora and Benevente, and lastly, the reserve of Bayonne under General Drouet, 19,000 strong, which, organized as a 9th corps had only entered Spain in August, being replaced at Bayonne by a fresh reserve under General Caffarelli. Thus, the active army of invasion did not much exceed 70,000; and as every man, combatant or non-combatant, is borne on the strength of a French army, not more than 55,000 infantry and about 8000 horsemen were with the eagles. The 9th corps, had, however, orders to follow the traces of the Prince of Esling, and the void thus left at Burgos and Valladolid was supplied by 16,000 of the young guard.

This arrangement shows how absurdly Napoleon has been called a rash warrior, and one never thinking of retreat. No man ever made bolder marches, but no man ever secured his base with more care. Here he would not suffer any advance to fresh conquests until his line of communication had been strengthened with three additional fortresses,—namely, Astorga, Ciudad, and Almeida; and while he employed 65,000 men in the invasion of Portugal, he kept more than 80,000 in reserve. Thus, even the total loss of the army destined to make what is technically termed "a point" upon Lisbon, would, as a mere military disaster, have scarcely shaken his hold of Spain.

Massena's instructions were to convert Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida into places of arms for the conquest of Portugal, and to move on both sides of the Tagus against Lisbon in the beginning of September. Either thinking his force too weak to act upon two lines at the same time, or trusting to the co-operation of Soult's army from Andalusia, he relinquished the Alemtejo, looking only to the northern bank of the Tagus; and hence, as the experience of Junot's march in 1807 warned him off the Sobraira mountains, his views were confined to the three roads of Belmonte, Celerico, and Viseu.

The strength of the positions about the Alva was known to him, as were also the measures taken to impede a descent from Cavilhao to Espinhal; but Alorna, Pamplona, and the other Portuguese in the French camp, with a singular ignorance, asserted that the road by Viseu and Coimbra was easy, and that no important position covered the latter town. Wherefore the French general resolved suddenly to assemble all his forces, distribute 13 days' bread to the soldiers, and pour in one solid mass down the right bank of the Mondego, not doubting to reach Coimbra before General Hill could join Lord Wellington.

In pursuance of this project the three corps were directed to concentrate on the 16th of September; Reynier's at Guarda; Ney's, and the heavy cavalry, at Maçã da Chao, and Junot's at Pinhel. By this disposition all three roads were alike menaced; and the allies being kept in suspense as to the ultimate object, Massena hoped to gain one march, a great thing, seeing that from Coimbra he was not more than 100 miles, whereas Hill's distance from that town was longer. But, to cover the real object with more care, and to keep Hill as long as possible at Sarzedas, the French general caused Guarda to be seized on the 12th, by a detachment, which withdrew again immediately, as if it were only a continuation of the former feints; and meanwhile Reynier, having first ascertained that Mortier was at Monasterio, threatening Estremadura, suddenly destroyed the boat-bridge at Alcantara, and marched towards Sabugal.

On the 13th, the allies re-established their post at Guarda; but on the 15th, it was again driven away by a considerable mass of the enemy, and retired up the side of the Estrella. At the same time the cavalry in front of Celerico was forced back in the centre, and the post at Trancoso chased towards Mongualde on the left. Lord Wellington then felt assured that the invasion was at last in serious progress; and having ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the troops in Guarda were

of Reynier's corps, despatched his final orders for Hill and Leith to concentrate on the Alva.

On the 16th, Reynier descended from Guarda to the plains bordering the Mondego; and being there joined by the 6th corps and Montbrun's horsemen, the whole passed the river, and, pushing through Celerico, drove back the cavalry posts of the allies to the village of Cortiço; but there the first German hussars turning, overthrew the leading squadrons, and made some prisoners. Near Cortiço, the road branching off to the bridge of Fornos and to Gouvea, a French brigade took the latter to cover the march of the main body which made for Fornos. But this feint was closely watched; for there is a custom, peculiar to the British army, of sending mounted officers, singly to observe the enemy's motions; and, such is their habit, that they will penetrate through the midst of his cantonments, cross the line of his movement, and hover, just out of musket-shot, for whole days, on the skirts of his columns, until they obtain a clear notion of the numbers and the true direction of the march. Colonel Waters, one of these exploring officers, being close on the left of Reynier's troops during this day, reported their movements, and in the evening, leading some of the German cavalry behind the enemy, took several prisoners and the baggage of a general.

The French operations were decisive. Lord Wellington directed the first, third, and fourth divisions upon the Alva, withdrew his heavy cavalry from the front, and placed the light division at St. Romão, in the Estrella, to cover the head-quarters, which were transferred that night to Cea.

The 17th, the whole of the 2nd and 6th corps were observed to pass the bridge of Fornos, and the advanced guard entered Mongualde; but the 8th corps still kept the road leading towards Oporto, for 10,000 militia of the northern provinces, forming the brigades of Trant, Wilson, and Miller, were collected upon the Douro to harass the enemy's right flank and rear, and Trant, with about 3000, was already at Moimenta de Beira, in the defiles leading through the hills to Lamego. The country between the Coa and Coimbra, on both sides of the Mondego, had been before laid waste, the mills were destroyed, the ordenança were in arms, and the helpless population hidden amongst the highest mountains.

On the 18th, the French advanced guard reached the deserted city of Viseu. Pack's Portuguese brigade immediately passed the Mondego at Fosdao, and took post beyond the Criz; and General Pakenham, with a brigade of the first division, entered Coimbra, to protect it from the enemy's scouting parties. On the 19th, Captain Somers Cocks, a very gallant and zealous officer, commanding the cavalry post which had been driven from Guarda, came down from the Estrella, and following the enemy through Celerico, ascertained that neither sick men nor stores were left behind: hence it was evident that Massena, relinquishing his communications, had thrown his cavalry, infantry, artillery, parcs, baggage and hospital waggons, in one mass, upon the worst road in Portugal. The allies were now in motion also to cross the Mondego, when a false report, that the enemy was again on the left bank, arrested the general movement. The next day, however, the third, fourth, and light divisions, and the British cavalry passed the river at Pena Cova, Olivarez, and other places, and were distributed; the light division at Mortagao supporting Pack; the third and fourth in the villages between the Sierra de Busaco and Mortagao; and the horse on a plain in front of the latter place, connecting the light division with Pack's brigade.

But the 8th corps still pointed towards the valley of the Vouga; and it was doubtful whether Massena would not that way gain the main road from Oporto to Coimbra; wherefore General Spencer, with the first division, marched upon Milheada, and Trant was directed to join him by a march through San Pedro de Sul to Sardao. Meanwhile Leith arrived on the Alva, and General Hill was only one march behind; for having discovered Reynier's movements on the 12th, and, at the same time, getting intelligence that all the French boats on the Tagus had been destroyed, he, with a ready decision, anticipating Lord Wellington's orders, directed his artillery by Thomar, and putting his troops in motion that evening, reached Espisnal on the 20th, and was there joined by General Lecor, who, with equal vigour and judgment, had brought the Portuguese brigade, by

long marches, from Fundao. On the 21st, Hill arrived on the Alva, and pushed his cavalry in observation beyond that river. Thus the two corps of the allied army were united on the same day that the main body of the enemy entered Viseu; and although the French horsemen were on the Criz, the bridges had been destroyed by Pack; and the project of surprising Coimbra was baffled.

Neither had Massena failed to experience other evil consequences from his false movement. He had been obliged to repair the road from day to day for his artillery; and it was still 20 miles from Viseu on the 19th. Trant, aware of this, formed the hardy project of destroying it; and quitting Moimenta de Beira in the night, with a squadron of cavalry, 2000 militia, and five guns, on the 20th, surprised a patrol of 10 men, from whom he learnt that the convoy was at hand, and that Montbrun's cavalry was close in the rear. The defiles were, however, narrow, and Trant, charging the head of the escort, took 100 prisoners and some baggage. The convoy then fell back, and the militia followed; the ways being so narrow that Montbrun could never come up to the front. At this time a resolute attack would have thrown all into confusion, but the militia were unmanageable; and the enemy having at last rallied a few men, and repulsed the Portuguese cavalry, with a loss of 12 troopers, the whole got into disorder, and Trant, seeing nothing more was to be effected, returned to Moimenta de Beira, and from thence marched to Lamego with his prisoners. The French, ignorant of the number and quality of their assailants, still fell back, and did not finally reach Viseu until the 23rd, by which Massena lost two most important days.

While these events were passing in the valley of Mondego, a small expedition from Cadiz again landed at Moguer, to aid Copons in collecting provisions on the Tinto. It was, however, quickly obliged to re-embark; and Copons was defeated by General Remond, with the loss of 300 men, on the 15th. Meanwhile, Romana attacked the French posts near Monasterio, pushing his cavalry towards Seville. Soult sent the 5th corps against him, and he retired; but was beaten at Los Santos on the same day that Copons had been defeated on the Tinto. The pursuit was continued to Fuente del Maestre; and the whole army was like to disperse in flight, when Madden's Portuguese cavalry came up, and charging the pursuers with signal gallantry, overthrew the leading squadrons, recovered some prisoners, and gained time for the Spaniards to rally. Nevertheless, the French entered Zafra, and Romana retreated, by Almendralejo and Merida to Montijo, on the 18th, throwing a garrison into Olivenza, and three battalions into Badajoz. Being, however, sensible that the latter place was in no condition to resist a serious attack, he directed the junta to repair to Valencia d'Alcantara, and took refuge himself at Elvas.

Lord Wellington's anticipations were thus realized, and the Alemtejo laid open. Fortunately for the allies, Sebastiani was at this moment near Carthagenia in pursuit of the Murcian army, and a fresh insurrection breaking out in the mountains of Grenada, the castles of Motril and Almunecar were taken; Copons also advanced to the Tinto, and all these calls upon Soult taking place at one time, he was unable to bring quite 12,000 men to Zafra; a number inadequate to the invasion of the Alemtejo, the more especially that several regiments withdrawn from Cadiz, and others coming from England had reached Lisbon about this period, and formed a reserve for the allies of more than 5000 British troops. Wherefore the French returned to Ronquillo, the Spaniards again advanced to Xeres de los Caballeros, and Araceña, and this dangerous crisis glided gently away. But, to understand this, it is necessary to show how increasing political embarrassments had thwarted the original plan of the English general.

The first vexatious interference of the Souza faction had been checked, but the loss of Almeida furnished a favourable opportunity to renew their clamorous hostility to the military proceedings.* Falsely asserting that the provisions of that fortress had been carried away by the English commissaries; and as falsely pretending that Lord Wellington had promised to raise the siege, this party hypocritically assumed that his expressions of sorrow for its fall were indications of an intention to remove by a splendid victory the public despondency. 'They vehe-

* Appendix, No. 2.

mently insisted also on a defence of the frontier, inveighed against the destruction of the mills, and endeavoured to force their own friends of the fidalgo faction even on to the staff of Marshal Beresford, that they might the more readily embarrass the operations. Meanwhile, neglecting or delaying the measures agreed upon for laying waste the country, they protected the minor authorities when disobedient, refrained from punishing delinquents, and took every occasion to mislead the public mind at the very moment when the enemy commenced the invasion. Nor was there wanting either accident or indiscretion to increase the growing confusion.

When Almeida fell, an officer of the guards writing to a friend at Oporto, indiscreetly asserted, that Massena was advancing in front with 100,000 French, and that 80,000 more were moving in rear of the allies upon Lisbon. This letter being immediately made public, created such a panic amongst the English merchants that one and all applied for ships to carry their families and property away, and there arose such a tumult that Trant was obliged to quit his command for the purpose of suppressing the commotion. To dry this source of mischief Lord Wellington issued proclamations; and in the orders of the day declared that he would not seek to ascertain the author of this and similar letters, being assured that the feelings and sense of the officers would prevent any repetition.

To the regency he addressed himself in a more peremptory and severe manner, reproving them for the false colouring given to his communications, and informing them that he would never "permit public clamour and panic to induce him to change, in the smallest degree, a system and plan of operation which he had adopted after mature consideration, and which daily experience proved to be the only one likely to produce a good end." But this remonstrance only increased the virulence of his opponents; and such was their conduct, that before Lord Wellington reached Busaco he was obliged to tell them "their miserable intrigues must cease or he would advise his own government to withdraw the British army."

Meanwhile their proceedings had been so mischievously successful, that the country between the Mondego, the Tagus, and the lines, still contained provisions sufficient for the French during the ensuing winter, and the people were alike unprepared to expect an enemy or to attempt a removal of their property.

Lord Wellington could but choose then, between stopping the invaders on the Mondego, or wasting the country by force as he retreated. But what an act the last! His hopes depended upon the degree of moral strength he was enabled to call forth, and he would have had to retire with a mixed force before a powerful army and an eminent commander, his rear-guard engaged, and his advance driving miserable multitudes before it to the capital, where nothing was prepared to save them from famine, but where the violent and powerful faction in the regency was ready to misrepresent every proceeding and inflame the people's minds; and this, when the court of Rio Janeiro was discontented, and the English ministers, as I shall have occasion to show, panic stricken by the desponding letters of some general officers about the commander-in-chief! It was evidently necessary to fight, although Massena had above 60,000 veterans, and Lord Wellington could only bring about 50,000 men into line, more than half of which were untried soldiers.

The consequences of such a battle were not, however, to be estimated by the result on the field. The French general might indeed gain everything by a victory; but, if defeated, his powerful cavalry and the superior composition and experience of his army would prevent it from being very injurious; or a serious check might induce him to turn his attention from Coimbra towards Oporto, contenting himself with the capture of that city, and the reduction of the northern provinces, until more formidable preparations should enable him to renew his first design. Nor could the time thus gained by the allies be as profitably employed in the defence. The French could be reinforced to any amount, whereas the English general's resources could not be much improved, and it was very doubtful if either England or Portugal would longer endure the war, without some palpable advantage to balance the misery and the expense.

Such was the state of affairs when the allies passed to the right bank of the Mondego with a view to fight the battle thus forced upon their general. While the French remained concentrated at Viseu, the first division, under Spencer, was

held at Milheada in observation of the great road from Oporto ; the light division at Mortagao watching the road from Viseu, and the remainder of the army in reserve ready to move to either side. But when the French advanced guard had repaired the bridges over the Criz, and passed that river, Lord Wellington recalled the first division and fixed upon the Sierra de Busaco for his position of battle.

This mountain, about eight miles in length, abuts to the right on the Mondego, and on the left is connected with the Sierra de Caramula by a hilly rugged country, impervious to the march of an army. A road along the crest of Busaco afforded an easy communication, and at Pena Cova, just behind the right hand extremity, a ford in the Mondego permitted the troops to pass in a few hours to the Murcella ridge, behind the Alva. The face of Busaco was steep, rough, and fit for defence. The artillery of the allies fixed on certain points could play along the front freely, and there was some ground on the summit suitable for a small body of cavalry ; but neither guns nor horsemen of the enemy had a fair field, their infantry were to contend with every difficulty, and the approach to the position was also unfavourable to an attacking army.

After passing the Criz, a table-land permitted Massena to march, in a wide order of battle, to Mortagao ; but then a succession of ascending ridges led to the Sierra Busaco, which was separated from the last by a chasm so profound that the naked eye could hardly distinguish the movement of troops in the bottom, yet in parts so narrow that 12-pounders could range to the salient points on the opposite side. From Mortagao four roads conducted to Coimbra. The first, unfrequented and narrow, crossed the Caramula to Boyalva, a village situated on the western slope of that sierra, and from thence led to Sardao and Milheada. The other roads, penetrating through the rough ground in front, passed over the Sierra de Busaco ; one by a large convent on the right hand of the highest point of the ridge ; a second on the left hand of this culminating point, by a village called St. Antonio de Cantara ; and a third, which was a branch from the second, followed the Mondego to Pena Cova.

When this formidable position was chosen, some officers expressed their fears that Massena would not assail it. "But, if he does, I shall beat him," was the reply of the English general, who was well assured that the prince would attack ; for his advanced guard was already over the Criz, the 2nd and 6th corps were in mass on the other side of that river, and it was improbable that so celebrated a commander would, at the mere sight of a strong position, make a retrograde movement, change all his positions, and adopt a new line of operations by the Vouga, which would be exposed also to the militia under Baccellar. Massena was, indeed, only anxious for a battle, and, being still under the influence of Alorna's and Pamplona's false reports, as to the nature of the country in his front, never doubted that the allies would retire before him.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL PACK, on the 22nd, destroyed the bridges over the Criz, and fell back upon the light division ; but, the 23rd, the enemy re-established the communications, passed the river, and obliged the British horse to quit the plain, and take to the hills behind Mortagao. Three squadrons of light and one regiment of heavy cavalry were retained there by Lord Wellington ; but the rest he sent over the Sierra de Busaco to the low country about Milheada, whence he recalled Spencer, and at the same time caused the third and fourth divisions to take their ground on the position, the former at St. Antonio de Cantara, the latter at the convent. But the light division falling back only a league, encamped in a pine wood, where happened one of those extraordinary panics that, in ancient times, were attributed to the influence of a hostile god. No enemy was near, no alarm was given, yet suddenly the troops, as if seized with a frenzy, started from sleep and dispersed in every direction ; nor was there any possibility of allaying this strange terror, until some persons called out that the enemy's cavalry were amongst them, when the

soldiers mechanically run together in masses, and the illusion was instantly dissipated.

The 24th, the enemy appeared in force, and skirmished with the piquets in front of Montagao, when the light division, again retiring four miles, occupied strong ground, and in the evening some of the enemy's cavalry approaching too close, were charged by a squadron of the 14th dragoons, and overthrown, with the loss of 20 or 30 men.

Early on the 25th, Crawford moved down from his post, and appeared somewhat disposed to renew the scene at the Coa; for the enemy's cavalry were gathering in front, and the heads of three infantry columns were plainly descried on the table-land above Montagao, coming on abreast, and with a most impetuous pace, while heavy clouds of dust, rising and loading the atmosphere for miles behind, showed that the whole French army had passed the Criz, and was in full march to attack. The cavalry skirmishers were already exchanging pistol shots, when Lord Wellington, suddenly arriving, ordered the division to retire, and taking the personal direction, covered the retreat with the 52nd and 95th, the cavalry, and Ross's troop of horse-artillery. Nor was there a moment to lose: the enemy, with incredible rapidity, brought up both infantry and guns, and fell on so briskly that all the skill of the general, and the readiness of the excellent troops composing the rear-guard, could scarcely prevent the division from being dangerously engaged. Howbeit, a series of rapid and beautiful movements, a sharp cannonade, and an hour's march brought everything back in good order to the great position; but, almost at the same moment, the opposite ridge was crowned by the masses of the 6th corps, and the French batteries opened as the English troops mounted the steep ascent on which the convent was situated. Meanwhile, Reynier, taking the left hand route, along which a Portuguese battalion had retired, arrived at St. Antonio de Cantara, in front of the third division, and before three o'clock 40,000 French infantry were embattled on the two points, and the sharp musketry of the skirmishers arose from the dark-wooded chasms beneath.

Ney, whose military glance was magical, perceived in an instant that the position, a crested not a table mountain, could not hide any strong reserve, that it was scarcely half occupied, and that great part of the allied troops were moving from one place to another, with that sort of confusion which generally attends the first taking up of unknown ground. He desired to make an early and powerful attack; but the Prince of Esling was at Montagao, 10 miles in the rear, and an aide-de-camp, despatched to inform him of the state of affair, after attending two hours for an audience, was (as I have been informed) told that everything must await Massena's arrival. Thus a most favourable opportunity was lost; for the first division of the allies, although close at hand, was not upon the ridge; Leith's troops, now called the fifth division, were in the act of passing the Mondego; Hill was still behind the Alva; scarcely 25,000 men were actually in line, and there were great intervals between the divisions.

Reynier coincided with Ney; and they wrote in concert to Massena, on the 26th, intimating their joint desire to attack.* The Prince of Esling, however, did not reach the field until 12 o'clock, bringing with him the 8th corps, with which, and the cavalry, he formed a reserve, connecting the 6th and 2nd corps, and then sending out his skirmishers along the whole front, proceeded carefully to examine the position from left to right.

The situation of the allies was now greatly changed. Hill's corps, having crossed the Mondego, was posted athwart the road leading over the Sierra to Pena Cova; on his left Leith prolonged the line of defence, having the Lusitanian legion in reserve. Picton, with the third division, supported by Champlemond's Portuguese brigade, was next to Leith, and Spencer, with the first division, occupied the highest part of the ridge, being between Picton and the convent. The fourth division closed the extreme left, covering a path leading to Milheada, where the cavalry held the flat country, one heavy regiment only being kept in reserve on the summit of the sierra. Pack's brigade, forming an advanced guard to the first division, was posted half way down the descent, and the light division, supported by a German brigade,

* Appendix, No. 5.

occupied a piece of ground jutting out nearly half a mile in front of, and about 200 feet lower than, the convent, the space between being naturally scooped like the hollow of a wave before it breaks. Along the whole of the front, skirmishers were thrown out on the mountain side, and about 50 pieces of artillery were disposed upon the salient points.

Ney was averse to attack after the delay which had taken place, but Massena resolved to attempt carrying the position. Reynier thought that he had only to deal with a rear-guard of the allies, and the prince, whether partaking of this error or confident in the valour of his army, directed the 2nd and 6th corps to fall on the next day, each to its own front, while the 8th corps, the cavalry, and the artillery remained in reserve. To facilitate the attack, the light French troops, dropping by twos and threes into the lowest parts of the valley, endeavoured, in the evening, to steal up the wooded dells and hollows, and to establish themselves unseen close to the piquets of the light division. Some companies of rifle corps and *caçadores* checked this, but similar attempts made with more or less success at different points of the position, seeming to indicate a night attack, excited all the vigilance of the troops. Yet, were it otherwise, none but veterans, tired of war, could have slept, for the weather was calm and fine, and the dark mountain masses, rising on either side, were crowned with innumerable fires, around which more than 100,000 brave men were gathered.

BATTLE OF BUSACO.

Before daybreak on the 27th, the French formed five columns of attack; three under Ney, opposite the convent, and two under Reynier, at St. Antonio de Cantara, these points being about three miles asunder. Reynier's troops had comparatively easier ground before them, and were in the midst of the piquets and skirmishers of the third division almost as soon as they could be perceived to be in movement. The allies resisted vigorously, and six guns played along the ascent with grape, but in less than half an hour the French were close upon the summit, so swiftly and with such astonishing power and resolution did they scale the mountain, overthrowing everything that opposed their progress. The right of the third division was forced back; the 8th Portuguese regiment was broken to pieces, and the hostile masses gained the highest part of the crest, just between the third and the fifth divisions. The leading battalions immediately established themselves amongst the crowning rocks, and a confused mass wheeled to the right, intending to sweep the summit of the sierra, but at that moment Lord Wellington caused two guns to open with grape upon their flank, while a heavy musketry was still poured into their front, and, in a little time, the 45th and the 88th regiments charged so furiously that even fresh men could not have withstood them. The French, quite spent with their previous efforts, opened a straggling fire, and both parties, mingling together, went down the mountain side with a mighty clamour and confusion; the dead and dying strewing the way even to the bottom of the valley.

Meanwhile the French, who first gained the summit, had re-formed their ranks with the right resting upon a precipice overhanging the reverse side of the sierra, and thus the position was in fact gained, if any reserve had been at hand, for the greatest part of the third division, British and Portuguese, was fully engaged, and a misty cloud capped the summit, so that the enemy, thus ensconced amongst the rocks could not be seen, except by General Leith. That officer had put his 1st brigade in motion to his own left as soon as he perceived the vigorous impression made on the third division, and he was now coming on rapidly; yet he had two miles of rugged ground to pass in a narrow column before he could mingle in the fight. Keeping the Royals in reserve, he directed the 38th to turn the right of the French; but the precipice prevented this; and meanwhile Colonel Cameron, informed by a staff-officer of the critical state of affairs, formed the 9th regiment in line under a violent fire, and without returning a single shot, ran in upon and drove the grenadiers from the rocks with irresistible bravery, plying them with a destructive musketry as long as they could be reached, and yet with excellent discipline refraining from pursuit, lest the crest of the position should be again lost, for the mountain was so rugged that it was impossible to judge clearly of the general state of the action. The victory was, however, secure. Hill's corps edged in towards

the scene of action ; the 2nd brigade of Leith joined the 1st, and a great mass of fresh troops was thus concentrated, while Reynier had neither reserves nor guns to restore the fight.

Ney's attack had as little success. From the abutment of the mountain upon which the light division was stationed, the lowest parts of the valley could be discerned. The ascent was steeper and more difficult than where Reynier had attacked, and Crawford, in a happy mood of command, had made masterly dispositions. The table-land between him and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal the 43rd and 52nd regiments, drawn up in line ; and a quarter of a mile behind them, but on higher ground and close to the convent, a brigade of German infantry appeared to be the only solid line of resistance on this part of the position. In front of the two British regiments, some rocks, overhanging the descent, furnished natural embrasures, in which the guns of the division were placed, and the whole face of the hill was planted with the skirmishers of the rifle corps and of the two Portuguese caçadore battalions.

While it was yet dark, a straggling musketry was heard in the deep hollows separating the armies ; and when the light broke, the three divisions of the 6th corps were observed entering the woods below and throwing forward a profusion of skirmishers ; soon afterwards Marchand's division, emerging from the hollow, took the main road, as if to turn the right of the light division, Loison's made straight up the face of the mountain in front, and the third remained in reserve.

General Simon's brigade, which led Loison's attack, ascended with a wonderful alacrity, and though the light troops plied it unceasingly with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept through it from the first to the last section, its order was never disturbed, nor its speed in the least abated. Ross's guns were worked with incredible quickness, yet their range was palpably contracted every round, and the enemy's shot came singing up in a sharper key, until the skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed over the edge of the ascent, when the artillery suddenly drew back, and the victorious cries of the French were heard within a few yards of the summit. Crawford, who standing alone on one of the rocks, had been intently watching the progress of the attack, then turned, and in a quick shrill tone desired the two regiments in reserve to charge. The next moment a horrid shout startled the French column, and 1800 British bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. Yet so truly brave and hardy were the leaders of the enemy, that each man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers and ten soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had missed his mark ! They could do no more ! The head of their column was violently overturned and driven upon the rear, both flanks were lapped over by the English wings, and three terrible discharges at five yards' distance completed the rout. In a few minutes a long trail of carcasses and broken arms indicated the line of retreat. The main body of the British stood fast ; but several companies followed the pursuit down the mountain, until Ney, moving forward his reserve, and opening his guns from the opposite height, killed some men, and thus warned the rest to recover their own ground. The German brigade then spread over the hill, and the light division resumed its original position.

Loison showed no disposition to renew the attack, but Marchand's people who had followed the main road, broke into several masses, gained a pine wood half-way up the mountain, and sent a cloud of their skirmishers against the highest part, at the very moment that Simon was defeated. Such, however, was the difficulty of ascending, that Pack alone held the enemy in check, and half a mile higher up, Spencer showed a line of the royal guards which forbade any hope of success ; and from the salient point of land occupied by the light division, Crawford's artillery took the main body of the French in the wood, in flank. Ney, who was there in person, after sustaining this murderous fire for an hour, relinquished the attack. The desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased, and before two o'clock Crawford having assented to a momentary truce, parties of both armies were mixed amicably together searching for the wounded men.

Towards evening, however, a French company having, with signal audacity, seized a village within half-musket shot of the light division, refused to retire ; which so incensed Crawford that, turning 12 guns on the village, he overwhelmed

it with bullets for half an hour. After paying the French captain this distinguished honour, the English general recovering his temper, sent a company of the 43rd down, which cleared the village in a few minutes. Meanwhile an affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage character of the preceding events, added to the interest of the day. A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about 17 years of age, and very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain and driving an ass, loaded with all her property, through the midst of the French army. She had abandoned her dwelling in obedience to the proclamation, and now passed over the field of battle with a childish simplicity, totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and scarcely understanding which were the hostile and which the friendly troops, for no man on either side was so brutal as to molest her.

In this battle of Busaco, the French, after astonishing efforts of valour, were repulsed, in the manner to be expected from the strength of the ground, and the goodness of the soldiers opposed to them; and their loss, although prodigiously exaggerated at the time, was great. General Graind'orge and about 800 men were slain, Generals Foy and Merle wounded, Simon made prisoner, and the sum total may be estimated at 4500 men, while that of the allies did not exceed 1300. For on the one side musketry and artillery were brought into full activity, but the French sought to gain the day by resolution and audacity rather than by fire.

After this Massena judged the position of Busaco impregnable, and to turn it by the Mondego impossible, as the allies could pass that river quicker than himself. But a peasant informed him of the road leading from Montagao over the Caramula to Boyalva, and he resolved to turn Lord Wellington's left. To cover this movement the skirmishing was renewed with such vigour on the 28th, that a general battle was for some time expected. Yet an ostentatious display of men, the disappearance of baggage, and the throwing up of entrenchments on the hill covering the roads to Montagao plainly indicated some other design. Howbeit, it was not until evening when the enemy's masses in front being sensibly diminished, and his cavalry descried winding over the distant mountains, that the project became quite apparent. Hill then crossed the Mondego, and retired by Espinhal upon Thomar, while the centre and left of the army defiled in the night by the other roads upon Milheada. In this manner Busaco was evacuated before the 29th, the guns followed the convent road, and the light division furnished the rear-guard until they passed Fornos, when the open country enabled the cavalry to relieve them.

Massena's scouts reached Boyalva in the evening of the 28th, and it has been erroneously asserted, that Trant's absence from Sardao alone enabled the French general to execute his design. Trant was, however, at Sardao, four miles from Boyalva before one o'clock on the 28th; but having, through a mistake of Baccellar's, marched from Lamego, by the circuitous route of Oporto, instead of the direct road through San Pedro do Sul, he lost men from fatigue and desertion, and could bring only 1500 militia into line; hence his absence or presence could have produced no effect whatever, even though he had, as Lord Wellington intended, been at Boyalva itself.

Accordingly, the French cavalry, pushing between him and the British horse, on the 29th cut off one of his patrols, and the next morning drove him, with the loss of 20 men, behind the Vouga. When Massena's main body had cleared the defiles of Boyalva, it marched upon Coimbra, and the allies, crossing the Mondego at that city, commenced the passage of the defiles leading upon Condeixa and Pombal. The commissariat stores, which had been previously removed from Raiva de Pena Cova to Figueras, were embarked at Peniché; the light division and the cavalry remained on the right bank of the river; and Baccellar was directed to bring down all the militia of the northern provinces upon the Vouga.

But, notwithstanding the proclamations and the urgent and even menacing remonstrances of the English general, the Portuguese regency had not wasted the country behind the Mondego. During the few days that the enemy was stopped at Busaco, only the richest inhabitants had quitted Coimbra; when the allied army retreated, that city was still populous; and when the approach of the enemy left no choice but to fly or to risk the punishment of death and infamy announced in the

proclamation, so direful a scene of distress ensued that the most hardened of men could not behold it without emotion. Mothers, with children of all ages ; the sick, the old, the bedridden, and even lunatics, went or were carried forth ; the most part, with little hope and less help, to journey for days in company with contending armies. Fortunately for this unhappy multitude, the weather was fine, and the roads firm, or the greatest number must have perished in the most deplorable manner. And, notwithstanding all this misery, the object was not gained ; the people fled, but the provisions were left, and the mills were but partially and imperfectly ruined.

On the 1st of October, the outposts were attacked, and driven from the hills bounding the plain of Coimbra to the north. The French, on entering this plain, suffered some loss from a cannonade, and the British cavalry were drawn up in line, but with no serious intention of fighting, and were soon after withdrawn across the Mondego, yet somewhat unskilfully ; for the French following briskly, cut down some men even in the middle of the river, and were only prevented from forcing the passage by a strong skirmish, in which 50 or 60 men fell.

This scrambling affair obliged the light division to march hastily through the city, to gain the defiles of Condeixa, which commence at the end of the bridge, and all the inhabitants who had not before quitted the place rushed out, each with what could be caught up in the hand, and driving before them a number of animals loaded with sick people or children. At the entrance to the bridge, the press was so great that the troops halted for a few moments, just under the prison ; the jailor had fled with the keys, the prisoners, crowding to the windows, were endeavouring to tear down the bars with their hands, and even with their teeth, and bellowing in the most frantic manner, while the bitter lamentations of the multitude increased, and the pistol-shots of the cavalry, engaged at the ford below, were distinctly heard.

Captain William Campbell, an officer of Crawford's staff, burst the prison doors, and released the wretched inmates, while the troops forced their way over the bridge ; yet, at the other end, the up-hill road, passing between high rocks, was so crowded that no effort, even of the artillery, could make way. A troop of French dragons crossed a ford, and hovering close upon the flank, increased the confusion ; and a single regiment of foot would have sufficed to destroy the division, wedged in, as it was, in a hollow way, and totally incapable of advancing, retreating, or breaking out on either side. At last, some of the infantry opened a passage on the right flank, and, by great exertions, the road was cleared for the guns ; but it was not until after dusk that the division reached Condeixa, although the distance was less than eight miles. Head-quarters were that night at Redinha, and the next day at Leiria.

Hitherto the marches had been easy, the weather fine, and provisions abundant ; nevertheless, the usual disorders of a retreat had already commenced. In Coimbra, a quantity of harness and intrenching tools were scattered in the streets ; at Leiria, the magazines were plundered by the troops, and camp-followers ; and, at Condeixa, a magazine of tents, shoes, spirits, and salt meat was destroyed, or abandoned to the enemy : and, while the streets were flowing, ankle deep, with rum, the light division and Pack's Portuguese brigade, at the distance of a quarter of a mile, were obliged to slaughter their own bullocks, and received only half rations of liquor.

Lord Wellington arrested this growing disorder with a strong hand. Three men, taken in the fact at Leiria, were hanged on the spot ; and some regiments, whose discipline was more tainted than others, were forbidden to enter a village. This vigorous exercise of command, aided by the fine weather and the enemy's inactivity, restored order amongst the allies ; while Massena's conduct, the reverse of the English general's, introduced the confusion of a retreat in the pursuing army. In Coimbra, the French general permitted waste ; and, in a few days, resources were dissipated that, under good arrangements, would have supplied his troops for two months : and, during this licentious delay, the advantage gained by his dangerous flank march to Boyalva was lost.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. "Attack vigorously, after having observed well where to strike."—This simple, but profound expression in Napoleon's letter of service, forms the test by which the Prince of Esling's operations should be judged.

2. The design of turning the ground behind Celerico, by the route of Viseu, required close and rapid movements; yet the French general did not quit Viseu, to march against Coimbra, until the 10th day after passing the Pinhel. This was not "a vigorous attack."

3. Massena should have brought the allies to action in a forward position; and he might have done so either when Almeida fell, or before that event, because the complement of mules for the service of the army not being then full, the commissariat was dependent upon the country carts; and when the first retrograde movement took place from Alverca, the drivers fled with their animals, producing infinite confusion in the rear. The commissary-general Kennedy contrived, indeed, to procure 1500 additional mules; but, intermediately, a brisk advance of the enemy would have forced the English general to fight, or retire more hastily than would have beseemed his reputation, or suited his political position.

4. If the Prince of Esling had not been misled by Alorna and Pamplona, and the more readily that the estates of the latter were situated about Coimbra, he would have judged that the line his adversary had studied for eight months, and now so carefully and jealously guarded, was more likely to afford advantages than the circuitous route by Viseu, which was comparatively neglected. The French general, ill acquainted with the scene of action, but having the stronger and more movable army, should have followed closely.

A rapid pursuit, through Celerico, would have brought the French army on to the Alva before Hill or even Leith could have joined Lord Wellington. The latter must then have fought with half his own army, or he must have retreated to the lines. If he offered battle, his position could be turned either by the right or left; on the left by the slopes of the Estrella, on the right by crossing the Mondego, for Busaco was too extensive to be occupied before Hill and Leith arrived. Now, the road by Viseu being the longest and least practicable, demanded great diligence to compensate for the difficulties of the way, and to gain Coimbra and force the allies to a battle before Hill arrived, were objects more readily to be obtained by the left bank of the Mondego. The point where to strike was therefore not "well considered," and it is clear that Massena did not rightly estimate the greatness of his enterprise.

5. When the rocks of Busaco glittering with bayonets first rose on the Prince of Esling's view, two fresh questions were to be solved. Was he to attack or to turn that formidable post? Or, availing himself of his numerical strength and central situation, was he to keep the allies in check, seize Oporto, and neglect Lisbon until better combinations could be made? The last question has been already discussed; but, contrary to the general opinion, the attack upon Busaco appears to me faulty in the execution rather than in the conception; and the march by which that position was finally turned, a violation of the soundest principles of war. In a purely military view, the English general may be censured for not punishing his adversary's rashness.

With respect to the attack, 65,000 French veterans had no reason to believe that 50,000 mixed and inexperienced troops, distributed on a mountain more than eight miles long, were impregnablely posted. It would have been no overweening presumption in the French general to expect that three corps well disposed, supported by a numerous artillery, and led on the first day (as Ney desired), might carry some part of the position, and it is an error also to suppose that guns could not have been used: the light division were constantly within range, and 30 pieces of artillery employed on that point would have wonderfully aided the attack by the 6th corps. But when a general in chief remains 10 miles from a field of battle, gives his adversary two days to settle in a position, makes his attacks without connection, and without artillery, and brings forward no reserves, success is impossible even with the valiant soldiers Massena commanded.

6. "An army should always be in condition to fight."

"A general should never abandon one line of communication without establishing another."

"Flank marches within reach of an enemy are rash and injudicious."

These maxims of the greatest of all generals have been illustrated by many examples; Senef, Kollin, Rosbach, the valley of the Brenta, Salamanca, attest their value. Now, Massena violated all three, by his march to Boyalva, and some peculiar circumstances, or desperate crisis of affairs should be shown, to warrant such a departure from general principles. Sir Joshua Reynolds, treating of another art, says, "Genius begins where rules end." But here genius was dormant, and rules disregarded. Massena was not driven to a desperate game. The conquest of Oporto was open to him, or a march by Viseu upon the Vouga, which, though demanding time, was safe; while in that by Boyalva, he threw his whole army into a single and narrow defile, within 10 miles of an enemy in position; and that also (as I have been informed by an officer of Marshal Ney's staff) with much disorder: the baggage and commissariat, the wounded and sick, the artillery, cavalry, and infantry, mixed together; discord raging amongst the generals, confusion amongst the soldiers, and in the night season when every difficulty is doubled. His "army was not, then, in a condition to fight." He was making "a flank march within reach of an enemy in position," and he was "abandoning his line of communication without having established another."

7. Lord Wellington was within four hours' march of either end of the defile, through which the French army was moving. He might have sent the first division and the cavalry (forming with Portuguese regular troops, and Trant's militia, a mass of 12,000 or 14,000 men) to Sardo, to head the French in the defile; while the second, third, fourth, fifth, and light divisions, advancing by Martagao, assailed their rear. That he did not do so, is to be attributed to his political position. War is full of mischances, and the loss of a single brigade might have caused the English government to abandon the contest altogether. Nevertheless, his retreat was more critically dangerous than such an attack would have been, and in a military view the battle of Busaco should not have been fought: it was extraneous to his original plan, it was forced upon him by events, and was, in fine, a political battle.

8. Massena's march, being unopposed, was successful. The allied army could not cope with him in the open country between Busaco and the sea, where his cavalry would have had a fair field; hence Lord Wellington, reverting to his original plan, retreated by the Coimbra and Espinhal roads. But the Prince of Esling was at Avelans de Cima and Milheada on the 30th, the allied cavalry and the light division being still on the right bank of the Mondego, which was fordable in many places below Coimbra. Had the French general, directing his march through Tentugal, crossed at those fords, and pushed rapidly on to Leiria, by the route Sir Arthur Wellesley followed, in 1808, against Junot, the communication with Lisbon would have been cut: terror and confusion would then have raged in the capital, the patriarch's faction would have triumphed, and a dangerous battle must have been risked before the lines could be reached.

9. When the allies had gained Leiria, and secured their line of retreat, the fate of Portugal was still in the French general's hands. If he had established a fresh base at Coimbra, employed the 9th corps to seize Oporto, secured his line of communication with that city and with Almeida by fortified posts, and afterwards, extending his position by the left, attacked Abrantes, and given his hand to a corps sent by Soult from the south; not only would the campaign have been so far a successful one, but in no other manner could he have so effectually frustrated his adversary's political and military projects. Lord Wellington dreaded such a proceeding, and hailed the renewed advance of the French army, as the rising of a heavy cloud discovering a clear sky in the horizon beneath.

Even at Coimbra, the prince was unacquainted with the existence of the lines, and believed that, beyond Santarem, the country was open for the usage of all arms.* It is strange that, when Junot, Loison, Foy, and many officers, who had served in Portugal, were present, better information was not obtained; but every

* Appendix, No. 7, section 2.

part of this campaign illustrated Massena's character, as drawn by Napoleon :— "Brave, decided, and intrepid; dull in conversation, but in danger acquiring clearness and force of thought; ambitious, filled with self-love, neglectful of discipline, regardless of good administration, and, consequently, disliked by the troops; his dispositions for battle were bad, but his temper was pertinacious to the last degree, and he was never discouraged!"

10. It appears that the French reached Coimbra at the moment when the 14 days' bread, carried by the soldiers, was exhausted, and it is worthy of consideration that French soldiers are accustomed to carry so much bread. Other nations, especially the English, would not husband it; yet it was a practice of the ancient Romans, and it ought to be the practice of all armies. It requires a long previous discipline and well-confirmed military habits; but, without it, men are only half efficient, especially for offensive warfare. The secret of making perfect soldiers is only to be found in national customs and institutions; men should come to the ranks fitted, by previous habits, for military service, instead of being stretched as it were upon the bed of Procrustes, by a discipline which has no resource but fear.

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM the 1st of October until the 3rd, the French army was in disorder. The 4th, Massena resumed his march by Condeixa and Leiria, leaving his sick and wounded, with a slender guard (in all about 4700 men) at Coimbra. His hospital was established at the convent of Santa Clara, on the left bank of the river, and all the inhabitants, who were averse or unable to reach the lines, came down from their hiding-places in the mountains. But scarcely had the prince left the city, when Trant, Miller, and Wilson, with nearly 10,000 militia, closed upon his rear, occupying the sierras on both sides of the Mondego, and cutting off all communication with Almeida.

On the evening of the 4th, the French drove the English piquets from Pombal, and the next morning pushed so suddenly upon Leiria as to create some confusion; but the road being crossed at right angles, by a succession of parallel ravines, Captain Somers Cocks took advantage of one to charge the head of the enemy, and checked him until General Anson's brigade of cavalry and Captain Bull's troop of artillery arrived to his support. The French then, forming three columns, endeavoured to bear down the British with the centre, while the others turned the flanks. The ravines were, however, difficult to pass; Bull's artillery played well into the principal body, and Anson, charging as it emerged from every defile, slew a great number. The British lost three officers and about 50 men, the enemy considerably more, and, in five hours, he did not gain as many miles of ground, although he had 36 squadrons opposed to ten. During this delay, Leiria was cleared, and the army retreated; the right by Thomar and Santarem, the centre by Batalha and Rio Mayor, the left by Alcobaça and Obidos, and at the same time a native force, under Colonel Blunt, was thrown into Peniché. Massena followed, in one column, by the way of Rio Mayor; but, meanwhile, an exploit, as daring and hardy as any performed by a Partizan officer during the war, convicted him of bad generalship, and shook his plan of invasion to its base.

SURPRISE OF COIMBRA.

Colonel Trant reached Milheada, intending to form a junction with Wilson and Miller; but these last were still distant, and, believing that his own arrival was unknown at Coimbra, he resolved, alone to attack the French in that city. Having surprised a small post at Fornos early in the morning of the 7th, he sent his cavalry, at full gallop, through the streets of Coimbra, with orders to pass the bridge, and cut off all communication with the French army, of whose progress he was ignorant. Meanwhile, his infantry penetrated at different points into the principal parts of the town, and the enemy, astounded, made little or no resistance. The convent of Santa Clara surrendered at discretion, and thus, on the third day after the Prince of Esling had quitted the Mondego, his depôts and hospitals, and nearly 5000 prisoners wounded and unwounded, amongst which there was a company of the

marines of the imperial guards, fell into the hands of a small militia force! The next day, Miller and Wilson, arriving, spread their men on all the lines of communication, and picked up above 300 more prisoners, while Trant conducted his to Oporto.

During the first confusion, the Portuguese committed some violence on the prisoners; and the Abbé du Pradt and other French writers have not hesitated to accuse Trant of disgracing his country and his uniform by encouraging this conduct; whereas, his exertions repressed it; and if the fact, that not more than ten men lost their lives under such critical circumstances, was not sufficient refutation, the falsehood is placed beyond dispute in a letter of thanks, written to Colonel Trant, by the French officers who fell into his hands.*

This disaster made no change in Massena's dispositions. He continued his march, and, on the 8th, his advanced guard drove the cavalry piquets out of Rio Mayor. General Slade, who commanded, took no heed of this; and the enemy, pushing rapidly on, was like to have taken the brigade of artillery in Alcoentre; a good deal of confusion ensued, but the royals and the 16th drove the French out of the town, sabred many, and made twelve prisoners. The next day the skirmish was renewed with various turns of fortune, but, finally, the British retreated.

Meanwhile the allied army was entering the lines; the first, fourth, and fifth divisions in the centre by Sobral, the third division on the left by Torres Vedras, and Hill's corps on the right by Alhandra. The light division and Pack's brigade, should also have entered by Aruda. But Crawford, who had reached Alemquer on the 9th, was still there, at three o'clock p.m. on the 10th. The weather being stormy, the men were placed under cover, and no indication of marching was given by the general. The cavalry had already filed into the lines; yet no guards were posted, no patrols sent forward, nor any precaution taken against surprise, although the town, situated in a deep ravine, was peculiarly favourable for such an attempt.

Some officers, uneasy at this state of affairs, anxiously watched the height in front, and, about four o'clock, observed some French dragoons on the summit, which was within cannon shot. The alarm was given, and the regiments got under arms, but the posts of assembly had been marked on an open space, very much exposed, and from whence the road led through an ancient gateway to the top of the mountain behind. The enemy's numbers increased every moment, and they endeavoured to create a belief that their artillery was come up. This feint was easily seen through, but the general desired the regiments to break and re-form on the other side of the archway, out of gun range, and in a moment all was disorder. The baggage animals were still loading, the streets were crowded with the followers of the division, and the whole in one confused mass rushed or were driven headlong to the archway. Several were crushed, and with worse troops, a general panic must have ensued; but the greatest number of the soldiers, ashamed of the order, stood firm in their ranks until the first confusion had abated.

Nevertheless the mischief was sufficiently great, and the enemy's infantry descending the heights, endeavoured some to turn the town on the left, while others pushed directly through the streets in pursuit, and thus with his front in disorder, and his rear skirmishing, Crawford commenced a retreat. The weather was, however, so boisterous that the fire soon ceased, and a few men wounded and the loss of some baggage was all the hurt sustained; yet so uncertain is everything in war, that this affair had like to have produced the most terrible results in another quarter.

The division, instead of marching by Caregada and Cadafes, followed the route of Sobral, and was obliged in the night to make a flank march of several miles along the foot of the lines to gain Aruda, which was meanwhile left open to the enemy. Hence, the cavalry patrols from Villa Franca, meeting some stragglers and followers of the camp near Caregada, were by them told that the light division was cut off, a report confirmed in some measure by the ungarded state of Aruda, and by the presence of the enemy's scouts on that side. This information alarmed General Hill for the safety of the second line, and the more so that the weakest

part was in the vicinity of Aruda ; he made a retrograde movement towards Alverca with a view to watch the valley of Calandrix, or to gain the pass of Bucellas according to circumstances. Hence, when the enemy was in full march against the lines, the front from Alhandra to the forts above Sobral, a distance of eight or nine miles, was quite disorganised of troops. The true state of affairs was, however, quickly ascertained, and Hill regained Alhandra before daylight on the 11th.

During this time the 2nd and the 8th corps passed Alemquer, the former marching upon Villa Franca, the latter upon Sobral. Reynier's movements were languid ; he did not discover the unguarded state of Alhandra, and his piquets did not enter Villa Franca until the next day ; but General Clausel, one of the most distinguished officers in the French army, coming upon Sobral in the dusk with the head of the 8th corps dislodged the troops of the first division, occupied the ridge on which the town is built, and in the night threw up some entrenchments close under the centre of the allies' position.

It is, however, time to give a more detailed description of those celebrated works, improperly called

THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS.

It has been already said that they consisted of three distinct ranges of defence.

The first, extending from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the Zizandre on the sea-coast, was, following the inflections of the hills, 29 miles long.

The second, traced at a distance varying from six to ten miles in rear of the first, stretched from Quintella on the Tagus to the mouth of the St. Lorenza, being 24 miles in length.

The third, intended to cover a forced embarkation, extended from Passo d'Arcos on the Tagus to the tower of Junquera on the coast. Here an outer line, constructed on an opening of 3000 yards, enclosed an entrenched camp designed to cover the embarkation with fewer troops, should the operation be delayed by bad weather ; and within this second camp, Fort St. Julian (whose high ramparts and deep ditches defied an escalade) was armed and strengthened to enable a rear-guard to protect both itself and the army.

The nearest part of the second line was 24 miles from these works at Passo d'Arcos, and some parts of the first line were two long marches distant ; but the principal routes led through Lisbon, where measures were taken to retard the enemy and give time for the embarkation.

Of these stupendous lines, the second, whether regarded for its strength or importance, was undoubtedly the principal, and the others only appendages, the one as a final place of refuge, the other as an advanced work to stem the first violence of the enemy, and to enable the army to take up its ground on the second line without hurry or pressure. Massena having, however, wasted the summer season on the frontiers, the first line acquired such strength, both from labour and from the fall of rain, that Lord Wellington resolved to abide his opponent's charge there.

The ground presented to the French being, as it were, divided into five parts or positions, shall be described in succession from right to left.

1. From Alhandra to the head of the valley of Calandrix. This distance, of about five miles, was a continuous and lofty ridge, defended by 13 redoubts, and for two miles rendered inaccessible by a scarp 15 to 20 feet high, executed along the brow. It was guarded by the British and Portuguese divisions under General Hill, and flanked from the Tagus by a strong flotilla of gun-boats, manned by British ~~seamen~~.

2. From the head of the vale of Calandrix to the Pé de Monte. This position, also five miles in length, consisted of two salient mountains forming the valley of Aruda, that town being exactly in the mouth of the pass. Only three feeble redoubts, totally incapable of stopping an enemy for an instant, were constructed here ; the defence of the ground was entrusted to General Crawford and the light division.

3. The Monte Agraça. This lofty mountain overtopped the adjacent country in such a manner that from its summit the whole of the first line could be distinctly observed. The right was separated from the Aruda position by a deep

ravine which led to nothing, the left overlooked the village and valley of Zibreira, and the centre overhung the town of Sobral. The summit of this mountain was crowned by an immense redoubt, mounting 25 guns, and having three smaller works, containing 19 guns, clustered around. The garrisons, amounting to 2000 men, were supplied by Pack's brigade, and on the reverse of the position, which might be about four miles in length, the fifth division, under General Leith, was posted in reserve.

4. From the valley of Zibreira to Torres Vedras. This position, seven miles long, was at first without works, because it was only when the rains had set in that the resolution to defend the first line permanently was adopted. But the ground being rough and well defined, and the valley in front watered by the Zizandre, now become a considerable river, it presented a fine field of battle for a small army. The first and fourth, and a sixth division formed of troops just arrived from England and from Cadiz, were there posted under the immediate command of Lord Wellington himself; and his head-quarters were fixed at Pero Negro, near the Secorra, a rock on which a telegraph was erected, communicating with every part of the lines.


5. From the heights of Torres Vedras to the mouth of the Zizandre. The right flank of this position and the pass in front of the town of Torres Vedras were secured, first, by one great redoubt, mounting 40 guns, and, secondly, by several smaller forts, judiciously planted so as to command all the approaches. From these works to the sea a range of moderate heights was crowned with small forts; but the chief defence there, after the rains had set in, was to be found in the Zizandre, which was not only unfordable, but overflowed its banks, and formed an impassable marsh. A paved road, parallel to the foot of the hills, run along the whole front, that is, from Torres Vedras, by Runa Sobral and Aruda, to Alhandra. This was the nature of the *first* line of defence; the *second* was still more formidable.

1. From the mouth of the St. Lourença to Mafra, a distance of seven miles, there was a range of hills naturally steep, artificially scarpred, and covered by a deep, and in many parts impracticable, ravine. The salient points were secured by forts, which flanked and commanded the few accessible points; but as this line was extensive, a secondary post was fortified a few miles in the rear, to secure a road leading from Ereceira to Cintra.

2. On the right of the above line, the Tapada, or royal park of Mafra, offered some open ground for an attack. Yet it was strong, and, together with the pass of Mafra, was defended by a system of 14 redoubts, constructed with great labour and care, well considered with respect to the natural disposition of the ground, and in some degree connected with the secondary post spoken of above: in front, the Sierra de Chypre, covered with redoubts, obstructed all approaches to Mafra itself.

3. From the Tapada to the pass of Bucellas, a space of 10 or 12 miles, which formed the middle of the second line, the country is choked by the Monte Chique, the Cabeça, or head of which is in the centre of, and overtopping all the other mountain masses. A road, conducted along a chain of hills, high and salient, but less bold than any other parts of the line, connected Mafra with the Cabeça, and was secured by a number of forts. The country in front was extremely difficult, and a second and stronger range of heights, parallel to and behind the first, offered a good fighting position, which could only be approached with artillery by the connecting road in front, and to reach that, either the Sierra de Chypre, on the left, or the pass of the Cabeça de Monte Chique, on the right, must have been carried. Now the works covering the latter consisted of a cluster of redoubts constructed on the inferior rocky heads in advance of the Cabeça, and completely commanding all the approaches, and, both from their artificial and natural strength, nearly impregnable to open force. The Cabeça and its immediate flanks were considered secure in their natural precipitous strength; and, in like manner, the ridges connecting the Cabeça with the pass of Bucellas, being impregnable, were left untouched, save the blocking of one bad mule road that led over them.

4. From Bucellas (the pass of which was difficult and strongly defended by redoubts on each side) a ridge, or rather a collection of impassable rocks, called the



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Sierra de Serves, stretches to the right for two miles without a break, and then dies away by gradual slopes in the low ground about the Tagus. These declivities and the flat banks of the river offered an opening two miles and a half wide, which was laboriously and carefully strengthened by redoubts, water-cuts, and retrenchments, and connected by a system of forts with the heights of Alhandra, but it was the weakest part of the whole line in itself, and the most dangerous from its proximity to the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda.

There were five roads practicable for artillery piercing the *first line* of defence, namely, two at Torres Vedras, two at Sobral, and one at Alhandra; but as two of these united again at the Cabeça, there were, in fact, only four points of passage through the *second line*, that is to say, at Mafra, Monte Chique, Bucellas, and Quintella in the flat ground. The aim and scope of all the works was to bar those passes and to strengthen the favourable fighting positions between them, without impeding the movements of the army. These objects were attained, and it is certain that the loss of the *first line* would not have been injurious, save in reputation, because the retreat was secure upon the *second and stronger line*, and the guns of the first were all of inferior calibre, mounted on common truck carriages, and consequently immovable and useless to the enemy.

The movements of the allies were free and unfettered by the works. But the movements of the French army were impeded and cramped by the great Monte Junta, which, rising opposite the centre of the first line, sent forth a spur called the Sierra de Baragueda in a slanting direction, so close to the heights of Torres Vedras that the narrow pass of Ruña alone separated them. As this pass was commanded by heavy redoubts, Massena was of necessity obliged to dispose his forces on one or other side of the Baragueda, and he could not transfer his army to either without danger; because the sierra, although not impassable, was difficult, and the movement, which would require time and arrangement, could always be overlooked from the Monte Agraça, whence in a few hours, the allied forces could pour down upon the head, flank, or rear of the French while in march. And this with the utmost rapidity, because communications had been cut by the engineers to all important points of the lines, and a system of signals was established, by which orders were transmitted from the centre to the extremities in a few minutes.

Thus much I have thought fit to say respecting the *lines*, too little for the professional reader, too much, perhaps, for a general history. But I was desirous to notice, somewhat in detail, works more in keeping with ancient than modern military labours, partly that a just idea might be formed of the talents of the British engineers who constructed them, and partly to show that Lord Wellington's measures of defence were not, as some French military writers have supposed, dependent upon the first line. Had that been stormed, the standard of Portuguese independence could still have been securely planted amidst the rocks of the second position.

To occupy 50 miles of fortification, to man 150 forts, and to work 600 pieces of artillery, required a number of men; but a great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body of marines sent out from England, the civic guards of Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, the militia and the ordenança of Estremadura furnished altogether a powerful reserve. The native artillery and the militia supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second, and most of those on the first line. The British marines occupied the third line: the navy manned the gun-boats on the river, and aided in various ways the operations in the field. The recruits from the depôts, and all the men on furlough, being called in, rendered the Portuguese army stronger than it had yet been; and the British army, reinforced, as I have said, both from Cadiz and England, and remarkably healthy, presented such a front as a general would desire to see in a dangerous crisis.

It was, however, necessary not only to have strength, but the appearance of strength; and Lord Wellington had so dealt with Romana that, without much attention to the wishes of his own government, the latter agreed to join the allies with two divisions. The first, under his own command, crossed the Tagus at Aldea Gallega on the 19th of October, reached head-quarters the 24th, and was posted at Enxara de los Cavalleros, just behind Monte Agraça; the other followed

in a few days : and thus, before the end of October, not less than 130,000 fighting men received rations within the lines ; more than 70,000 being regular troops, completely disposable and unfettered by the works.

Meanwhile, Mendizabel, with the remainder of the Spanish army, reinforced by Madden's Portuguese dragoons, advanced towards Zafra. Ballasteros, at the same time, moved upon Aracena ; and Mortier, ignorant of Romana's absence, retired across the Morena on the 8th, for Soult was then seriously menacing Cadiz. Thus fortune combined with the dispositions of the English general to widen the distance, and to diversify the objects of the French armies, at the moment when the allies were concentrating the greatest force on the most important point.

Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of works, the existence of which had only become known to him five days before he came upon them, employed several days to examine their nature. The heights of Alhandra he judged unattacking ; but the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda attracted his attention. Through the former he could turn Hill's position, and come at once upon the weakest part of the second line ; yet the abattis, and the redoubts erected, and hourly strengthening, gave him little encouragement to attack there ; while the nature of the ground about Aruda was such that he could not ascertain what number of troops guarded it, although he made several demonstrations, and frequently skirmished with the light division, to oblige Crawford to show his force. That general, by making the town of Aruda an advanced post, rendered it impossible to discover his true situation without a serious affair ; and, in a short time, his division, with prodigious labour, secured the position in a manner really worthy of admiration.

Across the ravine on the left, a loose stone wall, 16 feet thick and 40 feet high, was raised ; and across the great valley of Aruda, a double line of abattis was drawn ; not composed, as is usual, of the limbs of trees, but of full-grown oaks and chestnuts, dug up with all their roots and branches, dragged, by main force, for several hundred yards, and then re-set and crossed, so that no human strength could break through. Breast-works, at convenient distances, to defend this line of trees, were then cast up ; and along the summits of the mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including the salient points, other stone walls, six feet high and four in thickness, with banquettes, were built ; so that a good defence could have been made against the attacks of 20,000 men.

The next points that drew Massena's attention were the Monte Agraça and the vale of the Upper Zizandre, where, from the recent period at which Lord Wellington had resolved to offer battle on the first line, no earthworks had been constructed ; and the valley of Zibreira, and even the hills above Runa, had not been fortified. Here it was possible to join battle on more equal terms, but the position of the allies was still very formidable ; the flanks and rear were protected by great forts, and not only was a powerful mass of troops permanently posted there, but six battalions, drawn from Hill's corps, and placed at Bucellas, could, in a very short time, have come into action.

Beyond Runa, the Baragueda ridge and the forts of Torres Vedras forbade any flank movement by the French general ; and it only remained for him to dispose his troops in such a manner between Villa Franca and Sobral that, while the heads of the columns menaced the weakest points of the lines, a few hours would suffice to concentrate the whole army at any part between the Tagus and the Baragueda ridge. The 2nd corps, still holding the hills opposite Alhandra, extended its right along some open ground as far as Aruda, and being covered at that point by a force of cavalry, was connected with the 8th corps ; the head of which was pushed forward on Sobral, occupying the lower ridges of the Baragueda, and lining the banks of the Zizandre as far as Duas Portas on the road to Runa : the outposts of the two armies being nearly in contact.

Massena did not bring the 6th corps beyond Otta, and his dispositions were not made without several skirmishes, especially near Sobral, on the morning of the 14th, when, attempting to dislodge the 71st regiment from a field-work, his troops were repulsed, pursued, and driven from their own retrenchments, which were held until evening, and only evacuated because the whole of the 8th corps was advancing for

the purpose of permanently establishing its position. The loss of the allies in these petty affairs amounted to 150; of which the greatest part fell at Sobral; that of the enemy was estimated higher. The English general, Harvey, was wounded, and at Villa Franca the fire of the gun-boats killed the French general, St. Croix, a young man of signal ability and promise.

The war was now reduced to a species of blockade: Massena's object being to feed his army until reinforcements reached it; Lord Wellington's to starve the French before succour could arrive. The former spread his movable columns in the rear to seek for provisions, and commenced forming magazines at Santarem, where his principal depôt was established; but the latter drew down all the militia and ordenança of the north on the French rear, putting their right in communication with the garrison of Peniché, and their left with the militia of Lower Beira. To strengthen the latter he prevailed on Carlos d'España to cross the Tagus, and act between Castello Branco and Abrantes; and thus the French were completely enclosed, without any weakening of the regular army.

To aid the communication between Peniché and the militia, a Spanish light battalion and a strong body of English cavalry advanced to Ramalhal. Obidos, surrounded by old walls, was placed in a temporary state of defence, and garrisoned by 300 Portuguese, under Major Fenwick; and a movable column, under Colonel Waters, issuing from Torres Vedras, made incursions against the enemy's marauding detachments, capturing many prisoners, and part of a considerable convoy which was passing the Baragueda. The French were thus continually harassed, yet their detachments scoured the whole country, even beyond Leiria, and obtained provisions in considerable quantities.

Meanwhile, the main bodies of the hostile forces remained quiet, although the French right was greatly exposed. Lord Wellington had four British divisions and Romana's corps, forming a mass of 25,000 men, close round Sobral, and by directing the greatest part of his cavalry and the six battalions at Bucellas upon Aruda, he could have assembled from 8000 to 10,000 men there also, who, advancing a short distance into the plain, could, in conjunction with Hill, have kept the 2nd corps in check; while the 25,000 pouring down at daylight from the Monte Agraça, from the valley of Zibreira, and from the side of Ruña, could have enveloped and crushed the head of the 8th corps long before the 6th could have reached the scene of action. But war is a curious and complicated web; and while the purely military part was thus happily situated and strong, the political part was one of weakness and alarm. Scarcely could the English general maintain a defensive attitude, struggling as he was against the intrigues and follies of men who have, nevertheless, been praised for their "earnest and manly co-operation."

CHAPTER IX.

THE presence of the enemy, in the heart of the country, embarrassed the finances, and the regency applied to England for an additional subsidy. Mr. Stuart, seeing the extreme distress, took upon himself to direct the house of Sampaio to furnish provisions to the troops on the credit of the first subsidy; he also made the greatest exertions to feed the fugitive inhabitants, 40,000 of whom arrived before the 13th of October, and others were hourly coming in, destitute and starving. Corn, purchased at any price, was sought for in all countries; from Ireland, America, and Egypt; and 1000 tons of government shipping were lent to merchants to fetch grain from Algiers. One commission of citizens was formed to facilitate the obtaining cattle and corn from the northern provinces; another to regulate the transport of provisions to the army, and to push a trade with Spain through the Alemtejo. Small craft were sent up the Tagus to carry off both the inhabitants and their stock from the islands and from the left bank, and post-vessels were established along the coast to Oporto. Bullion and jewels were put on board the men of war, a proclamation was issued, calling upon the people to be tranquil, and a strong police was established to enforce this object. Finally, to supply the deficiency of tonnage created by the sending off the transports in search of corn, an embargo was laid

upon the port of Lisbon ; it was strongly protested against by the Americans, but an imperious necessity ruled.

All these measures were vehemently opposed by the Patriarch and his faction ; and that nothing might be wanting to show how entirely the fate of the Peninsula depended in that hour upon Lord Wellington's firmness, the fears of the British cabinet, which had been increasing as the crisis approached, were now plainly disclosed. During the retreat from the north, affairs seemed so gloomy to the eyes of some officers of rank, that their correspondence bore evidence of their feelings ; and the letters of General Spencer and General Charles Stewart appeared so desponding to Lord Liverpool, that he transmitted them to Lord Wellington, and, by earnestly demanding an opinion upon their contents, showed how deeply they had disturbed his own mind.

Thus beset on every side, the English general rose like a giant. Without noticing either the arguments or the forebodings in these letters, he took a calm historical review of the grounds upon which he had undertaken the defence of Portugal, and which he had before pointed out to the minister he was addressing ; then showing that, up to that period, his views had been in every instance borne out by the results, he demonstrated that it was reasonable to confide in his judgment of what was to come. Having thus vindicated his own prudence and foresight by irresistible facts, he proceeded to trace the probable course of future events, entered largely into both his own and the enemy's designs, and with such a judgment and sagacity that the subsequent course of the war never belied his anticipations. This remarkable letter exists, and, were all other records of Lord Wellington's genius to be lost, it would alone suffice to vindicate his great reputation to posterity.

Having with conscious superiority replied to his own government, he, with a fierceness rendered necessary by the crisis, turned upon the Patriarch and his coadjutors. Reproaching them for their unpatriotic, foolish, and deceitful conduct, he told them plainly, that they were unfaithful servants of their country and their prince, and threatened *to withdraw the British army altogether*, if the practices of which he complained were not amended.*

"The King of England and the Prince Regent of Portugal had," he said "entrusted him with the conduct of military operations, and he would not suffer any person to interfere. He knew what to do, and he would not alter his plans to meet the *senseless suggestions of the regency*. Let the latter look to their own duties ! Let them provide food for the army and the people, and keep the capital tranquil." "With Principal Souza," he said, "it was not possible to act, and, if that person continued in power, the country would be lost. Either the Principal or himself must quit his employment ; if himself, he would take care that the world should know the reasons ; meanwhile he would address the prince upon the conduct of the regency.

"He had hoped," he resumed in another letter, "that the Portuguese government was satisfied with his acts, and that instead of endeavouring to render all defence useless by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have adopted measures to secure the tranquillity of that capital.† But, like other weak individuals, they added duplicity to weakness, and their past expressions of approbation and gratitude he supposed were intended to convey censure. All he asked from them was to preserve tranquillity, to provide food for their own troops while employed in the lines, and to be prepared, in case of disaster, to save those persons and their families who were obnoxious to the enemy. I have," he said, "little doubt of final success, but *I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know, that the result of any is not certain, even with the best arrangements.*" These reproaches were neither too severe nor ill-timed, for the war had been hanging in even balance, and the weight of interested folly thus thrown in by the regency was beginning to sink the scale. Yet to show the justice of Lord Wellington's complaints, it is necessary to resume the thread of those intrigues which have been before touched upon.

Instead of performing their own duties, the government assumed, that the

* Appendix, No. 5, section 3.

† Appendix, No. 5, section 4.

struggle could be maintained on the frontier, and when they should have been removing the people and the provisions from the line of retreat, they were discussing the expediency of military operations which were quite impracticable.* When convinced of their error by facts, they threw the burthen of driving the country upon the general, although they knew that he was ignorant even of the names and places of abode of those officers and magistrates who were to execute it, and that there was but one Portuguese agent at head-quarters to give assistance in translating the necessary orders.

When this was remarked to them, they issued the orders themselves, but made the execution referable to the general, without his knowledge, and well knowing that he had no means of communicating with the country people, and this at the very moment of the enemy's advance. The battle of Busaco, by delaying the French army, alone enabled the orders even to reach the persons to whom they were addressed. But it was the object of the regency, by nourishing and soothing the national indolence, to throw the odium of harsh and rigorous measures upon the British authorities. Lord Wellington, however, while he reproached them for this conduct, never shrunk from the odium; he avowed himself, in his proclamations, the author of the plan for wasting the country, and he was willing the regency should shelter themselves under his name, but he was not willing to lose the fruit of his responsibility, or, that those whose courage did shrink from the trial, "should seek popularity with the populace at the expense of the best interests of the country."

After the disputes which followed the fall of Almeida, the English government, convinced that a more secure and powerful grasp must be taken of Portugal, insisted, at the instance of Lord Wellington, that their envoy, Mr. Stuart, should have a seat in the regency, and that the subsidy should be placed under the control of the British instead of the native authorities. The 2nd of October, Mr. Stuart took his seat, and together with Doctor Noguera, the Conde de Redondo, and the Marquis Olhao (the former of whom was decidedly averse to the Souzas' faction, and the two latter moderate in their conduct), proceeded to control the intrigues and violence of the Patriarch and Principal Souza. It was full time, for both were formally protesting against the destruction of the mills in Beira, and vigorously opposing every measure proposed by Lord Wellington. They were deeply offended by the suppression of the Lusitanian legion, which about this time was incorporated with the regular forces; and they had openly declared that the Portuguese troops should not retreat from the frontiers, and that if the enemy obliged the British army to embark, not a native, whether soldier or citizen, should go with it. When the allies, notwithstanding this, fell back to the lines, Souza proposed that the regency should fly to the Algarves, which being indignantly protested against by Mr. Stuart, Souza threatened to quit the government. The dispute was then referred to Lord Wellington, and, on the 6th of October, drew from him those severe expressions of which an abstract has been given above.

Meanwhile, the restless Principal pursued his designs with activity, and, in conjunction with his brothers and the Patriarch, established a regular and systematic opposition to Lord Wellington's plans of defence. Factious in council, they were also clamorous out of doors, where many echoed their sentiments from anger at some wanton ravages, that in despite of the general's utmost efforts had marked the retreat. They courted the mob of Lisbon servilely and grossly; and Antonio Souza, getting the superintendence of the succours for the fugitive population, became the avowed patron of all persons preferring complaints. He took pains to stimulate and exasperate the public griefs, and to exaggerate the causes of them, frequently hinting that the Portuguese people and not the British army had formerly driven out the French. All these calumnies being echoed by the numerous friends and partizans of the caballers, and by the fidalgos, who endeavoured to spread discontent as widely as possible; there wanted but slight encouragement from the Brazils, to form a national party, and openly attack the conduct of the war.

To obtain this encouragement, Raymundo, the old tool of the party in the Oporto violences, was sent to the court of Rio Janeiro to excite the Prince Regent

against Lord Wellington ; and the Patriarch himself wrote to the Prince of Wales and to the Duke of Sussex, thinking to incense them also against the English general. The extent and nature of the intrigues may be estimated from a revelation made at the time by Baron Eben, and by the editor of a Lisbon newspaper called the *Brazilienza*.

Those persons abandoning the faction, asserted that the Patriarch, the Souzas, and (while he remained in Portugal) the ex-plenipotentiary, Mr. Villiers, were personally opposed to Lord Wellington, Marshal Beresford, and Mr. de Forjas, and had sought to remove them from their situations, and to get the Duke of Brunswick appointed generalissimo in Portugal ; that they had also endeavoured to engage the Duke of Sussex to take a leading part, but that his royal highness had repulsed them at the outset ; that their plan was to engage a newspaper to be their organ in London, as the *Brazilienza* was to have been in Lisbon ; that in their correspondence Lord Wellington was designated under the name of "Alberoni ;" Lord Wellesley, "Lama ;" Beresford, "Ferugem ;" Mr. Stuart, "Labre ;" the Patriarch, "Saxe ;" Antonio Souza, "Lamberti ;" Colonel Bunbury and Mr. Peel, then under-secretaries of state, as "Thin and By-Thin." That after Mr. Villiers' departure the intrigue was continued by the Patriarch and the Souzas, but upon a different plan ; for, overborne by the vigour of Mr. Stuart in the council, they agreed to refrain from openly opposing either him or Forjas, but resolved to write down what either might utter, and transmit that which suited their purpose to the Conde de Linhares and the Chevalier Souza ; these persons undertaking to represent the information so received, after their own fashion, to the cabinets of St. James's and Rio Janeiro.

The violent temper of the Patriarch unfitted him to execute this plan ; he made open display of his hostility to the English general ; and it is worthy of observation that, while thus thwarting every measure necessary to resist the enemy, his faction did not hesitate to exercise the most odious injustice and cruelty against those whom they denominated well-wishers to the French. By a decree of the prince regent's, dated the 20th of March, 1809, private denunciations in cases of disaffection were permitted, the informer's name to be kept secret ; and in September, 1810, this infamous system, although strenuously opposed by Mr. Stuart, was acted upon, and many persons suddenly sent to the islands, and others thrown into dungeons. Some might have been guilty ; and the government pretended that a traitorous correspondence with the enemy was carried on through a London house, which they indicated ; but it does not appear that a direct crime was brought home to any, and it is certain that many innocent persons were oppressed.

All these things showing that vigorous measures were necessary to prevent the ruin of the general cause, Lord Wellesley dealt so with the Brazilian court that every intrigue there was soon crushed, Lord Wellington's power in Portugal confirmed, and his proceedings approved of. Authority was also given him to dismiss or to retain Antonio Souza and even to remove Lord Strangford, the British envoy at Rio Janeiro, if it suited him so to do. The subsidies were placed under his and Mr. Stuart's control ; Admiral Berkeley was appointed to a seat in the regency ; and, in fine, Portugal was reduced to the condition of a vassal state ; a policy which could never have been attempted, however necessary, if the people at large had not been willing to acquiesce ; but, firm in their attachment to independence and abhorring the invaders, they submitted cheerfully to this temporary assumption of command, and fully justified the sagacity of the man who thus dared to grasp at the whole power of Portugal with one hand, while he kept the power of France at bay with the other.

Although so strongly armed, Lord Wellington removed no person, but with equal prudence and moderation reserved the exercise of this great authority until further provocation should render it absolutely necessary. But this remedy for the disorders above related was not perfected for a long time, nor until after a most alarming crisis of affairs had been brought on by the conduct of the Lisbon cabal.

From the strength of the lines it is plain that offensive operations were far more to be dreaded on the left than on the right bank of the Tagus. In the Alemtejo, the enemy could more easily subsist, more effectually operate to the injury of

Lisbon, and more securely retreat upon his own resources. Now Lord Wellington had repeatedly urged the regency to oblige the inhabitants to abandon their dwellings, and carry off their herds and grain, especially those near the banks and on the numerous islands in the river, and above all things to destroy or remove every boat. To carry this into effect a commission had been appointed, but so many delays and obstacles were interposed by the Patriarch and his coadjutors, that the commissioners did not leave Lisbon until the enemy were close upon that river; both banks being still stocked with cattle and corn, and what was worse 40 large boats on the right side, by which the French immediately made themselves masters of the islands, especially of Lizirias, where they obtained abundance of provisions.* But while the regency thus provided for the enemy, they left the fortresses of Palmella, St. Felipe de Setuval, and Abrantes with empty magazines.

Lord Wellington, thinking that the ordenança on the left bank, of whom 400 were armed with English muskets and furnished with three pieces of artillery, would be sufficient to repel plundering parties attempting to cross the Tagus, was unwilling to spare men from the lines. He wanted numbers there and he also judged that the ordenança would, if once assisted by a regular force, leave the war to their allies. But Antonio Souza was continually urging the planting of ambuscades, and other like frivolities, upon the left bank of the Tagus; and as his opinions were spread abroad by his party, the governor of Setuval adopted the idea and suddenly advanced with his garrison to Salvaterra on the river side.

This ridiculous movement attracted the enemy's attention, and Lord Wellington fearing they would pass over a detachment, disperse the Portuguese troops, and seize Setuval before it could be succoured, peremptorily ordered the governor to return to that fortress. This retrograde movement caused the dispersion of the ordenança, and consternation reigned in the Alemtejo. The supply of grain coming from Spain was stopped, the chain of communications broken, and, the alarm spreading to Lisbon, there was no remedy but to send General Fane, with some guns and Portuguese cavalry, that could be ill spared from the lines, to that side. Fane immediately destroyed all the boats he could find, hastened the removal of provisions, and patrolling the banks of the river as high as the mouth of the Zezere, kept a strict watch upon the enemy's movements.

Other embarrassments were, however, continually arising. The number of prisoners in Lisbon had accumulated so as to become a serious inconvenience; because, for some reason which does not appear, the English admiralty would not permit them to be transported to England in ships of war, and other vessels could not be spared. About this time also Admiral Berkeley, whose elaborate report the year before stated that, although the enemy should seize the heights of Almada, he could not injure the fleet in the river, now admitted that he was in error, and the engineers were directed to construct secondary lines on that side.

Another formidable evil, arising from the conduct of the regency, was the state of the Portuguese army. The troops were so ill supplied that more than once they would have disbanded, had they not been relieved from the British magazines.† Ten thousand soldiers of the line deserted between April and December, and the militia and ordenança abandoned their colours in far greater numbers; for as no remonstrance could induce the regency to put the laws in force against the delinquents, that which was at first the effect of want became a habit; so that even when regularly fed from the British stores within the lines, the desertion was alarmingly great.

Notwithstanding the mischiefs thus daily growing up, neither the Patriarch nor the Principal ceased their opposition. The order to fortify the heights of Almada caused a violent altercation in the regency, and Lord Wellington, greatly incensed, denounced them to the Prince Regent; and his letter produced such a paroxysm of anger in the Patriarch, that he personally insulted Mr. Stuart, and vented his passion in the most indecent language against the general. Soon after this, the deplorable state of the finances obliged the government to resort to the dangerous expedient of requisitions in kind for the feeding of the troops: and in that critical moment the Patriarch, whose influence was, from various causes, very great, took occasion to declare that "he would not suffer burthens to be laid upon the

* Appendix, No. 5, section 5.

† Appendix, No. 5, section 7.

people which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish the war in the heart of the kingdom."*

But it was his and his coadjutors' criminal conduct that really nourished the war, for there were ample means to have carried off in time ten-fold the quantity of provisions left for the enemy. Massena could not then have remained a week before the lines, and his retreat would have been attended with famine and disaster, if the measures previously agreed to by the regency had been duly executed. Whereas, now the country about Thomar, Torres Novas, Golegao, and Santarem was absolutely untouched; the inhabitants remained; the mills, but little injured, were quickly repaired, and Lord Wellington had the deep mortification to find that his well-considered design was frustrated by the very persons from whom he had a right to expect the most zealous support. There was, indeed, every reason to believe that the Prince of Esling would be enabled to maintain his positions until an overwhelming force should arrive from Spain to aid him. "It is heart-breaking," was the bitter reflection of the British general, "to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly."†

CHAPTER X.

THE increasing strength of the works, and the report of British deserters (unhappily very numerous at this period), soon convinced Massena that it was impracticable to force the lines without great reinforcements. His army suffered from sickness, from the irregular forces in the rear, and from the vengeance of individuals, driven to despair by the excesses which many French soldiers, taking advantage of the times, committed in their foraging courses. Nevertheless, with an obstinate pertinacity, only to be appreciated by those who have long made war, the French general maintained his forward position until the country for many leagues behind him was a desert, and then, reluctantly yielding to necessity, he sought for a fresh camp in which to make head against the allies, while his foragers searched more distant countries for food.

Early in October artillery officers had been directed to collect boats for crossing both the Tagus and the Zezere. Montbrun's cavalry, stretching along the right bank of the former, gathered provisions, and stored them at Santarem, and both there and at Barquina (a creek in the Tagus, below the mouth of the Zezere), rafts were formed and boats constructed with wheels to move from one place to another; but, from the extreme paucity of materials and tools, the progress was necessarily slow. Meanwhile, Fane reinforced by some infantry, watched them closely from the left bank; Carlos d'Espana came down from Castello Branco to Abrantes; Trant acted sharply on the side of Ourem, and Wilson's Portuguese militia so infested the country from Espinhal to the Zezere, that Loison's division was detached upon Thomar to hold him in check.

Towards the end of October, however, all the hospitals, stores, and other incumbrances of the French army were removed to Santarem, and on the 31st, 2000 men forded the Zezere above Punhete to cover the construction of a bridge. From this body, 400 infantry and 200 dragoons, under General Foy, moved against Abrantes, and, after skirmishing with the garrison, made towards Sobreira Formosa. The allies' bridge of Vilha Velha was foolishly burnt, but Foy, with a smaller escort, pushed for Penamacor, and the 8th had gained Ciudad Rodrigo, on his way to France, having undertaken to carry information of the state of affairs to Napoleon; a task which he performed with singular rapidity, courage, and address. The remainder of his escort retiring down the Zezere, were attacked by Wilson, and suffered some loss.

The bridge on the Zezere was destroyed by floods, the 6th; but the enemy having entrenched the height over Punhete, not only restored it, but cast a second at Martinchel, higher up the river. Massena then commenced his retrograde march, but with great caution, because his position was overlooked from the Monte Agraça, and the defile of Alemquer being in the rear of the 8th corps, it was an operation of some danger to withdraw from before the lines. To cover the move-

* Appendix, No. 5, section 10.

† Appendix, No. 5, section 7.

ment from the knowledge of the Partisans in the rear, Montbrun's cavalry marched upon Leiria and his detachment scoured the roads to Pombal, on the one side, and towards the Zézere, on the other. Meanwhile, the 6th corps marched from Otta and Alemquer to Thomar, and Loison removed to Golegao with his division, reinforced by a brigade of dragoons.

These dispositions being made, General Clausel withdrew from Sobral during the night of the 14th, and the whole of the 8th corps passed the defile in the morning of the 15th, under the protection of some cavalry left in front of Aruda, and of a strong rear-guard on the height covering Alemquer. The 2nd corps then retreated from Alhandra by the royal causeway upon Santarem, while the 8th corps marched by Alcoentre upon Alcanhede and Torres Novas.

This movement was not interrupted by Lord Wellington. The morning of the 15th proved foggy, and it was some hours after daybreak ere he perceived the void space in his front which disclosed the ability of the French general's operations. Fane had reported on the 14th that boats were collecting at Santarem, and information arrived at the same time that reinforcements for Massena were on the march from Ciudad Rodrigo. The enemy's intention was not clearly developed. It might be a retreat to Spain; it might be to pass round the Monte Junta, and so push the head of his army on Torres Vedras, while the allies were following the rear. Lord Wellington, therefore, kept the principal part of the army stationary, but directed the second and light divisions to follow the enemy, the former along the causeway to Villa Franca, the latter to Alemquer, at the same time calling up his cavalry, and requesting Admiral Berkeley to send all the boats of the fleet up the Tagus, to enable the allies to pass rapidly to the other bank if necessary.

Early on the 16th, the enemy was attacked, marching in two columns, the one upon Rio Mayor, the other upon Santarem. Having passed Alcoentre, it was clear that he had no views on Torres Vedras; but whether he was in retreat to cross the Zézere by the bridges at Punhete and Martinchel, or making for the Mondego, was still uncertain. In either case, it was important to strike a blow at the rear, before the reinforcements and convoy, said to be on the road from Ciudad Rodrigo, could be met with. The first division was immediately brought up to Alemquer, the fifth entered Sobral, the light division and cavalry marched in pursuit, 400 prisoners were made, principally marauders; and a remarkable exploit was performed by one Baxter, a sergeant of the 16th dragoons. This man having only five troopers, came suddenly upon a piquet of 50 men, who were cooking. The Frenchmen run to their arms, and killed one of the dragoons; but the rest broke in amongst them so strongly, that Baxter, with the assistance of some countrymen, made 42 captives.

The 17th, the 8th corps marched upon Alcanhede and Pernes, the head of the 2nd corps reached Santarem, and Fane, deceived by some false movements, reported that they were in full retreat, and the troops at Santarem only a rear-guard. This information seeming to be confirmed by the state of the immense plains skirting the Tagus which were covered with straw-ricks, it was concluded that Massena intended to pass the Zézere, over which it was known that he had cast a second bridge. Hill was immediately ordered to cross the Tagus with the second division and 13th dragoons, and move upon Abrantes, either to succour that fortress or to head the march of the French. Meanwhile, the fourth, fifth, and sixth divisions were directed upon Alemquer, the first division and Pack's brigades upon Cartaxo, and the light division reached El Valle, a village on the Rio Mayor, where a considerable rear-guard was formed, and an equal engagement would have ensued, but for the opportune arrival of the commander-in-chief. In the evening the enemy joined their main body on the heights of Santarem.

Hitherto, Lord Wellington, regarding the security of the lines with a jealous eye, acted very cautiously. On the 15th and 16th, while the French were still hampered by the defiles, his pursuit was slack, although it would in no degree have risked the safety of the lines, or of the pursuing troops, to have pushed the first, second, and light divisions and Pack's brigade vigorously against the enemy's rear. On the 18th, however, when Hill had passed the Tagus at Villada, and Fane was opposite to Abrantes, Lord Wellington, whether deceived by false reports or elated at this

retrograde movement, this proof of his own superior sagacity, prepared, with a small force, to assail what he conceived the rear-guard of an army in full retreat. But the French general had no intention of falling back any farther; his great qualities were roused by the difficulty of his situation, he had carried off his army with admirable arrangement, and his new position was chosen with equal sagacity and resolution.

Santarem is situated on a mountain, which, rising almost precipitously from the Tagus, extends about three miles inland. In front, a secondary range of hills formed an outwork, covered by the Rio Mayor, which is composed of two streams, running side by side to within a mile of the Tagus, but there they unite and flow in a direction parallel with that river for many miles; the ground between being an immense flat, called the plain of Santarem.

In advancing by the royal road from Lisbon, the allies ascended the Rio Mayor, until they reached the Ponte Seca, a raised causeway, 800 yards long, leading to the foot of the French position. On the right hand, as far as the Tagus, a flat sedgy marsh, not impassable, but difficult from deep water-cuts, covered the French left. On the other hand, the two streams of the Rio Mayor overflowing, presented a vast impassable sheet of water and marsh, covering the French right, and, in the centre, the causeway offered only a narrow line of approach, barred at the enemy's end by an abattis and by a gentle eminence, with a battery looking down the whole length. To force this dangerous passage was only a preliminary step; the secondary range of hills was then to be carried before the great height of Santarem could be reached; finally, the town, with its old walls, offered a fourth point of resistance.

In this formidable position, the 2nd corps covered the rich plain of Golegao, which was occupied by Loison's division of the 6th corps, placed there to watch the Tagus, and keep up the chain of communication with Punhete. On Reynier's right, in a rugged country, which separated Santarem from the Monte Junta and the Sierra de Alcoberte, the 8th corps was posted; not in a continuous line with the second, but having the right pushed forward to Alcanhete, the centre at Pernes, and the left thrown back to Torres Novas, where Massena's head-quarters were fixed. On the right of Alcanhete, the cavalry were disposed as far as Leiria, and the 6th corps was at Thomar, in reserve, having previously obliged Wilson's militia to retire from the Zézere upon Espinhal.

Massena thus enclosed an immense tract of fertile country; the plain of Golegao supplied him with maize and vegetables, and the Sierra de Alcoberte with cattle. He presented a formidable head to the allies at Santarem, commanded the road, by Leiria, to Coimbra, with the 8th corps and the cavalry; that from Thomar, by Ourem, to Coimbra, with the 6th corps; and, by his bridges over the Zézere, opened a line of operations towards the Spanish frontier, either through Castello Branco, or by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte. Preserving the power of offensive operations, by crossing the Tagus on his left, or of turning the Monte Junta by his right, he necessarily paralyzed a great part of the allied force, and appeared, even in retreating, to take the offensive.

His first dispositions were, however, faulty in detail. Between Santarem and the nearest division of the 8th corps there was a distance of 10 or 12 miles, where the British general might penetrate, turn the right of the 2nd corps, and cut it off from the rest of the army. Reynier, fearing such an attempt, hurried off his baggage and hospitals to Golegao, despatched a regiment up the Rio Mayor to watch two bridges on his right, by which he expected the allies to penetrate between him and the 8th corps, and then calling upon Junot for succour, and upon Massena for orders, proceeded to strengthen his own position. It was this march of Reynier's baggage, that led Fane to think the enemy was retreating to the Zézere, which, corresponding with Lord Wellington's high-raised expectations, induced him to make dispositions; not for a general attack, by separating the 2nd corps from the rest of the army, but, as I have before said, for assaulting Santarem in front with a small force, thinking he had only to deal with a rear-guard.

On the 19th, the light division entering the plain between the Rio Mayor and the Tagus advanced against the heights by the sedgy marsh. The first division under Spencer, was destined to attack the causeway, and Pack's Portuguese brigade

and the cavalry were ordered to cross the Rio Mayor at the bridges of Saliero and Subajeira and turn the right of the French. The columns were formed for the attack, and the skirmishers of the light division were exchanging shots with the enemy in the sedge marsh, when it was found that the guns belonging to Pack's brigade had not arrived ; and Lord Wellington, not quite satisfied with the appearance of his adversary's force, after three hours' demonstrations, ordered the troops to retire to their former ground. It was, indeed, become evident that the French were determined to maintain this position. Every advantageous spot of ground was fully occupied, the most advanced sentinels boldly returned the fire of the skirmishers, large bodies of reserve were descried, some in arms, others cooking, the strokes of the hatchet and the fall of trees resounded from the woods clothing the hills, and the commencement of a triple line of abattis, and the fresh earth of entrenchments, were discernible in many places.

On the 20th the demonstrations were renewed ; but, as the enemy's intention to fight was no longer doubtful, they soon ceased, and orders were sent to General Hill to halt at Chamusca, on the left bank of the Tagus. General Crawford, however, still thought it was but a rear-guard at Santarem ; his eager spirit was chafed, he seized a musket, and, followed only by a sergeant, advanced in the night along the causeway, commencing a personal skirmish with the French piquets, from whose fire he escaped by miracle, convinced at last that the enemy were not yet in flight.

Meanwhile Clausel brought his division from Alcanhedeclose up to Santarem, and Massena carefully examining the dispositions of the allies, satisfied himself that no great movement was in agitation ; wherefore, recalling the baggage of the 2nd corps, he directed Clausel to advance towards Rio Mayor ; a feint which instantly obliged Lord Wellington to withdraw the first division and Pack's brigade to Cartaxo ; and the light division was also held in readiness to retreat. In truth, Massena was only to be assailed by holding the 2nd corps in check at the Ponte Seca, while a powerful mass of troops penetrated in the direction of Tremes and Pernes ; but heavy rains rendered all the roads impracticable, and as the position of Santarem was maintained for several months, and many writers have rashly censured the conduct of both generals, it may be well to show here that they acted wisely and like great captains.

It has been already seen how, without any extreme dissemination of his force, the French general contrived to menace a variety of points and to command two distinct lines of retreat ; but there were other circumstances that equally weighed with him. He expected momentarily to be joined by the 9th corps, which had been added to his command, and by a variety of detachments ; his position, touching upon Leiria and upon the Zezere, enabled him to give his hand to his reinforcements and convoys, either by the line of the Mondego or that of Belmonte and the Estrada Nova ; at the same time he was ready to communicate with any troops coming from Andalusia to his assistance. He was undoubtedly open to a dangerous attack, between Santarem and Alcanhede ; but he judged that his adversary would not venture such a decisive operation, requiring rapid well-timed movements, with an army composed of three different nations and unpractised in great evolutions. In this, guided by his long experience of war, he calculated upon moral considerations with confidence, and he that does not understand this part of war is but half a general.

Like a great commander, he calculated likewise upon the military and political effect that his menacing attitude would have. While he maintained Santarem, he appeared, as it were, to besiege Lisbon ; he also prolonged the sufferings of that city, and it has been estimated that 40,000 persons died from privations within the lines during the winter of 1810 : moreover he encouraged the disaffected, and shook the power which the English had assumed in Portugal, thus rendering their final success so doubtful in appearance, that few men had sagacity enough to judge rightly upon the subject. At this period also, as the illness of George III., by reviving the question of a regency in England, had greatly strengthened the opposition in Parliament, it was most important that the arguments of the latter against the war should seem to be enforced by the position of the French army. It is plain there-

fore that, while any food was to be obtained, there were abundant reasons to justify Massena in holding his ground; and it must be admitted that, if he committed great errors in the early part of his campaign, in the latter part he proved himself a daring, able, and most pertinacious commander.

On the side of the British general, such were the political difficulties, that a battle was equally to be desired and dreaded. Desirable, because a victory would have silenced his opponents both in England and Portugal, and placed him in a situation to dictate the measures of war to the ministers instead of having to struggle incessantly against their fears. Desirable to relieve the misery of the Portuguese people, who were in a state of horrible suffering; but, above all things desirable, lest a second and a third army, now gathering in Castile and in Andalusia, should reach Massena, and again shut up the allies in their works.

Dreaded, because a defeat or even a repulse would have been tantamount to the ruin of the cause; for it was at this period that the disputes in the regency, relative to the lines, at Almada, were most violent, and the slightest disaster would have placed the Patriarch at the head of a national party. Dreaded, because of the discussions relative to the appointment of a regency in England, as any serious military check would have caused the opposition to triumph, and the troops to be withdrawn from Portugal. In this balanced state it was essential that a battle, upon which so many great interests hung, should not be fought, except on terms of advantage. Now those terms were not to be had. Lord Wellington, who had received some reinforcements from Halifax and England, had indeed more than 70,000 fighting men under arms, and the enemy at this time was not more than 50,000: nevertheless, if we analyze the composition and situation of both, it will be found that the latter, from the advantage of position, could actually bring more soldiers into the fight.

In the Portuguese army, since the month of April, the deaths had been 4000, the disbanded 4000, the deserters 10,000, the recruits 30,000; the numbers were therefore increased, but the efficiency for grand evolutions rather decreased. The Spanish auxiliaries also, ill-governed and turbulent, were at open discord with the Portuguese, and their general was neither able in war himself nor amenable to those who were.

While the heights of Almada were naked, the left bank of the Tagus could not be watched with less than 12,000 men; and as from Alcanhede the march to Torres Vedras was shorter than from Cartaxo, two British divisions were employed to protect the lines; during the attack upon Pernes, Reynier also might break out from Santarem, and 10,000 men were required to hold him in check: thus, the disposable troops would have fallen short of 45,000, comprehending soldiers of three nations and many recruits. Lord Wellington's experience in the movement of great armies was not at this period equal to his adversary's, and the attack was to be made in a difficult country, with deep roads, where the Alviella, the Almonda, and other rivers, greatly swelled by incessant rain, furnished a succession of defensive lines to the enemy, and the means of carrying off two-thirds of his army. Victory might crown the attempt, but the stakes were unequal. If Massena lost even a third of his force, the 9th corps could have replaced it. If Lord Wellington failed, the lines were gone, and with them the whole Peninsula.

He judged it best to remain on the defensive, to strengthen the lines, and to get the works at Almada sufficiently forward; meanwhile, quieting the troubles occasioned by the Patriarch, to perfect the discipline of the Portuguese troops, and improve the organization of the militia in rear of the enemy. In this view, the light division, supported by a brigade of cavalry, occupied Valle and the heights overlooking the marsh and inundation; the bridge at the English end of the causeway was mined; a sugar-loaf hill, looking straight down the approach, was crowned with embrasures for artillery and laced in front with a zigzag covered way, capable of containing 500 infantry: thus the causeway being blocked, the French could not, while the inundation kept up, make any sudden irruption from Santarem.

On the left of the light division, posts were extended along the inundation to Malhorquija; thence, by a range of heights to Rio Mayor; and behind the latter place Anson's cavalry was stationed in observation of the roads leading from

Pernes and Alcanhede. In rear of Anson a position was entrenched at Alcoentre, and occupied by a division of infantry. Thus all the routes leading upon the lines between the Tagus and the Monte Junta were secured by what are technically called heads of cantonments, under cover of which the other divisions were disposed in succession; the first and the head-quarters being at Cartaxo, a few miles in the rear of Valle; the remainder at Alemquer and Sobral. Torres Vedras was, however, always occupied in force, lest the enemy should make a sudden march round the Monte Junta.

Massena, satisfied that his front was safe, continued to build boats, fortified a post at Tancos, on the Tagus, and expected, with impatience, the arrival of a convoy escorted by 5000 men, with which General Gardanne was coming from Ciudad Rodrigo. This reinforcement, consisting of detachments and convalescents left in Castile when the army entered Portugal, marched by Belmonte and the Estrada Nova, and the 27th was at Cardijos, within a few leagues of the French bridges on the Zézere. The advance of a cavalry patrol on either side would have opened the communications, and secured the junction; but at that moment, Gardanne, harassed by the ordenança, and deceived by a false rumour that General Hill was in Abrantes, ready to move against him, suddenly retreated upon Sabugal, with such haste and blindness that he sacrificed a part of his convoy, and lost many men.

Notwithstanding this event, Massena, expecting to be joined by the 9th corps, greatly strengthened his position at Santarem, which enabled him to draw the bulk of his forces to his right, and to continue his marauding excursions in the most daring manner. General Ferey, with a strong detachment of the 6th corps, crossing the Zézere, foraged the country as far as Castello Branco without difficulty, and returned without loss: Junot occupied Leiria and Ourem with detachments of the 8th corps, and on the 9th of December a battalion endeavoured to surprise Coimbra: Trant, however, baffled that project. Meanwhile, Drouet avowed a design to invade the *Tras os Montes*, but the 22nd of December occupied the line of the Coa with the 9th corps, and Massena's patrols appeared again on the Mondego above Coimbra, making inquiries about the fords: all the spies likewise reported that a great reunion of forces from the south was to have place near Madrid.

These things gave reason to fear either that Massena intended to file behind the Mondego and seize Oporto, or that the reinforcements coming to him were so large that he meant to establish bridges over the Mondego, and occupy the northern country also. It was known that a 10th corps was forming at Burgos; the head of the 5th corps was again in Estremadura; the French boats at Punhete and Barquiña were numerous and large; and in all parts there was evidence of great forces assembling for a mighty effort on both sides of the Tagus.

It was calculated that before the end of January more than 40,000 fresh troops would co-operate with Massena; and preparations were made accordingly. An outward line of defence, from Aldea Gallega to Setuval, was already in a forward state; Abrantes, Palmella, and St. Felipe de Setuval had been at last provisioned; and a chain of forts parallel to the Tagus were constructing on the hills lining the left bank from Almada to Traffaria. Labourers had also been continually employed in strengthening the works of Alhandra, Aruda, and Monte Agrça, which were now nearly impregnable, soldiers only being wanting to defy the utmost force that could be brought against them. To procure these, Lord Wellington wrote earnestly to Lord Liverpool on the 29th of December, demonstrating the absolute necessity of reinforcing the army; and, on the receipt of his letter, 5000 British were ordered to embark for Lisbon, and three regiments were drafted from Sicily.

Sickness obliged General Hill to go home in December; and, as Soult was known to be collecting a disposable force behind the Morena, the troops on the left bank of the Tagus were augmented, and Marshal Beresford assumed the command: for the Portuguese army was now generally incorporated with the British divisions. His force, composed of 18 guns, two divisions of infantry, and five regiments of cavalry, Portuguese and British, was about 14,000 men, exclusive

of Carlos d'Espana's brigade, which, being at Abrantes, was under the marshal's orders.

To prevent the passage of the Tagus, to intercept all communication between Massena and Soult, to join the main body of the army by Vellada, if in retreat, and by Abrantes if in advance, were the instructions given to Beresford; hence, fixing his quarters at Chamusca, he disposed his troops along the Tagus, from Almeyrim by Chamusca, as high as the mouth of the Zezere, establishing signals between his different quarters. He also beat the roads leading towards Spanish Estremadura; established a sure and rapid intercourse with Elvas and the other frontier fortresses; organized good sources of intelligence at Golegao, at Santarem, and especially at Thomar, and, in addition to these general precautions, erected batteries opposite the mouth of the Zezere. But, against the advice of the engineers, he placed them at too great distance from the river, and in other respects unsuitable, and offering nothing threatening to the enemy: for the French craft dropped down frequently towards Santarem, without hindrance, until Colonel Colborne, of the 66th regiment, moored a guard-boat close to the mouth of the Zezere, disposing fires in such a manner on the banks of the Tagus that nothing could pass without being observed.*

On the side of Santarem, as all the country between Alcanhede and the Ponte Seca continued impracticable from the rain, the main bodies of both armies were, of necessity, tranquil. Anson's cavalry, however, acting in concert with Major Fenwick, who came down from Obidos towards Rio Mayor, harassed the enemy's foraging parties; and in the Upper Beira several actions of importance had taken place with the militia, which it is time to notice as forming an essential part of Lord Wellington's combinations.

It will be remembered that the 9th corps, being ordered to scour Biscay and Upper Castile in its progress towards the frontier of Portugal, was so long delayed that, instead of keeping the communications of Massena free, and securing his base, Drouet lost all connexion with the army of Portugal. Meanwhile the Partidas of Leon and Salamanca gave such employment to Serras's division that the *Tras os Montes* was unmolested, and Silveira, falling down to the Lower Douro, appeared on the 29th, before Almeida. Its former garrison had entered the French service, yet immediately deserted to their countrymen, and Silveira then blockaded the place closely, and made an attempt to surprise a French post at San Felices, but failed.

In November, however, the head of the 9th corps reached Ciudad Rodrigo, bringing a large convoy of provisions, collected in Castile, for Massena. Lord Wellington, anxious to prevent this from reaching its destination, directed Silveira to intercept it if possible, and ordered Miller on the 16th to Viseu, in support. On the 13th, General Gardanne, with 4000 infantry and three squadrons of cavalry, raised the blockade of Almeida, took possession of Pinhel, and supported by the 9th corps, conducted the convoy towards Sabugal and Peramacor. The 16th, he was between Valverde and Pereiro Gavillos, but Silveira falling upon him killed some of his men, took many prisoners, and then retiring to Trancoso on the 17th, united with Miller, the latter taking post at Guarda. Nevertheless, Gardanne pursued his march, but finally, as we have seen, retreated from Cardigos in a panic.

Drouet had not yet received the orders to put himself under Massena's command, but, at the representation of Foy, moved forward into Portugal, and to hide his object, spread the report, already noticed, of his intention to penetrate the *Tras os Montes*; the 17th December, however, he passed the Coa with 14,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, and crossing the Mondego the 18th, encamped near Gouvea, the 22nd. Thence the cavalry and one division under General Claparede, marched against Silveira, and after a skirmish occupied Trancoso; meanwhile, Drouet with 11 battalions, and the troops under Gardanne, made for the Alva and reached Ponte Murcella the 24th.

Hitherto Lord Wellington's communications with Baccellar, had been carried on, through Trant on the side of Coimbra, and through Wilson on that of Espinhal and Abrantes. But this sudden advance of the 9th corps obliged Wilson to cross

the Mondego to avoid being enclosed, and Drouet effecting his junction with Massena by Espinhal, established his division at Leiria; and then spreading towards the sea cut off all communication between the allies and the northern provinces. On the 2nd of January, however, Trant intercepted a letter from Drouet to Claparede, giving an account of his own arrival, and of the state of Massena's army; intimating also, that a great operation was in contemplation, and that the 5th corps was daily expected in the Alemtejo: Claparede was desired to seize Guarda, to forage the neighbouring villages, and to watch the road of Belmonte; and if Silveira should be troublesome, to defeat him.

Silveira, an insufficient man, naturally vain, and inflated with his former successes, had indeed already attacked Claparede, and was defeated with the loss of 200 men at Ponte Abad, on the side of Trancoso. Baccellar, alarmed for the safety of Oporto, then recalled Miller and Wilson. The first moved upon Viseu; the last who had already repassed the Mondego and taken 100 stragglers of Drouet's division, marched hastily towards the same point. Meanwhile, Silveira again provoked Claparede, who pressed him so closely, from the 10th to the 13th of January, that he drove him with loss over the Douro at Pezo de Ragoa, seized Lamego, and menaced Oporto before any troops could concentrate to oppose him. Yet when Baccellar brought up his reserve to the Pavia, and Miller's and Wilson's corps reached Castro d'Airo, Claparede returned to Moimenta de Beira, being followed by Wilson. Meanwhile, the arrival of the 9th corps having relieved the French troops in Leon, the latter again menaced Tras os Montes, and Silveira marched to Braganza. Miller died at Viseu, but Wilson and Trant continued to harass the enemy's parties.

Claparede taking post at Guarda, according to his instructions, seized Cavilhao; while Foy, who in returning from France had collected about 3000 infantry and cavalry convalescents, was marching by the road of Belmonte. Foy had escaped innumerable perils. At Pancorbo he was fain to fly from the Partidas, with the loss of his despatches and half his escort, and now at Enxabarda entering the Estrada Nova, he was harassed by Colonel Grant with a corps of ordenança from the Lower Beira; and although he suffered nothing here by the sword, 300 of his men died on the mountain from cold. On the 2nd of February he reached Santarem, where affairs were working to a crisis.

During December and January, the country being always more or less flooded, the armies continued in observation; but Massena's positions were much strengthened, his outposts were reinforced, and his marauding excursions extended in proportion to his increasing necessities. The weak point on either side was towards Rio Mayor; any movement there created great jealousy, especially as the season advanced and the roads became firmer. Hence, on the 19th of January (some reinforcements having landed at Lisbon a few days before) a fear lest the allies should be concentrating at Alcoentre, induced Junot to drive the outposts from Rio Mayor; to probe the state of affairs, and a general attack was expected; but after a skirmish he returned with a wound which disabled him for the rest of the campaign.

Early in February, a column of 6000 French again scouring all the country beyond the Zezere, got much concealed food near Pedragoa; while other detachments arriving on the Mondego below Coimbra, even passed that river, and carried off 400 oxen and 2000 sheep intended for the allies. These excursions gave rise to horrible excesses, which broke down the discipline of the French army, and were not always executed with impunity; the British cavalry at various times redeemed many cattle and brought in a considerable number of prisoners, amongst them an aide-de-camp of General Clausel's.

Meanwhile, Massena organized a secret communication with Lisbon, through the Portuguese general, Pamplona, who effected it by the help of the fidalgos in that capital: their agents, under the pretence of selling sugar to the inhabitants of Thomar and Torres Novas, passed by the road of Caldas and thence through the mountains of Pedragoa. Lord Wellington, on the other hand, was understood to have gained a French officer of rank, and it is certain that both generals had excellent information.

In this manner hostilities were carried on, each commander impatiently waiting for reinforcements which should enable him to act offensively. How both were disappointed, and how other events hitherto unnoticed, bore upon the plans of each, must be the subject of another book.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. "War is not a conjectural art."—Massena forgetting this, assumed that the allies would not make a stand in front of Lisbon, and that the militia would not venture to attack Coimbra, but the battle of Busaco and the capture of his hospitals evinced the soundness of the maxim. Again, he conjectured that the English would re-embark if pressed; the lines put an end to his dream; yet once awake, he made war like a great man, proving more formidable with reduced means and in difficulties, than he had been when opportunity was ripe and his numbers untouched. His stay at Santarem shows what 30,000 additional men acting on the left bank of the Tagus could have done, had they arrived on the heights of Almada before Admiral Berkeley's error was discovered: the supply of provisions from Alemtejo and from Spain would then have been transferred from Lisbon to the French armies, and the fleet would have been driven from the Tagus; when, the misery of the inhabitants, the fears of the British cabinet, the machinations of the Patriarch, and the little chance of final success would probably have induced the British general to embark.

2. It has been observed, that Massena, in the first week might have easily passed the Tagus, secured the resources of the Alemtejo, and sent the British fleet out of the port. This was not so practicable as it might at first sight appear. The rains were heavy; the fords impassable; the French had not boats sufficient for a bridge; a weak detachment would have been useless, a strong detachment would have been dangerous: to collect boats, cast a bridge, and raise the entrenchments necessary to defend it, in the face of the allied forces, would have been neither a safe nor certain operation; moreover, Massena would then have relinquished the certain aid of the 9th for the uncertain assistance of the 5th corps.

3. Lord Wellington conjecturing the French to be in full retreat, had like to have received a severe check at Santarem; he recovered himself in time, and with this exception, it would be difficult to support essential objections to his operations: yet, many have been urged, as that, he might have straightened the enemy's quarters more effectually at Santarem; and that Hill's corps, passing through Abrantes, could have destroyed the bridges at Punhete, and lining the *Zezere* cut off Massena's reinforcements, and obliged him to abandon his positions or even to capitulate. This last idea, advanced at the time by Colonel Squires, an engineer of great zeal and ability, perfectly acquainted with the localities, merits examination.

As a simple operation it was feasible, but the results were not so certain; the lines of Almada being unfinished, the rashness of leaving Tagus unguarded, before an enemy who possessed 80 large boats, exclusive of those forming the bridges on the *Zezere*, is apparent; Hill's corps must then have been replaced, and the army before Santarem would have been so weak as to invite a concentrated attack, to the great danger of the Torres Vedras lines. Nor was the forcing of the French works at Punhete a matter of certainty; the ground was strong, there were two bridges over the *Zezere*, and the 6th corps, being within a short march, might, by passing at Martinchel, have taken Hill in flank.

4. The same officer, at a later period, miscalculating the enemy's numbers at 30,000 men, and the allies at more than 70,000 regulars; proposed that Beresford should cross the Tagus at Azingha, behind the Almonda, and march upon Golegao, while Lord Wellington, concentrating at Rio Mayor, pushed upon Torres Novas. It was not a common head that conceived this project, by which 70,000 men would, in a single march, have been placed in the midst of the enemy's extended quarters; but the hand of Napoleon could scarcely have launched such a thunderbolt. Massena had still 50,000 fighting men; the boats from Abrantes must have been brought down, to pass the Tagus; the concentration of troops at Rio Mayor could scarcely have escaped the enemy's notice; exact concert, in point of time, was essential, yet the 8th corps could have held the allies in check on the Alviella, while

Reynier, from Santarem, and Ney, from Thomar, crushed Beresford between the Almonda and the Tagus : moreover the roads about Tremes were nearly impassable from rain during December ; in January, Soult, of whose operations I shall speak in the next book, was menacing the Alemtejo, and a disaster happening to the allies would have relieved the enemy's difficulties when nothing else could. A campaign is like other works of art ; accessories, however splendid, must be rejected when not conducive to the main object. That judgment which duly classes the value of every feasible operation is the best quality of a general, and Lord Wellington possessed it in a remarkable degree ; to it his genius and his courage were both subservient ; without it he might have performed many brilliant exploits in the Peninsula, but could never have conducted the war to a successful end.

BOOK XII.

CHAPTER I.

IN the preceding book, Spanish affairs have been little noticed, although Lord Wellington's combinations were deeply affected by them. The general position of the allies, extending from Coruña to Cadiz, presented a great crescent, in the convex of which the French armies were operating, and it was clear that, when checked at Lisbon, the most important point, their wings could reinforce the centre, unless the allied forces, at the horns of the crescent, acted vigorously on a system which the harbours and fortresses, at either extremity, pointed out as suitable to those who possessed the absolute command of the sea. A British army and fleet were therefore established at Cadiz, and a squadron of frigates at Coruña ; and how far this warfare relieved the pressure on Lord Wellington I shall now show.

The Gallician troops, under Mahi, usually hanging on the borders of Leon, were always reported to be above 20,000 men when arms or stores were demanded from England ; but there were never more than 10,000 or 12,000 in line, and although Serras's division, of only 8000, was spread over the plains, from Benevente to the Agueda, during Massena's advance, no stroke of importance was effected against it ; the arrival of the 9th corps, in October, put an end to all hopes from the Gallicians in that quarter, although the Partidas often surprised both posts and convoys. Behind Mahi there was, however, a second army, from 4000 to 6000 strong, embodied to defend the coast line towards the Asturias ; and in the latter province about 8000 men, including the regular bands of Porlier and other chiefs, constantly watched Bonet's movements.

That general frequently mastered the Asturias, but could never maintain himself there ; because the country is a long defile, lying between the great mountains and the sea, and being crossed by a succession of parallel ridges and rivers, is admirably calculated for Partisan warfare in connection with a fleet. Thus, if he penetrated towards Galicia, British and Spanish frigates, from Coruña, landing troops at the ports of Gihon, Santander, or Santona, could always form a junction with the great bands of Longa, Mina, and Amor, and excite insurrections on his rear.

In this manner Porlier, as before related, forced him to withdraw from Castrol, after he had defeated General Ponte at Sales, about the period of Almeida being invested ; and the advantages of such operations being evident, the British government sent Sir Home Popham to direct the naval, and General Walker the military affairs at Coruña. Preparations were then made to embark a considerable force, under Renovales, to renew the attack at Santona and Santander ; the Partidas of the interior were to move at the same time ; a battalion of marnes was assembled, in England, to garrison Santona, when taken ; and Mahi promised to co-operate by an incursion. Serras, however, threatened the frontier of Galicia,

and Mahi remained in suspense, and this, together with the usual procrastination of the Spaniards, and the late arrival of Sir Home Popham, delayed the expedition until October. Meanwhile, Porlier, Escadron, and other chiefs commenced an isolated attack in the beginning of September. Serras returned to Zamora, Mahi sent a division into Leon, and Bonet, aware of the preparations at Coruña, first concentrated at Oviedo, and then fell back towards Santander, leaving a post at Gihon.

On the 16th of October, Renovales sailed, but with only 1300 men; accompanied, however, by General Walker, who carried 10,000 stand of arms and ammunition. The 10th, entering the harbour of Gihon, they captured some French vessels; and Porlier, coming up on the land side, took some treasure and 80 prisoners. The next day, Renovales proceeded to Santona, but tempests impeded his landing, and he returned to Coruña the 2nd of November, with only 850 men: a frigate and a brig had foundered, with the remainder of his troops, in a dreadful gale, which destroyed all the Spanish naval force along the coast, 12 vessels being wrecked even in the harbour of Coruña. Meanwhile, Mahi, leaving Toboado Gil's division to watch Serras, entered the Asturias with the rest of the Gallicians, and being joined first by the troops of that province, and soon after by Renovales, was very superior to the French; yet he effected nothing, and Bonet maintained his line from Gihon, through Oviedo, to the borders of Leon.

In this manner hostilities were feebly on; the junta of the Asturias continued, as from the first, distinguished by their venality and indifference to the public good; their province was in a miserable and exhausted state; and the powers of the British naval officers on the coast not being defined, occasioned some dispute between them and General Walker; and gave opportunity to the junta to interfere improperly with the distribution of the English stores. Galicia was comparatively rich, but its junta culpably inactive in the discharge of duties and oppressive in government, disgusted the whole province, and a general desire to end their power was prevalent. In the course of the winter a combination of the clergy was formed to oppose both the local junta and the general cortes, and assumed so threatening an aspect that Mahi, who was then on the coast, applied to be taken in an English vessel to Coruña, to ensure his personal safety; one Acuña was soon after arrested at Ponferrada, the discontent spread, and the army was more employed to overawe these factions than to oppose the enemy. Little advantage, therefore, was derived from the Spanish operations in the north, and General Walker, despairing to effect anything useful, desired either that a British force should be placed at his disposal or that he might join the army in Portugal.

These expeditions from Coruña naturally increased the audacity of the inland Partidas, who could only become really dangerous, by having a sea-port where they could receive supplies and reinforcements, or embarking, save themselves in extremity, and change the theatre of operations. To prevent this, the emperor employed considerable numbers of men in the military governments touching on the Bay of Biscay, and directed, as we have seen, the corps d'armée, in their progress towards Portugal, to scour all the disturbed countries to the right and left. The 9th corps was thus employed during the months of August and September, but when it passed onward, the Partidas resumed their activity. Mina, Longa, Campillo, and Amor, frequently united about Villar Caya and Espinosa in numbers sufficient to attack large French detachments with success; and to aid them, General Walker repeatedly recommended the taking possession of Santona with a corps of British troops. That town, having the best winter harbour along the coast, and being built on a mountain promontory joined to the main by a narrow sandy neck, could have been made very strong; it would have cut off Bonet's communication with France by sea, have given the British squadron a secure post from whence to vex the French coasts; and it offered a point of connexion with the Partidas of the Rioja, Biscay, and Navarre.

Lord Liverpool, swayed by these considerations, desired to employ a corps of 4000 men to secure it; but, having first demanded Lord Wellington's opinion, the latter "earnestly recommended that no such maritime operations should be undertaken. For," said he, "unless a very large force was sent, it would scarcely be

able to effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which it might take possession. Then that large force would be unable to move or effect any object at all adequate to the expense, or to the expectations which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships must be deficient. It was vain to hope for any assistance, even in this way, much less in military assistance from the Spaniards; the first thing they would require uniformly would be money; then arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, means of transport, and everything which the expedition would have a right to require from them; and, after all, this extraordinary and perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of the expedition to have a voice in the plan of operations, to be followed when the whole should be ready to undertake any, if indeed they ever should be ready."

Meanwhile Napoleon caused Caffarelli's reserve to enter Spain, ordered Santona to be fortified, directed other reinforcements from France upon the northern provinces, and finally sent Marshal Bessieres to command the young guard, the third and fourth governments, and that of the Asturias, including Bonet's division, the whole forming a distinct force, called the army of the north.

The 1st of January, 1811, this army exceeded 70,000, of which 59,000 men and 8000 horses, were present under arms; and Bessieres, who had received unusual powers, was especially ordered to support and furnish all necessary assistance to the army of Portugal.* This was the state of the northern parts of Spain.

In the middle parts, the army of the centre, or that immediately under the king, at first about 20,000, was, before the end of the year, carried up to 27,000, exclusive of French and Spanish guards and juramentados, or native troops, who had taken the oath of allegiance: with this power he protected his court, watched the movements of the Valencians, and chased the guerillas of the interior.

The summer and autumn of 1810 were, however, for reasons before mentioned, the period of greatest activity with these irregulars; numerous petty actions were constantly fought around the capital, many small French posts, and numbers of isolated men and officers, were cut off, and few despatches reached their destinations without a considerable escort. To remedy this, the lines of correspondence were maintained by small fortified posts which run from Madrid; through Guadarama and Segovia to the provinces of Valladolid and Salamanca; through Buitrago and Somosierra to the army of the north; through Guadalajara and Calatayud to the army of Aragon; through La Mancha to the army of the south; and by the valley of the Tagus, Arzobispo, and Truxillo, to the 5th corps during its incursions into Estremadura; a brigade of cavalry was also generally stationed at Truxillo.

As the warfare of the Partidas was merely a succession of surprises and massacres, little instruction, and no pleasure, can be derived from the details; but in the course of the summer and autumn, not less than 12 considerable, and an infinite number of trifling affairs, took place between the movable columns and these bands: and the latter being almost always beaten; at the close of the year, only the Empecinado, Sanchez, Longa, Campillo, Porlier, and Mina retained any reputation, and the country people were so harassed that counter Partidas in many places assisted the French.

The situation of the army of the centre enabled the king to aid Massena, either by an advance upon the Elga, or by reinforcing, or, at least, supporting the 5th corps in Estremadura. But Joseph, troubled by the Partidas, and having many convoys to protect, was also averse to join any of the marshals, with all of whom, except Massena, he was on ill terms; neither were his relations with Napoleon such as to induce him to take an interest in any military operations, save those which affected the immediate security of his court.† His poverty was extreme; he was surrounded by French and Spanish intriguers; his plan of organizing a national party was thwarted by his brother's regulations; plots were formed, or supposed to be formed, against his person, and, in this uneasy posture, the secondary part he was forced to sustain, combined with his natural gentleness which shrunk from the terrible scenes of bloodshed and devastation continually before his eyes, rendered

* Appendix, No. 1, section 6.

† Appendix, No. 4, section 4.

his situation so irksome, that he resolved to vacate the throne and retire to France, a resolution which he soon afterwards partially executed. Such being the course of affairs in the northern and central provinces, it remains to trace the more important military operations at the southern horn of the crescent, where the allies were most favourably situated to press the left flank of the invaders.

Sebastiani was peculiarly exposed to a harassing warfare, because of the city of Grenada and other towns in the interior, which he was obliged to hold at the same time with those on the coast, although the two districts were completely separated by the mountains. Hence a large body of troops were necessarily kept in the strip of country bordering the Mediterranean, although menaced, on the one flank by Gibraltar and the Spanish troops at San Roque, on the other by the Murcian army, and in front by continual descents from the sea; yet, from the shallowness and length of their position, unable to concentrate in time to avoid being cut off in detail. Now the Murcian army, nominally 20,000, was based upon the cities of Murcia and Carthagena, and menaced alike the coast-line and that of Grenada by the route of Baza and Guadix; and any movement towards the latter was sure to attract the French, while troops landing from Cadiz or Gibraltar fell upon their disseminated posts along the coast.

To meet this system, Sebastiani, keeping his reserves about Grenada, where he had entrenched a permanent camp, made sudden incursions, sometimes against the Murcians, sometimes against the Spanish forces on the side of Gibraltar; but that fortress afforded a refuge to the patriots on one side, and Carthagena, surrounded by arid lands, where, for two marches, no water is to be found, always offered a sure retreat on the other. Meanwhile the French general endeavoured to gain the important castles on the coast, and to put them into a state of defence: yet Estipona and Marbella were defended by the Spaniards, and the latter sustained many attacks, nor was it finally reduced until the 9th of December, when the garrison of 100 men took refuge on board the *Topaze* frigate. But Sebastiani's hold of these towns, and even the security of the French troops along the coast, depended upon the communications across the mountains with Grenada, Chiclana, and Seville, and to impede these, General Campbell sent British officers into the Ronda, who successfully directed the wild mountaineers of that district, until their operations were marred by Lascy's misconduct.

The various movements and insurrections in Grenada during the summer of 1810 have been already noted, but, in October, General Campbell and Admiral Penrose, conjointly with the governor of Ceuta, renewed the design of surprising Malaga, where were many privateers and a flotilla of gun-boats, supposed to be destined against the islands near Ceuta. The French dépôt for the siege of Marbella was at Fuengirola, which is only 30 miles from Malaga, and it was judged that an attack there would draw the troops from the latter place; and the more surely, as General Valdemoro, commanding the Spanish force at San Roque, engaged to co-operate on the side of Ronda.

EXPEDITION OF FUENGIROLA.

On the 13th of October, Captain Hope, in the *Topaze*, sailed from Ceuta, with a division of gun-boats and a convoy, containing a brigade of 12-pounders, 65 gunners, a battalion of the 89th regiment, a detachment of foreign deserters, and the Spanish imperial regiment of Toledo, in all 1500 men, including serjeants. Lord Blayney, commanding this force, was directed to make a false attack on Fuengirola, and should the enemy come out from Malaga, he was to sail against that place. A landing was effected the same day, and Sebastiani instantly marched, leaving only 300 men in Malaga. Lord Blayney was as instantly apprised of the success of the demonstration, yet he remained two days cannonading the castle with 12-pounders, although the heavier metal of the gun-boats and of the frigate, had failed to make any impression on the walls; and during this time his dispositions betrayed the utmost contempt of military rules. On the second day, while he was on board a gun-boat himself, the garrison, which did not exceed 200 men, having first descried Sebastiani's column, made a sally, took the battery, and drove the

British part of the investing force headlong towards the boats.* Lord Blayney landed, rallied his men, and re-took the artillery; but at this moment two squadrons of French cavalry came up, and his lordship, mistaking them for Spaniards, ordered the firing to cease. He was immediately made prisoner: his troops again fled to the beach, and would have been sabred, but for the opportune arrival of the *Rodney* with the 82nd regiment, the flank companies of which were immediately disembarked and first checked the enemy. The Spanish regiment, untouched by the panic, regained the ships regularly and without loss; but, of the British, two officers and 30 men were killed or wounded, and one general, seven inferior officers, and nearly 200 serjeants and privates taken. Thus an expedition, well contrived and adequate to its object, was ruined by misconduct, and terminated in disaster and disgrace.

Scarcely was this affair finished, when Valdemoro and the Marquis of Portasgo appeared in the Ronda; an insurrection commenced at Velez Malaga and in the neighbouring villages; and Blake, who had returned from Cadiz to the army in Murcia, advanced, with 8000 men, towards Cullar on the side of Baza. General Campbell immediately furnished money to Portasgo, and embarked 1000 stand of arms for the people of Velez Malaga. An English frigate was also sent to cruise along the coast, yet Sebastiani, relieved from the fear of a descent, soon quelled this insurrection; and then sending Milhaud on before with some cavalry, followed himself with reinforcements for General Rey, who was opposed to Blake. The latter, retiring behind the Almanzora river, was overtaken by Milhaud, and, being defeated on the 4th of November, his army dispersed: at the same time, a contagious fever, breaking out at Carthagena, spread along the coast to Gibraltar and Cadiz, and the Spanish operations on the side of Murcia ceased.

In the kingdom of Seville, the war turned chiefly upon the blockade of the Isla, and the movements of the Spanish armies in Estremadura. Provisions for Cadiz were principally drawn from the Condado de Niebla, and it has been seen that Copons, aided by descents from the ocean, endeavoured to secure this important resource; but neither his efforts, nor the descents, would have availed, if Ballasteros had not co-operated by constantly menacing Seville from Araceña and the Aroche mountains. Neither could Ballasteros have maintained the war there, were it not for the support of Badajos and Olivenza; under cover of which, Romana's army protected his line of operation, and sent military supplies and reinforcements. On the possession of Badajos, therefore, the supply of Cadiz chiefly depended.

Seville was the French point of defence; Cadiz, Estremadura, and the Condado de Niebla their points of offence. The want of provisions, or the desire to cut off the Spanish convoys, or the sudden irruption of troops from Cadiz, threatening their posts at Moguer and Heulva, always drew them towards the coast; the enterprises of Ballasteros brought them towards Araceña; and, in like manner, the advance of Romana towards the mountains brought them to Estremadura; but Romana had wasted the greater part of the latter province, and as the 5th corps alone was disposable either for offensive movements, or for the defence of the country around Seville, Soult contented himself with such advantages as could be gained by sudden strokes; frequently, however, crossing the mountains to prevent the Spaniards from permanently establishing themselves on the frontier of Andalusia.

In October, Romana entered the lines of Torres Vedras, and Mendizabal, who remained with two divisions, finding that Mortier, unconscious of Romana's absence, had retired across the mountains, occupied Merida. He would also have established himself in the yet unwasted country about Llerena; but the appearance of a movable column on the frontier of La Mancha, sent him back to Badajos, and, on the 20th of November, he united with Ballasteros. The French then fortified Gibralfaro and other posts in the Condado de Niebla; Girard's division re-appeared at Guadalcanal, and being joined by the column from La Mancha, foraged the country towards Llerena: whereupon Mendizabal took post at Zafra with 9000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, including Madden's Portuguese brigade. Meanwhile, Copons, who had 4000 men, was totally defeated at Castillejos by D'Aremburg, and retired to Puebla de Gusman.

At Cadiz, no change or military event had occurred after the affair of Matagorda,

save the expeditions against Moguer already noticed, and a slight attempt of the Spaniards against the Chiclana works in September; but all men's hopes and expectations had been wonderfully raised by political events which it was fondly hoped would secure both independence and a good constitution to Spain. After two years of intrigues and delay, the national cortes was assembled, and the long suppressed voice of the people was at last to be heard. Nevertheless the members of the cortes could not be duly and legally chosen in the provinces possessed by the enemy; and as some members were captured by the French on their journey to Cadiz, many persons unknown, even by name, to their supposed constituents, were chosen: a new principle of election, unknown to former cortes, was also adopted; for all persons 25 years old, not holding office or pension under the government, nor incapacitated by crime, nor by debts to the state, nor by bodily infirmity, were eligible to sit if chosen. A supplement of 68 members was likewise provided to supply accidental vacancies; and it was agreed that 26 persons then in Spain, natives of the colonies, should represent those dependencies.

Towards the latter end of September, this great assembly met, and immediately took the title of majesty: it afterwards declared the press free in respect of political, but not of religious matters, abolished some of the provincial juntas, re-appointed captains-general, and proceeded to form a constitution worded in the spirit of republican freedom. These things, aided by a vehement eloquence, drew much attention to the proceedings of the cortes, and a fresh impulse seemed given to the war: but men brought up under despotism do not readily attain the fashions of freedom. The provincial junta, the central junta, the junta of Cadiz, the regency, had all been, in succession, violent and tyrannical in act, while claiming only to be popular leaders, and this spirit did not desert the cortes. Abstract principles of liberty were freely promulgated, yet tyrannical and partial proceedings were of common occurrence; and the reformations, by outstripping the feelings and understandings of the nation, weakened the main springs of its resistance to the French. It was not for liberty, but for national pride and from religious influence, that the people struck. Freedom had no attractions for the nobles, nor for the monastics, nor even for the merchants; and the cortes, in suppressing old establishments and violating old forms and customs, wounded powerful interests, created active enemies, and shocked those very prejudices which had produced resistance to Napoleon.

In the administration of the armies, in the conduct of the war, in the execution of the laws, and the treatment of the colonies, there was as much of vanity, of intrigue, of procrastination, negligence, folly, and violence as before. Hence the people were soon discontented; and when the power of the religious orders was openly attacked by a proposition to abolish the inquisition, the clergy became active enemies of the cortes. The great cause of feudal privileges being once given up, the natural tendency of the cortes was towards the enemy. A broad line of distinction was thus drawn between the objects of the Spanish and English governments in the prosecution of the war; and, ere the contest was finished, there was a schism between the British cabinet and the Spanish government, which would inevitably have thrown the latter into Napoleon's hands, if fortune had not, at the moment, betrayed him in Russia.

The regency, jealous of the cortes, and little pleased with the inferior title of highness accorded them, were far from partaking of the republican spirit, and so anxious to check any tendency towards innovation, that early in the year they had invited the Duke of Orleans to command the provinces bordering on France, permitted him to issue proclamations, and received him at Cadiz with the honours of a royal prince; intending to oppose his authority to that of the local juntas at the moment, and finally to that of the cortes. The latter, however, refused their sanction to this appointment, obliged the duke to quit Spain, and soon afterwards displaced the regency of five; appointing Joachim Blake, Gabriel Ciscar, and Pedro Agar in their stead. During the absence of the two first, substitutes were provided, but one of them (Palacios) making some difficulty about taking the oath to the cortes, was immediately declared to have forfeited the confidence of the nation; so peremptorily did the cortes proceed.

Nevertheless, the new regents, not more pleased with the democratic spirit than

their predecessors, and yet wishing to retain the power in their own hands, refused to listen to the Princess of Brazil's claim, and thus factions sprung up on every side ; for the republicans were not paramount in the cortes at first, and the majority were so subtly dealt with by Pedro Souza, as actually to acknowledge Carlotta's hereditary claim to the succession and to the immediate control of the whole Peninsula ; and, as I have before noticed, would have proclaimed her sole regent, but for the interference of Lord Wellington.

Don Manuel Lapeña being declared captain-general of Andalusia, and commander of the forces in the Isla, was subservient to the views of the cortes ; but the new regency, anxious to have a counterbalancing force, and being instigated also by persons from Badajos, enemies to Romana, removed that officer in December, and ordered his divisions to separate from the British army and come to Cadiz. The conduct of those divisions had, indeed, given little satisfaction either to the British or Portuguese, but numbers were so absolutely necessary to Lord Wellington, that Colonel O'Neil was sent to remonstrate with the regency ; and, by showing that the fall of Estremadura, and the total loss of communication with the interior of Spain would ensue, obtained a momentary respite.

In matters relating to the war against the French, or to the administration of the country, the Spanish leaders were incapable of acting cordially on any mature plan ; but with respect to the colonies, all parties agreed to push violence, injustice, cruelty, and impolicy to their utmost bounds. To please the British government, the first regency had published, in May, a decree, permitting the South Americans to export their own products, under certain conditions. This legalizing of a trade, which could not be suppressed, and which was but a decent return to England for her assistance, gave offence to the municipal junta of Cadiz, and its resentment was so much dreaded that the regency, in June, disowned their own decree of the previous month, and even punished the printers, as having given birth to a forged instrument. Exasperated at this treatment, the colonies, who had resisted all the intrigues of the French, with a firmness and singleness of purpose very displeasing to the government in Old Spain, openly discovered their discontent, and then the authorities in the mother country, throwing off the mask of liberality and patriotism, exposed their own secret views. "It is not enough that Americans should be Spanish subjects now, but that in all cases they should belong to Spain," was the proclamation of the regency, in answer to a declaration from the Caraccas, avowing attachment to the cause of Ferdinand : meaning that, if Spain should pass under the power of the usurper, America must follow, as having no right to decide in any case for herself.

When the cortes met, America expected more justice ; she had contributed ninety millions of dollars for the support of the war, and many of her sons had served zealously in person ; she had also been declared an integral part of the empire by the central junta, and her deputies were now permitted to sit in the great national assembly. She was, however, soon made to understand that the first of these privileges meant eternal slavery, and that the second was a mere form. "The Americans complain of having been tyrannized over for 300 years ; they shall now suffer for 3000 years," and "I know not to what class of beast the Americans belong : " such were the expressions heard and applauded in the cortes, when the rights of the colonists were agitated in that assembly. Better to lose Spain to Joseph, if America be retained, than to save Spain if America be separated from her, was a feeling deeply rooted in every Spanish heart, a sentiment covertly expressed in many public documents, and openly acted upon ; for when repeated insults, treachery, and continued violence, had driven the colonists to defend their rights in arms, the money and stores, supplied by England for the support of the war against the French, were applied to the fitting out of expeditions against America. Thus the convocation of the national cortes, far from improving the posture of affairs, dried up the chief sources of revenue, weakened the army in the field, offended many powerful bodies in the state, involved the nation in a colonial war, and struck at the root of the alliance with England.

CHAPTER II.

WHILE the Spaniards were occupied with the debates of the cortes, the French works were laboured with care. The chain of forts was perfected, each being complete in itself with ditch and palisades and a week's provisions ; the batteries at the Trocadero were powerful, and the flotillas at San Lucar de Barameda, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and Chiclana, were ready for action. Soult repaired in person to San Lucar, and in the last night of October, 30 pinnaces and gun-boats slipping out of the Guadalquivir eluded the allied fleet, passed along the coast to Rota, and from thence, aided by shore batteries, fought their way to Santa Maria and the San Pedro. But, to avoid the fire of the fleet and forts in doubling Matagorda, the Duke of Dalmatia, remembering what he had formerly effected at Campo Saucos on the Minho, transported his flotilla on rollers, overland ; and, in November, 130 armed vessels and transports were assembled in the Trocadero canal. This success was, however, alloyed by the death of General Senarmont, an artillery officer of the highest reputation.

At the Trocadero point there were immense batteries, and some notable pieces of ordnance, called cannon-mortars, or Villantroys, after the inventor. These huge engines were cast in Seville, and, being placed in slings, threw shells with such prodigious force as to range over Cadiz, a distance of more than 5000 yards. But to obtain this flight the shells were partly filled with lead, and their charge of powder was too small for an effective explosion. Nevertheless, they produced some alarm in the city, and were troublesome to the shipping. But Soult's real design was first to ruin, by a superior fire, the opposite fort of the Puntales, then pass the straits with his flotilla, and establish his army between the Isla and the city ; nor was this plan chimerical, for on the side of the besieged there was neither concert nor industry.

Two drafts, made in August and September, by Lord Wellington, had reduced Graham's force to 5000 men, and in October the fever broke out in Cadiz ; but as Soult's preparations became formidable, reinforcements were drawn from Gibraltar and Sicily, and, at the end of the year, 7000 British, Germans, and Portuguese were still behind the Santi Petri. Graham felt confident—1. That, with due preparation, he could maintain the Puntales even though its fire should be silenced ; 2. That Soult must establish a stronger flotilla than the allies, or his communication with Matagorda could not be maintained ; 3. That the intercourse between the army in Isla and the garrison of Cadiz could not be interrupted, unless the great redoubt of the Cortadura was lost.

To ensure a superiority of naval means, Admiral Keats drew all the armed craft from Gibraltar. To secure the land defence, General Graham perseveringly urged the regency to adopt certain plans, and he was warmly seconded by Sir Henry Wellesley ; but neither their entreaties, nor the imminence of the danger, could overcome the apathy of the Spaniards. Their army, reinforced by a small body from Ceuta, was wanting in discipline, clothing, and equipments, and only 16,000 men of all arms were effective on a muster-roll of 23,000. The labour of the British troops, far from being assisted, was vexatiously impeded ; it was the end of December, and after many sharp altercations, ere Graham could even obtain leave to put the interior line of the Cortadura in a state of defence, although by a sudden disembarkation the enemy might enter it from the rear, and cut off the army of the Isla from the city.* But while the Duke of Dalmatia was thus collecting means of attack, the events in Portugal prevented the execution of his design.

When Massena passed the frontier, his communications with France became so uncertain, that the emperor's principal source of information was through the English newspapers. Foy brought the first exact intelligence of the posture of affairs. It was then that the army of the north was directed to support the army of Portugal ; that the 9th corps was made a component part of the latter ; that the Prince of Esling was enjoined to hold fast between Santarem and the *Zezeze* ; to

besiege Abrantes ; and to expect the Duke of Dalmatia, who had been already several times commanded to move through the Alemtejo to his assistance. The emperor seems even to have contemplated the evacuation of Andalusia and the concentration of the whole army of the south on the Tagus, a project that would have strengthened rather than weakened the French in the Peninsula, because it was more important to crush the regular warfare in Portugal, than to hold any particular province.

Massena's instructions reached him in due time, Soult's were intercepted by the guerillas, and the duplicates did not arrive before the end of December ; a delay affording proof that 30,000 men would scarcely have compensated for the uncertainty of the French communications. Postponing his design against Cadiz, the Duke of Dalmatia repaired to Seville, carrying with him Latour Maubourg's cavalry and 5000 infantry from the 1st corps. His instructions neither prescribed a line of movement nor enjoined any specific operation ; the Prince of Esling was to communicate his plan, to which Soult's was to be subordinate. But no certain intelligence even of Massena's early proceedings had reached Seville, and such were the precautions of Lord Wellington, such the activity of the Partidas, that from the time Soult quitted Cadiz, until his operation terminated, no communication could be effected between the two marshals, and each acted in perfect ignorance of the plans and situation of the other.

The Duke of Dalmatia considering that Sebastiani had his hands full, and that the blockade of Cadiz, the protection of Seville on the side of Niebla and of Araceña, would not permit the drawing off more than 20,000 men, represented to the emperor that with such a force he durst not penetrate the Alemtejo, leaving Olivenza and Badajos, and Ballasteros (who would certainly join Mendizabel), on his rear ; while Romana alone, without reckoning British troops, could bring 10,000 men against his front ; hence he demanded leave to besiege those places, and Napoleon consented. Meanwhile, order was taken to secure Andalusia during the operations. Dessolles' division had been recalled to form the army of the centre, and General Godinot took his place at Cordoba ; a column of observation was posted under General Digeon at Ecija ; Seville, entrenched on the side of Niebla, was given over to General Daricau, and a detachment under Remond was posted at Gibraleon. The expeditionary army, consisting of 16,000 infantry, artillery, sappers and miners, and about 4000 cavalry and 54 guns, was assembled on the 2nd January. An equipage of siege, a light pontoon train, and 1700 carts, for stores and provisions were also prepared, and Soult's administration was now so efficient, that he ordered a levy of 5000 young Spaniards, called "escopeteros" (fusileers) to maintain the police of the province.

SOULT'S FIRST EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.

Mortier, moving from Guadalcanal, entered Zafra on the 5th January, Mendizabel retired to Merida, and Ballasteros, in consequence of orders from the regency, passed over the mountains to Frejenal. Winter tempests raged, and the French convoy which moved on Araceña, being overwhelmed by storms, was detained at the foot of the mountains, and to cover it, Gazan, marching from Zafra, drove Ballasteros out of Frejenal. Meanwhile, the Spanish leaders, as well those in Estremadura, as in Cadiz, were quite ignorant of Soult's intentions, some asserting that he was going to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, others, that his object was only to crush Ballasteros. Lord Wellington alone divined the truth, and it was he who first gave Mendizabel notice, that the French were not assembling at Seville at all, so destitute of intelligence and of military knowledge were the Spaniards.* Now when the French were breaking into Estremadura, terror and confusion spread far and wide ; Badajos was ill provisioned, Albuquerque in ruins, Olivenza nearly dismantled ; and, in the midst of this disorder, Ballasteros was drawn off towards the Condada de Niebla by the regency, who thus deprived Estremadura of half its defenders at the moment of invasion.

Lord Wellington had advised that the troops should be concentrated, the bridges over the Guadiana mined for destruction, and the passage of that river

* Appendix, No. 2, sections 2, 5, 6.

disputed to gain time ; but these things being neglected, an advanced guard of cavalry alone carried the bridge of Merida on the 6th. Soult then turned upon Olivenza with the infantry, and while Latour Maubourg's dragoons held Mendizabel in check on the side of Badajos, Briche's light horsemen collected cattle on the side of Estremadura ; Gazan's division, still posted near Frejenal, protected the march of the artillery and convoy, and La Houssaye's brigade, belonging to the army of the centre, quitting Truxillo, marched against the Partidas and scoured the banks of the Tagus from Arzobispo to Alcantara.

FIRST SIEGE OF OLIVENZA.

This place, although regularly fortified with nine bastions, a covered way, and some unfinished ravelins, was incapable of a good defence. With an old breach slightly repaired, very few guns mounted, and commanding no passage of the Guadiana, it was of little importance to the French, yet, as containing 4000 troops, it was of some consequence to reduce it. Lord Wellington had pressed Romana to destroy the defences entirely, or to supply it with the means of resistance, and the marquis decided on the former ; but Mendizabel slighting his orders, had thrown his best division into the place.

It was invested the 11th of January ; an abandoned outwork, 340 yards south of the town, was taken possession of the first night ; and breaching batteries of eight guns, and counter-batteries of six guns were then marked out. The trenches were opened on the west, and approaches carried on by the flying sap against the old breach ; but the rains were heavy and continual, the scarcity of entrenching-tools great, and it was not until the 18th, when the head of the convoy had passed the mountains, that the works could be properly advanced.

On the 19th the covered way was crowned, and the 20th the breaching batteries opened their fire ; two mortars also threw shells into the town, and a globe of compression was prepared to blow in the counterscarp. In the evening, the governor of Badajos skirmished unsuccessfully with Latour Maubourg's horsemen, and, on the 21st, the mine was completed and preparations made for the passage of the ditch.

Mendizabel, unable from the absence of Ballasteros' division to relieve Olivenza, demanded succour, and Romana sent Carlos D'España's brigade from Abrantes the 18th, and General Virues, with his own Spanish division, from Cartaxo on the 20th. The 21st, the governor of Olivenza was informed of this, and replied that he would maintain the place to the last moment ; but the next day he capitulated, having still provisions, ammunition, 18 guns, and 4100 effective soldiers. The 26th, Soult marched against Badajos.

Meanwhile Ballasteros advanced upon Niebla, but being followed by Gazan, was overtaken at Castillejos on the 28th, and, after a sharp battle, driven with the loss of 1000 men over the Guadiana. The Spanish artillery was saved in the castle of Paymigo, the infantry took refuge at Alcontin and Mertola ; and that nothing might be left to alarm the French in that quarter, the regency recalled Copon's force to Cadiz. In this manner a fortress was taken, and 12,000 men, who, well employed, might have frustrated the French designs against Badajos, were all dispersed, withdrawn, or made prisoners in 20 days after the commencement of Soult's expedition.

For many months previous to these events Lord Wellington had striven to teach the Spanish commander that there was but one safe mode of proceeding in Estremadura, and Romana had just yielded to his counsels, when the sudden arrival of the French threw everything into confusion. The defence of the Guadiana, the dismantling of Olivenza, the concentration of the forces, were all neglected. Romana, however, had sent his divisions towards the frontier, and they reached Montemor the 22nd ; the 23rd they received Mendizabel's orders to halt as Olivenza had surrendered ; and the 24th Romana died of an aneurism in the heart. He was a worthy man and of quick parts, although deficient in military talent. His death was a great loss, yet his influence was on the wane ; he had many enemies, and his authority was chiefly sustained by the attachment of his troops, and by his

riches, for his estates being in the Balearic Isles, his revenues did not suffer by the war.

Mendizabel now commanded in Estremadura. He had received Romana's orders to adopt Lord Wellington's plan, which was still to concentrate all the Spanish troops, amounting to at least 10,000 men on the frontier, and before the enemy appeared on the right bank of the Guadiana, to occupy a certain position of great natural strength close to Badajos; the right touching the fort of St. Christoval, the front covered by the Gebora river and by the Guadiana, the fortress of Campo Mayo immediately in rear of the left, and Elvas behind the centre. When Mendizabel was entrenched on this position, and a strong garrison in Badajos, the English general thought Soult could not invest or even straiten the communications of the town, yet, knowing well the people he dealt with, prophetically observed, "With soldiers of any other nation success is certain, but no calculation can be made of any operation in which Spanish troops are engaged."*

When Olivenza fell, a small garrison was in Albuquerque, and another in Valencia d'Alcantara; Carlos d'Espana was in Campo Mayor, and Virues with Romana's division, at Montemor. When Soult drove back the outposts of Badajos on the 26th, Mendizabel shut himself up with 6000 men in that fortress; but although a siege had been expected for a year, the place was still unprovisioned. It was, however, still possible to execute the English general's plan, yet no Spaniard moved, and on the 27th, Latour Maubourg crossing the Guadiana at Merida forded the Gebora, and cut off the communications with Campo Mayor and Elvas!

FRENCH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

This city stands on a tongue of land at the confluence of the Guadiana with the Rivillas; the first is a noble river 500 yards broad, the second a trifling stream. A rock 100 feet high, and crowned by an old castle, overhangs the meeting of the waters, and the town spreading like a fan as the land opens between the rivers, is protected by eight regular curtains and bastions, from 23 to 30 feet in height, with good counterscarps, covered way, and glacis. On the left bank of the Guadiana the out-works were—1. The lunette of San Roque, covering a dam and sluice on the Rivillas, by which an inundation could be commanded; 2. An isolated redoubt called the Picurina, situated beyond the Rivillas, and 400 yards from the town; 3. The Pardaleras, a defective crown-work, central between the Lower Guadiana and the Rivillas, and 200 yards from the ramparts.

On the right bank of the Guadiana a hill, crowned by a regular fort 300 feet square, called San Christoval, overlooked the interior of the castle, and a quarter of a mile farther down the stream, the bridge, 600 yards in length, was protected by a bridge-head slightly connected with San Christoval, but commanded on every side.

Soult constructed a ferry on the Guadiana, above the confluence of the Gebora, and three attacks were opened against the town, the 28th, two on the side of Picurina and one on that of the Pardaleras. The 29th and 30th, slight sallies were repulsed, but tempestuous weather spoiled the works. Gazan's division was distant; the infantry before the place were few, and on the 30th, the garrison making a vigorous sally from the Pardaleras, killed or wounded 60 men and cleared the trenches. Meanwhile, some Spanish cavalry gliding round the left of the French, sabred several engineers and sappers, and then retired.

In the night of the 2nd of February, a violent tempest flooded the Rivillas, carried away the French bridges, drowned men and horses, damaged the dépôt, and reduced the besiegers to the greatest distress. The cavalry employed in the investment could no longer forage; scarcity was felt in the camp; the convoys could only arrive by detachments; the rigour of winter bivouacs caused sickness, and on the 3rd, the Spaniards making a second sally from Pardaleras, killed or wounded 80 men, and ruined a part of the parallel. The same day Gazan arrived in camp, but the French cavalry being withdrawn from the right bank of the Guadiana, in consequence of rigorous weather, the communication was re-estab-

* Appendix, No. 2, section 6.

lished with Elvas, and Mendizabel called the divisions in Portugal to his assistance. Virues immediately marched upon Elvas, Carlo d'Espana and Madden united at Campo Mayor, and Julian Sanchez brought down his Partidas from Upper Estremadura.

In the night of the 5th, Mendizabel repaired to Elvas in person ; passed the Caya the next day, and being joined on the road by the troops from Campo Mayor, pushed the few French horsemen still on the right of the Guadiana over the Gebora. The Portuguese brigade crossed that river in pursuit, and captured some baggage ; but the infantry entered Badajos, for Mendizabel again neglecting Lord Wellington's counsel, designed not to take up a position behind the Gebora, but to raise the siege by a sally ; yet he delayed this until the next day, thus risking to have his whole army shut up in an ill-provided fortress ; for Latour Maubourg seeing that Madden was unsupported, turned and drove him back over the Gebora with loss. Badajos now contained 16,000 men, and early on the 7th, Carrera and Carlos d'Espana, at the head of 5000 infantry, and 300 cavalry, breaking out at the Picurina side, with one burst carried the trenches and the batteries ; the soldiers fought with surprising ardour, but the entire want of arrangement on the part of the generals (unworthy to command the brave men under them) ruined all. They had not even provided the means to spike the guns, and when Mortier brought his reserves against the front and flank of the attack, the whole driven back in disorder, re-entered the city, having 85 officers and near 600 soldiers killed and wounded ; the enemy also lost several engineers and 400 men.

While this action took place on the left bank, Latour Maubourg occupied the ground between the Gebora and the Caya, and again cut off the communication with Elvas and Campo Mayor ; but his forces were too weak to maintain themselves there, and Mendizabel, leaving the defence of the town entirely to the governor, Rafael Menacho pitched his own camp round San Christoval. Some days previous to this, the French had bombarded Badajos, a proceeding only mischievous to themselves ; for the inhabitants, terrified by the shells, fled in great numbers while the communication was open, but left behind their provisions, which enabled Menacho to feed his garrison without difficulty.

Soult observing the numbers, and awake to all the real resources of the Spanish succouring army, feared lest delay should produce a change of commanders, or of system, and resolved to bring matters to a crisis. On the 11th, he stormed the Pardaleras ; on the 12th, he sent 1500 cavalry across the Guadiana to Montijo ; and, on the 14th, threw shells into the camp about Christoval, which obliged Mendizabel to remove from the heights in front of that fort. Meanwhile, intelligence that Castaños was appointed captain-general of Estremadura created the greatest anger amongst Romana's soldiers : they had long considered themselves independent of the central government, and in this mood, although the position behind the Gebora, recommended by Lord Wellington, was at last occupied, little attention was paid to military discipline. The English general had expressly advised Mendizabel to increase the great natural strength of this position with entrenchments ; for his design was that the Spaniards, whom he thought quite unequal to open field operations, should have an impregnable post whence they could safely aid in the defence of the town, and yet preserve a free communication with the Alemtejo, until the arrival of his own reinforcements (which he expected in the latter end of January) should enable him to raise the siege.* Mendizabel, with that arrogance which is peculiar to his nation, rejected this counsel, and hung 12 days on the heights of Christoval in a torpid state ; and when driven thence by the French shells, merely destroyed a small bridge over the Gebora, but neither cast up entrenchments, nor kept a guard in his front, nor disposed his men with care. Soult observing these things, suddenly leaped upon him.

BATTLE OF THE GEBORA.

The Guadiana and the Gebora rivers covered the Spanish position ; this did not deter the Duke of Dalmatia from attempting to pass both and surprise the camp.

* Appendix, No. 10, section 2.

But first to deprive Mendizabel of the aid of San Christoval, and to create a diversion, the French mortar batteries again threw shells on the 17th : yet the swell of the rivers would not permit the main operation to be commenced before the evening of the 18th, when the cavalry drew down the right bank of the Guadiana from Montijo, and the artillery and infantry crossed at the French ferry, four miles above the confluence of the Gebora. These combinations were so exactly executed, that at daybreak, on the 19th, 6000 infantry and 3000 cavalry were in order of battle on the right bank of the Guadiana ; the Gebora was, however, still to be forded, and behind it the Spaniards had 10,000 infantry, a considerable artillery, and 1500 cavalry, besides many armed followers of the camp ; the whole number not being less than 15,000.

A thick mist covered the country, no Spanish posts were in advance, and Soult riding through the French rank, and exhorting the soldiers to fight manfully, commenced the passage of the Gebora. His cavalry forded five miles up the stream, but his infantry passed in two columns on the right and left of the ruined bridge : a few shots, near the latter, first alarmed the Spaniards, and, as the instant clamour amongst the multitude indicated that the surprise was complete, Mortier, who directed the movements, rapidly formed the line of battle.

At eight o'clock the fog cleared away, and the first beams of the sun and the certainty of victory, flashed together on the French soldiers ; for the horsemen were already surrounding the Spanish left ; and in the centre, infantry, cavalry, and guns, heaped together, were waving to and fro in disorder ; while the right having fallen away from San Christoval was unsupported. In one moment, Girard, with three battalions, stood between the Spaniards and the ford ; the artillery roared on both sides ; and the French bore forward as one man to the attack : six battalions pressed the centre ; Girard moved perpendicularly on the right, and Latour Maubourg charged the left. Thus surrounded, Mendizabel's people, instinctively crowding together on the centre, resisted for some time by their inert weight ; but the French infantry closed with a destroying musketry, the horsemen rode in with loose bridles, and the Spaniards were shaken, divided, and slaughtered. Their cavalry fled outright, even Madden's Portuguese, either from panic or from hatred of their allies, disregarded alike his exhortations and example, and shamefully turned their backs.* At ten o'clock the fight was over ; Virues was taken, Mendizabel and Carrera escaped with difficulty, España alone made good his retreat to Campo Mayor with 2000 men ; a few more reached Elvas, 3000 got into Badajos by the bridge, and 900 bodies strewed the field : 8000, including armed followers, were made prisoners ; and guns, colours, muskets, ammunition, baggage, all fell into the enemy's hands.

It was a disastrous and a shameful defeat. In the depth of winter, Soult, with a small force, had passed two difficult rivers, carried a strong position, and annihilated an army which had been two years in constant service. Mendizabel, instead of destroying the bridge over the Gebora, should have cast others, that he might freely issue to attack the French while crossing the Guadiana ; he should have opposed them again in passing the Gebora ; or he might have passed through Badajos, and fallen on the troops in the trenches with his whole army, while Soult was still entangled between the rivers.

In the evening after the action the French cast up entrenchments, posting three battalions and the heavy cavalry on the important position they had gained ; and the next day the works of the siege were renewed with greater activity ; yet the difficulty of Soult's undertaking was rendered apparent by his victories. The continual rains, interrupting the arrival of his convoys, obliged him to employ a number of men at a great distance to gather provisions ; nearly 2000 French had been killed or wounded in the two sieges and in this battle, many also were sick, and Badajos was still powerful. The body of the place was entire, the garrison, 9000 strong, and, by the flight of the inhabitants, well provided with food ; and there was no want of other stores : the governor was resolute and confident ; the season rigorous for the besiegers ; no communication had been yet opened with Massena ; and

Lord Wellington, in momentary expectation that his reinforcements would arrive, was impatient to bring on a crisis ; meanwhile, the Duke of Dalmatia's power in Andalusia was menaced in a most serious manner.

CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF CADIZ.

When General Graham was aware of Soult's departure, and knew also that the 5th corps had quitted Seville, he undertook, in concert with the Spaniards, to drive Victor out of his lines. A force, sailing from Cadiz the 29th of January, was to have been joined in rear of the enemy by the troops from Tarifa, under Major Brown, and by 3000 Spaniards, from Algeiras and San Roque under General Beguines ; but contrary winds detained even the vessels carrying counter orders to Beguines and Brown, and they advanced, the first to Medina, the other to Casa Vieja. Victor, having notice of this project, at first kept close, but afterwards sent troops to retake Medina and Casa Vieja ; and, in the course of February, 12,000 men, drawn from the northern governments, were directed upon Andalusia, to reinforce the different corps. The 1st corps was thus increased to 20,000 men, of which 15,000 were before Cadiz, and the remainder at San Lucar, Medina, Sidonia, and other quarters.* Nevertheless, on the 21st of February, 10,000 infantry and near 600 cavalry of the allies were again embarked at Cadiz ; being to land at Tarifa, and march upon the rear of the enemy's camp at Chiclana. Meanwhile, General Zayas, commanding the Spanish forces left in the Isla, was to cast a bridge over the San Petri, near the sea mouth ; Ballasteros, also, with the remains of his army, was directed to menace Seville, the irregular bands were to act against Sebastiani, and insurrections were expected in all quarters.

The British troops passed their port in a gale, the 22nd, but landing at Algeiras, marched to Tarifa the next day. Being there joined by the 28th and the flank companies of the 9th and 82nd regiments, somewhat more than 4000 effective troops (including two companies of the 20th Portuguese and 180 German hussars) were assembled under General Graham ; all good and hardy troops, and himself a daring old man and of a ready temper for battle.†

General La Peña arrived on the 27th, with 7000 Spaniards, and Graham, for the sake of unanimity, ceded the chief command, although it was contrary to his instructions. The next day, the whole, moving forward about 12 miles, passed the mountain ridges, that, descending from Ronda to the sea, separate the plains of San Roque from those of Medina and Chiclana ; but being now within four leagues of the enemy's posts, the troops were re-organized. The vanguard was given to Lardizabal ; the centre to the Prince of Anglona ; the reserve, composed of two Spanish regiments and the British were confided to Graham ; but the cavalry of both nations, formed in one body, was commanded by Colonel Whittingham, then in the Spanish service.

The French covering division, under General Cassagne, consisted of three battalions and a regiment of horse at Medina, with outposts at Vejer de la Frontera and Casa Viejas. Before La Peña's arrival, the irregulars had attacked Casa Viejas, and General Beguines had even taken Medina ; but Cassagne, reinforced by a battalion of infantry from Arcos, retook and entrenched it, the 29th ; and the signal of action being thus given, the French generals in the higher provinces, perceiving that the people were ready for commotion, gathered in their respective forces at Seville, Ecija, and Cordoba ; following the orders left by Soult. In Grenada the insurgents were especially active ; Sebastiani, doubtful if the storm would not break on his head, concentrated a column at Estipona as a good covering point to the coast line, and one whence he could easily gain Ronda. Victor manned his works at Roto, Santa Maria, Puerto Real, and the Trocadero with a mixed force of refugee French, juramentados, and regular troops ; but he assembled 11,000 good soldiers near Chiclana, taking post between the roads of Conil and Medina, to await the development of the allies' project.‡

* Appendix, No. 1, section 5.

† Appendix, No. 9, section 2.

‡ Appendix, No. 1, section 6.

At first, La Peña's march pointed to Medina Sidonia, his vanguard stormed Casa Vieja on the 2nd of March, and the troops from Algeiras, amounting to 1600 infantry, besides several hundreds of irregular cavalry, came in to him; increasing his force to 12,000 infantry, 800 horsemen, and 24 guns. The 3rd, he resumed his march, but hearing that Medina Sidonia was entrenched, turned towards the coast, and drove the French from Vejer de la Frontera. The following evening he continued his movement, and at nine o'clock on the morning of the 5th, after a skirmish, in which his advanced guard of cavalry was routed by a French squadron, he reached the Cerro de Puerco, called by the English the heights of Barosa; being then only four miles from the sea mouth of the Santi Petri.

Barosa is a low ridge, creeping in from the coast about one mile and a half, and overlooking a high and broken plain of small extent. This plain was bounded on the left by the coast cliffs, on the right by the forest of Chiclana, and in front by a pine wood, beyond which rose the narrow height of Bermeja, filling the space between the Almanza creek and the sea. The Bermeja hill could be reached either by moving through the wood in front, or along the beach under the cliffs.

At Tarifa, Graham, judging that Victor would surely come out of his lines to fight, had obtained from La Peña a promise to make short marches; to keep the troops fresh for battle; and not to approach the enemy except in a concentrated mass. Nevertheless, the day's march from Casa Vieja, being made through bad roads, with ignorant guides, had occupied 15 hours, and the night march to Barosa had been still more fatiguing.* The troops came up in a straggling manner, and ere they had all arrived, La Peña, as if in contempt of his colleague, without either disclosing his own plans, or communicating by signal or otherwise with Zayas, sent the vanguard, reinforced by a squadron and three guns, straight against the mouth of the Santi Petri. Zayas had, indeed, cast his bridge there on the 2nd, and commenced an entrenchment; but, in the following night, being surprised by the French, was driven again into the Isla: hence the movement of the vanguard was exceedingly dangerous. Lardizabal, however, after a sharp skirmish, in which he lost nearly 300 men, forced the enemy's posts between the Almanza creek and the sea, and effected a junction with Zayas.

Graham was extremely desirous of holding the Barosa height, as the key both to offensive and defensive movements, and he argued that no general in his senses would lend his flank to an enemy, by attacking the Bermeja while Barosa was occupied in force. Lasey, the chief of the Spanish staff, having however opposed this reasoning, La Peña commanded Graham to march the British troops through the wood to Bermeja. With great temper, he obeyed this uncourteous order; and leaving the flank companies of the 9th and 82nd, under Major Brown, as a guard for the baggage, commenced his march, in the full persuasion that La Peña would remain with Anglona's division and the cavalry at Barosa; and the more so, as a Spanish detachment was still on the side of Medina. But scarcely had the British entered the wood, when La Peña, without any notice, carried off the corps of battle, directed the cavalry to follow by the sea-road, and repaired himself to Santi Petri, leaving Barosa crowded with baggage, and protected only by a rear-guard of four guns and five battalions.

During these movements, Victor remained close in the forest of Chiclana, and the patrols of the allied cavalry reported that they could see no enemy; Graham's march, therefore, being only of two miles, seemed secure. The French marshal was, however, keenly watching the allies' progress; having recalled his infantry from Medina Sidonia as soon as La Peña had reached Barosa, he momentarily expected their arrival; but he felt so sure of success, that the cavalry at Medina and Arcos were directed upon Vejer and other places, to cut off the fugitives after the approaching battle. The Duke of Belluno had in hand 14 pieces of artillery and 6000 excellent troops, of the divisions of Laval, Ruffin, and Villatte; from these he drew three grenadier battalions as reserves, attaching two of them and three squadrons of cavalry to the division of Ruffin, which formed his left wing, the other to the division of Laval, which formed his centre.† Villatte's troops, about 2500 in

* Appendix, No. 9, section 1.

† Appendix, No. 1, section 7.

number, after being withdrawn from Bermeja, were posted close to a bridge on the Almanza creek, to cover the works of the camp, and to watch the Spanish forces at Santi Petri and Bermeja.

BATTLE OF BAROSA.

When Victor observed that Graham's corps was in the wood, that a strong body of Spaniards was on the Bermeja, that a third body, with all the baggage, was at Barosa, and a fourth still in march from Vejer; he took Villatte's division as his pivot, and coming forth with a rapid pace into the plain, directed Laval against the English, while himself, with Ruffin's brigade, ascending the reverse side of Barosa, cut off the Spanish detachment on the road to Medina, and drove the whole of the rear guard off the height towards the sea; dispersing the baggage and followers of the army in all directions, and taking three Spanish guns.

Major Brown, seeing the general confusion, and being unable to stem the torrent, slowly retired into the plain, sending notice of what was passing to Graham, and demanding orders. That general, being then near Bermeja, answered that he was to fight; and instantly facing about himself, regained the plain with the greatest celerity, expecting to find La Peña, with the corps of battle and the cavalry, on the height: but when the view opened, he beheld Ruffin, flanked by the chosen battalions, near the top of Barosa at the one side, the Spanish rear-guard and baggage flying in confusion on the other, the French cavalry between the summit and the sea, and Laval close on his own left flank; but La Peña he could see nowhere. In this desperate situation, he felt that to retreat upon Bermeja, and thus bring the enemy pell mell with the allies on to that narrow ridge, must be disastrous; hence, without a moment's hesitation, he resolved to attack, although the key of the field of battle was already in the enemy's possession.

Ten guns, under Major Duncan, instantly opened a terrific fire against Laval's column, while Colonel Andrew Barnard, with the riflemen and the Portuguese companies, running out to the left, commenced the fight: the remainder of the British troops, without any attention to regiments or brigades, so sudden was the affair, formed two masses, one of which, under General Dilke, marched hastily against Ruffin, and the other under Colonel Wheately against Laval. Duncan's guns ravaged the French ranks; Laval's artillery replied vigorously; Ruffin's batteries took Wheately's column in flank; and the infantry on both sides pressed forward eagerly, and with a pealing musketry; but, when near together, a fierce, rapid, prolonged charge of the British overthrew the first line of the French, and, notwithstanding its extreme valour, drove it in confusion over a narrow dip of ground upon the second, which was almost immediately broken in the same manner, and only the chosen battalion, hitherto posted on the right, remained to cover the retreat.

Meanwhile Brown, on receiving his orders, had marched headlong against Ruffin. Nearly half of his detachment went down under the enemy's first fire; yet he maintained the fight, until Dilke's column, which had crossed a deep hollow and never stopped even to reform the regiments, came up, with little order indeed, but in a fierce mood, when the whole ran up towards the summit; there was no slackness on any side, and at the very edge of the ascent their gallant opponents met them. A dreadful, and for some time a doubtful, fight ensued, but Ruffin and Chaudron Rousseau, commanding the chosen grenadiers, both fell mortally wounded; the English bore strongly onward, and their incessant slaughtering fire forced the French from the hill with the loss of three guns and many brave soldiers.

The discomfited divisions, retiring concentrically, soon met, and with infinite spirit endeavoured to re-form and renew the action; but the play of Duncan's guns, close, rapid, and murderous, rendered the attempt vain. Victor was soon in full retreat, and the British having been twenty-four hours under arms without food, were too exhausted to pursue.

While these terrible combats of infantry were fighting, La Peña looked idly on, neither sending his cavalry, nor his horse-artillery, nor any part of his army, to the assistance of his ally, nor yet menacing the right of the enemy, which was close to



BATTLE of BAROSA

7th March 1811.



him and weak. The Spanish Walloon guards, the regiment of Ciudad Real, and some guerilla cavalry, indeed turned without orders, coming up just as the action ceased ; and it was expected that Colonel Whittingham, an Englishman commanding a powerful body of horse, would have done as much ; but no stroke in aid of the British was struck by a Spanish sabre that day, although the French cavalry did not exceed 250 men, and it is evident that the 800 under Whittingham might, by sweeping round the left of Ruffin's division, have rendered the defeat ruinous. So certain, indeed, was this, that Colonel Frederick Ponsonby, drawing off the 180 German hussars belonging to the English army, reached the field of battle, charged the French squadrons just as their retreating divisions met, overthrew them, took two guns, and even attempted, though vainly, to sabre Rousseau's chosen battalions.

Such was the fight of Barosa. Short, for it lasted only one hour and a half, but most violent and bloody ; for 50 officers, 60 sergeants, and above 1100 British soldiers, and more than 2000 Frenchmen were killed and wounded ; and from the latter, six guns, an eagle, and two generals (both mortally wounded) were taken, together with 400 other prisoners.

After the action, Graham remained some hours on the height, still hoping that La Peña would awake to the prospect of success and glory, which the extreme valour of the British had opened. Four thousand men and a powerful artillery had come over the Santi Petri ; hence the Spanish general was at the head of 12,000 infantry and 800 cavalry, all fresh troops ; while before him were only the remains of the French line of battle retreating in the greatest disorder upon Chiclana. But all military feeling being extinct in La Peña, Graham would no longer endure such command. The morning of the 6th saw the British filing over Zaya's bridge into the Isla.*

On the French side, Cassagne's reserve came in from Medina, a council of war was held in the night of the 5th, and Victor, although of a desponding nature, proposed another attack ; but the suggestion being ill received, nothing was done ; and the 6th, Admiral Keats, landing his seamen and marines, dismantled, with the exception of Catalina, every fort from Rota to Santa Maria, and even obtained momentary possession of the latter place. Confusion and alarm then prevailed in the French camp ; the Duke of Belluno, leaving garrisons at the great points of his lines and a rear-guard at Chiclana, retreated behind the San Pedro, where he expected to be immediately attacked. If La Peña had even then pushed to Chiclana, Graham and Keats were willing to make a simultaneous attack upon the Trocadero ; but the 6th and 7th passed without even a Spanish patrol following the French. On the 8th, Victor returned to Chiclana, and La Peña instantly recrossing the Santi Petri, destroyed the bridge, and his detachment on the side of Medina being thus cut off from the Isla, was soon afterwards obliged to retire to Algeiras.

All the passages in this extraordinary battle were so broadly marked that observations would be useless. The contemptible feebleness of La Peña furnished a surprising contrast to the heroic vigour of Graham, whose attack was an inspiration rather than a resolution, so wise, so sudden was the decision, so swift, so conclusive was the execution. The original plan of the enterprise having, however, been rather rashly censured, some remarks on that head may be useful. "Sebastiani, it is said, might, by moving on the rear of the allies, have crushed them, and they had no right to calculate upon his inactivity." This is weak. Graham, weighing the natural dislike of one general to serve under another, judged that Sebastiani, harassed by insurrections in Grenada, would not hastily abandon his own district to succour Victor, before it was clear where the blow was to be struck. The distance from Tarifa to Chiclana was about 50 miles, whereas, from Sebastiani's nearest post to Chiclana was above 100, and the real object of the allies could not be known until they had passed the mountains separating Tarifa from Medina.

Combining these moral and physical considerations, Graham had reason to

* Appendix, No. 9, section 1.

expect several days of free action ; and thus indeed it happened, and with a worthy colleague he would have raised the blockade : more than that could scarcely have been hoped, as the French forces would have concentrated either before Cadiz or about Seville or Ecija ; and they had still 50,000 men in Andalusia.*

Victor's attack on the 5th was well judged, well timed, vigorous ; with a few thousand more troops he alone would have crushed the allies. The unconquerable spirit of the English prevented this disaster ; but if Graham or his troops had given way, or even hesitated, the whole army must have been driven like sheep into an enclosure ; the Almanza creek on one side, the sea on the other, the San Petri to bar their flight, and the enemy hanging on their rear in all the fierceness of victory. Indeed, such was La Peña's misconduct, that the French, although defeated, gained their main point ; the blockade was renewed, and it is remarkable that during the action a French detachment passed near the bridge of Zuazo without difficulty, and brought back prisoners ; thus proving that with a few more troops Victor might have seized the Isla. Meanwhile Ballasteros, who had gone against Seville, was chased, in a miserable condition, to the Aroche hills, by Daricau.

In Cadiz violent disputes arose. La Peña, in an address to the cortes, claimed the victory for himself. He affirmed that all the previous arrangements were made with the knowledge and approbation of the English general, and the latter's retreat into the Isla he indicated as the real cause of failure : Lascy and General Cruz-Murgeon also published inaccurate accounts of the action, and even had deceptive plans engraved to uphold their statements. Graham, stung by these unworthy proceedings, exposed the conduct of La Peña in a letter to the British envoy ; and when Lascy let fall some expressions personally offensive, he enforced an apology with his sword ; but having thus shown himself superior to his opponents at all points, the gallant old man soon afterwards relinquished his command to General Cooke, and joined Lord Wellington's army.

CHAPTER III.

WHILE discord prevailed at Cadiz, the siege of Badajos continued. Early in March, the second parallel being completed and the Pardaleras taken into the works, the approaches were carried by sap to the covered way, and mines were prepared to blow in the counterscarp. Nevertheless, Rafael Menacho, the governor, was in no manner dismayed ; his sallies were frequent and vigorous, his activity and courage inspired his troops with confidence, he had begun to retrench in the streets behind the part attacked, and as the fire of the besiegers was also inferior to that of the besieged, everything seemed to promise favourably for the latter : but, on the evening of the 2nd, during a sally, in which the nearest French batteries were carried, the guns spiked, and trenches partly ruined, Menacho was killed, and the command fell to Imas, a man so unworthy that a worse could not be found. At once the spirit of the garrison died away, the besiegers' works advanced rapidly, the ditch was passed, a lodgment was made on one of the ravelins, the rampart was breached, and the fire of the besieged being nearly extinguished, on the 10th of March the place was summoned in a peremptory manner.

At this time the great crisis of the campaign had passed, and a strong body of British and Portuguese troops were ready to raise the siege of Badajos. In three different ways, by telegraph, by a letter, and by a confidential messenger, the governor was informed that Massena was in full retreat, and that the relieving army was actually in march. The breach was still impracticable, provisions were plentiful, the garrison above 8000 strong, the French army reduced by sickness, by detachments and the previous operations, to less than 14,000 men. Imas read the letter and instantly surrendered, handing over at the same moment the intelligence thus obtained to the enemy. But he also demanded that his grenadiers should march out of the breach ; it was granted, and he was obliged to enlarge the opening

* Appendix, No. 9, section 5.

himself ere they could do so ! Yet this man, so covered with opprobrium, and who had secured his own liberty while consigning his fellow soldiers to a prison, and his character to infamy, was never punished by the Spanish rulers : Lord Wellington's indignant remonstrances forced them, indeed, to bring him to trial, but they made the process last during the whole war.

When the place fell, Mortier marched against Campo Mayor, and Latour Maubourg seizing Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, made 600 prisoners ; but Soult, alarmed by the effects of the battle of Barosa, returned to Andalusia, having in 50 days mastered four fortresses and invested a fifth ; having killed or dispersed 10,000 men, and having taken 20,000 with a force which, at no time, exceeded the number of his prisoners : yet great and daring and successful as his operations had been, the principal object of his expedition was frustrated, for Massena was in retreat. Lord Wellington's combinations had palsied the hand of the conqueror.

While the siege of Badajos was proceeding, no change took place in the main positions of either army at Santarem. The English general, certain that the French, who were greatly reduced by sickness, must soon quit their ground if he could relieve Badajos, was only waiting for his reinforcements to send Beresford with 14,000 men against Soult ; when the battle of the Gebora ruined this plan and changed his situation. The arrival of the reinforcements could not then enable him to detach a sufficient number of men to relieve Badajos, and it was no longer a question of starving Massena out, but of beating him, before Soult could take Badajos and the two armies be joined. In this difficulty, abandoning the design of raising the siege by a detachment, Lord Wellington prepared to attack Massena's army in front on the side of Tremes, while Beresford, crossing at Abrantes, fell upon the rear ; he hoped thus to force back the French right and centre, and to cut off the left and to drive it into the Tagus. However, nothing could be attempted until the troops from England arrived, and day after day passed in vain expectation of their coming. Being embarked in January, they would have reached Lisbon before the end of that month, had Sir Joseph Yorke, the admiral charged to conduct the fleet, taken advantage of a favourable wind which blew when the troops were first put on board ; but he neglected this opportunity, contrary gales followed, and a voyage of ten days was thus prolonged for six weeks.

On the other hand, the French general's situation was becoming very perilous. To besiege Abrantes was above his means, and although that fortress was an important strategic point for the allies who had a movable bridge, it would not have been so for the French. Massena could only choose then to force the passage of the Tagus alone, or to wait until Soult appeared on the left bank, or to retreat. For some time he seemed inclined to the first, showing great jealousy of the works opposite the mouth of the Zezere, and carrying his boats on wheel-carriages along the banks of the Tagus, as if to alarm Beresford and oblige him to concentrate to his left : yet that general relaxed nothing of his vigilance, neither spy nor officer passed his lines of observation, and Massena knew, generally, that Soult was before Badajos, but nothing more. However, time wore away, sickness wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the troops was seriously loosened, the leading generals were at variance, and the conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain was by no means relinquished.

Under these accumulating difficulties even Massena's obstinacy gave way ; he promised to retreat when he had no more provisions left than would serve his army for the march. A tardy resolution ; yet adopted at the moment, when to maintain his position was more important than ever, as ten days longer at Santarem would have insured the co-operation of Soult. General Pelet says that the latter marshal, by engaging in the siege of Badajos and Olivenza, instead of coming directly down upon the Tagus, was the cause of Massena's failure ; this can hardly be sustained. Before those sieges and the battle of the Gebora, Mendizabel could have assembled 20,000 men on Soult's rear, and there was a large body of militia on the Ponçul and the Elga ; Beresford had 14,000 British and Portuguese regulars, besides ordnance ; while the infinite number of boats at Lord Wellington's command would have enabled him to throw troops upon the left bank of the Tagus, with a celerity

that would have baffled any effort of Massena to assist the Duke of Dalmatia. Now, if the latter had been defeated, with what argument could he have defended his reputation as a general, after having left three or four garrisoned fortresses and 35,000 men upon his flank and rear ; to say nothing of the results threatened by the battle of Barosa ?

The true cause of Massena's failure was the insufficiency of his means to oppose the English general's combinations. The French army reduced by sickness to 40,000 fighting men, exclusive of Drouet's troops at Leiria, would have been unable to maintain its extended position against the attack meditated by Lord Wellington ; and when Massena, through the means of the fidalgos, knew that the English reinforcements were come, he prepared to retreat. Those troops landed the 2nd of March, and, the 6th, the French had evacuated the position of Santarem.

At this time Napoleon directed the armies of Spain to be remodelled. The king's force was diminished ; the army of the south increased ; General Drouet was ordered to march with 11,000 men to the 5th corps, which he was appointed to command, in place of Mortier ; the remainder of the 9th corps was to compose two divisions, under the command of Clausel and Foy, and to be incorporated with the army of Portugal. Marmont was appointed to relieve Ney in the command of the 6th corps ; Loison was removed to the 2nd corps ; and Bessieres was ordered to post 6000 men at Ciudad Rodrigo, to watch the frontiers of Portugal and support Claparede. Of the imperial guards ; 7000 were to assemble at Zamora, to hold the Gallicians in check, and the remainder at Valladolid, with strong parties of cavalry in the space between those places, that intelligence of what was passing in Portugal might be daily received.* Thus Massena was enabled to adopt any operation that might seem good to him, without reference to his original base ; but the order for the execution of these measures did not reach the armies until a later period.

RETREAT OF THE FRENCH FROM SANTAREM.

Several lines of operation were open to the Prince of Esling. 1. He could pass the Tagus, between Punhete and Abrantes, by boats or by fords, which were always practicable after a week of dry weather. 2. He could retire, by the Sobreira Formosa, upon Castello Branco, and open a communication with the king by Placentia, and with the Duke of Dalmatia by Alcantara. 3. He could march, by the Estrada Nova and Belmonte, to Sabugal, and afterwards act according to circumstances. 4. He could gain the Mondego, and ascend the left bank of that river towards Guarda and Almeida ; or, crossing it, march upon Oporto through an untouched country. Of these four plans the first was perilous, and the weather too unsettled to be sure of the fords. The second and third were difficult, from the ruggedness of the Sobreira, and exposed because the allies could break out by Abrantes upon the flank of the army while in retreat. Massena decided on the last, but his actual position being to the left of the line of retreat, he was necessarily forced to make a flank movement, with more than 10,000 sick men and all his stores, under the beard of an adversary, before he could begin his retreat. Yet this he executed, and in a manner bespeaking the great commander.

Commencing his preparations by destroying munition, and all guns that could not be horsed, he passed his sick and baggage, by degrees, upon Thomar, keeping only his fighting men in the front, and at the same time indicating an intention of passing the Zezere. But when the impediments of the army had gained two marches, Ney suddenly assembled the 6th corps and the cavalry on the Lys, near Leiria, as if with the intention of advancing against Torres Vedras, a movement that necessarily kept Lord Wellington in suspense. Meanwhile, the 2nd and 8th corps, quitting Santarem, Tremes, and Alcanhete, in the night of the 5th, fell back, by Pernes, upon Torres Novas and Thomar, destroying the bridges on the Alviella behind them. The next morning the boats were burnt at Punhete, and Loison

retreated by the road of Espinal to cover the flank of the main line of retreat; the remainder of the army, by rapid concentric marches, made for a position in front of Pombal: the line of movement to the Mondego was thus secured, and four days gained; for Lord Wellington, although aware that a retreat was in execution, was quite unable to take any decided step, lest he should open the lines to his adversary. Nevertheless, he had caused Beresford to close to his right on the 5th, and at daylight on the 6th, discovering the empty camps of Santarem, followed the enemy closely with his own army.

Thomar seemed to be the French point of concentration; but as their boats were still maintained at Punhete, General William Stewart crossed the Tagus, at Abrantes, with the greatest part of Beresford's corps, while the first, fourth, and sixth divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, marched to Golegao; the light division also reached Pernes, where the bridge was rapidly repaired by Captain Tod, of the royal staff-corps. The 7th, the enemy having burnt his boats on the Zezere, the Abrantes' bridge was brought down to that river, and Stewart, crossing, moved to Thomar; on which place the divisions at Golegao were likewise directed. But the retreat being soon decidedly pronounced for the Mondego, the troops at Thomar were ordered to halt; and the light division, German hussars, and royal dragoons followed the 8th corps, taking 200 prisoners.

This day's march disclosed a horrible calamity. A large house, situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered, filled with starving persons. Above 30 women and children had sunk, and sitting by the bodies were 15 or 16 survivors, of whom one only was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little food we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first; all the children were dead; none were emaciated in the bodies, but the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life; the women appeared patient and resigned, and even in this distress, had arranged the bodies of those who first died with decency and care.

While one part of the army was thus in pursuit, the third and fifth divisions moved from the lines, upon Leiria; the Abrantes' boats fell down the river to Tancos, where a bridge was fixed; and the second and fourth divisions, and some cavalry, were directed to return from Thomar to the left bank of the Tagus, to relieve Badajos: Beresford also, who remained with a part of his corps near Barca, had already sent a brigade of cavalry to Portalegre for that purpose. This was on the morning of the 9th; but the enemy, instead of continuing his retreat, concentrated the 6th and 8th corps and Montbrun's cavalry on a table-land, in front of Pombal, where the light division skirmished with his advanced posts, and the German horse charged his cavalry with success, taking some prisoners.

Lord Wellington, finding the French disposed to accept battle, was now compelled to alter his plans. To fight with advantage it was necessary to bring up from Thomar the troops destined to relieve Badajos; not to fight, was giving up to the enemy Coimbra, and the untouched country behind, as far as Oporto: Massena would thus retire with the advantages of a conqueror. However, intelligence received that morning from Badajos, described it as being in a sufficient state, and capable of holding out yet a month. This decided the question.

The fourth division and the heavy cavalry, already on the march for the Alemtejo, were countermanded; General Nightingale, with a brigade of the first division and some horse, was directed by the road of Espinal, to observe the 2nd corps; and the rest of the army was concentrically directed upon Pombal. How dangerous a captain Massena could be, was here proved. His first movement began the 4th, it was the 11th before a sufficient number of troops could be assembled to fight him at Pombal, and during these seven days he had executed one of the most difficult operations in war, gained three or four marches, and completely organized his system of retreat.

SKIRMISH AT POMBAL.

Pack's brigade and the cavalry, the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, and the Portuguese troops, which were attached, like the ancient Latin

auxiliaries of the Roman legion, to each British division, were assembling in front of the enemy on the 10th; when Massena, who had sent his baggage over the Soure river in the night by the bridge of Pombal, suddenly retired through that town. He was so closely followed by the light division, that the streets being still encumbered, Ney drew up a rear-guard on a height behind the town, and threw a detachment into the old castle of Pombal. He had, however, waited too long. The French army was moving in some confusion and in a very extended column of march, by a narrow defile, between the mountains and the Soure river, which was fordable; and the British divisions were in rapid motion along the left bank, with the design of crossing lower down, and cutting Massena's line of retreat. But darkness came on too fast, and the operation terminated with a sharp skirmish at Pombal, whence the 95th and the 3rd caçadores of the light division, after some changes of fortune, drove the French from the castle and town with such vigour, that the latter could not destroy the bridge, although it was mined. About 40 of the allies were hurt, and the loss of the enemy was somewhat greater.

In the night Massena continued his retreat, which now assumed a regular and concentrated form. The baggage and sick, protected by the reserve cavalry, marched first; these were followed by the 8th corps; and the 6th, with some light cavalry, and the best horsed of the artillery, were destined to stem the pursuit. Ney had been ordered to detach Marcognet's brigade on the 10th, from the Lys, to seize Coimbra; but some delay having taken place, Montbrun was now appointed for that service.

Lord Wellington's immediate object was to save Coimbra, and he designed, by skilful, rather than daring operations, to oblige Massena to quit the Portuguese territory: the moral effect of such an event, he judged, would be sufficient; but as his reinforcements were still distant, he was obliged to retain the fourth division and the heavy cavalry from the relief of Badajos, and was therefore willing to strike a sudden stroke, if a fair occasion offered. Howbeit the country was full of strong positions, the roads hollow and confined by mountains on either hand, every village formed a defile; the weather also, being moderate, was favourable to the enemy, and Ney, with a wonderfully happy mixture of courage, readiness, and skill, illustrated every league of ground by some signal combination of war.

Daybreak, on the 12th, saw both armies in movement, and eight miles of march, and some slight skirmishing, brought the head of the British into a hollow way, leading to a high table-land on which Ney had disposed 5000 infantry, a few squadrons of cavalry, and some light guns. His centre was opposite the hollow road, his wings were covered by wooded heights, which he occupied with light troops; his right rested on the ravine of the Soure, his left on the Redinha, which circling round his rear fell into the Soure. Behind him the village of Redinha, situated in a hollow, covered a narrow bridge and a long and dangerous defile; and, beyond the stream, some very rugged heights, commanding a view of the position in front of the village, were occupied by a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a battery of heavy guns; all so skilfully disposed as to give the appearance of a very considerable force.

COMBAT OF REDINHA.

After examining the enemy's position for a short time, Lord Wellington first directed the light division, now commanded by Sir William Erskine, to attack the wooded slopes covering Ney's right: in less than an hour these orders were executed. The 52nd, the 95th, and the caçadores, assisted by a company of the 43rd, carried the ascent and cleared the woods, and their skirmishers even advanced on to the open plain; but the French battalions, supported by four guns, immediately opened a heavy rolling fire, and at the same moment, Colonel Ferriere, of the 3rd French hussars, charged and took 14 prisoners. This officer, during the whole campaign, had never failed to break in upon the skirmishers in the most critical moments; sometimes with a squadron, sometimes with only a few men; he was, however, sure to be found in the right place, and was continually proving how much may be done, even in the most rugged mountains, by a small body of good cavalry.

Erskine's line, consisting of five battalions of infantry and six guns, being now formed in such a manner that it outflanked the French right, tending towards the ford of the Redinha, was reinforced with two regiments of dragoons; meanwhile Picton seized the wooded heights protecting the French left, and thus Ney's position was laid bare. Nevertheless, that marshal observing that Lord Wellington, deceived as to his real numbers, was bringing the mass of the allied troops into line; far from retreating, even charged Picton's skirmishers, and continued to hold his ground with an astonishing confidence if we consider his position; for the third division was nearer to the village and bridge than his right, and there were already cavalry and guns enough on the plain to overwhelm him. In this posture both sides remained for about an hour, when three shots were fired from the British centre as a signal for a forward movement, and a most splendid spectacle of war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with troops; and in a few moments 30,000 men, forming three gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain; but bending on a gentle curve, and moving majestically onwards, while horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from the centre and from the left wing, charged under a general volley from the French battalions: the latter were instantly hidden by the smoke, and when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen.

Ney, keenly watching the progress of this grand formation, had opposed Picton's foremost skirmishers with his left, and, at the same moment, withdrew the rest of his people with such rapidity, that he gained the village ere the cavalry could touch him: the utmost efforts of Picton's skirmishers and of the horse artillery scarcely enabled them to gall the hindmost of the French left with their fire. One howitzer was, indeed, dismounted close to the bridge, but the village of Redinha was in flames; and the marshal, wishing to confirm the courage of his soldiers at the commencement of the retreat, in person superintended the carrying it off: this he effected, yet with the loss of 15 or 20 men, and with great danger to himself, for the British guns were thundering on his rear, and the light troops of the third division, chasing like heated blood-hounds, passed the river almost at the same time with the French. The reserves of the latter cannonaded the bridge from the heights beyond, but a fresh disposition of attack being made by Lord Wellington, while the third division continued to press the left, Ney fell back upon the main body, then at Condeixa, 10 miles in the rear.

The British had 12 officers and 200 men killed and wounded in this combat, and the enemy lost as many; but he might have been utterly destroyed; for there is no doubt, that the Duke of Elchingen remained a quarter of an hour too long upon his first position, and that, deceived by the skilful arrangement of his reserve, Lord Wellington paid him too much respect. Yet the extraordinary facility and precision with which the English general handled so large a force, was a warning to the French commander, and produced a palpable effect upon the after operations.

On the 13th, the allies renewed the pursuit, and before 10 o'clock discovered the French army, the 2nd corps which was at Espinhal excepted, in order of battle. The crisis of Massena's retreat had arrived, the defiles of Condeixa, leading upon Coimbra, were behind him; those of Miranda de Corvo, leading to the Puente de Murcella, were on his left; and in the fork of these two roads Ney was seated on a strong range of heights covered by a marsh, his position being only to be approached by the highway leading through a deep hollow against his right. Trees were felled to obstruct the passage; a palisado was constructed across the hollow; breast-works were thrown up on each side, and Massena expected to stop the pursuit, while Montbrun seized Coimbra: for he designed to pass the Mondego, and either capture Oporto or maintain a position between the Douro and the Mondego, until the operations of Soult should draw the British away; or until the advance of Bessieres with the army of the north, should enable himself again to act offensively. Hitherto the French general had appeared the abler tactician, but now his adversary assumed the superiority.

When at Thomar Lord Wellington had sent Baccellar orders to look to the security of Oporto, and had directed Wilson and Trant also to abandon the Mondego and the Vouga the moment the fords were passable, retiring across the Douro; breaking up the roads as they retreated, and taking care to remove or to destroy all

boats and means of transport. Now Wilson was in march for the Vouga, but Trant having destroyed an arch of the Coimbra bridge on the city side, and placed guards at the fords as far as Figueras, resolved to oppose the enemy's passage; for the sound of guns had reached his out-posts, the river was rising, and he felt assured that the allied army was close upon the heels of the enemy.

As early as the evening of the 11th, the French appeared at the suburb of Santa Clara, and a small party of their dragoons actually forded the Mondego at Pereiras that day: on the 12th, some French officers examined the bridge of Coimbra, but a cannon-shot from the outer side wounded one of them, and a general skirmish took place along the banks of the river, during which a party attempting to feel their way along the bridge, were scattered by a round of grape. The fords were, however, actually practicable for cavalry, and there were not more than 200 or 300 militia and a few guns at the bridge; for Baccellar had obliged Trant to withdraw the greatest part of his force on the 11th; nevertheless, the latter opposed the enemy with the remainder, and it would appear that the French imagined the reinforcement, which reached Lisbon the 2nd of March, had been sent by sea to the Mondego and was in Coimbra. This was an error. Coimbra was saved by the same man and the same militia that had captured it during the advance.

Montbrun sent his report to Massena early on the 13th, and the latter too readily crediting his opinion of Trant's strength, relinquished the idea of passing the Mondego, and determined to retire by the Puente de Murcella: but to ensure the power of changing his front, and to secure his communication with Reynier and Loison, he had carried Clausel's division to Fonte Coberta, a village about five miles on his left, situated at the point where the Anciao road falls into that leading to Murcella. There Loison rejoined him, and being thus pivoted on the Anciao Sierra, and covering the line of communication with the 2nd corps while Ney held Condeixa, he considered his position secure. His baggage was, however, observed filing off by the Murcella road when the allies first came upon Ney, and Lord Wellington instantly comprehending the state of affairs, as instantly detached the third division by a very difficult path over the Sierra de Anciao to turn the enemy's left.

For some time all appeared quiet in the French lines. Massena, in repairing to Fonte Coberta, had left Ney orders, it is said, to fire Condeixa at a certain hour, when all the divisions were simultaneously to concentrate at Casal Nova, in a second position, perpendicular to the first, and covering the road to Puente Murcella. But towards three o'clock Picton was descried winding round the bluff end of a mountain, about eight miles distant, and as he was already beyond the French left instant confusion pervaded their camp: a thick smoke arose from Condeixa, the columns were seen hurrying towards Casal Nova; and the British immediately pushed forward. The felled trees and other obstacles impeded their advance at first, and a number of fires, simultaneously kindled, covered the retreating troops with smoke, while the flames of Condeixa stopped the artillery, hence the skirmishers and some cavalry only could close with the rear of the enemy, but so rapidly, as to penetrate between the division at Fonte Coberta and the rest of the French; and it is affirmed that the Prince of Esling, who was on the road, only escaped capture by taking the feathers out of his hat and riding through some of the light troops.

Condeixa being thus evacuated, the British cavalry pushed towards Coimbra, opened the communication with Trant, and cutting off Montbrun, captured a part of his horsemen. The rest of the army kindled their fires, and the light division planted piquets close up to the enemy; but, about ten at night, the French divisions, whose presence at Fonte Coberta was unknown to Lord Wellington, stole out, and passing close along the front of the British posts, made for Miranda de Corvo. The noise of their march was heard, but the night was dark; it was imagined to be the moving of the French baggage to the rear, and being so reported to Sir William Erskine, that officer, without any further inquiry, put the light division in march at daylight on the 14th.

COMBAT OF CASAL NOVA.

The morning was so obscured that nothing could be descried at the distance of 100 feet, but the sound of a great multitude was heard on the hills in front ; and it being evident that the French were there in force, many officers represented the rashness of thus advancing without orders and in such a fog ; but Erskine, with an astounding negligence, sent the 52nd forward in a simple column of sections, without a vanguard or other precaution, and even before the pickets had come in from their posts. The road dipped suddenly, descending into a valley, and the regiment was immediately lost in the mist, which was so thick that the troops unconsciously passing the enemy's outposts had like to have captured Ney himself, whose bivouac was close to the pickets. The riflemen followed in a few moments, and the rest of the division was about to plunge into the same gulf, when the rattling of musketry and the booming of round shot was heard, and the vapour slowly rising, discovered the 52nd on the slopes of the opposite mountain, engaged, without support, in the midst of the enemy's army.

At this moment Lord Wellington arrived. His design had been to turn the left of the French, for their front position was very strong, and behind it they occupied the ridges, in succession, to the Deuca river and the defiles of Miranda de Corvo. There was, however, a road leading from Condeixa to Espinhal, and the fourth division was already in march by it for Panella, having orders to communicate with Nightingale ; to attack Reynier ; and to gain the sources of the Deuca and Ceira rivers : between the fourth division and Casal Nova the third division was more directly turning the enemy's left flank ; and meanwhile the main body was coming up to the front, but as it marched in one column, required time to reach the field. Howbeit Erskine's error forced on this action, and the whole of the light division were pushed forward to succour the 52nd.

The enemy's ground was so extensive, and his skirmishers so thick and so easily supported, that, in a little time, the division was necessarily stretched out in one thin thread, and closely engaged in every part, without any reserve ; nor could it even thus present an equal front, until Picton sent the riflemen of the 60th to prolong the line. Nevertheless, the fight was vigorously maintained amidst the numerous stone enclosures on the mountain side ; some advantages were even gained and the right of the enemy was partially turned ; yet the main position could not be shaken, until Picton near and Cole further off, had turned it by the left. Then, the first, fifth, and sixth divisions, the heavy cavalry, and the artillery, came up on the centre, and Ney commenced his retreat, covering his rear with guns and light troops, and retiring from ridge to ridge with admirable precision, and, for a long time, without confusion and with very little loss. Towards the middle of the day, however, the British guns and the skirmishers got within range of his masses, and the retreat became more rapid and less orderly ; yet he finally gained the strong pass of Miranda de Corvo, which had been secured by the main body of the French.

Montbrun also rejoined the army at Miranda. He had summoned Coimbra on the 13th at noon, and, without waiting for an answer, passed over the mountain and gained the right bank of the Deuca by a very difficult march. The loss of the light division this day was 11 officers and 150 men ; that of the enemy was greater, and about 100 prisoners were taken.

During the action of the 14th, Reynier, seeing the approach of the fourth division, hastily abandoned Panella ; and Cole having effected a junction with Nightingale, passed the Deuca ; when Massena fearing lest they should gain his rear, set fire to the town of Miranda, and passed the Ceira that night. His whole army was now compressed and crowded in one narrow line, between the higher sierras and the Mondego ; and to lighten the march, he destroyed a great quantity of ammunition and baggage ; yet his encumbrances were still so heavy, and the confusion in his army so great, that he directed Ney to cover the passage with a few battalions ; yet charged him not to risk an action. Ney, however, disregarding this order, kept on the left bank 10 or 12 battalions, a brigade of cavalry, and some guns.

COMBAT OF FOZ D'ARONCE.

The 15th, the weather was so obscure that the allies could not reach the Ceira before four o'clock in the evening, and the troops, as they came up, proceeded to kindle fires for the night, thinking that Ney's position being strong, nothing would be done. The French right rested on some thickly wooded and rugged ground, and their left upon the village of Foz d'Aronce, but Lord Wellington, having cast a rapid glance over it, directed the light division, and Pack's brigade, to hold the right in play, ordered the third division against the left, and at the same moment the horse-artillery, galloping forward to a rising ground, opened with a great and sudden effect. Ney's left wing being surprised and overthrown by the first charge of the third division, dispersed in a panic, and fled in such confusion towards the river, that some, missing the fords, rushed into the deeps and were drowned, and others crowding on the bridge were crushed to death. On the right the ground was so rugged and close that the action resolved itself into a skirmish, and thus Ney was enabled to use some battalions to check the pursuit of his left, but meanwhile darkness came on and the French troops in their disorder fired on each other. Only four officers and 60 men fell on the side of the British. The enemy's loss was not less than 500, of which one-half were drowned; and an eagle was afterwards found in the bed of the river when the waters subsided.

In the night Massena retired behind the Alva; yet Ney, notwithstanding this disastrous combat, maintained the left bank of the Ceira until every encumbrance had passed; and then blowing up 70 feet of the bridge, sent his corps on, but remained himself with a weak rear-guard on the opposite bank. Thus terminated the first part of the retreat from Santarem, during which the French commander, if we except his errors with regard to Coimbra, displayed infinite ability, but withal a harsh and ruthless spirit.

I pass over the destruction of Redinha, Condeixa, Miranda de Corvo, and many villages on the route; the burning of those towns covered the retrograde movements of the army, and something must be attributed to the disorder, which usually attends a forced retreat: but the town of Leiria, and the convent of Alcobaça, were given to the flames by express orders from the French head-quarters; and although the laws of war rigorously interpreted, authorize such examples when the inhabitants take arms, it can only be justly done for the purpose of overawing the people, and not from a spirit of vengeance when abandoning the country. But every horror that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march! Distress, conflagrations, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigues, from water, from the flames, from starvation! On every side unlimited violence, unlimited vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog to devour the dead and dying; and the spirit of cruelty once unchained smote even the brute creation. On the 15th, the French general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, ordered a number of beasts of burthen to be destroyed; the inhuman fellow charged with the execution, hamstringed 500 asses and left them to starve, and thus they were found by the British army on that day. The mute but deep expression of pain and grief visible in these poor creatures' looks, wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers; and so little weight has reason with the multitude when opposed by a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any prisoner at that moment. Excess of feeling would have led to direct cruelty. This shows how dangerous it is in war to listen to the passions at all, since the most praiseworthy could be thus perverted by an accidental combination of circumstances.

CHAPTER IV.

ON the 16th, the allies halted, partly because the Ceira was swollen and unfordable, partly from the extreme exhaustion of the troops who had suffered far greater privations than the enemy. The latter, following his custom, carried 15 days' bread; the allies depended upon a commissariat, which broke down under the difficulties; not from any deficiency in the chief (Mr. Kennedy), who was distinguished alike

for zeal, probity, and talent; but from the ill conduct of the Portuguese government; who, deaf to the repeated representations of Lord Wellington and Beresford, would neither feed the Portuguese troops regularly while at Santarem, nor fill their magazines, nor collect the means of transport for the march. Hence, after passing Pombal, the greater part of the native force had been unable to continue the pursuit; and the brigades under General Pack and Colonel Ashworth, which did keep up and engaged daily with the enemy, were actually four days without food of any sort. Numbers died of inanition on the roads, and to save the whole from destruction the British supplies were shared with them. The commissary-general's means were thus overlaid, the whole army suffered, and an imperative necessity obliged Lord Wellington to halt. Nevertheless, he had saved Coimbra, forced the enemy into a narrow, intricate, and ravaged country, and with an inferior force, turned him out of every strong position; and this, by a series of movements based on the soundest principles of war. For, noting the skill and tenacity with which Massena and Ney clung to every league of ground and every ridge defensible, against superior numbers, he seized the higher slopes of the mountains by Picton's flank march on the 13th; and again by Cole's on the 14th; and thus continually menacing the passes in rear of the French, obliged them to abandon positions which could scarcely have been forced: and this method of turning the strength of the country to profit is the true key to mountain warfare. He who receives battle in the hills has always the advantage; and he who first seizes the important points chooses his own field of battle.

In saying an inferior force, I advert to the state of the Portuguese army and to Badajos; for Lord Wellington having saved Coimbra, and seen that the French would not accept a general battle, except on very advantageous terms, had detached a brigade of cavalry, some guns, and a division of native infantry, from Condeixa, to the Alemtejo. He had, therefore, actually less than 25,000 men in hand, during the subsequent operations. In the night of the 13th, also, he received intelligence that Badajos had surrendered, and feeling all the importance of this event, detached the fourth division likewise to the Alemtejo, for he designed that Beresford should immediately retake the lost fortress: but as the road of Espinhal was the shortest line to the Tagus, General Cole, as we have seen, moved into it by Panella, thus threatening Massena's flank and rear at the same moment that he gained a march towards his ultimate destination. Meanwhile, Trant and Wilson, with the militia, moving up the right bank of the Mondego parallel to the enemy's line of retreat, forbade his foragers to pass that river, and were at hand either to interfere between him and Oporto, or to act against his flank and rear.

Such were the dispositions of the English general; but the military horizon was still clouded. Intelligence came from the north that Bessieres, after providing for his government, had been able to draw together at Zamora, above 7000 men, and menaced an invasion of Galicia; and although Mahi had an army of 16,000 men, Lord Wellington anticipated no resistance.* In the south, affairs were even more gloomy. The battle of Barosa, the disputes which followed, and the conduct of Imas and Mendizabel, proved that from Spain no useful co-operation was ever to be expected. Mortier also had invested Campo Mayor, and it was hardly expected to hold out until Beresford arrived. The Spaniards, to whom it had been delivered under an engagement of honour, entered into by Romana, to keep it against the enemy, had disloyally neglected and abandoned it at the very moment when Badajos fell, and 200 Portuguese militia thrown in at the moment, had to defend this fortress which required a garrison of 5000 regulars.† Nor was the enemy, immediately in the British front, the last to be considered.

Ney withdrew from the Ceira in the evening of the 16th, and on the 17th the light division forded that river with great difficulty, while the rest of the army passed over a trestle bridge, thrown in the night by the staff-corps. The French were, however, again in position immediately behind the Alva and on the Sierra de Moita, and they destroyed the Ponte Murcella and the bridge near Pombeira; while the 2nd corps moved towards the upper part of the river, and Massena spread his foraging parties to a considerable distance, designing to halt for several days.

* Appendix, No. 2, section 9.

† Ibid.

Nevertheless, the first, third, and fifth divisions were directed on the 18th, by the Sierra de St. Quiteria, to menace the French left, and they made way over the mountains with a wonderful perseverance and strength, while the sixth and light divisions cannonaded the enemy on the Lower Alva.

As the upper course of the river, now threatened by Lord Wellington's right, was parallel to the line of Massena's retreat, that marshal recalled the 2nd corps, and, quitting the Lower Alva also, concentrated on the Sierra de Moita, lest the divisions, moving up the river, should cross and fall on his troops while separated and in march. It then behoved the allies to concentrate also, lest the heads of their columns should be crushed by the enemy's masses. The Alva was deep, wide, and rapid, yet the staff-corps succeeded in forming a most ingenious raft-bridge, and the light division immediately passed between Ponte Murcella and Pombeira ; and at the same time the right wing of the army entered Arganil, while Trant and Wilson closed on the other side of Mondego.

Massena now re-commenced his retreat with great rapidity, and being desirous to gain Celerico and the defiles leading upon Guarda betimes, he again destroyed baggage and ammunition, and abandoned even his more distant foraging-parties, who were intercepted and taken, to the number of 800, in returning to the Alva : for Lord Wellington, seeing the success of his combinations, had immediately directed all his columns upon Moita, and the whole army was assembled there on the 19th. The pursuit was renewed the 20th, through Penhancos, but only with the light division and the cavalry ; the communication was, however, again opened with Wilson and Trant, who had reached the bridge of Fornos, and with Silveira, who was about Trancoso. The third and sixth divisions followed in reserve, but the remainder of the army halted at Moita, until provisions, sent by sea from Lisbon to the Mondego, could come up to them. The French reached Celerico the 21st, with two corps and the cavalry, and immediately opened the communication with Almeida, by posting detachments of horse on the Pinhel, and at the same time Reynier, who had retired through Govea, occupied Guarda with the 2nd corps.

Massena had now regained his original base of operations, and his retreat may be said to have terminated ; but he was far from wishing to re-enter Spain, where he could only appear as a baffled general, and shorn of half his authority ; because Bessieres commanded the northern provinces, which, at the commencement of the invasion, had been under himself. Hence, anxious to hold on to Portugal, and that his previous retreat might appear as a mere change of position, he formed the design of throwing all his sick men and other encumbrances into Almeida, and then, passing the Estrella at Guarda, make a countermarch through Sabugal and Penamacor, to the Elga ; establishing a communication across the Tagus with Soult, and by the valley of the Tagus with the king.

But now the factions in his army had risen to such a height that he could no longer command the obedience of his lieutenants ; Montbrun, Junot, Drouet, Reynier, and Ney, were all at variance with each other and with him. The first had, in the beginning of the retreat, been requested to secure Coimbra ; instead of which he quitted Portugal, carrying with him Claparede's division ; Marcognet's brigade was then ordered for that operation, but it did not move ; finally, Montbrun undertook it, and failed in default of vigour. Junot was disabled by his wound, but his faction did not the less show their discontent. Reynier's dislike to the prince was so strong, that the officers carrying flags of truce from his corps, never failed to speak of it to the British ; and Ney, more fierce than all of them, defied his authority. To him the dangerous delay at Pombal, the tardiness of Marcognet's brigade, and, finally, the too-sudden evacuation of the position at Condeixa, have been attributed : and it is alleged that, far from being ordered to set fire to that town on the 13th, as the signal for a preconcerted retreat, he had promised Massena to maintain the position for 24 hours longer. The personal risk of the latter, in consequence of the hasty change of position, would seem to confirm this ; but it is certain that, when Picton was observed passing the Sierra de Anciao by a road before unknown to the French, and by which the 2nd corps could have been separated from the army, and the passes of Miranda de Corvo seized, Ney would have been frantic to have delayed his movement.

At Miranda, the long gathering anger broke out in a violent altercation between the prince and the marshal ; and at Celerico, Ney, wishing to fall back on Almeida, to shorten the term of retreat, absolutely refused to concur in the projected march to Coria ; and even marched his troops in a contrary direction. Massena, a man not to be opposed with impunity, then deprived him of his command, giving the 6th corps to Loison ; and each marshal sent confidential officers to Paris to justify their conduct to the emperor. From both of those officers I have derived information, but as each thinks that the conduct of his general was approved by Napoleon, their opinions are irreconcilable upon many points ; I have, therefore, set down in the narrative the leading sentiments of each, without drawing any other conclusions than those deducible from the acknowledged principles of art and from unquestioned facts. Thus judging, it appears that Massena's general views were as superior to Ney's as the latter's readiness and genius in the handling of troops in action were superior to the prince's. Yet the Duke of Elchingen often played too near the flame, whereas nothing could be grander than the conceptions of Massena : nor was the project now meditated by him the least important.

From Guarda to Zarza Mayor and Coria was not two days' longer march than to Ciudad Rodrigo, but the army of Portugal must have gone to the latter place a beaten army, seeking for refuge and succour in its fortresses and reserves, and being separated from the central line of invasion : whereas, by gaining Coria, a great movement of war, wiping out the notion of a forced retreat, would have been accomplished. A close and concentric direction would also have been given to the three armies of the south, of the centre, and of Portugal ; and a powerful demonstration effected against Lisbon, which would inevitably bring Lord Wellington back to the Tagus. Thus the conquests of the campaign, namely, Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeida, Badajos, and Olivenza, would have been preserved, and meanwhile the army of the north could have protected Castile, and menaced the frontier of Portugal. Massena, having maturely considered this plan, gave orders, on the 23rd, for the execution ; but, Ney, as we have seen, thwarted him.

Meanwhile the English horse and militia, hovering round Celerico, made, in different skirmishes, 100 prisoners, and killed as many more ; and the French cavalry posts withdrew from the Pinhel. The 6th corps then took a position at Guarda ; the 2nd corps at Belmonte : the 8th corps and the cavalry in the eastern valleys of Estrella.

Ney's insubordination had rendered null the plan of marching upon the Elga ; but Massena expected still to maintain himself at Guarda with the aid of the army of the south, and to hold open the communications with the king and with Soult. His foragers had gathered provisions in the western valleys of the Estrella, and he calculated upon being able to keep his position for eight days with his own force alone ; and, independent of the general advantage, it was essential to hold Guarda for some time, because Drouet had permitted Julian Sanchez to cut off a large convoy destined for Ciudad Rodrigo, and had left Almeida with only ten days' provisions. Lord Wellington's ready boldness, however, disarranged all the prince's calculations.

The troops had come up from Moita on the 28th, and with them the reinforcements, which were organized as a seventh division.

The light division and the cavalry then passed the Mondego at Celerico, and, driving the French out of Frexadas, occupied the villages beyond that place ; at the same time, the militia took post on the Pinhel river, cutting the communication with Almeida, while the third division was established at Porca de Misarella, half way up the mountain, to secure the bridges over the higher Mondego. Early on the 29th, the third, sixth, and light divisions, and two regiments of light cavalry, disposed in five columns of attack on a half circle round the foot of the Guarda mountain, ascended by as many paths, all leading upon the town of Guarda, and outflanking both the right and left of the enemy ; they were supported on one wing by the militia, on the other by the fifth division, and in the centre by the first and seventh divisions. A battle was expected, but the absence of Ney was at once felt by both armies ; the appearance of the allied columns threw the French into the greatest confusion, and, without firing a shot, this great and nearly impregnable

position was abandoned. Had the pursuit been as vigorous as the attack, it is not easy to see how the 2nd corps could have rejoined Massena ; but Reynier quitting Belmonte in the night, recovered his communication with a loss of only 300 prisoners, although the horse-artillery and cavalry had been launched against him at daylight on the 30th. Much more could however have been done if General Slade had pushed his cavalry forward with the celerity and vigour the occasion required.

On the 1st of April, the allied army descended the mountains, and reached the Coa ; but the French general, anxious to maintain at once his hold of Portugal and the power of operating either on the side of Coria or of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, was in position on the right bank of that river. The 6th corps was at Rovina, with detachments guarding the bridge of Seceiras and the ford of Atalayan, and the communication with Almeida was maintained by a brigade of the 9th corps, which was posted near the ford of Junça. The 2nd corps was on the hills behind Sabugal, stretching towards Alfayates, but having strong detachments at the bridge of Sabugal and the ford of Rapoulha de Coa. The 8th corps was at Alfayates, and a post was established at Rendo to maintain the communication between the 2nd and the 6th corps. In this situation, the French army was disposed on two sides of a triangle, the apex of which was at Sabugal, and both fronts were covered by the Coa, because Sabugal was situated in a sharp bend of the stream ; by holding Alfayates, Massena also commanded the passes leading through St. Martin Trebeja to Coria.

Along the whole course of the Coa, which is a considerable river, the banks are rugged, but the ravine continually deepens as the stream flows ; and, during the first two days of April, the allies occupied a line parallel to the enemy's right, which could not be attacked. Meanwhile Trant and Wilson, passing the Coa below Almeida, penetrated between that fortress and Ciudad Rodrigo, as if the passage of the river was to be made on that side. Lord Wellington's aim was, however, against the other flank, and to protect the left and rear of the army, he placed the sixth division opposite the 6th corps, and a battalion of the seventh division at the bridge of Secerías.

At daybreak on the 3rd of April the cavalry under General Slade, being on the extreme right, was directed to cross the Upper Coa ; the light division was ordered to ford a little below ; the third division still lower ; and the fifth division, with the artillery, to force the bridge of Sabugal ; the first and seventh, with the exception of the battalion at Seceiras, were held in reserve. The English general having thus 10,000 men pivoted on the fifth division at Sabugal, designed to turn Reynier's left, to separate him from the 8th corps, and to surround him before he could be succoured by the 6th corps. One of those accidents which are frequent in war marred this well-concerted plan, and brought on the

COMBAT OF SABUGAL.

The morning was so foggy that the troops could not gain their respective posts of attack with that simultaneous regularity which is so essential to success ; and in the light division no measures were taken by Sir William Erskine to put the columns in a right direction : the brigades were not even held together, and he carried off the cavalry and the 3rd caçadores without communicating with Colonel Beckwith. This officer, who commanded the 1st brigade, being without any instructions, halted at a ford to await further orders, and at that moment a staff officer rode up, and somewhat hastily asked, why he did not attack ? The thing appeared rash, but with an enemy in his front he could make no reply, and instantly passing the river, which was deep and rapid, mounted a very steep wooded hill on the other side. Four companies of the 95th led in skirmishing order, and were followed by the 43rd regiment ; but the caçadores and the other brigade, being in movement to the true point, were already distant, and a dark heavy rain setting in rendered it impossible for some time to distinguish friends or foes. The attack was thus made too soon, for, owing to the obscurity, none of the divisions of the army had reached their respective posts. It was made also in a partial, disseminated, and dangerous

manner, and on the wrong point ; for Reynier's whole corps was directly in front, and Beckwith, having only one bayonet regiment and four companies of riflemen, was advancing against more than 12,000 infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery.

Scarcely had the riflemen reached the top of the hill, when a compact and strong body of French drove them back upon the 43rd ; the weather cleared at that instant, and Beckwith at once saw and felt all his danger ; but he met it with a heart that nothing could shake. Leading a fierce charge he beat back the enemy, and the summit of the hill was attained, but at the same moment two French guns opened with grape at the distance of 100 yards, a fresh body appeared in front, and considerable forces came on either flank of the regiment. Fortunately, Reynier, little expecting to be attacked, had for the convenience of water, placed his principal masses in the low ground behind the height on which the action commenced ; his renewed attack was therefore up hill ; yet the musketry, heavy from the beginning, now increased to a storm ; the French sprung up the acclivity with great clamour, and it was evident that nothing but the most desperate fighting could save the regiment from destruction.

Captain Hopkins, commanding a flank company of the 43rd, immediately run out to the right, and with admirable presence of mind seized a small eminence, close to the French guns and commanding the ascent up which the French troops turning the right flank were approaching. His first fire was so sharp, that the assailants were thrown into confusion ; they rallied and were again disordered by the volleys of this company ; a third time they endeavoured to form a head of attack ; when Hopkins with a sudden charge increased the disorder, and at the same moment the two battalions of the 52nd regiment, which had been attracted by the fire, entered the line. Meanwhile, the centre and left of the 43rd were furiously engaged and wonderfully excited ; for Beckwith wounded in the head, and with the blood streaming down his face, rode amongst the foremost of the skirmishers, directing all with ability, and praising the men in a loud cheerful tone.

The musket-bullets flew thicker and closer every instant, but the French fell fast ; a second charge cleared the hill, a howitzer was taken, and the British skirmishers were even advanced a short way down the descent, when small bodies of French cavalry came galloping in from all parts, and obliged them to take refuge with the main body of the regiment. The English line was instantly formed behind a stone wall above ; yet one squadron of dragoons surmounted the ascent, and, with incredible desperation, riding up to this wall, were in the act of firing over it with their pistols, when a rolling volley laid nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground. By this time however a second and stronger column of infantry had rushed up the face of the hill, endeavouring to break in and retake the howitzer which was on the edge of the descent and only 50 yards from the wall ; but no man could reach it and live, so deadly was the 43rd's fire. Meanwhile two English guns came into action, and the two battalions of the 52nd, charging upon the flank of the assailants, vindicated the right of the division to the height. A squadron of French cavalry, which had followed the columns in their last attack, then fell in amongst the 52nd men, extended as they were from the circumstances of the action, and at first created considerable confusion, but it was finally repulsed.

Reynier, convinced at last that he had acted unskilfully in sending up his troops piecemeal, put all his reserves, amounting to nearly 6000 infantry with artillery and cavalry, in motion, and outflanking the division on its left, appeared resolute to storm the contested height. But, at this critical period, the fifth division passed the bridge of Sabugal, the British cavalry appeared on the hills beyond the enemy's left, and General Colville with the leading brigade of the third division issuing out of the woods on Reynier's right, opened a fire on that flank, which instantly decided the fate of the day. The French general hastily retreated upon Rendo, where the 6th corps, which had been put in march when the first shots were heard, met him, and together they fell back upon Alfayates, pursued by the English cavalry. The loss of the allies in this bloody encounter, which did not last quite an hour, was nearly 200 killed and wounded, that of the enemy was enormous ; 300 dead bodies were heaped together on the hill, the greatest part round the

captured howitzer, and more than 1200 were wounded; so unwisely had Reynier handled his masses and so true and constant was the English fire. Although the principal causes of this disproportion undoubtedly were, first, the heavy rain which gave the French only a partial view of the British; and secondly, the thick wood which ended near the top of the hill, leaving an open and exposed space upon which the enemy mounted after the first attack; yet it was no exaggeration in Lord Wellington to say, "that this was one of the most glorious actions that British troops were ever engaged in."

The next day, the light division took the route of Valdespina, to feel for the enemy on the side of the passes leading upon Coria; but Massena was in full retreat for Ciudad Rodrigo, and on the 5th crossed the frontier of Portugal. Here the vigour of the French discipline on sudden occasions was surprisingly manifested. Those men who had for months been living by rapine, whose retreat had been one continued course of violence and devastation, passed an imaginary line of frontier, and became the most orderly of soldiers; not the slightest rudeness was offered to any Spaniard, and everything demanded was scrupulously paid for, although bread was sold at two shillings a pound! Massena himself also, fierce and terrible as he was in Portugal, always treated the Spaniards with gentleness and moderation.*

While these events were passing at Sabugal, Trant crossing the Lower Coa with 4000 militia, had taken post two miles from Almeida, when the river suddenly flooded behind him. Near Fort Conception, there was a brigade of the 9th corps, which had been employed to cover the march of the battering train from Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo; but ere those troops discovered Trant's dangerous situation, he constructed a temporary bridge and was going to retire on the 6th, when he received a letter from the British head-quarters, desiring him to be vigilant in cutting the communication with Almeida, and fearless, because the next day a British force would be up to his assistance. Marching then to Val de Mula, he interposed between the fortress and the brigade of the 9th corps. The latter were already within half a mile of his position, and his destruction appeared inevitable; but suddenly two cannon shots were heard to the southward, the enemy immediately formed squares and commenced a retreat, and six squadrons of British cavalry and Bull's troop of horse-artillery came sweeping over the plain in their rear. Military order and coolness marked the French retreat across the Turones, yet the cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through their dense masses, and the horsemen continually flanked their line of march: they however gained the rough ground, and finally escaped over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco; but with the loss of 300 men killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Prince of Esling had reached Ciudad Rodrigo two days before, and Lord Wellington now stood victorious on the confines of Portugal, having executed what to others appeared incredibly rash and vain even to attempt.

CHAPTER V.


MASSENA entered Portugal with 65,000 men; his reinforcements while at Santarem were about 10,000; he repassed the frontier with 45,000; hence the invasion of Portugal cost him about 30,000 men, of which 14,000 might have fallen by the sword or been taken. Not more than 6000 were lost during the retreat; but had Lord Wellington, unrestrained by political considerations, attacked him vigorously at Redinha, Condeixa, Casal Nova, and Miranda de Corvo, half the French army would have been lost. It is unquestionable that a retreating army should fight as little as possible.

When Massena reached the Agueda, his cavalry detachments, heavy artillery, and convalescents again augmented his army to more than 50,000 men, but the fatigues of the retreat and the want of provisions would not suffer him to show a front to the allies; wherefore, drawing 200,000 rations from Ciudad, he fell back to

* Appendix, No. 4. section 2.

MASSENA'S RETREAT **(Combat of Sabugal)** **(1811)**





Salamanca, and Lord Wellington invested Almeida. The light division occupied Gallegos and Espeja, the rest of the army were disposed in villages on both sides of the Coa, and the head-quarters were transferred to Villa Formosa.

Here Colonel Waters, who had been taken near Belmonte during the retreat, rejoined the army. Confident in his own resources, he had refused his parole, and when carried to Ciudad Rodrigo, rashly mentioned his intention of escaping to the Spaniard in whose house he was lodged. This man betrayed him; but a servant, detesting his master's treachery, secretly offered his aid, and Waters coolly desired him to get the rowels of his spurs sharpened. When the French army was near Salamanca, Waters, being in the custody of *gens d'armes*, waited until their chief, who rode the only good horse in the party, had alighted, then giving the spur to his own beast, he galloped off!—an act of incredible resolution and hardihood, for he was on a large plain, and before him, and for miles behind him, the road was covered with the French columns. His hat fell off, and thus distinguished, he rode along the flank of the troops, some encouraging him, others firing at him, and the *gens d'armes*, sword in hand, close at his heels; but suddenly breaking at full speed, between two columns, he gained a wooded hollow, and having baffled his pursuers, evaded the rear of the enemy's army. The third day he reached head-quarters, where Lord Wellington had caused his baggage to be brought, observing that he would not be long absent.

Massena, having occupied Salamanca, and communicated with Bessieres, sent a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, and Lord Wellington was unable to prevent its entrance.* He had sent the militia to their homes, disposed his army between the Coa and the Agueda, and blockaded Almeida; but the Portuguese regulars were in a dreadful state, and daily decreasing in numbers; while the continued misconduct of the regency, and the absolute want of money gave no hope of any amelioration; it was therefore impossible to take a position beyond the Agueda.

The depôts were re-established at Lamego on the Douro, and at Raiva on the Mondego; and magazines of consumption were formed at Celerico, from whence the mule-brigades brought up the provisions by the way of Castello Bom: measures were also taken at Guarda, Pena Macor, and Castello Branco, to form commissariat establishments which were to be supplied from Abrantes. But the transport of stores was difficult, and this consideration combined with the capricious nature of the Agueda and Coa, rendered it dangerous to blockade both Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; seeing that the troops would have those rivers behind them, while the position itself would be weak and extended. The blockade of Almeida was undertaken because, from intercepted letters and other sources, it was known to have provisions only for a fortnight; but the operations formed no part of the plan which Lord Wellington was now revolving in his mind and he was even prepared to relinquish it altogether if hardly pressed.

The success in Portugal had given stability to the English ministers; and it would appear that they at first meant to limit their future efforts to the defence of that country, for Lord Liverpool required the return of many battalions. But offensive warfare in Spain occupied the general's thoughts, and two lines of operation had presented themselves to his mind.—1. Under the supposition that it would be long ere Massena could again make any serious attempt on Portugal; to remain on the defensive in Beira, and march against the army of the south to raise the siege of Cadiz. 2. If Almeida fell to the blockade, to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo; or if Almeida did not so fall, to besiege both together, and when they were taken, march at once into the heart of Spain, and open a communication with Valencia and with the army of Sicily. This great and lofty conception would have delivered Andalusia as certainly as any direct operation; for thus Madrid, the great depôt of the French, would have been taken, the northern and southern armies cut asunder, and the English base momentarily fixed on the Mediterranean coast: then the whole of the Spanish and British force could have been concentrated, and one or two great battles must have decided the fate of Spain.

Filled with this grand project Lord Wellington demanded reinforcements from

* Appendix, No. 7.

England, and leave to carry his design into execution, if occasion offered : yet he checked his secret aspirations, when reflecting upon the national pride and perverseness of the Spaniards, and on their uncertain proceedings, and the great difficulty, if not impossibility of ensuring any reasonable concert and assistance. When to this he also added the bad disposition of the Portuguese regency, and the timid temper of the English ministers, so many jarring elements were presented that he could make no fixed combinations. Nevertheless, maturing the leading points of action in his own mind, he resolved to keep them in view ; adapting his proceedings to circumstances as they should arise.

His projects were, however, necessarily conditional upon whether Napoleon reinforced his armies again, which would create new combinations ; and before any other measure, it was essential to recapture Badajos ; not only as its possession by the enemy affected the safety of Cadiz, but as it bore upon the execution of both the above-mentioned plans, and upon the safety of Portugal, by enabling the enemy to besiege Elvas ; yet so deeply and sagaciously had he probed the nature of the contest, that we shall find his after operations strictly conformable to these his first conceptions, and always successful. Judging now that Massena would be unable to interrupt the blockade of Almeida, Lord Wellington left the command of the northern army to General Spencer, and departed for the Alemtejo, where Beresford was operating : but as this was one of the most critical periods of the war, it is essential to have a clear notion of the true state of affairs in the south, at the moment when Beresford commenced his memorable campaign.

Soult returned to Andalusia immediately after the fall of Badajos, leaving Mortier to besiege Campo Mayor, and his arrival at Seville and the fame of his successes restored tranquillity in that province, and confidence amongst the troops. Both had been grievously shaken by the battle of Barosa, and the works of Arcos. Lucar, Medina, and Alcalade Gazules, intended to defend the rear of the 1st corps, had been stopped, and the utmost despondency prevailed. Discontent and gloom were, however, also strong in Cadiz, the government had for some days pretended to make a fresh effort against Victor ; but the fall of Badajos menaced the city with famine, and hence Zayas was finally detached with 6000 infantry and 400 cavalry to Huelva. His object was to gather provisions in the Conda de Neibla, where Ballasteros had, on the 10th, surprised and dispersed Remond's detachment. The French were, however, soon reinforced, Zayas was checked by D'Aremberg, and as many of his men deserted to Ballasteros, he withdrew the rest. Blake then assumed the command, Ballasteros and Copons were placed under his orders, and the united corps, amounting to 11,000 infantry and 1200 cavalry, were called the " fourth army." Meanwhile, Mendizabal rallying his fugitives from the battle of the Gebora, at Villa Viciosa reinforced a weak corps, called the " fifth army ;" during these proceedings, Mortier occupied Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, and carried on the

SIEGE OF CAMPO MAYOR.

This fortress being commanded at 400 yards distance by a hill, on which there was an abandoned horn-work, would have fallen at once, but for the courage and talents of Major Tallaia, a Portuguese engineer. With only 200 men and five mounted guns he made such skilful dispositions, that the French opened regular trenches, battered the wall in breach with six guns, bombarded the palace with 11 mortars, and pushed a sap to the crest of the glacis. At the end of five days a breach was made, but Tallaia, although ill seconded by the garrison, repulsed one partial assault, and, being summoned for the second time, demanded and obtained 24 hours to wait for succour. None arrived, and this brave man surrendered the 21st of March. Mortier then returned to the Guadiana, leaving Latour Maubourg to dismantle the works and remove the artillery and stores to Badajos.

Such was the posture of affairs when Beresford, who had quitted the northern army after the combat of Foz d'Aronce, arrived at Portalegre with 20,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 18 guns.

His instructions were to relieve Campo Mayor, and to besiege Olivenza and

Badajos. The first had already surrendered, but the marshal, being within two marches of it, judged that he might surprise the besieging corps, and with this view put his troops in motion the 23rd. In the morning of the 25th, his advanced guard of cavalry, supported by a detachment of infantry, under Colonel Colborne, came suddenly upon Campo Mayor, just as Latour Maubourg was marching out in confusion, with 1200 cavalry, three battalions of infantry, some horse artillery, and the battering-train of 13 guns. The allies pursued him, and passing over a wooded rise of ground, issued forth at the other side by some gentle slopes on either flank of the French, who were in a fine plain. Colonel Colborne was on the right and at a considerable distance from the enemy, but Colonel Head, with the 13th light dragoons, was on the left, close to them, and supported by Colonel Otway with two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese. The heavy cavalry was in reserve; and while in this state the French hussars, suddenly charging with a loose rein from behind their infantry, fell some on the Portuguese and some on the 13th dragoons. So fiercely did these last on both sides come together, that many men were dismounted by the shock, and both parties pierced clear through to the opposite side, then re-formed, and passed again in the same fearful manner to their own ground: but Head's troopers rallied quicker than the French, and riding a third time closely in upon them, overthrew horse and man, receiving at the same time the fire of the infantry squares. Nevertheless, without flinching, they galloped upon the battering train, hewed down the gunners, and drawing up beyond the French line of march, barred the way, in expectation that the heavy cavalry would also fall on; but Beresford would not suffer the latter to charge, and the French infantry returned for their guns and resumed their march. The 13th and the Portuguese, however, continued the pursuit, in a rash and disorderly manner, even to the bridge of Badajos, and being repulsed by the guns of that fortress, were followed by Mortier in person, and lost some prisoners. Of the allies 100 men were killed or hurt, and above 70 taken. Of the enemy about 300 suffered, one howitzer was captured, and the French colonel, Chamorin, was slain in single combat by a trooper of the 13th.

To profit by sudden opportunities, a general must be constantly with his advanced guard in an offensive movement. When this combat commenced, Beresford was with the main body, and Baron Trip, a staff-officer, deceived by appearances, informed him that the 13th had been cut off. Hence the marshal, anxious to save his cavalry, which he knew could not be reinforced, would not follow up the first blow, truly observing that the loss of one regiment was enough. But the regiment was not lost, and the country being open and plain, the enemy's force and the exact posture of affairs were easy to be discerned. The 13th were reprimanded, perhaps justly, for having pursued so eagerly without orders, yet the unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them.

Campo Mayor was thus recovered so suddenly, that the French left 800 rations of bread in the magazines; and they also evacuated Albuquerque and Valencia d'Alcantara, being infinitely dismayed by the appearance of so powerful an army in the south: indeed, so secretly and promptly had Lord Wellington assembled it, that its existence was only known to the French general by the blow at Campo Mayor. But, to profit from such able dispositions, it was necessary to be as rapid in execution, giving the enemy no time to recover from his first surprise; and this was the more essential, because the breach in Badajos was not closed, nor the trenches obliterated, nor the exhausted magazines and stores replenished. Soult had carried away six battalions and a regiment of cavalry, 400 men were thrown into Olivenza, 3000 into Badajos; thus, with the losses sustained during the operations, Mortier's numbers were reduced to less than 10,000 men: he could not therefore have maintained the line of the Guadiana and collected provisions also, and Beresford should have instantly marched upon Merida, driven back the 5th corps, and opened a fresh communication by Jerumenha with Elvas; the fall of Badajos would then have been inevitable. The confusion occasioned by the sudden appearance of the army at Campo Mayor and the charge of the 13th dragoons guaranteed the success of this march; the English general might even have passed the river at Merida before Mortier could have ascertained his object.

Beresford, neglecting this happy opportunity, put his troops into quarters round

Elvas, induced thereto by the fatigue and wants of the soldiers ; especially those of the fourth division, who had been marching incessantly since the 6th of the month, and were bare-footed and exhausted.

He had been instructed, by Lord Wellington, to throw a bridge over the Guadiana at Jerumenha ; to push back the 5th corps ; and to invest Olivenza and Badajos. The Portuguese government had undertaken not only to provide the means for these operations, but had actually reported that they were collected at Elvas and Jerumenha ; that is to say, that provisions, shoes, battering guns, ammunition, and transport were there ; that the Guadiana abounded in serviceable craft ; that 20 large boats, formerly belonging to Cuesta, which had been brought away from Badajos before the siege, were at Elvas ; and that all other necessities would be sent from Lisbon. It now appeared that no magazines of provisions or stores had been formed ; that very little transport was provided ; that only five of Cuesta's boats had been brought from Badajos ; that there was no serviceable craft on the river, and that some small pontoons, sent from Lisbon, were unfit to bear the force of the current, or to sustain the passage of guns. The country, also, was so deficient in provisions, that the garrison stores of Elvas were taken to feed the army.

All these circumstances combined to point out Merida as the true line of operations ; moreover, plenty of food was to be had on the left bank of the Guadiana, and the measures necessary to remedy the evil state of affairs on the right bank, did not require the presence of an army to protect them. The great distress of the fourth division for shoes, alone offered any serious obstacle ; but, under the circumstances, it would not have been too much to expect a momentary effort from such an excellent division, or it might without danger even have been left behind.

Marshal Beresford preferred halting until he could procure the means of passing at Jerumenha ; an error which may be considered as the first and principal cause of those long and bloody operations which afterwards detained Lord Wellington nearly two years on the frontiers of Portugal. For, during Beresford's delay, General Phillipon, one of the ablest governors that ever defended a fortress, levelled the trenches, restored the glacis, and stopped the breach ; meanwhile Latour Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in command of the troops, covered the country with foraging parties and filled the magazines.

Captain Squires, of the engineers, now undertook to bridge the Guadiana under Jerumenha, by fixing trestle-piers on each side in the shallows, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats ; wherefore, a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over by a ford, to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3rd of April, the bridge being finished, the troops assembled during the night in the woods near Jerumenha, being to cross at daylight ; but the river suddenly swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered the ford impassable, and stopped the operations. No more materials could be immediately procured, and the Spanish boats were converted into flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, while Squires constructed a slight narrow bridge for infantry with the pontoons and with casks taken from the neighbouring villages. To cover this operation a battalion was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and the army commenced passing the 5th of April ; but it was late in the night of the 6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their position, which was on a strong range of hills, covered by a swampy rivulet.

During this time, Latour Maubourg was so entirely occupied in securing and provisioning Badajos, that his foragers were extended 50 miles to the rear, and he took no notice whatever of Beresford's proceedings ; an error savouring rather of the Spanish than of the French method of making war : for it is evident that a movable column of 5000 infantry, with guns and cavalry, could have easily cut off the small detachment of the British on the left bank, and thus have completely frustrated the operations. The allied troops being most numerous should have been carried over in the boats, and entrenched on the other side in sufficient force to resist any attack before the construction of the bridge was attempted ; it is not easy to say which general acted with most imprudence ; Latour Maubourg in neglecting, or Beresford in unnecessarily tempting fortune.

When the British were in possession of the left bank, the French general awak-

ing, collected 3000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and four guns at Olivenza, whence he marched, at daylight on the 7th, to oppose a passage which had been completed the day before. He, however, surprised a squadron of the 13th, which was in front, and then came so close up to the main body as to exchange shots; yet he was permitted to retire unmolested, in the face of more than 20,000 men!

During these proceedings, the 5th Spanish army re-occupied Valencia d'Alcantara and Albuquerque; having cavalry posts at La Rocca and Montijo. Ballasteros also entered Fregenal, and Castaños, who was appointed to command in Galicia as well as Estremadura, arrived at Elvas. This general was in friendly intercourse with Beresford, but had a grudge against Blake. At first, he pretended to the chief command, as the elder captain-general; but Blake demanded a like authority over Beresford, who was not disposed to admit the claim. Now Castaños, having little liking for a command under such difficult circumstances, and being desirous to thwart Blake, and fearful lest Beresford should, under these circumstances, refuse to pass the Guadiana, arranged that he who brought the greatest force in the field should be generalissimo. Thus the youngest officer commanded in chief.

Beresford, being joined by Madden's cavalry, and having traced out entrenchments capable of covering several thousand men, ordered his bridges to be reconstructed in a more substantial manner; brought up a Portuguese regiment of militia to labour at the works; left a strong detachment of British infantry and some Portuguese horse for their protection, and advanced with the remainder of the army. Hereupon Latour Maubourg retired upon Albuera, and Beresford summoned Olivenza on the 9th, apparently expecting no defence; but the governor having rejected the summons, the army encamped round the place, and Major A. Dickson was despatched to Elvas to prepare battering-guns for the siege. The communication was now open with Ballasteros at Fregenal, and Castaños having carried Morillo's division of infantry and Penne Villamur's cavalry from Montijo to Merida, pushed a part on to Almendralejos. Latour Maubourg then retired to Llerena; and, on the 11th, Beresford, leaving General Cole with the fourth division, Madden's cavalry, and a brigade of 9-pounders to besiege Olivenza, took post himself at Albuera; communicating, by his left, with Almendralejos, and spreading his cavalry in front, so as to cut off all communication with Badajos. The army now lived on the resources of the country; and a brigade was sent to Talavera Real to collect supplies.

The 14th, six 24-pounders reached Olivenza, and, being placed in a battery constructed on the abandoned horn-work formerly noticed, played with such success that the breach became practicable before the morning of the 15th. Some riflemen posted in the vineyards kept down the fire of the place, and the garrison, consisting of 380 men, with 15 guns, surrendered at discretion. Cole was immediately directed upon Zafra by the road of Almendral; and Beresford, who had recalled the brigade from Talavera, was already in movement for the same place by the royal causeway. This movement was to drive Latour Maubourg over the Morena, and cut off General Maransin. The latter general had been in pursuit of Ballasteros ever since the retreat of Zayas, and having defeated him at Fregenal on the 12th, was following up his victory towards Salvatierra: an alcalde, however, gave him notice of the allies' approach, and he retreated in safety. Meanwhile two French regiments of cavalry, advancing from Llerena to collect contributions, had reached Usagre, where, meeting with the British cavalry, they were suddenly charged by the 13th dragoons, and followed for six miles so vigorously that 300 were killed or taken, without the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers.

On the 16th, General Cole arrived from Olivenza, and the whole army being thus concentrated about Zafra, Latour Maubourg retired on the 18th to Guadalcanal; the Spanish cavalry then occupied Llerena, and the resources of Estremadura were wholly at the service of the allies. During these operations, General Charles Alten, coming from Lisbon with a brigade of German light infantry, reached Olivenza, and Lord Wellington also arrived at Elvas, where Beresford, after drawing his infantry nearer to Badajos, went to meet him. The presence of the general-in-chief was very agreeable to the troops; they had seen, with surprise, great masses put in motion without any adequate results, and thought the operations had been slow, without

being prudent. The whole army was over the Guadiana on the 7th, and, including the Spaniards from Montijo, Beresford commanded at least 25,000 men, whereas Latour Maubourg never had more than 10,000, many of whom were dispersed foraging, far and wide: yet the French general had maintained himself in Estremadura for ten days; and during this time, no corps being employed to constrain the garrison of Badajos, the governor continued to bring in timber and other materials for the defence, at his pleasure.

Lord Wellington arrived the 21st. The 22nd, he forded the Guadiana just below the mouth of the Caya with Madden's cavalry and Alten's Germans, pushing close up to Badajos. A convoy, escorted by some infantry and cavalry, was coming in from the country, and an effort was made to cut it off; but the governor sallied, the allies lost 100 men, and the convoy reached the town.

Lord Wellington, now considering that Soult would certainly endeavour to disturb the siege with a considerable force, demanded the assent of the Spanish generals to the following plan of combined operations, before he would commence the investment of the place. 1. That Blake, marching up from Ayamonte, should take post at Xeres de los Cavalleros. 2. That Ballasteros should occupy Burquillo on his left. 3. That the cavalry of the fifth army, stationed at Llerena, should observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra, by the right, with Ballasteros. These dispositions were to watch the passes of the Morena. 4. That Castaños should furnish three battalions for the siege, and keep the rest of his corps at Merida, to support the Spanish cavalry. 5. That the British army should be in second line, and, in the event of a battle, Albuera, centrally situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajos, should be the point of concentration for all the allied forces.

In consequence of the neglect of the Portuguese government, the whole of the battering-train and stores for the siege were necessarily taken from the ramparts and magazines of Elvas; the utmost prudence was therefore required to secure the safety of these guns, lest that fortress, half dismantled, should be exposed to a siege. Hence, as the Guadiana, by rising 10 feet, had again carried away the bridge at Jerumenha on the 24th, Lord Wellington directed the line of communication with Portugal to be re-established by Merida, until settled weather would admit of fresh arrangements.

Howbeit, political difficulties intervening obliged him to delay the siege. The troops under Mendizabel had committed many excesses in Portugal; the disputes between them and the inhabitants were pushed so far, that the Spanish general pillaged the town of Fernando; while the Portuguese government, in reprisal, meant to seize Olivenza, which had formerly belonged to them. The Spanish regency publicly disavowed Mendizabel's conduct, and Mr. Stuart's strenuous representations deterred the Portuguese from plunging the two countries into a war; but this affair, joined to the natural slowness and arrogance of the Spaniards, prevented both Castaños and Blake from giving an immediate assent to the English general's plans: meanwhile, intelligence reached the latter that Massena was again in force on the Agueda; wherefore, reluctantly directing Beresford to postpone the siege until the Spanish generals should give in their assent, or until the fall of Almeida should enable a British reinforcement to arrive, he repaired with the utmost speed to the Agueda.*

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH.

During his absence, the blockade of Almeida had been closely pressed, while the army was so disposed as to cut off all communication. The allied forces were, however, distressed for provisions, and great part of their corn came from the side of Ledesma; being smuggled by the peasants through the French posts, and passed over the Agueda by ropes, which were easily hidden amongst the deep chasms of that river, near its confluence with the Douro.

Massena was, however, intent upon relieving the place. His retreat upon

* Appendix, No. 2, section 10.

Salamanca had been to restore the organization and equipments of his army, which he could not do at Ciudad Rodrigo, without consuming the stores of that fortress. His cantonments extended from San Felices by Ledesma to Toro, his cavalry was in bad condition, his artillery nearly unhorsed : but from Bessieres he expected, with reason, aid, both of men and provisions, and in that expectation was prepared to renew the campaign immediately. Discord, that bane of military operations, interfered. Bessieres had neglected and continued to neglect the army of Portugal ; symptoms of hostilities with Russia were so apparent, even at this period, that he looked rather to that quarter than to what was passing before him ; his opinion that a war in the north was inevitable was so openly expressed as to reach the English army ; and, meanwhile, Massena vainly demanded the aid which was necessary to save the only acquisition of his campaign.

A convoy of provisions had entered Ciudad Rodrigo on the 13th of April ; on the 16th a reinforcement and a second convoy also succeeded in gaining that fortress, although General Spencer crossed the Agueda, with 8000 men, to intercept them ; a rear-guard of 200 men was, indeed, overtaken ; but, although surrounded by the cavalry in an open plain, they made their way into the place.

Towards the end of the month, the new organization, decreed by Napoleon, was put in execution. Two divisions of the 9th corps joined Massena ; and Drouet was preparing to march with the remaining 11,000 infantry and cavalry, to reinforce and take the command of the 5th corps ; when Massena, having collected all his own detachments, and received a promise of assistance from Bessieres, prevailed upon him to defer his march until an effort had been made to relieve Almeida. With this view the French army was put in motion towards the frontier of Portugal. The light division immediately resumed its former positions, the left at Gallegos and Marialva, the right at Espeja ; the cavalry were dispersed, partly towards the sources of the Azava, and partly behind Gallegos, and, while in this situation, Colonel O'Meara and 80 men of the Irish brigade were taken by Julian Sanchez ; the affair having been, it was said, preconceived, to enable the former to quit the French service.

On the 23rd, 2000 French infantry and a squadron of cavalry marching out of Ciudad Rodrigo, made a sudden effort to seize the bridge of Marialva ; but the passage was bravely maintained by Captain Dobbs, with only a company of the 52nd and some riflemen.

On the 25th, Massena reached Ciudad Rodrigo ; and the 27th, his advanced guards felt all the line of the light division from Espeja to Marialva. Lord Wellington arrived on the 28th, and immediately concentrated the main body of the allies behind the Dos Casas river. The Azava being swollen and difficult to ford, the enemy continued to feel the line of the outposts ; but, on the 2nd of May, the waters having subsided, the whole French army was observed coming out of Ciudad Rodrigo, wherefore, the light division, after a slight skirmish of horse at Gallegos, commenced a retrograde movement, from that place and from Espeja, upon Fuentes Onoro. The country immediately in rear of those villages was wooded as far as the Dos Casas, but an open plain between the two lines of march offered the enemy's powerful cavalry an opportunity of cutting off the retreat. As the French appeared regardless of this advantage, the division remained in the woods bordering the right and left of the plain until the middle of the night, when the march was renewed, and the Dos Casas was crossed at Fuentes Onoro. This beautiful village had escaped all injury during the previous warfare, although occupied alternately, for above a year, by both sides. Every family in it was well known to the light division, it was therefore a subject of deep regret to find that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving only the shells of houses where, three days before, a friendly population had been living in comfort. This wanton act, was so warmly felt by the whole army, that 8000 dollars were afterwards collected by general subscription for the poor inhabitants ; yet the injury sunk deeper than the atonement.

Lord Wellington had determined not to risk much to maintain his blockade, and he was well aware that Massena, reinforced by the army of the north and by the 9th corps, could bring down superior numbers. Nevertheless, when the moment arrived, trusting to the valour of his troops and the ascendancy which they had

acquired over the enemy during the pursuit from Santarem, he resolved to abide a battle ; but not to seek one, because his force, reduced to 32,000 infantry, 1200 cavalry in bad condition, and 42 guns, was unable, seeing the superiority of the French horse, to oppose the enemy's march.

The allies occupied a fine table-land, lying between the Turones and the Dos Casas, the left at Fort Conception ; the centre opposite to the village of Alameda ; the right at Fuentes Onoro ; the whole distance being five miles. The Dos Casas, flowing in a deep ravine, protected the front of this line, and the French general could not, with any prudence, venture to march, by his own right, against Almeida, lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of Alameda and Fuentes Onoro, should fall on his flank, and drive him into the Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained by Pack's brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave the fifth division near Fort Conception, and the sixth division opposite Alameda. The first and third were then concentrated on a gentle rise, about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes Onoro, where the steppe of land which the army occupied turned back, and ended on the Turones, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river.

FIRST COMBAT OF FUENTES ONORO.

The French came up in three columns abreast, the cavalry, the 6th corps, and Drouet's division against Fuentes Onoro ; but the 8th and 2nd corps against Alameda and Fort Conception, seeming to menace the left of the position ; wherefore, the light division, after passing the Dos Casas, reinforced the sixth division. General Loison, however, without waiting for Massena's orders, fell upon Fuentes Onoro, which was occupied by five battalions of chosen troops, detached from the first and third divisions.

Most of the houses of this village were quite in the bottom of the ravine, but an old chapel and some buildings on a craggy eminence, overhung one end. The low parts were vigorously defended ; yet the violence of the attack was so great, and the cannonade so heavy, that the British abandoned the streets, and could scarcely maintain the upper ground about the chapel. Colonel Williams, the commanding officer, fell badly wounded, and the fight was becoming very dangerous, when the 24th, the 71st, and the 79th regiments, coming down from the main position, charged so roughly, that the French were forced back, and after a severe contest, finally driven over the stream of the Dos Casas. During the night the detachments were withdrawn ; but the 24th, the 71st, and 79th regiments were left in the village, where 260 of the allies and somewhat more of the French had fallen.

On the 4th, Massena arrived, and, being joined by Bessieres with 1200 cavalry and a battery of the imperial guard, examined all the line, and made dispositions for the next day. His design was to hold the left of the allies in check with the 2nd corps, but to turn the right with the remainder of the army.

Forty thousand infantry and 5000 horse, with 30 pieces of artillery, were under arms, and they had shown in the action of the 3rd that their courage was not abated ; it was, therefore, a very audacious resolution in the English general to receive battle on such dangerous ground. His position as far as Fuentes Onoro was indeed strong and free for the use of all arms, and it covered his communication by the bridge of Castello Bom ; but on his right flank, the plain was continued in a second steppe to Nava d'Aver, where a considerable hill overlooking all the country, commanded the roads leading to the bridges of Seceiras and Sabugal. The enemy could, therefore, by a direct march from Ciudad Rodrigo, place his army at once in line of battle upon the right flank of the allies, and attack them while entangled between the Dos Casas, the Turones, the Coa, and the fortress of Almeida ; and the bridge of Castello Bom only would have been open for retreat. To prevent this stroke, and to cover his communications with Sabugal and Seceiras, Lord Wellington, yielding to General Spencer's earnest suggestions, stretched his right wing out to Nava d'Aver, the hill of which he caused Julian Sanchez to occupy, supporting him by the seventh division, under General Houston. Thus the line of battle was above seven miles in length, besides the circuit of

blockade. The Dos Casas, indeed, still covered the front ; but above Fuentes Onoro, the ravine became gradually obliterated, resolving itself into a swampy wood, which extended to Poço Velho, a village half way between Fuentes and Nava d'Aver. The left wing of the seventh division occupied this wood and the village of Poço Velho, but the right wing was refused.

BATTLE OF FUENTES ONORO.

It was Massena's intention to have made his dispositions in the night, in such a manner as to commence the attack at daybreak on the 5th ; but a delay of two hours occurring, the whole of his movements were plainly described. The 8th corps, withdrawn from Alameda, and supported by all the French cavalry, was seen marching above the village of Poço Velho, and at the same time the 6th corps and Drouet's division took ground to their own left, but still keeping a division in front of Fuentes. At this sight the light division and the English horse hastened to the support of General Houston ; while the first and third divisions made a movement parallel to that of the 6th corps. The latter, however, drove the left wing of the seventh division, consisting of Portuguese and British, from the village of Poço Velho with loss, and was gaining ground in the wood also, when the riflemen of the light division arriving at that point, restored the fight. The French cavalry, then passing Poço Velho, commenced forming in order of battle on the plain, between the wood and the hill of Nava d'Aver. Julian Sanchez immediately retired across the Turones, partly in fear, but more in anger, at the death of his lieutenant, who, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer, and shot by a soldier of the guards, before the action commenced.

Montbrun occupied himself with this weak Partida for an hour ; but when the guerilla chief had fallen back, the French general turned the right of the seventh division, and charged the British cavalry, which had moved up to its support. The combat was unequal ; for by an abuse too common, so many men had been drawn from the ranks as orderlies to general officers, and for other purposes, that not more than 1000 troopers were in the field. After one shock, in which the enemy were partially checked and the French colonel, Lamotte, taken fighting hand to hand, by General Charles Stewart, the cavalry withdrew behind the light division. Houston's people, being thus entirely exposed, were charged strongly, and Captain Ramsay's horse-artillery was cut off and surrounded. The light division instantly threw itself into squares, but the main body of the French horsemen were upon the seventh division ere a like formation could be effected : nevertheless, the troops stood firm, and, although some were cut down, the chasseurs Britanniques, taking advantage of a loose wall, received the attack with such a fire that the enemy recoiled. Immediately after this, a great commotion was observed amongst the French squadrons ; men and officers closed in confusion towards one point where a thick dust was rising, and where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols indicated some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude was violently agitated, an English shout arose, the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth at the head of his battery, his horses breathing fire and stretching like greyhounds along the plain, his guns bounding like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners in close and compact order protecting the rear. But while this brilliant action was passing in one part, the enemy were making progress in the wood, and the English divisions being separated and the right wing turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would soon be lost, if the original position was not immediately regained.

In this posture of affairs Lord Wellington directed the seventh division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to Frenada, the light division to retire over the plain, the cavalry to cover the rear. He also withdrew the first and third divisions, placing them and the Portuguese in line on the steppe, before described as running perpendicular to the ravine of Fuentes Onoro.

General Crawford, who had resumed the command of the light division, first covered the passage of the seventh division over the Turones, and then retired

slowly over the plain in squares, having the British cavalry principally on his right flank. He was followed by the enemy's horse, which continually outflanked him, and near the wood surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards, making Colonel Hill and 14 men prisoners, but then continuing their charge against the 42nd regiment, the French were repulsed. Many times Montbrun made as if he would storm the light division squares, but the latter were too formidable to be meddled with; yet, in all this war, there was not a more dangerous hour for England. The whole of that vast plain as far as the Turones was covered with a confused multitude, amidst which the squares appeared but as specks, for there was a great concourse, composed of commissariat followers of the camp, servants, baggage, led horses, and peasants attracted by curiosity, and finally, the broken piquets and parties coming out of the woods. The seventh division was separated from the army by the Turones, 5000 French cavalry, with 15 pieces of artillery, were close at hand impatient to charge; the infantry of the 8th corps was in order of battle behind the horsemen; the wood was filled with the skirmishers of the 6th corps, and if the latter body, pivoting upon Fuentes, had issued forth, while Drouet's divisions fell on that village, while the 8th corps attacked the light division, and while the whole of the cavalry made a general charge; the loose multitude encumbering the plain would have been driven violently in upon the first division, in such a manner as to have intercepted the latter's fire and broken their ranks.

No such effort was made; Montbrun's horsemen merely hovered about Crawford's squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to the right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the rocks to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada and was there joined by Julian Sanchez.

At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great execution from the closeness of the allied masses; but 12 British guns replied with vigour, and the violence of the enemy's fire abated; their cavalry then drew out of range, and a body of French infantry attempting to glide down the ravine of the Turones was repulsed by the riflemen and the light companies of the guards. But all this time a fierce battle was going on at Fuentes Onoro. Massena had directed Drouet to carry this village at the very moment when Montbrun's cavalry should turn the right wing; it was, however, two hours later ere the attack commenced. The three British regiments made a desperate resistance, but overmatched in number, and little accustomed to the desultory fighting of light troops, they were pierced and divided; two companies of the 79th were taken, Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, and the lower part of the town was carried; the upper part was, however, stiffly held, and the rolling of the musketry was incessant.

Had the attack been made earlier, and the whole of Drouet's division thrown frankly into the fight, while the 6th corps moving through the wood closely turned the village, the passage must have been forced and the left of the new position outflanked; but now Lord Wellington, having all his reserves in hand, detached considerable masses to the support of the regiments in Fuentes. The French continued also to reinforce their troops until the whole of the 6th corps and a part of Drouet's division were engaged, when several turns of fortune occurred. At one time the fighting was on the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another upon the rugged heights and round the chapel, and some of the enemy's skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the main position; but the village was never entirely abandoned by the defenders, and, in a charge of the 71st, 79th, and 88th regiments, led by Colonel M'Kinnon against a heavy mass which had gained the chapel eminence, a great number of the French fell. In this manner the fight lasted until evening, when the lower part of the town was abandoned by both parties, the British maintaining the chapel and crags, and the French retiring a cannon shot from the stream.

When the action ceased, a brigade of the light division relieved the regiments in the village; and a slight demonstration by the 2nd corps near Fort Concepcion, having been repulsed by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion, both armies remained in observation. Fifteen hundred men and officers, of which 300 were prisoners,

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constituted the loss of the allies ; that of the enemy was estimated at the time to be near 5000, but this exaggerated calculation was founded upon the erroneous supposition that 400 dead were lying about Fuentes Onoro. All armies make rash estimates on such occasions. Having had charge to bury the carcasses at that point, I can affirm that, immediately about the village, not more than 130 bodies were to be found, one-third of which were British.

During the battle, the French convoy for the supply of Almeida being held at Gallegos, in readiness to move, Lord Wellington sent Julian Sanchez from Frenada to menace it, and to disturb the communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This produced no effect, and a more decisive battle being expected on the 6th, the light division made breast-works amongst the crags of Fuentes Onoro, while Lord Wellington entrenched that part of the position which was immediately behind this village, so that the carrying of it would have scarcely benefited the enemy. Fuentes Onoro, strictly speaking, was not tenable ; there was a wooded tongue of land on the British right that overlooked, at half-cannon shot, all the upper as well as the lower part of the village both in flank and rear, yet was too distant from the position to be occupied by the allies : had Ney been at the head of the 6th corps, he would have quickly crowned this ridge, and then Fuentes could only have been maintained by submitting to a butchery.

On the 6th, the enemy sent his wounded to the rear, making no demonstration of attack, and as the 7th passed in a like inaction, the British entrenchments were perfected. The 8th, Massena withdrew his main body to the woods leading upon Espeja and Gallegos, but still maintained posts at Alameda and Fuentes. On the 10th, without being in any manner molested, he retired across the Agueda ; the 6th and 8th corps, and the cavalry, at Ciudad Rodrigo, the 2nd corps by the bridge of Barba del Puerco. Bessieres also carried off the imperial guards, for Massena had been recalled to France, and Marmont assumed the command of the army of Portugal.

Both sides claimed the victory ; the French, because they won the passage at Poço Velho, cleared the wood, turned our right flank, obliged the cavalry to retire, and forced Lord Wellington to relinquish three miles of ground, and to change his front. The English, because the village of Fuentes so often attacked, was successfully defended, and because the principal object (the covering the blockade of Almeida) was attained.

Certain it is that Massena at first gained great advantages. Napoleon would have made them fatal ; but it is also certain that, with an overwhelming cavalry, on ground particularly suitable to that arm, the Prince of Esling having, as it were, indicated all the errors of the English general's position, stopped short at the very moment when he should have sprung forward. By some this has been attributed to negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont ; but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his army had risen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would not charge at his order ; Junot did not second him cordially ; Loison neglected his instructions ; Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight ; and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of battle, being shaken, would not work.

General Pelet censures Lord Wellington for not sending his cavalry against Reynier after the second position was taken up ; asserting that any danger on that side would have forced the French to retreat ; but the criticism is unsustainable, being based on the notion that the allies had 50,000 men in the field, whereas, including Sanchez' Partidas, they had not 35,000. It may be with more justice objected to Massena that he did not launch some of his numerous horsemen, by the bridge of Seceiras, or Sabugal, against Guarda and Celerico, to destroy the magazines, cut the communication, and capture the mules and other means of transport belonging to the allied army.* The vice of the English general's position would then have been clearly exposed, for although the second regiment of German hussars was on the march from Lisbon, it had not passed Coimbra at this period, and could not have protected the depôts. But it can never be too often repeated

* Appendix, No. 1, section 8.

that war, however adorned by splendid strokes of skill, is commonly a series of errors and accidents. All the operations, on both sides, for six weeks furnished illustrations of this truth.

Ney's opposition had prevented Massena's march upon Coria, which would have secured Badajos and Campo Mayor, and, probably, added Elvas to them. Latour Maubourg's tardiness had like to have cost Mortier a rear-guard and a battering-train. By refusing the line of Merida, Beresford enabled the French to secure Badajos. At Sabugal, the petulance of a staff-officer marred an admirable combination, and produced a dangerous combat. Drouet's negligence placed Almeida at the mercy of the allies, and a mistaken notion of Massena's sufferings during the retreat, induced Lord Wellington to undertake two great operations at the same time, which were above his strength. In the battle of Fuentes Onoro, more errors than skill were observable on both sides, and the train of accidents did not stop there. The prize contended for presented another example of the uncertainty of war.

EVACUATION OF ALMEIDA.

General Brennier, a prisoner at Vimiero, and afterwards exchanged, was governor of this fortress. During the battle of Fuentes Onoro, his garrison, consisting of 1500 men, skirmished boldly with the blockading force, and loud explosions, supposed to be signals of communication with the relieving army, were frequent in the place. When all hopes of succour vanished, a soldier, named Tillet, contrived, with extraordinary courage and presence of mind, to penetrate, although in uniform, through the posts of blockade, carrying Brennier orders to evacuate the fortress. The French general had, however, by crossing the Agueda, left Almeida to its fate; the British general placed the light division in its old position on the Azava with cavalry posts on the Lower Agueda, and desired Sir William Erskine to send the fourth regiment to Barba del Puerco, while General Alexander Campbell continued the blockade with the sixth division and with General Pack's brigade.

Campbell's dispositions were either negligently made, or negligently executed. Erskine never transmitted the orders to the 4th regiment, and, in the mean time, Brennier, undismayed by the retreat of the French army, was preparing, like Julian Estrada, at Hostalrich, to force his way through the blockading troops. An open country and a double line of posts greatly enhanced the difficulty, yet Brennier was resolute not only to cut his own passage but to render the fortress useless to the allies. To effect this, he ruined all the principal bastions, and kept up a constant fire of his artillery in a singular manner, for always he fired several guns at one moment with very heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of another, so that, while some shots flew towards the besiegers and a loud explosion was heard, others destroyed pieces without attracting notice.

At midnight of the 10th, all being ready, he sprung his mines, sallied forth in a compact column, broke through the piquets, and passed between the quarters of the reserves, with a nicety that proved at once his talent of observation and his coolness. General Pack following, with a few men collected on the instant, plied him with a constant fire, yet nothing could shake or retard his column, which in silence, and without returning a shot, gained the rough country leading upon Barba del Puerco. Here it halted for a moment, just as daylight broke, and Pack, who was at hand, hearing that some English dragoons were in a village a short distance to the right, sent an officer to bring them out upon the French flank, thus occasioning a slight skirmish and consequent delay. The troops of blockade had paid little attention at first to the explosion of the mines, thinking them a repetition of Brennier's previous practice; but Pack's fire having roused them, the 36th regiment was close at hand, and the 4th, also, having heard the firing at Valde Mula, was rapidly gaining the right flank of the enemy. Brennier, having driven off the cavalry, was again in march; yet the British regiments, throwing off their knapsacks, followed at such a pace that they overtook the rear of his column in the act of descending the deep chasm of Barba del Puerco, killed and wounded many,

captured about 300, and even passed the bridge in pursuit ; there, however, the 2nd corps, which was in order of battle, awaiting Brennier's approach, repulsed them with a loss of 30 or 40 men. Had Sir William Erskine given the 4th regiment its orders, the French column would have been lost.

Lord Wellington, stung by this event, and irritated by several previous examples of undisciplined valour, issued a remonstrance to the army. It was justly strong, and the following remarks are as applicable to some writers as to soldiers :—"The officers of the army may depend upon it that the enemy to whom they are opposed is not less prudent than powerful. Notwithstanding what has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have never seen small bodies, unsupported, successfully opposed to large ; nor has the experience of any officer realized the stories which all have read of whole armies being driven by a handful of light infantry and dragoons."

CHAPTER VI.

WHEN Marmont had thus recovered the garrison of Almeida, he withdrew the greatest part of his army towards Salamanca. Lord Wellington then, leaving the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, under General Spencer, on the Azava, directed the third and seventh divisions and the second German hussars upon Badajos : and on the 15th, hearing that Soult, although hitherto reported by Beresford to be entirely on the defensive, was actually marching into Estremadura, he set out himself for that province ; but, ere he could arrive, a great and bloody battle had terminated the operations.*

While awaiting the Spanish general's accession to Lord Wellington's plan, Beresford fixed his head-quarters at Almendralejos ; but Latour Maubourg remained at Guadalcanal, and his parties were foraging the most fertile tracts between the armies. Penne Villamur was, therefore, reinforced with five squadrons ; and Colonel John Colborne was detached with a brigade of the second division, two Spanish guns, and two squadrons of cavalry, to curb the French inroads, and to raise the confidence of the people. Colborne, a man of singular talent for war, by rapid marches and sudden changes of direction, in concert with Villamur, created great confusion amongst the enemy's parties. He intercepted several convoys, and obliged the French troops to quit Fuente Ovejuna, La Granja, Azuaga, and most of the other frontier towns, and he imposed upon Latour Maubourg with so much address, that the latter, imagining a great force was at hand, abandoned Guadalcanal also, and fell back to Constantino.

Having cleared the country on that side, Colborne attempted to surprise the fortified post of Benelcazar, and, by a hardy attempt, was like to have carried it ; for, riding on to the drawbridge with a few officers in the grey of the morning, he summoned the commandant to surrender, as the only means of saving himself from the Spanish army, which was close at hand and would give no quarter. The French officer, amazed at the appearance of the party, was yet too resolute to yield, and Colborne, quick to perceive the attempt had failed, galloped off under a few straggling shots. After this, taking to the mountains, he rejoined the army without any loss.

During his absence, the Spanish generals acceded to Lord Wellington's proposition ; Blake was in march for Xeres Caballeros, and Ballasteros was at Burghillos. The waters of the Guadiana had also subsided, the bridge under Jerumenha was restored, and the preparations completed for the

FIRST ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

The 5th of May, General William Stewart invested this place, on the left bank of the Guadiana, with two squadrons of horse, six field-pieces, and three brigades of infantry, while the formation of the depôt of the siege was commenced by the engineers and artillery.

* Appendix, No. 2, section 11.

On the 7th the remainder of the infantry, reinforced by 2000 Spaniards under Carlos d'España, encamped in the woods near the fortress; but Madden's Portuguese remained in observation near Merida, and a troop of horse-artillery arriving from Lisbon was attached to the English cavalry, which was still near Los Santos and Zafra. The flying bridge was at first brought up from Jerumenha, and re-established near the mouth of the Caya; it was however again drawn over, because the right bank of the Guadiana being still open, some French horse had come down the river.

The 8th, General Lumley invested Christoval on the right bank, with a brigade of the fourth division, four light Spanish guns, the 17th Portuguese infantry, and two squadrons of horse drafted from the garrison of Elvas; nevertheless, the troops did not arrive simultaneously, and 60 French dragoons, moving under the fire of the place, disputed the ground, and were only repulsed, after a sharp skirmish, by the Portuguese infantry.

Thus the first serious siege undertaken by the British army in the Peninsula was commenced, and, to the discredit of the English government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of prosecuting such enterprises. The engineer officers were exceedingly zealous, and, notwithstanding some defects in the constitution and customs of their corps tending rather to make regimental than practical scientific officers, many of them were very well versed in the theory of their business. But the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utter destitution of all that belonged to real service. Without a corps of sappers and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on an approach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended by the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age: the best officers and the finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice themselves in a lamentable manner to compensate for the negligence and incapacity of a government, always ready to plunge the nation into war without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. The sieges carried on by the British in Spain were a succession of butcheries, because the commonest resources of their art were denied to the engineers.

Colonel Fletcher's plan was to breach the castle of Badajos, while batteries established on the right bank of the Guadiana should take the defences in reverse; false attacks against the Pardaleras and Picurina were also to be commenced by re-opening the French trenches; but it was necessary to reduce the fort of Christoval ere the batteries for ruining the defences of the castle could be erected.

In double operations, whether of the field or of siege, it is essential to move with an exact concert, lest the enemy should crush each in detail, yet neither in the investment nor in the attack was this maxim regarded. Captain Squires, although ill provided with tools, was directed to commence a battery against Christoval on the night of the 8th, under a bright moon, and at the distance of only 400 yards from the rampart. Exposed to a destructive fire of musketry from the fort, and of shot and shells from the town, he continued to work, with great loss, until the 10th, when the enemy, making a furious sally, carried his battery.* The French were, indeed, immediately driven back, but the allies pursuing too hotly, were taken in front and flank with grape, and lost 400 men. Thus five engineers and 700 officers and soldiers of the line were already on the long and bloody list of victims offered to this Moloch; and only one small battery against a small outwork was completed! On the 11th it opened, but before sunset the fire of the enemy had disabled four of its five guns, and killed many more of the besiegers; nor could any other result be expected, seeing that this single work was exposed to the undivided fire of the fortress, for the approaches against the castle were not yet commenced, and two distant batteries on the false attacks scarcely attracted the notice of the enemy.

To check future sallies, a second battery was erected against the bridge-head, but this was also overmatched, and meanwhile Beresford, having received intelligence that the French army was again in movement, arrested the progress of all the works. On the 12th, believing this information premature, he resumed the labour, directing the trenches to be opened against the castle: the intelligence was,

* Appendix, No. 10, section 3.

however, true, and being confirmed at 12 o'clock in the night, the working parties were again drawn off, and measures taken to raise the siege.

SOULT'S SECOND EXPEDITION TO ESTREMADURA.

The Duke of Dalmatia resolved to succour Badajos the moment he heard of Beresford's being in Estremadura; the tardiness of the latter not only gave the garrison time to organize a defence, but permitted the French general to tranquillize his province and arrange a system of resistance to the allied army in the Isla. With that view, he commenced additional fortifications at Seville, renewing also the construction of those which had been suspended in other places by the battle of Barosa, and thus deceived Beresford, who believed that, far from thinking to relieve Badajos, he was trembling for his own province.* Nothing could be more fallacious. There were 70,000 fighting men in Andalusia, and Drouet, who had quitted Massena immediately after the battle of Fuentes Onoro, was likewise in march for that province by the way of Avila and Toledo, bringing with him 11,000 men.

All things being ready, Soult quitted Seville the 10th, with 30 guns, 3000 heavy dragoons, and a division of infantry, reinforced by a battalion of grenadiers belonging to the 1st corps, and by two regiments of light cavalry belonging to the 4th corps. The 11th, he entered Olalla, where General Marasin joined him, and at the same time a brigade of Godinot's division marched from Cordoba upon Constantino, to reinforce the 5th corps, which was falling back from Guadalcanal in consequence of Colborne's operations. The 13th, a junction was effected with Latour Maubourg, who assumed the command of the heavy cavalry, while Girard taking that of the 5th corps, advanced to Los Santos. The 14th, the French head-quarters reached Villa Franca. Being then within 30 miles of Badajos, Soult caused his heaviest guns to fire salvos during the night, to give notice of his approach to the garrison; but the expedient failed of success, and the 15th, in the evening, the army was concentrated at Santa Marta.

Beresford, as I have before said, remained in a state of uncertainty until the night of the 12th, when he commenced raising the siege, contrary to the earnest representations of the engineers, who promised to put him in possession of the place in three days if he would persevere. This promise was ill-founded, and, if it had been otherwise, Soult would have surprised him in the trenches: his firmness, therefore, saved the army, and his arrangements for carrying off the stores were admirably executed. The artillery and the platforms were removed in the night of the 13th, and at 12 o'clock on the 15th, all the guns and stores on the left bank having been passed over the Guadiana, the gabions and fascines were burnt, and the flying-bridge removed. These transactions were completely masked by the fourth division, which, with the Spaniards, continued to maintain the investment; it was not until the rear-guard was ready to draw off that the French, in a sally, after severely handling the piquets of Harvey's Portuguese brigade, learned that the siege was raised. But of the cause they were still ignorant.

Beresford held a conference with the Spanish generals at Valverde, on the 13th, when it was agreed to receive battle at the village of Albuera. Ballasteros' and Blake's corps, having already formed a junction at Baracotta, were then falling back upon Almendral, and Blake engaged to bring them into line at Albuera, before 12 o'clock, on the 15th. Meanwhile, as Badajos was the centre of an arc, sweeping through Valverde, Albuera, and Talavera Real, it was arranged that Blake's army should watch the roads on the right; the British and the 5th Spanish army guard those leading upon the centre; and that Madden's Portuguese cavalry should observe those on the left, conducting through Talavera Real. The main body of the British, being in the woods near Valverde, could reach Albuera by a half march, and no part of the arc was more than four leagues from Badajos; but the enemy, being on the 14th at Los Santos, was eight leagues distant from Albuera: hence, Beresford, thinking that he could not be forestalled on any point of importance to the allies, continued to keep the fourth division round the fortress. Colborne's

* Appendix, No. 2, section 11.

movable column joined the army on the 14th, Madden then retired to Talavera Real, Blake's army reached Almendral, and the allied cavalry, under General Long, fell back before the enemy from Zafra and Los Santos to Santa Marta, where it was joined by the dragoons of the 4th army.

In the morning of the 15th, the British occupied the left of the position of Albuera, which was a ridge about four miles long, having the Aroya Val de Seville in rear and the Albuera river in front. The right of the army was prolonged towards Almendral, the left towards Badajos, and the ascent from the river was easy, the ground being in all parts practicable for cavalry and artillery. Somewhat in advance of the centre were the bridge and village of Albuera, the former commanded by a battery, the latter occupied by Alten's brigade. The second division, under General William Stewart, was drawn up in one line, the right on a commanding hill over which the Valverde road passed; the left on the road of Badajos, beyond which the order of battle was continued in two lines by the Portuguese troops under General Hamilton and Colonel Collins.

The right of the position, which was stronger and higher and broader than any other part, was left open for Blake's army, because Beresford, thinking the hill on the Valverde road to be the key of the position, as protecting his only line of retreat, was desirous to secure it with the best troops. The fourth division and the infantry of the 5th army were still before Badajos, but General Cole had orders to send the 17th Portuguese regiment to Elvas; to throw a battalion of Spaniards into Olivenza; to bring his second brigade, which was before Christoval, over the Guadiana, by a ford above Badajos, if practicable, and to be in readiness to march at the first notice.

In this posture of affairs, about three o'clock in the evening of the 15th, while Beresford was at some distance on the left, the whole mass of the allied cavalry, closely followed by the French light horsemen, came in from Santa Marta in a hurried manner, and, passing the Albuera, abandoned all the wooded heights in front to the enemy, whose dispositions being thus effectually concealed at the distance of cannon-shot, the strength of the position was already sapped. Beresford immediately formed a temporary right wing with the cavalry and artillery, stretching his piquets along the road to Almendral, and sending officers to hasten Blake's movements; but that general, who had only a few miles of good road to march, and who had promised to be in line at noon, did not reach the ground before 11 at night; and his rear was not there before three o'clock in the morning of the 16th; meanwhile, as the enemy was evidently in force on the Albuera road, Cole and Madden were ordered up. The orders failed to reach the latter, but, at six o'clock in the morning, the former reached the position with the infantry of the fifth army, two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry, and two brigades of the fourth division; the third brigade, under Colonel Kemmis, being unable to cross the Guadiana, above Badajos, was in march by Jerumenha. The Spanish troops immediately joined Blake on the right, and the two brigades of the fourth division were drawn up in columns behind the second division. The Portuguese squadrons reinforced Colonel Otway, whose horsemen, of the same nation, were pushed forward in front of the left wing; and, as General Long seemed oppressed by the responsibility of directing the troops of so many different nations, General Lumley assumed the chief command of the allied squadrons, which were concentrated in rear of the centre.

The position was now occupied by 30,000 infantry, above 2000 cavalry, and 38 pieces of artillery, of which 18 were 9-pounders; but, the brigade of the fourth division being still absent, the British infantry, the pith and strength of battle, did not amount to 7000, and already Blake's arrogance was shaking Beresford's authority. The French had 50 guns, and above 4000 veteran cavalry, but only 19,000 chosen infantry; yet being of one nation, obedient to one discipline, and animated by one spirit, their excellent composition amply compensated for the inferiority of numbers, and their general's talent was immeasurably greater than his adversary's.

Soult examined Beresford's position, without hindrance, on the evening of the 15th, and having heard that the fourth division was left before Badajos, and that

Blake would not arrive before the 17th, he resolved to attack the next morning, for he had detected all the weakness of the English general's dispositions for battle.

The hill in the centre, commanding the Valverde road, was undoubtedly the key of the position if an attack was made parallel to the front; but the heights on the right presented a sort of table-land, trending backwards towards the Valverde road, and looking into the rear of the line of battle. Hence it was evident that, if a mass of troops could be placed there, they must be beaten, or the right wing of the allied army would be rolled up on the centre and pushed into the narrow ravine of the Aroya: the Valverde road could then be seized, the retreat cut, and the powerful cavalry of the French would complete the victory. Now the right of the allies and the left of the French approximated to each other, being only divided by a wooded hill, about cannon-shot distance from either but separated from the allies by the Albueira, and from the French by a rivulet called the FERIA. This height, neglected by Beresford, was ably made use of by Soult. During the night he placed behind it the artillery under General Ruty; the 5th corps under Girard; and the heavy dragoons under Latour Maubourg; thus concentrating 15,000 men and 40 guns within ten minutes' march of Beresford's right wing, and yet that general could neither see a man nor draw a sound conclusion as to the real plan of attack.

The light cavalry, the division of the first corps under General Werlé, Godinot's brigade, and ten guns, still remained at the French marshal's disposal. These he formed in the woods, extending along the banks of the FERIA towards its confluence with the Albueira, and Godinot was ordered to attack the village and bridge, and to bear strongly against the centre of the position, with a view to attract Beresford's attention, to separate his wings, and to double up his right at the moment when the principal attack should be developed.

BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

During the night, Blake and Cole, as we have seen, arrived with above 16,000 men; but so defective was the occupation of the ground, that Soult had no change to make in his plans from this circumstance, and, a little before nine o'clock in the morning, Godinot's division issued from the woods in one heavy column of attack, preceded by ten guns. He was flanked by the light cavalry, and followed by Werlé's division of reserve, and, making straight towards the bridge, commenced a sharp cannonade, attempting to force the passage; at the same time Briché, with two regiments of hussars, drew further down the river to observe Colonel Otway's horse.

The allies' guns on the rising ground above the village answered the fire of the French, and ploughed through their columns, which were crowding without judgment towards the bridge, although the stream was passable above and below. But Beresford, observing that Werlé's division did not follow closely, was soon convinced that the principal effort would be on the right, and, therefore, sent Blake orders to form a part of the first and all the second line of the Spanish army, on the broad part of the hills, at right angles to their actual front. Then drawing the Portuguese infantry of the left wing to the centre, he sent one brigade down to support Alten, and directed General Hamilton to hold the remainder in columns of battalions ready to move to any part of the field. The 13th dragoons were posted near the edge of the river, above the bridge, and, meanwhile, the second division marched to support Blake. The horse artillery, the heavy dragoons, and the fourth division also took ground to the right, and were posted; the cavalry and guns on a small plain behind the Aroya, and the fourth division in an oblique line about half musket shot behind them. This done, Beresford galloped to Blake, for that general had refused to change his front, and, with great heat, told Colonel Hardinge, the bearer of the order, that the real attack was at the village and bridge. Beresford had sent again to entreat that he would obey, but this message was as fruitless as the former, and when the marshal arrived nothing had been done. The enemy's columns were, however, now beginning to appear on the right, and Blake, yielding to this evidence, proceeded to make the evolution, yet with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford, impatient of his folly, took the direction in person.

Great was the confusion and the delay thus occasioned, and ere the troops could be put in order the French were amongst them. For scarcely had Godinot engaged Alten's brigade, when Werlé, leaving only a battalion of grenadiers and some squadrons to watch the 13th dragons and to connect the attacks, countermarched with the remainder of his division, and rapidly gained the rear of the 5th corps as it was mounting the hills on the right of the allies. At the same time the mass of light cavalry suddenly quitted Godinot's column, and crossing the river Albuera above the bridge, ascended the left bank at a gallop, and, sweeping round the rear of the 5th corps, joined Latour Maubourg, who was already in face of Lumley's squadrons. Thus half an hour had sufficed to render Beresford's position nearly desperate. Two-thirds of the French were in a compact order of battle on a line perpendicular to his right, and his army, disordered and composed of different nations, was still in the difficult act of changing its front. It was in vain that he endeavoured to form the Spanish line sufficiently in advance to give room for the second division to support it; the French guns opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musketry, and their cavalry, outflanking the front and charging here and there, put the Spaniards in disorder at all points; in a short time the latter gave way, and Soult, thinking the whole army was yielding, pushed forward his columns while his reserves also mounted the hill, and General Ruty placed all the batteries in position.

At this critical moment General William Stewart arrived at the foot of the height with Colonel Colborne's brigade, which formed the head of the second division. The colonel, seeing the confusion above, desired to form in order of battle previous to mounting the ascent, but Stewart, whose boiling courage overlaid his judgment, led up without any delay in column of companies, and attempted to open out his line in succession as the battalions arrived at the summit. Being under a destructive fire, the foremost charged to gain room, but a heavy rain prevented any object from being distinctly seen, and four regiments of hussars and lancers, which had passed the right flank in the obscurity, came galloping in upon the rear of the line at the instant of its development, and slew or took two-thirds of the brigade. One battalion only (the 31st) being still in column, escaped the storm and maintained its ground, while the French horsemen, riding violently over everything else, penetrated to all parts. In the tumult, a lancer fell upon Beresford, but the marshal, a man of great strength, putting his spear aside, cast him from his saddle, and a shift of wind blowing aside the mist and smoke, the mischief was perceived from the plains by General Lumley, who sent four squadrons out upon the lancers, and cut many of them off.

During this first unhappy effort of the second division, so great was the confusion, that the Spanish line continued to fire without cessation, although the British were before them; whereupon Beresford, finding his exhortations to advance fruitless, seized an ensign and bore him and his colours, by main force, to the front, yet the troops would not follow, and the man went back again on being released. In this crisis, the weather, which had ruined Colborne's brigade, also prevented Soult from seeing the whole extent of the field of battle, and he still kept his heavy columns together. His cavalry, indeed, began to hem in that of the allies, but the fire of the horse-artillery enabled Lumley, covered as he was by the bed of the Aroya and supported by the fourth division, to check them on the plain, while Colborne still maintained the heights with the 31st regiment; the British artillery, under Major Dickson, was likewise coming fast into action, and William Stewart, who had escaped the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the hill with General Houghton's brigade; which he brought on with the same vehemence, but, instructed by his previous misfortune, in a juster order of battle. The weather now cleared, and a dreadful fire poured into the thickest of the French columns convinced Soult that the day was yet to be won.

Houghton's regiments soon got footing on the summit; Dickson placed the artillery in line, the remaining brigade of the second division came up on the left, and two Spanish corps at last moved forward. The enemy's infantry then recoiled, yet soon recovering, renewed the fight with greater violence than before; the cannon on both sides discharged showers of grape at half range, and the peals of

musketry were incessant and often within pistol shot ; but the close formation of the French embarrassed their battle, and the British line would not yield them one inch of ground nor a moment of time to open their ranks. Their fighting was, however, fierce and dangerous. Stewart was twice wounded, Colonel Duckworth, of the 48th was slain, and the gallant Houghton, who had received many wounds without shrinking, fell and died in the act of cheering his men. Still the struggle continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis and 22 officers, and more than 400 men out of 570 that had mounted the hill, fell in the 57th alone, and the other regiments were scarcely better off ; not one-third were standing in any ; ammunition failed, and, as the English fire slackened, the enemy established a column in advance upon the right flank ; the play of Dickson's artillery indeed checked them a moment, but again the Polish lancers charging, captured six guns. In this desperate crisis, Beresford, who had already withdrawn the 13th dragoons from the banks of the river and brought Hamilton's Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde movement, wavered !—destruction stared him in the face, his personal resources were exhausted, and the unhappy thought of a retreat rose in his agitated mind. Yet no order to that effect was given, and it was urged by some about him that the day might still be redeemed with the fourth division. While he hesitated, Colonel Hardinge boldly ordered General Cole to advance, and then riding to Colonel Abercrombie, who commanded the remaining brigade of the second division, directed him also to push forward into the fight. The die being thus cast, Beresford acquiesced, and this terrible battle was continued.

The fourth division had only two brigades in the field ; the one Portuguese under General Harvey, the other British, commanded by Sir W. Myers and composed of the 7th and 23rd regiments, was called the fusileer brigade. General Cole directed the Portuguese to move between Lumley's dragoons and the hill, where they were immediately charged by some of the French horsemen, but beat them off with great loss : meanwhile he led the fusileers in person up the height.

At this time six guns were in the enemy's possession, the whole of Werlé's reserves were coming forward to reinforce the front column of the French, and the remnant of Houghton's brigade could no longer maintain its ground ; the field was heaped with carcases, the lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the upper part of the hill, and on the lower slopes, a Spanish and an English regiment in mutual error were exchanging volleys : behind all, General Hamilton's Portuguese, in withdrawing from the heights above the bridge, appeared to be in retreat. The conduct of a few brave men soon changed this state of affairs. Colonel Robert Arbuthnot, pushing between the double fire of the mistaken troops, arrested that mischief, while Cole, with the fusileers, flanked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion under Colonel Hawkshawe, mounted the hill, dispersed the lancers, recovered the captured guns, and appeared on the right of Houghton's brigade exactly as Abercrombie passed it on the left.

Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy's heavy masses, which were increasing and pressing onwards as to an assured victory : they wavered, hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from the artillery whistled through the British ranks. Cole and three colonels fell wounded, and the fusileer battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult, by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen ; in vain did the hardest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair field ; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their order ; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front ; their measured tread shook the ground ; their dreadful volleys swept away the head

of every formation ; their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot and with a horrid carnage, it was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the struggling multitude, endeavour to sustain the fight ; their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass, giving way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and 1500 unwounded men, the remnant of 6000 unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill !

CHAPTER VII.

WHILE the fusileers were thus striving on the upper part of the hill, the cavalry and Harvey's brigade continually advanced, and Latour Maubourg's dragoons, battered by Lefebvre's guns, retired before them, yet still threatening the British with their right, and covering the flank of their own infantry from a charge of Lumley's horse. Beresford, seeing that Colonel Hardinge's decision had brought on the critical moment of the battle, then endeavoured to secure a favourable result. Blake's first line had not been at all engaged, and were ordered to move upon the village ; Alten's Germans and Hamilton's and Collins's Portuguese were thus rendered disposable, forming a mass of 10,000 fresh men with which the English general followed up the attack of the fusileers and Abercrombie's brigade, and at the same time the Spanish divisions of Zayas, Ballasteros, and España advanced. Nevertheless, so rapid was the execution of the fusileers, that the enemy's infantry were never attained by these reserves, which yet suffered severely ; for General Ruty got the French guns altogether, and worked them with prodigious activity, while the 5th corps still made head, and, when the day was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the Albuera, and protected the passage of the broken infantry.

Beresford, being too hardly handled to pursue, formed a fresh line with his Portuguese, parallel to the hill from whence Soult had advanced to the attack in the morning, and where the French troops were now rallying with their usual celerity. Meanwhile the fight continued at the village, but Godinot's division and the connecting battalion of grenadiers on that side were soon afterwards withdrawn, and the action terminated before three o'clock.

The serious fighting had endured only four hours, and in that space of time, nearly 7000 of the allies and above 8000 of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals were wounded, two slain, and 800 soldiers so badly hurt as to be left on the field. On Beresford's side only 2000 Spaniards, and 600 Germans and Portuguese, were killed or wounded ; hence it is plain with what a resolution the pure British fought, for they had only 1500 men left standing out of 6000 ! The laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it on his bleeding front.

The trophies of the French were 500 unwounded prisoners, a howitzer, and several stand of colours ; the British had nothing of that kind to boast of ; but the horrid piles of carcasses within their lines told, with dreadful eloquence, who were the conquerors, and all the night the rain poured down, and the river and the hills and the woods on each side resounded with the dismal clamour and groans of dying men. Beresford, obliged to place his Portuguese in the front line, was oppressed with the number of his wounded ; they far exceeded that of the sound amongst the British soldiers, and when the latter's piquets were established, few men remained to help the sufferers. In this cruel situation he sent Colonel Hardinge to demand assistance from Blake ; but wrath and mortified pride were predominant in that general's breast, and he refused ; saying it was customary with allied armies for each to take care of its own men.

Morning came, and both sides remained in their respective situations, the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines still menacing and dangerous. The greater multitude had fallen on the French part, but the best soldiers on that of the allies ; and the dark masses of Soult's powerful cavalry and artil-



lery, as they covered all his front, seemed alone able to contend again for the victory : the right of the French also appeared to threaten the Badajos road, and Beresford, in gloom and doubt, awaited another attack. On the 17th, however, the third brigade of the fourth division came up by a forced march from Jerumenha, and enabled the second division to retake their former ground between the Valverde and the Badajos roads. On the 18th, Soult retreated.

He left to the generosity of the English general several hundred men too deeply wounded to be removed ; but all that could travel he had, in the night of the 17th, sent towards Seville, by the royal road, through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio : then, protecting his movements with all his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he filed the army, in the morning, to its right, and gained the road of Solano. When this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briché protected the march of the wounded men by the royal road.

The Duke of Dalmatia remained the 10th at Solano. His intention was to hold a position in Estremadura until he could receive reinforcements from Andalusia ; for he judged truly that, although Beresford was in no condition to hurt Badajos, Lord Wellington would come down, and that fresh combats would be required to save that fortress. On the 14th, he had commenced repairing the castle of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos and Santa Marta, and he now continued this work ; designing to form a head of cantonments, that the allies would be unable to besiege before the French army could be reinforced.

When Beresford discovered the enemy's retreat, he despatched General Hamilton to make a show of re-investing Badajos, which was effected at daybreak the 10th, but on the left bank only. Meanwhile the allied cavalry, supported by Alten's Germans, followed the French line of retreat. Soult then transferred his headquarters to Fuente del Maestre, and the Spanish cavalry cutting off some of his men menaced Villalba. Lord Wellington reached the field of battle the same day, and, after examining the state of affairs, desired the marshal to follow the enemy cautiously ; then returning to Elvas himself, he directed the third and seventh divisions, which were already at Campo Mayor, to complete the re-investment of Badajos on the right bank.

Meanwhile Beresford, advanced by the Solano road to Almendralejos, where he found some more wounded men. His further progress was not opposed. The number of officers who had fallen in the French army, together with the privations endured, had produced despondence and discontent ; the garrison at Villalba was not even disposed to maintain the castle, and under these circumstances, the Duke of Dalmatia evacuated it, and continued his own retreat in the direction of Llerena, where he assumed a position on the 23rd, his cavalry being near Usagre. This abandonment of the royal road to Seville was a well-considered movement. The country through which Soult passed being more fruitful and open, he could draw greater advantage from his superior cavalry ; the mountains behind him were so strong he had nothing to fear from an attack ; and by Belalcázar and Almadén, he could maintain a communication with La Mancha, from whence he expected Drouet's division. The road of Guadalcanal was in his rear, by which he could draw reinforcements from Córdoba and from the 4th corps, and meanwhile the allies durst not venture to expose their left flank by marching on Monasterio.

From Llerena, a detachment was sent to drive away a Spanish Partisan corps which had cut his communications with Guadalcanal, and at the same time Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the country beyond Usagre ; this led to an action ; for that town, built upon a hill, and covered towards Los Santos by a river with steep and rugged banks, had only the one outlet by the bridge on that side, and when Latour Maubourg approached, Lumley retired across the river. The French light cavalry then marched along the right bank, with the intention of crossing lower down and thus covering the passage of the heavy horsemen ; but before they could effect this object, General Bron rashly passed the river with two regiments of dragoons, and drew up in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley was lying close behind a rising ground, and when the French regiments had advanced a sufficient

distance, Lefebvre's guns opened on them, and the 3rd and 4th dragoon guards charged them in front while Madden's Portuguese fell on their flank. They were overthrown at the first shock, and fled towards the bridge, but that being choked by the remainder of the cavalry advancing to their support, the fugitives turned to the right and left, endeavouring to save themselves amongst some gardens situated on the banks of the river; there they were pursued and sabred until the French on the opposite side, seeing their distress, opened a fire of carbines and artillery that obliged the British to discontinue the attack. Forty killed, above 100 wounded, and 80 prisoners, were the fruits of this brilliant action of General Lumley's, which terminated Beresford's operations, for the miserable state to which the regency had reduced the Portuguese army imperatively called for the marshal's presence. General Hill who had returned to Portugal, then re-assumed the command of the second division, amidst the eager rejoicings of the troops, and Lord Wellington directed the renewed siege of Badajos in person.

OBSERVATIONS.

No general ever gained a great battle with so little increase of military reputation as Marshal Beresford. His personal intrepidity and strength, qualities so attractive for the multitude, were conspicuously displayed, yet the breath of his own army withered his laurels, and his triumph was disputed by the very soldiers who followed his car. Their censures have been reiterated, without change and without abatement, even to this hour; and a close examination of his operations, while it detects many ill-founded objections, and others tainted with malice, leaves little doubt that the general feeling was right.

When he had passed the Guadiana and driven the 5th corps upon Guadalcanal, the delay that intervened before he invested Badajos, was unjustly attributed to him: it was Lord Wellington's order, resulting from the tardiness of the Spanish generals, that paralyzed his operations. But when the time for action arrived, the want of concert in the investment, and the ill-matured attack on San Christoval, belonged to Beresford's arrangements; and he is especially responsible in reputation for the latter, because Captain Squires personally represented the inevitable result, and his words were unheeded.

During the progress of the siege, either the want of correct intelligence, or a blunted judgment, misled the marshal. It was remarked that, at all times, he too readily believed the idle tales of distress and difficulties in the French armies, with which the spies generally, and the deserters always, interlarded their information. Thus he was incredulous of Soult's enterprise, and that marshal was actually over the Morena before the orders were given for the commencing of the main attack of the castle of Badajos. However, the firmness with which Beresford resisted the importunities of the engineers to continue the siege, and the quick and orderly removal of the stores and battering-train, were alike remarkable and praiseworthy. It would have been happy if he had shown as much magnanimity in what followed.

When he met Blake and Castaños at Valverde, the alternative of fighting or retiring behind the Guadiana was the subject of consideration. The Spanish generals were both in favour of giving battle. Blake, who could not retire the way he had arrived, without danger of having his march intercepted, was particularly earnest to fight; affirming that his troops, who were already in a miserable state, would disperse entirely if they were obliged to enter Portugal. Castaños was of the same opinion. Beresford also argued that it was unwise to relinquish the hope of taking Badajos, and ungenerous to desert the people of Estremadura; that a retreat would endanger Elvas, lay open the Alemtejo, and encourage the enemy to push his incursions further, which he could safely do, having such a fortress as Badajos, with its bridge over the Guadiana, in his rear; a battle must then be fought in the Alemtejo with fewer troops and after a dispiriting retreat; there was also a greater scarcity of food in the Portuguese than in the Spanish province, and, finally, as the weather was menacing, the Guadiana might again rise before the stores were carried over, when the latter must be abandoned, or the army endangered to protect their passage.

But these plausible reasons were but a mask; the true cause why the English general adopted Blake's proposals was the impatient temper of the British troops. None of them had been engaged in the battles under Lord Wellington. At Busaco the regiments of the fourth division were idle spectators on the left, as those of the second division were on the right, while the action was in the centre. During Massena's retreat they had not been employed under fire, and the combats of Sabugal and Fuentes Onoro had been fought without them. Thus a burning thirst for battle was general, and Beresford had not the art either of conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a very violent and unjust clamour would have been raised against him, and this was so strongly and unceremoniously represented to him, by an officer on his own staff, that he gave way. These are what may be termed the moral obstacles of war. Such men as Lord Wellington or Sir John Moore can stride over them, but to second-rate minds they are insuperable. Practice and study may make a good general as far as the handling of troops and the designing of a campaign, but that ascendancy of spirit which leads the wise, and controls the insolence of folly, is a rare gift of nature.

Beresford yielded with an unhappy flexibility to the clamour of the army and the representations of Blake, for it is unquestionable that the resolution to fight was unwarrantable on any sound military principle. We may pass over the argument founded upon the taking of Badajos, because neither the measures nor the means of the English general promised the slightest chance of success; the siege would have died away of itself in default of resources to carry it on. The true question to consider was, not whether Estremadura should be destroyed or Badajos abandoned, but whether Lord Wellington's combinations and his great and well-considered design for the deliverance of the Peninsula, should be ruined and defaced at a blow. To say that the Alemtejo could not have been defended until the commander-in-chief arrived from the north with reinforcements was mere trifling. Soult, with 20,000 or even 30,000 men, durst not have attempted the siege of Elvas in the face of 24,000 men such as Beresford commanded. The result of the battle of Fuentes Onoro was known in the English and in the French camps, before Beresford broke up from Badajos; hence he was certain that additional troops would soon be brought down to the Guadiana; indeed, the third and seventh divisions were actually at Campo Mayor the 23rd of May. The danger to the Alemtejo was, therefore, slight, and the necessity of a battle being by no means apparent, it remains to analyze the chances of success.

Soult's numbers were not accurately known, but it was ascertained that he had not less than 20,000 veteran troops. He had also a great superiority of cavalry and artillery, and the country was peculiarly suitable for these arms; the martial character of the man was also understood. Now the allies could bring into the field more of infantry by 10,000 than the French, but they were of various tongues, and the Spanish part, ill armed, starving, and worn out with fatigue, had been repeatedly and recently defeated by the very troops they were going to engage. The French were compact, swift of movement, inured to war, used to act together, and under the command of one able and experienced general. The allied army was unwieldy, each nation mistrusting the other, and the whole without unity of spirit, or of discipline, or of command. On what, then, could Marshal Beresford found his hopes of success? The British troops. The latter were therefore to be freely used. But was it a time to risk the total destruction of two superb divisions and to encounter a certain and heavy loss of men, whose value he knew so well when he calculated upon them alone for victory in such circumstances?

To resolve on battle was, however, easier than to prepare for it with skill. Albuera, we have seen, was the point of concentration. Colonel Colborne's brigade did not arrive until the 14th, and there was no certainty that it could arrive before the enemy did. Blake did not arrive until three in the morning of the 16th; the fourth division not until six o'clock. Kemmis, with three fine British regiments, and Madden's cavalry, did not come at all. These facts prove that the whole plan was faulty; it was mere accident that a sufficient force to give battle was concentrated. Beresford was too late, and the keeping up the investment of

Badajos, although laudable in one sense, was a great error ; it was only an accessory, and yet the success of the principal object was made subservient to it. If Soult, instead of passing by Villa Franca, in his advance, had pushed straight on from Los Santos to Albuera, he would have arrived the 15th, when Beresford had not much more than half his force in position ; the point of concentration would then have been lost, and the allies scattered in all directions. If the French had even continued their march by Solano instead of turning upon Albuera, they must inevitably have communicated with Badajos, unless Beresford had fought without waiting for Blake, and without Kemmis's brigade. Why, then, did the French marshal turn out of the way to seek a battle, in preference to attaining his object without one ? and why did he neglect to operate by his right or left until the unwieldy allied army should separate or get into confusion, as it inevitably would have done ? Because the English general's dispositions were so faulty that no worse error could well be expected from him, and Soult had every reason to hope for a great and decided victory ; a victory which would have more than counter-balanced Massena's failure. He knew that only one half of the allied force was at Albuera on the 15th, and when he examined the ground, everything promised the most complete success.

Marshal Beresford had fixed upon and studied his own field of battle above a month before the action took place, and yet occupied it in such a manner as to render defeat almost certain ; his infantry were not held in hand, and his inferiority in guns and cavalry was not compensated for by entrenchments. But were any other proofs of error wanting, this fact would suffice—he had a greater strength of infantry on a field of battle scarcely four miles long, and three times the day was lost and won, the allies being always fewest in number at the decisive point. It is true that Blake's conduct was very perplexing ; it is true that General William Stewart's error cost one brigade, and thus annihilated the command of Colonel Colborne, a man capable of turning the fate of a battle even with fewer troops than those swept away from him by the French cavalry : but the neglect of the hill beyond the Albuera, fronting the right of the position, was Beresford's own error and a most serious one ; so also were the successive attacks of the brigades, and the hesitation about the fourth division. And where are we to look for that promptness in critical moments which marks the great commander ? It was Colonel Hardinge that gave the fourth division and Abercrombie's brigade orders to advance, and it was their astounding valour in attack, and the astonishing firmness of Houghton's brigade in defence that saved the day ; the person of the general-in-chief was indeed seen everywhere, a gallant soldier ! but the mind of the great commander was seen nowhere.

Beresford remained master of the field of battle, but he could not take Badajos ; that prize was the result of many great efforts, and many deep combinations by a far greater man : neither did he clear Estremadura, for Soult maintained positions from Llerena to Usagre. What then did he gain ? The power of simulating a renewal of the siege, and holding his own cantonments on the left bank of the Guadiana ; I say simulating, for, if the third and seventh divisions had not arrived from Beira, even the investment could not have been completed. These illusive advantages he purchased at the price of 7000 men. Now Lord Wellington fought two general and several minor actions with a smaller loss, and moreover turned Massena and 70,000 men out of Portugal !

Such being the fruit of victory, what would have been the result of defeat ? There was no retreat, save by the temporary bridge of Jerumenha, but, had the hill on the right been carried in the battle, the Valverde road would have been in Soult's possession, and the line of retreat cut ; and, had it been otherwise, Beresford, with 4000 victorious French cavalry at his heels, could never have passed the river. Back, then, must have come the army from the north—the lines of Lisbon would have been once more occupied—a French force fixed on the south of the Tagus—Spain ruined—Portugal laid prostrate—England in dismay. Could even the genius of Lord Wellington have recovered such a state of affairs ? And yet, with these results, the terrible balance hung for two hours, and twice trembling to the sinister side, only yielded at last to the superlative vigour of the fusileers. The battle should

never have been fought. The siege of Badajos could not have been renewed without reinforcements, and, with them, it could have been renewed without an action, or at least without risking an unequal one.

But would even the bravery of British soldiers have saved the day, at Albuera, if the French general had not also committed great errors? His plan of attack and his execution of it, up to the moment when the Spanish line fell back in disorder, cannot be too much admired; after that the great error of fighting in dense columns being persisted in beyond reason, lost the fairest field ever offered to the arms of France. Had the 5th corps opened out while there was time to do so, that is, between the falling back of the Spaniards and the advance of Houghton's brigade, what on earth could have saved Beresford from a total defeat? The fire of the enemy's columns alone destroyed two-thirds of his British troops; the fire of their lines would have swept away all!

It has been said that Latour Maubourg and Godinot did not second Soult with sufficient vigour; the latter certainly did not display any great energy, but the village was maintained by Alten's Germans, who were good and hardy troops, and well backed up by a great body of Portuguese. Latour Maubourg's movements seem to have been objected to without reason. He took six guns, sabred many Spaniards, and overthrew a whole brigade of the British, without ceasing to keep in check their cavalry. He was, undoubtedly, greatly superior in numbers, but General Lumley handled the allied squadrons with skill and courage, and drew all the advantage possible from his situation, and, in the choice of that situation, none can deny ability to Marshal Beresford. The rising ground behind the horsemen, the bed of the Aroya in their front, the aid of the horse-artillery, and the support of the fourth division, were all circumstances of strength so well combined that nothing could be better, and they dictated Latour Maubourg's proceedings, which seem consonant to true principles. If he had charged in mass, under the fire of Lefebvre's guns, he must have been thrown into confusion in passing the Aroya at the moment when the fourth division, advancing along the slopes, would have opened a musketry on his right flank; Lumley could then have charged, or retired up the hill, according to circumstances. In this case, great loss might have been sustained, and nothing very decisive could have accrued to the advantage of the French, because no number of cavalry, if unsustained by infantry and artillery, can make a serious impression against the three arms united.

On the other hand, a repulse might have been fatal not only to himself but to the French infantry on the hill, as their left would have been open to the enterprises of the allied cavalry. If Latour Maubourg had stretched away to his own left, he would, in like manner, have exposed the flank of Soult's infantry, and his movements would have been eccentric, and contrary to sound principles; and (in the event of a disaster to the corps on the hill, as really happened) destructive to the safety of the retreating army. By keeping in mass on the plain, and detaching squadrons from time to time, as favourable opportunities offered for partial charges, he gained, as we have seen, great advantages during the action, and kept his troopers well in hand for the decisive moment; finally, he covered the retreat of the beaten infantry. Still it may be admitted that, with such superior numbers, he might have more closely pressed Lumley.

When Soult had regained the hills at the other side of the Albuera, the battle ceased, each side being, as we have seen, so hardly handled that neither offered to renew the fight. Here was the greatest failure of the French commander; he had lost 8000 men, but he had still 15,000 under arms, and his artillery and his cavalry were comparatively untouched. On the side of the allies, only 1500 British infantry were standing; the troops were suffering greatly from famine; the Spaniards had been feeding on horseflesh, and were so extenuated by continual fatigue and misery, that, for several days previous to the battle, they had gone over in considerable numbers even to the French, hoping thus to get food: these circumstances should be borne in mind, when reflecting on their conduct in the battle; under such a commander as Blake, and, while enduring such heavy privations, it was a great effort of resolution, and honourable to them that they fought at all. Their resistance feeble, when compared to the desperate valour of the British, was by no

means weak in itself or infirm ; nor is it to be wondered at that men so exhausted and so ill-managed should have been deaf to the call of Beresford, a strange general, whose exhortations they probably did not understand. When the fortune of the day changed, they followed the fusileers with alacrity, and at no period did they give way with dishonour.

Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, they were not and could not be equal to a second desperate struggle ; a renewed attack on the 17th, would have certainly ended in favour of the French ; and so conscious was Beresford of this, that, on the evening of the 16th, he wrote to Lord Wellington, avowing that he anticipated a certain and ruinous defeat the next day. The resolution with which he maintained the position notwithstanding, was the strongest indication of military talent he gave during the whole of his operations ; had Soult only persisted in holding his position with equal pertinacity, Beresford must have retired. It was a great and decided mistake of the French marshal not to have done so. There is nothing more essential in war than a confident front ; a general should never acknowledge himself vanquished, for the front line of an army always looks formidable, and the adversary can seldom see the real state of what is behind. The importance of this maxim is finely indicated in Livy, where he relates that, after a drawn battle, a god called out in the night, the Etruscans had lost one man more than the Romans ! Hereupon the former retired, and the latter, remaining on the field, gathered all the fruits of a real victory.

BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER I.

WHILE Marshal Beresford followed Soult towards Llerena, Lord Wellington recommenced the siege of Badajoz, but the relation of that operation must be delayed until the transactions which occurred in Spain, during Massena's invasion of Portugal, have been noticed, for it is not by following one stream of action that a just idea of this war can be obtained. Many of Lord Wellington's proceedings might be called rash, and others timid, and slow, if taken separately; yet, when viewed as parts of a great plan for delivering the whole Peninsula, they will be found discreet or daring, as the circumstances warranted: nor is there any portion of his campaigns that requires this wide-based consideration more than his early sieges; which, being instituted contrary to the rules of art, and unsuccessful, or, when successful, attended with a mournful slaughter, have given occasion for questioning his great military qualities, which were, however, then most signally displayed.

OPERATIONS IN SPAIN.

In the northern provinces the events were of little interest.* Galicia, after the failure of Renouales' expedition and the shipwreck that followed, became torpid; the junta disregarded General Walker's exhortations, and, although he furnished vast supplies, the army, nominally 20,000 strong, mustered only 6000 in the field; there was no cavalry, and the infantry kept close in the mountains about Villa Franca, while a weak French division occupied the rich plains of Leon. General Mahi having refused to combine his operations with those of the Anglo-Portuguese army, was thought to be disaffected, and at the desire of the British authorities had been removed to make way for the Duke of Albuquerque: he was, however, immediately appointed to the command of Murcia, by Blake, in defiance of the remonstrances of Mr. Wellesley, for Blake disregarded the English influence.

When Albuquerque died, Galicia fell to Castaños, and while that officer was co-operating with Beresford in Estremadura, Santocildes assumed the command.† Meanwhile Caffarelli's reserve having joined the army of the north, Santana was fortified, and Bessieres, as I have before observed, assembled 7000 men at Zamora to invade Galicia.

In the Asturias, Bonet, although harassed, on the side of Potes, by the Guerillas from the mountains of Liebaña, and on the coast by the English frigates, remained at Oviedo, and maintained his communications by the left with the troops in Leon. In November, 1810, he defeated a considerable body of insurgents, and in February, 1811, the Spanish General, St. Pol, retired before him with the regular forces from the Xalon to the Navia; but this retreat caused such discontent in Galicia that St. Pol advanced again on the 19th March, and was again driven back. Bonet then dispersed the Partidas, and was ready to aid Bessieres' invasion of Galicia; and although the arrival of the allied forces on the Coa in pursuit of Massena stopped that enterprise, he made an incursion along the coast, seized the Spanish stores of English arms and clothing, and then returned to Oviedo. The war was, indeed, so little formidable to the French, that in May Santander was evacuated, and all the cavalry in Castile and Leon joined Massena for the battle of Fuentes Onoro, and yet the Gallician and Austrian regular armies gained no advantage during their absence.

The Partidas, who had re-assembled after their defeat by Bonet, were more

* See p. 144.

† See pp. 111, 145, and 170.

active. Porlier, Campillo, Longa, Amor, and Merino, cut off small French parties in the Montaña in the Rioja, in Biscay, and in the Baston de Laredo; they were not, indeed, dangerous in action, nor was it very difficult to destroy them by combined movements, but these combinations were hard to effect, from the little accord amongst the French generals, and thus they easily maintained their posts at Espinosa de Monteres, Medina, and Villarcayo. Campillo was the most powerful after Porlier. His principal haunts were in the valleys of Mena and Caranza; but he was in communication with Barbara, Honejas, and Curillas, petty chiefs of Biscay, with whom he concerted attacks upon couriers and weak detachments: and he sometimes divided his band into small parties, with which he overran the valleys of Gurieso, Soba, Carrado, and Jorrande, partly to raise contributions, partly to gather recruits, whom he forced to join him. His chief aim was, however, to intercept the despatches going from Bilbao to Santander, and for this purpose he used to infest Liendo between Ovíra and Laredo, which he was enabled the more safely to do, because General Barthelemy, the governor of the Montaña, was forced to watch more earnestly towards the hilly district of Liebana, between Leon and the Asturias. This district was Porlier's stronghold, and that chief, under whom Campillo himself would at times act, used to cross the Deba and penetrate into the valleys of Cabuerniego, Rio Nauza, Cieza, and Buelna, and he obliged the people to fly to the mountains with their effects whenever the French approached: nevertheless the mass were tired of this guerilla system and tractable enough, except in Liebana.

To beat Campillo once or twice would have been sufficient to ruin him, but to ruin Porlier required great combinations. It was necessary to seize Espinosa, not that of Monteres, but a village in the mountains of Liebana, from whence the valleys all projected as from a point, and whence the troops could consequently act towards Potes with success. General Barthelemy proposed this plan to Drouet, then with the 9th corps on the Upper Douro, whom he desired to co-operate from the side of Leon, while Bonet did the same from the side of the Asturias: but though partially adopted, the execution was not effectually followed up, the districts of Liebana and Santander continued to be disturbed, and the chain of Partidas was prolonged through Biscay and the Rioja, to Navarre.

In this last province Mina had on the 22nd of May defeated at the Puerto de Arlaban, near Vittoria, 1200 men who were escorting a convoy of prisoners and treasure to France; his success was complete, but alloyed by the death of 200 of the prisoners, unfortunately killed during the tumult; and it was stained by the murder of six Spanish ladies, who, for being attached to French officers, were in cold blood executed after the fight. Massena, whose baggage was captured, was to have travelled with this escort, but disliking the manner of the march, he remained in Vittoria until a better opportunity, and so escaped.

These Partizan operations, combined with the descents on the coast, the aspect of the war in Estremadura, and the unprotected state of Castile, which was now menaced by Santo-cildes, were rendered more important by another event to be noticed hereafter; Bessieres therefore resolved to contract his position in the north; and first causing Reille and Caffarelli to scour Biscay and the Rioja, he ordered Bonet to abandon the Asturias. On the 14th of June, that general, having dismantled the coast-batteries, sent his sick and baggage by sea to St. Ander, and marched into Leon, where Santocildes, who had now increased the Gallician field army to 13,000 men, was menacing Astorga, which place the French evacuated after blowing up some of the works. Serras and Bonet then united on the Esla, and being supported by 3000 men from Rio Seco, skirmished at the Ponte de Orvigo on the 23rd, but had the worst, and General Valletaux was killed on their side: and as Lord Wellington's operations in Estremadura soon drew the French armies towards that quarter, Santocildes held his ground at Astorga until August. Meanwhile 2000 French were thrown into Santona, and General Rognet coming, from the side of Burgos, with a division of the young guard, made a fruitless incursion against the Partidas of Liebana.

This system of warfare was necessarily harassing to the French divisions actually engaged, but it was evident that neither the Asturias nor Galicia could be reckoned

as good auxiliaries to Lord Wellington. Galicia, with its lordly junta, regular army, fortified towns, rugged fastnesses, numerous population, and constant supplies from England, was of less weight in the contest than 5000 Portuguese militia conducted by Trant and Wilson. The irregular warfare was now also beginning to produce its usual effects; the tree though grafted in patriotism bore strange fruit. In Biscay, which had been longest accustomed to the presence of the invaders, the armed peasantry were often found fighting in the ranks of the enemy, and on one occasion did of themselves attack the boats of the *Amelia* frigate to save French military stores! * Turning now to the other line of invasion, we shall find the contest fiercer, indeed, and more honourable to the Spaniards, but the result still more unfavourable to their cause.

OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES.

It will be remembered that Suchet, after the fall of Mequinenza, was ordered to besiege Tortosa while Macdonald marched against Tarragona. Massena was then concentrating his army for the invasion of Portugal, and it was the emperor's intention that Suchet should, after taking Tortosa, march with half of the 3rd corps to support the Prince of Esling. But the reduction of Tortosa proved a more tedious task than Napoleon anticipated, and as the course of events had now given the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon a common object, it will be well to compare their situation and resources with those of their adversary.

Suchet was completely master of Aragon, and not more by the force of his arms, than by the influence of his administration; the province was fertile, and so tranquil in the interior, that his magazines were all filled, and his convoys travelled under the care of Spanish commissaries and conductors. Mina was however in Navarre on his rear, and he communicated on the right bank of the Ebro with the *Partidas* in the mountains of Moncayo and Albaracin; and these last were occasionally backed by the *Empecinado*, Duran, and others whose strongholds were in the Guadalupe, and who from thence infested Cuenca and the vicinity of Madrid. From Albaracin, Villa Campa continued the chain of Partizan warfare and connected it with the Valencian army, which had also a line of operation towards Cuenca. Mina, who communicated with the English vessels in the Bay of Biscay, received his supplies from Coruña; and the others, in like manner, corresponded with Valencia, from whence the English consul Tupper succoured them with arms, money, and ammunition. Thus a line was drawn quite across the Peninsula which it was in vain for the enemy to break, as the retreat was secure at both ends, and the excitement to renewed efforts constant.

On the other flank of Suchet's position the high valleys of the Pyrenees were swarming with small bands, forming a link between Mina and a division of the Catalanian army stationed about the *Seu d'Urgel*, which was a fortified castle, closing the passage leading from the plain of that name to the *Cerdaña*: this division in conjunction with Rovira, and other Partizans, extended the irregular warfare on the side of Olot and Castelfolli to the Ampurdan; and the whole depended upon Tarragona, which itself was supported by the English fleet in the Mediterranean. Aragon may therefore be considered as an invested fortress, which the Spaniards thought to reduce by famine, by assault, and by exciting the population against the garrison; but Suchet baffled them; he had made such judicious arrangements that his convoys were secure in the interior, and all the important points on the frontier circle were fortified, and connected with Zaragoza, by chains of minor ports radiating from that common centre. Lerida, Mequinenza, and the plain of Urgel in Catalonia, the fort of Morella in Valencia, were his; and by fortifying Teruel and Alcanitz he had secured the chief passages leading through the mountains to the latter kingdom: he could thus, at will, invade either Catalonia or Valencia, and from Mequinenza he could, by water, transport the stores necessary to besiege Tortosa. Nor were these advantages the result of aught but

* Appendix, No. 12, section 1.

his uncommon talents for war, a consideration which rendered them doubly formidable.

The situation of the French in Catalonia was different. Macdonald, who had assumed the command at the moment when Napoleon wished him to co-operate with Suchet, was inexperienced in the peculiar warfare of the province, and unprepared to execute any extended plan of operations. His troops were about Gerona and Hostalrich, which were in fact the bounds of the French conquest at this period; for Barcelona was a military point beyond their field system, and only to be maintained by expeditions; and the country was so exhausted of provisions in the interior, that the army itself could only be fed by land-convoys from France, or by such coasters as, eluding the vigilance of the English cruisers, could reach Rosas, St. Feliu, and Palamos. Barcelona, like the horse-leech, continually cried for more, and as the inhabitants as well as the garrison depended on the convoys, the latter were enormous, reference being had to the limited means of the French general, and the difficulty of moving; for although the distance between Hostalrich and Barcelona was only 40 miles, the road, as far, as Granollers, was a succession of defiles, and crossed by several rivers, of which the Congosta and the Tordera were considerable obstacles; and the nature of the soil was clayey and heavy, especially in the defiles of the Trenta Pasos.

These things rendered it difficult for Macdonald to operate in regular warfare from his base of Gerona, and as the stores for the siege of Tarragona were to come from France, until they arrived he could only make sudden incursions with light baggage, trusting to the resources still to be found in the open country, or to be gathered in the mountains by detachments which would have to fight for every morsel. This, then, was the condition of the French armies, that starting from separate bases, they had to operate on lines meeting at Tortosa. It remains to show the situation of the Catalan general.

After the battle of Margalef, Henry O'Donnel reunited his scattered forces, and being of a stern unyielding disposition, not only repressed the discontent occasioned by that defeat, but forced the reluctant Miguelettes to swell his ranks and to submit to discipline. Being assisted with money and arms by the British agents, and having free communication by sea with Gibraltar, Cadiz, and Minorca, he was soon enabled to reorganize his army, to collect vast magazines at Tarragona, and to strengthen that place by new works. In July his force again amounted to 22,000 men exclusive of the Partidas, and of the Somatenes, who were useful to aid in a pursuit, to break up roads, and to cut off straggling soldiers. Of this number one division under Campo Verde, was, as I have before said, in the higher valleys, having a detachment at Olot, and being supported by the fortified castles of Seu D'Urgel, Cardona, Solsona, and Berga. A second division was on the Llobregat, watching the garrison of Barcelona, and having detachments in Montserrat, Igualada, and Manresa, to communicate with Campo Verde. The third division, the reserve, and the cavalry were on the hills about Tarragona, and that place and Tortosa had large garrisons.

By this disposition, O'Donnel occupied Falcet, the Col de Balaguer, and the Col del Alba, which were the passages leading to Tortosa; the Col de Ribas and Momblanch, which commanded the roads to Lerida; San Coloma de Queralt and Igualada, through which his connection with Campo Verde was maintained; and thus the two French armies were separated not only by the great spinal ridges descending from the Pyrenees, but by the position of the Spaniards, who held all the passes, and could at will concentrate and attack either Suchet or Macdonald. But the Catalanian system was now also connected with Valencia, where, exclusive of irregulars, there were about 15,000 men under General Bassecour. That officer had in June occupied Cuenca, yet having many quarrels with his officers he could do nothing, and was driven from thence by troops from Madrid: he returned to Valencia, but the disputes continued and extended to the junta or congress of Valencia, three members of which were by the general imprisoned. Nevertheless, as all parties were now sensible that Valencia should be defended at Tortosa, Bassecour prepared to march to its succour by the coast road where he had several fortified posts. Thus, while Suchet and Macdonald were combining to crush

O'Donnel, the latter was combining with Bassecour, to press upon Suchet; and there was always the English maritime force at hand to aid the attacks or to facilitate the escape of the Spaniards.

In the above exposition I have called the native armies by the names of their provinces, but in December 1810 the whole military force being re-organized by the regency the armies were designated by numbers. Thus the Catalan forces, formerly called *the army of the right*, was now called the *first army*. The Valencians, together with Villa Campa's division, and the Partidas of the Empecinado and Duran, were called the *second army*. The Murcian force was called the *third army*. The troops at Cadiz, at Algesiras, and in the Conde Niebla were called the *fourth army*. The remnants of Romana's old Gallician division which had escaped the slaughter on the Gebora formed the *fifth army*. The new-raised troops of Galicia and those of the Asturias were called the *sixth army*. And the Partidas of the north, that is to say, Mina's, Longa's, Campillo's, Porlier's, and other smaller bands, formed the *seventh army*.

Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon's order to besiege Tortosa arrived. Suchet was ready to execute it. More than 50 battering guns selected from those at Lerida were already equipped, and his depôts were established at Mequinenza, Caspe, and Alcanitz. All the fortified posts were provisioned; 12,000 men under General Musnier, intended for the security of Aragon, were disposed at Huesca and other minor points on the left bank of the Ebro, and at Daroca, Teruel, and Calatayud on the right bank; and while these arrangements were being executed, the troops destined for the siege had assembled at Lerida and Alcanitz, under Generals Habert and Laval, their provisions being drawn from the newly-conquered district of Urgel.

From Mequinenza, which was the principal depôt, there was water-carriage, but as the Ebro was crossed at several points by rocky bars, some of which were only passable in full water, the communication was too uncertain to depend upon, and Suchet therefore set workmen to re-open an old road 30 miles in length, which had been made by the Duke of Orleans during the war of the succession. This road pierced the mountains on the right bank of the Ebro, passed through Batea and other places to Mora, and from thence by Pinel to Tortosa, running through a celebrated defile called indifferently the *Trincheras* and the *Passage of Arms*. When these preliminary arrangements were made, General Habert assembled his division at Belpuig near Lerida, and after making a feint as if to go towards Barcelona, suddenly turned to his right, and penetrating through the district of Garriga, reached Garcia on the left bank of the Lower Ebro the 5th of July. Laval at the same time quitted Alcanitz, made a feint towards Valencia by Morella, and then turning to his left, came so unexpectedly upon Tortosa by the right bank of the Ebro, that he surprised some of the outposts on the 2nd, and then encamped before the bridge-head. The 4th he extended his line to Amposta, seized the ferry-boat of the great road from Barcelona to Valencia, and posted Boussard's cuirassiers, with a battalion of infantry and six guns, at Uldecona, on the Cenia river, to observe Bassecour's Valencians.

During these operations Suchet fixed his own quarters at Mora, and as the new road was not finished, he occupied Miravet, Pinel, and the Trincheras, on its intended line; and having placed flying bridges, with covering works, on the Ebro, at Mora and Xerta, made those places his depôt of siege. He likewise seized the craft on the river, established posts at Rapita, near the mouth of the Ebro, and at Amposta, and made a fruitless attempt to burn the boat bridge of Tortosa with fire vessels. Following Napoleon's order, Macdonald should at this time have been before Tarragona; but on the 9th, Suchet learned from a spy that the 7th corps was still at Gerona, and he thus found himself exposed alone to the combined efforts of the Catalans and Valencians. This made him repent of having moved from Aragon so soon, yet thinking it would be bad to retire, he resolved to blockade Tortosa, hoping to resist both O'Donnel and Bassecour until Macdonald could advance.

The Spaniards, who knew his situation, sallied on the right bank the 6th and 8th, and on the 10th his outposts on the left bank were driven in at Tivisa by a division from Falcet, which the next day fell on his works at Mora, but was

repulsed ; and the 12th, General Paris pushed back the Spanish line, while Habert took post in force at Tivisa, by which he covered the roads to Xerta and Mora. O'Donoghue, who commanded Bassecour's advanced guard, now menaced Morella, but General Montmarie being detached to its succour, drove him away.

The 30th, O'Donnel, having brought up fresh troops to Falcet, made a feint with 10,000 men against Tivisa, and then suddenly entered Tortosa, from whence at mid-day, on the 3rd of August, he passed the bridge and fell with the bayonet on Laval's entrenchments. The French gave way at first, but soon rallied, and the Spaniards, fearing for their communications, regained the town in disorder, having lost 200 prisoners besides killed and wounded.

This operation had been concerted with General Caro, who, having superseded O'Donoghue, was now marching with the Valencians by the coast-road towards Uldecona : Suchet, therefore, judging that the intention of the Spaniards was to force him away from the Lower Ebro before Macdonald could pass the Llobregat, resolved first to strike a sudden blow at the Valencians, and then turn upon the Catalans. In this view he contracted his quarters on the Ebro and united at Uldecona, on the 13th, 11 battalions with 800 horsemen. Caro was then in a strong position covering the two great routes to Valencia, but when the French, after driving in his advanced guard from Vinaros, came up, his Valencians would not stand a battle, and, being followed beyond Peniscola, separated, and retreated in disorder by different roads. Whereupon Suchet returned to Mora, and there found an officer of Macdonald's army, who brought information that the 7th corps was at last in the plains of Reus, and its communications with the 3rd corps open.

OPERATIONS OF THE 7TH CORPS.

When Macdonald succeeded Augereau he found the troops in a state of insubordination, accustomed to plunder, and excited to ferocity by the cruelty of the Catalans and by the conduct of his predecessor ; they were without magazines or regular subsistence, and lived by exactions : hence, the people, driven to desperation, were more like wild beasts than men, and the war was repulsive to him in all its features. It was one of shifts and devices, and he better understood methodical movements ; it was one of plunder, and he was a severe disciplinarian ; it was full of cruelty on all sides, and he was of a humane and just disposition. Being resolved to introduce regular habits, Macdonald severely rebuked the troops for their bad discipline and cruelty, and endeavoured to soothe the Catalans, but neither could be brought to soften in their enmity ; the mutual injuries sustained were too horrible and too recent to be forgiven. The soldiers, drawn from different countries, and therefore not bound by any common national feeling, were irritated against a general who made them pay for wanton damages and punished them for plundering ; and the Catalans, attributing his conduct to fear, because he could not entirely restrain the violence of his men, still fled from the villages, and still massacred his stragglers with unrelenting barbarity.

While establishing his system it was impossible for Macdonald to take the field, because without magazines no army can be kept in due discipline ; wherefore he remained about Gerona, drawing with great labour and pains his provisions from France, and storing up the overplus for his future operations. On the 10th of June, however, the wants of Barcelona became so serious that, leaving his baggage under a strong guard at Gerona, and his recruits and cavalry at Figueras, he marched with 10,000 men and a convoy to its relief, by the way of the Trenta Pasos, Cardedieu, and Granollers. The road was heavy, the defiles narrow, the rivers swelled, and the manner of march rather too pompous for the nature of the war, for Macdonald took post in order of battle on each side of the defiles, while the engineers repaired the ways : in everything adhered to his resolution of restoring a sound system ; but while imitating the Jugurthine Metellus, he forgot that he had not Romans, but a mixed and ferocious multitude under his command, and he lost more by wasting of time than he gained by enforcing an irksome discipline. Thus, when he had reached Barcelona, his own provisions were expended, his convoy furnished only a slender supply for the city, and the next day he was forced to return with empty

carts in all haste to Gerona, where he resumed his former plan of action, and demolished the forts beyond that city.

In July he collected another convoy and prepared to march in the same order as before, for his intent was to form magazines in Barcelona sufficient for that city and his own supply during the siege of Tarragona ; but meanwhile Suchet was unable to commence the siege of Tortosa, in default of the co-operation of the 7th corps ; and Henry O'Donnel, having gained time to re-organize his army and to re-establish his authority, was now ready to interrupt the French marshal's march, proposing, if he failed, to raise a fresh insurrection in the Ampurdan, and thus give further occupation on that side. He had transferred a part of his forces to Caldas, Santa Coloma, and Bruñolas, taking nearly the same positions that Blake had occupied during the siege of Gerona ; but the French detachments soon obliged him to concentrate again behind the defiles of the Congosta, where he hoped to stop the passage of the convoy ; Macdonald, however, entered Hostalrich on the 16th, forced the Trenta Pasos on the 17th, and although his troops had only fifty rounds of ammunition, he drove 3000 men from the pass of Garriga on the 18th, reached Barcelona that night, delivered his convoy, and returned immediately.

The French soldiers now became sickly from the hardships of a march rendered oppressive by the severity of their discipline, and many also deserted ; yet others who had before gone off returned to their colours, reinforcements arrived from France, and the emperor's orders to take the field were becoming so pressing, that Macdonald, giving Baraguay d'Hilliers the command of the Ampurdan, marched on the 8th of August with a third convoy for Barcelona, resolved at last to co-operate with Suchet. Instructed by experience, he however moved this time with less formality, and having reached Barcelona the 11th, deposited his convoy, appointed Maurice Mathieu governor of that city, and on the 15th forced the pass of Ordal, and reached Villa Franca with about 16,000 men under arms. O'Donnel, still smarting from the affair at Tortosa, retired before him to Tarragona without fighting, but directed Campo Verde to leave a body of troops under General Martinez in the mountains about Olot, and to move himself through Montserrat to the district of Garriga, which lies between Lerida and Tortosa ; meanwhile, the 7th corps passed by Brañin and Valls into the plain of Reus, and, as we have seen, opened the communication with Suchet, but to how little purpose shall be shown in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

As the Spanish general knew that the French could at Reus find provisions for only a few days, he withdrew his division from Falcet, and while Campo Verde, coming into the Garriga, occupied the passes behind them, and other troops were placed in the defiles between Valls and Villafranca, he held the main body of his army concentrated at Tarragona, ready to fall upon Macdonald whenever he should move. This done, he became extremely elated, for, like all Spaniards, he imagined that to surround an enemy was the perfection of military operations. Macdonald cared little for the vicinity of the Catalan troops, but he had not yet formed sufficient magazines at Barcelona to commence the siege of Tarragona, nor could he, as O'Donnel had foreseen, procure more than a few days' supply about Reus ; he therefore relinquished all idea of a siege, and proposed to aid Suchet in the operation against Tortosa, if the latter would feed the 7th corps : and pending Suchet's decision he resolved to remove to Lerida.

The 25th of August, leaving 700 sick men in Reus, he made a feint against the Col de Balaguer, but soon changing his direction, marched upon Mombanch and the Col de Ribas : his rear-guard, composed of Italian troops, being overtaken near Alcover, offered battle at the bridge of Goy, but this the Spaniards declined, and they also neglected to secure the heights on each side, which the Italians immediately turned to account and so made their way to Pixamoxons. They were pursued immediately, and Sarsfield coming from the Lerida side disputed the passage of Pixamoxons ; but Macdonald, keeping the troops from Tarragona in check with

a rear-guard, again sent his Italians up the hills on the flanks while he pushed his French troops against the front of the enemy, and so succeeded ; for the Italians quickly carried the heights, the rear-guard was very slightly pressed, the front was unopposed, and in two hours the army reached Momblanch, whence, after a short halt, it descended into the plains of Urgel.

Suchet being informed of this march came from Mora to confer with Macdonald, and they agreed that the 7th corps should have for its subsistence the magazines of Monzon and the plains of Urgel, which had not yet delivered its contributions. In return Macdonald lent the Neapolitan division to guard Suchet's convoys down the Ebro, and promised that the divisions of Severoli and Souham should cover the operations of the 3rd corps, during the siege of Tortosa, by drawing the attention of the Catalan generals to the side of Cardona.

The 7th corps was now quartered about Tarega, Cervera, Guisona, and Agramunt, and Severoli was detached with 4000 men over the Segre to enforce the requisitions about Talarn. He drove 400 Swiss from the bridge of Tremp, and executed his mission, but with such violence that the people, becoming furious, assassinated the stragglers and laid so many successful schemes of murder, that Macdonald was forced reluctantly to renew the executions and burnings of his predecessors. Indeed, to feed an army forcibly when all things are paid for, will, in a poor and mountainous country, create soreness, because the things taken cannot easily be replaced ; but with requisitions severity is absolutely necessary. In rich plains the inhabitants can afford to supply the troops and will do so, to avoid being plundered ; but mountaineers having scarcely anything besides food, and little of that, are immediately rendered desperate and must be treated as enemies or left in quiet.

When Severoli was ravaging Tremp and Talarn, General Eugenio marched with another Italian detachment towards Castelfolliit, which had a French garrison, and Macdonald removed his own quarters to Cervera. Meanwhile O'Donnel, having replaced his division at Falcet to observe Suchet, distributed his other forces on the line of communication through San Coloma de Queralt, Igualada, Montserrat, and Cardona ; he thus cut off all connection between Macdonald and the Ampurdan, and enabled Campo Verde closely to follow the operations of the 7th corps, and that general seeing the French army separated, fell first upon the head-quarters at Cervera, but being unsuccessful, marched against Eugenio, and was by him also repulsed near Castelfolliit. Eugenio, distinguished alike by his valour and ferocity, then returned with his booty to Agramunt, and afterwards invading Pons, spoiled and ravaged all that district without hindrance. The provisions obtained were heaped up in Lerida and Balaguer ; but while Macdonald was thus acting in the plain of Urgel, O'Donnel formed and executed the most skilful plan which had yet graced the Spanish arms.

We have seen that Baraguay d'Hilliers was left with 18,000 or 20,000 men in the Ampurdan, but these troops were necessarily scattered : 700 were at Palamos, San Felieu, and other small ports along the coast ; 1200, under General Swartz, were quartered in Abispal, one short march from Gerona, and 200 were at Calonjé, connecting Abispal with Palamos ; the rest were in Figueras, Rosas, Olot, Castelfolliit, Gerona, and Hostalrich, and several thousand were in hospital. O'Donnel having exact knowledge of all this, left a small garrison in Tarragona, placed the Baron d'Errolles at Montserrat, Colonel Georget at Igualada, and Obispo at Martorel, while with 6000 infantry and 400 cavalry he marched himself through the mountains, by San Culgat to Mattaro on the sea coast : then crossing the Tordera below Hostalrich, he moved rapidly by Vidreras to Llagostera, which he reached the 12th of September. His arrival was unknown to Macdonald, or Maurice Mathieu, or Baraguay d'Hilliers, for though many reports of his intentions were afloat, most of them spread by himself, no person divined his real object : by some he was said to be gone against a French corps, which, from the side of Navarre, had entered the Cerdaña ; by others that he was concentrating at Manresa, and many concluded that he was still in Tarragona.

Having thus happily attained his first object, O'Donnel proceeded in his plan with a vigour of execution equal to the conception. Leaving Campo Verde with a

reserve in the valley of Aro, he sent detachments to fall on Calonjé and the posts along the coast, the operations there being seconded by two English frigates ; and while this was in progress, O'Donnel himself on the 14th marched violently down from Casa de Silva upon Abispal. Swartz, always unfortunate, had his infantry and some cavalry under arms in an entrenched camp, and accepted battle ; but after losing 200 men and seeing no retreat, yielded, and all the French troops along the coast were likewise forced to surrender. The prisoners and spoil were immediately embarked on board the English vessels and sent to Tarragona.

Until this moment Baraguay d'Hilliers was quite ignorant of O'Donnel's arrival, and the whole Ampurdan was thrown into confusion ; for the Somatenes, rising in all parts, cut off the communications with Macdonald, whose posts on the side of Calaf and Cervera were at the same time harassed by Errolles and Obispo : nevertheless, although a rumour of Swartz's disaster reached him, Macdonald would not credit it, and continued in the plain of Urgel. Baraguay d'Hilliers was therefore unable to do more than protect his own convoys from France, and would have been in a dangerous position if O'Donnel's activity had continued ; but that general having been severely wounded, the Spanish efforts relaxed, and Napoleon, whose eyes were everywhere, sent General Conroux, in the latter end of October, with a convoy and reinforcement of troops from Perpignan to Gerona. O'Donnel, troubled by his wound, then embarked ; and Campo Verde, who succeeded to the command, immediately sent a part of the army to Tarragona, left Rovira, and Claros, and Manso, to nourish the insurrection in the Ampurdan, and took post himself at Manresa ; from thence he at first menaced Macdonald's posts at Calaf ; but his real object was to break up that road, which he effected, and then passed suddenly through Berga and Cardona to Puigcerda, and drove the French detachment, which had come from Navarre to ravage the fertile district of Cerdaña, under the guns of Fort Louis.

This excursion attracted Macdonald's attention ; he was now fully apprised of Swartz's misfortune, and he hoped to repair it by crushing Campo Verde, taking Cardona, and dispersing the local junta of Upper Catalonia, which had assembled in Solsona ; wherefore, on the 18th, he put his troops in motion, and the 19th, passing the mountains of Portellas, entered Solsona ; but the junta and the inhabitants escaped to Cardona and Berja, and up the valleys of Oleana and Urgel. Macdonald immediately sent columns in all directions to collect provisions and to chase the Spanish detachments, and this obliged Campo Verde to abandon the Cerdaña, which was immediately foraged by the troops from Fort Louis. It only remained to seize Cardona, and on the 21st, the French marched against that place ; but Campo Verde, by a rapid movement, arrived before them, and was in order of battle with a considerable force when Macdonald came up.

COMBAT OF CARDONA.

This town stands at the foot of a rugged hill, which is joined by a hog's-back ridge to the great mountain spine, dividing Eastern from Western Catalonia. The Cardona river washed the walls, a castle of strength crowned the height above, and though the works of the place were weak, the Spanish army, covering all the side of the hill between the town and the castle, presented such an imposing spectacle, that the French general resolved to avoid a serious action. But the French and Italians marched in separate columns, and the latter under Eugenio, who arrived first, attacked contrary to orders ; yet he soon found his hands too full, and thus, against his will, Macdonald was obliged also to engage to bring Eugenio off. Yet neither was he able to resist Campo Verde, who drove all down the mountain, and followed them briskly as they retreated to Solsona.

Macdonald lost many men in this fight, and on the 26th returned to Guisona. It was now more than two months since he had left the Ampurdan, and during that time he had struck no useful blow against the Spaniards, nor had he, in any serious manner, aided Suchet's operations ; for the Catalans continually harassed that general's convoys, from the left of the Ebro, while the 7th corps, besides suffering severely from assassinations, had been repulsed at Cardona, had excited

the people of the plain of Urgel to a state of rabid insurrection, and had lost its own communications with the Ampurdan. In that district the brigade of Swartz had been destroyed, the ports of Felieu and Palamos taken, and the Catalans were everywhere become more powerful and elated than before: Barcelona also was again in distress, and a convoy from Perpignan destined for its relief dared not pass Hostalrich. Macdonald therefore resolved to return to Gerona by the road of Manreza, Moya, and Granollers, and having communicated his intention to Suchet, and placed his baggage in Lerida, commenced his march the 4th of November.

Campo Verde getting intelligence of this design, took post to fight near Calaf, yet when the French approached, his heart failed, and he permitted them to pass. The French general therefore reached Manreza the 7th, and immediately despatched parties towards Vich and other places to mislead the Spaniards, while with his main body he marched by Moya and the Gariga pass to Granollers, where he expected to meet Baraguay d'Hilliers with the convoy from Barcelona; but being disappointed in this, he returned by the Trenta Pasos to Gerona the 10th, and sent his convalescents to Figueras.

The vicinity of Gerona was now quite exhausted, and fresh convoys from France were required to feed the troops, while the posts in the Ampurdan were re-established and the district re-organized. Macdonald's muster-rolls presented a force of 51,000 men, of which 10,000 were in hospital, 6000 in Barcelona, and several thousand distributed along the coast and on the lines of communication, leaving somewhat more than 30,000 disposable for field operations. Of this number, 14,000 were placed under Baraguay d'Hilliers to maintain the Ampurdan, and when the convoys arrived from France the French marshal marched, with the remaining 16,000, for the fourth time, to the succour of Barcelona. His divisions were commanded by Souham and Pino, for Severoli had been recalled to Italy to organize fresh reinforcements; but following his former plan, this march also was made in one solid body, and as the defiles had been cut up by the Spaniards, and the bridge over the Tordera broken, Macdonald set his troops to labour, and in six hours opened fresh ways over the hills on the right and left of the Trenta Pasos, and so, without opposition, reached the more open country about Granollers and Moncada. The Spaniards then retired by their own left to Tarasa and Caldas, but Macdonald continued to move on in a solid body upon Barcelona; for as he was resolved not to expose himself to a dangerous attack, so he avoided all enterprise. Thus, on the 23rd, he would not permit Pino to improve a favourable opportunity of crushing the Catalans in his front, and on the 24th, after delivering his convoy and sending the carts back to Belgarde, instead of pursuing Campo Verde to Tarasa, as all the generals advised, he marched towards the Llobregat; and as Souham and Pino remained discontented at Barcelona, their divisions were given to Frere and Fontanes.

Macdonald moved, on the 27th, towards Tarragona, but without any design to undertake the siege; for though the road by Ordal and Villa Franca was broad and good, he carried no artillery or wheel-carriages: the Spaniards, seeing this, judged he would again go to Lerida, and posted their main body about Montserrat and Igualada; but he disregarded them, and after beating Sarsfield from Arbos and Vendril, turned towards the pass of Massarbones, which leads through the range of hills separating Villa Franca from the district of Valls. The Catalans had broken up both that and the pass of Christina leading to the Gaya, yet the French general again made new ways, and on the 30th spread his troops over the Paneda or plain of Tarragona: thus showing of how little use it is to destroy roads as a defence, unless men are also prepared to fight.

Instead of occupying Reus as before, Macdonald now took a position about Mombanch, having his rear towards Lerida, but leaving all the passes leading from Tarragona to the Ebro open for the Spaniards; so that Suchet derived no benefit from the presence of the 7th corps, nor could the latter feed itself, nor yet in any manner hinder the Catalans from succouring Tortosa. For Campo Verde, coming from Montserrat and Igualada, was encamped above the defiles between the French position and Tarragona, principally at Lilla, on the road from Valls; and O'Donnel, who still directed the general movements, although his wound

would not suffer him to appear in the field, sent parties into the Gariga behind Macdonald's right flank to interrupt his foraging parties, and to harass Suchet's communications by the Ebro.

From the strong heights at Lilla, the Catalans defied the French soldiers, calling upon them to come up and fight, and they would have done so if Macdonald would have suffered them, but after ten days of inactivity he divided his troops into many columns, and in concert with Abbé's brigade of the 3rd corps, which marched from Xerta, endeavoured to enclose and destroy the detachments in the Gariga ; the Spaniards, however, disappeared in the mountains, and the French army only gained some mules and 4000 sheep and oxen. With this spoil they united again on the left bank of the Ebro, and were immediately disposed on a line extending from Vinebre, which is opposite to Flix, to Masos, which is opposite to Mora, and from thence to Garcia and Gniestar. Suchet was thus enabled to concentrate his troops about Tortosa and the siege of that place was immediately commenced.

The operations of the 3rd corps during the five months it had been dependent upon the slow movements of the 7th corps shall now be related.

Suchet, by resigning the plain of Urgel and the magazines at Monzon, for Macdonald's subsistence, in September, had deprived himself of all the resources of the left bank of the Ebro from Mequinenza to Tortosa, and the country about the latter place was barren ; hence he was obliged to send for his provisions to Zaragoza, Teruel, and other places more than 100 miles from his camp ; and meanwhile the difficulty of getting his battering train and ammunition down the river from Mequinenza was increased because of the numerous bars and weirs which impeded the navigation when the waters were low ; moreover Macdonald, by going to Cardona, exposed the convoys to attacks from the left bank, by the Spanish troops, which being stationed between Tarragona, Mombianch, and Falcet, were always on the watch. Considering these things Suchet had, while the 7th corps was yet at Lerida, and the waters accidentally high, employed the Neapolitan brigade of the 7th corps to escort 26 pieces of artillery down the river. This convoy reached Xerta the 5th of September, and the Neapolitans were then sent to Guardia ; General Habert was placed at Tivisa ; Mas de Mora was occupied by a reserve, and the Spaniards again took post at Falcet. At this time General Laval died, and his division was given to General Harispe, a person distinguished throughout the war by his ability, courage, and humanity.

Meanwhile the Valencian army had again concentrated to disturb the blockade of Tortosa, wherefore Suchet strengthened Boussard's detachment at Uldecona, and gave the command to General Musnier, who was replaced at Zaragoza by General Paris. At the same time Colonel Kliski was sent to command the detachments on the side of Montalvan, Teruel, Daroca, and Calatayud, where a Partisan warfare was continued with undiminished activity by Villa Campa, who had contrived to open secret communications, and to excite some commotions even in Zaragoza. On the 7th of August he had beaten a French foraging detachment near Cuevas, and recaptured 6000 sheep, and at Andorra had taken both convoy and escort. On the side of Navarre also, Mina coming down into the Cinco Villas destroyed some detachments, and impeded the foraging parties. Thus the 3rd corps also began to suffer privations, and no progress was made towards the conquest of Catalonia.

In September, however, Villa Campa, having increased his forces, advanced so near Suchet that General Habert attacked and drove him over the frontier in dispersion, and recaptured all the sheep before lost, and Suchet then brought down the remainder of the battering train, and the stores for the siege ; but as the waters of the Ebro were low, the new road was used for the convoys, which thus came slowly and with many interruptions and considerable loss ; especially on the 17th of September, when a whole Neapolitan battalion suffered itself to be taken without firing a shot.

In this manner affairs dragged on until the 28th of October ; but then Macdonald (O'Donnel having meantime captured Swartz and raised the Ampurdan) returned to Gerona, whereby Suchet's hopes of commencing the siege were again baffled. And, as it was at this moment that the assembling of the cortes gave a

new vigour to the resistance in Spain, and the regency's plan of sending secret juntas, to organize and regulate the proceedings of the Partidas, was put in execution, the activity of those bands became proportioned to the hopes excited, and the supplies and promises thus conveyed to them. One of those secret juntas, composed of clergy and military men having property or influence in Aragon, endeavoured to renew the insurrection formerly excited by Blake in that province, and for this purpose sent their emissaries into all quarters, and combined their operations with Mina. They also diligently followed a plan of secretly drawing off the provisions from Aragon, with a view to starve the French, and General Carbajal, one of the junta, joining Villa Campa, assumed the supreme command on that side; while Captain Codrington, at the desire of Bassecour, carried a Valencian detachment by sea to Peniscola to fall on the left flank of Suchet, if he should attempt to penetrate by the coast road to Valencia. Thus, at the moment when Macdonald returned to the Ampurdan, the Aragonese became unquiet, the Partidas from Navarre and the district of Montalvan and Calatayud closed in on Suchet's communications, the Valencians came up on the one side towards Uldecona, and on the other Garcia Navarro moving from Tarragona with a division again assumed the position of Falcet.

To check this tide of hostility the French general resolved first to crush the insurrection project, and for this purpose detached seven battalions and 400 cavalry against Carbajal. Chlopiski, who commanded them, defeated the Spaniards the 31st at Alventoza on the route to Valencia, taking some guns and ammunition. Nevertheless Villa Campa rallied his men in a few days on the mountain of Fuente Santa, where he was joined by Carbajal, and having received fresh succours renewed the project of raising the Aragonese. But Chlopiski again defeated him the 12th of November, and the Spaniards fled in confusion towards the river Libras, where the bridge breaking many were drowned. The French lost more than 100 men in this sharp attack, and Chlopiski then returned to the blockade, leaving Kliski with 1200 men to watch Villa Campa's further movements.

The Ebro having now risen sufficiently, the remainder of the battering train and stores were embarked at Mequinenza, and on the 3rd dropped down the stream; but the craft outstripped the escort, and the convoy being assailed from the left bank, lost two boats; the others grounded on the right bank, and were there defended by the cannoneers, until the escort came up on the one side, and on the other, General Abbé, who had been sent from Guardia to their succour. The waters, however, suddenly subsided, and the convoy was still in danger until Suchet reinforced Abbé, who was thus enabled to keep the Spaniards at bay, while Habert with 1500 men, made a diversion by attacking the camp at Falcet. On the 7th, the waters again rose and the boats with little loss reached Xerta on the 9th, and thus all things were ready to commence the siege, but the 7th corps still kept aloof.

Suchet was now exceedingly perplexed; for the provisions he had with so much pains collected, from the most distant parts of Aragon, were rapidly wasting; forage was every day becoming scarcer, and the plain of Urgel, was by agreement given over to the 7th corps, which thus became a burthen instead of an aid to the 3rd corps. The latter had been, since the beginning of the year, ordered to supply itself entirely from the resources of Aragon without any help from France; and the difficulty of so doing may be judged of by the fact, that in six months they had consumed above 120,000 sheep and 1200 bullocks.

To obviate the embarrassments thus accumulating, the French general called the notables and heads of the clergy in Aragon to his head-quarters, and with their assistance re-organized the whole system of internal administration, in such a manner, that, giving his confidence to the natives, removing many absurd restrictions of their industry and trade, and leaving the municipal power and police entirely in their hands, he drew forth the resources of the provinces in greater abundance than before; and yet with less discontent, being well served and obeyed, both in matters of administration and police, by the Aragonese, whose feelings he was careful to soothe, showing himself in all things, an able governor, as well as a great commander.

Macdonald was now in march from Barcelona towards Tarragona, and Suchet

to aid this operation attacked the Spanish troops at Falset. General Habert fell on their camp in front the 19th, and to cut off the retreat, two detachments were ordered to turn it by the right and left; but Habert's assault was so brisk, that before the flanking corps could take their stations the Catalans fled, leaving their general, Garcia Navarro, and 300 men, in the hands of the victors. But while Suchet obtained this success on the side of Falset, the Valencian general, Bassecour, thinking that the main body of the French would be detained by Navarro on the left bank of the Ebro, formed the design of surprising General Musnier at Uldecona. To aid this operation, a flotilla from the harbour of Peniscola, attacked Rapita, and other small posts occupied by the French, on the coast between the Cenia and the Ebro; and at the same time the governor of Tortosa menaced Amposta and the stations at the mouth of the Ebro.

Bassecour moved against Uldecona in three columns, one of which, following the coast-road towards Alcanar, turned the French left, while another passing behind the mountains took post at Las Ventallas, in rear of Musnier's position, to cut him off from Tortosa. The main body went straight against his front, and in the night of the 26th the Spanish cavalry fell upon the French camp outside the town; but the guards, undismayed, opened a fire which checked the attack until the troops came out of the town and formed in order of battle.

At daylight the Spanish army was perceived covering the hills in front; and those in rear also, for the detachment at Ventallas was in sight; the French were thus surrounded and the action immediately commenced; but the Valencians were defeated with the loss of 1600 men, and the detachment in the rear seeing the result made off to the mountains again. Bassecour then withdrew in some order behind the Cenia, where in the night Musnier surprised him, and at the same time sent the cuirassiers by the route of Vinaros to cut off his retreat, which was made with such haste and disorder that the French cavalry, falling in with the fugitives near Benicarlo, killed or took 900. Bassecour saved himself in Peniscola, and thither also the flotilla, having failed at Rapita, returned.

Suchet having thus cleared his rear, sent his prisoners to France by Jaca, and directed a convoy of provisions, newly collected at Mequinenza, to fall down the Ebro, to the magazines at Mora: fearing however that the current might again carry the boats faster than the escort, he directed the latter to proceed first, and sent General Abbé to Flix to meet the vessels. The Spaniards in the Garriga observing this disposition, placed an ambuscade near Mequinenza, and attacked the craft before they could come up with the escort; the boats were then run ashore on the right side, and 70 men from Mequinenza came down the left bank to their aid, which saved the convoy, but the succouring detachment was cut to pieces. Soon after this the 7th corps having scoured the Garriga took post on the left bank of the Ebro, and enabled the 3rd corps to commence the long-delayed siege.

CHAPTER III.

TORTOSA, with a population of 10,000 souls and a garrison of from 8000 to 9000 regular troops, was justly considered the principal bulwark of both Catalonia and Valencia, but it was under the command of General Lilli, Conde d'Alacha, a feeble man, whose only claim was, that he had shown less incapacity than others before the battle of Tudela in 1808. However, so confident were the Spaniards in the strength of the place that the French attack was considerably advanced ere any interruption was contemplated, and had any well-considered project for its relief been framed, it could not have been executed, because jealousy and discord raged amongst the Spanish chiefs. Campo Verde was anxious to succeed O'Donnel in command of the Catalanian army; Bassecour held unceasing dispute with his own officers, and with the members of the junta or congress of Valencia; and Villa Campa repelled the interference both of Carbajal and Bassecour.

At this critical time therefore everything was stagnant, except the English vessels which blockaded Rosas, Barcelona, and the mouths of the Ebro, or from certain headlands observed and pounced upon the enemy's convoys creeping along from

port to port : they had thrown provisions, ammunition, and stores of all kinds into Tarragona and Tortosa, and were generally successful, yet at times met with disasters. Thus Captain Rogers of the *Kent*, having with him the *Ajax*, *Cambrian*, *Sparrow-hawk*, and *Minstrel* disembarked 600 men and two field pieces under Captain Fane at Palamos, where they destroyed a convoy intended for Barcelona ; but as the seamen were re-embarking in a disorderly manner, the French fell upon them and took or killed 200, Captain Fane being amongst the prisoners.

The Catalan army was 30,000 strong, including garrisons, and in a better state than it had hitherto been ; the Valencians, although discouraged by the defeat at Uldecona, were still numerous, and all things tended to confirm the Spaniards in the confident expectation that whether succoured or unsuccoured the place would not fall. But O'Donnell, who had been created Conde de' Bispal, was so disabled by wounds that he resigned the command soon after the siege commenced, and Campo Verde was by the voice of the people raised in his stead ; for it was their nature always to believe that the man who made most noise was the fittest person to head them, and in this instance, as in most others, they were greatly mistaken.

Tortosa, situated on the left of the Ebro, communicated with the right bank by a bridge of boats, which was the only Spanish bridge on that river, from Zaragoza to the sea ; and below and above the place there was a plain, but so narrowed by the juttings of the mountains at the point where the town was built, that while part of the houses stood close to the water on flat ground, the other part stood on the bluff rocky points shot from the hills above, and thus appeared to tie the mountains, the river, and the plains together.

Five of these shoots were taken into the defence either by the ramparts or by outworks. That on the south of the town was crowned by the fort of Orleans, and on the north another was occupied by a fort called the Tenaxas. To the east a horn-work was raised on a third shoot, which, being prolonged and rising suddenly again between the suburbs and the city, furnished the site of a castle or citadel : the other two, and the deep ravines between them, were defended by the ramparts of the place, which were extremely irregular, and strong from their situation, rather than their construction.

There were four fronts.

1. The northern defending the suburb. Although this front was built on the plain, it was so imbedded between the Ebro, the horn-work, the citadel, and the Tenaxas, that it could not even be approached without first taking the latter fort.

2. The eastern. Extending from the horn-work to the bastion of San Pico. Here the deep ravines and the rocky nature of the ground, which was also overlooked by the citadel and flanked by the horn-work, rendered any attack very difficult.

3. The south-eastern. From the bastion of San Pico to the bastion of Santa Cruz. This front, protected by a deep narrow ravine, was again covered by the fort of Orleans, which was itself covered by a second ravine.

4. The southern. From the Santa Cruz to the Ebro. The ground of approach here was flat, the soil easy to work in, and the fort of Orleans not sufficiently advanced to flank it with any dangerous effect ; wherefore against this front Suchet resolved to conduct his attack.

The Rocquetta, a rising ground opposite the bridge-head on the right bank of the Ebro, was fortified and occupied by three regiments, but the other troops were collected at Xerta ; and the 15th, before daybreak, Suchet crossed the Ebro by his own bridge at that point, with eight battalions, the sappers, and two squadrons of hussars. He marched between the mountains and the river upon the fort of Tenaxas, while General Habert, with two regiments and 300 hussars, moved from the side of Perillo, and attacked a detachment of the garrison which was encamped on the Col d'Alba, eastward of the city. When Suchet's column arrived in sight of the works, the head took ground, but the rear, under General Harispe, filed off to the left, across the rugged shoots from the hills, and swept round the place, leaving in every ravine and on every ridge a detachment, until the half circle ended on the Ebro, below Tortosa. The investment was then perfected on the left bank by the troops from Rocquetta ; and during this movement Habert, having seized



Explanatory Sketch
 OF THE
 SIEGE OF TORTOSA,
 1811.



the Col d'Alba, entered the line of investment, driving before him 600 men, who hardly escaped being cut off from the place by the march of Harispe. The communication across the water was then established by three, and afterwards by four flying bridges, placed above and below the town; a matter of some difficulty and importance, because all the artillery and stores had to come from Rocquetta, across the water, which was there 200 yards wide, and in certain winds very rough.

The camps of investment were now secured, and meanwhile Macdonald, sending the greatest part of his cavalry, for which he could find no forage, back to Lerida by the road of Lardicans, marched, from Mas de Mora, across the hills to Perillo, to cover the siege. His patrols discovered a Spanish division in a position resting upon the fort of Felipe de Balaguer, yet he would not attack them, and thinking he could not remain for want of provisions, returned on the 19th to Gniestar; but this retrograde movement was like to have exposed the investing troops to a disaster, for as the 7th corps retired, a second Spanish division coming from Reus reinforced the first. However, Macdonald, seeing this, placed Frere's division of 6000 infantry and a regiment of cavalry at Suchet's disposal, on condition that the latter should feed them, which he could well do. These troops were immediately stationed behind the investing force, on the road of Amposta, by which the Spaniards from Tarragona could most easily approach; and the remainder of the 7th corps encamped at Gniestar, a strong position covering the siege on the side of Falcet, only 15 miles distant from Tortoza. In this situation it could be more easily fed from Lerida, and could with greater facility send detachments up the Ebro, to protect the convoy of the 3rd corps coming from Mequinenza.

The Catalan army was now divided, part being kept on the Llobregat, under General Caro, part under General Yranzo at Momblanch, and part under Campo Verde, on the hills watching Frere's covering division. O'Donnel had before directed two convoys upon Tortoza, but the rapidity with which the investment had been effected prevented them from entering the place; and while he was endeavouring to arrange with Bassecour and Campo Verde a general plan of succour, his wounds forced him to embark for Valencia, when the command, of right, belonged to Yranzo, but the people, as I have before said, insisted upon having Campo Verde.

SIEGE OF TORTOZA.

The half bastion of San Pedro, which was situated in the plain, and close to the river, was the first object of the French attack, and to prevent the fire of Fort Orleans from incommoding the trenches, the line of approach was traced in a slanting direction, refusing the right, and pushing forward the left; and to protect its flanks on the one side, Fort Orleans was masked by a false attack, while, on the other side of the Ebro, trenches were opened against the bridge-head, and brought down close to the water.

The 19th, the posts of the besieged were all driven in, and an unfinished Spanish work, commenced on the heights in advance of Fort Orleans, was taken possession of. In the night, a flying sap was commenced upon an extent of 360 yards, and at a distance of only 160 from the fort; but in the following night, the true attack was undertaken in the plain during a storm of wind, which, together with the negligence of the Spaniards, who had placed no guards in front of their covered way, enabled the besiegers to begin this work at only 150 yards from the half bastion of San Pedro. This parallel was above 500 yards long, extending from the false attack against Fort Orleans, down to the bank of the river; two communications were also begun, and on the left bank ground was broken against the bridge-head.

The 21st, at daybreak, the Spaniards, perceiving the works, commenced a heavy fire, and soon after made a sally; but they were overwhelmed by musketry from the false attack of Fort Orleans, and from the trenches on the right bank of the Ebro.

In the night of the 21st, the communication in the plain was extended to 1400 yards, nine batteries were commenced, and bags of earth were placed along the edge of the trenches, whence chosen men shot down the Spanish artillerymen.

On the 23rd, a night sally, made from the bridge-head, was repulsed; and on the 24th, the second parallel of the true attack was commenced.

In the night of the 25th, at eleven o'clock and at one o'clock, separate sallies were again made, but both were repulsed, and the works were advanced to within 25 yards of the pallisades; a tenth battery was also commenced, and when day broke the Spanish gunners quailed under the aim of the chosen marksmen.

In the night of the 26th, the besieged fell upon the head of the sap, which they overturned, and killed the sappers, but were finally repulsed by the reserve, and the approach was immediately pushed forward to the place of arms. Thus, on the seventh night of open trenches, the besiegers were lodged in the covered way, before a shot had been fired from either breaching or counter batteries; a remarkable instance of activity and boldness, and a signal proof that the defence was ill-conducted.

The night of the 27th the works were enlarged as much as the fire of the place which was untouched would permit; but the Spaniards, seeing the besiegers' batteries ready to open, made a general sally through the eastern gates, against the false attack at Fort Orleans; and through the southern gates against the works in the plain. General Habert drove them back with slaughter from the former point, but at the latter they beat the French from the covered way, and arriving at the second parallel, burnt the gabions and did much damage ere the reserves could repulse them.

The night of the 28th, the batteries were armed with 45 pieces, of which 17 were placed on the right bank, to take the Spanish works at the main attack in reverse and to break the bridge. At daybreak all these guns opened, and with success, against the demi-bastion, on the left bank of the river; but the fire from the castle, the bridge-head, the horn-work, and the quay, overpowered the French guns on the right bank, and although the bridge was injured, it was not rendered impassable.

On the 30th, the Spanish fire was in turn overpowered by the besiegers, the bridge was then broken, and in the following night an attempt was made to pass the ditch at the true attack; but two guns, which were still untouched and flanked the point of attack, defeated this effort.

In the morning of the 31st, the Spaniards abandoned the bridge-head, and the French batteries on the right bank dismounted the two guns which had defended the half bastion of San Pedro. The besiegers then effected the passage of the ditch without difficulty, and attached the miner to the scarp.

In the night of the 31st, the miner worked into the wall, and the batteries opened a breach in the curtain, where a lodgment was established in preparation for an assault. At 10 o'clock in the morning the besieged, alarmed at the progress of the attack, displayed the white flag. The negotiations for a surrender were, however, prolonged until evening by the governor without any result, and the miner resumed his work in the night.

At seven o'clock on the 1st of January, two practicable breaches besides that in the curtain were opened by the artillery, and the mine was ready to explode, when three white flags were seen to wave from different parts of the fortress; nevertheless the disposition of the garrison was mistrusted, and Suchet demanded as a preliminary the immediate possession of one of the forts—a necessary precaution, for disputes arose among the besieged, and General Lilli intimated to Suchet, that his own authority was scarcely recognized.

In this critical moment, the French general gave proof that his talents were not those of a mere soldier, for suddenly riding up to the gates with a considerable staff, and escorted only by a company of grenadiers, he informed the Spanish officer on guard that hostilities had ceased, and then, leaving his grenadiers on the spot, desired to be conducted to the governor, who was in the citadel. Lilli still wavering, was upon the point of renewing the defence, in compliance with the desires of the officers about him, when the French general thus came suddenly into his presence, and although the appearance of the Spanish guard was threatening, assumed an imperious tone, spoke largely of the impatience of the French army, and even menaced the garrison with military execution if any further delay occurred; during

this extraordinary scene General Habert brought in the grenadiers from the gate, and the governor then signing a short capitulation, gave over the citadel to the French.

When this event was known in the city, the Spanish troops assembled, and Alacha, in the presence of Suchet, ordered them to lay down their arms. Four hundred French and about 1400 Spanish had fallen during the siege; and many thousand prisoners, nine standards, 100 pieces of artillery, 10,000 muskets, and immense magazines, enhanced the value of the conquest, which by some was attributed to General Lilli's treachery, by others to his imbecility, and it would seem that there was reason for both charges.

The fall of Tortosa, besides opening the western passage into Catalonia, and cutting off the communication between that province and Valencia, reduced the Spanish army to 20,000 men, including the garrisons of the towns which still remained in their possession. Campo Verde immediately retired from Falcet to Momblanch, and Suchet always prompt to make one success the prelude to another, endeavoured in the first moment of consternation and surprise to get possession of the forts of Peniscola and of Felipe de Balaguer: nor was he deceived with respect to the last, for that place, in which were five guns and 100 men, was taken on the 9th by Habert; but at Peniscola his summons was disregarded and his detachment returned.

Meanwhile, Macdonald leaving the Neapolitan brigade still on the Ebro, passed by Falcet to Reus, where he encamped the 11th, as if to invest Tarragona; but without any real intention to do so, for his cavalry and field artillery were left at Lerida and Tortosa, and his actual force did not exceed 12,000 men. Campo Verde, who had retreated before him, then posted Sarsfield with 6000 men at Valls, from whence he made incursions against Macdonald's foragers, and also surprised at Tarega, on the other side of the mountains, a regiment of Italian dragoons, which would have been destroyed but for the succour of a neighbouring post.

On the 14th, Macdonald having marched towards Valls, Sarsfield retired to Pla, and was pursued by General Eugenio with 2000 Italian infantry. This officer, being of a headstrong intractable disposition, pushed into the plain of Pla, contrary to his orders, and was nearing that town, when a strong body of cavalry poured out of it; and on each side the Spanish infantry were seen descending the hill in order of battle. Eugenio, instead of retiring, attacked the first that entered the plain, but he fell mortally wounded, and his men retreated fighting: meanwhile, the firing being heard at Valls, Palombini marched to his assistance, but was himself beaten and thrown into confusion, and Sarsfield at the head of the Spanish horse was preparing to complete the victory, when the French Colonel Delort bringing up some squadrons charged with great fury, and so brought off the Italians; yet Delort himself was desperately wounded, and the whole loss was not less than 600 men.

Macdonald would not suffer his main body to stir, and Vacani asserts that it was only by entreaty that Palombini obtained permission to succour Eugenio, which was certainly a great error, for so hot and eager was Sarsfield in the pursuit, that he was come within two miles of Valls, and being on open ground might have been crushed in turn. He, however, returned unmolested to the pass of Cabra, leaving his cavalry as before in Pla, whence through by-roads they communicated with Tarragona.

A few days after this fight Sarsfield came out again in order of battle, and at the same time Campo Verde appeared with a division on the hills in rear of Valls. Macdonald was thus surrounded, but Palombini's brigade sufficed to send Campo Verde back to Tarragona, and Sarsfield refused battle; then the French marshal, who had resolved to go to Lerida, but wished to move without fighting, broke up from Valls in the night, and with great order and silence passed by the road of Fuencalde, between the defiles of Cabra and Ribas, and though both were occupied by the Spaniards, they did not discover his movements until the next day. From thence he marched by Momblanch upon Lerida, where he arrived the 19th, and three days afterwards spread his troops over the plains of Urgel to collect provisions, money, and transport, and to watch the defiles of the mountains.

On the other hand the Catalan general, who had received stores and arms both

from England and Cadiz, renewed the equipment of his troops, and called all out the Migulettes and Somatenes of the hills round the plain of Urgel, to replace the loss sustained by the fall of Tortosa. These new levies were united at Santa Coloma de Queralt under Sarsfield, while the regular army assembled at Igualada and Villafranca, by which the Spaniards, holding a close and concentrated position themselves, cut off Macdonald equally from Barcelona and the Ampurdan ; and this latter district was continually harassed by Errolles, Rovira, and the brigade of Martinez, which still kept the mountains behind Olot, Vich, and the Cerdaña.

Meanwhile, Suchet being called by the exigencies of his government to Zaragoza, carried one division there, and distributed another under Musnier at Teruel, Molina, Alcanitz, and Morella : he also withdrew his troops from Cambril, which Habert had surprised on the 7th of February, but he left that general with a division in command of Tortosa, having 2000 men at Perillo to connect the city with San Felipe de Balaguer. Thus all things seemed to favour the Spanish side, and give importance to their success against Eugenio ; for they did not fail to attribute both Suchet's and Macdonald's retreats to fear occasioned by the skirmish with that general ; and with some show of reason as regarded the latter, seeing that his night march had all the appearance of a flight.

Macdonald, while gathering provisions at Lerida, and stores and guns at Tortosa, also repaired the works of Balaguer near Lerida, to serve as a pivot for the troops employed to forage the country watered by the Noguera, Cinca, and Legre rivers. However, Sarsfield and Campo Verde kept about Cervera and Calaf, watching for an opportunity to fall on the French detachments, and meanwhile, the organization of the province went on.

It may appear extraordinary that the war could have been continued by either side under such difficulties, but the resources were still great.* A patriotic junta had been formed in Catalonia to procure provisions, and although the English orders in council interfered with the trade of neutral vessels bringing grain, bread could be bought at the rate of 12lbs. to the dollar, while with Lord Wellington's army in Castile it often cost half a dollar a pound. When the French foraging parties came out from Barcelona, their march could be always traced by the swarms of boats loaded with people and provisions, which shooting out from the coast-towns, would hover, for a while, under the protection of the English vessels, and then return when the danger was over : and the enemy did never meddle with these boats lest they should remove the cover to their own supplies. Suchet, however, armed Rapita, and other small places at the mouth of the Ebro, with a view to afford shelter to certain craft, which he kept to watch for provision-vessels, sailing from Valencia for Tarragona, and to aid French vessels engaged in a like course coming from France.

To feed Barcelona, Maurice Mathieu at times occupied the headlands from St. Felieu to Blanes with troops, and thus small convoys crept along shore ; a fleet loaded with provisions and powder, escorted by three frigates, entered it in February, and a continual stream of supply was also kept up by sailing-boats and other small vessels, which could not be easily detected amidst the numerous craft belonging to the people along the coast. And besides these channels, as the claims of hunger are paramount to all others, it was necessary, for the sake of the inhabitants, to permit provision sometimes to reach Barcelona by land : the Spanish generals winked at it, and Milens and Lacy have even been charged with permitting corn to pass into that city for private profit, as well as from consideration for the citizens. By these and like expedients the war was sustained.

No important event occurred after the skirmish in which Eugenio fell until the 3rd of March, when the Spaniards, having observed that the garrison of Tortosa was weakened by a detachment at Perillo, endeavoured to cut the latter off, intending if successful to assault Tortosa itself. At the same time they also attacked the fort of San Felipe but failed, and the French at Perillo effected their retreat, although with considerable loss. This attempt was, however, followed by a more important effort. On the 19th of March, Campo Verde having assembled 8000

* Appendix, No. 12, section 2.

men at Molinos del Rey, 4000 at Guisols, and 3000 at Igualada, prepared to surprise the city and forts of Barcelona, for he had, as he thought, corrupted the town-major of Monjuic. Trusting to this treason, he first sent 800 chosen grenadiers in the night by the hills of Hospitalette to enter that place, and they descended into the ditch in expectation of having the gate opened; but Maurice Mathieu, apprised of the plan, had prepared everything to receive this unfortunate column, which was in an instant overwhelmed with fire.

Napoleon now changed the system of the war. All that part of Catalonia west of the Upper Llobregat, and from Igualada by Ordal to the sea, including the district of Tortosa, was placed under Suchet's government, and 17,000 of Macdonald's troops were united to the 3rd corps, which was thus augmented to 42,000 men, and took the title of the "Army of Aragon." It was destined to besiege Tarragona, while Macdonald, whose force was thus reduced to 27,000 under arms, including 15,000 in garrison and in the Ampurdan, was restricted to the upper part of Catalonia. His orders were to attack Cardona, Berga, Seu d'Urgel, and Montserrat, and to war down Martinez, Manso, Rovira, and other chiefs, who kept in the mountains between Olot and the Cerdaña: and a division of 5000 men, chiefly composed of national guards, was also ordered to assemble at Mont Louis, for the purpose of acting in the Cerdaña and on the rear of the Partizans in the high valleys. By these means the line of operations for the invasion of Catalonia was altered from France to Aragon, the difficulties were lessened, the 7th corps, reduced in numbers, became, instead of the principal, the secondary army; and Macdonald's formal method was thus exchanged for the lively vigorous talent of Suchet. But the delay already caused in the siege of Tortosa could never be compensated; Suchet had been kept on the Ebro when he should have been on the Guadalaviar, and this enabled the Murcians to keep the 4th corps in Grenada, when it should have been on the Tagus aiding Massena.

CHAPTER IV.

WHEN the troops of the 7th corps were incorporated with the army of Aragon, the preparations for the siege of Tarragona were pushed forward with Suchet's usual activity; but previous to touching upon that subject it is necessary to notice the guerilla warfare which Villa Campa and others had carried on against Aragon during the siege of Tortosa. This warfare was stimulated by the appointment of the secret juntas, and by the supplies which England furnished, especially along the northern coast from Coruña to Bilbao, where experience had also produced a better application of them than heretofore. The movements of the English squadrons in that sea, being from the same cause better combined with the operations of the Partidas, rendered the latter more formidable, and they became more harassing to the enemy as they acquired something of the consistency of regular troops in their organization, although irregular in their mode of operations: for it must not be supposed that because the guerilla system was in itself unequal to the deliverance of the country, and was necessarily accompanied with great evils, that as an auxiliary it was altogether useless. The interruption of the French correspondence was, as I have already said, tantamount to a diminution on their side of 30,000 regular troops, without reckoning those who were necessarily employed to watch and pursue the Partidas; this estimate may even be considered too low, and it is certain that the moral effect produced over Europe by the struggle thus maintained was very considerable.

Nevertheless, the same number of men under a good discipline would have been more efficacious, less onerous to the country people, and less subversive of social order. When the regular army is completed all that remains in a country may be turned to advantage as irregulars, yet they are to be valued as their degree of organization approaches that of the regular troops: thus militia are better than armed bodies of peasantry, and these last, if directed by regular officers, better than sudden insurrections of villagers. But the Spanish armies were never completed, never well organized; and when they were dispersed, which happened nearly as

often as they took the field, the war must have ceased in Spain had it not been kept alive by the Partidas, and it is there we find their moral value. Again, when the British armies kept the field, the Partidas harassed the enemy's communications, and this constituted their military value; yet it is certain that they never much exceeded 30,000 in number; and they could not have long existed in any numbers without the supplies of England, unless a spirit of order and providence, very different from anything witnessed during the war, had arisen in Spain.* How absurd then to reverse the order of the resources possessed by an invaded country, to confound the moral with the military means, to place the irregular resistance of the peasants first, and that of the soldiers last in the scale of physical defence.

That many of the Partida chiefs became less active after they received regular rank is undeniable; but this was not so much a consequence of the change of denomination, as of the inveterate abuses which oppressed the vigour of the regular armies, and by which the Partidas were necessarily affected when they became a constituent part of those armies; many persons of weight have indeed ascribed entirely to this cause the acknowledged diminution of their general activity at one period. It seems, however, more probable that a life of toil and danger, repeated defeats, the scarcity of plunder, and the discontent of the people at the exactions of the chiefs, had in reality abated the desire to continue the struggle; inactivity was rather the sign of subjection than the result of an injudicious interference by the government. But it is time to support this reasoning by facts.

During the siege of Tortosa the concentration of the 3rd and 7th corps exposed Aragon and Catalonia to desultory enterprises at a moment when the Partidas, rendered more numerous and powerful by the secret juntas, were also more ardent, from the assembly of the cortes, by which the people's importance in the struggle seemed at last to be acknowledged. Hence no better test of their real influence on the general operations can be found than their exploits during that period, when two French armies were fixed as it were to one spot, the supplies from France nearly cut off by natural difficulties, the district immediately around Tortosa completely sterile, Catalonia generally exhausted, and a project to create a fictitious scarcity in the fertile parts of Aragon diligently and in some sort successfully pursued by the secret juntas. The number of French foraging parties, and the distances to which they were sent, were then greatly increased, and the facility of cutting them off proportionably augmented. Now the several operations of Villa Campa during the blockade have been already related, but, although sometimes successful, the results were mostly adverse to the Spaniards; and when that chief, after the siege was actually commenced, came down on the 19th December, 1810, towards the side of Daroca, his cavalry was surprised by Colonel Kliski, who captured or killed 150 in the village of Blancas. The Spanish chief then retired, but being soon after joined by the Empecinado from Cuenca, he returned in January to the frontier of Aragon, and took post between Molina and Albaracin.

At this period Tortosa had surrendered, and Musnier's division was spread along the western part of Aragon, wherefore Suchet immediately detached General Paris with one column from Zaragoza, and General Abbé with another from Teruel, to chase these two Partidas. Paris fell in with the Empecinado near Molina, and the latter then joined Villa Campa, but the French general forced both from their mountain position near Frias, where he was joined by Abbé: and they continued the pursuit for several days, but finding that the fugitives took different routes, again separated; Paris followed Villa Campa, and Abbé pursued the Empecinado through Cuenca, from whence Carbajal and the secret junta immediately fled. Paris, failing to overtake Villa Campa, entered Beleta, Cobeta, and Paralejos, all three containing manufactories for arms, which he destroyed, and then returned; and the whole expedition lasted only 12 days, yet the smaller Partidas, in Aragon, had taken advantage of it to cut off a detachment of 50 men near Fuentes: and this was followed up on the side of Navarre by Mina, who entered the Cinco Villas in April, and cut to pieces 150 *gens d'armes* near Sadava. However, Chlopiski pursued him also so closely that he obliged his band to disperse near Coseda in Navarre.

During this time the Valencians had been plunged in disputes, Bassecour was displaced, and Coupigny appointed in his stead. The Notables, indeed, raised a sum of money for recruits, but Coupigny would not take the command, because the Murcian army was not also given to him; and that army, although numerous, was in a very neglected state, and unable to undertake any service. However, when Tortosa fell, the Valencians were frightened, and set about their own defence. They repaired and garrisoned the fort of Oropesa, and some smaller posts on the coast, along which runs the only artillery road to their capital: they commenced fortifying Murviedro, or rather the rock of Saguntum overhanging it, and they sent 1500 men into the hills about Cantavieja. These last were dispersed on the 5th of April by a column from Teruel; and on the 11th another body having attempted to surprise Uldecona, which was weakly guarded, were also defeated and sabred by the French cavalry.

These different events, especially the destruction of the gun-manufactories, repressed the activity of the Partizans, and Suchet was enabled to go to Lerida in the latter end of March to receive the soldiers to be drafted from the 7th corps: Macdonald himself could not, however, regain Barcelona without an escort, and hence 7000 men marched with him on the 29th of the month, not by Igualada, which was occupied in force by Sarsfield, but by the circuitous way of Manresa; for neither Macdonald nor Suchet wished to engage in desultory actions with the forces destined for the siege. Nevertheless Sarsfield, getting intelligence of the march, passed by Calaf with his own and Eroles' troops, and waited on Macdonald's flanks and rear near the Cardenera river, while a detachment, barricading the bridge of Manresa, opposed him in front. This bridge was indeed carried, but the town being abandoned, the Italian soldiers wantonly set fire to it in the night; an act which was immediately revenged, for the flames being seen to a great distance, so enraged the Catalans that in the morning all the armed men in this district whether regulars, Miguelettes, or Somatenes, were assembled on the neighbouring hills, and fell with infinite fury upon Macdonald's rear, as it passed out from the ruins of the burning city. The head of the French column was then pushing for the bridge of Villamara, over the Llobregat, which was two leagues distant; and as the country between the rivers was one vast mountain, Sarsfield, seeing that the French rear stood firm to receive the attack of the Somatenes, while the front still advanced, thought to place his division between, by moving along the heights which skirted the road. Macdonald, however, concentrated his troops, gained the second bridge, and passed the Llobregat, but with great difficulty and with the loss of 400 men, for his march was continually under Sarsfield's fire, and some of his troops were even cut off from the bridge, and obliged to cross by a ford higher up. During the night, however, he collected his scattered men, and moved upon Sabadel, whence he pushed on alone for Barcelona, and on the 3rd of April, Harispe, who commanded the escort, recommenced the march, and passing by Villa Franca, Christina, Cabra, and Momblanch, returned to Lerida the 10th.

The invasion of Catalonia was now divided into three parts, each assigned to a distinct army.

1. Suchet, with that of Aragon, was to take Tarragona and subdue the lower part of the province.

2. Macdonald, with that part of the 7th corps called the active army of Catalonia, was to break the long Spanish line extending from Tarragona, through Montserrat to the Cerdaña, and the high mountains about Olot.

3. Baraguay d'Hilliers, having his head-quarters at Gerona, was to hold the Ampurdan with the troops before assigned to his charge, and to co-operate, as occasion might offer, with Macdonald, under whose orders he still remained; and the division of 5000 men before mentioned as having been collected near Mount Louis, at the entrance of the French Cerdaña, was to act on the rear of the Spaniards in the mountains, while the others attacked them in front. Nor did the success appear doubtful, for the hopes and means of the province were both sinking. The great losses of men sustained at Tortosa and in the different combats; the reputation of Suchet; the failure of the attempts to surprise Barcelona, Perillo, and San Felipe de Balaguer; the incapacity of Campo Verde, which was now generally

felt, and the consequent desertion of the Miguelettes, would probably have rendered certain the French plans, if at the very moment of execution they had not been marred by Rovira, who surprised the great fortress of Figueras, the key of the Pyrenees on that side of Catalonia. This, the boldest and most important stroke made by a Partida chief during the whole war, merits a particular detail.

SURPRISE OF FERNANDO DE FIGUERAS.

The governor of the place, General Guillot, enforced no military discipline, his guards were weak, he permitted the soldiers to use the pallisades for fuel, and often detached the greatest part of the garrison to make incursions to a distance from the place; in all things disregarding the rules of service. The town, which is situated below the hill, upon which the great fortress of Fernando stands, was momentarily occupied by the Italian general, Peyri, with about 600 men, who were destined to join Macdonald, and who, trusting to the strength of the fortress above, were in no manner on their guard. And the garrison above was still more negligent; for Guillot had on the 9th of April sent out his best men to disperse some Somatenes assembled in the neighbouring hills, and this detachment having returned at night fatigued, and being to go out again the next day, slept while the gates were confided to convalescents, or men unfit for duty: thus the ramparts were entirely unguarded. Now there were in the fort two Catalan brothers named Palopos, and a man called Juan, employed as under-storekeepers, who being gained by Rovira had, such was the negligence of discipline, obtained from the head of their department the keys of the magazines, and also that of a postern under one of the gates.

Rovira, having arranged his plan, came down from the mountain of St. Lorens de Muga in the night of the 9th, and secretly reached the covered way with 700 chosen men of his own Partida. General Martinez followed in support with about 3000 Miguelettes, and the Catalan brothers, having previously arranged the signals, opened the postern, and admitted Rovira, who immediately disarmed the guard and set wide the gates for the reserve; and although some shots were fired, which alarmed the garrison, Martinez came up so quickly that no effectual resistance could be made. Thirty or forty men were killed or wounded, the magazines were seized, the governor and 1600 soldiers and camp-followers were taken in their quarters, and thus in an hour Rovira mastered one of the strongest fortresses in Europe: three cannon-shot were then fired as a signal to the Somatenes in the surrounding mountains, that the place was taken, and that they were to bring in provisions as rapidly as possible. Meanwhile General Peyri, alarmed by the noise in the fortress and guessing at the cause, had collected the troops, baggage, sick men, and stores in the town below, and sent notice to Gerona, but he made no attempt to retake the place, and at daylight retired to Bascara. For having mounted the hills during the night to observe how matters went, he thought nothing could be done, an opinion condemned by some as a great error; and indeed it appears probable that during the confusion of the first surprise, a brisk attempt by 600 fresh men might have recovered the fortress. At Bascara 500 men detached from Gerona, on the spur of the occasion, met him with orders to re-invest the place, and Baraguay d'Hilliers promised to follow with all his forces without any delay. Then Peyri, although troubled by the fears of his troops, many of whom were only national guards, returned to Figueras, and driving the Spaniards out of the town, took post in front of the fort above; but he could not prevent Martinez from receiving some assistance in men and provisions from the Somatenes. The news of Rovira's exploit spread with inconceivable rapidity throughout the Peninsula, extending its exhilarating influence, even to the Anglo-Portuguese army, then not much given to credit or admire the exploits of the Spaniards, but Baraguay d'Hilliers with great promptness assembled his dispersed troops, and on the 13th invested the fort with 6000 infantry and 500 cavalry; and this so quickly that the Spaniard had not time, or, more probably neglected, to remove 16,000 muskets which were in the place.

Martinez remained governor, but Rovira was again in the mountains, and all Catalonia, animated by the Promethean touch of this Partida chief, seemed to be

moving at once upon Figueras. Campo Verde came up to Vich, intending first to relieve Figueras, and then in concert with the English and Spanish vessels to blockade Rosas by land and sea. Rovira himself collected a convoy of provisions near Olot. Captain Bullen, with the *Cambrian* and *Volontaire* frigates, taking advantage of the French troops having been withdrawn from Gerona, drove out the small garrison from San Felieu and Palamos, destroyed the batteries, and made sail to join Captain Codrington at Rosas. A Spanish frigate, with a fleet of coasting-vessels loaded with supplies, anchored at Palamos; and Francisco Milans, after beating a small French detachment near Arens de Mar, invested Hostalrich; Juan Claros hovered about Gerona, and Eroles and Manso coming from Montserrat reduced Olot and Castelfollit. Sarsfield however remained in the Seu d'Urgel, and directed the mountaineers to establish themselves at Balaguer, but they were driven away again with great loss by a detachment from the garrison of Lerida.

On the 3rd of May, Rovira having brought his convoy up to Besalu, Campo Verde, who had arranged that Captain Codrington should make a diversion by an attack on Rosas, drew Milans from Hostalrich, and having thus united 11,000 men marched in several columns from Avionet and Villa Fan against the town, hoping to draw Baraguay d'Hilliers to that side; and to beat him, while Rovira, forcing a small camp near Llers, at the opposite quarter, should introduce the convoy and its escort into the fortress. The circuit of investment was wide, and very difficult, and therefore slightly furnished of men; but it was strengthened by some works, and when the Spanish columns first advanced, the French general reinforced the camp near Llers, and then hastened with 4000 men against Campo Verde, who was already in the valley of Figueras, and only opposed by one battalion. Baraguay d'Hilliers immediately fell on the right flank of the Spaniards and defeated them; the French cavalry, which had been before driven in from the front, rallied and completed the victory, and the Spaniards retreated with a loss of 1500 including prisoners. This affair was exceedingly ill-managed by Campo Verde, who was so sure of success that he kept the sheep of the convoy too far behind to enter, although the way was open for some time, hence the succour was confined to a few artillerymen, some tobacco, and medicines. Meanwhile the English ships landed some men at Rosas, but neither did this produce any serious effect, and the attempt to relieve Figueras having thus generally failed, that place was left to its own resources which were few; for the French with an unaccountable negligence had always kept a scanty supply of provisions and stores there. Martinez, who had now above 4000 men, was therefore obliged to practise the most rigorous economy in the distribution of food, and in bearing such privations the peninsular race are unvalued.

Macdonald was so concerned for the loss of Figueras, that, setting aside all his own plans, he earnestly adjured Suchet to suspend the siege of Tarragona, and restore him the troops of the 7th corps: Maurice Mathieu also wrote from Barcelona in a like strain, thinking that the possession of Upper Catalonia depended upon one powerful effort to recover the lost fortress. But Suchet, who had no immediate interest in that part of the province, whose hopes of obtaining a marshal's staff rested on the taking of Tarragona, and whose preparations were all made for that siege, Suchet I say, whose judgment was unclouded, and whose military talent was of a high order, refused to move a step towards Figueras, or even to delay, for one moment, his march against Tarragona.

He said that "his battalions being scattered, in search of supplies, he could not reunite them, and reach Figueras under 25 days; during that time the enemy, unless prevented by Baraguay d'Hilliers, could gather in provisions, receive reinforcements, and secure the fortress. A simple blockade might be established by the nearest troops, and to accumulate great numbers on such a sterile spot would not forward the recapture, but would create infinite difficulties with respect to subsistence. It was probable Napoleon had already received information of the disaster, and given orders for the remedy; and it was by no means reasonable to renounce the attack on Tarragona, the only remaining bulwark of Catalonia, at the very moment of execution, because of the loss of a fort; it was in Tarragona, the greatest part of the forces of Catalonia would be shut up, and it was only in

such a situation that they could be made prisoners ; at Lerida, Mequinenza, and Tortosa, 18,000 men and 800 officers had been captured, and if 10,000 or 12,000 more could be taken in Tarragona, the strength of Catalonia would be entirely broken. If the Spaniards failed in revictualling Figueras, that place, by occupying their attention, would become more hurtful than useful to them ; because Campo Verde might, and most probably would, march to its succour, and thus weaken Tarragona, which was a reason for hastening rather than suspending the investment of the latter ; wherefore he resolved, notwithstanding the separation of his battalions and the incomplete state of his preparations, to move down immediately and commence the siege." A wise determination and alone sufficient to justify his reputation as a general.

Macdonald was now fain to send all the troops he could safely draw together, to reinforce Baraguay d'Hilliers. In June, when a detachment from Toulon, and some frontier guards, had arrived at Figueras, the united forces amounting to 15,000 men, he took the command in person and established a rigorous blockade, working day and night, to construct works of circumvallation and contravallation ; his lines six miles in length, crowning the tops of the mountains and sinking into the deepest valleys, proved what prodigious labours even small armies are capable of. Thus with incessant wakefulness Macdonald recovered the place ; but this was at a late period in the year, and when Suchet's operations had quite changed the aspect of affairs.

When Tortosa fell, that general's movable columns traversing the borders of Castile, the eastern districts of Valencia, a portion of Navarre, and all the lower province of Catalonia, protected the collection of supplies, and suppressed the smaller bands which swarmed in those parts ; hence, when the siege of Tarragona was confided to the 3rd corps, the magazines, at Lerida and Mora, were already full ; and a battering train was formed at Tortosa, to which place the tools, platforms, and other materials, fabricated at Zaragoza were conveyed. Fifteen hundred draft horses, the greatest part of the artillerymen, and engineers, and 10 battalions of infantry, were also collected in that town, and from thence shot and shells were continually forwarded to San Felipe de Balaguer. This was a fine application of Cæsar's maxim, that war should maintain itself, for all the money, the guns, provisions, and materials, collected for this siege, were the fruits of former victories ; nothing was derived from France but the men. It is curious, however, that Suchet so little understood the nature and effects of the English system of finance, that he observes, in his memoirs, upon the ability with which the ministers made Spain pay the expense of this war by never permitting English gold to go to the Peninsula ; he was ignorant that the paper money system had left them no English gold to send.

The want of forage in the district of Tortosa, and the advantage of the carriage-road by the Col de Balaguer, induced the French general to direct his artillery that way ; but his provisions, and other stores, passed from Mora by Falcet and Momblanch to Reus, in which latter town he proposed to establish his stores for the siege, while Mora, the chief magazine, was supplied from Zaragoza, Caspe, and Mequinenza. Divers other arrangements, of which I shall now give the outline, contributed to the security of the communications, and enabled the army of Aragon to undertake the great enterprise for which it was destined.

1. Detachments of gens-d'armes and of the frontier guards of France, descending the high valleys of Aragon, helped to maintain tranquillity on the left bank of the Ebro, and occupied the castles of Venasque and Jaca, which had been taken by Suchet in his previous campaign.

2. The line of correspondence from France, instead of running as before through Guipuscoa and Navarre, by Pampeluna, was now directed by Pau, Oleron, and Jaca to Zaragoza ; and in the latter city, and in the towns around it, four or five battalions, and a proportion of horsemen and artillery, were disposed, to watch the Partidas from Navarre and the Moncayo mountains.

3. Four battalions with cavalry and guns, were posted at Daroca under General Paris, whose command extended from thence to the Fort of Molina, which was armed and garrisoned.

4. General Abbé was placed at Teruel with five battalions, 300 cuirassiers, and two pieces of artillery, to watch Villa Campa, and the Valencian army, which was again in the field.

5. Alcanitz and Morella were occupied by 1400 men, whereby that short passage through the mountains from Aragon to Valencia was secured; and from thence the line to Caspe, and down the Ebro from Mequinenza to Tortosa, was protected by 1200 men; Tortosa itself was garrisoned by two battalions, the forts at the mouth of the Ebro were occupied, and 400 men were placed in Rapita.

This line of defence from right to left was 14 days' march, but the number of fortified posts enabled the troops to move from point to point without much danger; and thus the army of the great and rich province of Valencia, the division of Villa Campa, the *Partidas* of New Castile and Navarre, including Mina and the *Empecinado*, the most powerful of those independent chiefs, were all set at naught by 12,000 French, although the latter had to defend a line of 150 miles. Under cover of this feeble chain of defence, Suchet besieged a strong city which had a powerful garrison, an open harbour, a commanding squadron of ships, and a free communication, by sea, with Cadiz, Valencia, Gibraltar, and the Balearic islands. It is true that detachments from the army of the centre, acting on a large circuit round Madrid, sometimes dispersed, and chased the *Partidas* that threatened Suchet's line of defence, but at this period, from circumstances to be hereafter mentioned, that army was in a manner paralysed.

While the French general's posts were being established, he turned his attention to the arrangements for a permanent supply of food. The difficulty of procuring meat was become great, because he wisely refrained from using up the sheep and cattle of Aragon, lest the future supply of his army should be anticipated, and the minds of the people of that province alienated by the destruction of their breeding flocks; to avoid this, he engaged contractors to furnish him from France, and so completely had he pacified the Aragonese, through whose territories the flocks were brought, and with whose money they were paid for, that none of his contracts failed. But as these resources were not immediately available, the troops on the right bank of the Ebro made incursions after cattle beyond the frontiers of Aragon; and when Harispe returned from Barcelona, eight battalions marched upon a like service up the higher valleys of the Pyrenees.

It was in this state of affairs that Suchet received intelligence of the surprise of Figueras, which induced him to hasten the investment of Tarragona. Meanwhile, fearing that Mina might penetrate to the higher valleys of Aragon, and in conjunction with the *Partidas* of Upper Catalonia cut off all correspondence with France, he detached Chlopiski with four battalions and 200 hussars to watch the movements of that chief only, and demanded of the emperor that some troops from Pampeluna should occupy Sangüessa, while others, from the army of the north, should relieve the detachments of the army of Aragon, at Soria and Calatayud.

The battalions sent up the high valleys of Catalonia returned in the latter end of April. Suchet then reviewed his troops, issued a month's pay, and six days' provisions to each soldier, loaded many carriages and mules with flour, and, having first spread a report, that he was going to relieve Figueras, commenced his march to Tarragona by the way of Mombianch. Some Miguelettes entrenched in the pass of Ribas were dispersed by Harispe's division on the 1st of May, and the army descended the hills to Alcover; but 400 men were left in Mombianch, where a post was fortified, to protect the line of communication with Lerida, and to prevent the Spanish Partizans on that flank, from troubling the communication between Mora and Reus. The 2nd, the head-quarters were fixed at Reus, and the 3rd, the Spanish outposts were driven over the Francoli; meanwhile Habert, sending the artillery from Tortosa by the Col de Balaguer, moved himself with a large convoy from Mora by Falcet to Reus.

CHAPTER V.

IN Tarragona, although a siege had been so long expected, there was a great scarcity of money and ammunition, and so many men had, as Suchet foresaw, been drawn off to succour Figueras, that the garrison, commanded by Colonel Gonzalez, was not more than 6000, including 1200 armed inhabitants and the seamen of the port. The town was encumbered with defensive works of all kinds, but most of them were ill-constructed, irregular, and without convenient places for making sallies.

Tarragona itself was built upon rocks, steep on the north-east and south, but sinking gently on the south-west and west into low ground. A mole formed a harbour capable of receiving ships of the line, and beyond the mole there was a roadstead. The upper town was surrounded by ancient walls, crowning the rocks, and these walls were inclosed by a second rampart with irregular bastions which ran round the whole city. On the east, across the road to Barcelona, there was a chain of redoubts connected by curtains, with a ditch and covered way; and behind this line there was a rocky space called the *Milagro*, opening between the body of the place and the sea. The lower town, or suburb, was separated from the upper, by the inner ramparts of the latter, and was protected by three regular and some irregular bastions with a ditch; a square work, called *Fort Royal*, formed a species of citadel within, and the double town presented the figure of an irregular oblong, whose length lying parallel to the sea, was about 1200 yards.

On the east beyond the walls, a newly-constructed line of defence was carried along the coast to the mouth of the *Francoli*, where it ended in a large redoubt, built to secure access to that river when the ancient aqueducts which furnished the city with water should be cut by the French. This line was strengthened by a second redoubt, called the *Prince*, half-way between that near the *Francoli* and the town; and it was supported by the mole which, being armed with batteries, and nearly in a parallel direction, formed as it were a second sea line.

The approach on the side of the *Francoli* river was of a level character, and exposed to the fire of the *Olivo*, a large outwork on the north, crowning a rocky table-land of an equal height with the upper town, but divided from it by a ravine nearly half-a-mile wide, across which the aqueducts of the place were carried. This *Olivo* was an irregular horn-work, 400 yards long, with a ditch 24 feet deep and 40 wide, but the covered way was not completed, and the gorge was only closed by a loopholed wall; neither was this defence quite finished, as the steepness of the rock and the fire of the city appeared to render it secure. The bastion on the left of the *Olivo* was cut off by a ditch and a rampart from the body of the work, and on the right also within the rampart there was a small redoubt of refuge, with a high cavalier or bank, on which three guns were placed that overlooked all the country round. The ordinary garrison of the *Olivo* was from 1200 to 1500 men, and it contained 50 out of 300 pieces of artillery, which served the defence of Tarragona.

The nature of the soil, combined with the peculiarities of the works, determined Suchet's line of attack. On the north and east side the ground was rocky, the fronts of defence wide, the approaches unfavourable for breaching batteries; and as all the guns and stores would have to be dragged over the hills on a great circuit, unless the *Olivo* was first taken, no difficulty could be avoided in an attack. Wherefore, on the side of the lower town the French resolved to approach, although the artificial defences were there accumulated, and the ground between the town and the *Francoli* river taken in reverse by the *Olivo*, which rendered it necessary first to reduce that outwork. But this part was chosen by the French, because the soil was deep and easily moved, their depôts and parcs close at hand, the ground-plot of the works so salient that they could be easily embraced with fire, and because the attack would, it was supposed, cut off the garrison from fresh water, yet this last advantage was not realized.

On the 4th of May, the French, passing the *Francoli*, drove in the outposts, took

possession of two small detached redoubts, situated on the northern side, called the forts of Loretto, and invested the place. However, the Spanish troops, supported by the fire of the Olivo, killed and wounded 200 men, and the next day a fruitless attempt was made to retake the lost ground; at the same time the fleet under Captain Codrington, consisting of three English ships of the line and three frigates, besides sloops and Spanish vessels of war, cannonaded the French right, and harassed their convoys, then coming by the coast-road from the Col de Balaguer. The investing troops, whose posts were very close to the Olivo, were also greatly incommoded by the heavy fire from that outwork, yet the line was maintained and perfected.

Habert's division, forming the right wing, extended from the sea to the bridge of the Francoli; General Frere's division connected Habert with Harispe's, whose troops occupied the ground before the Olivo; the Italian division prolonged Harispe's left to the road of Barcelona, which runs close to the sea on the east side of Tarragona; three regiments were placed in reserve higher up on the Francoli, where a trestle bridge was cast, and the parc, which was established on the right of that river, at the village of Canonja, contained 66 battering guns and mortars, each furnished with 700 rounds. There were also 36 field-pieces, 2000 artillerymen to serve the guns, 700 sappers and miners, 1400 cavalry, and nearly 15,000 infantry. The head-quarters were fixed at the village of Constanti, a strong covering position, the depôt at Reus was secured by fortified convents, and the works at Mora were defended by several battalions. Other troops, placed at Falcet, guarded the communications, which were further secured by the escorts belonging to the convoys; and the French had cut off the water of the aqueducts from the Olivo, but this water, whose source was 10 or 12 miles off, was also necessary to the besiegers on that sterile land, and was again cut off by the Somatenes; which obliged the French to guard its whole course during the siege.

Meanwhile Campo Verde after his defeat at Figueras had sent Sarsfield and Eroles to their former posts near Valls, Momblanch, and Igualada, and embarking at Mattaro himself, with 4000 men, came on the 10th to Tarragona, where the sudden appearance of the French had produced great consternation.* Yet when Campo Verde arrived with this reinforcement, and when Colonel Green, the English military agent, arrived on the 15th from Cadiz, in the *Merope*, bringing with him 50,000 dollars and two transports laden with arms and stores, Spanish apathy again prevailed, and the necessary measures of defence were neglected. Beyond the walls, however, the French post at Momblanch was attacked by 2000 Miguelettes and the Somatenes assembled in the vicinity of Reus.

Suchet detached General Frere with four battalions to relieve the former place, where the attack had failed; the commandant of Reus also dispersed the Somatenes, and meanwhile Harispe pushed his patrols over the Gaya as far as Torre de Bara, where he found some wounded Spaniards. These men were within the protection of a convention, made by St. Cyr with Reding, by which the wounded men of both armies were to be left in the civil hospitals of the different towns, and mutually taken care of, without being made prisoners; and it is remarkable that this compact was scrupulously executed on both sides, while beyond those hospitals the utmost ferocity and a total disregard of civilized usages prevailed.

Sarsfield's arrival near Momblanch threatened the communications between Reus and Mora, and at the same time a Valencian column, acting in concert with Captain Adam of the *Invincible*, attacked the posts of Rapita and Amposta: the former was abandoned by the garrison, and the latter was surrounded by the Valencians, but a regiment sent from Tortosa, after disengaging Amposta, defeated the Valencians near Rapita; nevertheless Suchet, unwilling to lessen his already too small force, did not restore the latter post.

SIEGE OF TARRAGONA.

The French general having resolved to attack the lower town, commenced his operations by constructing a fort and batteries, on the right of the Francoli, near the

sea-shore, with a view to keep the English ships of war and the gun-boats at a distance from his projected trenches. These works, commenced in the night of the 7th, were successfully continued towards the mouth of the river under fire of the vessels; a trench, lined with musketeers, was also carried from the left along the bank of the river to the bridge, but the Spaniards continually harassed the investing troops both from within and from without, and made some attempts against the camp; wherefore the brigade of General Salme, which was close to the Olivo, was obliged to entrench, and yet lost 50 or 60 men daily by the enemy's skirmishers.

On the night of the 13th, during a tempest, the French stormed two external entrenchments near the Olivo, and turned them against the besieged; the next morning a vigorous attempt to retake them was repulsed with a loss of 100 men, and on the Francoli side, a sally supported by the shipping, failed in consequence of the cowardice of some Spanish officers.* On the same day, besides this attack on the side of the Francoli, the garrison came out from the Barcelona gate, and 600 Somatenes from the Upper Gaya fell on the patrols of the Italian division, whereupon Palombini scoured the country on the 15th as far as Arbos.

The 18th, a powerful sortie from the lower town was made by Gonzalez, who passed the bridge, and, aided by a fire from the place, from the Olivo, and from the fleet, pressed Habert's division hard; Suchet, however, came down with his reserve, pushed between the river and the Olivo, and menaced the Spanish line of retreat, which obliged Gonzalez to retire with loss. On the 20th, three other sallies were made from the Olivo, and from the upper town, on the Barcelona side, but they were all in like manner repulsed; and that day Sarsfield took post with 1200 men on a high and rugged place near Alcover, thus menacing the dépôt at Reus. The French general therefore detached two battalions of infantry and some cavalry, under General Broussard, to dislodge him, which was effected with a loss of 100 French; but three days later he appeared before Momblanch, and was only driven away by the united brigades of Frere and Palombini, who marched against him. Divers attempts were also made upon the line of Falcet, especially at Grattalopes, where the Spanish colonel, Villamil, having attacked Morozinski, a Pole, the latter defended himself successfully, and with a bravery that has always distinguished the people of that heroic nation; a nation whose glory springs like an *ignis fatuus* from the corruption of European honour!

These repeated attacks having warned Suchet how difficult it would be to maintain, with his weak army, so great an extent of communication, he abandoned his post at Momblanch, and contented himself with preserving the lines of Falcet and Felipe de Balaguer; a measure the more necessary, that the garrison of Tarragona was now greatly augmented; for on the 16th, Blake had sailed for Valencia to seek reinforcements, and Carlos O'Donnel, who had succeeded Bassecour, gave him above 2000 infantry and 200 cannoneers, who were safely landed at Tarragona on the 22nd, 2000 stand of arms being, in return, delivered by Captain Codrington to O'Donnel, to equip fresh levies. Above 12,000 men were thus collected in the fortress, but all the richest citizens had removed with their families and effects to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and the people were dispirited.

Suchet broke ground before the Olivo in the night of the 21st, and carried on his approaches from both ends of the Spanish entrenchments which he had seized on the night of the 13th. His engineers wished to reach a round hill, close to the works, on which they proposed to plant their first breaching battery, and they crowned it on the 22nd, but with much loss, being obliged to carry the earth for the work up the hill in baskets, and they were continually interrupted by sallies. Three counter-batteries were, however, completed and armed on the 27th with 13 pieces, of which six threw shells; but to effect this, the soldiers dragged the artillery over the rocks, under a heavy fire of grape, and the garrison making a vigorous sally, killed General Salme, when he opposed them with the reserves. The moment was dangerous to the French, but they were finally victorious, and the fire of the batteries having opened the same morning, was sustained until the evening of the 29th, when a breach was formed, the assault being ordered.

STORMING OF THE OLIVO.

Upon the success of this attack Suchet thought, and with reason, that his chance of taking the town would depend, seeing that his army was too feeble to bear any serious check. Wherefore, having formed his columns of assault, he personally encouraged them, and at the same time directed the troops along the whole line of investment to advance simultaneously, and menace every part of the town. The night was dark, and the Spaniards were unexpectant of an attack, because none of their guns had yet been silenced; but the French, full of hope and resolution, were watching for the signal. When that was given, the troops on the Francoli, and those on the Barcelona side, made a sudden discharge of musketry, beat all their drums, and with loud shouts approached the town at those opposite quarters; the rampart of the place was instantly covered with fire from within and from without; the ships in the offing threw up rockets, and amidst the noise of 400 guns the storming columns rushed upon the Olivo.

The principal force made for the breach; but a second column, turning the fort, got between it and the town, at the moment when 1500 men, sent to relieve the old garrison, were entering the gates. Some of the French instantly fell on their rear, which hurrying forward, gave an opportunity to the assailants to penetrate with them before the gates could be closed, and 30 sappers with hatchets having followed closely, endeavoured to break the door, while Papignay, their officer, attempted to climb over the wall; the Spaniards killed him and most of the sappers, but the other troops planted their ladders to the right and left, and cutting through the pointed stakes above, entered the place and opened the gate.

At the main attack the French boldly assailed the narrow breach, but the ditch was 15 feet deep, the Spaniards firm, and the fire heavy, and they were giving way, when the historian, Vacani, followed by some of his countrymen (it is a strange error to think the Italians have not a brave spirit!) cut down the paling which blocked the subterranean passage of the aqueduct, and thus got into the ditch and afterwards into the fort. Then the Spaniards were driven from the ramparts on all sides, back to the little works of refuge, before noticed as being at each end of the Olivo, from whence they fired both musketry and guns; but the French and Italian reserves, followed by Harispe with a third column, now entered the place, and with a terrible slaughter ended the contest. Twelve hundred men perished, some escaped, 1000 were taken, and amongst them their commander, who had received ten wounds.

In the morning 3000 Spaniards came out of Tarragona, yet retired without attacking, and Suchet demanded a suspension of arms to dispose of the dead; this was, however, treated with scorn and the heaps were burned, for the sterile rocks afforded no earth to bury them. Campo Verde now gave General Senens de Contreras the command of Tarragona, and went himself to the field-army, which was about 10,000 strong, including some new levies made by the junta of Catalonia.

Suchet's investment having been precipitated by the fall of Figueras, his stores were not all collected until the 1st of June, when trenches were opened to embrace the whole of the lower town, including the fort of Francoli and its chain of connecting works running along the sea-shore, that is to say—1. The Nun's bastion and a half-moon called the King's, which formed, on the Spanish right, a sort of horn-work to the royal fort or citadel. 2. The bastion of San Carlos and a half-moon called the Prince's, which stood on the left, in the retiring angle where the sea-line joined the body of the place, and served as a counter-guard to the bastion of San Carlos. 3. The sea-line itself and the Francoli fort.

The 2nd of June, the besieged made a fruitless sally, and in the night of the 3rd some advanced Spanish entrenchments were destroyed by the French. Sarsfield then entered Tarragona with a detachment, and took the command of what was called the Port, which included the mole, the works leading to the Francoli, and the suburb or lower town, Contreras still remaining governor of all, although reluctantly, for he expected no success.

In the night of the 4th, the approaches were carried forward by the sap, the

second parallel was commenced, and on the 6th the besiegers were within 20 yards of the Francoli fort, which had a wet ditch and was of regular construction. The breaching batteries which had been armed as the trenches proceeded, opened their fire against it on the 7th. The fresh masonry crumbled away rapidly, and at ten o'clock that night, the fort being entirely destroyed, 300 chosen men in three columns, one of which forded the Francoli river, attacked the ruins, and the defenders retired fighting, towards the half-moon of the Prince. The assailants then made a disorderly attempt to enter with them, but were quickly repulsed with a loss of 50 men, yet the lodgment was under a heavy fire secured; and the next night a battery of six pieces was constructed there, with a view to silence the guns of the mole, which, together with that of the place, endeavoured to overwhelm the small space thus occupied, with shot.

In the nights of the 8th and 9th, under terrible discharges from both the upper and lower town, the second parallel was prolonged to Fort Francoli on the right, and on the left, carried to within 70 yards of the Nun's bastion.

The 11th, Sarsfield, making a sally, killed some men, and retarded the works; but before the 15th, three approaches by the sap were conducted against the Nun's bastion, where the besiegers crowned the glacis, and against the half-moon of the King and Prince. Fresh batteries were also constructed, whose fire embraced the whole front from the Prince to the Nun's bastion.

On the morning of the 16th, 54 guns opened from the French batteries, and the Spaniards placing sand-bags along the parapets endeavoured by musketry to kill the gunners, who were much exposed, while all the cannon of the place which could be directed upon the trenches were employed to crush the batteries. Towards evening this fire had in a great degree mastered that of the besiegers, destroyed the centre of their second parallel, and silenced a battery on their right; but the loss and damage was great on both sides, for two consumption magazines exploded in the town and the Nun's bastion was breached. The engineers also observed that the ditch of the Prince was not carried round to the sea, and hence Suchet, who feared a continuation of this murderous artillery battle, resolved to storm that point at once, hoping to enter by the defect in the ditch.

At nine o'clock, two columns, supported by a reserve, issued from the trenches, and after a short resistance entered the work both by the gap of the ditch and by escalade; the garrison fought well, and were put to the sword, a few only escaping along the quay; these were pursued by a party of the French, who passing a ditch, and drawbridge which cut off the road from the bastion of San Carlos, endeavoured to maintain themselves there, but being unsupported were mostly destroyed. The lodgment thus made was immediately secured and included in the trenches.

During the night of the 17th, the old batteries were repaired and the construction of a new one, to breach the bastion of San Carlos, was begun upon the half-moon of the Prince; the saps and other approaches were also pushed forward, a lodgment was effected in the covered way of the Nun's bastion, and the third parallel was commenced; but on the right of the trenches, in advance of the Prince, the workmen came upon water, which obliged them to desist at that point.

The 18th, the third parallel was completed and the descent of the ditch at the Nun's bastion was commenced by an underground gallery; yet the fire from the upper town plunged into the trenches, and 37 shells thrown very exactly into the lodgment on the counterscarp, obliged the besiegers to relinquish their operations there during the day. At this time also the gun-boats, which hitherto had been of little service in the defence, were put under the direction of the British navy, and worked with more effect; yet it does not appear that the enemy ever suffered much injury from the vessels of war, beyond the interruption sometimes given to their convoys on the Col de Balaguer road.

During the nights of the 19th and 20th, all the French works were advanced, and the morning of the 21st the new battery, in the Prince, being ready, opened its fire against San Carlos, and was followed by all the other batteries. The explosion of an expense magazine silenced the Prince's battery after a few rounds, the damage was, however, repaired, and at four o'clock in the evening nearly all the Spanish guns being overcome and the breaches enlarged, Suchet resolved to storm

the lower town. But previous to describing this terrible event, it is necessary to notice the proceedings within and without the place, that a just idea of the actual state of affairs on both sides may be formed.

Macdonald had continued the blockade of Figueras with unceasing vigilance ; and as the best of the Miguelettes were shut up there, and as the defeat of Campo Verde, on the 3rd of May, had spread consternation throughout the province, the operations to relieve it were confined to such exertions as Rovira, Manso, and other chiefs could call forth. In like manner Francisco Milans was left in the Hostalrich district, and by his local popularity amongst the people of the coast between Palamos and Barcelona, was enabled to keep up an irregular force ; but his object was to be made captain-general of the province, and his desire of popularity, or some other motive, led him to favour the towns of his district at the expense of the general cause. Mattaro and Villa Nueva de Sitjes trafficked in corn with Barcelona, and one of their secret convoys was detected at a later period passing the outposts with Milans' written authority. He put the men to death who permitted the convoy to pass, but he did not succeed in removing the suspicion of corruption from himself.* This traffic was very advantageous for the French, and Maurice Mathieu being either unwilling to disturb it, or that having recently suffered in a skirmish at Mattaro, he feared to risk his troops, made no movement to aid the siege of Tarragona, which it would appear he might have done by taking possession of Villa Nueva de Sitjes.

Such was the state of Eastern Catalonia, and in the western parts, the infantry of Sarsfield, and of Eroles, who had come down to the vicinity of Valls, and the cavalry under Caro, which was 1000 strong, formed, with the new levies ordered by the junta, an army of 7000 or 8000 men. This force might have done much, if Campo Verde, a man of weak character, and led by others, had not continually changed his plans. At the opening of the siege, Sarsfield had acted, as we have seen, with some success on the side of Momblanch and Reus ; but when he was sent into the lower town, the active army being reduced to Eroles' division, the cavalry could do no more than supply small detachments to watch the different French convoys and posts. Campo Verde, however, fixed his quarters at Igualada, sent detachments to the Gaya and Villa Franca, and holding Villa Nueva de Sitjes as his post of communication with the fleet, demanded assistance from Murcia and Valencia, and formed a general plan for the succour of the place. But in Tarragona his proceedings were viewed with dislike, and discord and negligence were rendering the courage of the garrison of no avail.

We have seen that Captain Codrington landed 2500 Valencians on the 22nd of May ; besides that reinforcement, vessels loaded with powder and other stores, and additional mortars for the batteries, came from Carthage and from Cadiz in the beginning of June. From Murcia also came reinforcements ; but such was the perversity of some authorities and the want of arrangement in all, that the arms of these men were taken away from them before they sailed ; and yet in Tarragona there were already 2000 men without arms, a folly attributed by some to the Spanish authorities of Murcia, by others to Colonel Roche, the English military agent.† Nor did the confusion end here ; for Captain Codrington, when he sailed from Tarragona to Peniscola in the latter end of May, supplied O'Donnel with arms for 2000 recruits, who were to replace the Valencians then embarked ; and a few days afterwards he delivered so many more at the city of Valencia, that Villa Campa and the Empecinado, whose troops, after their dispersion in April by Abbé and Paris, had remained inactive, were enabled again to take the field. Thus it appears that, while men were sent without arms from Valencia to Tarragona, arms were being conveyed from the latter place to Valencia.‡

The troops in Tarragona had, by these different reinforcements, been augmented to near 17,000 men ; however, that number was never available at one time, for the Murcians were sent to Montserrat to be armed, and the losses during the operations, including those caused by sickness, had reduced the garrison at this period to less than 12,000. Several colonels of regiments, and many other officers, feigning

* Appendix, No. 13, section 4.

† Appendix No. 13, section 1.

‡ Ibid.

sickness, or with open cowardice running away, had quitted the town, leaving their battalions to be commanded by captains ; the general of artillery was incapable, and Contreras himself, unknown to the inhabitants, unacquainted with the place or its resources, was vacillating and deceitful to those serving under him. He was very unwilling to undertake the defence, and he was at variance with Campo Verde outside, and jealous of Sarsfield inside. In the fleet, also, some disagreement occurred between Captain Codrington and Captain Bullen, and the commanders of the *Diana* and *Preuba* Spanish ships of war were accused of gross misconduct.

Carlos O'Donnel and his brother the Conde de Abispa, at the desire of Captain Codrington, had permitted Miranda to embark with 4000 of the best Valencian troops for Tarragona, there to join in a grand sally ; but they exacted from Codrington a pledge to bring those who survived back, for they would not suffer this their second aid in men to be shut up in the place when the object was effected. These troops landed the 12th at Tarragona, yet the next day, at Campo Verde's order, Miranda, instead of making a sally as had been projected, carried them off by sea to Villa Nueva de Sitjes, and from thence marched to meet a detachment of horse coming from Villa Franca ; and on the 15th two squadrons of cavalry, issuing from Tarragona by the Barcelona gate, passed the French line of investment without difficulty, and also joined Miranda, who then marched to unite with Campo Verde at Igualada.

This movement was in pursuance of a grand plan to succour the place ; for the junta of Catalonia, having quitted Tarragona after the fall of the Olivo, repaired with the archives to Montserrat, and as usual made their clamours for succour ring throughout the peninsula : they had received promises of co-operation from O'Donnel, from Villa Campa, and from the Partizans, and Campo Verde proposed, that the English ships of war should keep between the Col de Balaguer and Tarragona, to cannonade the French convoys on that route ; that a detachment should take post at Ordal to watch the garrison of Barcelona, and that he, with the remainder of his forces, which including Miranda's division amounted to 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, should take some commanding position near Reus. In this situation he designed to send a detachment towards San Felipe de Balaguer to communicate with the fleet, and, avoiding any serious action, to operate by small corps against the French line of supply, and thus oblige them to raise the siege, or if they came out of their lines to fight them in strong positions.

Contreras treated this plan with contempt. He said it would cause the loss both of the place and the army ; that the French would not raise the siege except for a general battle, and that within their lines the best mode of fighting them would be in concert with the garrison ; wherefore he desired the general-in-chief to attack them in conjunction with himself, and the junta, who were at variance with Campo Verde, backed this proposal.

Neither of these plans, however, appeared sound ; for though it is certain, if the generals could have depended upon their troops, such was the reduced state of Suchet's force, and so extensive was his line of investment, that it would have been easy to break through ; yet, unless the French were put entirely to the rout, which was unlikely, no great advantage would have followed, because the communication was already open by sea. On the other hand, Campo Verde's plan was only proposed on the 13th, and would have been too slow for the critical nature of the case. It would have been more in accord with that great maxim of war which describes the *attack of an enemy's weakest point with the greatest possible numbers*, to have marched with his whole force upon Mora, or upon Reus, to beat the troops there, and destroy the depôts ; and then seizing some strong posts on the hills close to the besieger's lines to have entrenched it and operated daily and hourly against their rear. If Campo Verde had destroyed either of these depôts, the siege must have been raised ; and if he was unable to beat 2000 or 3000 infantry at those places, he could not hope, even with the assistance of the garrison, to destroy 16,000 of all arms in the entrenchments before Tarragona. Suchet did not fear a battle on the Francoli river ; but so tender was he of the depôts, that when Campo Verde sent an officer to raise the Somatenes about Mora, he called Abbé with 3000

infantry from Teruel, and that general, who was active and experienced in the guerilla warfare, soon dispersed the Spanish levies, and took their chief with many others prisoners, after which he joined the besieging army.

Suchet required this reinforcement. He had lost a general, 200 inferior officers, and above 2500 men during the siege, and had not more than 12,000 infantry fit for duty; but Colonel Villamil, a partisan of Campo Verde's, taking advantage of Abbé's absence, marched with 1000 men to attack Mora, and being beaten on the 16th was succeeded by Eroles, who came with his whole division to Falset on the 20th, and captured a convoy of loaded mules, driving back the escort with some loss to Mora. The design was to tempt Suchet to send a strong detachment in pursuit of Eroles, in which case the latter was by a rapid march to rejoin Campo Verde near Alcover, when the whole army was to attack Suchet thus weakened. However, the French general would not turn from his principal object, and his magazines at Reus were still so full that the loss of the convoy did not seriously affect him.

Such was the situation of affairs on the 21st of June, when the order to assault the lower town was given to an army, small in number, but full of vigour, and confident of success; while in the place there was confusion, folly, and cowardice. Contreras indeed acted a shameful part; for during Captain Codrington's absence, Sarsfield had concerted with the navy, that in the case of the lower town being stormed, the ships should come to the mole and the garrison would retire there, rather than to the upper town; meanwhile Campo Verde recalled him to the active army, intending that General Velasco should replace him; but at three o'clock on the 21st, the breaches being then open, and the assault momentarily expected, Contreras commanded Sarsfield instantly to embark, falsely averring that such was the peremptory order of Campo Verde. Sarsfield remonstrated in vain, and a boat from the Cambrian frigate carried him and his personal staff and his effects on board that vessel; thus the command of the troops was left to an inefficient subordinate officer, the assault took place at that moment, and when Velasco arrived he found only the dead bodies of those he was to have commanded.* Contreras then assured Captain Codrington and the junta that Sarsfield had acted without his consent, and had in fact betrayed his post!

STORMING OF THE LOWER TOWN.

This calamitous event happened in the evening of the 21st. Two breaches had been made in the bastions, and one in the Fort Royal; they were not wide, and a few Spanish guns still answered the French fire; nevertheless, the assault was ordered, and, as some suppose, because Suchet had secret intelligence of Sarsfield's removal, and the consequent confusion in the garrison.

Fifteen hundred grenadiers, destined for the attack, were assembled under Palombini in the trenches; a second column was formed to support the storming troops, and to repel any sally from the upper town; and while the arrangements were in progress, the French guns thundered incessantly, and the shouts of the infantry, impatient for the signal, were heard between the salvos, redoubling as the shattered walls gave way. At last Harispe's division began to menace the ramparts on the side of Barcelona, to distract the attention of the Spaniards, and then Suchet exhorting the soldiers to act vigorously, gave the signal and let them loose while it was still day. In an instant the breaches were crowned, and the assailants swarmed on the bastions, the ramparts, and the Fort Royal; the Spaniards, without a leader, were thrown into confusion, and falling in heaps broke and fled towards the port, towards the mole, and towards the upper town, and a reserve stationed under the walls of the latter was overthrown with the same shock. Then some of the fugitives, running towards the mole, were saved by the English launches, others escaped into the upper town, a few were made prisoners, and the rest were slaughtered.

At eight o'clock the lower town was in the possession of the enemy. Fifteen

* Appendix, No. 13. section 1.

hundred bodies, many of whom were inhabitants, lay stretched upon the place, and the mercantile magazines of the port being set on fire, the flames finished what the sword had begun. When the carnage ceased, the troops were rallied, working parties were set to labour; and ere the confusion in the upper town had subsided, the besiegers were again hidden in their trenches and burrowing forward to the walls of the upper town.

The front before them consisted of four bastions with curtains, but without a ditch. The bastion of St. Paul was opposite their left, that of St. John opposite their centre, that of Jesus opposite their right; but the bastion of Cervantes, which covered the principal landing-place of the Milagro, although on the same front of defence, was somewhat retired and not included within the attack. A hollow piece of ground, serving as a trench, had enabled the French to establish their left in a side bastion of the wall, connecting the upper with the lower town; and their right was strongly protected by some houses lining the road, for between the two parts of the city there were 400 yards of open garden-ground interspersed with single houses. A battery was constructed to play upon the landing-places of the Milagro, two mortars which were on the hill of the fort Loretto concurred in this object, and the light troops were pushed close up to the wall; but at daylight the ships of war passed the port delivering their broadsides in succession; Contreras then showed the heads of columns as if for a sally, and the French skirmishers retired; whereupon the Spanish general, contented with having thus cleared his front, re-entered the place.

The men saved from the mole, by the ships, were now re-landed in the upper town, and the second reinforcement from Murcia arrived, but being like the first detachment without arms only added to the confusion and difficulties of the governor. Nevertheless as the loss of the French in the storming was about 600, and that of the Spaniards not more than 2000, the besieged had still 9000 fighting men; a number nearly equal to the whole infantry of Suchet's army; and hence Contreras, far from quailing beneath the blow, would not even receive a flag of truce by which the French general offered honourable conditions.

Suchet's position was becoming more embarrassing every moment; he had now delivered four assaults, his force was diminished nearly one-fifth of its original number, and the men's strength was spent with labouring on his prodigious works: his line of communication with Lerida was quite intercepted and that with Mora interrupted, and he had lost a large convoy of provisions, together with the mules that carried it. The resolution of the besieged seemed in no manner abated, and their communication with the sea, although partially under the French fire, was still free; the sea itself was covered with ships of war, overwhelming reinforcements might arrive at any moment, and Campo Verde with 10,000 men was daily menacing his rear. The Valencian army, Villa Campa, the Empecinado, Duran who had defeated a French detachment near Mirando del Ebro, Mina who had just then taken the convoy with Massena's baggage at the Puerto de Arlaban, in fine all the Partidas of the mountains of Albaracin, Moncayo, and Navarre, were in motion, and menacing his position in Aragon. This rendered it dangerous for him to call to his aid any more troops from the right of the Ebro, and yet a single check might introduce despondency amongst the soldiers of the siege, composed as they were of different nations, and some but lately come under his command; indeed their labours and dangers were so incessant and wearing, that it is no small proof of the French general's talent, and the men's spirit, that the confidence of both was still unshaken.

On the 24th, the crisis seemed at hand, intelligence arrived in the French camp, that the Spanish army was coming down the Gaya river to fight, at the same time the garrison got under arms, and an active interchange of signals took place between the town and the fleet. Suchet immediately placed a reserve to sustain the guards of his trenches, and marched with a part of his army to meet Campo Verde. That general, pressed by the remonstrances of Contreras and the junta, had at last relinquished his own plan, recalled Eroles, and united his army at Momblanch on the 22nd, and then, moving by Villardona, had descended the hills between the Gaya and the Francoli; he was now marching in two columns to deliver battle, having

directed Contreras to make a sally at the same moment. But Miranda, who commanded his right wing, found, or pretended to find, some obstacles and halted, whereupon Campo Verde instantly relinquished the attack, and marched to Vendril before the French general could reach him.

The 25th, he again promised Contreras to make a decisive attack, and for that purpose desired that 3000 men of the garrison should be sent to Vendril, and the remainder be held ready to cut their way through the enemy's lines during the action. He likewise assured him that 4000 English were coming by sea to aid in this project, and it is probable some great effort was really intended, for the breaching batteries had not yet opened their fire, and the wall of the place was consequently untouched; 10,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry under Campo Verde were within a few miles of the French camp on the Barcelona side; 8000 men accustomed to fire were still under arms within the walls; and on the 26th, Colonel Skerrett appeared in the roadstead, not with 4000, but with 1200 British soldiers, sent from Cadiz and from Gibraltar to succour Tarragona.

The arrival of this force, the increase of shipping in the roadstead, and the promises of Campo Verde, raised the spirits of the garrison from the depression occasioned by the disappointment of the 27th; and they were still more elated when in the evening Colonel Skerrett and his staff, accompanied by General Doyle, Captain Codrington, and other officers of the navy, disembarked, and proceeded to examine the means of defence. But they were struck with consternation when they heard that the British commander, because his engineers affirmed that the wall would give way after a few salvos from the breaching batteries, had resolved to keep his troops on board the transports, idle spectators of the garrison's efforts, to defend the important place which he had been sent to succour.*

Contreras, thus disappointed on all sides, and without dependence on Campo Verde, resolved, if the French delayed the storm until the 29th, to make way by a sally on the Barcelona road, and so join the army in the field; meanwhile to stand the assault if fortune so willed it. And he had good reason for his resolution, for the ground in front of the walls was high and narrow; and although there was neither ditch nor covered way, a thick hedge of aloë trees, no small obstacle to troops, grew at the foot of the rampart, which was also cut off from the town, and from the side works, by an internal ditch and retrenchment. Behind the rampart the houses of the great street called the Rambla, were prepared for defence, furnishing a second line of resistance; and although the cuts on the flanks hindered the making of sallies in force, which at such a period was a good mode of defence, the reduced state of the French army gave reason to believe that 8000 brave men could resist it effectually.

The 28th, a general plan for breaking out on the Barcelona side, the co-operation of the fleet, and a combined attack of the Spanish army, was arranged; and Eroles embarked for the purpose of re-landing at Tarragona, to take the leading of the troops destined to sally forth on the 29th. The French general had, however, completed his batteries on the night of the 27th, and in the morning of the 28th they opened with a crashing effect. One magazine blew up in the bastion of Cervantes; all the guns in that of San Paulo were dismounted; the wall fell away in huge fragments before the stroke of the batteries, and from the Olivo, and from all the old French trenches, the guns and mortars showered bullets and shells into the place. This fire was returned from many Spanish pieces, still in good condition, and the shoulders of the French batteries were beaten down; yet their gunners, eager for the last act of the siege, stood to their work uncovered, the musketry rattled round the ramparts, the men on both sides crowded to the front, and while opprobrious words and mutual defiance passed between them, the generals, almost within hearing of each other, exhorted the soldiers to fight with the vigour that the crisis demanded.

* Appendix, No. 13, section 1.

STORMING OF THE UPPER TOWN.

At five o'clock in the evening the French fire suddenly ceased, and 1500 men led by General Habert passing out from the parallel, went at full speed up against the breach; 1200 under General Ficatier followed in support, General Montmarie led a brigade round the left, to the bastion of Rosario, with a view to break the gates there during the assault, and thus penetrating to turn the interior defence of the Rambla. Harispe took post on the Barcelona road, to cut off the retreat of the garrison.

The columns of attack had to pass over an open space of more than 100 yards before they could reach the foot of the breach; and when within 20 yards of it, the hedge of aloes obliged them to turn to the right and left, under a terrible fire of musketry and of grape, which the Spaniards, who were crowding on the breach with apparent desperation, poured unceasingly upon them. The destruction was great; the head of the French column got into confusion, gave back, and was beginning to fly, when the reserves rushed up, and a great many officers coming forward in a body, renewed the attack. At that moment one Bianchini, an Italian soldier, who had obtained leave to join the column as a volunteer, and whose white clothes, amidst the blue uniforms of the French, gave him a supernatural appearance, went forth alone from the ranks, and gliding silently and sternly up the breach, notwithstanding many wounds, reached the top, and there fell dead. Then the multitude bounded forward with a shout, the first line of the Spaniards fled, and the ramparts were darkened by the following masses of the French.

Meanwhile Montmarie's sappers cut away the palisades at Rosario, and his light troops finding a rope hanging from the wall, mounted by it, at the moment when the assailants at the breach broke the Spanish reserves with one shock, and poured into the town like a devastating torrent. At the Rambla a momentary stand was indeed made, but the impulse of victory was too strong to be longer resisted, and a dreadful scene of slaughter and violence ensued. Citizens and soldiers, maddened with fear, rushed out in crowds by the Barcelona gate, while others, throwing themselves over the ramparts, made for the landing-places within the Milagro; but that way also had been intercepted by General Rogniat with his sappers, and then numbers throwing themselves down the steep rocks were dashed to pieces, while they who gained the shore were still exposed to the sword of the enemy. Those that went out by the Barcelona gate were met by Harispe's men, and some being killed, the rest, 3000 in number, were made prisoners. But within the town all was horror; fire had been set to many houses, Gonzales, fighting manfully, was killed; Contreras, wounded with the stroke of a bayonet, was only saved by a French officer; and though the hospitals were respected by the soldiers, in every other part their fury was unbounded. When the assault first commenced, the ship-launches had come close into the Milagro, and now saved some of the fugitives, but their guns swept the open space beyond, killing friends and enemies, as, mixed together, they rushed to the shore; and the French dragoons, passing through the flaming streets at a trot, rode upon the fugitives, sabring those who had outstripped the infantry. In every quarter there was great rage and cruelty, and although most of the women and children had, during the siege, been removed from Tarragona by the English shipping, and that the richest citizens had all gone to Sitjes, this assault was memorable as a day of blood. Only 700 or 800 miserable creatures, principally soldiers, escaped on board the vessels; 9000, including the sick and wounded, were made prisoners; more than 5000 persons were slain, and a great part of the city was reduced to ashes.

CHAPTER VI.

SUCHET had lost in killed and wounded during the siege between 4000 and 5000 men, yet scarcely had the necessary orders to efface the trenches, secure the prisoners, and establish order in the ruined city been given, than the French general was again in movement to disperse Campo Verde's force. In the night of the

29th Frere's division marched upon Villa Franca, Harispe's upon Villa Nueva, being followed by Suchet himself with Abbé's brigade and the heavy cavalry. Campo Verde then abandoned Vendril, and Harispe's column, although cannonaded by the English squadron, reached Villa Nueva, where a great multitude, military and others, were striving to embark in the vessels off the port. The light cavalry sabred some and made 1500 prisoners, including the wounded men who had been carried there from Tarragona during the siege; and Frere's column in a like manner dispersed the Spanish rear-guard at Vendril and Villa Franca. Campo Verde then fled with the main body to Igualada, and Suchet pushed on with the reserve to Barcelona, where he arranged with Maurice Mathieu a plan to prevent the Valencian division from re-embarking, or marching to aid the blockade of Figueras.

Distrust, confusion, and discord now prevailed amongst the Catalans. The people were enraged against Campo Verde, and the junta sent to Cadiz to demand the Duke of Infantado as a chief. Milans, who had assembled some Miguelettes, and Somatenes about Arens de Mar, openly proposed himself, and Sarsfield, whose division was the only one in any order, was at variance with Eroles. The country people desired to have the latter made captain-general, and a junta of general officers actually appointed him; yet he would not accept it while Campo Verde remained, and that general had already reached Agramunt, whence, overwhelmed with his misfortunes, he meant to fly towards Aragon.* He was, however, persuaded to return to Cervera, and call a council of war, and then it was proposed to abandon Catalonia as a lost country, and embark the army; and this disgraceful resolution, although opposed by Sarsfield, Santa-Cruz, and even Campo Verde himself, was adopted by the council, and spread universal consternation. The junta remonstrated loudly, all the troops who were not Catalans deserted, making principally for the Segre and Cinça rivers, in hope to pass through Aragon into New Castile, and so regain their own provinces; every place was filled with grief and despair.

In this conjuncture Captain Codrington refused to embark any Catalans, but he had promised to take back the Valencians, and although the conditions of his agreement had been grossly violated by Campo Verde and Miranda, he performed his contract: yet even this was not arranged without a contest between him and Doyle, on the one side, and Miranda and Caro on the other.† Meanwhile Colonel Green, instead of remaining at the Spanish head-quarters, returned to Peniscola with all the money and arms under his control; and the captain of the *Prueba* frigate, having under his command several Spanish vessels of war loaded with wounded men, the archives of the municipality, ammunition, stores, and money, all belonging to Catalonia, set sail for Majorca under such suspicious circumstances that Captain Codrington thought it necessary to send a ship to fetch him back by force.‡

In the midst of these afflicting scenes Suchet brought up his troops to Barcelona, and Maurice Mathieu, with a part of his garrison, marching upon Mataro, dispersed a small body of men that Eroles had collected there; but the Valencian infantry to the number of 2400 escaped to Arens de Mar, and being received on board the English vessels, were sent back to their own country. The cavalry, unwilling to part with their horses, would not embark, and menaced their general, Caro, who fled from their fury; nevertheless Eroles rallied them, and having gathered some stores and money from the smaller depôts, marched inland. Campo Verde then embarked privately in the *Diana* to avoid the vengeance of the people, and General Lacy, who had arrived from Cadiz, took the command; yet he would have been disregarded if Eroles had not set the example of obedience. Suchet, however, moved against him, and first scouring the valley of the Congosta and that of Vich, spread his columns in all directions, and opened a communication with Macdonald at Figueras. Lacy, thus pressed, collected the cavalry and a few scattered Catalan battalions remaining about Solsona, Cardona, and Seu d'Urgel, and took

* Appendix No. 13, section 5. † Appendix No. 13, section 2.

‡ Appendix No. 13, section 3.

refuge in the hills, while Eroles threw himself into Montserrat, where large magazines had been previously formed.

Suchet, unable to find subsistence in the valleys, resolved to attack this celebrated place, and for this purpose, leaving Frere and Harispe at Vich and Moya, with orders to move at a given time upon Montserrat, returned himself with the reserve to Reus. Here he received despatches from Napoleon, who had created him a marshal, and had sent him orders to take Montserrat, to destroy the works of Tarragona, with the exception of a citadel, and finally to march against Valencia. He therefore preserved the upper town of Tarragona, ruined the rest of the works, carried the artillery to Tortosa, and marched against Mont Serrat on the 22nd of July by the way of Momblanch and San Coloma to Igualada. At the same time Harispe and Frere moved by Manresa, and Maurice Mathieu entered Esparaguera with a part of the garrison of Barcelona.

TAKING OF MONTSERRAT.

This stronghold was occupied by 1400 or 1500 Miguelettes and Somatenes, inadequate as it proved to defend it against a great body of men such as Suchet was bringing up. But Eroles was daily raising recruits and adding works to the natural strength, and it would soon have been impregnable; for on all sides the approaches were through the midst of steepes and precipices, and high upon a natural platform, opening to the east, and overlooking the Llobregat, stood the convent of "Nuestra Señora de Montserrat," a great edifice, and once full of riches, but the wary monks had removed their valuables to Minorca early in the war. It was now well stored and armed, and above it huge peaks of stone shot up into the clouds so rude, so naked, so desolate, that, to use Suchet's expressive simile, "It was like the skeleton of a mountain."

There were three ways of ascending to this convent; one from Igualada which winded up on the north, from Casa Mansana, between a perpendicular rock and a precipice; this road, which was the only one supposed practicable for an attack, was defended by two successive batteries, and by a retrenchment immediately in front of the convent itself. The other two ways were—a footpath on the south leading to Colbato, and a narrow road crossing the Llobregat and running by Monistrol on the east, but both so crossed and barred by precipices as to be nearly inaccessible to troops.

Suchet disposed one brigade at Colbato to menace that front, and to intercept the retreat of the Spaniards; he then occupied the roads of Igualada and Monistrol with Harispe's and Frere's divisions, and directed Abbé's brigade to attack from the convent by the northern line. The 24th, Abbé drove the Spaniards from Casa Mansana, and the 25th advanced up the mountain, flanked by some light troops, and supported by Suchet in person with the Barcelona troops, but exposed to the fire of the Somatenes, who had gathered round the peaks above. In a short time the first Spanish battery opened upon the head of the column as it turned an angle, but more light troops being sent out, they climbed the rough rocks, and getting above the battery shot down upon the gunners, while the leading companies of the column rushed forward, in front, and before a second discharge could be made, reached the foot of the battery beneath the line of fire. The Spaniards then threw down large stones upon the French until the fire of the light troops above became so galling that the work was abandoned; the French, however, followed close, and the men above continued clambering along with that energy which the near prospect of success inspires; thus the Spaniards, unable to rally in time, were overtaken and bayoneted in the second battery, and the road was opened.

Abbé now re-formed his troops and marched on to assail the entrenchments of the convent, but as he advanced a sharp musketry was heard on the opposite quarter, and suddenly the Spanish garrison came flying out of the building pursued by French soldiers, who were supposed to be the brigade from Colbato; they however proved to be the light troops first sent out, to keep off the Somatenes from the right flank; for when the column advanced up the mountain, these men, about 300

in number, had wandered too far to the right, and insensibly gaining ground uphill, had seized one or two of the hermitages with which the peaks are furnished ; then growing more daring, they pressed on unopposed, until they gained the rock immediately overhanging the convent itself, and perceiving their advantage, with that intelligence which belongs only to veterans, immediately attacked the Spanish reserves. Their commanding position, the steep rocks, and narrow staircases, compensated for their inferiority of numbers, and in a little time they gained one of the doors, entered, and fought the defenders amongst the cloisters and galleries, with various turns of fortune, until the fugitives from the batteries, followed by Abbé, arrived, and then the whole garrison gave way and fled down the eastern precipices to the Llobregat, where from their knowledge of the country they easily avoided Harispe's men.

The loss of this place, which by Eroles and others was attributed to Colonel Green's having carried off the money destined for strengthening it, was deeply felt from its military importance, and from the superstitious veneration in which it was held : several towns then offered their submission, many villages gave up their arms, and a general fear of Suchet's prowess began to spread all over Spain ; but the Catalans, a fierce and constant race, were not yet conquered. The anarchy attendant upon the fall of Tarragona and the after movements of Suchet had indeed been great ; and as we have seen, most of the persons who might have aided to restore order, acted so as to increase the general confusion, and their bad example was followed by the authorities in other provinces who were most immediately connected with Catalonia : thus Cuesta, at this time governor of the Balearic Isles, Bassecour, who was at Cuença, and Palacios, who had just been made captain-general of Valencia, did in no manner comport themselves as the occasion required. Cuesta, who had neglected to send from Minorca the guns wanted in Catalonia, now entered into a negotiation to exchange the prisoners at Cabrera against those of Tarragona, a praiseworthy thing, if, as Suchet asserts, it arose from humanity ; and not an ill-judged measure in itself, because the Catalonian soldiers to be exchanged were the best in Spain, and the French prisoners were ruined in constitution by their hard captivity. But at this period of distress it was impolitic, and viewed with suspicion by the Catalonians, as tending to increase the French force. At the desire of Mr. Wellesley this exchange was, however, peremptorily forbidden by the regency, and Cuesta refused to receive any more prisoners at Cabrera, which while those already there were so tormented, was, from whatever motive arising, a meritorious act, and the last important one of his life, for he soon after died. The prisoners remained, therefore, a disgrace to Spain and to England ; for if her envoy interfered to prevent their release, she was bound to insist, that thousands of men, whose prolonged captivity was the result of her interference, should not be exposed upon a barren rock, naked as they were born, and fighting for each other's miserable rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched.*

This untoward state of affairs in Catalonia was aggravated by the English, Spanish, and French privateers, who taking advantage of the times, plundered the people along the coast in concert ; and they were all engaged in the smuggling of tobacco, the monopoly of which here as in other parts of Spain formed the principal resource of the revenue.† Yet there were many considerable resources left to the Catalans. The chief towns had fallen, but the mountainous districts were not subdued and scarcely crossed by the French lines of invasion. The Somatenes were numerous, more experienced, and still ready to come forward, under a good general, if arms were provided for them, and the English squadron was always at hand to aid them : Admiral Keats brought 3000 muskets from Gibraltar, Sir E. Pellew, who had succeeded to the command of the Mediterranean fleet, was anxious to succour the province to the full extent of his means, and Minorca was a great depôt of guns, stores, and even men. Lacy, Eroles, Rovira, and others, therefore, raised fresh levies ; and while the blockade of Figueras continued to keep all Macdonald's army employed, the Spaniards seized the opportunity to operate partially on the side of Besalu and Bispal, and even in the French Cerdaña, which being unprotected, was invaded by Lacy.

* Appendix, No. 12, section 4.

† Ibid.

Suchet, whose posts now extended from Lerida to Montserrat on one side, and on the other from Tarragona to Mequinenza, foresaw that a new and troublesome Catalanian war was preparing ; but he was obliged to return to Saragoza, partly to prepare for the invasion of Valencia, partly to restore tranquillity in Aragon, which had been disturbed by the passage of the seceders from Campo Verde's army. The Valencian cavalry also, when Eroles threw himself into Montserrat, had under the conduct of General Gasca endeavoured to push through Aragon towards Navarre ; and although they were intercepted by General Reille, and followed closely by Chlopiski, they finally reached Valencia without much loss, and the rest of the fugitives gained the Moncayo mountains and afterwards joined Mina. That chief was then in a very low state ; he had been defeated on the 14th at Sanguesa, by Chlopiski and Reille, who using the reinforcements then pouring into Spain, had pursued and defeated him again at Estella on the 23rd of July, at Sorlada on the 24th, and at Val de Baygory on the 25th ; yet he finally escaped to Mortico on the Biscay coast, where he received fresh arms and stores from the English vessels ; but he was again defeated by Caffarelli, and finally driven for refuge to the district of Leibana ; here the soldiers flying from Tarragona and Figueras joined him, and he soon re-appeared more fierce and powerful than before.

Meanwhile, Villa Campa, whose division had been re-equipped from the supplies given by Captain Codrington, concerted his operations with the Partida chiefs Duran and Campillo ; and their combined forces being 8000 strong, having advanced from different quarters on the right bank of the Ebro, invested Calatayud, and sought to carry off grain, which now was very scarce. This delayed the invasion of Valencia, for Suchet would not undertake it until he had again secured the frontier of Aragon, and many of his battalions were then escorting the prisoners to France. But when they returned, he directed numerous columns against the Partidas, and at the same time troops belonging to the army of the centre came down by the way of Medina Celi ; whereupon the Spaniards retired to their fastnesses in the mountains of Soria on one side, and in those of Albaracin on the other.

Four thousand of the Valencian army had meanwhile marched against Rapita and Amposta, for the former post was re-established after the fall of Taragona, but although Habert marching out of Tortosa with 700 or 800 men, defeated them with a considerable loss, the embarrassments of the 3rd corps were not removed ; for while these successes were obtained on the right of the Ebro, the Catalans began to harass the posts between Lerida and Montserrat. On the 9th of August the Somatenes fell on some Italians placed in Monistrol, and were with difficulty repulsed ; and a few days after a convoy coming from Igualada to Montserrat was attacked by 1500 insurgents, and was unable to proceed until Palombini arrived with a battalion and dislodged the Catalans, but he lost more than 100 of his own men in the action. Suchet, finding from these events that he could not safely withdraw his main body from Catalonia until the fall of Figueras should let loose the army of the upper province, sent fresh troops to Montserrat, and ordered Palombini to move with his garrison to aid Macdonald in the blockade ; that place had, however, surrendered before Palombini had passed Barcelona.

General Martinez, after making many vain efforts to break the line of blockade, and having used every edible substance, prepared on the 16th of August to make a final effort, in concert with Rovira who came down to Llers. An officer deserting from the garrison betrayed the project ; and Rovira was beaten in the morning before the garrison sallied ; nevertheless, in the night Martinez endeavoured to cut his way through the lines on the side of Rosas, but was driven back with a loss of 400 men. Three days after, the place was given up and 3000 famished men were made prisoners. Thus ended the fourth great effort of the Catalanians. The success of the French was not without alloy, more than a fourth part of the blockading troops had died of a pestilent distemper ; Macdonald himself was too ill to continue in the command, and the remainder of his army was so weakened that no further active operations could be undertaken ; Suchet was still occupied in Aragon, and Lacy thus obtained time and means to reorganize troops for a fifth effort.

The persons who had betrayed the place to Rovira were shot by Macdonald, and the commandant whose negligence had occasioned this misfortune was condemned to death ; but Napoleon, who has been so foully misrepresented as a sanguinary tyrant, Napoleon, who had commuted the sentence of Dupont, now pardoned General Guillot ; a clemency in both cases remarkable, seeing that the loss of an army by one, and of a great fortress by the other, not only tended directly and powerfully to the destruction of the emperor's projects, but were in themselves great crimes ; and it is to be doubted if any other sovereign in Europe would have displayed such a merciful greatness of mind.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The emperor was discontented with Macdonald's operations, and that general seems to have mistaken both the nature of mountain warfare in general, and that of Catalonia in particular. The first requires a persevering activity in seizing such commanding posts on the flanks or rear of an adversary as will oblige him to fight on disadvantageous terms ; and as the success greatly depends upon the rapidity and vigour of the troops, their spirit should be excited by continual enterprise, and nourished by commendation and rewards. Now Macdonald, if we may believe Vacani, an eye-witness, did neither gain the confidence of his soldiers, nor cherish their ardour ; and while he exacted a more rigid discipline than the composition of his troops and the nature of the war would bear, he let pass many important opportunities of crushing his enemies in the field. His intent was to reduce the ferocious and insubordinate disposition of his men, but the peculiar state of feeling with respect to the war on both sides did not permit this, and hence his marches appeared rather as processions and ceremonies than warlike operations. He won no town, struck no important blow in the field, gave no turn to the public feeling, and lost a most important fortress, which with infinite pains and trouble he could scarcely regain.

The plans of all the French generals had been different. St. Cyr used to remain quiet until the Spaniards gathered in such numbers that he could crush them in general battles ; but then he lost all the fruit of his success by his inactivity afterwards. Augereau neither fought battles nor made excursions with skill, nor fulfilled the political hopes which he had excited. Macdonald was in constant movement, but he avoided battles ; although in every previous important attack the Catalans had been beaten, whether in strong or in weak positions. Suchet alone combined skill, activity, and resolution, and the success which distinguished his operations is the best comment upon the proceedings of the others. It is in vain to allege that this last marshal was in a better condition for offensive operations, and that the emperor required of the 7th corps exertions which the extreme want of provisions prevented it from making. Napoleon might have been deceived as to the resources at first, and have thus put it upon enterprises beyond its means ; but after two years' experience, after receiving the reports of all the generals employed there, and having the most exact information of all occurrences, it is impossible to imagine that so consummate a captain would have urged Macdonald to undertake impracticable operations ; and the latter gave no convincing proof that his own views were sound. Notwithstanding, the continual complaints of St. Cyr and other French writers, who have endeavoured to show that Napoleon was the only man who did not understand the nature of the war in Spain, and that the French armies were continually overmatched, it is certain, that after Baylen, the latter never lost a great battle except to the English ; that they took every town they besieged, and never suffered any reverse from the Spaniards which cannot be distinctly traced to the executive officers. It would be silly to doubt the general merit of a man who in so many wars and for many years has maintained the noblest reputation, amidst innumerable dangers, and many great political changes in his own country, but Macdonald's military talents do not seem to have been calculated for the irregular warfare of Catalonia.

2. The surprise of Figueras has been designated as a misfortune to the Spaniards, because it shut up a large body of their best Miguelettes, who fell with

the place ; and because it drew off Campo Verde from Tarragona at a critical period. Let us, however, contrast the advantages, and apart from the vigour and enterprise displayed in the execution, no mean help to the cause at the time, it will be seen that the taking of that fortress was a great gain to the Catalans ; for, first, it carried away Macdonald from Barcelona, and thus the fall of Montserrat was deferred, and great danger of failure incurred by Suchet at Tarragona ; a failure infallible, if his adversaries had behaved with either skill or courage. Secondly, it employed all the French army of Upper Catalonia, the national guards of the frontier, and even troops from Toulon, in a blockade, during which the sword and sickness destroyed more than 4000 men, and the remainder were so weakened as to be incapable of field service for a long time ; meanwhile, Lacy reorganized fresh forces, and revived the war, which he could never have done if the 7th corps had been disposable. Thirdly, seeing that Campo Verde was incapable of handling large masses, it is doubtful if he could have resisted or retarded for any time the investment of Tarragona ; but it is certain that the blockade of Figueras gave an opportunity to Catalonia to recover the loss of Tarragona ; and it obliged Suchet, instead of Macdonald, to take Montserrat which disseminated the former force, and retarded the invasion of Valencia. Wherefore Rovira's daring in the surprise, and Martinez' resolution in the maintaining of Figueras were as useful as they were glorious.

3. The usual negligence and slowness of the Spaniards was apparent during this campaign ; although resolution, perseverance, and talent were evinced by Suchet in all his operations, the success was in a great measure due to the faults of his opponents, and amongst those faults Colonel Skerrett's conduct was prominent. It is true that Captain Codrington and others agreed in the resolution not to land ; that there was a heavy surf, and that the engineers predicted on the 27th that the wall would soon be beaten down ; but the question should have been viewed in another light by Colonel Skerrett. Tarragona was the bulwark of the principality, the stay and hope of the war. It was the city of Spain whose importance was next to Cadiz, and before its walls the security or the ruin of Valencia as well as of Catalonia was to be found. Of the French scarcely 14,000 infantry were under arms, and those were exhausted with toil. The upper town, which was the body of the place, was still unbreached, it was only attacked upon one narrow front, and behind it the Rambla offered a second and a more powerful defence. There were to use the governor's expression, within the walls "8000 of the most warlike troops in Spain," and there was a succouring army without, equal in number to the whole infantry of the besiegers. Under these circumstances the stoutest assailants might have been repulsed, and a severe repulse would have been fatal to the French operations.

Captain Codrington asserts that in the skirmishes beyond the walls, the valour of the garrison was eminent ; and he saw a poor ragged fellow endeavouring, such was his humanity and greatness of mind, to stifle the burning fuze of a shell with sand, that some women and children might have time to escape. Feeling and courage, the springs of moral force, were therefore not wanting, but the virtue of the people was diminished, and the spirit of the soldiery overlaid, by the bad conduct of their leaders. The rich citizens fled early to Villa Nueva, and they were followed by many superior officers of regiments ; Contreras, jealous of Sarsfield, had obliged him, as we have seen, to quit his post at a critical moment, and then represented it to the garrison as a desertion ; the Valencians were carried off after being one day in the place, and the Murcians came without arms ; and all this confusion and mischief were so palpable, that the poor Spanish soldiers could anticipate nothing but failure if left to themselves, and it was precisely for this reason that the British should have been landed to restore confidence. And is there nothing to be allowed for the impetuous fury of an English column breaking out of the place at the moment of attack ? Let it be remembered also, that in consequence of the arrival of a seventy-four, convoying the transports, such was the number of ships of war, that 1000 seamen and marines might have been added to the troops ; and who can believe that 3000 or 4000 French and Italians, the utmost that could be brought to bear in mass on one point, and that not an easy point, for the breach

was narrow and scarcely practicable, would have carried the place against 8000 Spaniards and 2000 British? But then the surf, and the enemy's shot at the landing-place, and the opinion of General Doyle and of Captain Codrington and of the engineers! The enemy's shot might have inflicted loss, but could not, especially at night, have stopped the disembarkation; and the opinion of the engineers was a just report of the state of the walls, but in no manner touched the moral considerations.

When the Roman Pompey was adjured by his friends not to put to sea during a violent storm he replied, "It is necessary to sail—it is not necessary to live." It was also necessary to save Tarragona! Was no risk to be incurred for so great an object? Was an uncertain danger to be weighed against such a loss to Spain? Was the British intrepidity to be set at naught? Were British soldiers to be quiet spectators, while Spaniards stood up in a fight too dangerous for them to meddle with? Is that false but common doctrine, so degrading to soldiers, that brick-and-mortar sentiment, that the courage of the garrison is not to be taken into account, to be implicitly followed? What if the Spaniards had been successful? The result was most painful! Tarragona strongly fortified, having at different periods about 15,000 men thrown into it, with an open harbour and free communication by sea, was taken by less than 20,000 French and Italian infantry, in the face of a succouring army, a British brigade, and a British fleet!

4. The cruelty of the French general and the ferocity of his soldiers have been dwelt upon by several writers, but Suchet has vindicated his own conduct, and it is therefore unnecessary here to enter into a close investigation of facts which have been distorted, or of reasoning which has been misapplied. That every barbarity, commonly attendant upon the storming of towns, was practised may be supposed; there is in the military institutions of Europe nothing calculated to arrest such atrocities. Soldiers of every nation look upon the devastation of a town taken by assault as their right, and it would be unjust to hold Suchet responsible for the violence of an army composed of men from different countries, exasperated by the obstinacy of the defence, and by a cruel warfare; in Spanish towns also the people generally formed a part of the garrison.

OPERATIONS IN VALENCIA AND MURCIA.

The transactions in the first of these provinces during the siege of Tarragona have been already sufficiently noticed; and those in Murcia were of little interest, for the defeat of Blake at Cullar in November, 1810, and the fever which raged at Carthagena, together with the frequent change of commanders, and the neglect of the government, had completely ruined the Murcian army. The number of men was indeed considerable, and the 4th French corps, weakened by drafts for the expedition to Estremadura, and menaced by the Barossa expedition, could not oppose more than 5000 or 6000 men; yet the province had never been touched by an enemy, and the circumstances were all favourable for the organization and frequent trial of new troops.

In February, 1811, Colonel Roche, the military agent, described the whole army as "ready to disperse on the first appearance of an enemy," and in the following June he says that, "after being left to themselves for three years, the Murcian troops were absolutely in a worse state than they were at the commencement of the revolution, that General Freire, although at the head of 16,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, dared not attack the 6000 French before him, lest his men should disperse, and they thought as little of the general as he did of them; that indolence, lassitude, and egotism prevailed in all parts; that the establishment of the cortes had proved but a slight stimulus to the enthusiasm, which was fast dying away, and that the most agreeable thing in the world at the moment to the Spaniards, would be to remain neuter, while England and France fought the battle and paid all the expense." The Murcian force was increased after Mahi's arrival to 22,000 men, but remained inactive until August, when Blake assumed the command, and the events which followed will be treated of hereafter.

The petty warfare in the south of Grenada and Andalusia deserves little notice,

for during Blake's absence in Estremadura with the fourth army, it was principally confined to the Ronda, where the Serranos, aided at times by the troops from Alge-siras, and by succours from Gibraltar, were always in arms ; yet even there the extreme arrogance and folly of the Spanish generals, so vexed the Serranos that they were hardly prevented from capitulating in form with the French, and while Soult continued at Llerena after the battle of Albuera. The Escopeteros and civic guards sufficed to keep the Partidas in check. Thus the blockade of the Isla remained undisturbed from without, and Cadiz itself, the seat of all intrigues and follies, was fed by English fleets and defended by English troops.

The narrative of the circle of secondary operations being now completed, and the fate of Spain proved to depend upon the British general alone, it will be proper in the next book to take a view of political affairs, showing how strongly they bore upon Lord Wellington's decisions ; and if such an interruption of the military story should be distasteful to any reader I would have him reflect, that war is not so much a series of battles, as a series of difficulties in the preparations to fight them with success.

BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF JOSEPH.

AFTER the conquest of Andalusia, the intrusive monarch pursued his own system of policy with more eagerness than before. He published amnesties, granted honours and rewards to his followers, took many of the opposite party into his service, and treated the people generally with mildness. But he was guided principally by his Spanish ministers, who, being tainted with the national weaknesses of character, were, especially Orquijo, continually making exaggerated reports, intriguing against the French generals, and striving, sometimes with sometimes without justice, to incense the king against them.* This course, which was almost the inevitable consequence of his situation, excited angry feelings in the military, which, joined to the natural haughtiness of soldiers in command, produced constant disputes. In the conquered provinces, Joseph's civil agents endeavoured to obtain more of the spoil than comported with the wants of the armies, and hence bickerings between the French officers and the Spanish authorities were as unceasing as they were violent. The prefects, royal commissaries, and intendants would not act under military orders, with respect to the supplies, nor would they furnish sums for the military chests. On the other hand, the generals often seized the king's revenue, raised extraordinary and forced contributions, disregarded legal forms, and even threatened to arrest the royal agents when they refused compliance with their wishes. Neither was Joseph's own conduct always free from violence, for in the latter part of 1811 he obliged the merchants of Madrid to draw bills, for two millions of dollars, on their correspondents in London, to supply him with a forced loan.

He was always complaining to the emperor that the niggardly allowances from France, the exactions of the generals, and the misery of the country, left him no means of existence as a monarch; and during the greatest part of 1810 and the beginning of 1811, Santa Fé, Almenara, and Orquijo, succeeding each other as ambassadors at Paris, were in angry negotiations with Napoleon's ministers, relating to this subject and to a project for ceding the provinces of the Ebro in exchange for Portugal. Against this project Joseph protested, on the grounds that it was contrary to the constitution of Bayonne, that it would alienate the Spaniards, was degrading to himself, and unjust as a bargain; seeing that Portugal was neither so rich, so industrious, so pleasant, nor so well affected to him as the provinces to be taken away, and the well-known hatred between the Spaniards and Portuguese would never allow the latter to be quiet subjects.

To these complaints, Napoleon answered with his usual force and clearness of judgment. He insisted that the cost of the war had drained the French exchequer; that he had employed nearly 400,000 men for the king's interest, and that rather than increase the expenses he would withdraw some of the troops. He reproached Joseph with the feebleness of his operations, the waste and luxury of his court, his ill-judged schemes of conciliation, his extravagant rewards, his too great generosity to the opposite party, and his raising, contrary to the opinion of the marshals, a Spanish army which would desert on the first reverse. The constitution of Bayonne, he said, was rendered null by the war; nevertheless he had not taken a single village from Spain, and he had no wish to seize the provinces of the Ebro, unless the state of the contest obliged him to do so. He required indeed a guarantee for the repayment of the money France had expended for the Spanish crown, yet the real wishes of the people were to be ascertained before any cession of territory could

* Appendix No. 14, section 1.

take place, and to talk of Portugal before it was conquered was folly. As this last observation was Joseph's own argument, an explanation ensued, when it appeared that Almenara, thinking the seizure of the Ebro provinces a settled plan, had, of his own accord, asked for Portugal as an indemnification; a fact that marks the character of the Spanish cabinet.

Napoleon also assured the king that there must be a great deal of money in Spain, for, besides the sums sent from France, the plate of the suppressed convents, and the silver received by the Spaniards from America, there were the subsidies from England, and the enormous expenditure of her troops. Then, the seizure and sale of national domains, and of confiscated colonial produce, were to be taken into calculation, and if the king wanted more he must extract it from the country or go without. France would only continue her subsidy of two millions of francs monthly. The emperor had always supported his wars by the resources of the territory in which it was carried on, and the king might do the same.

Joseph replied that his court was neither luxurious nor magnificent; that he recompensed services by giving bills on the contingent sales of national domains, which could not be applied to the wants of the soldiers; that he could scarcely keep the public servants alive, and that his own expenses were not greater than the splendour of the crown required; that many of the best generals approved of his raising a Spanish army, desertions from it were less frequent than was imagined, and were daily diminishing; and these native troops served to garrison towns while the French were in the field. He wished, he said, to obtain large loans rather than small gifts from the French treasury, and desired that the confiscated property of the Spanish noblemen who had been declared traitors in 1808, should be paid to him; but with regard to harsh measures, the people could not pay the contributions, and the proceedings of a king with his subjects should not be like those of a foreign general. Lenity was necessary to tranquillize the provinces subdued, and as an example to those which resisted. The first thing was to conciliate the people's affections. The plate of the suppressed convents was not so valuable as it appeared at a distance, the greater part of it was already plundered by the guerillas, or by the French troops. The French marshals intercepted his revenues, disregarded his orders, insulted his government, and oppressed the country. He was degraded as a monarch, and would endure it no longer. He had been appointed to the throne of Spain without his own consent, and although he would never oppose his brother's will, he would not live a degraded king, and was therefore ready to resign, unless the emperor would come in person and remedy the present evils.

Napoleon, while he admitted the reasonableness of some of the king's statements, still insisted, and with propriety of argument, that it was necessary to subdue the people before they could be conciliated. Yet to prevent wanton abuses of power, he fixed the exact sum which each person, from the general governors down to the lowest subaltern was to receive, and he ordered every person violating this regulation to be dismissed upon the spot, and a report of the circumstance sent to Paris within 20 hours after.* Before this, Bessieres, acknowledged by all to be a just and mild man, had been sent to remedy the mischief said to have been done by Kellerman and others in the northern provinces. And in respect of conciliation, the emperor remarked that he had himself, at first, intended to open secret negotiations with the cortes, but on finding what an obscure rabble they were, he had desisted. He therefore recommended Joseph to assemble at Madrid a counter-cortes, composed of men of influence and reputation, wherein (adverting to the insane insolence of the Spaniards towards their colonies) he might by the discussion of really liberal institutions, and by exposing the bad faith with which the English encouraged the Americans, improve public opinion, and conciliate the Spaniards with hopes of preserving the integrity of the empire, so rudely shaken by the revolt of the colonies.

An additional subsidy was peremptorily refused, but the emperor finally consented to furnish Joseph with half a million of francs monthly, for the particular support of his court; and it is worthy of notice, as illustrating the character of

Napoleon, that in the course of these disputes, Joseph's friends at Paris repeatedly advised him that the diplomatic style of his letters incensed and hardened the emperor, whereas his familiar style as a brother always softened and disposed him to concede what was demanded.* Joseph, however, could not endure the decree for establishing the military governments, by which the administration was placed entirely in the hands of the generals, and their reports upon the civil and judicial administration referred entirely to the emperor. It was a measure assailing at once his pride, his power, and his purse. His mind, therefore, became daily more embittered, and his prefects and commissaries, emboldened by his opinions, absolutely refused to act under the French marshal's orders. Many of these complaints, founded on the reports of his Spanish servants, were untrue and others distorted. We have seen how the habitual exaggerations, and even downright falsehoods of the juntas and the regency, thwarted the English general's operations, and the king as well as the French generals, must have encountered a like disposition in the Spanish ministers. Nevertheless, the nature of the war rendered it impossible but that much ground of complaint should exist.

Joseph's personal sentiments, abstractedly viewed, were high-minded and benevolent; but they sorted ill with his situation as an usurper. He had neither patience nor profundity in his policy, and at last such was his irritation, that, having drawn up a private but formal renunciation of the crown, he took an escort of 5000 men, and about the period of the battle of Fuentes Onoro, passed out of Spain and reached Paris: there Ney, Massena, Junot, St. Cyr, Kellerman, Augereau, Loison, and Sebastiani, were also assembled, and all discontented with the war and with each other.†

By this rash and ill-timed proceeding, the intrusive government was left without a head, and the army of the centre was rendered nearly useless at the critical moment, when Soult, engaged in the Albuera operations, had a right to expect support from Madrid. The northern army, also, was in a great measure paralyzed, and the army of Portugal, besides having just failed at Fuentes, was in all the disorganization attendant upon the retreat from Santarem, and upon a change of commanders. This was the principal cause why Bessieres abandoned the Asturias and concentrated his forces in Leon and Castile on the communications with France; for it behoved the French generals everywhere to hold their troops in hand, and to be on the defensive, until the emperor's resolution in this extraordinary conjuncture should be known.

Napoleon, astounded at this precipitate action of the king, complained, with reason, that having promised not to quit the country without due notice, Joseph had failed to him, both as a monarch and as a general, and that he should at least have better chosen his time; for if he had retired in January, when the armies were all inactive, the evil would have been less, as the emperor might then have abandoned Andalusia, and concentrated Soult's and Massena's troops on the Tagus; which would have been in accord with the policy fitting for the occasion.‡ But now when the armies had suffered reverses, when they were widely separated, and in pursuit of different objects, the mischief was great, and the king's conduct not to be justified.

Joseph replied that he had taken good measures to prevent confusion during his absence, and then, reiterating his complaints and declaring his resolution to retire into obscurity, he finished by observing, with equal truth and simplicity of mind, that it would be better for the emperor that he should do so, inasmuch as in France he would be a good subject, but in Spain a bad king.§

The emperor had, however, too powerful an intellect for his brother to contend with. Partly by reason, partly by authority, partly by concession, he obliged him to return again in July, furnished with a species of private treaty, by which the army of the centre was placed entirely at his disposal. He was also empowered to punish delinquents, to change the organization, and to remove officers who were offensive to him, even the chief of the staff, General Belliard, who had been repre-

* Appendix, No. 14.

† Appendix No. 14, section 3.

‡ Appendix, No. 14, section 2.

§ Appendix, No. 14, section 2.

sented by Orquijo as inimical to his system. And if any of the other armies should, by the chances of war, arrive within the district of the centre army, they also, while there, were to be under the king; and at all times, even in their own districts, when he placed himself at their head. The army of the north was to remain with its actual organization and under a marshal, but Joseph had liberty to change Bessieres for Jourdan.

To prevent the oppression of the people, especially in the north, Napoleon required the French military authorities to send daily reports to the king, of all requisitions and contributions exacted. And he advised his brother to keep a Spanish commissary at the head-quarters of each army, to watch over Spanish interests; promising that whenever a province should have the means, and the will, to resist the incursions of the guerillas, it should revert entirely to the government of the king, and be subjected to no charges, save those made by the Spanish civil authorities for general purposes.* The armies of the south and of Aragon were placed in a like situation on the same terms, and meanwhile Joseph was to receive a quarter of the contributions from each, for the support of his court and of the central army.

The entire command of the forces in Spain the emperor would not grant, observing that the marshal directing from Madrid, as major-general, would naturally claim the glory as well as the responsibility of arranging the operations; and hence the other marshals finding themselves, in reality, under his instead of the king's command, would obey badly or not at all. All their reports and the intelligence necessary to the understanding of affairs were therefore to be addressed directly to Berthier, for the Emperor's information. Finally, the 500,000 francs hitherto given monthly to the king was to be increased to 1,000,000 for the year 1811; and it was expected that Joseph would immediately re-organize the army of the centre, restore its discipline, and make it, what it had not yet been, of weight in the contest.

The king afterwards obtained some further concessions, the most important of which related to the employment and assembling of Spaniards according to his own directions and plans.† This final arrangement and the importance given to Joseph's return, for, by the emperor's orders, he was received as if he had only been to Paris to concert a great plan, produced a good effect for a short time; but after the fall of Figueras, Napoleon, fearing to trust Spanish civilians, extended the plan, hitherto confined to Catalonia, of employing French intendants in all the provinces on the left of the Ebro. Then the king's jealousy was again excited, and the old bickerings between him and the marshals were revived.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF FRANCE.

In 1811 the emperor's power over the continent, as far as the frontier of Russia, was, in fact, absolute; and in France internal prosperity was enjoyed with external glory. But the Emperor of Russia, stimulated by English diplomacy, and by a personal discontent; in dread also of his nobles, who were impatient under the losses which the continental system inflicted upon them; was plainly in opposition to the ascendancy of France, and Napoleon, although wishing to avoid a rupture, was too long-sighted not to perceive that it was time to prepare for a more gigantic contest than any he had hitherto engaged in. He therefore husbanded his money and soldiers, and would no longer lavish them upon the Spanish war. He had poured men, indeed, continually into that country, but these were generally conscripts, while in the north of France he was forming a reserve of 200,000 old soldiers; but with that art that it was doubtful whether they were intended for the Peninsula or for ulterior objects, being ready for either, according to circumstances.

Such an uncertain state of affairs prevented him from taking more decided steps, in person, with relation to Spain, which he would undoubtedly have done if the war there had been the only great matter on his hands, and therefore the aspect of

* Appendix, No. 13, section 3.

† Ibid.

French politics, both in Spain and other places, was favourable to Lord Wellington's views. A Russian war, sooner or later, was one of the principal chances upon which he rested his hopes of final success; yet his anticipations were dashed with fear, for the situation of the Spanish and Portuguese governments, and of their armies, and the condition of the English government, were by no means so favourable to his plans, as shall be shown in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II.

POLITICAL STATE OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE WAR

It was very clear that merely to defend Portugal, with enormous loss of treasure and of blood, would be a ruinous policy; and that to redeem the Peninsula the Spaniards must be brought to act more reasonably than they had hitherto done. But this the national character and the extreme ignorance of public business, whether military or civil, which distinguished the generals and statesmen, rendered a very difficult task.

Lord Wellington, finding the English power weak to control, and its influence as weak to sway, the councils of Spain, could only hope, by industry, patience, and the glory of his successes in Portugal, to acquire that personal ascendancy which would enable him to direct the resources of the whole Peninsula in a vigorous manner, and towards a common object. And the difficulty of attaining that ascendancy can only be made clear by a review of the intercourse between the British government and the Spanish authorities, from the first bursting out of the insurrection to the period now treated of; a review which will disclose the utter unfitness of Mr. Canning to conduct great affairs. Heaping treasure, stores, arms, and flattery, upon those who were unable to bear the latter or use the former beneficially, he neglected all those persons who were capable of forwarding the cause; and neither in the choice of his agents, nor in his instructions to them, nor in his estimation of the value of events, did he discover wisdom or diligence, although he covered his misconduct at the moment by his glittering oratory.

Soon after the Spanish deputies had first applied for the assistance of England,* Mr. Charles Stuart, who was the only regular diplomatist sent to Spain, carried to Coruña such a sum as, with previous subsidies, made up 1,000,000 of dollars for Galicia alone. The deputies from the Asturias had at the same time demanded 5,000,000 dollars, and 1,000,000 was paid in part of their demand; but when this was known, 2,000,000 more were demanded for Galicia, which were not refused; and yet the first point in Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Stuart, was, to enter into "no political engagements."

Mr. Duff, the consul for Cadiz, carried out 1,000,000 dollars for Andalusia, the junta asked for 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 more, and the demands of Portugal, although less extravagant, were very great.† Thus above 16,000,000 dollars were craved, and more than 4,000,000, including the gift to Portugal, had been sent: the remainder was not denied; and the amount of arms and other stores given may be estimated by the fact, that 82 pieces of artillery, 96,000 muskets, 800,000 flints, 6,500,000 ball-cartridges, 7500 barrels powder, and 30,000 swords and belts had been sent to Coruña and Cadiz; and the supply to the Asturias was in proportion. But Mr. Canning's instructions to Mr. Duff and to the other agents were still the same as to Mr. Stuart, "His Majesty had no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary assistance which he furnished to Spain."

Mr. Canning observed that he considered the amount of money as nothing! but acknowledged that specie was at this time so scarce that it was only by a direct and secret understanding with the former government of Spain, under the connivance of France, that any considerable amount of dollars had been collected in England. And "each province of Spain," he said, "had made its own particular application, and the whole occasioned a call for specie such as had never before

* 1808.

† Appendix, No. 15, section 1.

been made upon England at any period of its existence. There was a rivalry between the provinces with reference to the amount of sums demanded which rendered the greatest caution necessary." And the more so, that "the deputies were incompetent to furnish either information or advice upon the state of affairs in Spain;" yet Mr. Duff was commanded, while representing these astounding things to the junta of Seville, "to avoid any appearance of a desire to overrate the merit and value of the exertions then making by Great Britain in favour of the Spanish nation, or to lay the grounds for restraining or limiting those exertions within any other bounds than those which were prescribed by the limits of the actual means of the country." In proof of Mr. Canning's sincerity upon this head, he afterwards sent 2,000,000 dollars by Mr. Frere, while the British army was left without any funds at all! Moreover the supplies, so recklessly granted, being transmitted through subordinates and irresponsible persons, were absurdly and unequally distributed.

This obsequious extravagance produced the utmost arrogance on the part of the Spanish leaders, who treated the English minister's humble policy with the insolence it courted. When Mr. Stuart reached Madrid, after the establishment of the supreme junta, that body, raising its demands upon England, in proportion to its superior importance, required, and in the most peremptory language, additional succours so enormous as to startle even the prodigality of the English government.

Ten millions of dollars instantly, 500,000 yards of cloth, 4,000,000 yards of linen for shirts and for the hospitals, 300,000 pair of shoes, 30,000 pair of boots, 12,000,000 cartridges, 200,000 muskets, 12,000 pair of pistols, 50,000 swords, 100,000 arrobas of flour, besides salt meat and fish! These were their demands! and when Mr. Stuart's remonstrance obliged them to alter the insulting language of their note, they insisted the more strenuously upon having the succours; observing that England had as yet only done enough to set their force afloat, and that she might *naturally expect demands like the present to follow the first*. They desired also that the money should be furnished at once, by bills on the British treasury, and at the same time required the confiscation of Godoy's property in the English funds!

Such was Mr. Canning's opening policy, and the sequel was worthy of the commencement. His proceedings with respect to the Erfurth proposals for peace, his injudicious choice of Mr. Frere, his leaving of Mr. Stuart without instructions for three months at the most critical period of the insurrection, and his management of affairs in Portugal and at Cadiz during Sir John Cradock's command, have been already noticed; and that he was not misled by any curious accordance in the reports of his agents, is certain, for he was early and constantly informed of the real state of affairs by Mr. Stuart. That gentleman was the accredited diplomatist, and in all important points, his reports were very exactly corroborated by the letters of Sir John Moore, and by the running course of events; yet Mr. Canning neither acted upon them nor published them, but he received all the idle, vaunting accounts of the subordinate civil and military agents, with complacency, and published them with ostentation; thus encouraging the misrepresentations of ignorant men, increasing the arrogance of the Spaniards, deceiving the English nation, and as far as he was able misleading the English general.

Mr. Stuart reached Coruña in July 1808, and on the 22nd of that month informed Mr. Canning that the reports of successes in the south were not to be depended upon, seeing that they increased exactly in proportion to the difficulty of communicating with the alleged scenes of action, and with the dearth of events, or the recurrence of disasters in the northern parts. He also assured him, that the numbers of the Spanish armies, within his knowledge, were by no means so great as they were represented.

On the 26th of July he gave a detailed history of the Gallician insurrection, by which he plainly showed that every species of violence, disorder, intrigue, and deceit were to be expected from the leading people; that the junta's object was to separate Galicia from Spain; and that so inappropriate was the affected delicacy of abstaining from conditions, while furnishing succours; that the junta of Galicia was only kept in power, by the countenance of England, evinced in her lavish

supplies, and the residence of her convoy at Coruña.* The interference of the British naval officers to quell a political tumult had even been asked for, and had been successful; and Mr. Stuart himself had been intreated to meddle in the appointments of the governing members, and in other contests for power, which were daily taking place. In fine, before the end of August the system of folly, speculation, waste, and improvidence which characterized Spanish proceedings, was completely detected by Mr. Stuart, and laid before Mr. Canning, without in the slightest degree altering the latter's egregious system, or even attracting his notice; nay, he even intimated to the ambitious junta of Seville, that England would willingly acknowledge its supremacy, if the consent of the other provinces could be obtained; thus holding out a premium for the continuation of that anarchy, which it should have been his first object to suppress.†

Mr. Stuart was kept in a corner of the peninsula, whence he could not communicate freely with any other province, and where his presence materially contributed to cherish the project of separating Galicia; and this without the shadow of a pretence, because there was also a British admiral and consul, and a military mission at Coruña, all capable of transmitting the necessary local intelligence. But so little did Mr. Canning care to receive his envoy's reports, that the packet, conveying his despatches, was ordered to touch at Gihon to receive the consul's letters, which caused the delay of a week when every moment was big with important events; a delay not to be remedied by the admiral on the station, because he had not even been officially informed that Mr. Stuart was an accredited person!

When the latter, thinking it time to look to the public affairs, on his own responsibility, proceeded to Madrid, and finally to Andalusia, he found the evils springing from Mr. Canning's inconsiderate conduct everywhere prominent.‡ In the capital the supreme junta had regarded England as a bonded debtor; and the influence of her diplomatist at Seville may be estimated from the following note, written by Mr. Stuart to Mr. Frere, upon the subject of permitting British troops to enter Cadiz.

"When the junta refused to admit General Mackenzie's detachment, you tell me it was merely from alarm respecting the disposition of the inhabitants of Seville and Cadiz. I am not aware of the feelings which prevail in Seville, but with respect to this town, whatever the navy or the English travellers may assert to the contrary, I am perfectly convinced that there exists only a wish to receive them, and general regret and surprise at their continuance on board."

Nor was the mischief confined to Spain. Mr. Frere, apparently tired of the presence of a man whose energy and talent were a continued reflection upon his own imbecile diplomacy, ordered Mr. Stuart, either to join Cuesta's army or to go by Trieste to Vienna; he chose the latter, because there was not even a subordinate political agent there, although this was the critical period, which preceded the Austrian declaration of war against France in 1809. He was without formal powers as an envoy, but his knowledge of the affairs of Spain, and his intimate personal acquaintance with many of the leading statesmen at Vienna, enabled him at once to send home the most exact information of the proceedings, the wants, the wishes, and intentions of the Austrian government in respect to the impending war.

That great diversion for Spain, which with infinite pains had been brought to maturity by Count Stadion, was on the point of being abandoned because of Mr. Canning's conduct. He had sent no minister to Vienna, and while he was lavishing millions upon the Spaniards, without conditions, refused in the most haughty and repulsive terms, the prayers of Austria for a subsidy or even a loan, without which she could not pass her own frontier. And when Mr. Stuart suggested the resource of borrowing some of the 25,000,000 dollars which were then accumulated at Cadiz, it was rejected because Mr. Frere said it would alarm the Spaniards. Thus, the aid of a great empire with 400,000 good troops, was in a manner rejected in favour of a few miserable self-elected juntas in the peninsula, while one-half the succours which they received and misused, would have sent the whole Austrian nation head-

* Appendix, No. 15, section 1.

† Ibid.

‡ See vol. I.

long upon France ; for all their landwehr was in arms, and where the emperor had only calculated upon 150 battalions, 300 had come forward, voluntarily, besides the Hungarian insurrection. In this way Mr. Canning proved his narrow capacity for business, and how little he knew either the strength of France, the value of Austria, the weakness of Spain, or the true interests of England at the moment ; although he had not scrupled by his petulant answers to the proposals of Erfurth to confirm a war which he was so incapable of conducting. Instead of improving the great occasion thus offered, he angrily recalled Mr. Stuart, for having proceeded to Vienna without his permission. In his eyes the breach of form was of much higher importance than the success of the object. Yet it is capable of proof, that had Mr. Stuart remained, the Austrians would have been slower to negotiate after the battle of Wagram ; and the Walcheren expedition would have been turned towards Germany, where a great northern confederation was then ready to take arms against France. The Prussian cabinet, in defiance of the king, or rather of the queen, whose fears influenced the king's resolutions, only waited for these troops to declare war ; and there was every reason to believe that Russia would then also have adopted that side. The misfortunes of Moore's campaign, the folly and arrogance of the Spaniards, the loss of the great British army which perished in Walcheren, the exhausting of England both of troops and specie, when she most needed both ; finally, the throwing of Austria entirely into the hands of France, may thus be distinctly traced to Mr. Canning's incapacity as a statesman.

But through the whole of the Napoleonic wars this man was the evil genius of the Peninsula ; for passing over the misplaced military powers which he gave to Mr. Villiers' legation in Portugal, while he neglected the political affairs in that country, it was he who sent Lord Strangford to Rio Janeiro, whence all manner of mischief flowed. And when Mr. Stuart succeeded Mr. Villiers at Lisbon, Mr. Canning insisted upon having the enormous mass of intelligence, received from different parts of the Peninsula, translated before it was sent home ; an act of undisguised indolence, which retarded the real business of the embassy, prevented important information from being transmitted rapidly, and exposed the secrets of the hour to the activity of the enemy's emissaries at Lisbon. In after times when by a notorious abuse of government he was himself sent ambassador to Lisbon, he complained that there were no archives of the former embassies, and he obliged Mr. Stuart, then minister at the Hague, to employ several hundred soldiers, as clerks, to copy all his papers relating to the previous war ; these, at a great public expense, were sent to Lisbon ; and there they were to be seen unexamined and unpacked in the year 1826 ! And while this folly was passing, the interests of Europe in general were neglected, and the particular welfare of Portugal seriously injured by another display of official importance still more culpable.

It had been arranged that a Portuguese auxiliary force was to have joined the Duke of Wellington's army, previous to the battle of Waterloo ; and to have this agreement executed, was the only business of real importance which Mr. Canning had to transact during his embassy. Marshal Beresford, well acquainted with the characters of the members of the Portuguese regency, had assembled 15,000 men, the flower of the old troops, perfectly equipped, with artillery, baggage, and all things needful to take the field ; the ships were ready, the men willing to embark, and the marshal informed the English ambassador that he had only to give the order and in a few hours the whole would be on board, warning him at the same time, that in no other way could the thing be effected. But as this summary proceeding did not give Mr. Canning an opportunity to record his own talents for negotiation, he replied that it must be done by diplomacy ; the Souza faction eagerly seized the opportunity of displaying their talents in the same line, and being more expert, beat Mr. Canning at his own weapons, and, as Beresford had foreseen, no troops were embarked at all. Lord Wellington was thus deprived of important reinforcements ; the Portuguese were deprived of the advantage of supporting their army, for several years, on the resources of France, and of their share of the contributions from that country ; last and worst, those veterans of the Peninsular war, the strength of the country, were sent to the Brazils, where they all perished by disease or by the sword in the obscure wars of Don Pedro ! If such errors may

be redeemed by an eloquence, always used in defence of public corruption, and a wit, that made human sufferings its sport, Mr. Canning was an English statesman, and wisdom has little to do with the affairs of nations.

When the issue of the Walcheren expedition caused a change of ministry, Lord Wellesley obtained the foreign office. Mr. Henry Wellesley then replaced Mr. Frere at Cadiz, and he and Mr. Stuart received orders to make conditions and to demand guarantees for the due application of the British succours; those succours were more sparingly granted, and the envoys were directed to interfere with advice and remonstrances in all the proceedings of the respective governments to which they were accredited: Mr. Stuart was even desired to meddle with the internal administration of the Portuguese nation—the exertions and sacrifices of Great Britain, far from being kept out of sight, were magnified, and the system adopted was in everything a contrast to that of Mr. Canning.*

But there was in England a powerful, and as recent events have proved, a most unprincipled parliamentary opposition, and there were two parties in the cabinet: the one headed by Lord Wellesley, who was anxious to push the war vigorously in the Peninsula, without much regard to the ultimate pressure upon the people of his own country; the other, headed by Mr. Perceval, who sought only to maintain himself in power. Narrow, harsh, factious, and illiberal, in everything relating to public matters, this man's career was one of unmixed evil. His bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but his religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence. He lived by faction; he had neither the wisdom to support, nor the manliness to put an end to, the war in the Peninsula, and his crooked contemptible policy was shown by withholding what was necessary to sustain the contest, and throwing on the general the responsibility of failure.

With all the fears of little minds, he and his coadjutors awaited the result of Lord Wellington's operations in 1810. They affected to dread his rashness, yet could give no reasonable ground for their alarm; and their private letters were at variance with their public instructions, that they might be prepared for either event. They deprived him, without notice, of his command over the troops at Cadiz; they gave Graham power to furnish pecuniary succours to the Spaniards at that place, which threw another difficulty in the way of obtaining money for Portugal: and when Wellington complained of the attention paid to the unfounded apprehension of some superior officers more immediately about him, he was plainly told that those officers were better generals than himself. At the same time he was, from a pitiful economy, ordered to dismiss the transports on which the safety of the army depended in the event of failure.†

Between these factions there was a constant struggle, and Lord Wellington's successes in the field only furthered the views of Mr. Perceval, because they furnished ground for asserting that due support had been given to him. Indeed, such a result is to be always apprehended by English commanders. The slightest movement in war requires a great effort, and is attended with many vexations, which the general feels acutely and unceasingly; but the politician, believing in no difficulties because he feels none, neglects the supplies, charges disaster on the general, and covers his misdeeds with words. The inefficient state of the cabinet under both Mr. Canning and Mr. Perceval may, however, be judged of by the following extracts, the writers of which, as it is easy to perceive, were in official situations.

"I hope by next mail will be sent something more satisfactory and useful than we have yet done, in the way of instructions. But I am afraid the late O. P. riots have occupied all the thoughts of our great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget more distant but not less interesting concerns."

"With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the inefficiency of the Portuguese government, the people here are by no means so satisfied of their existence (to a great degree) as you who are on the spot. Here we judge only of the results, the details we read over, but being unable to remedy forget them the

* Appendix, No. 15. section 2.

† Appendix, No. 15.

next day ; and in the mean time be the tools you have to work with good or bad, so it is that you have produced results so far beyond the most sanguine expectations entertained here by all who have not been in Portugal within the last eight months, that none inquire the causes which prevented more being done in a shorter time ; of which indeed there seems to have been a great probability, if the government could have stepped forward at an earlier period with one hand in their pockets, and in the other strong energetic declarations of the indispensable necessity of a change of measures and principles in the government."

"I have done everything in my power to get people here to attend to their real interests in Portugal, and I have clamoured for money ! money ! money ! in every office to which I have had access. To all my clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the same answer, 'that the thing is impossible.' The prince himself certainly appears to be *à la hauteur des circonstances*, and has expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote the good cause in the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley has a perfect comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the present government, that I really despair of witnessing any decided and adequate effect, on our part, to save the Peninsula. The present feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all that is in our power, that the rest must be left to all-bounteous Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious to us as we deserved. This feeling, you must allow, is wonderfully moral and Christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more vigorous military system and a ministry capable of directing the resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents and embarkations."

A more perfect picture of an imbecile administration could scarcely be exhibited, and it was not wonderful that Lord Wellington, oppressed with the folly of the peninsular governments, should have often resolved to relinquish a contest that was one of constant risks, difficulties, and cares, when he had no better support from England. In the next chapter shall be shown the ultimate effects of Canning's policy in the Spanish and Portuguese affairs.

CHAPTER III.

POLITICAL STATE OF SPAIN.

As the military operations were, by the defeat of the regular armies, broken into a multitude of petty and disconnected actions, so the political affairs were, by the species of anarchy which prevailed, rendered exceedingly diversified and incongruous. Notwithstanding the restoration of the captain-generals, the provincial juntas remained very powerful ; and while nominally responsible to the cortes and the regency, acted independently of either, except when interested views urged them to a seeming obedience. The disputes that arose between them and the generals, who were for the most part the creatures of the regency or of the cortes, were constant. In Galicia, in the Asturias, in Catalonia, in Valencia, and in Murcia, disputes were increasing. Mahi, Abadia, Moscoso, Campo Verde, Lacy, Sarsfield, Eroles, Milans, Bassecour, Coupigny, Castaños, and Blake, were always in controversy with each other or with the juntas. Palacios, dismissed from the regency for his high monarchical opinions, was made captain-general of Valencia, where he immediately joined the church-party against the cortes. In the Condado de Niebla the juntas of Seville claimed superior authority, and Ballasteros of his own motion placed the country under martial law. The junta, strangely enough, then appealed to Colonel Austin, the British governor of the Algarves, but he refused to interfere.*

The cortes often annulled the decrees of the regency, and the latter, of whomsoever composed, always hating and fearing the cortes, were only intent upon increasing their own power, and entirely neglected the general cause ; their

* Appendix, No. 12, section 4.

conduct was at once haughty and mean, violent and intriguing, and it was impossible ever to satisfy them. Thus confusion was everywhere perpetuated, and it is proved by the intercepted papers of Joseph, as well as by the testimony of the British officers and diplomatists, that with the Spaniards, the only moral resource left for keeping up the war, was their personal hatred of the French, partially called into action by particular oppression.* Sir John Moore with that keen and sure judgment which marked all his views, had early described Spain as being "without armies, generals, or government." And in 1811, after three years of war, Lord Wellington complained that "there was no head in Spain, neither generals, nor officers, nor disciplined troops, and no cavalry; that the government had commenced the war without a magazine or military resource of any kind, without money or financial resource, and that the people at the head of affairs were as feeble as their resources were small." But the miserable state of the armies and the unquenchable vanity of the officers have been too frequently exposed to need further illustration. They hated and ill-used the peasantry, while their own want of discipline and subordination rendered them odious to their country. The poorer people, much as they detested the French, almost wished for the establishment of Joseph, and all spirit and enthusiasm had long been extinct.

The real points of interest affecting England in her prosecution of the contest were, therefore—1. The improvement and the better guidance of the military power; 2. The preventing of war between Portugal and Spain; 3. The pretensions of the Princess Carlotta of Portugal; 4. The dispute with the American colonists.

With respect to the first, Lord Wellington had made strenuous efforts, and his advice and remonstrance had at the time saved the armies in the field from destruction; some partial attempts were also made to form troops under British officers in the Spanish service, but to a system like that which England exercised in Portugal, the leading Spaniards would never listen. This was one result of Mr. Canning's impolitic fostering of the Spanish pride, for it was by no means apparent that the people would have objected to such an arrangement if it had been prudently urged, before the republican party in the cortes, and the popular press, had filled their minds with alarm upon the subject. The Catalans openly and repeatedly desired to have an English general, and in 1812 Colonel Green did organize a small corps there, while Whittingham and Roche formed in the Balearic Isles large divisions; Colonel Cox had proposed a like scheme for the north, but it was rejected by Lord Wellington, and I have been unable to trace any important service rendered by those officers with their divisions. Their reputation was, however, quite eclipsed by one Downie, who had passed from the British commissariat into the Spanish service, and the English ministers taken with his boasting manner, supplied him with uniforms and equipments for a body of cavalry called the Estremadura Legion, of such an expensive and absurd nature, as to induce a general officer to exclaim on seeing them that "he blushed for the folly of his government."

When the British ministers found themselves unable to deal with the Spanish regulars, they endeavoured to prop the war by the irregulars. But the increase of this force, which, however, never exceeded 30,000 men in arms, gave offence to the regular officers, and amidst these distractions, the soldiers, ill-organized, ill-fed, and quite incapable of moving in the field in large bodies, lost all confidence in their generals.† The latter, as in the case of Freire with the Murcian army, generally expected to be beaten in every action, and cared very little about it, because the regency were sure to affirm that they were victorious; and another of those wandering starved naked bands which they called armies could be formed from new levies in a month.

The chances of the war with Portugal were by no means slight; the early ravages of the Spanish insurgent forces when Junot was in Lisbon, the violence of Romana's soldiers, and the burning of the village of San Fernando, together with the disputes between the people of Algarves and the Andalusians, had revived all the national hatred on both sides. The two governments, indeed, entered into a treaty for recruiting in their respective territories; but it was with the utmost difficulty that

* Appendix, No. 12, section 4.

† Ibid.

the united exertions of Mr. Stuart and Lord Wellington could prevent the Portuguese regency first, and afterwards the court of the Brazils from provoking a war by re-annexing Olivença to Portugal when it was taken from the French by Marshal Beresford. And so little were the passions of these people subordinate to their policy that this design was formed at the very moment when the Princess Carlotta was strenuously, and with good prospect of success, pushing her claim to the regency of Spain.

The intrigues of this princess were constant sources of evil ; she laboured against the influence of the British at Cadiz, and her agent, Pedro Souza, proffering gold to vulgar baseness, diamonds to delicate consciences, and promises to all, was adroit and persevering. In August, 1810, a paper, signed by only one member, but with an intimation that it contained the sentiments of the whole cortes, was secretly given to Mr. Wellesley as a guide for his conduct. It purported that the impossibility of releasing Ferdinand and his brother from their captivity being apparent, the Princess Carlotta should be called to the throne, and it was proposed to marry her eldest son, Pedro, to the Princess of Wales, or some other princess of the House of Brunswick, that a " sudden and mortal blow might be given to the French empire." Mr. Wellesley was also told that a note of the same tendency would in the first session of the cortes be transmitted to the English legation. This, however, did not happen, chiefly because Arguelles openly and eloquently expressed his reasons against the appointment of a royal person as regent, and some months later procured a decree rendering such persons ineligible to pass in the cortes. This seemed to quash Carlotta's intrigue ; nevertheless, her pretensions, although continually overborne by the English influence, were as continually renewed, and often on the point of being publicly admitted.

The assumption that it was hopeless to expect Ferdinand's release was founded partly on the great influence which it was known Napoleon had acquired over his mind, and partly on his extreme personal timidity, which rendered any attempt to release him hopeless. Otherwise there were at Lisbon one Francisco Sagas, and his brother, daring men, who were only deterred from undertaking the enterprise by a previous experiment made at Bayonne, where they had for an hour implored Ferdinand to escape, all things being ready, yet in vain, because Escoiquez, who ruled the prince, and was as timid as himself, opposed it. To prevent ill effects from this well-known weakness, the cortes passed a decree to render null every act of Ferdinand while in captivity.

These intrigues of Carlotta were, however, of minor consequence compared to the conduct of the American colonies, which was one of the highest interest and importance. The causes and the nature of their revolt have been already touched upon, and the violence and injustice of the juntas, the regency, and the cortes, with relation to them, having been also exposed in a general way, need not be repeated here. When the Spanish insurrection first commenced, the leading men of Mexico signed a paper which was sent to the peninsula in November, 1808, urging the immediate appointment of the Duke of Infantado to the vice-royalty. He was averse to quitting Spain, but his wife persuaded him to consent, provided the central junta, just then established, was not opposed to it. Mr. Stuart, foreseeing great advantage from this appointment, laboured to persuade Mr. Frere to support it ; but the latter, always narrow in his views, refused, because Infantado was personally disliked in England ! and this, joined to the duke's own reluctance, seemed to end the matter. Meanwhile the disturbances in the colonies went on, and Carlotta of Portugal urged her claim to be regent, and, ultimately, queen of that country, as well as of Spain ; and her interests were strongly supported there, until May, 1809, when Cisneros, the Spanish viceroy, arrived at Monte Video, and spoiled her schemes.

The cry for a free trade with England, was then raised by the colonists, and Cisneros assented, but under conditions presenting a curious contrast to the affected generosity of Mr. Canning, and affording an additional proof how little the latter knew the temper of the people he was dealing with. After detailing the dangers of his situation from the disposition of the colonists to revolt, and the impoverishment of the royal treasury in consequence of the disturbances which had already taken

place, Cisneros observed that the only mode of relief was a temporary permission to trade with England for the sake of the duties. Necessity, he said, drove him to this measure; he regretted it, and directed that the ordinary laws relative to the residence of foreigners, most rigorous in themselves, should be most rigorously executed; and he added others of such a nature that, at first sight, they appear to be directed against some common enemy of mankind, rather than against the subjects and vessels of a nation which was then supporting the mother-country with troops and treasure in the most prodigal manner. Englishmen were not to be suffered to possess property, to have a residence, to keep an hotel, or even to remain on shore except for a fixed period. Any property already acquired by them was to be confiscated, and when the goods by which he hoped to raise his revenue were landed, the owners were not to be permitted to have them carried to the warehouses by their own sailors!

In April, 1810, the disposition to revolt spread; the Caraccas and Porto Rico declared for independence, and the British governor of Curaçoa expressed his approval of their proceedings. This naturally gave great jealousy and alarm to the Spaniards, who looked upon it as a secret continuation of Miranda's affair. Lord Liverpool, indeed, immediately disavowed the governor's manifesto, but being very desirous to retain the trade, to conciliate the Spaniards, and to oblige the colonists to acknowledge Ferdinand and oppose France, three things incompatible, his policy produced no good result. Mexico indeed still remained obedient in outward appearance, but the desire to have Infantado existed, and a strong party of the Mexicans even purposed raising him to the throne, if Napoleon's success should separate the two countries; but the Spanish regency, with characteristic folly, chose this moment to appoint Venegas, who was the avowed enemy of Infantado, viceroy of Mexico, and thus the revolt was forced on in that country also.

This state of affairs had a bad effect upon the war in Spain in many ways. The Spaniards, thinking to retain the colonies by violence, sent out a small squadron at first, and at a later period employed the succours received from England, in fitting out large expeditions of their best troops; and that, when the enemy were most closely pressing them in the Peninsula.* The remonstrances of the British on this head were considered as indications of a faithless policy; and Carlotta also wrote to Elio, the governor of Buenos Ayres, and to the cortes, warning both, to beware of the English as "a people capable of any baseness where their own interests were concerned." Hence there was a prevalent suspicion, that England had a design of connecting itself with the colonies independently of Spain, which greatly diminished the English influence at Cadiz.

By this dispute with America the supply of specie for the Peninsula was endangered, which involved the very existence of the war; all things therefore conduced to make Lord Wellesley desire his brother, Mr. Wellesley, to offer the mediation of England, and to please the Spaniards he also removed the governor of Curaçoa; but his plans, like Lord Liverpool's, were based upon the desire to preserve the trade with the colonies, and this feeling pervaded and vitiated his instructions to Mr. Wellesley. That gentleman was directed to enter into a full discussion of the subject, on principles founded on cordial amity and good faith; and to endeavour to convince the regency that the British course of proceeding had hitherto been the best for all parties. For the primary object being to keep France from forming a party in America, the revolted colonies had been by England received into an amicable intercourse of trade, a measure not inconsistent with good faith to Spain, inasmuch as the colonists would otherwise have had recourse to France, whereas now England was considered by them as a safe and honourable channel of reconciliation with the mother-country. There had been, it was said, no formal recognition of the self-constituted governments, or if any had taken place by subordinate officers they would be disavowed. Protection and mediation had indeed been offered, but the rights of Ferdinand had been supported, and as war between Spain and America would only injure the great cause, a mediatory policy was pressed upon the latter.—The blockade of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas had

* Appendix, No. 12, section 1.

already diverted money and forces from Spain, and driven the Americans to seek for French officers to assist them. The trade was essential to enable England to continue her assistance to Spain, and although this had been frequently represented to the regency, the latter had sent ships (which had been fitted out in English ports and stored at the expense of Great Britain for the war with France) to blockade the colonies and to cut off the English trade; and it was done also at a moment when the regency was unable to transport Blake's army from Cadiz to the Condado di Niebla without the assistance of British vessels. "It was difficult," Lord Wellesley said, "to state an instance in which the prejudices and jealousy of individuals had occasioned so much confusion of every maxim of discretion and good policy, and so much danger to the acknowledged mutual interests of two great states engaged in a defensive alliance against the assaults of a foreign foe:"—"Spain could not expect England to concur in a continuance of a system by which, at her own expense, her trade was injured, and by which Spain was making efforts not against the French but against the main sources of her own strength."

After these instructions, which were given before the constitution of Spain was arranged by the cortes, Mr. Wellesley pressed the mediation upon Mr. Bardaxi, the Spanish minister, who agreed to accept it upon condition that Mexico, which had not yet declared a form of government, should be excepted—that England should immediately break off all intercourse with the colonies, and, if the mediation failed, should assist Spain to reconquer them. When the injustice and bad policy of this proposition was objected to, Mr. Bardaxi maintained that it was just and politic, and pressed it as a secret article; he however finally offered to accept the mediation, if Mr. Wellesley would only pledge England to break off the intercourse of trade. This was refused, and the negotiation continued, but, as Bardaxi asserted that Lord Wellington had before agreed to the propriety of England going to war with the colonies, Mr. Wellesley referred to the latter, and that extraordinary man, while actually engaged with the enemy, under most critical circumstances, was thus called upon to discuss so grave and extensive a subject. But it was on such occasions that all his power of mind was displayed, and his manner of treating this question proved, that in political, and even in commercial affairs, his reach of thought and enlarged conceptions immeasurably surpassed the cabinet he served. And when we consider that his opinions, stated in 1811, have been since verified in all points to the very letter, it is impossible not to be filled with admiration of his foresight and judgment.

"He denied that he had ever given grounds for Bardaxi's observation. His opinion had always been that Great Britain should follow, as he hoped she had, liberal counsels towards Spain, by laying aside, at least during the existence of the war, all consideration of merchants' profits. He felt certain that such a policy would equally suit her commercial interests and her warlike policy, as well as add greatly to her character. The immediate advantages extorted from an open trade with the colonies he had always considered ideal. Profit was undoubtedly to be made there, and eventually the commerce would be very great; but its value must arise from the increasing riches of the colonies and the growth of luxury there, and the period at which this would happen was more likely to be checked than forwarded by the extravagant speculations of English traders. Whatever might be the final particular relations established between Spain and her colonies, the general result must be, the relaxation, if not the annihilation, of their colonial commercial system, and Great Britain was then sure to be the greatest gainer.

"In expectation of this ultimate advantage, her policy ought to have been liberal throughout, that is, the colonies themselves should have been checked, and the endeavours of traders and captains of ships to separate them from Spain ought to have been repressed. England should, when the colonies first showed a disposition to revolt, have considered not only what they could do, but what Great Britain could assist them to effect. His knowledge of the Spanish government and its means enabled him to say she could not reduce even one of the weakest of her colonies, and to make the attempt would be a gross folly and misapplication of means. Nay, England could not, in justice to the great object in the Peninsula, give Spain any effectual assistance; for it was but too true that distant colonies

could always separate from the mother country when they willed it, and certainly it would be the highest madness, in Spain, to attempt at that time to prevent such a separation by force, and in England, to assist, or even encourage her in such an attempt.

"The conduct of the latter should then have been by her influence and advice to have prevented the disputes from coming to extremity, and *now* should be to divert Spain from such an absurdity as having recourse to violence. But the reception of the deputies from America, which the Spaniards so much complained of, was useful to the latter. It prevented those deputies from going to France, and if they had gone, the fact, that colonies have the power to separate if they have the will, would have been at once verified.

"Great Britain, although late, had at last *offered* that mediation which he wished had been *asked* for, and it remained to consider on what terms it ought to be accepted. It would have been better if Spain had come forward with an explicit declaration of what her intentions towards the colonies in respect to constitution and commerce were. England could then have had something intelligible to mediate upon; but now Spain only desired her to procure the submission of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas; and if she failed in that impracticable object she was to aid Spain in forcing them to submission! and he, Lord Wellington, was said to have approved of this! One would really, he exclaimed, believe that Mr. Bardaxi has never adverted to the means and resources of his own country, to the object they have acquired at home, nor to the efforts making by England in the Peninsula; and that he imagines I have considered these facts as little as he appears to have done! Great Britain cannot agree to that condition!

"In respect to constitution" (alluding to the acknowledgment of the civil rights of the Americans by the cortes)* "the Spaniards had gone a great way, but not so far as some of her colonies would require; they would probably ask her to have separate local representative bodies for their interior concerns, such as the English colonial assemblies, yet this important point had not been considered in the treaty of mediation, and in respect of commerce the Spanish government had said nothing; although it was quite certain her prohibitory system could not continue, and the necessary consequence of the actual state of affairs required that in the treaty of mediation the colonies should be put, with respect to trade, exactly on the same footing as the provinces of Old Spain. If that was not done it would be useless to talk to the colonists of equal rights and interests; they would feel that their interests were sacrificed to those of the mother country.

"It was true that the latter would lose immediately, though probably not eventually, very largely in revenue and commercial profit by such a concession. This was the unavoidable result of the circumstances of the times, she had therefore a fair claim to participate in the advantages the colonies would enjoy from it. To this object the treaty of mediation should have adverted. Spain should have confidentially declared to Great Britain her intended course, what system she would follow, what duties impose, and what proportion she would demand for general imperial purposes. Upon such materials England might have worked with a prospect of permanently maintaining the integrity of the Spanish empire on just and fair principles; or at all events have allayed the present disputes and so removed the difficulties they occasioned in the Peninsula, and in either case have insured her own real interests. Spain had, however, taken a narrow view both of her own and the relative situation of others, and if she did not enlarge it, matters would grow worse and worse. It would be useless for England to interfere, and after a long contest which would only tend to weaken the mother country and deprive her of the resources which she would otherwise find in the colonies for her war with France, the business would end in the separation of the colonies from Spain."

The mediation was, however, after many discussions, finally accepted by the cortes, Mexico only being excepted, and an English commission of mediation, of which Mr. Stuart was the head, was even appointed in September, 1811, but from various causes it never proceeded beyond Cadiz. The Spaniards continued to send

* See p. 149.

out expeditions, Mr. Wellesley's remonstrances were unheeded, and although the regency afterwards offered to open the trade under certain duties, in return for a subsidy, nothing was concluded.

CHAPTER IV.

POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.

THE power and crafty projects of the Souzas, their influence over their weak-minded prince, their cabal to place the Duke of Brunswick at the head of the Portuguese army, the personal violence of the Patriarch, the resignation of Das Minas, and the disputes with Lord Wellington, have been already touched upon; but the extent of the difficulties engendered by those things cannot be understood without a more detailed exposition.

Mr. Villiers's mission, like all those emanating from Mr. Canning, had been expensive in style, tainted by intrigues, useless in business, and productive of disorders. When Mr. Stuart arrived, he found everything, except the army under Beresford, in a state of disorganization; and the influence of England was decreasing, because of the vacillating system hitherto pursued by the British government. As early as 1808, Lord Wellington had advised the ministers not only to adopt Portugal as the base of operations in the Peninsula, but to assume in reality the whole administration of that country; to draw forth all its resources, both of men and money, and to make up any deficiency, by the power of England. This advice had been neglected, and an entirely different policy pursued, which, in execution, was also feeble and uncertain.

The Portuguese constitution, like most of those springing from the feudal system, was excellent in theory, as far as regarded the defence of the kingdom: but it was overwhelmed with abuses in practice; and it was a favourite maxim with the authorities that it did not become a paternal government to punish neglect in the subordinates. When court intrigues were to be effected, or poor men to be oppressed, there was no want of vigour or of severity; but in all that regarded the administration of affairs, it was considered sufficient to give orders without looking to their execution, and no animadversion, much less punishment, followed disobedience. The character of the government was extreme weakness; the taxes, partially levied, produced only half their just amount; the payments from the treasury were in arrears; the army was neglected in all things dependent on the civil administration, and a bad navy was kept up, at an expense of a quarter of a million, to meet a war with Algiers. This last question was, however, a knife with a double edge, for in peace, a tribute paid in coin, drained the treasury already too empty, and in war the fleet did nothing; meanwhile the feeding of Cadiz was rendered precarious by it; and of Lisbon also, for the whole produce of Portugal was only equal to four months' consumption. In commercial affairs, the usual Peninsular jealousy was displayed; the imports of British goods were prohibited, to the advantage of smugglers only, while the government, which thus neglected its own resources to the injury of both countries, clamoured for subsidies. Finally, the power of the Souzas was so great, and the regency was so entirely subservient to them, that although Mr. Stuart had been assured by Mr. Canning, that a note forbidding Domingo Souza to meddle with affairs at Lisbon, had been procured from the Brazils, all representations to the regency were met by references to that nobleman, who was in London, and the business of the mission was thus paralyzed.

In March, 1809, the British government had taken 10,000 Portuguese troops into pay. In May they were increased to 20,000, and in June to 30,000. The cost of these forces, and the increased pay to Portuguese officers, added to the subsidy, amounted to two millions sterling; but this subsidy, partly from negligence, partly from the exhaustion of England in consequence of Mr. Canning's prodigal donations to Spain, was in arrears. However, as this mode of proceeding was perfectly in unison with their own method, the regency did not much regard it, but they were eager to obtain a loan from England, in the disposal of which they would have

been quite uncontrolled, and for this very reason Lord Wellington strenuously opposed it. In revenge, the regency, by a wilful misunderstanding of the debates of parliament, and by the distortion of facts, endeavoured to throw a doubt upon the sincerity of England, and this, with the encouragement given to all Portuguese malcontents by the Whigs, whose clamour, just, as applied to the ministers, was unjustly extended to the generals, greatly increased the disorder of the times.

In this state of affairs Mr. Canning, being happily removed from office, Lord Wellesley, who succeeded him, changed the instructions of the diplomatic agents in the Peninsula. They were now directed to make conditions with respect to the succours, and in Portugal they were vigorously to interfere in all civil changes, augmentations of revenue, and military resources; and even to demand monthly reports of the condition of the army, and the expenditure of the subsidy. Lord Wellesley, also, thinking that the example of a cortes in Spain, might create a desire for a more temperate government in Portugal, was prepared to forward such a change, provided old forms were preserved, and that all appeared to flow from the prince regent, whose consent he undertook to secure. Resistance to the enemy, he said, would be in proportion to the attachment of the people, and hence it was advisable to make timely concessions, giving, however, no more than was absolutely necessary.

The regency were strongly opposed to this notion of a cortes, and Mr. Stuart and Lord Wellington affirmed, and truly, that the docility of the people, and their hatred of the French, were motives powerful enough, without any other stimulus, to urge them to action. Thus the project fell to the ground, and the time was perhaps inconvenient to effect a revolution of this nature, which the people themselves certainly did not contemplate, and which, as Spain had shown, was not a certain help to the war. Lord Wellington, who only considered what would conduce to the success of the war, was therefore consistent upon this occasion, but it is curious to observe the course of the English cabinet. The enforcement in France of a military conscription, authorized by the laws, was an unheard-of oppression on the part of Napoleon; but in Portugal a conscription, enforced by foreigners, was a wise and vigorous measure; and Lord Wellesley admitting that the Portuguese government had been harsh and oppressive, as well as weak and capricious, was content to withhold a better system from the people, expressly because they loved their country and were obedient subjects; for he would have readily granted it to them if they had been unruly and of doubtful patriotism.

Mr. Stuart, in concert with Lord Wellington, diligently endeavoured to remedy the evils of the hour, but whenever he complained of any particular disorder, he was, by the regency, offered arbitrary power to punish, which being only an expedient to render the British odious to the people, he refused. The intrigues of the Fidalgos then became apparent, and the first regency was broken up in 1810. The Marquis of Das Minas retired from it under the pretext of ill health, but really because he found himself too weak to support Mr. De Mello, a Fidalgo officer, who was thrust forward to oppose the legal authority of Marshal Beresford. Mr. Cypriano Freire was then made minister of finance and of foreign affairs, and Mr. Forjas, secretary at war, with a vote in the regency on matters of war. But the former, soon after Mr. Stuart's arrival, resigned his situation in consequence of some disgust, and the Conde Redondo, having undertaken the office, commenced, with the advice of Mr. Stuart, a better arrangement of the taxes, especially the *decima*, or income-tax, which was neither impartially nor strictly enforced on the rich towns, nor on the powerful people of the Fidalgo faction. The clergy also evaded the imposts, and the British merchants, although profiting enormously from the war, sought exemption under the factory privileges, not only from the taxes, which in certain cases they could legally do, but from the billets, and from those recruiting laws affecting their servants, which they could not justly demand, and which all other classes in the community were liable to.

The working of the Souza's, in the Brazils, where the minister of finance wished to have the regulation of the Portuguese treasury under his control, soon changed this arrangement. Freire's resignation was not accepted, Redondo was excluded from the government, and Forjas, who was the most efficient member of the

government, was deprived of his functions. The remaining members then proposed to fill up Das Minas's vacancy themselves, but this was resisted by Lord Wellington, on the ground that, without the prince's order, the proceeding would be illegal, and involve the regency in an indefensible quarrel at the Brazils. The order for removing Redondo, and cramping the utility of Forjas, he, in concert with Mr. Stuart, withstood; and this, for the moment, prevented a change which would have impeded the ameliorations begun. Such, however, was the disorder in the finances, that Mr. Stuart proposed, as the least difficult mode of arranging them, to take the whole direction himself, England becoming answerable for the expenditure of the country; Lord Wellington thought this could not be done, without assuming, at the same time, the whole government of the country, which he had previously proposed to the British cabinet, but which it was now too late to attempt, and Mr. Stuart's project fell to the ground.

Another spring of mischief soon bubbled up; Lord Strangford, whose diplomatic dexterity evinced by his Bruton-street despatch, had been rewarded by the situation of minister at the Brazils, was there bestirring himself. It had been the policy of Mr. Stuart and the English general to keep the regency permanent, and to support the secretariats as they were placed in the hands of Mr. de Forjas and the Conde de Redondo; for these men had been found by experience to be better qualified to co-operate with the British authorities than any other persons, and hence Lord Wellington had resisted the prince's orders for Cypriano Freire's resumption of office, and had continued the functions of Forjas and Redondo, until his own remonstrances could reach the Brazils. In this state of affairs Lord Strangford informed Mr. Stuart that he had persuaded the prince to accede to the following propositions:—1. That the British plenipotentiary at Lisbon, the Count Redondo, Doctor Nogueras, and the Principal Souza, should be added to the old regency. 2. That Admiral Berkeley should be naval commander-in-chief. 3. That all traitorous correspondence should be prevented, and that measures should be taken to limit the exuberant power assumed by subordinates. This last article was directed against Forjas, and the whole went to establish the preponderance of the Souza faction. The only useful part was the appointment of Mr. Stuart to the regency, but this was arranged before it was known that Mr. Villiers had been recalled, and consequently had the same object of favouring the Souzas in view.

Mr. Stuart and Lord Wellington strongly objected to this change, although they submitted to it as not wishing to appear regardless of the prince regent's rights. Mr. Stuart, however, reflecting that a government, composed of men having different views and feelings, and without any casting vote, the number being even, could not go on usefully, was at first averse to join the regency, but was finally persuaded to do so by Lord Wellington, who justly considered that his presence there would give the only chance of success.

Doctor Nogueras's appointment was described by Lord Strangford as a tribute to democracy, the object being to counteract the power of those very secretariats which Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were labouring to preserve. But Lord Strangford prided himself chiefly upon the appointment of the Principal Souza, who, he said, had been recommended to him by Mr. Villiers, an avowal of great import, as showing at once the spirit of the new arrangement: for this Souza had, in a subordinate situation, hitherto opposed every proceeding of the British in Portugal; he was the avowed enemy of Beresford, the contriver of all confusion, and the most mischievous person in Portugal; and his absence from that country was so desirable, that intimations to that effect had been formally given to him by Lord Wellesley, through Mr. Stuart. This factious person was now, however, armed with additional power to thwart the English authorities in Portugal, and thus Lord Strangford's diplomacy tended, in effect, to ruin that cause which he had been sent to the Brazils to support.

In relating these proceedings I have, following his own letter announcing the change, described Lord Strangford as acting voluntarily; but in a subsequent despatch he affirmed that it was under Mr. Canning's instructions he had pressed for this incorporating of the British minister in the regency, and that Nogueras's appointment sprang entirely from the prince regent's own will, which he did not

choose to oppose. In like manner, when Lord Wellesley was intent upon assembling a cortes, Lord Strangford called it "a great and essential measure strongly and wisely urged by the government," and yet afterwards acknowledged that he neglected to press it, because he thought it "useless and even hurtful," which inconsistency renders it difficult to determine on whom these affairs rested. As affecting Mr. Canning's policy, however, it is to be observed that if he originally arranged this change, his object was to put Mr. Villiers in the regency, not with any view to the more complete control of Portugal for the purposes of war, but, as the instructions to Sir John Cradock prove, to ensure a preponderance to the diplomatic department over the military in that country.*

The principal reforms in the administration, which had been sought for by Lord Wellington, were a better arrangement of the financial system—the execution of the laws without favour to the *Fidalgos*—the suppression of the *junta di viveres*, a negligent and fraudulent board, for which he wished to establish a Portuguese commissariat—the due supply of provisions and stores, for the national troops and fortresses—the consolidation of the arsenal department under one head—the formation of a military chest, distinct from the treasury, which was always diverting the funds to other purposes—the enforcing of the regulations about the means of transport—the repairs of the roads and bridges—the reformation of the hospitals—the succouring of the starving people, and the revival of agriculture in the parts desolated by the war.

These things he had hoped to accomplish; but from the moment the change effected by Lord Strangford took place, unceasing acrimonious disputes ensued between the British commander and the Portuguese government, and no species of falsehood or intrigue, not even personal insult, and the writing of anonymous threatening letters, were spared by the Souza faction. In the beginning of 1811 they had organized an anti-English party, and a plot was laid to force the British out of the country, which would have succeeded if less vigilance had been used by Mr. Stuart, or less vigour of control by Lord Wellington. This plot, however, required that the Patriarch should go to the northern provinces, a journey which the envoy always dexterously prevented.

The first complaint of the British authorities, accompanied with a demand for the removal of the Principal Souza, reached the Brazils in February, 1811, and Das Minas died about the same time; but so strongly was the faction supported at Rio Janeiro, that in May the prince regent expressed his entire approval of the Souzas' proceedings and his high displeasure with Forjas and Mr. Stuart. His minister, the Conde de Linhares, wrote, that the capture of Massena with his whole army, which he expected to hear of each day, would not make amends for the destruction of the country during the retreat of the allies; and in an official note to Lord Strangford, he declared, that the prince regent could not permit Mr. Stuart to vote in matters concerning the internal government of the kingdom, because he was influenced by, and consulted persons suspected of disaffection, which expression Lord Strangford said referred solely to Forjas.

The prince himself also wrote to Lord Wellington, accusing Mr. Stuart of acting separately from the commander-in-chief, and of being the cause of all the factions which had sprung up, and he declared that he would not remove Souza, unless Mr. Stuart was recalled. He desired that Forjas, who he affirmed to be the real author of the opposition complained of by the British, should be sent to the Brazils, to answer for his conduct; and finally he announced his intention to write in a like strain to the king of England. To this Lord Wellington answered that finding his conduct disapproved and Souza's applauded, he proposed to quit Portugal. Forjas immediately sent in his resignation, Admiral Berkeley proposed to do the same, and Mr. Stuart withdrew from the council until the pleasure of his own cabinet should be made known: the war was then on the point of finishing, but the crisis was not perceived by the public, because the resolution of the English general was kept secret, to avoid disturbing the public mind, and in the hopes of submission on the part of the prince.

* See vol. I., appendix.

Meanwhile other embarrassments were superadded, of a nature to leave the English general little hope of being able to continue the contest, should he even defeat the intrigues at Rio Janeiro; for besides the quarrel with the Souza faction, in which he and Mr. Stuart supported Forjas, Nogueiras and Redondo, against their enemies in the Brazils, these very persons, although the best that could be found, and men of undoubted ability, influenced partly by national habits, partly by fears of ultimate consequences, continually harassed him in the execution of the details belonging to their offices. No delinquent was ever punished, no fortress ever stored in due time and quantity, the suffering people were uncared for, disorders were unrepressed, the troops were starved, and the favouring of the Fidalgos constant. The *junta de viveres* was supported, the formation of a military chest, and commissariat, delayed; many wild and foolish schemes daily broached; and the natural weakness of the government was, by instability, increased, because the prince regent had, early in 1811, intimated an intention of immediately returning to Europe.

I have said that it was a favourite maxim with the regency that a paternal government should not punish delinquents in the public service, and they added to this another still more absurd, namely, that the Portuguese troops could thrive under privations of food, which would kill men of another nation; with these two follies they excused neglect, whenever the repetition that there had been no neglect, became fatiguing to them. Besides this, collisions between the British commissariat and the *junta di viveres* were frequent and very hurtful, because the former, able to outbid, and more in fear of failure, overbought the latter; this contracted the already too small sphere of their activity, and Lord Wellington was prevented feeding the whole Portuguese army himself by a curious obstacle. His principal dependence for the support of his own troops was upon the Spanish muleteers attached to the army; they were the very life and sustenance of the war, and their patience, hardiness, and fidelity to the British were remarkable; but they so abhorred the Portuguese people that they would not carry provisions for their soldiers, and Lord Wellington only obtained their services for those brigades which were attached to the English divisions, by making them think the food was entirely for the latter. Upon such nice management even in apparently trifling matters did this war depend. And yet it is not uncommon for politicians, versed only in the classic puerilities of public schools, and the tricks of parliamentary faction, to hold the rugged experience of Wellington's camp as nothing in the formation of a statesman.

The effects of these complicated affairs were soon and severely felt. Abrantes had like to have been abandoned, from want, at the time Massena held Santarem, and the Portuguese troops were starved during that general's retreat; Beresford's operations in the Alemtejo were impeded, and his hospitals were left without succour; at Fuentes Onoro ammunition failed, and the Portuguese artillery were forced to supply themselves by picking up the enemy's bullets; the cavalry of that nation were quite ruined, and out of more than 40,000 regular troops, formed by Beresford, only 19,000 were to be found under arms after the battle of Albuera; the rest had deserted or died from extreme want.

When Massena retreated, the provincial organization of the country was restored, and to encourage the people to sow the devastated districts before the season passed, Mr. Stuart had furnished seed corn on the credit of the coming subsidy; an amnesty for deserters was also published, the feudal imposts for the year were remitted, and fairs were established to supply tools of husbandry; but notwithstanding these efforts, such was the distress, that at Caldas 80 persons died daily, and at Figueras, where 12,000 people, chiefly from Portuguese Estremadura, had taken refuge, the daily deaths were above 100, and the whole would have perished but for the active benevolence of Major Von Linstow, an officer of General Trant's staff. Meanwhile the country was so overrun with robbers that the detached officers could not travel in safety upon the service of the army, and Wellington was fearful of being obliged to employ his troops against them. British officers were daily insulted at Lisbon, and even assassinated while on duty with impunity; the whole army was disgusted, the letters to England were engendering

in that country a general dislike to the war, and the British soldiers, when not with their regiments, committed a thousand outrages on the line of operations.

As a climax to these scenes of misery and mischief, the harvest, which had failed in Portugal, failed also in England; and no corn was to be got from the Baltic because there was no specie to pay for it, and bills were refused. Hence the famine spread in a terrible manner until Mr. Stuart obtained leave to license 50 American vessels with corn, whose cargoes were paid for out of funds provided partly by the charity of the people of England, and partly by a parliamentary grant which passed when Massena retreated.

In this crisis the British cabinet granted an additional subsidy to Portugal, but from the scarcity of specie, the greatest part of it was paid in kind, and the distress of the regency for money was scarcely lessened; for these supplies merely stood in the place of the plunder which had hitherto prevailed in the country. Thus Mr. Canning's prodigality, Mr. Vansittart's paper system, and Mr. Perceval's economy, all combined to press upon the British general, and, to use his own words, he was supplied with only one-sixth part of the money necessary to keep the great machine going which had been set in motion. Mr. Perceval, however, in answer to his remonstrances, employed a secretary of the treasury to prove in a laboured paper, founded entirely upon false data, that the army had been over-supplied, and must have money to spare. But that minister, whose speeches breathed nothing but the final destruction of France, designed to confine the efforts of England to the defence of Portugal alone, without any regard to the rest of the Peninsula.

Amongst the other follies of the Portuguese regency was a resolution to issue proclamations, filled with bombastic adulation of themselves, vulgar abuse of the French, and altogether unsuited to the object of raising the public feeling, which flagged under their system. To the English general's remonstrances on this head, Forjas replied, that praise of themselves and abuse of the French was a national custom, and could not be dispensed with!—a circumstance which certain English writers who have implicitly followed the accounts of the Portuguese authors, such as Accursio de Neves, and men of his stamp, relative to French enormities, would do well to consider. And here it is right to observe that so many complaints were made of the cruelty committed by Massena's army while at Santarem, that Lord Wellington had some thoughts of reprisals; but having first caused strict inquiry to be made, it was discovered that in most cases the ordenanças, after having submitted to the French, and received their protection, took advantage of it to destroy the stragglers and small detachments, and the cruelty complained of was only the infliction of legitimate punishment for such conduct; the projected retaliation was therefore changed for an injunction to the ordenanças to cease from such a warfare.

The character of the regency was, however, most openly shown in their proceedings connected with the convention of Cintra. All the advantages which that treaty ensured to Portugal they complacently reaped, but overlooked or annulled those points in which the character of England was concerned. In violation of the convention, and in despite of the remonstrances of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, they cast the French residents at Lisbon into loathsome dungeons, without any cause of complaint; and in the affair of Mascarheñas their conduct was distinguished alike by wanton cruelty and useless treachery. This youth, when only 15, had with many others entered the French service in Junot's time, under the permission of his own prince; and he and the Conde de Sabugal were taken by the peasantry in 1810 endeavouring to pass from Massena's army into Spain, Sabugal in uniform, Mascarheñas in disguise. They were both tried as traitors. The first, a general officer, and with powerful friends amongst the Fidalgos, was acquitted, as, indeed, was only just; but he was then appointed to a situation under the regency, which was disgraceful, as arising from faction: Mascarheñas was a boy, and had no powerful friends, and he was condemned to death. Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart represented the injustice of this sentence, and they desired that if humanity was unheeded the government would put him to death as a spy, for being in disguise, and so prevent the danger of reprisals, already threatened by Massena. The young man's mother and sisters, grovelling in the

dust, implored the regency to spare him, but to show their hatred of Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart, for the disputes with the regency were then at the highest, the government told the miserable women, that it was the British general and minister who demanded his death, and they were sent, with this brutal falsehood, to weep and to ask grace from persons who had no power to grant it. Mascarheñas was publicly executed as a traitor, for entering the French service under the authority of his native prince, while Sabugal was acquitted, and even rewarded, although precisely in the same circumstances, when the excuse of the disguise had been rejected.

In 1810, one Corea, calling himself an aide-de-camp of Massena, was likewise seized in disguise within the British lines, and, having given useful information, was by Lord Wellington confined in St Julian's, to protect him from the Portuguese government. After a time he became deranged, and was released, whereupon the regency, rather than keep him, desired that he might be sent as a prisoner of war to England; thus for convenience admitting the very principle which they had rejected when only honour and humanity were concerned. A process against the Marquis d'Alorna had also been commenced, but his family being powerful it was soon dropped, and yet the government refused Madame d'Alorna leave to join her husband, thus showing themselves spiteful and contemptible as well as cowardly and bloody. Even the court of Brazil was shocked. The prince rebuked the regency severely for the death of Mascarheñas, reversed the sentences on some others, and banished Sabugal to Terceira.

This was the political state of Portugal.

Lord Liverpool's intimation,* that neither corn nor specie could be had from England, threw Lord Wellington on his own resources for feeding his troops. He had before created a paper money by means of commissariat bills, which, being paid regularly at certain periods, passed current with the people when the national bonds called "Apolocies" were at an enormous discount. He now, in concert with Mr. Stuart, entered into commerce to supply his necessities. For having ascertained that grain in different parts of the world, especially in South America, could be bought by bills cheaper than it sold for hard cash in Lisbon; and that in Egypt, although only to be bought with specie, it was at a reduced price; they employed mercantile agents, to purchase it for the army account, and after filling the magazines sold the overplus to the inhabitants. This transaction was, however, greatly impeded by the disputes with North America, which were now rapidly hastening to a rupture; the American ships which frequented the Tagus being prevented by the non-importation act from bringing back merchandise, were forced to demand coin, which helped to drain the country of specie.

As Mr. Stuart could obtain no assistance from the English merchants of Lisbon, to aid him in a traffic which interfered with their profits, he wrote circular letters to the consuls in the Mediterranean, and in the Portuguese islands, and to the English minister at Washington, desiring them to negotiate treasury bills; to increase the shipments of corn to Lisbon, and pay with new bills, to be invested in such articles of British manufacture as the non-importation law still permitted to go to America. By this complicated process he contrived to keep something in the military chest; and this commerce, which Lord Wellington truly observed, was not what ought to have occupied his time and attention, saved the army and the people, when the proceedings of Mr. Percival would have destroyed both. Yet it was afterwards cavilled at and censured by the ministers, on the representations of the merchants, who found their exorbitant gains interrupted by it.

Pressed by such accumulated difficulties, and not supported in England as he deserved, the general, who had more than once intimated his resolution to withdraw from the Peninsula, now seriously thought of executing it. Yet when he considered that the cause was one even of more interest to England than to the Peninsula; that the embarrassments of the French might be even greater than his own, and that Napoleon himself, gigantic as his exertions had been, and were likely to be, was scarcely aware of the difficulty of conquering the Peninsula while an English army held Portugal; when he considered also, that light was breaking in the north of Europe, that the chances of war are many, even in the worst

of times, and above all, when his mental eye caught the beams of his own coming glory, he quelled his rising indignation, and re-tempered his mighty energies to bear the buffet of the tempest.

But he could not remove the obstacles that choked his path, nor could he stand still, lest the ground should open beneath his feet. If he moved in the north, Marmont's army and the army under Bessieres were ready to oppose him, and he must take Ciudad Rodrigo or blockade it before he could even advance against them. To take that place required a battering-train, to be brought up through a mountainous country from Lamego, and there was no covering position for the army during the siege. To blockade and pass it, would so weaken his forces, already inferior to the enemy, that he could do nothing effectual; meanwhile, Soult would have again advanced from Llerena, and perhaps have added Elvas to his former conquests.

To act on the defensive in Beira, and to follow up the blow against Soult, by invading Andalusia, in concert with the Murcians and the corps of Blake, Beguines, and Graham, while Joseph's absence paralyzed the army of the centre; while the army of Portugal was being re-organized in Castile; and while Suchet was still engaged with Tarragona, would have been an operation suitable to Lord Wellington's fame and to the circumstances of the moment. But then Badajos must have been blockaded with a corps powerful enough to have defied the army of the centre, and the conduct of the Portuguese government had so reduced the allied forces, that this would not have left a sufficient army to encounter Soult. Hence, after the battle of Albuera, the only thing to be done, was to renew the siege of Badajos, which, besides its local interest, contained the enemy's bridge equipage and battering train; but which, on common military calculations, could scarcely be expected to fall before Soult and Marmont would succour it: yet it was only by the taking of that town that Portugal itself could be secured beyond the precincts of Lisbon, and a base for further operations obtained.

According to the regular rules of art, Soult should have been driven over the mountains before the siege was begun, but there was no time to do this, and Marmont was equally to be dreaded on the other side; wherefore Lord Wellington could only try, as it were, to snatch away the fortress from between them, and he who, knowing his real situation, censures him for the attempt, is neither a general nor a statesman. The question was, whether the attempt should be made or the contest in the Peninsula be resigned. It failed, indeed, and the Peninsula was not lost, but no argument can be thence derived, because it was the attempt, rather than the success which was necessary to keep the war alive; moreover, the French did not push their advantages as far as they might have done, and the unforeseen circumstance of a large sum of money being brought to Lisbon, by private speculation, at the moment of failure, enabled the English general to support the crisis.

CHAPTER V.

SECOND ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

THERE is no operation in war so certain as a modern siege, provided the rules of art are strictly followed, but, unlike the ancient sieges in that particular, it is also different in this: that no operation is less open to irregular daring, because the course of the engineer can neither be hurried nor delayed without danger. Lord Wellington knew that a siege of Badajos, in form, required longer time and better means than were at his disposal, but he was forced to incur danger and loss of reputation, which is loss of strength, or to adopt some compendious mode of taking that place. The time that he could command, and time is in all sieges the greatest point, was precisely that which the French required to bring up a force sufficient to disturb the operation; and this depended on the movements of the army of Portugal, whose march from Salamanca to Badajos, by the pass of Baños, or even through that of Gata, could not be stopped by General Spencer, because the mouths of those defiles were commanded by Marmont's positions. It was possible also at

that season for an army to pass the Tagus by fords near Alcantara, and hence more than 20 days of free action against the place were not to be calculated upon.

Now the carriages of the battering guns used in Beresford's siege were so much damaged, that the artillery officers asked 11 days to repair them; and the scanty means of transport for stores was much diminished by carrying the wounded from Albuera to the different hospitals. Thus more than 15 days of open trenches and nine days of fire could not be expected. With good guns, plentiful stores, and a corps of regular sappers and miners, this time would probably have sufficed; but none of these things were in the camp, and it was a keen jest of Picton to say, that "Lord Wellington sued Badajos *in forma pauperis*."

The guns, some of them cast in Philip II.'s reign, were of soft brass, and false in their bore; the shot were of different sizes, and the largest too small; the Portuguese gunners were inexperienced, there were but few British artillerymen, few engineers, no sappers or miners, and no time to teach the troops of the line how to make fascines and gabions. Regular and sure approaches against the body of the place by the Pardaleras and the Picurina outworks could not be attempted; but it was judged that Beresford's lines of attack on the castle and Fort Christoval might be successfully renewed, avoiding the errors of that general; that is to say, by pushing the double attacks simultaneously, and with more powerful means. San Christoval might thus be taken, and batteries from thence could sweep the interior of the castle, which was meanwhile to be breached. Something also was hoped from the inhabitants, and something from the effect of Soult's retreat after Albuera.

This determination once taken, everything was put in motion with the greatest energy. Major Dickson, an artillery officer whose talents were very conspicuous during the whole war, had, with unexpected rapidity, prepared a battering train of thirty 24-pounders, four 16-pounders, and twelve 8 and 10-inch howitzers made to serve as mortars by taking off the wheels and placing them on trucks. Six iron Portuguese ship-guns were forwarded from Salvatierra, making altogether 52 pieces, a considerable convoy of engineer's stores had already arrived from Alcaccer do Sal, and a company of British artillery marched from Lisbon to be mixed with the Portuguese, making a total of 600 gunners. The regular engineer-officers present were only 21 in number; but 11 volunteers from the line were joined as assistant-engineers, and a draft of 300 intelligent men from the line, including 25 artificers of the staff corps, strengthened the force immediately under their command.

Hamilton's Portuguese division was already before the town, and on the 24th of May, at the close of evening, General Houston's division, increased to 5000 men by the addition of the 17th Portuguese regiment and the Tavira and Lagos militia, invested San Christoval. The flying bridge was then laid down on the Guadiana, and on the 27th, Picton's division, arriving from Campo Mayor, crossed the river by the ford above the town, and joined Hamilton, their united force being about 10,000 men. General Hill commanded the covering army, which, including the Spaniards, was spread from Merida to Albuera. The cavalry was pushed forward in observation of Soult, and a few days after, intelligence having arrived that Drouet's division was on the point of effecting a junction with that marshal, two regiments of cavalry and two brigades of infantry, which had been quartered at Coria as posts of communication with Spencer, were called up to reinforce the covering army.

While the allies were engaged at Albuera, Phillipon, the governor of Badajos, had levelled their trenches, repaired his own damages, and obtained a small supply of wine and vegetables from the people of Estremadura, who were still awed by the presence of Soult's army; and within the place all was quiet, for the citizens did not now exceed 5000 souls. He had also mounted more guns, and when the place was invested parties of the townsmen mixed with soldiers were observed working to improve the defences; wherefore, as any retrenchments made in the castle behind the intended points of attack would have frustrated the besiegers' object by prolonging the siege, Lord Wellington had a large telescope placed in the tower of La Lyppe, near Elvas, by which the interior of the castle could be plainly looked into, and all preparations discovered.

In the night of the 29th, ground was broken for a false attack against the Pardaleras, and the following night 1600 workmen, with a covering party of 1200,

sank a parallel against the castle, on an extent of 1100 yards, without being discovered by the enemy, who did not fire until after daylight. The same night 1200 workmen, covered by 800 men under arms, opened a parallel 450 yards from San Christoval and 700 yards from the bridge-head. On this line one breaching and two counter batteries were raised against the fort and against the bridge-head, to prevent a sally from that point; and a fourth battery was also commenced to search the defences of the castle, but the workmen were discovered, and a heavy fire struck down many of them.

On the 31st, the attack against the castle, the soil being very soft, was pushed forward without much interruption, and rapidly; but the Christoval attack, being carried on in a rocky soil, and the earth brought up from the rear, proceeded slowly and with considerable loss. This day the British artillery company came up on mules from Estremos, and the engineer hastened the works. The direction of the parallel against the castle was such that the right gradually approached the point of attack by which the heaviest fire of the place was avoided; yet, so great was the desire to save time, that before the suitable point of distance was attained, a battery of fourteen 24-pounders with six large howitzers was marked out.

On the Christoval side the batteries were not finished before the night of the 1st of June, for the soil was so rocky that the miner was employed to level the ground for the platforms; and the garrison, having mortars of 16 and 18 inches diameter mounted on the castle, sent every shell amongst the workmen. These huge missiles would have ruined the batteries on that side altogether, if the latter had not been on the edge of a ridge, from whence most of the shells rolled off before bursting, yet so difficult is it to judge rightly in war, that Phillipon stopped this fire, thinking it was thrown away! The progress of the works was also delayed by the bringing of earth from a distance, and woolpacks purchased at Elvas were found to be an excellent substitute.

In the night of the 2nd, the batteries on both sides were completed, and armed with 43 pieces of different sizes, of which 20 were pointed against the castle; the next day the fire of the besiegers opened, but the windage caused by the smallness of the shot, rendered it very ineffectual at first, and five pieces became unserviceable. However, before evening the practice was steadier, the fire of the fort was nearly silenced, and the covering of masonry fell from the castle-wall, discovering a perpendicular bank of clay.

In the night of the 3rd, the parallel against the castle was prolonged, and a fresh battery for seven guns traced out at 650 yards from the breach. On the 4th, the garrison's fire was increased by several additional guns, and six more pieces of the besiegers were disabled, principally by their own fire. Meanwhile the batteries told but slightly against the bank of clay.

At Christoval, the fort was much injured, and some damage was done to the castle from one of the batteries on that side; but the guns were so soft and bad that the rate of firing was of necessity greatly reduced in all the batteries. In the night the new battery was armed, all the damaged works were repaired, and the next day the enemy having brought a gun in Christoval to plunge into the trenches on the castle side, the parallel there was deepened and traverses were constructed to protect the troops.

Fifteen pieces still played against the castle, but the bank of clay, although falling away in flakes, always remained perpendicular. One damaged gun was repaired on the Christoval side, but two more had become unserviceable.

In the night the parallel against the castle was again extended, a fresh battery was traced out, at only 520 yards from the breach, to receive the Portuguese iron guns, which had arrived at Elvas; and on the Christoval side some new batteries were opened and some old ones were abandoned. During this night the garrison began to entrench themselves behind the castle breach, before morning their labourers were well covered, and two additional pieces, from Christoval, were made to plunge into the trenches with great effect. On the other hand the fire of the besiegers had broken the clay bank, which took such a slope as to appear nearly practicable, and the stray shells and shots set fire to the houses nearest the castle, but three more guns were disabled.

On the 6th, there were two breaches in Christoval, and the principal one being found practicable, a company of grenadiers with 12 ladders were directed to assault it, while a second company turned the fort by the east to divert the enemy's attention. Three hundred men from the trenches were at the same time pushed forward by the west side to cut the communication between the fort and the bridge-head; and a detachment, with a six-pounder, moved into the valley of the Gebora, to prevent any passage of the Guadiana by boats.

FIRST ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL.

The storming party, commanded by Major M'Intosh, of the 85th regiment, was preceded by a forlorn hope under Mr. Dyas, of the 51st, and this gallant gentleman, guided by the engineer, William Forster, a young man of uncommon bravery, reached the glacis about midnight, and descended the ditch without being discovered. The French had, however, cleared all the rubbish away, the breach had still seven feet of perpendicular wall, many obstacles, such as carts chained together and pointed beams of wood, were placed above it, and large shells were ranged along the ramparts to roll down upon the assailants. The forlorn hope finding the opening impracticable, was retiring with little loss, when the main body, which had been exposed to a flank fire from the town as well as a direct fire from the fort, came leaping into the ditch with ladders, and another effort was made to escalate at different points; the ladders were too short, and the garrison, consisting of only 75 men, besides the cannoneers, made so stout a resistance, and the confusion and mischief occasioned by the bursting of the shells was so great, that the assailants again retired with the loss of more than 100 men.

Bad success always produces disputes, and the causes of this failure were attributed by some to the breach being impracticable from the first; by others to the confusion which arose after the main body had entered. French writers affirm that the breach was certainly practicable on the night of the 5th, but repaired on the 6th; that as the besiegers did not attack until midnight, the workmen had time to clear the ruins away and to raise fresh obstacles, and the bravery of the soldiers, who were provided with three muskets each, did the rest. But it is also evident, that whether from inexperience, accident, or other causes, the combinations for the assault were not very well calculated; the storming party was too weak, the ladders few and short, and the breach not sufficiently scoured by the fire of the batteries. The attack itself was also irregular and ill-combined, for the leading troops were certainly repulsed before the main body had descended the ditch. The intrepidity of the assailants was admitted by all sides, yet it is a great point in such attacks that the supports should form almost one body with the leaders, because the sense of power derived from numbers is a strong incentive to valour, and obstacles which would be insurmountable to a few, seem to vanish before a multitude. It is also to be recollected that this was a case where not loss of men, but time was to be considered.

During this night the iron guns were placed in battery against the castle, but two more of the brass pieces became unserviceable, and the following day three others were disabled. However, the bank of clay at the castle at last offered a practicable slope, and during the night Captain Patton, of the engineers, examined it closely; he was mortally wounded in returning, yet lived to make his report that it was practicable. Nevertheless the garrison continued, as they had done every night at both breaches, to clear away the ruins, and with bales of wool and other materials to form defences behind the opening. They ranged also a number of huge shells and barrels of powder, with matches fastened to them, along the ramparts, and placed chosen men to defend the breach, each man being supplied with four muskets.

In this order they fearlessly awaited another attack, which was soon made. For intelligence now arrived that Drouet's corps was close to Llerena, and that Marmont was on the move from Salamanca, and hence Lord Wellington, seeing that his prey was likely to escape, as a last effort resolved to assault Christoval again. But this time 400 British, Portuguese, and French men of the Chasseurs Britanniques,

carrying 16 long ladders, were destined for the attack; the supports were better closed up; the appointed hour was nine instead of twelve, and a greater number of detachments than before were distributed to the right and left to distract the enemy's attention, to cut off his communication with the town, and to be ready to improve any success which might be obtained. On the other side Phillipon increased the garrison of the fort to 200 men.

SECOND ASSAULT OF CRISTOVAL.

The storming party was commanded by Major M'Geechy, the forlorn hope, again led by the gallant Dyas, was accompanied by Mr. Hunt, an engineer officer, and a little after nine o'clock the leading troops bounding forward, were immediately followed by the support, amidst a shattering fire of musketry which killed Major M'Geechy, Mr. Hunt, and many men upon the glacis. The troops with loud shouts jumped into the ditch, but the French scoffingly called to them to come on, and at the same time rolled the barrels of powder and shells down, while the musketry made fearful and rapid havoc. In a little time the two leading columns united at the main breach, the supports also came up, confusion arose about the ladders, of which only a few could be reared, and the enemy standing on the ramparts, bayoneted the foremost of the assailants, overturned the ladders, and again poured their destructive fire upon the crowd below. When 140 men had fallen the order to retire was given.

An assault on the castle breach might still have been tried, but the troops could not have formed between the top and the retrenchments behind the breach, until Christoval was taken, and the guns from thence used to clear the interior of the castle; hence the siege was of necessity raised, because to take Christoval required several days more, and Soult was now ready to advance. The stores were removed on the 10th, and the attack was turned into a blockade.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The allies lost, during this unfortunate siege, nearly 400 men and officers, and the whole of their proceedings were against rules. The working parties were too weak, the guns and stores too few, and the points of attack chosen not the best; the defences were untouched by counter-batteries, and the breaching batteries were at too great a distance for the bad guns employed; howitzers mounted on trucks were but a poor substitute for mortars, and the sap was not practised; lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been crowned, and a musketry fire established against the breach.

2. That a siege so conducted should fail against such a brave and intelligent garrison is not strange; but it is strange and culpable that a government which had been so long engaged in war as the British should have left the engineer department, with respect to organization and equipment, in such a state as to make it in despite of the officers' experience, bravery, and zeal, a very inefficient arm of war. The skill displayed belonged to particular persons rather than to the corps at large; and the very tools with which they worked, especially those sent from the storekeeper's department, were so shamefully bad that the work required could scarcely be performed; the captured French cutting-tools were eagerly sought for by the engineers as being infinitely better than the British; when the soldiers' lives and the honour of England's arms were at stake, the English cutlery was found worse than the French.

3. The neglect of rules above noticed was for the most part a matter of absolute necessity; yet censure might attach to the general, inasmuch as he could have previously sent to England for a battering train. But then the conduct of the Portuguese and British government, when Lord Wellington was in the lines, left him so little hope of besieging any place on the frontier, that he was hourly in fear of being obliged to embark: moreover, the badness of the Portuguese guns was not known, and the space of time that elapsed between the fall of Badajos and this siege was insufficient to procure artillery from England; neither would the Portu-

guesse have furnished the means of carriage. It may, however, at all times be taken as a maxim that the difficulties of war are so innumerable that no head was ever yet strong enough to fore-calculate them all.

CHAPTER VI.

It will be remembered that Soult, instead of retiring into Andalusia, took a flank position at Llerena and awaited the arrival of Drouet's division which had been detached from Massena's army. At Llerena, although closely watched by General Hill, the French marshal, with an army oppressed by its losses and rendered unruly by want, maintained an attitude of offence until assured of Drouet's approach, when he again advanced to Los Santos, near which place a slight cavalry skirmish took place to the disadvantage of the French.

On the 14th, Drouet, whose march had been very rapid, arrived, and then Soult, who knew that Lord Wellington expected large reinforcements, and was desirous to forestall them, advanced to Fuente del Maestro, whereupon Hill took measures to concentrate the covering army on the position of Albueira. Meanwhile, Marmont, who had reorganized the army of Portugal, in six divisions of infantry and five brigades of cavalry, received Napoleon's orders to co-operate with Soult; and in this view had sent Reynier with two divisions by the pass of Baños, while himself with a considerable force of infantry and cavalry and 10 guns escorted a convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo. General Spencer, with the first, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, and one brigade of cavalry, was then behind the Agueda; and Pack's Portuguese brigade was above Almeida, which had been again placed in a condition to resist an irregular assault. Spencer's orders were to make his marches correspond with those of the enemy, if the latter should point towards the Tagus: but if the French attacked, he was to take the line of the Coa, and to blow up Almeida if the movements went to isolate that fortress. On the morning of the 6th, Marmont having introduced his convoy, marched out of Rodrigo in two columns, one moving upon Gallegos, the other upon Espeja. The light division fell back before the latter, and Slade's cavalry before the former; but in this retrograde movement, the latter gave its flank obliquely to the line of the enemy's advance which soon closed upon and cannonaded it with eight pieces of artillery. Unfortunately, the British rear-guard got jammed in between the French and a piece of marshy ground, and in this situation the whole must have been destroyed, if Captain Purvis, with a squadron of the 4th dragoons, had not charged the enemy while the other troopers with strong horses and a knowledge of the firmest parts, got through the marsh. Purvis then passed also, and the French horses could not follow. Thus the retreat was effected with a loss of only 20 men. After the action an officer calling himself Montbrun's aide-de-camp deserted to the allies.

General Spencer, more distinguished for great personal intrepidity than for quickness of military conception, was now undecided as to his measures; and the army was by no means in a safe situation for the country was covered with baggage, the movements of the divisions were wide and without concert, and General Pack who had the charge of Almeida too hastily blew it up. In this uncertainty the Adjutant-general, Pakenham, pointed out that the French did not advance as if to give battle, that their numbers were evidently small, their movements more ostentatious than vigorous, and probably intended to cover a flank movement by the passes leading to the Tagus; he therefore urged Spencer either to take up a position of battle which would make the enemy discover his real numbers and intentions, or retire at once behind the Coa with a view to march to Lord Wellington's assistance. These arguments were supported by Colonel Waters, who having closely watched the infantry coming out of Ciudad Rodrigo, observed that they were too clean and well dressed to have come off a long march, and must therefore be a part of the garrison. He had also ascertained that a large body was actually in movement towards the passes.

Spencer yielding to these representations marched in the evening by Alfayates to Soito, and the next day behind the Coa. Here certain intelligence, that Marmont

was in the passes, reached him, and he continued his march to the Alemtejo by Penamacor, but detached one division and his cavalry to Coria as flankers, while he passed with the main body by Castello Branco, Vilha Velha, Niza, and Portalegre. The season was burning and the marches long, yet so hardened by constant service were the light division, and so well organized by General Crawford, that although covering from 18 to 28 miles daily, they did not leave a single straggler behind. The flanking troops, who had been rather unnecessarily exposed at Coria, then followed, and Marmont, having imposed upon Spencer and Pack by his demonstration in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, filed off by the pass of Perales, while Reynier moved by the passes of Bejar and Baños, and the whole were by forced marches soon united at the bridge of Almaraz. Here a pontoon bridge expected from Madrid had not arrived, and the passage of the Tagus was made with only one ferry-boat, which caused a delay of four days, which would have proved fatal to Badajos if the battering guns employed in that siege had been really effective.

When the river was crossed, the French army marched in two columns with the greatest rapidity upon Merida and Medellin, where they arrived the 18th, and opened their communications with Soult.

On the other side, Lord Wellington had been attentively watching these movements; he had never intended to press Badajos beyond the 10th, because he knew that when reinforced with Drouet's division, Soult alone would be strong enough to raise the siege, and hence the hurried assaults; but he was resolved to fight Soult, and although he raised the siege on the 10th, yet by a deciphered intercepted letter that Phillipon's provisions would be exhausted on the 20th, he continued the blockade of the place in hopes that some such accident of war as the delay at Almaraz might impede Marmont. It may be here asked, why, as he knew a few days would suffice to reduce Badajos, he did not retrench his whole army and persist in the siege? The answer is that Elvas being out of repair, and exhausted both of provisions and ammunition by the siege of Badajos, the enemy would immediately have taken that fortress.

When Soult's advanced guard had reached Los Santos, the covering army, consisting of the second and fourth divisions and Blake's Spaniards, was concentrated at Albuera; Hamilton's Portuguese were also directed there from Badajos; meanwhile the third and seventh divisions maintained the blockade, and Wellington expecting a battle repaired in person to Albuera, but, unlike Beresford, he had that position entrenched, and did not forget to occupy the hill on the right.

On the 14th, it was known that Marmont was at Truxillo, and that in four days he could unite with Soult, wherefore the blockade was also raised with a view to repass the Guadiana, yet Wellington still lingered at Albuera hoping to fall on Soult separately, but the cautious manner in which the latter moved, continually refusing his left and edging with his right, towards Almendralejos, soon extinguished this chance; on the 17th, the blockade having been raised the day before, the allies repassed the Guadiana in two columns. The British and Portuguese moved by the pontoon bridge near Badajos, the Spaniards crossed at Jerumenha; this movement, not an easy one, was executed without any loss of men or stores, and without accident, save that General William Stewart by some error, took the same line as Blake, and at night fell in with the Spaniards, who thought his division French and were like to have fired.

The 19th, the united French armies entered Badajos, which was thus succoured after two most honourable defences, and at a moment when Phillipon, despairing of aid and without provisions, was preparing his means of breaking out and escaping.

The 21st, Godinot's division, which had marched by Valverde, took possession of Olivenza; the 22nd, he pushed a detachment under the guns of Jerumenha, and the same day the whole of the French cavalry crossed the Guadiana in two columns, advancing towards Villa Viciosa and Elvas on one side, and Campo Mayor on the other.

Lord Wellington, being now joined by the head of Spencer's corps, had placed

his army on both sides of the Caya, with cavalry posts towards the mouth of that river and on the Guadiana in front of Elvas. His right wing was extended behind the Caya to the lower bridge on that river, and his left wing had a field of battle on some high ground resting on the Gebora, a little beyond Campo Mayo, which fortress was occupied, and the open space between it and the high ground strongly entrenched. On this side also, cavalry were posted in observation beyond the Gebora and about Albuquerque, the whole position forming an irregular arch embracing the bridge of Badajos. The wood and town of Aronches were behind the centre of the position, and the little fortified place of Ouguella was behind the left; but the right wing was much more numerous than the left, and the Monte Reguingo, a wooded ridge between Campo Mayor and the Caya, was occupied by the light division, whose position could not be recognized by the enemy.

If the French attacked the left of the allies, a short movement would have sufficed to bring the bulk of the troops into action on the menaced point, because the whole extent of country occupied did not exceed 10 or 12 miles: the communications also were good, and from Campo Mayor open plains, reaching to Badajos, exposed the French movements which could be distinguished both from Elvas, from Campo Mayor, and from the many *atalayas* or watch-towers on that frontier.

The chief merit of this position was the difficulty of recognizing it from the enemy's side, and to protect the rear, the first division was retained at Portalegre: from thence it could intercept the enemy at *Marvão* or *Castello de Vide* if he should attempt to turn the allies by Albuquerque; and was ready to oppose Soult if he should move between Elvas and Estremos; but the march from Portalegre was too long to hope for the assistance of this division in a battle near Elvas or Campo Mayor.

The French cavalry, as I have said, passed the Guadiana on the 21st, both by the bridge of Badajos and by two fords, where the road of Olivenza crosses that river, below the confluence of the Caya. The right column, after driving back the outposts of the allies, was opposed by the heavy dragoons, and by Madden's Portuguese, and retired without seeing the position on the Campo Mayor side; but the horsemen of the left column, while patrolling towards Villa Viciosa and Elvas, cut off a squadron of the 11th dragoons, and the 2nd German hussars, which were on the Guadiana, escaped to Elvas with difficulty and loss. The cause of this misfortune, in which nearly 150 men were killed or taken, is not very clear, for the French aver that Colonel Lallemand by a feigned retreat drew the cavalry into an ambuscade, and the rumours in the English camp were various and discordant.

After this action the French troops were quartered along the Guadiana above and below Badajos from Xeres de los Cavalheiros to Montijo, and proceeded to collect provisions for themselves and for the fortress; hence, with the exception of a vain attempt on the 26th to cut off the cavalry detachments on the side of Albuquerque, no farther operations took place.

All things had seemed to tend to a great and decisive battle, and, although the crisis glided away without any even of importance, this was one of the most critical periods of the war.* For Marmont brought down, including a detachment of the army of the centre, 31,000 infantry, 4500 cavalry, and 54 guns; Soult about 25,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 36 guns; to effect this, Andalusia and Castile had been nearly stripped of troops. Bessieres had abandoned the Asturias, Bonnet united with General Mayer, who had succeeded Serras in Leon, was scarcely able, as we have seen, to keep the Gallicians in check on the Orbijo, the chief armies of the Peninsula were in presence, a great battle seemed to be the interest of the French, and it was in their option to fight or not. Their success at Badajos, and the surprise of the cavalry on the Caya, had made ample amends for their losses at Los Santos and Usagre, and now, when Badajos was succoured, and the allied army in a manner driven into Portugal, Albuera seemed to be a victory. The general result of the Estremadura campaign had been favourable to them, and the

political state of their affairs seemed to require some dazzling action to impose upon the Peninsulars. Their army was powerful, and as they were especially strong in cavalry, and on favourable ground for that arm, there could scarcely be a better opportunity for a blow, which would, if successful, have revenged Massena's disasters, and sent Lord Wellington back to Lisbon, perhaps from the Peninsula altogether; if unsuccessful not involving any very serious consequences, because from their strength of horse and artillery, and nearness to Badajos, a fatal defeat was not to be expected. But the allied army was thought to be stronger by the whole amount of the Spanish troops than it really was; the position, very difficult to be examined, was confidently held by Lord Wellington, and no battle took place.

Napoleon's estimation of the weight of moral over physical force in war was here finely exemplified. Both the French armies were conscious of recent defeats; Busaco, Sabugal, Fuentes, and the horrid field of Albuera, were fresh in their memory; the fierce blood there spilled, still reeked in their nostrils; and if Cæsar after a partial check at Dyrracchiaum held it unsafe to fight a pitched battle with recently defeated soldiers, however experienced or brave, Soult may well be excused, seeing that he knew there were divisions on the Caya as good in all points and more experienced than those he had fought with on the banks of the Albuera. The stern nature of the British soldier had been often before proved by him, and he could now draw no hope from the unskilfulness of the general. Lord Wellington's resolution to accept battle on the banks of the Caya, was, nevertheless, one of as unmixed greatness as the crisis was one of unmixed danger to the cause he supported. For the Portuguese government, following up the system which I have already described, had reduced their troops to the lowest degree of misery, and the fortresses were, at times, only not abandoned to the enemy. The British government had taken the native troops into pay, but it had not undertaken to feed them; yet such was the suffering of those brave men, that Wellington, after repeatedly refusing to assist them from the English stores, unable longer to endure the sight of their misfortunes, and to prevent them from disbanding, at last fed the six brigades, or three-fourths of the whole army, the English commissariat charging the expense to the subsidy. He hoped that the government would then supply the remnant, but they starved it likewise, and during the siege of Badajos these troops were of necessity thrown for subsistence upon the magazines of Elvas, which were thus exhausted; and what with desertion, famine, and sickness, that flourishing army which had mustered more than 40,000 good soldiers in line, at the time of Massena's invasion, could now scarcely produce 14,000 for a battle on which the fate of their country depended. The British troops, although large reinforcements had come out, and more were arriving, had so many sick and wounded, that scarcely 28,000 sabres and bayonets were in the field. The enemy had therefore a superiority, of one-fourth in artillery and infantry, and the strength of his cavalry was double that of the British.

To accept battle in such circumstances, military considerations only being had in view, would have been rash in the extreme, but the Portuguese government besides throwing the subsistence of the troops upon Elvas, had utterly neglected that place, and Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella, Aronches and Santa Olaya, which were the fortresses covering this frontier; neither had they drawn forth any means of transport from the country. The siege of Badajos had been entirely furnished from Elvas; but all the carts and animals of burthen that could be found in the vicinity, or as far as the British detachments could go, and all the commissariat means to boot, were scarcely sufficient to convey the ammunition, the stores, and the subsistence of the native troops, day by day, from Elvas to the camp; there was consequently no possibility of replacing these things from the British magazines at Abrantes and Lisbon.

When the allies crossed the Guadiana in retreat, Elvas had only 10,000 rounds of shot left, and not a fortnight's provisions in-store, even for her own garrison; her works were mouldering in many places, from want of care, houses and enclosures encumbered her glacis, most of her guns were rendered unserviceable by the fire

at Badajos, the remainder were very bad, and her garrison was composed of untried soldiers and militia. Jerumenha was not better looked to ; Olaya, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella had nothing but their walls. It would appear then, that if Soult had been aware of this state of affairs, he might, under cover of the Guadiana, have collected his army below the confluence of the Caya, and then by means of the pontoon train from Badajos, and by the fords at which his cavalry did pass, have crossed the Guadiana, overpowered the right of the allies, and suddenly investing Elvas, have covered his army with lines, which would have ensured the fall of that place ; unless the English general, anticipating such an attempt, had, with very inferior numbers, defeated him between the Caya and Elvas. But this, in a perfectly open country, offering no advantages to the weaker army, would not have been easy. Soult also, by marching on the side of Estremos, could have turned the right, and menaced the communications of the allies with Abrantes, which would have obliged him to retreat and abandon Elvas or fight to disadvantage. The position on the Caya was therefore taken up solely with reference to the state of political affairs. It was intended to impose upon the enemy, and it did so ; Elvas and Jerumenha must otherwise have fallen.

While a front of battle was thus presented, the rear was cleared of all the hospitals and heavy baggage ; workmen were day and night employed to restore the fortifications of the strong places, and guns, ammunition and provisions were brought up from Abrantes, by means of the animals and carts before employed in the siege of Badajos. Until all this was effected Portugal was on the brink of perdition, but the true Peninsular character was now displayed, and in a manner that proclaims most forcibly the difficulties overcome by the English general, difficulties which have been little appreciated in his own country. The danger of Elvas had aroused all the bustle of the Portuguese government, and the regency were at first frightened at the consequences of their own conduct ; but when they found their own tardy efforts were forestalled by the diligence of Lord Wellington, they with prodigious effrontery asserted, that he had exhausted Elvas for the supply of the British troops, and that they had replenished it !

His imperturbable firmness at this crisis was wonderful, and the more admirable, because Mr. Perceval's policy, prevailing in the cabinet, had left him without a halfpenny in the military chest, and almost without a hope of support in his own country : yet his daring was not a wild cast of the net for fortune ; it was supported by great circumspection, and a penetration and activity that let no advantages escape. He had thrown a wide glance over the Peninsula, knew his true situation, had pointed out to the Spaniards how to push their war to advantage, while the French were thus concentrated in Estremadura, and at this period had a right to expect assistance from them ; for Soult and Marmont were united at Badajos, the army of the north and the army of the centre were paralyzed by the flight of the king, and this was the moment when Figueras having been surprised by Rovira, and Tarragona besieged by Suchet, the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon were entirely occupied with those places. Thus, nearly the whole of the Peninsula was open to the enterprises of the Spaniards. They could have collected, of Murcians and Valencians only, above 40,000 regulars, besides Partizans, with which they might have marched against Madrid, while the Gallicians operated in Castile, and the Asturian army supported the enterprises of the northern Partidas.

This favourable occasion was not seized. Julian Sanchez, indeed, cut off a convoy, menaced Salamanca, and blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo ; Santocildes came down to Astorga, and as I have before observed,* Mina and the northern chiefs harassed the French communications ; some stir also was made by the guerillas near Madrid, and Suchet was harassed, but the commotion soon subsided ; and a detachment from Madrid having surprised a congregation of Partidas at Peneranda, killed many and recovered a large convoy which they had taken ; and in this complicated war, which being spread like a spider's web over the whole of the Peninsula,

* See Book xiii., chap. 2.

any drag upon one part would have made the whole quiver to the most distant extremities, the regular armies effected nothing. Nor did any general insurrection of the people take place in the rear of the French, who retained all their fortified posts, while their civil administrations continued to rule in the great towns as tranquilly as if there was no war!

Lord Wellington's principal measure for dissipating the storm in his front had rested upon Blake. That general had wished him to fight beyond the Guadiana, and was not well pleased at being refused; wherefore the English general, instead of taking 10,000 or 12,000 Spaniards, and an uneasy colleague, into the line of battle at Campo Mayor, where he knew by experience that they would quarrel with the Portuguese, and by their slowness, insubordination, and folly, would rather weaken than strengthen himself, delivered to Blake the pontoons used at Badajos, and concerted with him a movement down the right bank of the Guadiana. He was to recross that river at Mertola, and to fall upon Seville, which was but slightly guarded by a mixed force of French and Spaniards in Joseph's service; and this blow, apparently easy of execution, would have destroyed all the arsenals and magazines which supported the blockade of Cadiz. Lord Wellington had therefore good reason to expect the raising of that siege, as well as the dispersion of the French army in its front. He likewise urged the regency at Cadiz to push forward General Beguines from San Roque, against Seville, while the insurgents in the Ronda pressed the few troops left in Grenada, on one side, and Freire, with the Murcian army, pressed them on the other.

Blake marched the 18th, recrossed the river at Mertola the 22nd, remained inactive at Castillegos until the 30th, and sent his heavy artillery to Ayamonte by water; then, instead of moving direct with his whole force upon Seville, he detached only a small body, and with a kind of infatuation wasted two successive days in assaulting the castle of Niebla; a contemptible work garrisoned by 300 Swiss, who had in the early part of the war abandoned the Spanish service. Being without artillery he could not succeed, and meanwhile Soult, hearing of his march, ordered Olivenza to be blown up, and taking some cavalry, and Godinot's division which formed the left of his army, passed the Morena by Santa Ollalla and moved rapidly upon Seville. From Monasterio he sent a detachment to relieve the castle of Niebla; and at the same time, General Conroux, whose division was at Xeres de los Cavalheiro, crossed the mountain by the Aracena road, and endeavoured to cut off Blake from Ayamonte.

Thus far, notwithstanding the failure at Niebla, the English general's project was crowned with success. The great army in his front was broken up, Soult was gone, Marmont was preparing to retire, and Portugal was safe. Blake's cavalry under Penne Villemur, and some infantry under Ballasteros, had also, during the attack on Niebla, appeared in front of Seville on the right of the Guadalquivir, and a slight insurrection took place at Carmona on the left bank. The Serranos, always in arms, were assisted by Beguines with 3000 men, and blockaded the town of Ronda, and Freire advancing with his Murcians beyond Lorca, menaced General Laval, who had succeeded Sebastiani in command of the 4th corps. In this crisis, General Daricau, unable to keep the field, shut himself up in a great convent, which Soult had, in anticipation of such a crisis, fortified in the Triana suburb, before his first invasion of Estremadura. But the Spanish troops of Joseph showed no disposition to quit him, the people of Seville remained tranquil, and Blake's incapacity ruined the whole combination.

Soult approached on the 6th of July, Ballasteros and Villemur immediately retired, and the insurrection at Carmona ceased. Blake, hearing of Conroux's march, precipitately fled from Niebla, and only escaped into Portugal by the assistance of a bridge laid for him at San Lucar de Guadiana by Colonel Austin. He then resolved to embark some of his forces and sail to attack San Lucar de Barameda; but scarcely had a few men got on board, when the French advanced guard appeared, and he again fled in disorder to Ayamonte, and got into the island of Canelas, where fortunately a Spanish frigate and 300 transports had un-

expectedly arrived. While Ballasteros, with the cavalry and 3000 infantry, protected the embarkation, by taking a position on the Rio Piedra, Blake got on board with great confusion, and sailed to Cadiz, for the French had reinforced San Lucar de Barameda, and entered Ayamonte. The Portuguese militia, of the Algarves, were then called out; and Ballasteros, after losing some men on the Piedra, took post in the mountains of Aroches on his left, until the French retired, when he came back with his infantry and entrenched himself in Canelas. On this island he remained until August, and then embarked under the protection of the Portuguese militia at Villa Real, while his cavalry marched up the Guadiana to rejoin Castafios, who with a few troops still remained in Estremadura. A small battalion left in the castle of Paymago was soon after unsuccessfully attacked by the French, and this finished the long Partizan warfare of the Condado de Niebla.

There was now nothing to prevent the French from again pressing the allies on the Caya, except the timid operations of Freire on the side of Grenada, and these Soult was in march to repress. With indefatigable activity he had recalled the troops of the 4th corps from Estremadura to supply the place of the detachments which he had already sent from Seville, Cadiz, Grenada, and Malaga, to quell the insurrection in the Ronda; and while he thus prepared the means of attacking Freire, Beguines was driven back to San Roque, and the Serranos, as I have before observed, disgusted with the Spanish general's ill conduct, were upon the point of capitulating with the French. During these events in the Ronda, Godinot returned from the pursuit of Blake to Jaen, whence, on the 7th of August, he was directed to march against Pozalçon and Baza, where the Murcian army was posted. Meanwhile, Blake, re-landing his troops at Almeria, joined Freire; his intention was to have commenced active operations against Grenada, but thinking it necessary to go first to Valencia where Palacio was making mischief, he left the army, which was above 27,000 strong, under Freire, and before he could return, it was utterly dispersed.

ROUT OF BAZA.

General Quadra, who commanded the right wing of the Murcians, was at Pozalçon, and, it is said, had orders to rejoin Freire, but disobeyed. The centre and left, under Freire himself, were at Venta de Bahul in front of Baza. The 8th, Soult, at the head of a mixed force of French and Spanish troops in Joseph's service, drove back the advanced guards from Guadix. The 9th, he appeared in front of Bahul, where he discerned the Spanish army on strong ground, their front being covered by a deep ravine. As his object was to cut off the retreat upon Lorca and the city of Murcia, he only showed a few troops at first, and skirmished slightly, to draw Freire's attention, while Godinot attacked his right at Pozalçon and got in his rear. Godinot wasted time. His advanced guard alone had defeated Quadra with great loss, but instead of entering Baza, he halted for the night near it; and during the darkness the Spaniards, who had no other line of retreat, and were now falling back in confusion before Soult, passed through that place, and made for Lorca and Caravaha. Soult's cavalry, however, soon cut this line, and the fugitives took to the by-roads, followed and severely harassed by the French horse.

At this time the whole province was in a defenceless state, but the people generally took arms to protect the city of Murcia. That place was entrenched, and the French marshal, whose troops were few, and fatigued by constant marching, not thinking fit to persevere, especially as the yellow fever was raging at Carthage, returned to Grenada, whence he sent detachments to disperse some insurgents who had gathered under the Conde de Montijo in the Alpuxaras. Thus Grenada was entirely quieted.

Here it is impossible to refrain from admiring Soult's vigour and ability. We see him in the latter end of 1810, with a small force and in the depth of winter, taking Olivenza, Badajoz, Albuquerque, Valencia d'Alcantara, and Campo Mayor; defeating a great army, and capturing above 20,000 men. Again, when un-

expectedly assailed by Beresford in the north, by the Murcians in the east, by Ballasteros in the west, and by Lapeña and Graham in the south, he found means to repel three of them, to persevere in the blockade of Cadiz, and to keep Seville tranquil, while he marched against the fourth. At Albuera he lost one of the fiercest battles upon human record, and that at a moment when the king by abandoning his throne had doubled every embarrassment; nevertheless, holding fast to Estremadura, he still maintained the struggle, and again taking the offensive, obliged the allies to repass the Guadiana. If he did not then push his fortune to the utmost, it must be considered that his command was divided, that his troops were still impressed with the recollection of Albuera, and that the genius of his adversary had worked out new troubles for him in Andalusia. With how much resolution and activity he repressed those troubles I have just shown; but, above all things, he is to be commended for the prudent vigour of his administration, which, in despite of the opposition of Joseph's Spanish counsellors, had impressed the Andalusians with such a notion of his power and resources, that no revolt of any real consequence took place, and none of his civic guards or "Escopeteros" failed him in the hour of need.

Let any man observe the wide extent of country he had to maintain; the frontiers fringed as it were with hostile armies, the interior suffering under war requisitions, the people secretly hating the French, a constant insurrection in the Ronda, and a national government and a powerful army in the Isla de Leon; innumerable English and Spanish agents prodigal of money and of arms continually instigating the people of Andalusia to revolt; the coast covered with hostile vessels, Gibraltar sheltering beaten armies on one side, Cadiz on another, Portugal on a third, Murcia on a fourth; the communication with France difficult, two battles lost, few reinforcements, and all the material means to be created in the country. Let any man, I say, consider this, and he will be convinced that it was no common genius that could remain unshaken amidst such difficulties; yet Soult not only sustained himself, but contemplated the most gigantic offensive enterprises, and was at all times an adversary to be dreaded. What though his skill in actual combat was not so remarkable as in some of his contemporaries; who can deny him firmness, activity, vigour, foresight, grand perception, and admirable arrangement? It is this combination of high qualities that forms a great captain.

CHAPTER VII.

WHILE Soult was clearing the eastern frontier of Andalusia, Marmont retired gradually from Badajos and quartered his troops in the valley of the Tagus, with the exception of one division, which he left at Truxillo. At the same time the 5th corps retired to Zafra, and thus Lord Wellington found himself relieved from the presence of the French at the very moment when he had most reason to fear their efforts. He had by this time secured the fortresses on the frontier, his troops were beginning to suffer from the terrible pestilence of the Guadiana; this was sufficient to prevent him from renewing the siege of Badajos, if Marmont's position had not forbid that measure, he therefore resolved to adopt a new system of operations. But to judge of the motives which influenced his conduct, we must again cast a hasty glance over the general state of the Peninsula, which was hourly changing.

In Catalonia, Suchet had stormed Tarragona, seized Montserrat, and dispersed the Catalan army. A division of the army of the centre had chased the Partidas from Guadalaxara and Cuença, and re-established the communications with Aragon. Valencia and Murcia were in fear and confusion, both from internal intrigue and from the double disasters on each side of their frontier at Baza and Tarragona.

The French emperor was pouring reinforcements into Spain by the northern line; these troops as usual scoured the country to put down the guerillas on each side of their march, and nearly 40,000 fresh men, mostly old soldiers from the army of the reserve, were come, or coming, into the north of Spain. The young guard

which was at Burgos, under General Dorsenne, was increased to 17,000 men; and as no efforts, except those already noticed, were made by the Spaniards to shake the French hold of the country while Soult and Marmont were on the Guadiana, the French generals were enabled to plan extensive measures of further conquest: and the more readily, because the king was now on his return from Paris in apparent harmony with his brother, and the powers and duties of all parties were defined.

Suchet, urged by Napoleon to hasten his preparations for the invasion of Valencia, was resolved to be under the walls of that city in the middle of September, and Soult was secretly planning a gigantic enterprise, calculated to change the whole aspect of the war. In the north when the king, who re-entered Madrid the 14th, had passed Valladolid, the imperial guards entered Leon; 13,000 men of the army of the north were concentrated at Benevente on the 17th, and Santocildes retired into the mountains. Bessieres then sent a large convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, but following the treaty between Joseph and Napoleon, returned himself to France, and General Dorsenne, taking the command of the army of the north, prepared to invade Galicia.*

Meanwhile Marmont was directed to resign the whole of Castile and Leon to the protection of the army of the north, and to withdraw all his posts and depôts, with the exception of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was to be changed at a more convenient time. His line of communication was to be with Madrid, and that city was to be his chief depôt and base; he was to take positions in the valley of the Tagus and at Truxillo; to fortify either Alcantara or Almaraz, and to secure the communication across the river.

Thus posted, the emperor judged that Marmont could more effectually arrest the progress of the allies than in any other. The invasion of Andalusia, for the purpose of raising the siege of Cadiz, was, he said, the only object the allies had at the moment, but it could always be frustrated by Marmont's moving against their flank; and with respect to the north, the allies having no object on that side, would be unlikely to make any serious attempt, because they must in time be over-matched, as the French fell back upon their resources. Marmont could also act against their right flank, as he could do against their left flank, if they marched upon Andalusia; and while stationary he protected Madrid, and gave power and activity to the king's administration.

In pursuance of these instructions, Marmont, who had remained in Estremadura, to cover Soult's operations against Blake and the Murcians, now proceeded to occupy Talavera, and other posts in the valley of the Tagus; and he placed a division at Truxillo, the castle of which place, as well as that of Medellin, was repaired. Another division occupied Placencia, with posts in the passes of Bejar and Baños; Girard's division of the 5th corps remained at Zafra to serve as a point of connection between Marmont and Soult, and to support Badajos, which, by a wise provision of Napoleon's, was now garrisoned with detachments from the three armies, of the centre, of Portugal, and of the south. This gave each general a direct interest in moving to its succour, and in the same policy Ciudad Rodrigo was to be wholly garrisoned by the army of the north, that Marmont might have no temptation to neglect the army of the south, under pretence of succouring Ciudad.

To restore and maintain Alcantara was beyond the means of the Duke of Ragusa; he therefore repaired the bridge of Almaraz, and constructed two strong forts, one at each side, to protect it, and to serve as an intermediate field depôt; a third and more considerable fort was also built on the high ridge of Mirabete, to insure a passage over the hills from Almaraz to Truxillo. A free intercourse with the army of the south was thus secured on one side, and on the other, the passes of Baños and Bejar, and the Roman road of Puerto Pico, which had been restored in 1810, served for communication with the army of the north.

The French affairs had now assumed a very favourable aspect. There was indeed a want of money, but the generals were obeyed with scrupulous attention by the people of Spain, not only within the districts occupied by them, but even in those villages where the guerillas were posted. This obedience Lord Wellington attributed entirely to fear, and hoped as the exactions were heavy, that the people would at last fight or fly from their habitations on the approach of a French soldier; but this did not happen generally, and to me it appears that the obedience was rather a symptom of the subjection of the nation, and that with a judicious mixture of mildness and severity perfect submission would have followed if England had not kept the war alive.

On the other hand the weakness and anarchy of the Spaniards were daily increasing, and the disputes, between the British general and the Portuguese government, had arrived to such a height that Lord Wellington, having drawn up powerful and clear statements of his grievous situation, sent one to the Brazils, and the other to his own government, with a positive intimation that if an entirely new system was not immediately adopted, he would no longer attempt to carry on the contest. Lord Wellesley, taking his stand upon this ground, made strenuous exertions in both countries to prevent the ruin of the cause; but Lord Wellington, while expecting the benefit of his brother's interference, had to contend with the most surprising difficulties, and to seek in his own personal resources for the means of even defending Portugal. He had sent Marshal Beresford to Lisbon, immediately after Albuera, to superintend the reorganization and restoration of the Portuguese forces, and Beresford had sent Mr. de Lemos, an officer of his own staff, to the Brazils, to represent the inconveniences arising from the interference of the regency in the military affairs. On the other hand the Souzas sent one Vasconcellos, who had been about the British head-quarters as their spy, to Rio Janeiro, and thus the political intrigues became more complicated than ever.

But with respect to the war Wellington had penetrated Napoleon's object, when he saw Marmont's position in the valley of the Tagus; he felt the full force of the emperor's military reasoning, yet he did not despair, if he could overcome the political obstacles, to gain some advantage. He had now a powerful and experienced British force under his command, the different departments and the staff of the army were every day becoming more skilful and ready, and he had also seen enough of his adversaries to estimate their powers. The king he knew to be no general, and discontented with the marshals; Soult he had found able and vast in his plans, but too cautious in their execution; Marmont, with considerable vigour, had already shown some rashness in the manner he had pushed Reynier's division forward, after passing the Tagus, and it was, therefore, easy to conceive that no very strict concert would be maintained in their combined operations.

Lord Wellington had also established some good channels of information. He had a number of spies amongst the Spaniards who were living within the French lines; a British officer in disguise constantly visited the French armies in the field; a Spanish state-counsellor, living at the head-quarters of the 1st corps, gave intelligence from that side, and a guitar-player of celebrity, named Fuentes, repeatedly making his way to Madrid, brought advice from thence. Mr. Stuart, under cover of vessels licensed to fetch corn for France, kept *chasse mardées* constantly plying along the Biscay coast, by which he not only acquired direct information, but facilitated the transmission of intelligence from the land spies, amongst whom the most remarkable was a cobbler, living in a little hutch at the end of the bridge of Irun. This man, while plying his trade, continued for years, without being suspected, to count every French soldier that passed in or out of Spain by that passage, and transmitted their numbers by the *chasse mardées* to Lisbon.

With the exception of the state spy at Victor's head-quarters, who being a double traitor was infamous, all the persons thus employed were very meritorious. The greater number, and the cleverest also, were Spanish gentlemen, *alcaldes*, or poor men, who, disdaining rewards and disregarding danger, acted from a pure spirit of patriotism, and are to be lauded alike for their boldness, their talent, and

their virtue. Many are dead. Fuentes was drowned in passing a river, on one of his expeditions; and the alcalde of Caceres, a man of the clearest courage and patriotism, who expended his own property in the cause, and spurned at remuneration, was on Ferdinand's restoration cast into a dungeon, where he perished; a victim to the unbounded ingratitude and baseness of the monarch he had served so well!

With such means Lord Wellington did not despair of baffling the deep policy of the emperor in the field. He thought that the saying of Henry IV. of France, that "large armies would starve, and small ones be beaten in Spain," was still applicable. He felt that a solid possession of Portugal and her resources, which, through his brother's aid, he hoped to have, would enable him either to strike partial blows against the French, or oblige them to concentrate in large masses, which, confident in his own martial genius he felt he could hold in check, while the Spaniards ruined the small posts, and disorganized the civil administrations in their rear. Hitherto, indeed, the Spaniards had not made any such efforts except by the *Partidas*, which were insufficient; but time, his own remonstrances, and the palpable advantages of the system, he trusted would yet teach them what to do.

Having deeply meditated upon these matters and received his reinforcements from England, he resolved to leave Hill with 10,000 infantry, a division of cavalry, and four brigades of artillery, about Portalegre, Villa Viciosa, and Estremos. From these rich towns, which were beyond the influence of the Guadiana fever, the troops could rapidly concentrate either for an advance or retreat; and the latter was secured upon Abrantes, or upon the communications with Beira, by Niza, and Vilha Velha, where a permanent boat-bridge had now been established. The front was protected by Elvas, Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella; and Castaños also remained in Estremadura with the fifth army, which by the return of the cavalry from Ayamonte and the formation of Downie's legion now amounted to about 1000 infantry and 900 horse. This force, placed on the side of Montijo, had Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara as posts of support, and a retreat either by the fords of the Tagus near the bridge of Alcantara, or upon Portugal by Marvão and Castello de Vide. Hill's position was thus so well covered, that he could not be surprised, nor even pressed except by a very strong army; and he was always on the watch, as we shall hereafter find, to make incursions against the division of the 5th corps, which remained in Estremadura. The rest of the army was then placed in quarters of refreshment at Castello de Vide, Marvão, and other places near the Tagus, partly to avoid the Guadiana fever, partly to meet Marmont's movement to that river.

When this disposition was made, the English general arranged his other measures of offence. The conduct of the Portuguese government and the new positions of the French armies had, as Napoleon had foreseen, left him no means of undertaking any sustained operation; but, as he was ignorant of the great strength of the army of the north, he hoped to find an opportunity of taking Ciudad Rodrigo before Marmont could come to its assistance. For this purpose he had caused a fine train of iron battering guns, and mortars, together with a reinforcement of British artillerymen, which had arrived at Lisbon from England, to be shipped in large vessels, and then with some ostentation made them sail as it were for Cadiz; at sea they were, however, shifted on board small craft, and while the original vessels actually arrived at Cadiz and Gibraltar, the guns were secretly brought, first to Oporto, and then in boats to Lamego. During this process several engineer, artillery, and commissariat officers, were sent to meet and transport these guns, and the necessary stores for a siege, to Villaponte, near Celerico; and as one of the principal magazines of the army was at Lamego, and a constant intercourse was kept up between it and Celerico, another great depôt, the arrival, and passage of the guns and stores to their destination was not likely to attract the attention of the French spies.

Other combinations were also employed, both to deceive the enemy and to prepare the means for a sudden attack, before the troops commenced their march for

Beira ; but the hiding of such extensive preparations from the French would have been scarcely possible, if the personal hatred borne to the invaders by the Peninsulars, combined with the latter's peculiar subtlety of character, had not prevented any information spreading abroad, beyond the fact that artillery had arrived at Oporto. The operation of bringing 68 huge guns, with proportionate stores, across nearly 50 miles of mountain, was, however, one of no mean magnitude ; 5000 draft bullocks were required for the train alone, and above 1000 militia were for several weeks employed merely to repair the road.*

The allies broke up from the Caya the 21st of July, and they had received considerable reinforcements, especially in cavalry, but they were sickly, and required a change of cantonments ; hence when an intercepted despatch gave reason to believe that Ciudad Rodrigo was in want of provisions, Wellington suddenly crossed the Tagus at Vilha Velha, and marched in the beginning of August by Castello Branco and Penamacor towards Rodrigo, hoping to surprise it in a starving state, but giving out that his movement was for the sake of healthy quarters. His movement was unmolested save by some French dragoons, from the side of Placencia, who captured a convoy of 70 mules loaded with wine near Pedrogao, and getting drunk with their booty attacked some Portuguese infantry, who repulsed them and recovered the mules ; but there were other ostensible objects besides the obvious one of removing from the well-known pestilence of the Guadiana, which contributed to blind the French as to the secret motives of the English general. We have seen that Dorsenne was menacing Galicia, and that Soult was in full operation against the Murcians ; it was supposed that he intended to invade Murcia itself, and therefore the march of the allies had the double object, of saving Galicia, by menacing the rear of the invading army ; and of relieving Murcia by forcing Marmont to look after Ciudad Rodrigo, and thus draw him away from the support of Soult, who would not, it was supposed, then quit Andalusia.

Galicia was meanwhile in great danger, for the Partidas of the north had been vigorously repressed by Caffarelli and Reille, which enabled Dorsenne to collect about 20,000 men on the Esla. Abadia, who had succeeded Santocildes, was posted with about 7000 disciplined men behind this river, and he had a reserve of 1500 at Foncebadon ; but he could make no head, for to this number the Gallician army had again dwindled, and these were starving. The 25th, the French, having passed the river in four columns, made a concentric march upon Astorga. Abadia, whose rear-guard sustained a sharp conflict near La Baneza, retreated, precisely by the same line as Sir John Moore had done in 1809, and with about the same relative proportion of force ; but as he only took the Foncebadon road and did not use the same diligence and skill as that general, the enemy forestalling him by Manzanal and Bembibre, cut him off from Villa Franca del Bierzo and from the road to Lugo, and on the 27th drove him into the Val des Orres.† During this operation the division of the army of the north, which Bessieres had sent with the convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, entered that place and returned to Salamanca.

The Spanish general having thus lost his line of communication with Lugo, and a few stores he possessed at Villa Franca, took post at Domingo Flores in the Val des Orres, where he entered a strong country, and, under the worst circumstances, could retire upon Portugal and save his troops if not his province. But his army, which was in the utmost distress before, for shoes and clothing, was now ready to disband from misery, and the consternation in Galicia was excessive. That province, torn by faction, stood helpless before the invader, who could, and would, have taken both Coruña and Ferrol, but for the sudden arrival of the allies on the Coa, which obliged him, for his own safety, to return to the plains. Souham, also, who was coming from Burgos, by forced marches, to support Dorsenne, halted at Rio Seco, and Abadia did not fail to ascribe all this to the loss he had inflicted, but his vanity was laughed at.

To have thus saved Galicia was a great thing. That kingdom was the base of

* Appendix, No. 16, section 1.

† Ibid.

all the operations against the line of communication with France ; from thence went forth those British squadrons which nourished the guerilla warfare in Biscay, in the Montaña, in Navarre, in the Rioja, and the Asturias ; it was the chief resource for the supply of cattle to the allied army, it was the outwork of Portugal, and honestly and vigorously governed, would have been more important than Catalonia. But, like the rest of Spain, it was always weak from disorders, and, if the allies had remained in Alemtejo, there was nothing to prevent Dorsenne from conquering it ; for though he should not have taken Ferrol and Coruña, the points of St. Jago, Lugo, Villa Franca, and Orense would have given him an entire command of the interior, and the Spaniards holding the ports only would not have been able to dislodge him.

Lord Wellington arrived upon the Coa about the 8th of August, intending, as I have said, first, a close blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, and finally a siege ; it was, however, soon known that the French had on the 6th supplied the place for two months, and the first part of the design was therefore relinquished. The troops were then quartered near the sources of the Coa and Agueda, close to the line of communication between Marmont and Dorsenne, and in a country where there was still some corn. If the enemy advanced in superior numbers, the army could retire through a strong country to a position of battle near Sabugal, whence the communication with Hill was direct. Nor was the rest of Beira left unprotected, because the French would have exposed their left flank, by any advance in the direction of Almeida, and the allies could, by Guarda, send detachments to the valley of the Mondego in time to secure the magazines at Celerico. The line of supply from Lamego along which the battering-train was now moving, was, however, rather exposed.

While the army was in this position, the preparations for the siege went on briskly, until Wellington learned, contrary to his former belief, that the disposable force of the army of the north, was above 20,000 good troops ; and consequently, that Ciudad Rodrigo could not be attacked in face of that corps, and of Marmont's army. Then changing his plan, he resolved to blockade the place, and wait for some opportunity to strike a sudden blow, either against the fortress, or against the enemy's troops ; for it was the foundation of his hopes, that as the French could not long remain in masses, for want of provisions, and that he could check those masses on the frontier of Portugal, so he could always force them to concentrate, or suffer the loss of some important post. But it is worthy of observation, that his plans were based on calculations which did not comprise the Gallician army. He had no expectation that it would act at all, or if it did, that it would act effectually. It had no cavalry, and the infantry being undisciplined dared not enter the plains in face of the enemy's horsemen ; yet this was in August, 1811, and Galicia had not seen the face of an enemy since June, 1809.

Early in September, Marmont, pushing a detachment from Placencia through the passes, surprised a British cavalry piquet, at St. Martin de Trebejo, and opened his communications with Dorsenne. Nevertheless, Lord Wellington formed the blockade. His head-quarters were fixed at Guinaldo, the fifth division was placed at Perales, in observation of Marmont, and the first division, now commanded by General Graham, occupied Penamacor. A battery of artillery, was withdrawn from Hill, and three brigades of that general's corps, reinforced by a Portuguese regiment, passed the Tagus, and were placed on the Ponçul, in advance of Castello Branco, to protect the magazines on that line of communication. Meanwhile, the battering-train was collected at Villa de Ponte, the troops were employed to prepare gabions and fascines, and the engineers instructed 200 men of the line, in the duties of sappers. The bridge over the Coa at Almeida, which had been broken by Massena, was permanently repaired, and the works of Almeida itself, were ordered to be once more restored to form a place of arms for the battering-train and stores ; Carlos d'España came also to Leon to form a new army under the protection of the allies, but he was without officers, arms, money, or stores, and his force was a mere name.

CHAPTER VIII.

DURING the first arrangements for the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, the garrison made some excursions, to beat up the quarters of the British cavalry, and to forage the villages; and some lancers from Salamanca drove Julian Sanchez from Ledesma. Meanwhile in Estremadura, Morillo chased the enemy from Caceres, and advancing to Montanches, menaced Truxillo, but being beaten there by General Foy, he returned to Montijo, where some French cavalry, arriving from Zafra, again defeated him and drove him to Albuquerque. Other military operations, worth relating, there were none, but the civil transactions in Portugal were very important.

Mr. Stuart's exertions had produced some improvement in the Portuguese revenue; the ranks of the infantry were again filling by the return of deserters, and by fresh recruits, which, with the reinforcements from England, had raised the actual number of the allied army to upwards of 80,000 men, 56,000 of which were British; the number under arms did not, however, exceed 24,000 Portuguese and 33,000 British, of whom 5000 were cavalry, with about 90 pieces of artillery. The previous operations in Alemtejo had produced sickness, which was increasing, and 22,000 men were in hospital; and hence, Hill's corps being deducted, Lord Wellington could not bring to the blockade of Ciudad above 44,000 of all arms, including Sanchez's Partida.* But Marmont, alone, could in a few days bring as many to its succour, and Dorsenne always had from 20,000 to 25,000 men in hand; because the French reinforcements had relieved the old garrisons in the north and the latter had joined the army in the field.

At this time the British military chest was quite bankrupt; even the muleteers, upon whose fidelity and efficiency the war absolutely depended, were six months in arrears for wages; and the disputes with the Portuguese government were more acrimonious than ever. The regency had proposed a new system of military regulations, calculated to throw the burden of feeding the native troops entirely upon the British commissariat, without any reform of abuses, and Lord Wellington had rejected it, hence renewed violence; and as Beresford had fallen sick at Cintra, Mr. Stuart deprived of his support on military questions, and himself no longer a member of the regency, was unable to restrain the triumphant faction of the Souzas. The prince regent's return to Portugal was prevented by troubles in the Brazils, and the regency expecting a long hold of power, and foolishly imagining that the war was no longer doubtful, were, after the custom of all people who employ powerful auxiliaries, devising how to get rid of the British army. With this view they objected to or neglected every necessary measure, and made many absurd demands, such as that the British general should pay the expenses of the Portuguese post-office; and at the same time they preferred various vexatious and unfounded charges against British officers, while gross corruption and oppression of the poorer people marked the conduct of their own magistrates.

But the fate of Portugal, which to these people appeared fixed, was in the eyes of the English general more doubtful than ever. Intercepted letters gave reasons to believe that the emperor was coming to Spain. And this notion was confirmed by the assembling of an army of reserve in France, and by the formation of great magazines at Burgos, and other places, to supply which, and to obtain money, the French generals were exacting the fourth of the harvest, and selling the overplus of corn again even by retail. Minute reports of the state of these magazines were demanded by Napoleon; reinforcements, especially of the imperial guards, were pouring into Spain, and Wellington judging that the emperor must either drive the British from the Peninsula, or lower his tone with the world, thought that he would invade Portugal from the side of Rodrigo, the valley of the Tagus, and Alemtejo at the same time; and that he would risk his fleet in a combined attack upon Lisbon by sea and land.

Whether Napoleon really meant this, or whether he only spread the report with a view to restrain the allies from any offensive operations during the summer, and to mislead the English cabinet as to the real state of his negotiations with Russia, intending if the latter proved favourable to turn his whole force against the Peninsula, does not very clearly appear; yet it is certain that everything in Spain at this time indicated his approach. Lord Wellington's opinion that the emperor was bound to drive the British army away or lose his influence in the world does not, however, seem quite just; because the mighty expedition to Moscow proved that Napoleon did not want force to conquer Spain; and success in Russia would have enabled him to prolong the war in the Peninsula as a drain on the English resources for many years; which was so obvious a policy, that the rest of Europe could not from thence draw conclusions unfavourable to his influence.

Under the notion that Napoleon's coming was probable, the English general, with characteristic prudence, turned his own attention to the security of his ancient refuge within the lines, and therefore urgently desired the government to put the fortresses in order, repair the roads, and restore the bridges broken during Massena's invasion. An increased number of workmen were also put to the lines, for the engineers had never ceased to improve those on the northern bank of the Tagus, and on the southern bank the double lines of Almada had been continued on a gigantic scale. The defensive canal there was planned to float ships of 300 tons, and to serve as a passage from the Tagus to Setuval by joining the navigation of the Sadao and Marateca rivers; thus conducting to objects of general utility as well as the military defence; as it will be found that Lord Wellington did at all times sustain, not only the political, and financial, and military affairs, but also the agricultural, the commercial, and charitable interests of Portugal. The batteries at the mouth of the Tagus were likewise put into complete order, they were provided with furnaces for heating shot, and Captain Holloway, of the engineers, at a trifling expense, constructed four jetties at St. Julian's, in such an ingenious manner that they withstood the most tempestuous gales and secured the embarkation of the army in any season. Finally, the militia were again called out, a measure of greater import in the actual state of affairs than would at first appear: for the expense was a very heavy drain upon the finances, and the number of hands thus taken away from agriculture was a serious evil.

Had all these preparations been duly executed, Lord Wellington would not have feared even Napoleon; but all that depended upon the Portuguese government, if that can be called government which was but a faction, was, as usual, entirely neglected. The regency refused to publish any proclamation to display the danger, or to call upon the people to prepare for future efforts; and although the ancient laws of Portugal provided the most ample means for meeting such emergencies, the bridges over the Ceira, the Alva, and other rivers on the line of retreat were left unrepaid. The roads were, therefore, impassable, and as the rainy season was coming on, the safety of the army would have been seriously endangered if it had been obliged to retire before the emperor. The regency pleaded want of money, but this also could be traced to their own negligence in the collection of the taxes, for which there was no solid reason; because, with the exception of the devastated districts, the people were actually richer than they had ever been, not indeed in goods, but in hard cash, derived from the enormous sums expended by the British army. To add to these embarrassments the secret correspondents of the army on the side of Salamanca suddenly ceased their communications, and it was at first feared they had paid with their lives for the culpable indiscretion of the Portuguese government; for the latter had published, in the *Lisbon Gazette*, all the secret information sent to Silveira, which being copied into the English newspapers, drew the enemy's attention. Fortunately this alarm proved false, but a sense of the other difficulties was greatly aggravated to the English general, by comparison of his situation with that of the enemy; neither necessity nor remuneration could procure for him due assistance from the Portuguese people, while the French generals had merely to issue their orders to the Spaniards through the

prefects of the provinces, and all means of transport or other succour, possible to be obtained, were sure to be provided on the day and at the place indicated.

In the midst of these cares Lord Wellington was suddenly called into military action by the approach of the enemy. Ciudad Rodrigo having been blockaded for six weeks wanted food, and Marmont, who had received a reinforcement of 11,000 men from France, and had now 50,000 present under arms in the valley of the Tagus, being in pain for the garrison, had concerted with Dorsenne a great combined operation for its succour. In this view Truxillo had been occupied by a part of the 5th corps, and Girard with the remainder had advanced to Merida, while Foy, reinforced by a strong division of the army of the centre, occupied Placencia. Marmont himself, quitting Talavera, had passed the mountains and collected a large convoy at Bejar; at the same time Dorsenne, reinforced by 8000 men under Souham, had collected another convoy at Salamanca, and leaving Bonnet's division, which now included Mayer's troops, at Astorga, to watch the Galicians, came down to Tamames. They met on the 21st, their united armies presenting a mass of 60,000 men, of which 6000 were cavalry; and they had above 100 pieces of artillery.

The English general, who had expected this movement, immediately concentrated his scattered troops. He could not fight beyond the Agueda, but he did not think fit to retreat until he had seen their whole army, lest a detachment should relieve the place to his dishonour. Hence to make the enemy display his force, he established himself in the following positions near the fortress.

The third division, reinforced by three squadrons of German and British cavalry, formed his centre. It was posted on the heights of Elbodon and Pastores, on the left of the Agueda, and within three miles of Ciudad, commanding a complete prospect of the plains round that place.

The right wing, composed of the light division, some squadrons of cavalry, and six guns, was posted beyond the Agueda, and behind the Vadillo, a river rising in the Peña de Francia, and flowing in a rugged channel to the Agueda, which it joins about three miles above Rodrigo; from this line an enemy coming from the eastern passes of the hills could be discerned.

The left wing, composed of the sixth division and Anson's brigade of cavalry, the whole under General Graham, was placed at Espeja, on the lower Azava, with advanced posts at Carpion and Marialva. From thence to Ciudad Rodrigo was about eight miles over a plain, and on Graham's left, Julian Sanchez's Partida, nominally commanded by Carlos d'Espana, was spread along the lower Agueda in observation. The heads of the columns were therefore presented on three points to the fortress; namely, at the ford of the Valdillo, and the heights of Pastores and Espeja. The communication between the left and centre was kept up by two brigades of heavy cavalry, posted on the Upper Azava, and supported at Campillo by Pack's Portuguese brigade. But the left of the army was very distant from Guinaldo, which was the pivot of operations, and to obviate the danger of making a flank march in retreat, should the enemy advance, the seventh division was placed in reserve at Alamedillo, and the first division at Nava d'Aver. Thus the allied army was spread out on the different roads which led, like the sticks of a fan, to one point on the Coa.

The fifth division remained at St. Payo, watching the passes from Estremadura, lest Foy should from that direction fall on the rear of the right wing; and as Marmont's movement affected the line of communication along the eastern frontier, General Hill first sent Hamilton's Portuguese towards Albuquerque, to support the Spanish cavalry, which was menaced by the 5th corps, and then brought the remainder of his troops nearer to the Tagus, in readiness to take the place of his third brigade, which now marched from the Ponçul to Penamacor.

Wellington's position before Rodrigo was very extensive, and therefore very weak. The Agueda, although fordable in many places during fine weather, was liable to sudden freshes, and was on both sides lined with high ridges. The heights, occupied by the troops, on the left bank were about three miles wide, ending rather

abruptly above Pastores and Elbodon, and they were flanked by the great plains and woods which extend from Ciudad to the bed of the Coa. The position of Elbodon itself, which was held by the centre of the army, was, therefore, not tenable against an enemy commanding these plains ; and as the wings were distant their lines of retreat were liable to be cut, if the centre should be briskly pushed back beyond Guinaldo. But at the latter place three field redoubts had been constructed on the high land, with a view to impose upon the enemy, and so gain time to assemble and feel Marmont's disposition for a battle, because a retreat behind the Coa was to be avoided if possible.

On the 23rd, the French advanced from Tamames, and encamped behind the hills to the north-east of Ciudad Rodrigo. Then a strong detachment entered the plain, and having communicated with the garrison and examined the position of the light division on the Vadillo returned.

The 24th, 6000 cavalry, with four divisions of infantry, crossed the hills in two columns, and placing some troops in observation on the Vadillo, introduced the convoy. On this day the fourth division of the allies was brought up to the position of Guinaldo, and the redoubts were completed, yet no other change was made, for it was thought the French would not advance further. But the 25th, soon after daybreak, 14 squadrons of the imperial guards drove the outposts of the left wing from Carpio across the Azava, and the lancers of Berg crossed that river in pursuit ; they were, however, flanked by some infantry in a wood, and then charged and beaten by two squadrons of the 14th and 16th dragoons, who re-occupied the post at Carpio.

During this skirmish 14 battalions of infantry, 30 squadrons of cavalry, and 12 guns, the whole under Montbrun, passed the Agueda by the bridge of Rodrigo and the fords above it, and marched towards Guinaldo. The road soon divided, one branch turning the Elbodon heights on the right hand, the other leading nearer to the Agueda, and passing through the villages of Pastores, La Encina, and Elbodon ; and as the point of divarication was covered by a gentle ridge, it was for some time doubtful which branch the French would follow. In a short time this doubt was decided. Their cavalry poured along the right hand road leading directly to Guinaldo, the small advanced posts which the allied squadrons had on the plain were rapidly driven in, and the enemy's horsemen, without waiting for their infantry, commenced the

COMBAT OF ELBODON.

The position of the third division was completely turned by this movement, and the action began very disadvantageously, for the 74th and 60th regiments, being at Pastores, on the right, were too distant to be called in, and Picton being with three other regiments, at Elbodon, could not take any immediate part in the fight. Hence, as the French force was considerable, Wellington sent to Guinaldo for a brigade of the fourth division, and meanwhile directed General Colville to draw up the 77th and 5th British regiments, the 21st Portuguese, and two brigades of artillery of the same nation, on the hill over which the road to Guinaldo passed, supporting their flanks with Alten's three squadrons. The height thus occupied by the allies was convex towards the enemy, and covered in front and on both flanks by deep ravines, but it was too extensive for their numbers ; and before Picton could bring in the troops from the village of Elbodon, the crisis of the combat passed. The Portuguese guns had sent their shot amongst the thickest of Montbrun's horsemen in the plain, but the latter passed the front ravine in half squadrons, and with amazing vigour riding up the rough height, on three sides fell vehemently upon the allies. Neither the loose fire of the infantry nor of the artillery could stop them, but they were checked by the fine fighting of the cavalry, who charged the heads of the ascending masses, not once but 20 times, and always with a good will, thus maintaining the upper ground for above an hour.

It was astonishing to see so few troopers bearing up against that surging multi-



EXPLANATORY SKETCH
of the
OPERATIONS AND COMBAT
of
EL BODON.



tude, even favoured as the former were by the steep rocky nature of the ground ; but Montbrun, obstinate to win, soon brought up his artillery, and his horsemen gaining ground in the centre, cut down some of the gunners and captured the guns ; and one of the British squadrons by charging too far got entangled in the intricacy of the ravines. The danger was then imminent, when suddenly the 5th regiment, led by Major Ridge, a daring spirit, darted into the midst of the French cavalry and retook the artillery, which again opened its fire ; and nearly at the same time the 77th, supported by the 21st Portuguese, repulsed the enemy on the left. However, this charging of a weak line of infantry against a powerful cavalry, could only check the foe at that particular point. Montbrun still pressed onward with fresh masses against the left flank of the allies, while other squadrons penetrated between the right flank and the village of Elbodon. From the enclosures and vineyards of that village, Picton was at this time with difficulty and some confusion extricating his regiments ; the expected brigade of the fourth division was not yet in sight, and the French infantry was rapidly approaching ; the position was no longer tenable, and Lord Wellington directed both Picton and Colville to fall back and unite in the plain behind.

Colville, forming his battalions in two squares, immediately descended from the hill, but Picton had a considerable distance to move, and at this moment the allied squadrons, fearing to be surrounded by the French, who had completely turned their right, galloped away and took refuge with the Portuguese regiment which was farthest in retreat. Then the 5th and 77th, two weak battalions formed in one square, were quite exposed, and in an instant the whole of the French cavalry came thundering down upon them. But how vain, how fruitless to match the sword with the musket !—to send the charging horseman against the steadfast veteran ! The multitudinous squadrons rending the skies with their shouts, and closing upon the glowing squares like the falling edges of a burning crater were as instantly rejected, scorched, and scattered abroad ; and the rolling peal of musketry had scarcely ceased to echo in the hills, when bayonets glittered at the edge of the smoke, and with firm and even step, the British regiments came forth like the holy men from the Assyrian's furnace.

Picton now effected his junction and the whole retired over the plain to the position at Guinaldo, which was about six miles distant. The French, although fearing to renew the close attack, followed and plied the troops with shot and shell, until about four o'clock in the evening, when the entrenched camp was gained. Here the fourth division presented a fresh front, Pack's brigade came up from Campillo, and the heavy cavalry from the Upper Azava being also brought into line, the action ceased. By this retrograde movement of the left and centre of the third division, the 74th and the 60th regiments, posted at Pastores, were cut off ; they, however, crossed the Agueda by a ford, and moving up the right bank happily reached Guinaldo in the night, after a march of 15 hours, in the course of which they captured a French cavalry patrol.

During the retreat from Elbodon, the left wing of the army was ordered to fall back on the first division at Nava d'Aver, but to keep posts in observation on the Azava. Carlos d'Espana retired with Sanchez's infantry behind the Coa, and the guerilla chief himself passed with his cavalry into the French rear. The seventh division was withdrawn from Allemadilla to Albergaria, and the head-quarters' baggage moved to Casilla de Flores. The light division should have marched to Guinaldo ; General Crawford received the order at two o'clock, he plainly heard the cannonade, and might easily have reached Guinaldo before midnight, but he only marched to Cespedosa, one league from the Vadillo, which river was immediately passed by 1500 French. The position at Guinaldo was therefore occupied by only 14,000 men, of which about 2600 were cavalry. The left of the army concentrated at Nava d'Aver, under Graham, was 10 miles distant ; the light division being at Cespedosa and debarred the direct route by the ford of Carros, was 16 miles distant, and the fifth division posted at Payo in the mountains, was 12 miles distant. Meanwhile, Marmont brought up a second division of infantry, and in the course

of the night, and in the following day, united 60,000 men in front of Guinaldo. The situation of the English general was become most critical, yet he would not abandon the light division, which did not arrive until after three o'clock in the evening. Marmont's fortune was fixed in that hour! He knew nothing of the allies' true situation, and having detached a strong column by the valley of the Azava to menace their left, contented himself with making an ostentatious display of the imperial guards in the plain, instead of attacking an adversary who was too weak to fight, and laughing to see him so employed, soon changed the state of affairs.

In the night, Wellington, by a skilful concentric movement from Guinaldo, Nava d'Aver, Perales, and Payo, united the whole army on new ground between the Coa and the sources of the Agueda, 12 miles behind Guinaldo; and it is a curious fact that Marmont had so little knowledge of his own advantages, that instead of harassing the allies in this difficult movement, he also retired during the night, and was actually in march to the rear, when the scouts of the column which had marched by the valley of Azava, brought word that the allies were in retreat, and their divisions still widely separated. Dorsenne then insisted that Marmont should wheel round and pursue, but Lord Wellington was already in a strong position behind the stream of the Villa Mayor.

The fifth division, coming up from Payo, was now on the right at Aldea Velha; the fourth and light divisions, with Victor Alten's cavalry; and the heavy dragoons, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, were in the centre in front of Alfayates; the convent of Sacaparte was on their left, and the line was prolonged to Rebulon by Pack's and M'Mahon's Portuguese brigades; the sixth division, with Anson's cavalry, closed the line at Bismula. The cavalry piquets were pushed beyond the Villa Mayor in front of Aldea Ponte, in the centre, and towards Furcalhos on the right; and the third and seventh divisions were in reserve behind Alfayates. This position was extensive, but the days were short, serious dispositions were required for a general attack, and the allies could not be turned, because they covered all the practicable roads leading to the bridges and fords of the Coa.

COMBAT OF ALDEA DE PONTE.

The French, moving by the roads of Furcalhos and of Aldea de Ponte, were checked by the piquets of the light division on the former; but on the latter their horsemen drove the cavalry posts from the hills, and across the stream of the Villa Mayor, and about ten o'clock took possession of Aldea de Ponte.

At 12 o'clock the head of the infantry came up and immediately attacked General Pakenham, then commanding a brigade of the fourth division, which was posted on the opposite heights. Lord Wellington arrived at the same moment, and directed the 7th fusiliers to charge in line, and he supported them on each flank with a Portuguese regiment in column. The French, who had advanced well up the hill, were driven back, and though they afterwards attempted to turn the brigade by a wood, which was distant about musket-shot from the right, while their cavalry advanced to the foot of the hills, the artillery sufficed to baffle the effort. Then the English general, taking the offensive, directed the 23rd fusiliers and Portuguese caçadores to turn the French left, and seize the opposite hills, which finished the action, and Aldea de Ponte was again occupied by the allies. Wellington, who had been much exposed to the fire, rode to another part of the position, but scarcely had he departed when the French from the Furcalhos road joined those near Aldea de Ponte, and at five o'clock renewing the attack retook the village. Pakenham, with his fusiliers, immediately recovered it, but the French were very numerous, the country rugged and so wooded that he could not tell what was passing on the flanks, wherefore, knowing that the chosen ground of battle was behind the Coa, he abandoned Aldea de Ponte and regained his original post.

In the night the allies retreated, and on the morning of the 28th occupied a new

and very strong position in front of the Coa, the right resting on the Sierra de Mesas, the centre covered by the village of Soita, the left at Rendo upon the Coa. The whole army thus enclosed, as it were, in a deep loop of the Coa river, could only be attacked on a narrow front, and Marmont, who had brought up but a few days' provisions, and could gather none in that country, retired the same day. This terminated the operations. The French placed a fresh garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo; Dorsenne marched to Salamanca: a strong division was posted at Alba de Tormes to communicate with Marmont, and the latter resumed his old position in the valley of the Tagus. At the same time Foy, who had advanced with his two divisions as far as Zarza Mayor, in the direction of Castello Branco, returned to Placencia; Girard also, being threatened by Hamilton's Portuguese division, which Hill had sent to check his advance, left 2000 men of the 5th corps at Merida, and retired to Zafra; and when these movements were known, the light division reinforced by some cavalry resumed the nominal blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, in concert with Julian Sanchez. The rest of the army was cantoned on both sides of the Coa, and head-quarters were fixed at Frenada.

Nearly a month had been employed by the French in the preparation and execution of this great operation, which terminated so feebly and so abruptly, because the generals were as usual at variance. They had virtualled Ciudad Rodrigo, but they had lost the favourable opportunity of invading Galicia. Nothing had been gained in the field, time was lost, and the English general's plans were forwarded.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. Lord Wellington's position behind the Soita has been noticed by two recent authors. The one condemns the imprudence of offering battle on ground whence there was no retreat; the other intimates that it was assumed in contempt of the adversary's prowess. This last appears a mere shift to evade what was not understood, for if Lord Wellington had despised Marmont, he would have fought him beyond the Agueda. But 60,000 French soldiers were never to be despised, neither was Wellington a man to put an army in jeopardy from an overweening confidence; and it is not difficult to show that his position was chosen well, without imprudence, and without presumption.

The space between the Sierra de Mesas and the Coa was less than six miles, and the part open to attack was very much reduced by the rugged bed of a torrent which covered the left. Forty thousand men were quite able to defend this line, which was scarcely more than one-third of their full front; and as the roads were bad, the country hilly and much broken with woods and ravines, the superiority of the enemy's horse and guns would have availed him little. Lord Wellington had a right to be bold against an adversary who had not molested him at Guinaldo, and it is always of importance to show a menacing front. It was also certain that great combinations must have been made by Marmont, before he could fight a general battle on such ground; it was equally certain that he could only have a few days' provisions with his army, and that the neighbourhood could not supply him. It was, therefore, reasonable to expect that he would retire rather than fight, and he did so.

Let us, however, take the other side, and suppose that Marmont was prepared and resolute to bring on a great battle. The position behind Soita would still have been good. The French were indeed too strong to be fought with on a plain, yet not strong enough to warrant a retreat indicating fear; hence the allies had retired slowly for three days, each day engaged, and the enemy's powerful horse and artillery was always close upon their rear. Now the bed of the Coa, which was extremely rugged, furnished only a few points for crossing, of which the principal were—the ford of Serraleira, behind the right of the allies; the ford of Rapoulha de Coa, behind their left; and the bridge of Sabugal, behind their centre. The

ways to those points were narrow, and the passage of the river, with all the baggage, could not have been easily effected in face of an enemy without some loss and perhaps dishonour : and had Lord Wellington been unable to hold his position in a battle, the difficulty of passing the river would not have been very much increased, because his incumbrances would all have been at the other side, and there was a second range of heights half a mile in front of Sabugal favourable for a rear-guard. The position of Soita appears therefore to have been chosen with good judgment in regard to the immediate object of opposing the enemy ; but it is certain that the battering train, then between Pinhel and Villa Ponte, was completely exposed to the enemy. Marmont, however, had not sufficiently considered his enterprise, and knew not where or how to strike.

2. The position of Aldea Ponte was equally well chosen. Had the allies retreated at once from Guinaldo to Soita, baggage and stores would have been lost, and the retrograde movement have had the appearance of a flight ; the road from Payo would have been uncovered, and the junction of the fifth division endangered. But in the position taken up, the points of junction of all the roads were occupied, and as each point was strong in itself, it was not difficult for a quick-sighted general, perfectly acquainted with the country, and having excellent troops, to check the heads of the enemy's columns, until the baggage had gained a sufficient offing, and the fifth division had taken its place in line.

3. The position at Guinaldo was very different from the others. The previous entrenching of it proved Lord Wellington's foresight, and he remained there 35 hours, that is, from mid-day of the 25th until midnight of the 26th, which proved his firmness. It is said that Sir George Murray advised him to abandon it in the night of the 25th, and that arrangements were actually made in that view, yet anxious for the safety of the light division he would not stir. The object was certainly one of an importance sufficient to justify the resolution, but the resolution itself was one of those daring strokes of genius which the ordinary rules of art were never made to control. The position was contracted, of no great natural strength in front, and easily to be turned ; the entrenchments constructed were only a few breastworks and two weak field redoubts, open in rear, and without palisades ; not more than 14,000 British and Portuguese troops were in line, and 60,000 French veterans, with a hundred pieces of artillery, were before them ! When Marmont heard of the escape of the light division, and discovered the deceit, he prophetically exclaimed, alluding to Napoleon's fortune, "And Wellington's star, it also is bright !"

4. The positions of Aldea Ponte and Soita are to be commended, that at Guinaldo to be admired rather than imitated, but the preceding operations are censurable. The country immediately beyond Ciudad Rodrigo offered no covering position for a siege or blockade ; and the sudden floods, to which the Agueda is subject, rendered the communications with the left bank precarious. Nor though bridges had been secured, could Wellington have ventured to encamp round the place with lines of contravallation and circumvallation, on both sides of the river ; because Marmont's army would then have advanced from Placencia to Castello Branco, have seized the passage over the Tagus at Vilha Velha, and in concert with the 5th corps endangered the safety of Hill. This would have obliged the allies to quit their entrenched camp, and Dorsenne could then have revictualled the place. It was therefore necessary to hold a strong central position with respect to Marmont and Dorsenne, to keep both in check while separate, and to oppose them when united. This position was on the Coa, and as Salamanca or Bejar, the nearest points where convoys could be collected for Ciudad Rodrigo, were from 50 to 60 miles distant, Lord Wellington's object, namely, the forcing the French to assemble in large bodies without any adequate result, could be, and was obtained by a distant as well as by a close investment.

So far all was well calculated, but when Marmont and Dorsenne arrived with 60,000 men at Ciudad Rodrigo, the aspect of affairs entirely changed, and as the English general could not dispute the entrance of the convoy, he should have con-

centrated his army at once behind Guinaldo. Instead of doing this he kept it extended on a line of many miles and the right wing separated from the centre by a difficult river. In his despatch, he says, that, from some uncertainty in his estimate of the enemy's numbers, it was necessary to ascertain their exact strength by actual observation; but this is rather an excuse than a valid reason, because, for this object, which could be obtained by other means, he risked the loss of his whole army, and violated two vital rules of war which forbid—

1. The parcelling of an army before a concentrated enemy.
2. The fixing of your own point of concentration within the enemy's reach.

Now Lord Wellington's position on the 24th and 25th extended from the ford of the Vadillo on the right of the Agueda, to Marialva on the Azava; the distance either from the Vadillo, or Marialva, to Guinaldo, was as great as that from Ciudad to Guinaldo, and by worse roads; and the distance from Ciudad to Elbodon was as nothing compared to the distance of the wings from the same place. Wherefore when Montbrun attacked, at Elbodon, the allies' wings were cut off, and the escape of the third and light divisions, and of the troops at Pastores, was a matter of fortune and gallantry, rather than of generalship; that is, in the enlarged sense of the last word, for it cannot be denied that the actual movements of the troops were conducted with consummate skill.

But what if Marmont, instead of being drawn by circumstances into a series of ill-combined, and partial attacks, had previously made dispositions for a great battle? He certainly knew, through the garrison, the real situation of the allies, and he also knew of the camp at Guinaldo, which being on their line of retreat was the important point.* If he had issued from the fortress before daybreak on the 25th with the whole or even half of his forces, he could have reached Campillo in two hours with one column, while another fell on the position at Pastores and Elbodon; the third division, thus attacked, would have been enveloped and captured, or broken and driven over the Agueda, by the ford of Zamara, and would have been irretrievably separated from Guinaldo. And if this division had even reached Guinaldo, the French army would have arrived with it in such overwhelming numbers, that the fourth division could not have restored the battle; meanwhile a few thousand men thrown across the ford of Caros, near Robleda, would have sufficed to keep the light division at bay, because the channel of the Robleda torrent, over which their retreat lay, was a very deep and rugged ravine. The centre being broken, the French could, at choice, have either surrounded the light division, or directed the mass of their forces against the reserves, and then the left wing under Graham would have had to retreat from the Azava over the plains towards Almeida.

It may be said that all the French were not up on the 25th, but they might have been so, and as Lord Wellington was resolved to see their number he would have been in the same position the 26th. It is however sufficient to remark that the allies, exclusive of the fifth division, which was at Payo, did not exceed 35,000 men of all arms; that they were on an irregular line of at least 20 miles, and mostly in an open country; that at no point were the troops more than eight, and at the principal point, namely, Pastores, only three miles from a fortress from whence 60,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, with 120 guns, were ready to issue. Finally, the point of concentration at Guinaldo was only 12 miles from that fortress. The allies escaped because their adversary was blind! Lord Wellington's conduct at Guinaldo was above rules, but at Elbodon it was against rules, which is just the difference between genius and error.

5. In these operations Marmont gave proof that as a general he was rather shining than great. He was in error throughout. Before he commenced his march he had desired Girard to advance on the side of the Alentejo, assuring him that the whole of the allied army, and even the Spanish troops under Castaños, had crossed the Tagus to operate against Rodrigo; but in fact only one brigade of Hill's corps

* Appendix, No. 16, section 1.

had moved, and Girard would have been destroyed, if, fortunately for him, the allies had not intercepted the original and duplicate of the letter containing this false information.*

6. When Marmont brought his convoy into Ciudad, it would appear he had no intention of fighting, but tempted by the false position of the allies, and angry at the repulse of his cavalry on the Lower Azava, he turned his scouting troops into columns of attack. And yet he permitted his adversary to throw dust in his eyes for thirty-six hours at Guinaldo; and at Aldea Ponte his attack was a useless waste of men, because there was no local advantage offered, and he did not intend a great battle.

7. The loss incurred in the different combats was not great. About 300 men and officers fell on the part of the allies, and on that of the French rather more, because of the fire of the squares and artillery at Elbodon. But the movements during the three days were full of interest and instruction, and diversified also by brilliant examples of heroism. Ridge's daring charge has been already noticed, and it was in one of the cavalry encounters that a French officer in the act of striking at the gallant Felton Harvey, of the 14th dragoons, perceived that he had only one arm, and with a rapid movement brought down his sword into a salute and passed on! Such was the state of the war on the frontier of Portugal; in the next book will be found the contemporary events in Spain.

* Appendix No. 16, section 1.

BOOK XV.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF THE WAR IN SPAIN.

Northern Provinces.—The invasion of Galicia, which had been arrested by the arrival of the allies on the Coa, would have been a most serious calamity. Abadia, a weak man, with troops distressed for provisions and clothing, was on bad terms with the chief of his staff, Moscosa, whom he feared, and on worse terms with the junta. The great road to Coruña was open, and although General Walker, seeing the danger, advised that Ferrol, which was indefensible, should be dismantled, and the guns, amounting to 1500, with the timber and vessels of war in the harbour, transferred to Coruña, neither that nor any other useful measure was executed.*

Before this, overtures had been made to the Spanish government to take Spanish troops into British pay after the manner of the Portuguese; but the regency, remembering the prodigality of Canning, demanded three millions yearly, besides arms and clothing, without which they said the Spaniards could make no efficient exertions! To introduce British officers into the service on any other terms was not possible, because the Spanish military were indignant at what they termed the degradation of such a proposal. The Perceval faction finding it thus, and wanting greatness of mind to support Wellington, on a scale commensurate with his talents, then turned their attention to the encouragement of the *Partidas*, as being less expensive, and affording an example to the continental nations of popular and protracted resistance to France.

Sir Howard Douglas, who succeeded General Walker as military agent (these officers must not be confounded with the military agents originally sent out, and whose mischievous proceedings I have had occasion to notice), was directed to encourage those bodies by increased supplies, and to combine their movements better with each other and with the British squadron in the Bay of Biscay. Lord Wellington, at the desire of government, sent to the guerilla chiefs military presents, with a letter acknowledging the importance of their services, and this was not mere compliment, for he had indeed derived great advantages from their exertions, and thought he had derived more, because he only knew of their exploits by hearsay. When he afterwards advanced into Spain and saw them closely, he was forced to acknowledge that the guerillas, although active and willing, and although their operations in general occasioned the utmost annoyance to the enemy, were so little disciplined that they could do nothing against the French troops unless the latter were very inferior in numbers. If the French took post in a house or church of which they only barricaded the entrance, both regular troops and guerillas were so ill equipped as military bodies, that their enemy could remain in security until relieved. In like manner Napoleon reprimanding his generals for suffering the *Partidas* to gain any head, observed, that when cut off from communication with the English ships they were a nullity!

Douglas arrived just as Dorsenne's retreat enabled Abadia to resume his position on the frontier, but the army was in a miserable state; the wet season was setting in upon men destitute of even the necessities of life, although the province abounded in cattle and goods, which could be easily procured, because money, although plentiful, was generally hoarded, and commodities were therefore cheap,

* Appendix, No. 16 section 1.

and could be obtained in lieu of taxes at the market-price. An extraordinary increase of the customs, arising from the trade of Santander and Bilbao being transferred to Coruña by the war, also offered a valuable resource; the harbour was filled with colonial goods, and as the appetites of men generally stifle patriotism, and baffle power, a licensed commerce was carried on with the enemy's ports in Biscay; yet without judgment as related to the war, for the return was iron, to re-export to the colonies, whereas by an internal traffic of the same kind, clothes and grain for the troops might have been had from Castile and Leon. But confusion and corruption everywhere prevailed, the exigencies of the war were always the last things cared for, and the starving soldiers committed a thousand excesses with impunity, for where there is no food or pay, there can be no discipline.

The people were oppressed with imposts, legal and illegal, and yet the defalcation in the revenue was great, and the monopoly of tobacco, the principal financial resource, was injured by the smuggling arising from the unsettled nature of the times. The annual charge on the province was about £1,300,000, the actual receipts were less than £500,000, and the junta endeavoured to supply the deficiency by an extraordinary contribution from all property, save that of day-labourers, which they expected would produce 60,000,000 of reals (£750,000). But a corrupt and vexatious collection of this tax tormented the people without filling the treasury; the clergy, and the richer classes, were, as in Portugal, favoured, and it yielded, in six months, less than a seventh part.

From this state of affairs two inferences may be safely drawn:—1. That England and not Galicia had hitherto supported the war here, as in other parts of the Peninsula. 2. That as England had in 1808–9 paid to Galicia 3,000,000 of hard dollars, and given other succours sufficient for double the number of troops employed, the deficiency of the revenue had been amply compensated, and the causes of distress must be sought for in the proceedings of the authorities, and in the anomalous nature of the war itself. The successive juntas, apprehensive of offending the people, were always inert in the civil administration, and either too corrupt, or too incapable, to apply the succours from England, justly or wisely. The junta of this period was, like its predecessors, factious and intriguing; it was hostile to the junta of Leon, unfriendly to that of Asturias, jealous and contemptuous of the military leaders; in return these last abhorred the junta, and were tormented with factions of their own. The regular officers hated the guerillas, and endeavoured to get the control of the succours granted by England to the latter; and as they necessarily lived by plundering their own countrymen, they strenuously opposed the arming of the peasants, partly from fear lest the latter should resist this license, partly because the republican and anti-English spirit, which was growing up in the cortes, had also reached this quarter.

The clergy clung to the peasantry, with whom they had great influence, but the army, which had imbibed liberal words, rather than principles, was inimical to them. A press had been established at head-quarters, from whence issued political papers either original, or repeated from the libels at Cadiz, in which the Portuguese were called slaves for submitting to British influence; and it was openly avowed that the French yoke was preferable to that of England; the guerilla system and the arming of the people were also attacked, and these writings were met by other political papers from the civil press at Coruña and St. Jago. The frequent changes of commanders rendered all the evils more prominent; for the local government had legal power to meddle with the military arrangements, and every change of commander produced a new difficulty. Thus the junta refused to acknowledge Abadia as their president during the absence of Castaños; he in return complained alike of their neglect and of their interference; and when they proposed to establish a general dépôt at Lugo he marched a part of his army there to prevent it.

But the occult source of most of these difficulties is to be found in the inconsistent attempts of the British cabinet to uphold national independence with internal slavery, against foreign aggression, with an ameliorated government. The clergy, who led the mass of the people, clung to the English, because they supported

aristocracy and church domination ; and they were also strongly for the *Partidas*, because these were commanded by men who sprung directly from the church itself, or from people who were attached to the church, while the regular armies being officered by the friends of the *cortes*, disliked the *Partidas*, both as interlopers and as political enemies. The English ministers, hating Napoleon, not because he was the enemy of England, but because he was the champion of equality, cared not for Spain, unless her people were enslaved. They were willing enough to use a liberal *cortes* to defeat Napoleon, but they also desired to put down that *cortes*, by the aid of the clergy and of the bigoted part of the people : nevertheless, as liberty will always have more charms than slavery, they would have missed of both objects, if the exigencies of the continental system had not induced the emperor to go to Moscow, where the snow destroyed him ; and if the very advocates of liberty in Spain had not in their madness resolved to oppress the Americans. The *cortes*, by discovering a rabid love of power in practice, rendered their democratic doctrines suspected, and lost partizans ; but Lord Wellington, in support of aristocracy, used the greatest prudence in policy, and in his actions was considerate and just.

In the first conference held at Coruña, after Sir Howard Douglas's arrival, the junta, as the usual preliminary, demanded more money from England ; but he advised, instead, a better management of their own resources, and pointed out the military measures requisite to render the army efficient. He recommended the adoption of the line of retreat upon Orense, rather than upon Lugo and Coruña ; and he endeavoured to establish a permanent depôt in the island of Arosa, on the Vigo coast, as a secure resource in the event of defeat ; he also furnished the soldiers with shoes and great coats, the hospitals with blankets, and completed the firelocks of the army to 25,000. There were however abuses, which he could not remedy, and which would seem rather to belong to the army of an Asiatic despot, than to an European force fighting for independence. Innumerable baggage animals devoured all the forage, and the personal servants and cooks, who from custom never did duty, were above 5000 !—a sixth part of the whole force !* When the sick men were deducted, scarcely 16,000 infantry and three squadrons of cavalry remained for service. Then there was so little organization or arrangement that, although young, robust, patient, and docile to the greatest degree, the troops could scarcely be moved, even from one quarter to another, as a military body ; and the generals, unable to feed them on the frontier, more than once menaced, and in December did actually retire to Lugo, leaving the province open to invasion.

Abadia at first exerted himself with activity, and appeared to enter loyally into the ameliorations proposed. He gave the command of the troops to Portasgo, repaired to Coruña himself, and organized the province in seven military governments, under as many chiefs, one for each division of the army. Every government was to raise a reserve, and to supply and clothe the corresponding division on the frontier. But in a little time this activity relaxed ; he entered into various intrigues, displayed jealousy, both of the peasantry and the English, and no real improvement took place, save in that select part of the army, which the Cadiz regency had destined for South America, and had ordered him to equip from the English stores. This was done at the very moment when a French army on the frontier was again preparing to invade Galicia, and Sir Howard Douglas vehemently opposed the disloyal proceeding ; the junta also were really averse to it, and Abadia pretended to be so ; but he had a personal interest in the colonies and secretly forwarded the preparations. The regency, to evade Mr. Wellesley's reproaches, promised to suspend the embarkation of these troops, but the expedition sailed from Vigo, and the organization of another, three times its strength, including all the best artillery in the province, was immediately commenced, and also sailed a few months later. This, then, was the state of Galicia in the latter end of 1811. She was without magazines, hospitals, or system, whether civil or military, and torn by faction ; her people were oppressed, her governors foolish, her generals bad ; she had no cavalry,

* Appendix, No. 12, section 1.

and the infantry were starving, although the province easily supplied cattle for the allies in Portugal. As a natural consequence, those famished soldiers were too undisciplined to descend into the plains of Leon, and were consequently of little weight in the general contest.

Under these circumstances, Sir Howard Douglas had nothing to work upon, save the guerilla leaders, whose activity he very considerably increased. His policy was to augment the number of chiefs, but to keep the force of each low, lest, growing proud of their command, they should consider themselves generals, and become useless, as indeed had already happened to Campillo, Longa, and Porlier, when they were made a part of the seventh army. Nevertheless the advantage of this policy may be doubted, for of all the numerous bands in the north, seven only were not supported entirely by robbery. Mina, Pastor, Salazar, Pinto, Amor, and the curate, whose united forces did not exceed 10,000 men, were sustained by regular taxes, customs, convent revenues, and donations; Longa supported his from the produce of the salt-mines of Paza, but all the rest were bandits, whose extinction was one of the advantages expected from the formation of the seventh army.

It is now convenient to resume the narrative of military events.

In the Asturias, previous to Mendizabal's arrival, and when Bonet had marched to the Orbijo, Porlier surprised Santander, and plundered some houses; but being followed by General Caucault, a very active officer, he retired again to his stronghold of Liebana. The British cruisers, in concert with whom he acted, then destroyed several coast-batteries, and the *Iris* frigate having arms on board, came to the Bay of Biscay for the purpose of arranging an intercourse with the Partidas of that province. But this was the period when Reille and Caffarelli, were, as I have before noticed, chasing Mina and Longa, whom they drove from the coast into the mountains of Leon, and thus marred the object of the *Iris*. Nevertheless, when Mina was reinforced by the Valencians and other fugitives from Catalonia, he returned to Navarre, and there performed very considerable exploits, which, as belonging to other combinations of the war, will be hereafter noticed.

While Caffarelli and Reille thus scoured the line of communication, Dorsenne having the invasion of Galicia in view, relieved Bonet on the Esla, and sent him early in November, with 8000 men, to re-occupy the Asturias as a preliminary measure. The Galicians foreseeing this, had detached Moscoso with 3500 men to reinforce San Pol, who was at Pagares, below the passes leading from Leon; and on the other hand Mendizabal uniting the bands of Porlier and other chiefs, concentrated 5000 men to the eastward on the Xalon. Eleven thousand men were therefore ready to oppose the entrance of Bonet, but with the usual improvidence of the Spaniards, the passes of Cubillas and Ventana, to the westward of Pagares, were left unguarded. By these roads, Bonet, an excellent officer, turned Moscoso, and drove him down the Lena with loss and disgrace; then turning upon Mendizabal, he chased him also in disorder from Lanes into the Liebana.

All the civil authorities immediately fled to Castropol, the Spanish magazines fell into the hands of the French, and Bonet having resumed his old positions at Oviedo, Gihon, and Grado, fortified several posts in the passes leading to Leon, raised contributions, and effectually ruined all the military resources of the Asturias. The organization of the seventh army was thus for the time crushed, and in Galicia great mischief ensued. For the return of Moscoso's division and the want of provisions in the Bierzo, which had obliged Abadia to retire to Lugo, while Dorsenne was menacing the frontier, had thrown that kingdom into a ferment, which was increased by the imposition of the new contributions. The people became exceedingly exasperated and so unfavourably disposed, that it was common to hear them say, "the exactions of a French army were a relief in comparison to the depredations of the Spanish troops."

During these transactions in the north, Drouet had joined Girard at Merida, and menaced the allies in the Alemtejo, hoping thus to draw Wellington from the Coa; but the demonstration was too feeble, and the English general thought it

sufficient to reinforce Hill with his own brigade from Castello Branco. These movements were undoubtedly part of a grand plan for invading Portugal, if the emperor could have arranged his affairs peaceably with Russia. For to move once more against Lisbon, by Massena's route, was not promising unless the northern provinces of Portugal were likewise invaded, which required the preliminary occupation of Galicia, at least of the interior. In the south also, it was advisable to invade Alemtejo, simultaneously with Beira; and the occupation of Valencia and Murcia was necessary to protect Andalusia during the operation. The plan was vast, dangerous, and ready for execution; for though the wet season had set in, an attack on the northern parts of Portugal, and the invasion of Galicia, were openly talked of in Dorsenne's army; Caffarelli was to join in the expedition, and Monthion's reserve, which was to replace Caffarelli's on the line of communication, was already 6000 strong. Ney or Oudinot was spoken of to command the whole, and a strong division was already in march to reinforce the army of the south, arrangements which could have reference only to Napoleon's arrival; but the Russian war soon baulked the project, and Wellington's operations, to be hereafter noticed, obliged Dorsenne to relinquish the invasion of Galicia, and caused Bonet once more to abandon the Asturias.

Thus, with various turns of fortune, the war was managed in the northern provinces, and no great success attended the French arms, because the English general was always at hand to remedy the faults of the Spaniards. It was not so on the eastern line of invasion. There Suchet, meeting with no opponent capable of resisting him, had continued his career of victory, and the insufficiency of the Spaniards to save their own country was made manifest; but these things shall be clearly shown in the next chapter, which will treat of the conquest of Valencia.

CHAPTER II.

CONQUEST OF VALENCIA.

IN August, and the beginning of September, Suchet, while preparing for this great enterprise, had dispersed the bands of Villa Campa and the other chiefs, who during the siege of Tarragona vexed Aragon. He had sent his feeble soldiers to France, receiving conscripts in their places, and although the harvest was very bad, formed large magazines in Morella and Tortosa. Eight thousand men had been left in Catalonia under General Frere, another 8000 were placed under General Musnier, to protect Aragon, and 24,000 of all arms remained for the invasion of Valencia, but this force Suchet thought inadequate, and demanded a reinforcement from the army of reserve, then in Navarre. Napoleon, whose system of war, whatever has been said to the contrary, was eminently methodical, refused. He loved better to try a bold push, at a distant point, with a few men, than to make an overwhelming attack, if he thereby weakened his communications; he judged courage and enterprise fittest for the attack, prudence and force for the support. And yet he designed to aid Suchet's operations vigorously when the decisive blow could be struck. Then not only the divisions of the reserve were to march, but combined movements of detachments from nearly all the armies in the Peninsula, were arranged; and we shall find, that if Wellington, by menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, saved Galicia, the French army of the north, in return, by menacing Galicia fixed the allies on the Agueda, and so protected Suchet's invasion of Valencia.

Three roads led to the Guadalaviar, one from Tortosa by the sea-coast, one by Teruel and Segorbe, and one by Morella and San Mateo. That from Tortosa, and that by Teruel, were carriage-roads, but the first only was fit for heavy artillery, and it was blocked, partially by the fortress of Peniscola, and completed by the fort of Oropesa. Wherefore, though the infantry and cavalry could move on a by-road to the right, the convoys and the guns, which were at Tortosa, could not

pass until Oropesa was reduced. Nevertheless the French general, well knowing the value of boldness in war, resolved to mask Peniscola, to avoid Oropesa, to send his field artillery by Teruel, and uniting his troops near Saguntum, to offer battle to Blake; and if the latter declined it, to reduce Oropesa and Saguntum, trusting for subsistence to the "huerta," or garden of Valencia, until the arrival of his convoys.

He had, however, organized his system of supply with care. From Morella and Tortosa, brigades of mules, after the manner adopted in the British army, were to carry provisions to the troops, and sheep and cattle were delivered to each regiment for its subsistence in advance. This last plan, which Sir John Moore had also projected in his campaign, Suchet found advantageous; and I am persuaded that the principle should be extended, so that all things requisite for the subsistence and fighting of troops should be organized regimentally, and the persons employed wear the uniform of their different corps. Jealousies between the functionaries of different branches of the service would then be unknown; and the character of all subordinate persons, being under the guardianship of the battalions to which they belonged, would be equally praiseworthy, which cannot now be said.

While Suchet was thus gathering his strength, Valencia was a prey to disorder. About the period of the siege of Tarragona, Palacios, notwithstanding his high monarchical principles, which caused him to be dismissed from the regency, had been appointed captain-general of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon; and he immediately raised a strong party amongst the friars and other opponents of the cortes. When, after the dispersion of the Murcian army at Baza, Blake had rallied the fugitives, and in virtue of his power as regent, assumed the chief command at Valencia, Palacios' faction opposed him, and endeavoured to draw the soldiers and the populace to their side, by proposing to inundate the plain of Murviedro, and to defend the strong country in advance. Blake, however, resolved to act on the flanks of the French army by detachments, and, in this view, sent C. O'Donnell, with the divisions of Obispo and Villa Campa to Albaracin, supporting them with 4000 men at Segorbe and Leiria. He charged Mahi, who commanded 5000 infantry, and 700 cavalry of the Murcian army, to surprise the French detachment of the army of the centre, posted at Cuenca. He detached Bassecour with 2000 men to Requena, and the same time directed Duran and the Empecinado to unite and invade Aragon; and it was to aid in this expedition that Mina quitted the mountains of Leon.

Blake had, exclusive of Mahi's and Bassecour's divisions, about 20,000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry. Three thousand five hundred men were placed in Saguntum, which was provisioned for three months; 200 were in Oropesa, and 1500 in Peniscola; and there were so many Partidas that the whole country seemed to be in arms, but the assembling of these people being very uncertain, Blake could not depend upon having a permanent Partizan force of more than 8000. The Valencian army contained the Albuera divisions, St. Juan's, Miranda's, and Villa Campa's veterans; it was, therefore, not only numerous, but the best Spain had yet produced: and Valencia itself was exceedingly rich in all things necessary for its supply: but there was no real power, the building, though fair enough outside, had the dry rot within. The French had many secret friends, faction was as usual at work, the populace were not favourable to Blake, and that general had rather collected than organized his forces, and was quite incapable of leading them.* He was unpopular both at Cadiz and Valencia, and the regency, of which he formed a part, was tottering. The cortes had quashed Mahi's command of the Murcian army, and even recalled Blake himself; but the order, which did not reach him until he was engaged with Suchet, was not obeyed. Meanwhile that part of the Murcian army, which should have formed a reserve, after Mahi's division had marched for Cuenca, fell into the greatest disorder: above 8000 men deserted in a

* Appendix, No. 12, section 10.

few weeks, and those who remained were exceedingly dispirited. Thus all interest became concentrated in the city of Valencia ; which was in fact the key of all the eastern coast, because Carthagená required an army to defend it, and could only be fed from Valencia, and Alicante was then quite defenceless.

It was in this state of affairs that Suchet commenced the invasion. His army was divided into three columns, and, on the 15th of September, one moved by the coast-road, one by Morella and San Mateo, and one by Teruel, where an intermediate magazine was established ; but this latter column instead of proceeding directly to Segorbe, turned off to its left, and passed over the Sierra de Gudar to Castellon de la Plana, where the whole three were united on the 20th. The main column, commanded by Suchet in person, had masked Peniscola on the 15th, and invested Oropesa by a detachment on the 19th ; but as the road run directly under the fire of the last place, the main body moved by the rugged route of Cabanes to Villa Franca, leaving the battering-train still at Tortosa.

During these operations Blake appeared inclined to fight, for he brought Zayas up in front of Murviedro, and called in Obispo ; Mahi, who had done nothing on the side of Cuença, was also in march to join him ; but all these divisions marched slowly, and with confusion ; and a slight skirmish at Almansora, on the Mingares, where a few French dragoons put a great body of Spanish infantry to flight, made Blake doubt the firmness of his troops. He therefore left O'Donnell with 4000 men on the side of Segorbe, and then retired himself with 15,000 behind the Guadalaviar. Valencia was thus thrown into great confusion, but Bassecour's division was at hand, and Suchet fearing to attack so large an army in an entrenched camp (which had cost two years to construct), while his own communication with Tortosa was intercepted, merely dispersed the armed peasants which had assembled on his flank, and then turned against Murviedro.

SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM.

This celebrated place, situated about four leagues from Valencia, was a rocky mountain, covered with the ruins of the ancient city, and the remains of Moorish towers and walls, which being connected by modern works, formed four distinct posts covering the whole summit of the rock : but in consequence of the usual Spanish procrastination the heavy guns prepared to arm it were not yet mounted, and only 17 pieces of inferior size were available for defence. The modern town of Murviedro, situated at the foot of the rock, was covered by the river Palancia, and by a canal, and occupied by some Spanish piquets ; but the 23rd, Habert, having passed the water, invested the rock on the east, while Harispe invested it on the west and south, and a third division drove the Spanish posts from Murviedro and entrenched itself in the houses. The rest of the army was disposed in villages, on the hills to the north-west, and patrols were pushed towards Valencia. Thus the rock of Saguntum was invested, but it was inaccessible to the engineer, save on the west, where the ascent, although practicable, was very rough and difficult. It would have been impregnable, if the Spaniards had mounted their large guns ; for the French were obliged to bring earth from a distance to form the batteries and parallels, and to set the miner to level the approaches, and their parapets were too thin to withstand heavy shot.

The first point of resistance was an ancient tower called San Pedro, and immediately above it was the fort of San Fernando, which could not be attacked until San Pedro fell, and, from its height, then only by the miner. But near the eastern extremity of the rock there were two ancient breaches which the Spaniards were still engaged repairing, and had only stopped with timber ; a large tank offered cover for the assembling of troops close to these breaches, and Suchet resolved to try an escalade. To effect this, three columns were assembled before daybreak on the 28th in the tank, a strong reserve was held in support, and a false attack was directed against the San Pedro to distract the attention of the besieged : but in the previous part of the night, the Spaniards having sallied, were repulsed, and the

action having excited both sides, a French soldier fired from the tank before the appointed time, whereupon the columns rushing forward, in disorder, planted their ladders, and the French would have carried the place by noise, but the garrison thrust the ladders from the walls, and drove the stormers back, with the loss of 300 men. After this check, as the artillery was still at Tortoza, Suchet ordered a part of his army to attack Oropesa, employed another part in making a road, for the guns to reach the battery raised against the tower of San Pedro, and then turned his own attention to the movements of Blake.

That general, following his first plan of action against the French flanks, had during the investment of Saguntum, sent C. O'Donnel with Villa Campa's division and St. Juan's cavalry, to Betera, and Beneguazil, and Obispo's division to Segorbe; thus forming a half circle round the French army, and cutting its communication with Teruel, near which place Mahi had by this time arrived. Suchet, however, caused Palombini to attack Obispo, whose whole division dispersed after a skirmish with the advanced guard, and the Italians then returned to the siege. The next night Harispe marched against O'Donnel, who was well posted at Beneguazil behind a canal, having his centre protected by a chapel and some houses; nevertheless the Spaniards were beaten with loss at the first shock, and fled in disorder over the Guadalaviar. During these events Blake remained an idle spectator of the defeat of his division, although he had a large body of troops in hand, and was within a few miles of the field of battle.

The French train now advanced from Tortoza, and four pieces were placed in battery against Oropesa. On the 10th, Suchet took the direction of the attack in person, and the fort situated upon an isolated rock, was breached in a few hours: but the garrison of the King's Tower (a separate work placed on a small promontory, and commanding the harbour) refused to surrender, and was carried off, on the 11th, under the French fire, by the *Magnificent*. The French general having thus with a loss of only 30 men opened the road for his artillery, returned to Saguntum and pushed the siege of that place; but the difficulties were very great, the formation of the road to the batteries was itself a work of pain, and although his indefatigable troops had formed a breaching battery on the 12th, while seven small mortars and howitzers, placed on the right and left, had nearly silenced the Spanish fire, the muskets of the besiegers alone brought down from 15 to 20 men.

On the 17th, the breaching battery being armed, opened its fire against the tower, and the new masonry crumbled away at once; yet the ancient work resisted the guns like a rock. On the 18th, the fire recommenced, when the wall gave way to the stroke of the guns, and the assault was ordered; but from the height of the tower, which overlooked the works at a short distance, the preparations were early discovered, the Spaniards collecting on the breach repaired it with sand-bags, and regardless of the French fire, with loud cries provoked the attack. At five o'clock, 400 men rushed forward as swiftly as the steepness of the ascent would permit. Soon, however, the head of the column was checked, the rear began to fire, the whole got into confusion, and when one half had fallen without making the slightest impression on the defenders, the attempt was abandoned. After this signal failure the French erected a second battery of six pieces, 140 yards from the tower, and endeavoured to push the approach close to the foot of the breach, yet the plunging fire of the besieged baffled them; meanwhile Andriani the governor, having communication by signal with the ships in the Grao, was encouraged to continue his gallant defence, and was informed that he was already promoted for what he had done. But to understand Suchet's embarrassments, from the protracted resistance of Saguntum, we must take a view of Lacy's contemporary operations in Catalonia, and the proceedings of the Partidas against the French communications and posts in Aragon.

CATALONIA.

It will be recollected that the blockade of Figueras produced sickness in M'Donald's army, and that the return of Suchet to Aragon, and the parcelling of his troops on the lines, from Lerida to Montserrat, Tortosa, and Tarragona, had completely extinguished the French power in the field; because the divisions of the army of Aragon which still remained in Lower Catalonia, being destined for the enterprise against Valencia, could not be employed in harassing expeditions. Lacy was therefore enabled, notwithstanding the troubles which followed the fall of Tarragona, to reorganize about 8000 men in two divisions, the one under Eroles, the other under Sarsfield; the junta also called out the tercios of reserve, and arms and ammunition being supplied by the English navy, Lacy was soon in a condition to act offensively. Thus the taking of Montserrat was very injurious to the French, for it is generally supposed that Freire's division, if held together in the field, would have prevented this reaction in the principality. Lacy at first suggested to the British navy the recapture of the Medas Islands, and it was effected in the latter end of August, by the *Undaunted*, *Lavinia*, and *Blossom*, aided by a small party of Spaniards, the whole under the command of Captain Thomas. The enterprise itself was one of more labour than danger, and the Spanish allies were of little use, but the naval officers, to whose exertions the success was entirely due, were indignant at finding that Colonel Green, who served as a volunteer, endeavoured to raise his own reputation with the Catalans by injuring the character of those under whom he served.*

Immediately after the fall of Montserrat, Lacy and the junta had proposed the fortifying of Palamos or Blanes, to be held as a marine depôt and stronghold, in common with the British navy, but with a strange folly expected that Sir E. Pellew, who had no troops, would defend them from the enemy while establishing this post. Finding this scheme received coldly by the admiral, they turned their attention inland, and blowing up the works of Berga, fixed upon the position of Busa, as a place of strength and refuge. This remarkable rock which is situated between the Cardener and Bindasaes rivers and about 20 miles from Cardona could be reached by one road only, and that a very rugged one. The rock itself, 14 miles in circumference, healthy and full of springs, is fertile, and produces abundance of forage and fuel. It is cut off from the rest of the world by frightful precipices, and could neither be forced, nor starved into a surrender. Busa, Cardona, Solsona, and Seu d'Urgel were therefore guarded by the tercios of reserve, and Lacy soon commenced offensive excursions with the regular army, against the long lines of the French communication.

In September, while the Somatenes interrupted the passage of the convoys to Montserrat, Eroles made an unsuccessful attack on the fort of Moncada, near Barcelona; Lacy, who had returned from an incursion in the French Cerdaña where he had gathered some booty, then united Eroles and Sarsfield's troops, and surprised the town of Igualada, where he killed 200 French, but not daring to attack the castle retired to Calaf, and from thence again detached Eroles to Jorbas, to attack a French convoy coming to Igualada. Eroles beat the escort, and captured the convoy, and then the French quitted the fortified convent of Igualada, and joined the garrison of Montserrat, when the whole, fearful of being invested and so starved, abandoned that important point, and marched through Barcelona to Tarragona; the Spaniards immediately occupied Montserrat, and recovered a large store of clothing and cavalry equipments, which had been hidden in a vault and were undiscovered by the enemy. Eroles, pursuing his success, forced the garrisons of Belpuig and Cervera, about 500 in all, to surrender, and thus the whole line of communication between Lerida and Barcelona fell into the power of the Catalonians. The confidence of the people then revived; Sarsfield occupied Granollers, and the passes leading into the valley of Vich; Manso and Rovira menaced the Ampur-

* Appendix, No. 13, section 2.

dan ; and Eroles suddenly passing by Seu d'Urgel into the Cerdaña, defeated, at Puigcerda, some national guards commanded by General Gareau, who had been sent there after Lacy's invasion. He afterwards raised large contributions on the frontier, burnt a French town, and returning with his spoil by the way of Ribas and Ripol, took post in the pass of Garriga, while Milans occupied Mataro, and both watched to intercept a convoy which M'Donald was preparing for Barcelona.

Sarsfield at the same time embarked his division and sailed to the coast of the Ampurdan, but the weather would not permit him to land. Nevertheless the attention of the French general was distracted, and the convoy did not move. Lacy then recalled Sarsfield, and projected the surprise of Barcelona itself, but after putting his troops in march, feared the execution and relinquished the attempt. Meanwhile one swarm of the smaller Partidas menaced the French communication between Mequinenza and Tortosa, and another swarm settled on the plains about Lerida.

The state of Aragon was equally alarming. Duran and the Empecinado had received Blake's orders to unite near Cuença, for the purpose of invading Aragon ; but the secret junta of the district was averse to the plan, and the troops of the latter chief refused to move, and even came to blows with the junta's people. In this confusion, General d'Armanac, who had retired from Cuença, returned and dispersed the whole. The Empecinado, however, collected them again, and having joined Duran, their united powers being about 6000 infantry and 2500 horse, moved against Calatayud ; Mina also acting in concert with them, quitted the mountains of Leon and entered Navarre with about 5000 men, and some minor Partizans were already acting against different parts of Aragon. The whole were in want of clothing and ammunition, but Mr. Tupper, the consul at Valencia, having safe means of communication with the interior supplied them.

General Musnier's force was so scattered that he could not fight either of the large Partidas without exposing some important point to the other, and the 29th of September, the Empecinado took possession of the pass of Frasnó, while Duran invested the fortified convent of Calatayud. This place was garrisoned by some French and Italian troops, who differed upon the defence, and when the explosion of two mines had killed a number of them they surrendered. Musnier collected some men to succour the place, but unable to force the pass of Frasnó, retired ; yet being reinforced on the 5th, he again advanced, and a column sent from Navarre by General Reille also came up ; whereupon the Spaniards disappeared until the French retired, and then reoccupied Calatayud. They were now in full communication with Mina and a general plan of invasion was discussed, but as Duran and Mina could not accord each acted separately.

Severoli's division, 8000 strong and just arrived from Italy, then reinforced Musnier, and on the 9th driving the Spaniards from Calatayud, pursued them on the roads to Molina, Daroca, and Medinaceli. On the other side of the Ebro, however, Mina fell on the post of Exca in the Cinco Villas ; the garrison broke through his investment in the night, but he pursued them almost to the gates of Zaragoza, and then turning off towards Ayerbe, attacked that post and menaced the communication by Jaca. The commandant of Zaragoza had sent an Italian battalion to look after the flying garrison of Exca, which was found at Zuera, and the united forces, amounting to 1100 infantry and 60 cavalry, followed Mina, and came up with him at Ayerbe ; the guerilla chief instantly turned with a part of his troops, and the Italians retreated towards Huesca, but, having to cross a plain, were all killed or taken.

Reille and Musnier, hearing of this misfortune, spread their columns in all directions to intercept Mina, but he evaded their toils, and although sharply chased and several times engaged, reached Motrico on the Biscay coast with his prisoners. The *Iris* frigate, which was then harassing the enemy's coast line, took some of them off his hands, and the remainder, 300 in number, were sent to Corunna by the Asturian mountains, but only 36 arrived ; the rest were shot by the escort, under pretence that they made a noise near a French post !

While these events were passing on the left of the Ebro, Mazzuchelli's brigade followed the Empecinado, and having defeated him in a sharp action at Cubillejos de la Sierra, brought off the garrison of Molino and dismantled that fort ; but the smaller Partidas infested the road between Tortosa and Oropesa, and in this disturbed state of affairs reports were rife that an English force was to disembark at Peniscola. Blake also sent Obispo's division against Teruel, which was thus menaced on all sides, for Mahi was still in those parts. Thus the Partizan warfare seemed interminable, and Suchet's situation would really have been very dangerous if he had been opposed by a man of ability. He had an inferior force, and was cooped up between the enemy's fortresses ; his communications were all interrupted ; he had just met with two signal failures at Saguntum, and he was menaced by a formidable army which was entirely master of its operations. Blake, however, soon relieved him of his difficulties.

Palacios with the junta had retired to Alcira, and in concert with the friars of his faction had issued a manifesto, intended to raise a popular commotion to favour his own restoration to the command, but Blake was now become popular ; the Valencians, elated by the successful resistance of Saguntum, called for a battle, and the Spanish general, urged partly by his courage, the only military qualification he possessed, partly that he found his operations on the French rear had not disturbed the siege, acceded to their desire. Mahi and Bassecour's divisions had arrived at Valencia, Obispo was called in to Betera, 8000 irregulars were thrown upon the French communications, and the whole Spanish army, amounting to about 22,000 infantry, 2000 good cavalry, and 36 guns, made ready for battle.

Previous to this, Suchet, although expecting such an event, had detached several parties to scour the road of Tortosa, and had directed Palombini's division to attack Obispo and relieve Teruel. Obispo skirmished at Xerica on the 21st, and then rapidly marched upon Leiria with a view to assist in the approaching battle ; but Blake, who might have attacked while Palombini was absent, took little heed of the opportunity, and Suchet, now aware of his adversary's object, instantly recalled the Italians, who arrived the very morning of the action.

The ground between Murviedro and Valencia was a low flat, interspersed here and there with rugged isolated hills ; it was also intersected by ravines, torrents, and water-cuts, and thickly studded with olive-trees ; but near Saguntum it became straightened by the mountain and the sea, so as to leave an opening of not more than three miles, behind which it again spread out. In this narrow part Suchet resolved to receive the attack, without relinquishing the siege of Saguntum ; and he left a strong detachment in the trenches with orders to open the fire of a new battery the moment the Spanish army appeared.

His left, consisting of Habert's division and some squadrons of dragoons, was refused, to avoid the fire of some vessels of war and gunboats which flanked Blake's march. The centre, under Harispe, was extended to the foot of the mountains, so that he offered an oblique front, crossing the main road from Valencia to Murviedro. Palombini's division and the dragoons were placed in second line behind the centre, and behind them the cuirassiers were held in reserve.

This narrow front was favourable for an action in the plain, but the right flank of the French, and the troops left to carry on the siege, were liable to be turned by the pass of Espiritus, through which the roads from Betera led to Gilet directly upon the line of retreat. To prevent such an attempt Suchet posted Chlopiski with a strong detachment of infantry and the Italian dragoons in the pass, and placed the Neapolitan brigade of reserve at Gilet : in this situation, although his fighting troops did not exceed 17,000 men, and those cooped up between two fortresses, hemmed in by the mountain on one side, the sea on the other, and with only one narrow line of retreat, the French general did not hesitate to engage a very numerous army. He trusted to his superiority in moral resources, and what would have been madness in other circumstances, was here a proof of skilful daring.

Blake, having issued a fine address to his soldiers, on the 25th of October advanced to fight. His right wing, under Zayas, composed of the Albuera divisions,

marched by a road leading upon the village of Puzzol ; and Blake followed in person with a weak reserve, commanded by General Velasco.

The centre, under Lardizabal, supported by the cavalry of Loy and Caro, moved by the main road.

The left, consisting of Miranda's and Villa Campa's infantry and of St. Juan's cavalry, and supported by Mahi's division which came from the side of Betera, moved against the defile of Espiritus. Obispo, also coming from Betera, acted as a flanking corps, and entering the mountains by Naquera, menaced the right of Chlopiski, but he was met by a brigade under General Robert.

The Spaniards moved on rapidly and in good order, driving the French outposts over a ravine called the Piccador, which covered Suchet's front. Zayas and Lardizabal immediately passed this obstacle, as did also Caro and Loy, and the first took possession of Puzzol, while the flotilla, ranged along the coast and protected his right flank. Blake, with Velasco's reserve, halted at El Puig, an isolated hill on the sea-coast behind the Piccador, but Lardizabal and the cavalry forming an oblique line, in order to face the French front, occupied the ground between Puzzol and the Piccador. Thus the Spanish order of battle was cut in two by the ravine, for on the hither side of it St. Juan, Miranda, and Villa Campa were drawn up, and Mahi took possession of a height called the Germanels, which was opposite the mouth of St. Espiritus.

By this disposition the Spanish line, extending from Puzzol to the Germanels, was not less than six miles, and the division of Obispo was separated from the left by about the same distance. Blake's order of battle was therefore feeble, and he was without any efficient reserve, for Velasco was distant and weak, and Mahi's was actually in the line. The French order of battle, covering less than three miles, was compressed and strong, the reserves were well placed and close at hand ; and Chlopiski's division, although a league distant from the main body, was firmly posted and able to take a direct part in the battle, while the interval between him and Suchet was closed by impassable heights.

BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM.

The fight was commenced by Villa Campa, who was advancing against the pass of Espiritus, when the Italian dragoons galloping out overthrew his advanced guard, and put his division into confusion. Chlopiski seeing this, moved down with the infantry, drove Mahi from the Germanels, and then detached a regiment to the succour of the centre, where a brisk battle was going on to the disadvantage of Suchet.


That general had not judged his ground well at first, and when the Spaniards had crossed the Piccador, he too late perceived that an isolated height in advance of Harispe's division could command all that part of the field. Prompt, however, to remedy his error, he ordered the infantry to advance, and galloped forward himself with an escort of hussars to seize the hill ; the enemy was already in possession, and their guns opened from the summit, but the head of Harispe's infantry then attacked, and after a sharp fight, in which General Paris and several superior officers were wounded, gained the height.

At this time Obispo's guns were heard on the hills far to the right, and Zayas passing through Puzzol endeavoured to turn the French left, and as the day was fine, and the field of battle distinctly seen by the soldiers in Saguntum, they crowded on the ramparts, regardless of the besiegers' fire, and uttering loud cries of Victory ! Victory ! by their gestures seemed to encourage their countrymen to press forward. The critical moment of the battle was evidently approaching. Suchet ordered Palombini's Italians, and the dragoons, to support Harispe, and although wounded himself galloped to the cuirassiers and brought them into action. Mea while, the French hussars had pursued the Spaniards from the height to the Piccador, where, however, the latter rallied upon their second line and again advanced ; and it was in vain that the French artillery poured grape-shot into their



Explanatory. &c.
 (OF THE SIEGE & BATTLE OF;
 (SALZBURG,))





ranks, their march was not checked. Loy and Caro's horsemen overthrew the French hussars in a moment, and in the same charge sabred the French gunners and captured their battery. The crisis would have been fatal, if Harispe's infantry had not stood firm while Palombini's division marching on the left under cover of a small rise of ground, suddenly opened a fire upon the flank of the Spanish cavalry, which was still in pursuit of the hussars. These last immediately turned, and the Spaniards thus placed between two fires, and thinking the flight of the hussars had been feigned, to draw them into an ambuscade, hesitated; the next moment a tremendous charge of the cuirassiers put everything into confusion. Caro was wounded and taken, Loy fled with the remainder of the cavalry over the Piccador, the French guns were recovered, the Spanish artillery was taken, and Lardizabal's infantry being quite broken, laid down their arms, or throwing them away, saved themselves as they could. Harispe's division immediately joined Chlopiski's, and both together pursued the beaten troops.

This great, and nearly simultaneous success in the centre, and on the right, having cut the Spanish line in two, Zaya's position became exceedingly dangerous. Suchet was on his flank, Habert advancing against his front, and Blake had no reserve in hand to restore the battle, for the few troops and guns under Velasco, remained inactive at El Puig. However, such had been the vigour of the action in the centre, and so inferior were Suchet's numbers, that it required two hours to secure his prisoners and to rally Palombini's division for another effort. Meanwhile, Zayas, whose left flank was covered in some measure by the water-cuts, fought stoutly, maintained the village of Puzzol for a long time, and when finally driven out, although he was charged several times, by some squadrons attached to Habert's division, effected his retreat across the Piccador, and gained El Puig. Suchet had, however, re-formed his troops, and Zayas now attacked in front and flank, fled along the sea-coast to the Grao of Valencia, leaving his artillery and 800 prisoners.

During this time, Chlopiski and Harispe had pursued Mahi, Miranda, Villa Campa, and Lardizabal, as far as the torrent of Caraixet, where many prisoners were made; but the rest being joined by Obispo, rallied behind the torrent, and the French cavalry having outstripped their infantry, were unable to prevent the Spaniards from reaching the line of the Guadalaviar. The victors had about 1000 killed and wounded, and the Spaniards had not more, but two generals, 5000 prisoners, and 12 guns were taken; and Blake's inability to oppose Suchet in the field, being made manifest by this battle, the troops engaged were totally dispirited, and the effect reached even to Saguntum, for the garrison surrendered that night.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. In this campaign the main object on both sides was Valencia. That city could not be invested until Saguntum was taken, and the Spanish army defeated; hence to protect Saguntum without endangering his army, was the problem for Blake to solve, and it was not very difficult. He had at least 25,000 troops, besides the garrisons of Peniscola, Oropesa, and Segorbe, and he could either command or influence the movements of nearly 20,000 irregulars; his line of operations was direct and secure, and he had a fleet to assist him, and several secure harbours. On the other hand the French general could not bring 20,000 men into action, and his line of operation, which was long, and difficult, was intercepted by the Spanish fortresses. It was for Blake therefore to choose the nature of his defence: he could fight, or he could protract the war.

2. If he had resolved to fight, he should have taken post at Castellon de la Plana, keeping a corps of observation at Segorbe, and strong detachments towards Villa Franca, and Cabanes, holding his army in readiness to fall on the heads of Suchet's columns, as they came out of the mountains. But experience had, or should have, taught Blake that a battle in the open field between the French and Spanish troops, whatever might be the apparent advantage, was uncertain; and

this last and best army of the country ought not to have been risked. He should, therefore, have resolved upon protracting the war, and have merely held that position to check the heads of the French columns, without engaging in a pitched battle.

3. From Castellon de la Plana and Segorbe, the army might have been withdrawn, and concentrated at Murviedro, in one march, and Blake should have prepared an intrenched camp in the hills close to Saguntum, placing a corps of observation in the plain behind that fortress. These hills were rugged, very difficult of access, and the numerous water-cuts and the power of forming inundations in the place were so favourable for defence, that it would have been nearly impossible for the French to have dislodged him; nor could they have invested Saguntum while he remained in this camp.

4. In such a strong position, with his retreat secure upon the Guadalaviar, the Spanish general would have covered the fertile plains from the French foragers, and would have held their army at bay while the irregulars operated upon their communication. He might then have safely detached a division to his left, to assist the Partidas, or to his right, by sea, to land at Peniscola. His forces would soon have been increased and the invasion would have been frustrated.

5. Instead of following this simple principle of defensive warfare consecrated since the days of Fabius, Blake abandoned Saguntum, and from behind the Guadalaviar, sent unconnected detachments on a half circle round the French army, which being concentrated, and nearer to each detachment than the latter was to its own base at Valencia, could and did, as we have seen, defeat them all in detail.

6. Blake, like all the Spanish generals, indulged vast military conceptions far beyond his means, and, from want of knowledge, generally in violation of strategic principles. Thus his project of cutting the communication with Madrid, invading Aragon, and connecting Mina's operations between Zaragoza and the Pyrenees, with Lacy's in Catalonia, was gigantic in design, but without any chance of success. The division of Severoli being added to Musnier's, had secured Aragon; and if it had not been so, the reinforcements then marching through Navarre, to different parts of Spain, rendered the time chosen for these attempts peculiarly unfavourable. But the chief objection was, that Blake had lost the favourable occasion of protracting the war about Saguntum; and the operations against Valencia were sure to be brought to a crisis before the affair of Aragon could have been sufficiently embarrassing to recall the French general. The true way of using the large guerilla forces, was to bring them down close upon the rear of Suchet's army, especially on the side of Teruel, where he had magazines; which could have been done safely, because these Partidas had an open retreat, and if followed would have effected their object, of weakening and distressing the army before Valencia. This would have been quite a different operation from that which Blake adopted, when he posted Obispo and O'Donnel at Benaguazil and Segorbe; because those generals' lines of operations, springing from the Guadalaviar, were within the power of the French; and this error alone proves that Blake was entirely ignorant of the principles of strategy.

7. Urged by the cries of the Valencian population, the Spanish general delivered the battle of the 25th, which was another great error, and an error exaggerated by the mode of execution. He who had so much experience, who had now commanded in four or five pitched battles, was still so ignorant of his art, that with twice as many men as his adversary, and with the choice of time and place, he made three simultaneous attacks, on an extended front, without any connection or support; and he had no reserves to restore the fight or to cover his retreat. A wide sweep of the net, without regard to the strength or fierceness of his prey, was Blake's only notion, and the result was his own destruction.

8. Suchet's operations, especially his advance against Saguntum, leaving Oropesa behind him, were able and rapid. He saw the errors of his adversary, and made them fatal. To fight in front of Saguntum was no fault; the French

general acted with a just confidence in his own genius, and the valour of his troops. He gained that fortress by the battle, but he acknowledged that such were the difficulties of the siege, the place could only have been taken by a blockade, which would have required two months.

CHAPTER III.

SAGUNTUM having fallen, Suchet conceived the plan of enclosing and capturing the whole of Blake's force, together with the city of Valencia, round which it was encamped : and he was not deterred from this project by the desultory operations of the Partidas in Aragon, nor by the state of Catalonia. Blake, however, reverting to his former system, called up to Valencia, all the garrisons and depôts of Murcia, and directed the Conde de Montijo, who had been expelled by Soult from Grenada, to join Duran. He likewise ordered Freire to move upon Cuença, with the Murcian army, to support Montijo, Duran, and the Partida chiefs, who remained near Aragon after the defeat of the Empecinado. But the innumerable small bands, or rather armed peasants, immediately about Valencia, he made no use of, neither harassing the French nor in any manner accustoming these people to action.

In Aragon his affairs turned out ill. Mazuchelli entirely defeated Duran in a hard fight, near Almunia, on the 7th of November ; on the 23rd, Campillo was defeated at Añadon, and a Partida having appeared at Peñarova, near Morella, the people rose against it. Finally, Napoleon, seeing that the contest in Valencia was coming to a crisis, ordered General Reille to reinforce Suchet not only with Severoli's Italians, but with his own French division, in all 15,000 good troops.

Meanwhile in Catalonia Lacy's activity had greatly diminished. He had, including the Tercios, above 16,000 troops, of which about 12,000 were armed, and in conjunction with the junta he had classed the whole population in reserves ; but he was jealous of the people, who were generally of the church party, and, as he had before done in the Ronda, deprived them of their arms, although they had purchased them, in obedience to his own proclamation. He also discountenanced as much as possible the popular insurrection, and he was not without plausible reasons for this, although he could not justify the faithless and oppressive mode of execution.

He complained that the Somatenes always lost their arms and ammunition, that they were turbulent, expensive, and bad soldiers, and that his object was to incorporate them by just degrees with the regular army, where they could be of service ; but then he made no good use of the latter himself, and hence he impeded the irregulars without helping the regular warfare. His conduct disgusted the Catalonians. That people had always possessed a certain freedom and loved it ; but they had been treated despotically and unjustly by all the different commanders who had been placed at their head since the commencement of the war ; and now finding that Lacy was even worse than his predecessors, their ardour sensibly diminished ; many went over to the French, and this feeling of discouragement was increased by some unfortunate events.

Henriod, governor of Lerida, had, on the 25th of October, surprised and destroyed, in Balaguer, a swarm of Partidas which had settled on the plain of Urgel, and the Partizans on the left bank of the Ebro had been defeated by the escort of one of the convoys. The French also entrenched a post before the Medas Islands, in November, which prevented all communication by land, and in the same month Maurice Mathieu surprised Mattaro. The war had also now fatigued so many persons, that several towns were ready to receive the enemy as friends. Villa Nueva de Sitjes and other places were in constant communication with Barcelona ; and the people of Cadaques openly refused to pay their contributions to Lacy, declaring that they had already paid the French and meant to side with

the strongest.* One Guinart, a member of the junta, was detected corresponding with the enemy; counter guerillas, or rather freebooting bands, made their appearance near Berga; privateers of all nations infested the coast, and these pirates of the ocean, the disgrace of civilized warfare, generally agreed not to molest each other, but robbed all defenceless flags without distinction. Then the continued bickerings between Sarsfield, Eroles, and Milans, and of all three with Lacy, who was, besides, on bad terms with Captain Codrington, greatly affected the patriotic ardour of the people, and relieved the French armies from the alarm which the first operations had created.

In Catalonia the generals in chief were never natives, nor identified in feeling with the natives. Lacy was unfitted for open warfare, and had recourse to the infamous methods of assassination. Campo Verde had given some countenance to this horrible system, but Lacy and his coadjutors have been accused of instigating the murder of French officers in their quarters, the poisoning of wells, the drugging of wines and flour, and the firing of powder magazines, regardless of the safety even of the Spaniards who might be within reach of the explosion; and if any man shall doubt the truth of this allegation, let him read "*The History of the Conspiracies against the French Armies in Catalonia.*" That work printed in 1813 at Barcelona contains the official reports of the military police upon the different attempts, many successful, to destroy the French troops; and when due allowance for an enemy's tale and for the habitual falsification of police agents is made, ample proofs will remain that Lacy's warfare was one of assassination.

The facility which the great size of Barcelona afforded for these attempts, together with its continual cravings and large garrison, induced Napoleon to think of dismantling the walls of the city, preserving only the forts. This simple military precaution has been noted by some writers as an indication that he even then secretly despaired of final success in the Peninsula: but the weakness of this remark will appear evident, if we consider that he had just augmented his immense army, that his generals were invading Valencia, and menacing Galicia, after having relieved Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo; and that he was himself preparing to lead 400,000 men to the most distant extremity of Europe. However, the place was not dismantled, and Maurice Mathieu contrived both to maintain the city in obedience and to take an important part in the field operations.

It was under these circumstances that Suchet advanced to the Guadalaviar, although his losses and the escorts for his numerous prisoners had diminished his force to 18,000 men, while Blake's army including Freire's division was above 25,000, of which near 3000 were cavalry. He first summoned the city, to ascertain the public spirit; he was answered in lofty terms, yet he knew by his secret communications that the enthusiasm of the people was not very strong; and on the 3rd of November he seized the Grao, and the suburb of Serranos on the left of the Guadalaviar. Blake had broken two out of five stone bridges on the river, had occupied some houses and convents which covered them on the left bank, and protected those bridges which remained whole with regular works. Suchet immediately carried the convents which covered the broken bridges in the Serranos, and fortified his position there and at the Grao, and thus blocked the Spaniards on that side with a small force, while he prepared to pass the river higher up with the remainder of his army.

The Spanish defence on the right bank consisted of three posts.

1. The city itself, which was surrounded by a circular wall 30 feet in height, and 10 feet in thickness, with a road along the summit, the platform along the bastions supported from within by timber scaffolding. There was also a wet ditch and a covered way with earthen works in front of the gates.

2. An intrenched camp of an irregular form five miles in extent. It enclosed the city and the three suburbs of Quarte, San Vincente, and Ruzafa. The slope of

* Appendix, No. 12, section 3.



this work was so steep as to require scaling ladders, and there was a ditch in front 12 feet deep.

3. The lines which extended along the banks of the rivers to the sea at one side, and to the villages of Quarte and Manisses on the other.

The whole line, including the city and camp, was about eight miles; the ground was broken with deep and wide canals of irrigation which branched off from the river just above the village of Quarte, and the Spanish cavalry was posted at Aldaya behind the left wing to observe the open country. Suchet could not venture to force the passage of the river until Reille had joined him, and therefore contented himself with sending parties over to skirmish, while he increased his secret communications in the city, and employed detachments to scour the country in his rear. In this manner, nearly two months passed: the French waited for reinforcements, and Blake hoped that while he thus occupied his enemy a general insurrection would save Valencia. But in December, Reille having given over the charge of Navarre and Aragon to General Caffarelli, marched to Teruel, where Severoli with his Italians had already arrived.

The vicinity of Freire, and Montijo who now appeared near Cuença, obliged Reille to halt at Teruel until General D'Armanac with a detachment of the army of the centre had driven those Spanish generals away, but then he advanced to Segorbe, and as Freire did not rejoin Blake, and as the latter was ignorant of Reille's arrival, Suchet resolved to force the passage of the Guadalaviar instantly.

On the 25th, the Neapolitan division being placed in the camp at the Serranos to hold the Spaniards in check, Habert took post at the Grao, and Palombini's division was placed opposite the village of Mislata, which was about half way between Valencia and the village of Quarte. Reille at the same time made a forced march by Leiria and Benaguazil, and three bridges being thrown in the night above the sources of the canals opposite Ribaroya, the rest of the army crossed the Guadalaviar with all diligence on the 26th and formed in order of battle on the other side. It was then eight o'clock and Reille had not arrived, but Suchet, whose plan was to drive all Blake's army within the entrenched camp, fearing that the Spanish general would evade the danger, if he saw the French divisions in march, resolved to push at once with Harispe's infantry and the cavalry to the Albufera or salt-lake, beyond Valencia, and so cut off Blake's retreat to the Xucar river. Robert's brigade therefore halted to secure the bridges, until Reille should come up, and while the troops left on the other bank of the Guadalaviar attacked all the Spanish river line of entrenchments, Suchet marched towards the lake as rapidly as the thick woods would permit.

The French hussars soon fell in with the Spanish cavalry at Aldaya and were defeated, but this charge was stopped by the fire of the infantry, and the remainder of the French horsemen coming up overthrew the Spaniards. During this time Blake, instead of falling on Suchet with his reserve, was occupied by the defence of the river, especially at the village of Mislata, where a false attack, to cover the passage at Ribaroya, had first given him the alarm. Palombini, who was at this point, had passed over some skirmishers, and then throwing two bridges, attacked the entrenchments; but his troops were repulsed by Zayas, and driven back on the river in disorder; they rallied and had effected the passage of the canals, when a Spanish reserve coming up restored the fight, and the French were finally driven quite over the river. At that moment Reille's division, save one brigade which could not arrive in time, crossed at Ribaroya, and, in concert with Robert, attacked Mahi in the villages of Manisses and Quarte, which had been fortified carefully in front, but were quite neglected on the rear, and on the side of Aldaya. Suchet, who had been somewhat delayed at Aldaya by the aspect of affairs at Mislata, then continued his march to the lake, while Reille, meeting with a feeble resistance at Manisses and Quarte, carried both at one sweep, and turned Mislata, where he united with Palombini. Blake and Zayas retired towards the city, but Mahi driven from Quarte took the road to Alcira on the Xucar, and thus passing behind Suchet's division, was entirely cut off from Valencia.

All the Spanish army on the upper Guadalaviar was now entirely beaten with the loss of its artillery and baggage, and below the city, Habert was likewise victorious. He had first opened a cannonade against the Spanish gun-boats near the Grao, and this flotilla, although in sight of an English seventy-four and a frigate, and closely supported by the *Papillon* sloop, fled without returning a shot; the French then passed the water, and carried the entrenchment, which consisted of a feeble breast-work defended by the irregulars, who had only two guns. When the passage was effected Habert fixed his right as a pivot on the river, and sweeping round with his left, drove the Spaniards towards the camp, but before he could connect his flank with Harispe's troops, who were on the lake, Obispo's division, flying from Suchet's cavalry, passed over the rice ground between the lake and the sea, and so escaped to Cullera. The remainder of Blake's army, about 18,000 of all kinds, returned to the camp and were closely invested during the night.

Three detachments of French dragoons, each man having an infantry soldier behind him, were then sent by the different roads of Alcira, Cullera, and Cuença, the two first in pursuit of Mahi and Obispo, the latter to observe Freire. Mahi, was found in a position at Alcira, and Blake had already sent him orders to maintain the line of the Xucar; but he had lost his artillery, his troops were disheartened, and at the first shot he fled, although the ground was strong and he had 3000 men, while the French were not above 1000. Obispo likewise abandoned Cullera and endeavoured to rejoin Mahi, when a very heavy and unusual fall of snow not only prevented their junction, but offered a fine advantage to the French. For the British consul, thinking the Xucar would be defended, had landed large stores of provisions and ammunition at Denia and was endeavouring to re-embark them, when the storm drove the ships of war off the coast, and for three days 50 cavalry could have captured Denia and all the stores.

In this battle, which cost the French less than 500 men, Zayas alone displayed his usual vigour and spirit, and while retiring upon the city, he repeatedly proposed to Blake to retreat by the road Mahi had followed, which would have saved the army; yet the other was silent, for he was in every way incapable as an officer. With 23,000 infantry, a powerful cavalry, and a wide river in his front—with the command of several bridges by which he could have operated on either side—with strong intrenchments, a secure camp—with a fortified city in the centre, whence his reserves could have reached the most distant point of the scene of operation in less than two hours—with all these advantages he had permitted Suchet, whose force, seeing that one of Reille's brigades had not arrived, scarcely exceeded his own, to force the passage of the river, to beat him at all points, and to enclose him, by a march, which spread the French troops on a circuit of more than 15 miles or five hours' march; and he now rejected the only means of saving his army. But Suchet's operations, which indeed were of the nature of a surprise, prove that he must have had a supreme contempt for his adversary's talents, and the country people partook of the sentiment; the French parties which spread over the country for provisions, as far as Xativa, were everywhere well received, and Blake complained that Valencia contained a bad people.

The 2nd of December, the Spanish general, finding his error, attempted at the head of 10,000 men to break out by the left bank of the Guadalaviar; but his arrangements were unskilful, and when his advanced guard of 5000 men had made way, it was abandoned, and the main column returned to the city. The next day many deserters went over to the French, and Reille's absent brigade, now arrived and reinforced the posts on the left bank of the river. Suchet fortified his camp on the right bank, and having in the night of the 30th repulsed 2000 Spaniards who made a sally, commenced regular approaches against the camp and city.

SIEGE OF VALENCIA.

It was impossible for Blake to remain long in the camp; the city contained 150,000 souls besides the troops, and there was no means of provisioning them,

because Suchet's investment was complete. Sixty heavy guns with their parcels of ammunition, which had reached Saguntum, were transported across the river Guadalaviar to batter the works; and as the suburb of San Vicente, and the Olivet, offered two projecting points of the entrenched camp, which possessed but feeble means of defence, the trenches were opened against them in the night of the 1st of January.

The fire killed Colonel Henri, the chief engineer, but in the night of the 5th the Spaniards abandoned the camp and took refuge in the city; the French, perceiving the movement, escalated the works, and seized two of the suburbs so suddenly, that they captured 80 pieces of artillery and established themselves within 20 yards of the town wall, when their mortar batteries opened upon the place. In the evening, Suchet sent a summons to Blake, who replied, that he would have accepted certain terms the day before, but that the bombardment had convinced him that he might now depend upon both the citizens and the troops.

This answer satisfied Suchet. He was convinced the place would not make any defence, and he continued to throw shells until the 8th; after which he made an attack upon the suburb of Quarte, but the Spaniards still held out and he was defeated. However, the bombardment killed many persons, and set fire to the houses in several quarters; and as there were no cellars or caves, as at Zaragoza, the chief citizens begged Blake to capitulate. While he was debating with them, a friar bearing a flag, which he called the Standard of the Faith, came up with a mob, and insisted upon fighting to the last, and when a piquet of soldiers was sent against him, he routed it and shot the officer: nevertheless his party was soon dispersed. Finally, when a convent of Dominicans close to the walls was taken, and five batteries ready to open, Blake demanded leave to retire to Alicante with arms, baggage, and four guns.

These terms were refused, but a capitulation guaranteeing property and oblivion of the past, and providing that the unfortunate prisoners in the island of Cabrera should be exchanged against an equal number of Blake's army, was negotiated, and ratified on the 9th. Then Blake, complaining bitterly of the people, gave up the city. Above 18,000 regular troops, with 80 stand of colours, 2000 horses, 390 guns, 40,000 muskets, and enormous stores of powder were taken; and it is not one of the least remarkable features of this extraordinary war, that intelligence of the fall of so great a city took a week to reach Madrid, and it was not known in Cadiz until one month after!

On the 14th of January, Suchet made his triumphal entry into Valencia, having completed a series of campaigns in which the feebleness of his adversaries somewhat diminished his glory, but in which his own activity and skill were not the less conspicuous. Napoleon created him Duke of Albufera, and his civil administration was strictly in unison with his conduct in the field, that is to say, vigorous and prudent. He arrested all dangerous persons, especially the friars, and sent them to France, and he rigorously deprived the people of their military resources; but he proportioned his demands to their real ability, kept his troops in perfect discipline, was careful not to offend the citizens by violating their customs, or shocking their religious prejudices, and endeavoured, as much as possible, to govern through the native authorities. The archbishop and many of the clergy aided him, and the submission of the people was secured.

The errors of the Spaniards contributed as much to this object as the prudent vigilance of Suchet; for although the city was lost, the kingdom of Valencia might have recovered from the blow, under the guidance of able men. The convents and churches were full of riches, the towns and villages abounded in resources, the line of the Xucar was very strong, and several fortified places and good harbours remained unsubdued; the Partidas in the hills were still numerous, the people were willing to fight, and the British agents and the British fleets were ready to aid, and to supply arms and stores. The junta however dissolved itself, the magistrates fled from their posts, the populace were left without chiefs; and when the consul, Tupper, proposed to establish a commission of government, having at its head the

padre Rico, the author of Valencia's first defence against Monecy, and the most able and energetic man in those parts, Mahi evaded the proposition; he would not give Rico power, and showed every disposition to impede useful exertion. Then the leading people either openly submitted, or secretly entered into connection with the French, who were thus enabled tranquilly to secure the resources of the country; and as the regency at Cadiz refused the stipulated exchange of prisoners, the Spanish army was sent to France, and the horrors of the Cabrera were prolonged.

During the siege of Valencia, Freire, with his Murcians, including a body of cavalry, had abandoned the passes of the Contreras district and retired across the Xucar to Almanza; Mahi occupied Alcoy, and Villa Campa had marched to Carthagera. Suchet wished to leave them undisturbed until he was ready to attack Alicant itself. But to ensure the fall of Valencia, Napoleon had directed Soult to hold 10,000 men in the Despeñas Peros, ready to march if necessary to Suchet's assistance; and at the same time Marmont was ordered to detach Montbrun with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, from the valley of the Tagus, to co-operate with the army of Aragon. These last-named troops should have interposed between Valencia and Alicant before the battle of the 26th, but they were delayed, and only reached Almanza on the 9th, the very day Valencia surrendered. Freire retreated before them, and Mahi who was preparing to advance again to Alcira, took shelter in Alicant. Montbrun knew that Valencia had fallen, and was advised by Suchet to return immediately, but ambitious to share in the glory of the hour he marched against Alicant, and throwing a few shells summoned it to surrender. The municipal authorities, the governor and many of the leading people, were disposed to yield, yet Montbrun did not press them, and when he retired the place was, as Suchet had foreseen, put into a state of defence. The consul, Tupper, and Roche, the military agent, by distributing clothes and food to the naked famishing soldiers, restored their courage, drew many more to Alicant, and stopped the desertion, which was so great that in one month Freire's division alone had lost 2000 men. Montbrun's attempt, therefore, hurt the French interests, and his troops on their return to Toledo wasted and pillaged the country through which they passed in a shameful manner.

Villa Campa now abandoned Carthagera and returned to the mountains of Albarazin; and Suchet, embarrassed by the failure at Alicant, and dreading the fever at Carthagera, posted Harispe's division on the Xucar, to guard against the pestilence rather than to watch the enemy. Yet he seized Gandia and Denia, which last was strangely neglected both by the Spaniards and by the British squadron after the stores were removed; for the castle had 60 guns mounted, and many vessels were in the port; and as a post it was important, and might easily have been secured until a Spanish garrison could be thrown in. When these points were secured Suchet detached a brigade on the side of Cabrillas to preserve the communication with Cuenca, and then directed Musnier's division to form the siege of Peniscola; but at the moment of investing that place, intelligence arrived that Tarragona, the garrison of which, contrary to orders, had consumed the reserve-provisions, was menaced by Lacy: wherefore Severoli's division moved from Valencia to replace Musnier, and the latter marched to Tortosa in aid of Tarragona. Previous to Musnier's arrival, Lafosse, governor of Tortosa, had advanced with some cavalry and a battalion of infantry to the fort of Balaguer, to observe Lacy, and being falsely told that the Spaniards were in retreat, entered Cambril the 19th, and from thence pushed on with his cavalry to Tarragona. Lacy was nearer than he imagined.

It will be remembered that the Catalan army was posted in the valley of the Congosta and at Mattaro, to intercept the French convoy to Barcelona. In December Maurice Mathieu seized Mattaro, while Dacæen, who had received some reinforcements, brought down the long-expected convoy, and the Spaniards being thus placed between two fires, after a slight action, opened the road. When Dacæen returned to Gerona they resumed their position, but Lacy, after proposing several new projects, which he generally relinquished at the moment of execution,

at last decided to fall on Tarragona, and afterwards to invade Aragon. With this view, he drew off Eroles' division and some cavalry, in all about 6000 men, from the Congosta, and took post about the 18th of January, at Reus. Stores from Cadiz were landed from the English vessels at Cape Salou; Captain Codrington repaired to the Spanish quarters on the 19th to concert a combined operation with the fleet, and it was at this moment the scouts brought word that Lafosse had entered Tarragona with the cavalry, and that the French infantry, about 800 in number, were at Villa Seca, ignorant of the vicinity of the Spanish army.

Lacy immediately put his troops in motion, and Captain Codrington would have returned to his ship, but a patrol of French dragoons chased him back, and another patrol pushing to Salou made two captains and a lieutenant of the squadron prisoners, and brought them to Villa Seca. By this time, however, Lacy had fallen upon the French infantry in front, and Eroles turning both their flanks, and closing upon their rear, killed or wounded 200, when the remainder surrendered.

The naval officers, thus freed, immediately regained their ships, and the squadron was that night before Tarragona; but a gale of wind off shore impeded its fire, the Spaniards did not appear on the land-side, and the next day the increasing gale obliged the ships to anchor to the eastward. Lacy had meanwhile abandoned the project against Tarragona, and after sending his prisoners to Busa, went off himself towards Montserrat, leaving Eroles' division, reinforced by a considerable body of armed peasantry, in a position at Altafulla, behind the Gaya. Here the bridge in front being broken, and the position strong, Eroles, who had been also promised the aid of Sarsfield's division, awaited the attack of 3000 men, who were coming from Barcelona. He was, however, ignorant that Dacæen, finding the ways from Gerona open, because Sarsfield had moved to the side of Vich, had sent General Lamarque with 5000 men to Barcelona, and that Maurice Mathieu was thus in march not with 3000 but 8000 good troops.

BATTLE OF ALTAFULLA.

The French generals, anxious to surprise Eroles, took pains to conceal their numbers, and while Maurice Mathieu appeared in front, Lamarque was turning the left flank. They marched all night, and at daybreak on the 24th, having forded the river, made a well-combined and vigorous attack, by which the Spaniards were defeated with a loss of more than 1000 killed and wounded. The total dispersion of the beaten troops baffled pursuit, and the French in returning to Barcelona suffered from the fire of the British squadron, but Eroles complained that Sarsfield had kept away with a settled design to sacrifice him.

While this was passing in Lower Catalonia, Dacæen scoured the higher country about Olot, and then descending into the valley of Vich, defeated Sarsfield at Centellas, and that General himself was taken, but rescued by one of his soldiers. From Centellas, Dacæen marched by Caldas and Sabadel upon Barcelona, where he arrived the 27th January; meanwhile Musnier re-victualled Tarragona. Thus the Catalans were again reduced to great straits, for the French knowing that they were soon to be reinforced, occupied all the sea-coast, made new roads out of reach of fire from the ships, established fresh posts at Moncado, Mattaro, Palamos, and Cadaques, placed detachments in the higher valleys, and obliged their enemies to resort once more to an irregular warfare; which was, however, but a feeble resource, because from Lacy's policy the people were now generally disarmed and discontented.

Milans, Manso, Eroles, Sarsfield, and Rovira, indeed, although continually quarrelling, kept the field; and being still supplied with arms and stores which the British navy contrived to land, and send into the interior, sustained the war as Partizans until new combinations were produced by the efforts of England; but Lacy's intrigues and unpopularity increased, a general gloom prevailed, and the foundations of strength in the principality were shaken. The patriots indeed still possessed the mountains, but the French held all the towns, all the ports, and most

of the lines of communication ; and their movable columns without difficulty gathered the harvests of the valleys, and chased the most daring of the Partizans. Meanwhile Suchet, seeing that Tarragona was secure, renewed his operations.

SIEGE OF PENISCOLA.

This fortress, crowning the summit of a lofty rock in the sea, was nearly impregnable ; and the only communication with the shore was by a neck of land 60 yards wide and 250 long. In the middle of the town there was a strong castle, well furnished with guns and provisions, and some British ships of war were at hand to aid the defence ; the rock yielded copious springs of water, and deep marshes covered the approach to the neck of land, which being covered by the waves in heavy gales, had also an artificial cut defended by batteries and flanked by gun-boats. Garcia Navarro, who had been taken during the siege of Tortosa, but had escaped from France, was now governor of Peniscola, and his garrison was sufficiently numerous.

On the 20th, ground was broken, and mortar-batteries being established 1200 yards from the fort, opened their fire on the 28th.

In the night of the 31st, a parallel, 500 yards long, was built of fascines and gabions, and batteries were commenced on either flank.

In the night of the 2nd of February the approaches were pushed beyond the first parallel, and the breaching batteries being finished and armed were going to open when a privateer captured a despatch from the governor, who complained in it that the English wished to take the command of the place, and declared his resolution rather to surrender than suffer them to do so. On this hint Suchet opened negotiations which terminated in the capitulation of the fortress, the troops being allowed to go where they pleased. The French found 60 guns mounted, and the easy reduction of such a strong place, which secured their line of communication, produced a general disposition in the Valencians to submit to fortune. Such is Suchet's account of this affair, but the colour which he thought it necessary to give to a transaction full of shame and dishonour to Navarro, can only be considered as part of the price paid for Peniscola. The true causes of its fall were treachery and cowardice. The garrison were from the first desponding and divided in opinion, and the British naval officers did but stimulate the troops and general to do their duty to their country.

After this capture, 6000 Poles quitted Suchet, for Napoleon required all the troops of that nation for his Russian expedition. These veterans marched by Jaca, taking with them the prisoners of Blake's army ; at the same time Reille's two French divisions were ordered to form a separate corps of observation on the Lower Ebro, and Palombini's Italian division was sent towards Soria and Catalayud to oppose Montijo, Villa Campa, and Bassecour, who were still in joint operation on that side. But Reille soon marched towards Aragon, and Severoli's division took his place on the Lower Ebro ; for the Partidas of Duran, Empecinado, and those numerous bands from the Asturias and La Montaña composing the seventh army, harassed Navarre and Aragon, and were too powerful for Caffarelli. Mina's also re-entered Aragon in January, surprised Huesca, and being attacked during his retreat at Lumbar, repulsed the enemy and carried off his prisoners.

Suchet's field force in Valencia was thus reduced by 20,000 men ; he had only 15,000 left, and consequently could not push the invasion on the side of Murcia. The approaching departure of Napoleon from Paris also altered the situation of the French armies in the Peninsula. The king was again appointed the emperor's lieutenant, and he extended the right wing of Suchet's army to Cuença, and concentrated the army of the centre at Madrid ; thus Valencia was made, as it were, a mere head of cantonments, in front of which fresh Spanish armies soon assembled, and Alicant then became an object of interest to the English government. Suchet, who had neglected the wound he received at the battle of Saguntum, now fell into a dangerous disorder, and that fierce flame of war which seemed destined to lick up all the remains of the Spanish power, was suddenly extinguished.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The events which led to the capitulation of Valencia were but a continuation of those faults which had before ruined the Spanish cause in every part of the Peninsula, namely, the neglect of all good military usages, and the mania for fighting great battles with bad troops.

2. Blake needed not to have fought a serious action during any part of the campaign. He might have succoured Saguntum without a dangerous battle, and might have retreated in safety behind the Guadalaviar; he might have defended that river without risking his whole army, and then have retreated behind the Xucar. He should never have shut up his army in Valencia, but having done so he should never have capitulated. Eighteen thousand men, well conducted, could always have broken through the thin circle of investment drawn by Suchet, especially as the Spaniards had the power of operating on both banks of the river. But the campaign was one huge error throughout, and was pithily summed up in one sentence by the Duke of Wellington. Being accused by the regency at Cadiz of having caused the catastrophe, by permitting the army of the north and that of Portugal to send reinforcements to Suchet, he replied thus—"The misfortunes of Valencia are to be attributed to Blake's ignorance of his profession, and to Mahi's cowardice and treachery!"

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.

THE affairs of these provinces were so intimately connected that they cannot be treated separately, wherefore, taking Soult's position at Seville as the centre of a vast system, I will show how, from thence, he dealt his powerful blows around, and struggled, even as a consuming fire, which none could smother though many tried.

Seville, the base of his movements, and the store-house of his army, was fortified with temporary citadels, which, the people being generally submissive, were tenable against desultory attacks. From this point he maintained his line of communication, with the army of Portugal through Estremadura, and with Madrid through La Mancha; and from this point he sustained the most diversified operations on all parts of a circle, which embraced the Condado de Niebla, Cadiz, Grenada, Cordoba, and Estremadura.

The Niebla, which furnished large supplies, was the most vulnerable point, because from thence the allies might intercept the navigation of the river Guadalquivir, and so raise the blockade of Cadiz; and the frontier of Portugal would cover the assembly of the troops until the moment of attack. Moreover, expeditions from Cadiz to the mouth of the Guadiana were, as we have seen, frequent. Nevertheless, when Blake and Ballasteros had been driven from Ayamonte, in July and August, the French were masters of the Condado with the exception of the castle of Paymago, wherefore Soult, dreading the autumnal pestilence, did not keep more than 1200 men on that side.

The blockade of the Isla was always maintained by Victor, whose position formed an irregular crescent, extending from San Lucar de Barameda on the right, to Conil on the left, and running through Xeres, Arcos, Medina, Sidonia, and Chiclana. But that marshal while thus posted was in a manner blockaded himself. In the Isla, including the Anglo-Portuguese division, there were never less than 16,000 troops, who, having the command of the sea, could at any moment land on the flanks of the French. The Partidas, although neither numerous nor powerful, often impeded the intercourse with Seville; the Serranos of the Ronda and the regular forces at Algeiras issuing, as it were, from the fortress of Gibraltar, cut the communication with Grenada; and as Tarifa was still held by the allies, for

General Campbell would never relinquish that important point, the fresh supplies of cattle, drawn from the great plain called the Campiña de Tarifa, were straitened. Meanwhile the expeditions to Estremadura and Murcia, the battles of Barosa and Albuera, and the rout of Baza, had employed all the disposable part of the army of the south : hence Victor's corps, scarcely strong enough to preserve its own fortified position, could make no progress in the attack of the Isla. This weakness of the French army being well known in Cadiz, the safety of that city was no longer doubtful; a part of the British garrison therefore joined Lord Wellington's army, and Blake, as we have seen, carried his Albuera soldiers to Valencia.

In Grenada the 4th corps, which, after the departure of Sebastiani, was commanded by General Laval, had two distinct tasks to fulfil. The one to defend the eastern frontier from the Murcian army; the other to maintain the coast line, beyond the Alpuxaras, against the efforts of the Partidas of those mountains, against the Serranos of the Ronda, and against the expeditionary armies from Cadiz and from Algeiras. However, the defeat at Baza, and the calling off of Mahi, Freire, and Montijo, to aid the Valencian operations, secured the Grenadan frontier; and Martin Carera, who was left there with a small force, having pushed his Partizan excursions rashly, was killed in a skirmish at Lorca about the period when Valencia surrendered.

Cordoba was generally occupied by a division of 5000 or 6000 men, who were ready to operate on the side of Estremadura, or on that of Murcia, and meanwhile chased the Partidas, who were more numerous there than in other parts, and were also connected with those of La Mancha.

Estremadura was the most difficult field of operation. There Badajos, an advanced point, was to be supplied and defended from the most formidable army in the Peninsula; there the communications with Madrid, and with the army of Portugal, were to be maintained by the way of Truxillo; and there the 5th French corps, commanded by Drouet, had to collect its subsistence from a ravaged country; to preserve its communications over the Sierra Morena with Seville; to protect the march of monthly convoys to Badajos; to observe the corps of General Hill, and to oppose the enterprises of Morillo's Spanish army, which was becoming numerous and bold.

Neither the Spanish nor British divisions could prevent Drouet from sending convoys to Badajos, because of the want of bridges on the Guadiana, below the fortress, but Morillo incommoded his foraging parties; for being posted at Valencia de Alcantara, and having his retreat upon Portugal always secure, he vexed the country about Caceres, and even pushed his incursions to Truxillo. The French general, therefore, kept a strong detachment beyond the Guadiana, but this exposed his troops to Hill's enterprises; and that bold and vigilant commander having 10,000 excellent troops, and being well instructed by Wellington, was a very dangerous neighbour.

Marmont's position in the valley of the Tagus, the construction of the forts and bridge at Almaraz, which enabled him to keep a division at Truxillo, and connected him with the army of the south, tended indeed to hold Hill in check, and strengthened the French position in Estremadura; nevertheless, Drouet generally remained near Zafra with his main body, because from thence he could more easily make his retreat good to the Morena, or advance to Merida and Badajos as occasion required.

Such was the state of military affairs on the different parts of the circle round Seville, at the period when Suchet invaded Valencia, and Wellington blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; and to support his extensive operations, the Duke of Dalmatia, if his share of the reinforcements which entered Spain in July and August had joined him, would have had about 100,000 troops, of which 90,000 men and 14,000 horses were French.* But the reinforcements were detained in the different governments, and the actual number of French present with the eagles was not more than 67,000.

The 1st corps contained 20,000; the 4th and 5th about 11,000 each; the garrison of Badajos was 5000; 20,000 formed a disposable reserve, and the rest of the force consisted of "Escopeteros" and civic guards, who were chiefly employed in the garrisons and police. Upon pressing occasions, Soult could therefore take the field, at any point, with 24,000 or 25,000 men, and in Estremadura, on very pressing occasions, with even a greater number of excellent troops well and powerfully organized. The manner in which this great army was paralyzed in the latter part of 1811 shall now be shown.

In October, Drouet was in the Morena, and Girard at Merida, watching Morillo, who was in Caceres, when Soult, who had just returned to Seville after his Murcian expedition, sent 3000 men to Fregenal, seemingly to menace the Alemtejo. General Hill therefore recalled his brigades from the right bank of the Tagus, and concentrated his whole corps behind the Campo Mayor on the 9th.

The 11th, Girard and Drouet advanced, the Spanish cavalry retired from Caceres, the French drove Morillo to Caza de Cantellana, and everything indicated a serious attack; but at this moment Soult's attention was attracted by the appearance of Ballasteros in the Ronda, and he recalled the force from Fregenal. Drouet, who had reached Merida, then retired to Zafra, leaving Girard with a division and some cavalry near Caceres.

Ballasteros had disembarked at Algeiras on the 11th of September, and immediately marched with his own and Beguines' troops, in all 4000 men, to Ximena, raising fresh levies and collecting the Serranos of the Ronda as he advanced. On the 18th, he had endeavoured to succour the castle of Alcala de Gazules, where Beguines had a garrison, but a French detachment from Chiclana, had already reduced that post, and after some skirmishing both sides fell back, the one to Chiclana, the other to Ximena.

At this time 6000 French were collected at Ubrique, intending to occupy the sea coast, from Algeiras to Conil, in furtherance of a great project which Soult was then meditating, and by which he hoped to effect, not only the entire subjection of Andalusia, but the destruction of the British power in the Peninsula. But this design, which shall be hereafter explained more fully, required several preliminary operations, amongst the most important of which was the capture of Tarifa; for that place, situated in the narrowest part of the straits, furnished either a protection, or a dangerous point of offence, to the Mediterranean trade, following the relations of its possessor with England. It affected, as we have seen, the supplies of the French before the Isla; it was from its nearness, and from the run of the current, the most convenient and customary point for trading with Morocco; it menaced the security of Ceuta, and it possessed, from ancient recollections, a species of feudal superiority over the smaller towns and ports along the coast, which would have given the French, if they had taken it, a moral influence of some consequence.

Soult had in August despatched a confidential officer from Conil to the African coast to negotiate with the Barbaric emperor, and the latter had agreed to a convention, by which he engaged to exclude British agents from his court; and to permit vessels of all nations to use the Moorish flag to cover their cargoes, while carrying to the French those supplies hitherto sent to the allies, provided Soult would occupy Tarifa as a depôt. This important convention was on the point of being ratified, when the opportune arrival of some unusually magnificent presents from England, turned the scale against the French: their agent was then dismissed, the English supplies were increased, and Mr. Stuart entered into a treaty for the purchase of horses to remount the allied cavalry.

Although foiled in this attempt, Soult, calculating on the capricious nature of barbarians, resolved to fulfil his part by the capture of Tarifa; hence it was, that when Ballasteros appeared at Ximena, he arrested the movement of Drouet against the Alemtejo, and sent troops from Seville by Ubrique against the Spanish general, whose position besides being extremely inconvenient to the 1st and 4th corps, was likely to effect the taking of Tarifa. Ballasteros, if reinforced, might also have

become very dangerous to the blockade of Cadiz, by intercepting the supplies from the Campiña de Tarifa, and still more by menacing Victor's communications with Seville, along the Guadalquivir. A demonstration by the allies in the Isla de Leon arrested the march of these French troops for a moment, but on the 14th, 8000 men under Generals Godinot and Semélé advanced upon St. Roque and Algeiras. The inhabitants of those places immediately fled to the green island, and Ballasteros took refuge under Gibraltar, where his flanks were covered by the gun-boats of the place. The garrison was too weak to assist him with men, and thus cooped up, he lived upon the resources of the place, while efforts were therefore made to draw off the French by harassing their flanks. The naval means were not sufficient to remove his whole army to another quarter, but 700 were transported to Manilba, where the Serranos and some Partidas had assembled on the left of the French, and at the same time 1200 British troops with four guns, under Colonel Skerret, and 2000 Spaniards, under Copons, sailed from Cadiz to Tarifa to act upon the French right.

Copons was driven back by a gale of wind, but Skerret arrived the 17th. The next day Godinot sent a detachment against him, but the sea road by which it marched was so swept with the guns of the *Tuscan* frigate, aided by the boats of the *Stately*, that the French, after losing some men, returned. Then Godinot and Semélé being in dispute, and without provisions, retreated; they were followed by Ballasteros' cavalry as far as Ximena, where the two generals separated in great anger, and Godinot, having reached Seville, shot himself. This failure in the south unsettled Soult's plans, and was followed by a heavier disaster in Estremadura.

SURPRISE OF AROYO MOLINO.

WHEN Drouet had retired to Zafra, Hill received orders from Wellington to drive Girard away from Caceres, that Morillo might forage that country. For this purpose he assembled his corps at Albuquerque on the 23rd, and Morillo brought the 5th Spanish army to Aliseda on the Salor. Girard was then at Caceres with an advanced guard at Aroyo de Puerco, but on the 24th, Hill occupied Aliseda and Casa de Cantillana, and the Spanish cavalry drove the French from Aroyo de Puerco. The 26th, at daybreak, Hill entered Malpartida de Caceres, and his cavalry pushed back that of the enemy. Girard then abandoned Caceres, but the weather was wet and stormy, and Hill, having no certain knowledge of the enemy's movements, halted for the night at Malpartida.

On the morning of the 27th, the Spaniards entered Caceres; the enemy was tracked to Torre Mocha on the road to Merida; and the British general, hoping to intercept their line of march, pursued by a cross road, through Aldea de Cano and Casa de Don Antonio. During this movement intelligence was received that the French general had halted at Aroyo Molino, leaving a rear-guard at Albala, on the main road to Caceres, which proved that he was ignorant of the new direction taken by the allies, and only looked to a pursuit from Caceres. Hill immediately seized the advantage, and by a forced march reached Alcuesca in the night, being then within a league of Aroyo de Molinos.

This village was situated in a plain, and behind it a sierra or ridge of rocks, rose in the form of a crescent, about two miles wide on the chord. One road led directly from Alcuesca upon Aroyo, another entered it from the left, and three led from it to the right. The most distant of the last was the Truxillo road, which rounded the extremity of the sierra; the nearest was the Merida road, and between them was that of Medellin.

During the night, though the weather was dreadful, no fires were permitted in the allied camp; and at two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, the troops moved to a low ridge, half a mile from Aroyo, under cover of which they formed three bodies; the infantry on the wings and the cavalry in the centre. The left column then marched straight upon the village, the right marched towards the extreme



Explanatory Sketch of
(GEN. HILL'S OPERATIONS.)

point of the sierra, where the road to Truxillo turned the horn of the crescent ; the cavalry kept its due place between both.

One brigade of Girard's division, having marched at four o'clock by the road of Medellin, was already safe, but Dombrowski's brigade and the cavalry of Briche were still in the place ; the horses of the rear-guard, unbridled, were tied to the olive-trees, and the infantry were only gathering to form on the Medellin road outside the village. Girard himself was in his quarters, waiting for his horse, when two British officers galloped down the street, and in an instant all was confusion ; the cavalry bridled their horses, and the infantry run to their alarming posts. But a thick mist rolled down the craggy mountain, a terrifying shout, drowning even the clatter of the elements, arose on the blast, and with the driving storm came the 71st and 92nd regiments, charging down the street. Then the French rear-guard of cavalry, fighting and struggling hard, were driven to the end of the village, and the infantry, hastily forming their squares, covered the main body of the horsemen which gathered on their left.

The 71st immediately lined the garden walls, and opened a galling fire on the nearest square, while the 92nd, filing out of the streets, formed upon the French right ; the 50th regiment closely following, secured the prisoners in the village, and the rest of the column, headed by the Spanish cavalry, skirted the outside of the houses, and endeavoured to intercept the line of retreat. The guns soon opened on the French squares, the 13th dragoons captured their artillery, the 9th dragoons and German hussars charged their cavalry and entirely dispersed it with great loss ; but Girard, an intrepid officer, although wounded, still kept his infantry together, and continued his retreat by the Truxillo road. The right column of the allies was, however, already in possession of that line, the cavalry and artillery were close upon the French flank, and the left column, having re-formed, was again coming up fast ; Girard's men were falling by fifties, and his situation was desperate, yet he would not surrender, but giving the word to disperse, endeavoured to escape by scaling the almost inaccessible rocks of the sierra. His pursuers, not less obstinate, immediately divided. The Spaniards ascended the hills at an easier part beyond his left, the 39th regiment and Ashworth's Portuguese turned the mountain by the Truxillo road ; the 28th and 34th, led by General Howard, followed him step by step up the rocks, and prisoners were taken every moment, until the pursuers, heavily loaded, were unable to continue the trial of speed with men who had thrown away their arms and packs. Girard, Dombrowski, and Briche, escaped at first to San Hernando and Zorita, in the Guadalupe mountains, after which, crossing the Guadiana at Orellano on the 9th of November, they rejoined Drouet with about 600 men, the remains of 3000. They were said to be the finest troops then in Spain, and, indeed, their resolution not to surrender in such an appalling situation was no mean proof of their excellence.

The trophies of this action were the capture of 1200 or 1300 prisoners, including General Bron and the Prince of AreMBERG ; all the French artillery, baggage, and commissariat, together with a contribution just raised ; and during the fight, a Portuguese brigade, being united to Penne Villamur's cavalry was sent to Merida, where some stores were found. The loss of the allies was not more than 70 killed and wounded, but one officer, Lieutenant Strenowitz, was taken. He was distinguished by his courage and successful enterprises, but he was an Austrian, who having abandoned the French army in Spain to join Julian Sanchez' Partidas, was liable to death by the laws of war ; having been, however, originally forced into the French service he was, in reality, no deserter. General Hill, anxious to save him, applied frankly to General Drouet, and such was the latter's good temper, that while smarting under this disaster he released his prisoner.

Girard was only deprived of his division, which was given to General Barois, yet in a military point of view his offence was unpardonable. He knew two or three days before that General Hill was near him ; he knew that there was a good road from Malpartida to Alcuessa, because he had himself passed it coming from Caceres ; and yet he halted at Aroyo de Molino without necessity, and without

sending out even a patrol upon his flank, thus sacrificing 2000 brave men. Napoleon's clemency was therefore great, and yet not misplaced, for Girard afterwards repaid it by his devotion at the battle of Lutzen when the emperor's star was on the wane. On the other hand, General Hill neglected no precaution, let no advantage escape; and to good arrangements added celerity of movement, with the utmost firmness and vigour of execution. His troops seconded him as he merited; and here was made manifest the advantage of possessing the friendship of a people so strongly influenced by the instincts of revenge as the Peninsulars; for during the night of the 27th, every Spaniard in Aroya, as well as in Alcuésca, knew that the allies were at hand, and not one was found so base or so indiscreet as to betray the fact.

This blow being struck, Hill returned to his old quarters, and the Spanish troops fell back behind the Salor, but the report of Girard's disaster set all the French corps in motion. Drouet re-occupied Cáceres with 1000 men; Foy passed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 15th of November, and moved to Truxillo; a convoy entered Badajoz from Zafra on the 12th, a second on the 20th, and Soult, while collecting troops in Seville, directed Phillipon to plant all the ground under the guns at Badajoz with potatoes and corn. Everything seemed to indicate a powerful attack upon Hill, when a serious disturbance amongst the Polish troops, at Ronquillo, obliged Soult to detach men from Seville to quell it. When that was effected, a division of 4000 entered Estremadura, and Drouet, whose corps was thus raised to 14,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, on the 5th of December advanced to Almedralejos, and the 18th his advanced guard occupied Mérida. At the same time Marmont concentrated part of his army at Toledo, from whence Montbrun, as we have seen, was directed to aid Suchet at Valencia, and Soult with the same view sent 10,000 men to the Despeños Peros.

Drouet's movements were, however, again stopped by some insubordination in the 5th corps. And as it was now known that Soult's principal object was to destroy Ballasteros and take Tarifa, Hill again advanced, partly to protect Morillo from Drouet, partly to save the resources of Estremadura, partly to make a diversion in favour of Ballasteros and Tarifa, and in some sort also for Valencia. With this view he entered Estremadura by Albuquerque on the 27th of December, and having received information that the French, untaught by their former misfortunes, were not vigilant, he made a forced march in hopes to surprise them. On the 28th, he passed Villar del Rey and San Vicente and reached Nava de Membrillos, where he fell in with 300 French infantry and a few hussars, part of a foraging party, the remainder of which was at a village two leagues distant. A patrol gave an alarm, the French retreated towards Mérida, and were closely followed by 400 of the allied cavalry, who had orders to make every effort to stop their march; but to use the words of General Hill, "The intrepid and admirable manner in which the enemy retreated, the infantry formed in square, and favoured as he was by the nature of the country of which he knew how to take the fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting anything against him." Captain Neveux, the able officer who commanded on this occasion, reached Mérida with a loss of only 40 men, all killed or wounded by the fire of the artillery; but the French at Mérida immediately abandoned their unfinished works, and evacuated that town in the night, leaving behind some bread and a quantity of wheat.

From Mérida, Hill, intending to fight Drouet, marched on the 1st of January to Almedralejos, where he captured another field store; but the French general, whose troops were scattered, fell back towards Zafra; the weather was so bad, and the roads so deep, that General Hill with the main body halted, while Colonel Abercrombie, with a detachment of Portuguese and German cavalry, followed the enemy's rear-guard. Meanwhile Phillipon, who never lost an advantage, sent either the detachment which had escorted the convoy to Badajoz, or some Polish troops with whom he was discontented, down the Portuguese frontier on the right of the Guadiana, by Moura, Mourão, and Serpe, with orders to drive the herds of cattle from those places into the Sierra Morena.

Abercrombie reached Fuente del Maestro on the evening of the 3rd, where, meeting with a stout squadron of the enemy, a stiff charge took place, and the French, out-numbered and flanked on both sides, were overthrown with a loss of 30 men. But Drouet was now in full retreat for Monasterio, and Morillo, moving upon Medellin, took post at San Benito. Thus the allies remained masters of Estremadura until the 13th of January, when Marmont's divisions moved by the valley of the Tagus towards the eastern frontier of Portugal; Hill then returned to Portalegre and sent a division over the Tagus to Castello Branco. Drouet immediately returned to Llerena, and his cavalry supported by a detachment of infantry marched against Morillo, but that general, instead of falling back when Hill did, had made a sudden incursion to La Mancha, and was then attacking the castle of Almagro. There, however, he was so completely defeated by General Treillard that, flying to Horcajo in the Guadalupe mountains, although he reached it on the 18th, his fugitives were still coming in on the 21st, and his army remained for a long time in the greatest disorder.

CHAPTER V.

WHILE the events recorded in the foregoing chapter were passing in Estremadura, the south of Andalusia was the scene of more important operations. Soult, persisting in his design against Tarifa, had given orders to assemble a battering train, and directed General Laval, with a strong division of the 4th corps, to move from Antequera upon San Roque. Skerrett was then menacing the communications of General Semélé on the side of Vejer de Frontera, and Ballasteros had obtained some success against that general at Bornos on the 5th of November; but Skerrett, finding that Copons, instead of 4000 men, had only brought 700, returned to Tarifa on the approach of some French from Conil.

Semélé, being thus reinforced, obliged Ballasteros, on the 27th, again to take refuge under the walls of Gibraltar, which he reached just in time to avoid a collision with Laval's column from Antequera. Semélé's troops did not follow very close, and a combined attack upon Laval by the divisions of Ballasteros, Skerrett, and Copons, was projected. The two latter, with a part of the troops under Ballasteros, were actually embarked on the 29th of November for the purpose of landing at Manilba, in pursuance of this scheme, when Semélé's column came in sight, and Skerrett and Copons instantly returned to Tarifa.

Ballasteros remained at Gibraltar, a heavy burden upon that fortress, and his own troops without shelter from the winter rain, wherefore General Campbell proposed to send them, in British vessels, to renew the attempt against Malaga, which had formerly failed under Lord Blayney. On the 12th of January, at the very moment of embarking, the French retired from before Gibraltar by the Puerto de Ojen, a grand pass connecting the plains of Gibraltar and the valleys of the Guadarranque with a great and rich plain called the Campiña de Tarifa; and with the gorge of Los Pedragosos, which is the eastern entrance to the pastures called the Vega de Tarifa. This movement was preparatory to the siege of Tarifa; and as the battering train was already within five leagues of that place, Skerrett proposed to seize it by a combined operation from Cadiz, Tarifa, Gibraltar, and Los Barrios, where Ballasteros had now taken post. This combination was, however, on too wide a scale to be adopted in all its parts; Ballasteros indeed fell on the enemy by surprise at the pass of Ojen, and Skerrett and Copons received orders from General Campbell to take advantage of this diversion; but the former, seeing that his own plan was not adopted to its full extent, would not stir, and the Spaniards, after a skirmish of six hours, retired. Laval then left 1500 men to observe Ballasteros, and placing a detachment at Vejes to cover his right flank, threaded Los Pedragosos and advanced against Tarifa.

This town was scarcely expected by the French to make any resistance. It was encircled with towers, which were connected by an ancient archery wall, irregular in

form, without a ditch, and so thin as to offer no resistance even to field artillery. To the north and east some high ridges flanked, and seemed entirely to command, the weak rampart ; but the English engineer had observed that the nearest ridges formed, at half pistol-shot, a natural glacis, the plane of which, one point excepted, intersected the crest of the parapet with great nicety ; and to this advantage was added a greater number of towers, better flanks, and more powerful resources for an interior defence. He judged, therefore, that the seemingly favourable nature of the ridges, combined with other circumstances, would scarcely fail to tempt the enemy to commence their trenches on that side. With a view to render the delusion unavoidable, he strengthened the western front of the place, rendered the access to it uneasy by demolishing the main walls and removing the flooring of an isolated suburb on the north-west, and an outwork of a convent which was situated about 100 yards from the place and to the east of the suburb. This done, he prepared an internal defence which rendered the storming of the breach the smallest difficulty to be encountered ; but to appreciate his design the local peculiarities must be described.

Tarifa was cloven in two by the bed of a periodical torrent, which, entering at the east, passed out at the opposite point. This stream was barred at its entrance by a tower with a portcullis, in front of which palisades were planted across the bed of the water. The houses within the walls were strongly built, and occupied inclined planes rising from each side of the torrent, and at the exit of the latter there were two massive structures, forming part of the walls, called the tower and castle of the Gusmans, both of which looked up the hollow formed by the meeting of the inclined planes at the stream. From these structures, first a sandy neck of land, and then a causeway, the whole being about 600 yards long, joined the town to an island, or rather promontory, about 2000 yards in circumference, with perpendicular sides, which forbade any entrance save by the causeway ; and at the island end of the latter there was an unfinished entrenchment and battery.

On the connecting neck of land were some sand hills, the highest of which, called the Catalina, was scarped and crowned with a slight field work, containing a 12-pounder. This hill covered the causeway, and in conjunction with the tower of the Gusmans, which was armed with a ship 18-pounder, flanked the western front, and commanded all the ground between the walls and the island. The gun in the tower of the Gusmans also shot clear over the town on to the slope where the French batteries were expected to be raised ; and in addition to these posts, the stately ship of the line, the *Druid* frigate, and several gun and mortar-boats were anchored in the most favourable situation for flanking the enemy's approaches.

Reverting, then, to the head of the defence, it will be seen that, while the ridges on the eastern fronts and the hollow bed of the torrent, which offered cover for troops moving to the assault, deceitfully tempted the enemy to that side ; the flanking fire of the convent, the ruins of the suburb, the hill of the Catalina, and the appearance of the shipping deterred them even from examining the western side, and, as it were, forcibly urged them towards the eastern ridge, where the English engineer wished to find them. There he had even marked their ground, and indicated the situation of the breach ; that is to say, close to the entrance of the torrent, where the hollow meeting of the inclined planes rendered the inner depth of the walls far greater than the outer depth ; where he had loop-holed the houses, opened communications to the rear, barricaded the streets, and accumulated obstacles. The enemy after forcing the breach would thus have been confined between the houses on the inclined planes, exposed on each side to the musketry from the loop-holes and windows, and in front to the fire of the tower of the Gusmans, which looked up the bed of the torrent. Thus disputing every inch of ground, the garrison could at worst have reached the castle and tower of the Gusmans, which, being high and massive, were fitted for rear-guards to cover the evacuation of the place, and were provided with ladders for the troops to descend and retreat to the island under cover of the Catalina.

The artillery available for the defence appeared very powerful, for besides that



of the shipping and the guns in the Catalina, there were in the island 12 pieces, comprising four 24-pounders and two 10-inch mortars; and in the town there were six field-pieces and four coehorns on the east front. An 18-pounder was on the Gusmans, a howitzer on the portcullis tower, and two field-pieces were kept behind the town in reserve for sallies; but most of the artillery in the island was mounted after the investment, so that two 24-pounders and two mortars only could take part in the defence of the town; and as the walls and towers of the latter were too weak and narrow to sustain heavy guns, only three field-pieces and the coehorns did in fact reply to the enemy's fire.

SIEGE OF TARIFA.

The garrison, including 600 Spanish infantry and 100 horse of that nation, amounted to 2500 men, and were posted in the following manner:—700 were in the island, 100 in the Catalina, 200 in the convent, and 1500 in the town.

On the 19th of December, the enemy having driven in the advanced posts, were encountered with a sharp skirmish, and designedly led towards the eastern front.

The 20th, the place was invested, but on the 21st a piquet of French troops having incautiously advanced towards the western front, Captain Wren, of the 11th, suddenly descended from the Catalina and carried them off. In the night the enemy approached close to the walls, but the next morning Captain Wren again came down from the Catalina, and at the same time the troops sallied from the convent, with a view to discover the position of the French advanced posts. So daring was this sally that Mr. Welstead, of the 82nd, actually pushed into one of their camps and captured a field-piece there, and although he was unable to bring it off in face of the French reserves, the latter were drawn by the skirmish under the fire of the ships, of the island, and of the town, whereby they suffered severely and could with difficulty recover the captured piece of artillery from under the guns of the north-east tower.

In the night of the 22nd the anticipations of the British engineer were realized. The enemy broke ground in two places, 500 yards from the eastern front, and assiduously pushed forward their approaches until the 26th; but always under a destructive fire, to which they replied with musketry and with their wall-pieces, which killed several men, and would have been very dangerous but for the sand-bags which Captain Nicholas, the chief engineer at Cadiz, had copiously supplied. This advantage was, however, counterbalanced by the absence of the ships, which were all driven away in a gale on the 23rd.

On the 27th, the French battering-train arrived, and, on the 29th, the 16-pounders opened against the town, and the howitzers against the island. These last did little damage beyond dismounting the gun in the tower of the Gusmans, which was, however, quickly re-established; but the 16-pounders brought the old wall down in such flakes, that in a few hours a wide breach was effected, a little to the left of the portcullis tower, looking from the camp.

The place was now exposed both to assault and escalade, but behind the breach the depth to the street was above 14 feet, the space below was covered with iron window-gratings, having every second bar turned up, the houses there, and behind all points liable to escalade, were completely prepared and garrisoned, and the troops were dispersed all round the ramparts, each regiment having its own quarter assigned. The Spanish and 47th British regiment guarded the breach, and on their right some riflemen prolonged the line. The 87th regiment occupied the portcullis tower, and extended along the rampart to the left.

In the night of the 29th, the enemy fired salvos of grape on the breach, but the besieged cleared the foot of it between the discharges.

The 30th, the breaching fire was renewed, the wall was broken for 60 feet, and the whole breach offered an easy ascent, yet the besieged again cleared away the rubbish, and in the night were fast augmenting the defences behind, when a heavy rain filled the bed of the river, and the torrent bringing down, from the French

camp, planks, fascines, gabions, and dead bodies, broke the palisades with a shock, bent the portcullis backward, and with the surge of the waters even injured the defences behind the breach : a new passage was thus opened in the wall, yet such was the vigour of the besieged, that the damage was repaired before the morning, and the troops calmly and confidently awaited

THE ASSAULT.

The waters subsided in the night as quickly as they had risen, but at daylight a living stream of French grenadiers glided swiftly down the bed of the river, and as if assured of victory, arrived, without shout or tumult, within a few yards of the walls, when, instead of quitting the hollow to reach the breach, they, like the torrent of the night, continued their rapid course and dashed against the portcullis. The British soldiers, who had hitherto been silent and observant, as if at a spectacle which they were expected to applaud, now arose, and with a crashing volley smote the head of the French column ! The leading officer, covered with wounds, fell against the portcullis, and gave up his sword through the bars to Colonel Gough ; the French drummer, a gallant boy, who was beating the charge, dropped lifeless by his officer's side, and the dead and wounded filled the hollow. The remainder of the assailants then breaking out to the right and left, spread along the slopes of ground under the ramparts, and opened a quick irregular musketry. At the same time, a number of men coming out of the trenches, leaped into pits dugged in front, and shot fast at the garrison, but no escalade or diversion at the other points was made, and the storming column was dreadfully shattered. For the ramparts streamed forth fire, and from the north-eastern tower a field-piece, held in reserve expressly for the occasion, sent, at pistol-shot distance, a tempest of grape whistling through the French masses, which were swept away in such a dreadful manner, that they could no longer endure the destruction, but plunging once more into the hollow returned to their camp, while a shout of victory, mingled with the sound of musical instruments, passed round the wall of the town.

In this combat the allies lost five officers and 31 men, but the French dead covered all the slopes in front of the rampart, and choked the bed of the river, and 10 wounded officers, of whom only one survived, were brought in by the breach. Skerrett, compassionating their sufferings and admiring their bravery, permitted Laval to fetch off the remainder ; and the operations of the siege were then suspended, for both sides suffered severely from the weather. The rain partially ruined the French batteries, interrupted their communications, and stopped their supplies ; on the other hand the torrent, again swelling, broke the stockades of the allies and injured their retrenchments, and some vessels, coming from Gibraltar with ammunition, were wrecked on the coast. Nevertheless a fresh assault was hourly expected until the night of the 4th, when, several cannon-shots being heard in the French camp, without any bullets reaching the town, it was judged that the enemy were destroying the guns previous to retreating. Soon afterwards large fires were observed, and at daylight the troops issuing out of the convent, drove the enemy from the batteries, and commenced a skirmish with the rear-guard ; but a heavy storm impeded the action ; the French conducted their retreat skilfully, and the British, after making a few prisoners, relinquished the pursuit. Nevertheless Laval's misfortunes did not end here. The privations his troops had endured in the trenches produced sickness ; many men deserted, and it was computed, at the time, that the expedition cost the French not less than 1000 men, while the whole loss of the allies did not exceed 150.

Such is the simple tale of Tarifa, but the true history of its defence cannot there be found. To hide the errors of the dead is not always a virtue, and when it involves injustice to the living it becomes a crime ; Colonel Skerrett has obtained the credit, but he was not the author of the success at Tarifa. He, and Lord Proby, the second in command, were from the first impressed with a notion that the place could not be defended and ought to be abandoned ; all their proceedings

tended to that end, and they would even have abandoned the island. At Colonel Skerrett's express desire, General Cooke had recalled him on the 18th, that is to say, the day before the siege commenced; and during its progress he neither evinced hopes of final success, nor made exertions to obtain it; in some instances he even took measures tending directly towards failure.* To whom, then, was England indebted for this splendid achievement? The merit of the conception is undoubtedly due to General Campbell, the lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar. He first occupied Tarifa, and he also engaged the Spaniards to admit an English garrison into Ceuta, that the navigation of the straits and the coasting trade might be secured; for he was the only authority in the south of the Peninsula, who appeared to understand the true value of those points. Finally, it was his imperious and even menacing orders, which prevented Colonel Skerrett from abandoning Tarifa before the siege commenced.

General Campbell's resolution is the more to be admired because Tarifa was, strictly speaking, not within his command, which did not extend beyond the walls of his own fortress; and he had also to contend against General Cooke, who claimed the control of a garrison which was chiefly composed of troops from Cadiz. He acted also contrary to the opinion of Lord Wellington, who, always averse to any serious co-operation with the Spaniards, as well knowing the latter would inevitably fail, and throw the burthen on the British in the hour of need, was in this instance more strongly influenced, because the reports of General Cooke, founded on Colonel Skerrett's and Lord Proby's representations, reprobated the defence of Tarifa. Thus misinformed of the real resources, and having no local knowledge of the place, Lord Wellington judged that the island only could be held—that Skerrett's detachment was not wanting for that purpose—and that without the island the enemy could not keep possession of Tarifa. Were they even to take both, he thought they should not retain them, while Ballasteros was in strength and succoured from Gibraltar, unless they also kept a strong force in those parts; finally, that the defence of the island was the least costly and the most certain.† However, with that prudence, which always marked his proceedings, although he gave his opinion, he would not interfere from a distance, in a matter which could only be accurately judged of on the spot.

But the island had not a single house, and was defenceless; the rain alone, without reckoning the effects of the enemy's shells, would have gone near to force the troops away; and as the shipping could not always remain in the roadstead, the building of casemates and barracks, and storehouses for provisions and ammunition, would have been more expensive than the defence of the town. Tarifa was therefore an outwork to the island, and one so capable of a good defence that a much more powerful attack had been expected, and a more powerful resistance prepared by the English engineer; a defence not resting on the valour of the troops alone, but upon a skilful calculation of all the real resources, and all the chances.

That the value of the object was worth the risk may be gathered from this, that Soult, three months after the siege, thus expressed himself, "The taking of Tarifa will be more hurtful to the English and to the defenders of Cadiz, than the taking of Alicant or even Badajos, where I cannot go without first securing my left and taking Tarifa." And, besides the advantages already noticed as belonging to the possession of this place, it was close to Ceuta where there were a few British soldiers, but many French prisoners, and above 2000 discontented Spanish troops and galley-slaves; Ceuta, which was so neglected by the Spanish regency that a French general, a prisoner, did not hesitate to propose to the governor to give it up to Soult as his only means of avoiding starvation. Neither would Soult have failed to strengthen himself at Tarifa in despite of Ballasteros, were it only to command the supplies of the Campiña, and those from Barbary which could but be brought to that port or to Conil: the latter was, however, seldom frequented by the Moors, because the run was long and precarious, whereas a favourable current always

* Appendix, No., 17 section 3.

† Appendix, No. 17, section 5.

brought their craft well to Tarifa.* Swarms of French gun-boats would, therefore, soon have given Soult the command of the coasting trade, if not of the entire straits.

Tarifa then was worth the efforts made for its defence ; and setting aside the courage and devotion of the troops, without which nothing could have been effected, the merit chiefly appertains to Sir Charles Smith, the captain of engineers. That officer's vigour and capacity overmatched the enemy's strength without, and the weakness and cajolement of those who did not wish to defend it within. Skerrett could not measure a talent above his own mark, and though he yielded to Smith's energy, he did so with avowed reluctance, and dashed it with some wild actions, for which it is difficult to assign a motive ; because he was not a dull man, and he was a brave man, as his death at Bergen-op-Zoom proved. But his military capacity was naught, and his mind did not easily catch another's enthusiasm. Tarifa was the commentary upon Tarragona.

During the siege the engineer's works in front were constantly impeded by Colonel Skerrett ; he would call off the labourers to prepare posts of retreat, and Smith's desire to open the north-gate (which had been built up), that the troops might have egress in case of escalade, was opposed by him, although there was no other point for the garrison to sally, save by the sea-gate which was near the castle. On the 29th of December, a shell fired from the 18-pounder in the tower of the Gusmans, having burst too soon, killed or wounded one of the inhalitants, and a deputation of the citizens came to complain of the accident.† Colonel Skerrett, although the breach was then open, immediately ordered that gun and a 32-pound caronade, which at 400 yards looked into the French batteries to be dismounted and spiked !—and it was done ! To crown this absurd conduct, he assigned the charge of the breach entirely to the Spanish troops, and if Smith had not insisted upon posting the 47th British regiment alongside of them, this alone would have ruined the defence ; because hunger, nakedness, and neglect, had broken the spirit of those poor men, and during the combat General Copons alone displayed the qualities of a gallant soldier.

To the British engineer, therefore, the praise of this splendid action is chiefly due ; because he saw from the first all the resources of the place, and with equal firmness and talent developed them, notwithstanding the opposition of his superiors ; because at the same time, he by skilful imposition, induced the enemy (whose attack should have embraced the suburbs and the north-west salient angle of the place) to open his trenches on the east where the besieged, under the appearance of weakness, had concentrated all their strength ; finally, because he repressed despondency where he failed to infuse confidence. The second in merit was Captain Mitchell, of the artillery ; because in the management of that arm for the defence of the town, his talent and enterprise were conspicuous, especially during the assault ; nor can the result of this last event be taken as the just measure of either officer's merits, seeing that a prolonged siege and a more skilful and powerful attack was expected. In the enemy's camp was found the French engineer's sketch for a renewed operation by a cautious and extensive system of mines and breaches ; but nothing was there laid down that had not been already anticipated, and provided against by his British opponents. If then the defence of Tarifa was a great and splendid exploit, and none can doubt that it was, those who conceived, planned, and executed it should have all the glory. Amongst those persons Colonel Skerrett has no right to be placed ; yet such are the errors of power, that he was highly applauded for what he did not do, and General Campbell was severely rebuked by Lord Liverpool for having risked his Majesty's troops !

The French displayed courage but no skill. For two days their heavy howitzers had been directed vaguely against the interior of the town and the distant island, whither the unfortunate people fled from their shattered and burning houses. A portion of the shells thus thrown away in cruelty would have levelled the north-east

* Appendix, No. 17.

† Appendix, No. 17, section 3.

tower with the ground, and the French were aware of its importance : but throughout the siege their operations were mastered by the superior ability of the engineer and artillery officers opposed to them.

In the expectation that a more powerful attack would be made in the spring, General Campbell directed casemates and splinter proofs to be made in the island, but Skerrett's troops were recalled to Cadiz, which now contained nearly 8000 British, exclusive of 1500 of these destined for Carthagená and Alicant. This arrangement was, however, soon changed, because the events of the war put Carthagená out of the French line of operations, and the pestilence there caused the removal of the British troops. Neither was Tarifa again attacked ; Lord Wellington had predicted that it would not, and on sure grounds, for he was then contemplating a series of operations which were calculated to change the state of the war, and which shall be set forth in the next book.

BOOK XVI.

CHAPTER I.

UP to this period, the invasion, although diversified by occasional disasters on the part of the invaders, had been progressive. The tide, sometimes flowing, sometimes ebbing, had still gained upon the land, and wherever the Spaniards had arrested its progress, it was England that urged their labour and renovated their tired strength; no firm barrier, no solid dike had been opposed to its ravages, save by the British general in Portugal, and even there the foundation of his work, sapped by the trickling waters of folly and intrigue, was sliding away. By what a surprising effort of courage and judgment he secured it shall now be shown; and as the field operations in this war were always influenced more by political considerations than by military principles, it will be necessary first to place the general's situation with respect to the former in its true light.

Political situation of King Joseph.—France, abounding in riches and power, was absolute mistress of Europe from the Pyrenees to the Vistula; but Napoleon, resolute to perfect his continental system for the exclusion of British goods, now found himself, in the pursuit of that object, hastening rapidly to a new war, and one so vast, that even his force was strained to meet it. The Peninsula already felt relief from this cause. The dread of his arrival ceased to influence the operations of the allied army in Portugal, many able French officers were recalled, and as it was known that the imperial guards and the Polish troops were to withdraw from Spain, the scale of offensive projects was necessarily contracted. Conscripts and young soldiers instead of veterans, and in diminished numbers, were now to be expected; and in the French army there was a general and oppressive sense of the enormous exertion which would be required to bring two such mighty wars to a happy conclusion. On the other hand, the Peninsulars were cheered by seeing so powerful a monarch as the Czar, rise in opposition to Napoleon, and the English general found the principal basis of his calculations realized by this diversion. He had never yet been strong enough to meet 80,000 French troops in battle, even under a common general; but his hopes rose when he saw the great warrior of the age, not only turning himself from the contest, but withdrawing from it a reserve of 400,000 veterans, whose might the whole world seemed hardly able to withstand.

The most immediate effect, however, which the approaching contest with Russia produced in the Peninsula, was the necessity of restoring Joseph to his former power over the French armies. While the emperor was absent from Paris, the supreme control of the operations could only be placed in the hands of the monarch of Spain; yet this was only to reproduce there, and with greater virulence, the former jealousies and disputes. Joseph's Spanish policy remained unchanged; the pride of the French generals was at least equal to his, prettexts for disputes were never wanting on either side, and the mischievous nature of those disputes may be gathered from one example. In November, the king being pressed for money, sold the magazines of corn collected near Toledo for the army of Portugal, and without which the latter could not exist: Marmont, regardless of the political scandal, immediately sent troops to recover the magazines by force, and desired the purchasers to reclaim their money from the monarch.

Political state of Spain.—All the intrigues and corruptions and conflicting interests before described had increased in violence. The negotiations for the

mediation of England with the colonies, were not ended ; Carlotta still pressed her claims ; and the division between the Liberals and Serviles, as they were called, became daily wider. Cadiz was in 1811 the very focus of all disorder. The government was alike weak and dishonest, and used many pitiful arts to extract money from England. No subterfuge was too mean. When Blake was going with the 4th army to Estremadura, previous to the battle of Albuera, the minister Bardaxi entreated the British envoy to grant a loan, or a gift, without which, he asserted, Blake could not move ; Mr. Wellesley refused, because a large debt was already due to the legation, and the next morning a Spanish ship of war from America landed a million and a half of dollars !

In July, notwithstanding the victory of Albuera, the regency was held in universal contempt ; both it and the cortes were without influence, and their conduct merited it. For although vast sums were continually received, and every service was furnished, the treasury was declared empty, and there was no probability of any further remittances from America. The temper of the public was soured towards England, the press openly assailed the British character, and all things so evidently tended towards anarchy, that Mr. Wellesley declared "Spanish affairs to be then worse than they had been at any previous period of the war."

The cortes, at first swayed by priests and lawyers, who cherished the inquisition and were opposed to all free institutions, was now chiefly led by a liberal or rather democratic party, averse to the British influence ; hence, in August, a new constitution, quite opposed to the aristocratic principle, was promulgated. With the excellences and defects of that instrument the present History has indeed little concern, but the results were not in accord with the spirit of the contrivance, and the evils affecting the war were rather increased by it ; the democratic basis of the new constitution excited many and bitter enemies, and the time and attention which should have been bestowed upon the amelioration of the soldiers' condition, was occupied in factions, disputes, and corrupt intrigues.

That many sound abstract principles of government were clearly and vigorously laid down in the scheme of this constitution, cannot be denied ; the complicated oppressions of the feudal system were swept away with a bold and just hand ; but of what avail, as regarded the war, was the enunciation of principles which were never attempted to be reduced to practice ? What encouragement was it to the soldier, to be told he was a free man, fighting for a constitution as well as for national independence, when he saw the authors of that constitution corruptly revelling in the wealth which should have clothed, and armed, and fed him ? What was nominal equality to him, when he saw incapacity rewarded, crimes and treachery unpunished in the rich, the poor and patriotic oppressed ?* He laughed to scorn those who could find time to form the constitution of a great empire, but could not find time or honesty to feed, or clothe, or arm the men who were to defend it !

The enemies of democracy soon spread many grievous reports of misfortunes and treachery, some true, some false ; and at the most critical period of the war in Valencia, they endeavoured to raise a popular commotion to sweep away the cortes. The monks and friars, furious at the suppression of the inquisition, were the chief plotters everywhere ; and the proceedings of Palacios, in concert with them, were only part of a church project, commenced all over Spain, to resist the cortes. In October, Lardizabal, the other deposed regent, published at Alicante, a manifesto, in which he accused the cortes and the Cadiz writers of jacobinism, maintained the doctrine of passive obedience, and asserted that the regents only took the oath to the cortes, because they could not count on the army or the people at Cadiz ; otherwise they would cause the king's authority to be respected in their persons as his only legitimate representatives. This manifesto was declared treasonable, and a vessel was despatched to bring the offender to Cadiz ; but the following day it was discovered that the old council of Castile had also drawn up a manifesto

* Appendix, No. 12.

similar in principle, and the persons sent by the cortes to seize the paper were told that it was destroyed. The protest of three members against it was however found, and five lawyers were selected from the cortes to try the guilty councillors and Lardizabal.

In November the public cry for a new regency became general, and it was backed by the English plenipotentiary. Nevertheless the matter was deferred upon divers pretexts, and meanwhile the democratic party gained strength in the cortes, and the anti-British feeling appeared more widely diffused than it really was; because some time elapsed before the church and aristocratic party discovered that the secret policy of England was the same as their own. It was so, however, even to the upholding of the inquisition, which it was ridiculously asserted had become objectionable only in name; as if, while the frame-work of tyranny existed, there could ever be wanting the will to fill it up. Necessity alone induced the British cabinet to put on a smooth countenance towards the cortes. In this state of affairs, the negotiation for the colonial mediation was used by the Spaniards merely as a ground for demanding loans, subsidies, and succours in kind, which they used in fitting out new expeditions against the revolted colonists; the complaints of the British legation on this point were quite disregarded. At this time also Lapeña was acquitted of misconduct at Barosa, and would have been immediately re-employed, if the English minister had not threatened to quit Cadiz, and advised General Cooke to do the same.

Mr. Wellesley seeing that the most fatal consequences to the war must ensue, if a stop was not put to the misconduct of the regency, had sent Mr. Vaughan, the secretary of legation, to acquaint the British cabinet with the facts, and to solicit a more firm and decided course of policy. Above all things he desired to have the subsidies settled by treaty, that the people of Spain might really know what England had done and was still doing for them; for on every occasion, arms, clothing, ammunition, loans, provisions, guns, stores, and even workmen and funds, to form foundries, were demanded and obtained by the Spanish government, and then wasted or embezzled, without the people benefiting, or even knowing of the generosity, or rather extravagance, with which they were supplied; while the receivers and wasters were heaping calumnies on the donors.

The regency question was at last seriously discussed in the cortes, and the deputy, Capmany, who, if we may believe the partisans of Joseph, was anti-English in his heart, argued the necessity of this change on the ground of pleasing the British. This excited great discontent, as he probably intended, and many deputies declared at first that they would not be dictated to by any foreign power; but the departure of Mr. Vaughan alarmed them, and a commission, formed to improve the mode of governing, was hastening the decision of the question, when Blake's disaster at Valencia completed the work. Carlotta's agent was active in her behalf, but the eloquent and honest Arguelles was opposed to him; and the cortes, although they recognized her claim to the succession, denied her the regency, because of a previous decree which excluded all royal personages from that office.

On the 21st of January, 1812, after a secret discussion of twenty-four hours, a new regency, to consist of five members, of which two were Americans, was proclaimed. The men chosen were the Duke of Infantado, then in England, Henry O'Donnel, Admiral Villarvicencio, Joachim de Mosquera, and Ignacios de Ribas; and each was to have the presidency by rotation for six months.

They commenced beneficially. O'Donnel was friendly to the British alliance, and proposed a military feast, to restore harmony between the English and Spanish officers; he made many changes in the department of war, and finances; consulted the British generals, and disbanding several bad regiments, incorporated the men with other battalions; he also reduced many inefficient and malignant colonels, and striking off from the pay lists all unemployed and absent officers, it was found that they were 5000 in number! Ballasteros was appointed captain-general of Andalusia and received the command of the 4th army, whose head-quarters were prudently removed to Algeziras; the troops there were increased, by drafts from Cadiz, to

10,000 or 12,000 men, and a new army was set on foot in Murcia. Finally, to check trading with the French, a general blockade of all the coast in their possession, from Rosas to San Sebastian, was declared.

But it was soon discovered that the secret object was to obtain a loan from England, and as this did not succeed, and nothing good was ever permanent in Spanish affairs, the old disputes again broke out. The democratic spirit gained strength in the cortes; the anti-English party augmented; the press abounded in libels, impugning the good faith of the British nation, especially with respect to Ceuta; for which, however, there was some plausible ground of suspicion, because the acquisition of that fortress had actually been proposed to Lord Liverpool. The new regency, also as violent as their predecessors with respect to America, disregarded the mediation, and having secretly organized in Galicia an expedition against the colonies, supplied it with artillery furnished from England for the French war, and then, under another pretence, demanded money of the British minister to forward this iniquitous folly.

Political state of Portugal.—In October all the evils before described still existed, and were aggravated. The old disputes remained unsettled, the return of the royal family was put off, and the reforms in the military system, which Beresford had repaired to Lisbon to effect, were either thwarted or retarded by the regency. Mr. Stuart indeed forced the government to repair the bridges and roads in Beira, to throw some provisions into the fortresses; and, in despite of Redondo, the minister of finance, who, for the first time, now opposed the British influence, he made the regency substitute a military chest and commissariat, instead of the "Junta de Viveres." But Forjas and Redondo then disputed for the custody of the new chest; and when Mr. Stuart explained to the one, that, as the intent was to separate the money of the army from that of the civil departments, his claims were incompatible with such an object; and to the other that the conduct of his own department was already more than he could manage; both were offended; and this new source of disorder was only partially closed by withholding the subsidy until they yielded.

Great malversations in the revenue were also discovered; and a plan, to enforce an impartial exaction of the "decima," which was drawn up by Nogueira, at the desire of Wellington, was so ill received by those whose illegal exemptions it attacked, that the Souzas immediately placed themselves at the head of the objectors out of doors. Nogueira then modified it, but the Souzas still opposed, and as Wellington, judging the modification to be an evasion of the principle, would not recede from the first plan, a permanent dispute and a permanent evil were thus established by that pernicious faction. In fine, not the Souzas only, but the whole regency in their folly now imagined that the war was virtually decided in their favour, and were intent upon driving the British away by disgusting the general.

A new quarrel also arose in the Brazils. Lord Wellington had been created Conde de Vimiero, Beresford Conde de Trancoso, Silveira Conde d'Amurante; and other minor rewards, of a like nature, had been conferred on subordinate officers. These honours had, however, been delayed in a marked manner, and Lord Strangford, who appears to have been ruled entirely by the Souza faction, and was therefore opposed to Forjas, charged, or as he termed it, reported a charge, made against the latter, at the Brazils, for having culpably delayed the official return of the officers who were thus to be rewarded. Against this accusation, which had no foundation in fact, seeing that the report had been made, and that Forjas was not the person to whose department it belonged, Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart protested, because of the injustice; and because it was made in pursuance of a design to remove Forjas from the government. The English general was, however, thus placed in a strange position, for while his letters to Forjas were menacing rebukes to him, and his coadjutors, for their neglect of public affairs; and while his formal complaints of the conduct of the regency were transmitted to the Brazils, he was also obliged to send other letters in support of the very persons whom he was justly rebuking for misconduct.

In the midst of these embarrassments, an accidental event was like to have brought the question of the British remaining in Portugal to a very sudden decision. While Massena was before the lines, one d'Amblemont had appeared in North America, and given to Onis, the Spanish minister, a plan for burning the British fleet in the Tagus, which he pretended to have received orders from the French government to execute. This plan being transmitted to the Brazils, many persons named by d'Amblemont as implicated were, in consequence, arrested at Lisbon and sent to Rio Janeiro, although Mr. Stuart had ascertained the whole affair to be a forgery. The attention paid to this man by Onis and by the court of Rio Janeiro, induced him to make farther trial of their credulity, and he then brought forward a correspondence between the principal authorities of Mexico and the French government; he even produced letters from the French ministers, directing intrigues to be commenced at Lisbon, and the French interest there to be placed in the hands of the Portuguese intendant of police.

Mr. Stuart, lamenting the ruin of many innocent persons, whom this forging villain was thus dooming, prayed Lord Wellesley to interfere; but meanwhile the court of Rio Janeiro, falling headlong into the snare, sent orders to arrest more victims; and amongst others, without assigning any cause, and without any communication with the English general, the regency seized one Borel, a clerk in the department of the British paymaster-general. This act being at once contrary to treaty, hostile to the alliance, and insulting in manner, raised Lord Wellington's indignation to such a pitch, that he formally notified to the Portuguese government his resolution, unless good reasons were assigned and satisfaction made for the outrage, to order all persons attached to the British to place themselves in security under the protection of the army, as if in a hostile country, until the further pleasure of the British prince regent should be made known.

The political storm which had been so long gathering then seemed ready to break, but suddenly the horizon cleared. Lord Wellington's letter to the prince, backed up by Lord Wellesley's vigorous diplomacy, had at last alarmed the court of Rio Janeiro, and in the very crisis of Borel's case came letters, in which the prince regent admitted, and approved of all the ameliorations and changes proposed by the English general; and the contradiction given by Mr. Stuart to the calumnies of the Souza faction was taken as the ground for a complete and formal retraction, by Linhares, of his former insinuations, and insulting note relative to that gentleman's conduct. Principal Souza was however not dismissed, nor was Forjas' resignation noticed, but the prince declared that he would overlook that minister's disobedience, and retain him in office; thus proving that fear, not conviction, or justice, for Forjas had not been disobedient, was the true cause of this seeming return to friendly relations with the British.

Mr. Stuart, considering the submission of the prince to be a mere nominal concession of power which was yet to be ripened into real authority, looked for further difficulties, and he was not mistaken: meanwhile he made it a point of honour to defend Forjas and Nogueira from the secret vengeance of the opposite faction. The present submission of the court, however, gave the British an imposing influence, which rendered the Souzas' opposition nugatory for the moment. Borel was released and excuses were made for his arrest; the formation of a military chest was pushed with vigour; the paper money was raised in value; the revenue was somewhat increased, and Beresford was enabled to make progress in the restoration of the army. The prince had, however, directed the regency to revive his claim to Olivenza immediately; and it was with difficulty that Lord Wellington could stifle this absurd proceeding; neither did the forced harmony last, for the old abuses affecting the civil administration of the army rather increased, as will be shown in the narration of military operations which are now to be treated of.

It will be remembered that after the action of Elbodon, the allied army was extensively cantoned on both sides of the Coa. Ciudad Rodrigo was distantly observed by the British, and so closely by Julian Sanchez, that on the 15th he carried off more than 200 oxen from under the guns of the place, and at the same

time captured General Renaud, the governor, who had imprudently ventured out with a weak escort. At this time Marmont had one division in Placencia, and the rest of his infantry between that place and Madrid ; but his cavalry was at Penerranda on the Salamanca side of the mountains, and his line of communication was organized on the old Roman road of the Puerto de Pico, which had been repaired after the battle of Talavera. The army of the north stretched from the Tormes to Astorga, the walls of which place, as well as those of Zamora, and other towns in Leon, were being restored, that the flat country might be held with a few troops against the Gallician army. It was this scattering of the enemy which had enabled Lord Wellington to send Hill against Girard at Aroyo de Molino ; but when the reinforcements from France reached the army of Portugal, the army of the north was again concentrated, and would have invaded Galicia while Bonet attacked the Asturias, if Julian Sanchez' exploit had not rendered it necessary first to revictual Ciudad Rodrigo.

With this view a large convoy was collected at Salamanca, in October, by General Thiebault, who spread a report that a force was to assemble towards Tamames, and that the convoy was for its support. This report did not deceive Lord Wellington ; but he believed that the whole army of the north and one division of the army of Portugal would be employed in the operation, and therefore made arrangements to pass the Agueda and attack them on the march. The heavy rains, however, rendered the fords of that river impracticable ; Thiebault seized the occasion, introduced the convoy, and leaving a new governor, returned on the 2nd of November before the waters had subsided. One brigade of the light division was at this time on the Vadillo, but it was too weak to meddle with the French, and it was impossible to reinforce it while the Agueda was overflowed ; for such is the nature of that river that all military operations on its banks are uncertain. It is very difficult for an army to pass it at any time in winter, because of the narrow roads, the depth of the fords, and the ruggedness of the banks ; it will suddenly rise from rains falling on the hills, without any previous indication in the plains, and then the violence and depth of its stream will sweep away any temporary bridge, and render it impossible to pass except by the stone bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was at this time in the enemy's possession.

Early in November, Bonet having re-occupied the Asturias, Dorsenne marched a body of troops towards the hills above Ciudad, as if to conduct another convoy ; but the allied troops being immediately concentrated, passed the Agueda at the ford of Zamara, whereupon the French retired, and their rear was harassed by Carlos d'Espana and Julian Sanchez, who captured some provisions and money contributions they had raised. But now the provisions in the country between the Coa and the Agueda were all consumed, and the continued negligence of the Portuguese government, with respect to the means of transport, rendered it impossible to bring up the field magazines from the points of water carriage to the army. Lord Wellington was, therefore, contrary to all military rules, obliged to separate his divisions in face of the enemy, and to spread the troops, especially the cavalry, even to the Mondego, and the valley of the Douro, or see them starved.

To cover this dangerous proceeding he kept a considerable body of men beyond the Coa, and the state of all the rivers and roads, at that season, together with the distance of the enemy, in some measure protected him ; General Hill's second expedition into Estremadura was then also drawing the attention of the French towards that quarter : finally, Marmont, being about to detach Montbrun towards Valencia, had withdrawn Foy's division from Placencia, and concentrated the greatest part of his army at Toledo ; all which rendered the scattering of the allies less dangerous, and, in fact, no evil consequences ensued. This war of positions had, therefore, turned entirely to the advantage of the allies ; Lord Wellington by taking post near Ciudad Rodrigo while Hill moved round Badajos, had in a manner paralyzed three powerful armies. For Soult harassed by Hill in Estremadura, and by Ballesteros and Skerrett in Andalusia, failed in both quarters ; and although Marmont, in conjunction with Dorsenne, had succoured Ciudad

Rodrigo, the latter general's invasion of Galicia had been stopped short, and his enterprises confined to the re-occupation of the Asturias.

Meanwhile the works of Almeida were so far restored as to secure it from a sudden attack, and in November, when the army by crossing the Agueda had occupied the attention of the French, the battering train and siege stores were brought to that fortress, without exciting the enemy's attention, because they appeared to be only the armament for the new works; a trestle bridge to throw over the Agueda was also secretly prepared in the arsenal of Almeida by Major Sturgeon of the staff corps, an officer whose brilliant talents, scientific resources, and unmitigated activity continually attracted the attention of the whole army. Thus the preparation for the attack of Ciudad advanced while the English general seemed to be only intent upon defending his own positions.

CHAPTER II.

HAVING now brought the story of the war to that period when, after many changes of fortune, the chances had become more equal, and the fate of the Peninsula, thrown as it were between the contending powers, became a prize for the readiest and boldest warrior, I would, ere it is shown how Wellington seized it, recall to the reader's recollection the previous vicissitudes of the contest. I would have him remember how when the first, or insurrectional epoch of the war, had terminated successfully for the Spaniards, Napoleon vehemently broke and dispersed their armies, and drove the British auxiliaries to embark at Coruña. How the war with Austria, and the inactivity of Joseph, rendered the emperor's victories unavailing, and revived the confidence of the Spaniards. How Sir Arthur Wellesley, victorious on the Douro, then marched into Spain, and although the concentrated force of the enemy, and the ill conduct of the Spanish government, forced him to retreat again to Portugal, as Sir John Moore, from the same causes, had been obliged to retreat to the ocean, he by his advance relieved Galicia, as Moore had by a like operation before saved Andalusia, which concluded the third epoch.

How the Peninsulars, owing to the exertions of their allies, still possessed a country extending from the Asturias, through Galicia, Portugal, Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and including every important harbour and fortress except Santander, Santona, Barcelona, and St. Sebastian. How Wellington appreciating the advantages which an invaded people possess in their numerous lines of operation, then counselled the Spaniards, and forced the Portuguese, to adopt a defensive war; and with more reason that England, abounding beyond all nations in military resources, and invincible as a naval power, could form with her ships a secure exterior floating base or line of depôts round the Peninsula, and was ready to employ her armies as well as her squadrons in the struggle. How the Spaniards, unheeding these admonitions, sought great battles, and in a few months lost the Asturias, Andalusia, Estremadura, Aragon, and the best fortresses of Catalonia, and were again laid prostrate and helpless before the enemy.

How the victorious French armies then moved onwards, in swelling pride, until dashed against the rocks of Lisbon they receded, broken and reflux, and the English general once more stood a conqueror on the frontier of Spain; and had he then retaken Badajos and Rodrigo, he would have gloriously finished the fourth or defensive epoch of the war. But being baffled, partly by skill, partly by fortune, factiously opposed by the Portuguese regency, thwarted by the Spanish government, only half supported by his own cabinet, and pestered by the follies of all three, he was reduced to a seeming inactivity; and meanwhile the French added Tarragona and the rich kingdom of Valencia to their conquests.

These things I would have the reader reflect upon, because they are the proofs of what it is the main object of this History to inculcate, namely, that English steel, English gold, English genius, English influence, fought and won the battle of

Spanish independence; and this, not as a matter of boast, although it was very glorious! but as a useful lesson of experience. On the other hand also we must wonder at the prodigious strength of France under Napoleon, that strength which could at once fight England and Austria, aim at the conquest of the Peninsula, and the reduction of Russia at the same moment of time, and all with good hope of success.

Let it not be said that the emperor's efforts in the war of Spain were feeble, for if the insurrectional epoch, which was unexpected and accidental, be set aside, the grandeur of his efforts will be found answerable to his gigantic reputation. In 1809, the French army was, indeed, gradually decreased by losses and drafts for the Austrian war, from 335,000, which Napoleon had led into the country, to 226,000. But in 1810, it was again raised to 369,000, and fluctuated between that number and 330,000 until August, 1811, when it was again raised to 372,000 men with 52,000 horses! * And yet there are writers who assert that Napoleon neglected the war in Spain! But so great is the natural strength of that country, that had the firmness of the nation in battle and its wisdom in council been commensurate with its constancy in resistance, even this power, backed by the 400,000 men who marched to Russia, would scarcely have been sufficient to subdue it; whereas, weak in fight and steeped in folly, the Spaniards must have been trampled in the dust, but for the man whose great combinations I am now about to relate.

The nicety, the quickness, the prudence, and the audacity of Wellington's operations, cannot however be justly estimated without an exact knowledge of his political, local, and moral position. His political difficulties have been already described, and his moral situation was simply that of a man who felt that all depended upon himself; that he must by some rapid and unexpected stroke effect in the field what his brother could not effect in the cabinet, while the power of the Perceval faction was prevalent in England. But to understand his local or military position, the conformation of the country and the lines of communication must be carefully considered.

The principal French magazines were at Valladolid, and their advanced troops were on the Tormes, from whence to the Agueda, where they held the important point of Ciudad Rodrigo, was four long marches through a wild forest country.

The allies' line of communication from the Agueda to Lisbon, was supplied by water to Raiva on the Mondego, after which the land carriage was at least 100 miles, through wild mountains, or devastated valleys; it required 15 days to bring up a convoy from Lisbon to the army.

The line of communication with Oporto on the left flank, run through 80 miles of very rugged country, before it reached the first point of water carriage on the Douro.

The line of communication with Hill's army on the right flank, running also through a country full of strong passes and natural obstacles, offered no resources for an army, save what were furnished by the allies' field magazines, which were supplied from Abrantes, the first navigable point on the Tagus. On this line the boat-bridge of Vilha Velha was a remarkable feature, as furnishing the only military passage over the Tagus between Abrantes and Almaraz.

The country between the Coa and the Agueda could not supply the troops who occupied it: and the nature of the last river, and the want of a covering position beyond, rendered it a matter of the utmost danger and difficulty to besiege or even invest Ciudad Rodrigo. The disadvantage which the French suffered in being so distant from that fortress was thus balanced.

These considerations had prevented the English general from attacking Ciudad Rodrigo in May; he had then no battering train, and Almeida and her guns were rendered a heap of ruins by the exploit of Brenier. Badajos was at that period his object, because Beresford was actually besieging it, and the recent battle of Fuentes Onoro, the disputes of the French generals, the disorganization of Massena's army,

* Appendix, No. 20, section 2.

and, as proved by that battle, the inefficiency of the army of the north, rendered it improbable that a serious invasion of Portugal would be resumed on that side. And as the lines of communication with the Mondego and the Douro were not then completely re-established, and the intermediate magazines small, no incursion of the enemy could have done much mischief; and Spencer's corps was sufficiently strong to cover the line to Vilha Velha.

Affairs however soon changed. The skill of Phillipon, the diligence of Marmont, and the generalship of Soult in remaining at Llerena after his repulse at Albuera, had rescued Badajos. Lord Wellington's boldness in remaining on the Caya prevented further mischief, but the conduct of the Portuguese government, combined with the position which Napoleon had caused Marmont to take in the valley of the Tagus, effectually precluded a renewal of that siege; and then the fallacious hope of finding Ciudad unprovided, brought Lord Wellington back to the Coa. This baffled the enemy's projects, yet the position of the army of the north, and that of Portugal, the one in front, the other on the flank, prevented the English general from undertaking any important operations in the field. For if he had advanced on Salamanca, besides the natural difficulties of the country, his communications with Hill, and even with Abrantes and Lisbon, would have been cut by Marmont; and if he turned against Marmont on the Tagus, Soult and Dorsenne would have closed upon his flanks.

This state of affairs not being well considered, had induced some able officers, at the time of the Elbodon operation, to censure the line of retreat to Sabugal, because it uncovered the line of Celerico, and exposed to capture the battering train then at Villa Ponte; but war is always a choice of difficulties, and it was better to risk guns, of whose vicinity the enemy was not aware, than to give up the communication with Hill which was threatened by the advance of Foy's two divisions on Zarza Mayor.

As the French armies were reinforced after the allies came to Beira, Dorsenne and Marmont became each equal to Wellington in the field, and together infinitely too strong. Soult was then master of Andalusia, and had a movable reserve of 20,000 men; the army of Suchet daily gained ground in Valencia, the Asturias were re-occupied by Bonet, and the army of the centre was re-organized. Hence, to commence the siege of either Ciudad or Badajos, in form, was hopeless, and when the rumour of Napoleon's arrival became rife, the English general, whose embarrassments were hourly increasing, looked once more to the lines of Torres Vedras as a refuge. But when the certainty of the Russian war removed this fear, the aspect of affairs again changed, and the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo became possible. For, first, there was a good battering train in Almeida, and the works of that place were restored; secondly, the line of communication with Oporto was completely organized, and shortened by improving the navigation of the Douro; thirdly, Ciudad itself was very weakly garrisoned, and the ignorance of the French as to the state of the allies' preparations gave hope of a surprise. It was, however, only by a surprise that success could be expected, and it was not the least of Lord Wellington's merits that he so well concealed his preparations, and for so long a period. No other operation, promising any success, was open; and yet the general could no longer remain inactive, because around him the whole fabric of the war was falling to pieces from the folly of the governments he was serving. If he could not effect a blow against the French while Napoleon was engaged in the Russian war, it was clear that the Peninsula would be lost.

Now the surprise of a fortress, with a garrison of only 1700 men, seems a small matter in such grave circumstances, but in reality it was of the very greatest importance, because it was the first step in a plan which saved the Peninsula when nothing else could have saved it. Lord Wellington knew that the valley of the Tagus could not long support both the army of Portugal and the army of the centre; he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont and the king were already at open war upon the subject, and he judged, that if he could surprise Ciudad Rodrigo, the army of Portugal would be obliged, for the sake of provisions, and to protect

Leon, then weakened by the departure of the imperial guards, to concentrate in that province. This was the first step.

The French kept magazines in reserve for sudden expeditions, feeding meanwhile as they could upon the country, and therefore their distress for provisions never obstructed their moving upon important occasions. Nevertheless Lord Wellington thought the tempestuous season would render it very difficult for Marmont, when thus forced into Leon, to move with great masses; wherefore he proposed when Rodrigo fell, to march by Vilha Velha to Estremadura, and suddenly besiege Badajos also, the preparations to be previously made in Elvas, under the protection of Hill's corps, and unknown to the enemy. This was the second step, and in this surprise also he hoped to be successful, because of the jealousies of the marshals, the wet season, and his own combinations, which would impede the concentration of the French armies, and prevent them from keeping together if they did unite. He had hopes likewise that as Ballasteros' corps was now augmented, it would vex Soult's posts on the coast, while Hill and Morillo harassed him on the Guadiana; and if Badajos fell, the English general was resolved to leave a force to cover the captured place against the army of the centre, and then fight Soult in Andalusia. For he judged that Marmont could not for want of provisions, pass beyond the Guadiana, nor follow him before the harvest was ripe; neither did he fear him in Beira, because the torrents would be full, the country a desert, and the militia, aided by a small regular corps, and covered by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, would, he thought, be sufficient to prevent any serious impression being made on Portugal during the invasion of Andalusia.

This was Lord Wellington's plan, and his firmness and resolution in conceiving it were the more signal because his own troops were not in good plight. The army had indeed received reinforcements, but the infantry had served at Walcheren, and exposure to night air, or even slight hardship, threw them by hundreds into the hospital, while the new regiments of cavalry, inexperienced, and not acclimated, were found, men and horses, quite unfit for duty, and were sent to the rear. The pay of the army was three months in arrear, and the supplies, brought up with difficulty, were very scanty; half and quarter rations were often served, and sometimes the troops were without any bread for three days consecutively, and their clothing was so patched that scarcely a regiment could be known by its uniform. Chopped straw, the only forage, was so scarce that the regimental animals were dying of hunger; corn was rarely distributed save to the generals and staff, and even the horses of the artillery and of the old cavalry suffered; nay, the very mules of the commissariat were pinched by the scarcity, and the muleteers were eight months in arrears of pay. The cantonments on the Coa and Agueda were unhealthy from the continued rains; above 20,000 men were in hospital; and deduction made for other drains, only 54,000 of both nations, including garrisons and posts of communication, were under arms. To finish the picture, the sulky apathy produced in the Portuguese regency by the prince regent's letter, was now becoming more hurtful than the former active opposition.

But even these distresses, so threatening to the general cause, Wellington turned to the advantage of his present designs; for the enemy were aware of the misery in the army, and in their imagination magnified it; and as the allied troops were scattered for relief from the Gata mountains to the Douro, and from the Agueda to the Mondego, at the very moment when the battering train entered Almeida, both armies concluded that these guns were only to arm that fortress, as a cover to the extended country quarters which necessity had forced the British general to adopt. No person, not even the engineers employed in the preparations, knew more than that a siege or the simulation of a siege was in contemplation; but when it was to be attempted, or that it would be attempted at all, none knew; even the quartermaster, General Murray, was permitted to go home on leave, with the full persuasion that no operation would take place before spring.

In the new cantonments, however, abundance of provisions and dry weather (for in Beira the first rains generally subside during December) stopped the sickness,

and restored about 3000 men to the ranks ; and it would be a great error to suppose that the privations had in any manner weakened the moral courage of the troops. The old regiments had become incredibly hardy and experienced in all things necessary to sustain their strength and efficiency ; the staff of the army was well practised, and Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the military secretary, had established such an intercourse between the head-quarters and the commanders of battalions, that the latter had, so to speak, direct communication with the general-in-chief upon all the business of their regiments ; a privilege which increased the enthusiasm and zeal of all in a very surprising manner. For the battalions being generally under very young men, the distinctions of rank were not very rigidly enforced, and the merits of each officer were consequently better known, and more earnestly supported when promotion and honours were to be obtained. By this method Lord Fitzroy acquired an exact knowledge of the true moral state of each regiment, rendered his own office at once powerful and gracious to the army, and yet, such was his discretion and judgment, did in no manner weaken the military hierarchy ; thus also all the daring young men were excited, and being unacquainted with the political difficulties of their general, anticipated noble triumphs, which were happily realized.

The favourable moment for action so long watched for by Wellington came at last. An imperial decree had remodelled the French armies. That of Aragon was directed to give up four divisions to form a new corps under Reille, called the "army of the Ebro," whose head-quarters were at Lerida. The army of the south was recomposed in six divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, besides the garrison of Badajos, and Marshal Victor returned to France discontented, for he was one of those whose reputation had been abated by this war. His divisions were given to Generals Conroux, Barrois, Villate, Laval, Drouet, Daricau, Peyremont, Digeon, and the younger Soult, Phillipon continuing governor of Badajos. The reserve of Monthion was broken up, and the army of the north, destined to maintain the great communications with France and to reduce the Partidas on that line, was ordered to occupy the districts round St. Ander, Sebastian, Burgos, and Pampeluna, and to communicate by the left with the new army of the Ebro : it was also exceedingly reduced in numbers ; for the imperial guards, 17,000 strong, were required for the Russian war, and marched in December to France. And besides these troops, the Polish battalions, the skeletons of the cavalry regiments, and several thousand choice men destined to fill the ranks of the old guard were drafted ; so that not less than 40,000 of the very best soldiers were withdrawn, and the maimed and worn-out men being sent back to France at the same time, the force in the Peninsula was diminished by 60,000.

The head-quarters of the army of the north arrived at Burgos in January, and a division was immediately sent to drive Mendizabel from the Montaña de St. Ander ; but as this arrangement weakened the grand line of communication with France, Marmont was ordered to abandon the valley of the Tagus and fix his head-quarters at Valladolid or Salamanca. Ciudad Rodrigo, the sixth and seventh governments, and the Asturias, were also placed under his authority, by which Souham and Bonet's division, forming together about 18,000 men, were added to his army ; but the former general returned to France. These divisions, however, being pressed by want, were extended from the Asturias to Toledo, while Montbrun was near Valencia, and meanwhile Soult's attention was distracted by Tarifa and by Hill's pursuit of Drouet. Thus the French armies, everywhere occupied, were spread over an immense tract of country ; Marmont, deceived by the seemingly careless winter attitude of the allies, left Ciudad Rodrigo unprotected within their reach, and Wellington jumped with both feet upon the devoted fortress.

CHAPTER III.

SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

THE troops disposable for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo were about 35,000, including cavalry; the materials for the siege were established at Gallegos, Villa del Ciervo, and Espeja, on the left of the Agueda, and the ammunition was at Almeida. From those places the hired carts and mules were to bring up the stores to the parc, and 70 pieces of ordnance had been collected at Villa de Ponte. But from the scarcity of transports only 38 guns could be brought to the trenches, and these would have wanted their due supply of ammunition, if 8000 shot had not been found amidst the ruins of Almeida.

On the 1st of January, the bridge was commenced at Marialva, near the confluence of the Azava with the Agueda, about six miles below Ciudad, and piles were driven into the bed of the river above and below, to which the trestles were tied to render the whole firm. The fortress was to have been invested on the 6th, but the native carters were two days moving over 10 miles of flat and excellent road with empty carts; the operation was thus delayed, and it was dangerous to find fault with these people, because they deserted on the slightest offence. Meanwhile the place being closely examined, it was found that the French, in addition to the old works, had fortified two convents, which flanked and strengthened the bad Spanish entrenchments round the suburbs. They had also constructed an enclosed and palisadoed redoubt upon the greater Teson; and this redoubt, called Francisco, was supported by two guns and a howitzer placed on the flat roof of the convent of that name.

The soil around was exceedingly rocky, except on the Teson itself, and though the body of the place was there better covered by the outworks, and could bring most fire to bear on the trenches, it was more assailable according to the English general's views; because elsewhere the slope of the ground was such that batteries must have been erected on the very edge of the counterscarp before they could see low enough to breach. This would have been a tedious process, whereas the smaller Teson furnished the means of striking over the crest of the glacis at once, and a deep gully near the latter offered cover for the miners. It was therefore resolved to storm Fort Francisco, form a lodgment there, and opening the first parallel along the greater Teson, to place 33 pieces in counter-batteries with which to ruin the defences, and drive the besieged from the convent of Francisco; then working forward by the sap to construct breaching-batteries on the lesser Teson, and blow in the counterscarp, while seven guns, by battering a weak turret on the left, opened a second breach, with a view to turn any retrenchment behind the principal breach.

The first, third, fourth, and light divisions, and Pack's Portuguese, were destined for the siege, but as the country on the right bank of the Agueda was destitute of fuel and cover, these troops were still to keep their quarters on the left bank; and although there was a very severe frost and fall of snow, yet one division, carrying a day's provisions ready cooked, was to ford the river every 24 hours, either above or below the town, and thus alternately carry on the works. Meanwhile, to cover the siege, Julian Sanchez and Carlos d'Espana were posted on the Tormes in observation of the enemy.

To obviate the difficulty of obtaining country transport, the English general had previously constructed 800 carts drawn by horses, and these were now his surest dependence for bringing up ammunition; yet so many delays were anticipated from the irregularity of the native carters and muleteers, and the chances of weather, that he calculated upon an operation of 24 days, and yet hoped to steal it from his adversaries; sure, even if he failed, that the clash of his arms would again draw their scattered troops to that quarter, as tinkling bells draw swarming bees to an empty hive.

The 8th of January, the light division and Pack's Portuguese forded the Agueda near Caridad, three miles above the fortress, and making a circuit, took post

beyond the great Teson, where they remained quiet during the day, and as there was no regular investment, the enemy believed not that the siege was commenced. But in the evening the troops stood to their arms, and Colonel Colborne commanding the 52nd, having assembled two companies from each of the British regiments of the light division, stormed the redoubt of Francisco. This he did with so much fury that the assailants appeared to be at one and the same time, in the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting on the top of the rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt, where the explosion of one of the French shells had burst the gate open.

Of the defenders a few were killed, not many, and the remainder, about 40 in number, were made prisoners. The post being thus taken with the loss of only 24 men and officers, working parties were set to labour on the right of it, because the fort itself was instantly covered with shot and shells from the town. This tempest continued through the night, but at daybreak the parallel, 600 yards in length, was sunk three feet deep and four wide, the communication over the Teson to the rear was completed, and the progress of the siege was thus hastened several days by this well-managed assault.

The 9th, the first division took the trenches in hand. The place was encircled by posts to prevent any external communication, and at night 1200 workmen commenced three counter-batteries, for 11 guns each, under a heavy fire of shells and grape. Before daylight the labourers were under cover, and a ditch was also sunk in the front to provide earth; for the batteries were made 18 feet thick at top, to resist the very powerful artillery of the place.

On the 10th, the fourth division relieved the trenches, and 1000 men laboured, but in great peril, for the besieged had a superabundance of ammunition, and did not spare it. In the night the communication from the parallel to the batteries was opened, and on the 11th the third division undertook the siege.

This day the magazines in the batteries were excavated, and the approaches widened, but the enemy's fire was destructive, and the shells came so fast into the ditch in front of the batteries, that the troops were withdrawn, and the earth was raised from the inside. Great damage was also sustained from salvos of shells, with long fuzes, whose simultaneous explosion cut away the parapets in a strange manner, and in the night the French brought a howitzer to the garden of the convent of Francisco, with which they killed many men and wounded others.

On the 12th, the light division resumed the work, and the riflemen, taking advantage of a thick fog, covered themselves in pits, which they dug in front of the trenches, and from thence picked off the enemy's gunners; but in the night the weather was so cold, and the besieged shot so briskly, that little progress was made.

The 13th, the first division being on duty, the same causes impeded the labourers, and now also the scarcity of transport baulked the general's operations. One-third only, of the native carts expected, had arrived, and the drivers of those present were very indolent; much of the 24-pound ammunition was still at Villa de Ponte, and intelligence arrived that Marmont was collecting his forces to succour the place. Wellington, therefore, changing his first plan, resolved to open a breach with his counter-batteries, which were not quite 600 yards from the curtain, and then to storm the place without blowing in the counterscarp; in other words, to overstep the rules of science, and sacrifice life rather than time, for such was the capricious nature of the Agueda that in one night a flood might enable a small French force to relieve the place.

The whole army was immediately brought up from the distant quarters, and posted in the villages on the Coa, ready to cross the Agueda and give battle; and it was at this time that Hill, who was then at Merida, returned to Portalegre, and sent a division across the Tagus, lest Marmont in despair of uniting his force in the north in time to save Ciudad, should act against the line of communication by Castello Branco and Vilha Velha.

In the night of the 13th, the batteries were armed with 28 guns, the second

parallel and the approaches were continued by the flying sap, and the Santa Cruz convent was surprised by the Germans of the first division, which secured the right flank of the trenches.

The 14th, the enemy, who had observed that the men in the trenches always went off in a disorderly manner on the approach of the relief, made a sally and overturned the gabions of the sap; they even penetrated to the parallel, and were upon the point of entering the batteries, when a few of the workmen getting together, checked them until a support arrived, and thus the guns were saved. This affair, together with the death of the engineer on duty, and the heavy fire from the town, delayed the opening of the breaching-batteries, but at half-past four in the evening, 25 heavy guns battered the *fausse braye* and rampart, and two pieces were directed against the convent of Francisco. Then was beheld a spectacle at once fearful and sublime. The enemy replied to the assailants' fire with more than 50 pieces, the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the ground far and wide, the smoke rested in heavy volumes upon the battlements of the place, or curled in light wreaths about the numerous spires, the shells, hissing through the air, seemed fiery serpents leaping from the darkness, the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and the distant mountains, faintly returning the sound, appeared to moan over the falling city. And when night put an end to this turmoil, the quick clatter of musketry was heard like the pattering of hail after a peal of thunder, for the 40th regiment assaulted and carried the convent of Francisco, and established itself in the suburb on the left of the attack.

The next day the ramparts were again battered, and fell so fast that it was judged expedient to commence the small breach at the turret, and in the night of the 15th, five more guns were mounted. The 16th, at daylight, the besiegers' batteries recommenced, but at eight o'clock a thick fog obliged them to desist, nevertheless the small breach had been opened, and the place was now summoned, but without effect. At night the parallel on the lower Teson was extended, and a sharp musketry was directed from thence against the great breach. The breaching-battery as originally projected was also commenced, and the riflemen of the light division, hidden in the pits, continued to pick off the enemy's gunners.

The 17th, the fire on both sides was very heavy, and the wall of the place was beaten down in large cantles; but several of the besiegers' guns were dismounted, their batteries injured, and many of their men killed; General Borthwick, the commandant of artillery, was wounded, and the sap was entirely ruined. Even the riflemen in the pits were at first overpowered with grape, yet towards evening they recovered the upper hand, and the French could only fire from the more distant embrasures. In the night the battery, intended for the lesser breach, was armed, and that on the lower Teson raised so as to afford cover in the day-time.

On the 18th, the besiegers' fire was resumed with great violence. The turret was shaken at the small breach, the large breach became practicable in the middle, and the enemy commenced retrenching it. The sap, however, could make no progress, the superintending engineer was badly wounded, and a 24-pounder having burst in the batteries, killed several men. In the night the battery on the lower Teson was improved, and a field-piece and howitzer being placed there, kept up a constant fire on the great breach to destroy the French retrenchments.

On the 19th, both breaches became practicable, Major Sturgeon closely examined the place, and a plan of attack was formed on his report; the assault was then ordered, and the battering-guns were turned against the artillery of the ramparts.

ASSAULT OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

This operation, which was confided to the third and light divisions and Pack's Portuguese, was organized in four parts.

1. *The right attack.* The light company of the 83rd and the 2nd caçadores, which were posted in the houses beyond the bridge on the Agueda, were directed

to cross that river and escalate an outwork in front of the castle, where there was no ditch, but where two guns commanded the junction of the counterscarp with the body of the place. The 5th and 94th regiments posted behind the convent of Santa Cruz, and having the 77th in reserve, were to enter the ditch at the extremity of the counterscarp; then to escalate the *fausse braye*, and scour in to their left as far as the great breach.

2. *The centre attack or assault of the great breach.* One hundred and eighty men protected by the fire of the 83rd regiment, and carrying hay-bags to throw into the ditch, were to move out of the second parallel and to be followed by a storming party, which was again to be supported by General Mackinnon's brigade of the third division.

3. *Left attack.* The light division posted behind the convent of Francisco, was to send three companies of the 95th to scour the *fausse braye* to the right, and so connect the left and centre attacks. At the same time a storming party preceded by the 3rd *caçadores* carrying hay-sacks and followed by Vandeleur's and Andrew Barnard's brigade, was to make for the small breach, and when the *fausse braye* was carried to detach to their right to assist the main assault, and to the left to force a passage at the Salamanca gate.

4. *The false attack.* This was an escalate to be made by Pack's Portuguese on the St. Jago gate at the opposite side of the town.

The right attack was commanded by Colonel O'Toole, of the *caçadores*.

Five hundred volunteers commanded by Major Manners, of the 74th, with a forlorn hope under Mr. Mackie, of the 88th, composed the storming party of the third division.

Three hundred volunteers led by Major George Napier, of the 52nd, with a forlorn hope of 25 men under Mr. Gurwood, of the same regiment, composed the storming party of the light division.

All the troops reached their different posts without seeming to attract the attention of the enemy, but before the signal was given, and while Lord Wellington, who in person had been pointing out the lesser breach to Major Napier, was still at the convent of Francisco, the attack on the right commenced, and was instantly taken up along the whole line.* Then the space between the army and the ditch was covered with soldiers and ravaged by a tempest of grape from the ramparts. The storming parties of the third division jumped out of the parallel when the first shout arose, but so rapid had been the movements on their right, that before they could reach the ditch, Ridge, Dunkin, and Campbell, with the 5th, 77th, and 94th regiments, had already scoured the *fausse braye*, and were pushing up the great breach, amidst the bursting of shells, the whistling of grape and muskets, and the shrill cries of the French, who were driven fighting behind the retrenchments. There, however, they rallied, and aided by the musketry from the houses, made hard battle for their post; none would go back on either side, and yet the British could not get forward, and men and officers falling in heaps, choked up the passage, which from minute to minute was raked with grape, from two guns flanking the top of the breach at the distance of a few yards; thus striving and trampling alike upon the dead and the wounded, these brave men maintained the combat.

Meanwhile, the stormers of the light division who had 300 yards of ground to clear, would not wait for the hay-bags, but with extraordinary swiftness running to the crest of the glacis, jumped down the scarp, a depth of 11 feet, and rushed up the *fausse braye* under a smashing discharge of grape and musketry. The bottom of the ditch was dark and intricate, and the forlorn hope took too much to their left; but the storming party went straight to the breach, which was so contracted that a gun placed lengthwise across the top nearly blocked up the opening. Here the forlorn hope rejoined the stormers, but when two-thirds of the ascent were gained, the leading men, crushed together by the narrowness of the place, staggered under the weight of the enemy's fire; and such is the instinct of self-defence, that although

* Appendix, No. 18, section 1

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no man had been allowed to load, every musket in the crowd was snapped. The commander, Major Napier, was at this moment stricken to the earth by a grape shot which shattered his arm, but he called on his men to trust to their bayonets, and all the officers simultaneously sprang to the front, when the charge was renewed with a furious shout, and the entrance was gained. The supporting regiments coming up in sections abreast, then reached the rampart, the 52nd wheeled to the left, the 43rd to the right, and the place was won. During this contest which lasted only a few minutes, after the *fausse braye* was passed, the fighting had continued at the great breach with unabated violence, but when the 43rd and the stormers of the light division came pouring down upon the right flank of the French, the latter bent before the storm; at the same moment the explosion of three wall magazines destroyed many persons, and the third division with a mighty effort broke through the retrenchments. The garrison, indeed, still fought for a moment in the streets, but finally fled to the castle, where Mr. Gurwood, who though wounded, had been amongst the foremost at the lesser breach, received the governor's sword.

The allies now plunged into the streets from all quarters, for O'Toole's attack was also successful, and at the other side of the town Pack's Portuguese, meeting no resistance, had entered the place, and the reserves also came in. Then throwing off the restraints of discipline, the troops committed frightful excesses. The town was fired in three or four places, the soldiers menaced their officers, and shot each other; many were killed in the market-place, intoxication soon increased the tumult, disorder everywhere prevailed, and at last, the fury rising to an absolute madness, a fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of the great magazine, when the town and all in it would have been blown to atoms, but for the energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their senses.

Three hundred French had fallen, 1500 were made prisoners, and besides the immense stores of ammunition, above 150 pieces of artillery, including the battering-train of Marmont's army, were captured in the place. The whole loss of the allies was about 1200 soldiers and 90 officers, and of these above 650 men and 60 officers had been slain or hurt at the breaches. General Crawford and General Mackinnon, the former a man of great ability, were killed, and with them died many gallant men, amongst others, a captain of the 45th, of whom it has been felicitously said, that "Three generals and 70 other officers had fallen, but the soldiers fresh from the strife only talked of Hardyman." General Vandaleur, Colonel Colborne, and a crowd of inferior rank were wounded, and unhappily the slaughter did not end with the battle, for the next day as the prisoners and their escort were marching out by the breach, an accidental explosion took place and numbers of both were blown into the air.

To recompense an exploit so boldly undertaken and so gloriously finished, Lord Wellington was created Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the Spaniards, Earl of Wellington by the English, and Marquis of Torres Vedras by the Portuguese; but it is to be remarked, that the Prince Regent of Portugal had previous to that period displayed great ingratitude in the conferring of honours upon the British officers.

OBSERVATIONS.

1. The duration of this siege was 12 days, or half the time originally calculated upon by the English general, and yet the inexperience both of the engineer and soldier, and the very heavy fire of the place, had caused the works to be more slowly executed than might have been expected; the cold also had impeded the labourers, and yet with a less severe frost the trenches would have been overflowed, because in open weather the water rises everywhere to within six inches of the surface. But the worst obstacle was caused by the disgraceful badness of the cutting-tools furnished from the storekeeper-general's office in England; the profits of the contractor seemed to be the only thing respected; the engineers eagerly sought for French implements, because those provided by England were useless.

2. The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of Francisco,

and broke ground on the first night of the investment, the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the fire of the defence had been in any manner lessened, and before the counterscarp had been blown in; were the true causes of the sudden fall of the place. Both the military and political state of affairs warranted this neglect of rules. The final success depended more upon the courage of the troops than the skill of the engineer; and when the general terminated his order for the assault with the sentence, "*Ciudad Rodrigo must be stormed this evening*," he knew well that it would be nobly understood. Yet the French fought bravely on the breach, and by their side many British deserters, desperate men, were bayoneted.

3. The great breach was cut off from the town by a perpendicular descent of 16 feet, and the bottom was planted with sharp spikes, and strewn with live shells; the houses behind were all loop-holed, and garnished with musketeers, and on the flanks there were cuts, not indeed very deep or wide, and the French had left the temporary bridges over them, but behind were parapets so powerfully defended that it was said the third division could never have carried them, had not the light division taken the enemy in flank: an assertion perhaps easier made than proved.

4. The rapid progress of the allies on this occasion has been contrasted with the slow proceedings of Massena in 1810, and the defence of Herrasti has been compared with that of Barrié. But Massena was not pressed for time, and he would have been blamable to have spared labour at the expense of blood; Herrasti also had a garrison of 6000 men, whereas Barrié had less than 2000, of which only 1700 were able to bear arms, and he had additional works to guard. Nevertheless, his neglect of the lesser breach was a great error; it was so narrow and high, that a very slight addition to its defences would have rendered it quite impracticable; and as the deserters told him in the morning of the 19th that the light division was coming up out of its turn, he must have expected the assault and had time to prepare for it. Moreover, the small breach was flanked at a very short distance by a demi-bastion with a parapet, which, though little injured, was abandoned when the head of the storming party had forced their way on to the rampart. But the true way of defending Ciudad was by external operations, and it was not until it fell, that the error of Marmont at Elbodon could be judged in its full extent. Neither can that marshal be in any manner justified for having left so few men in Ciudad Rodrigo; it is certain that with a garrison of 5000 the place would not have been taken, for when there are enough of men the engineer's art cannot be overcome by mere courage.

5. The excesses committed by the allied troops were very disgraceful. The Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and helpless, and all these claims were disregarded. "The soldiers were not to be controlled." That excuse will, however, scarcely suffice here, because Colonel Macleod, of the 43rd, a young man of a most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach and did constrain his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorders commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally carried away in the increasing tumult.

CHAPTER IV.

IN Ciudad Rodrigo, papers were found by which it appeared that many of the inhabitants were emissaries of the enemy: all these people Carlos d'España slew without mercy, but of the English deserters, who were taken, some were executed, some pardoned, and the rigour of the Spanish generals was thought to be overstrained.

When order had been restored workmen were set to repair the breaches and to level the trenches, and arrangements were made to provision the place quickly, for Marmont's army was gathering at Valladolid; that general was, however, still

ignorant that Ciudad had fallen. In the latter end of December, rumour, anticipating the fact, had indeed spoken of an English bridge on the Agueda, and the expedition to Alicant was countermanded; yet the report died away, and Montbrun recommenced his march. But though the bridge was cast on the 1st and the siege commenced on the 8th, on the 12th nothing was known at Salamanca.

On the 11th, Marmont arrived at Valladolid; on the 15th he for the first time heard of the siege. His army was immediately ordered to concentrate at Salamanca, Bonet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment to aid, and on the 25th, six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, being about 45,000 in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence to Ciudad, was four marches.

On the 23rd, Souham had advanced to Matilla to ascertain the fate of the fortress, but meanwhile 5000 of Hill's troops had reached Castello Branco, and the allies were therefore strong enough to fight beyond the Agueda. Hence if the siege had even lasted 24 days, the place might still have been taken.

The 26th, Marmont knew that the fortress was lost, and unable to comprehend his adversary's success, retired to Valladolid. His divisions were thus harassed by ruinous marches in winter; for Montbrun had already reached Arevalo on his return from Valencia, and Bonet, in repassing the Asturian mountains, had suffered much from cold and fatigue, and more from the attacks of Porlier, who harassed him without cessation. Sir Howard Douglas immediately sent money and arms to the Asturias, on one flank, and on the other flank, Morillo, who had remained at Horcajo in great peril after his flight from Almagro, took the opportunity to escape by Truxillo; meanwhile Saornil's band cut off a French detachment at Medina del Campo, other losses were sustained from the Partidas on the Tietar, and the operations of those in the Rioja, Navarre, and New Castile were renewed. The regular Spanish troops were likewise put in movement. Abadia and Cabrera, advancing from Galicia, menaced Astorga and La Baneza, but the arrival of Bonet at Benevente, soon obliged them to retire again to Puebla de Senabria and Villa Franca; and Silveira, who had marched across the frontier of Tras os Montes to aid them, also fell back to Portugal.

Marmont's operations were here again ill judged. He should have taken post at Tamames, or St. Martin de Rio, and placed strong advanced guards at Tenebron and St. Espiritus, in the hills immediately above Ciudad. His troops could have been concentrated at those places the 28th, and on that day such a heavy rain set in, that the trestle bridge at Marialva could not stand, and the river rose two feet over the stone bridge at the town. The allies were then on the left bank, the communication with the town was entirely cut off, the repair of the breaches was scarcely complete, and Ciudad being entirely exposed for several days might have been retaken. But the greatest warriors are the very slaves of fortune!

The English general's eyes were now turned towards Badajos, which he was desirous to invest in the second week of March; because then the flooding of the rivers in Beira would enable him to carry nearly all his forces to the Alemtejo, without risk, and the same rains would impede the junction of the enemy's force in Estremadura. Green forage was to be had in the last province considerably earlier than on the Agueda, and the success of the contemplated campaign in Andalusia depended upon the operations taking place before the harvest upon the ground should ripen, which was the enemy's resource, and would happen much earlier there than in Leon.

Preliminary measures were already in progress. In December a pontoon bridge escorted by military artificers and some Portuguese seamen had been ordered from Lisbon to Abrantes, where draft bullocks were collected to draw it to Elvas. After the fall of Ciudad stores and tools were sent from Lisbon to Setuval, and thence in boats to Alcacer do Sal; and a company of the military artificers, then at Cadiz, were disembarked at Ayamonte to proceed to Elvas, where an engineer officer secretly superintended the preparations for the siege. Meanwhile the repairs of Ciudad went on, two new redoubts were traced out upon the Tesons, the old one

was enlarged and the suburbs were strengthened, but the heavy storms before mentioned impeded these works, and having entirely stopped all communication by sea and land, delayed for many days the preparations for the ulterior operations. When the weather cleared they were renewed, yet other obstacles were not wanting.

The draft bullocks, sinking from want, were unable to drag the whole battering-train by the way of Vilha Velha, and only sixteen 24-pounders and 20 spare carriages could be moved on that line. To supply the deficiency sixteen 24-pounders, then in vessels in the Tagus, were ordered up to Abrantes, and Admiral Berkeley was applied to for twenty ship-guns. He had none of that calibre and offered 18-pounders, which were accepted; but when Major Dickson, who superintended the arrangements for the artillery service, arrived at Lisbon, he found that these were Russian pieces whose bore was too large for English shot, and the admiral refused to give guns from his own ship, the *Barfleur*, in their place. This apparently capricious proceeding produced both difficulty and delay, because the artillerymen were in consequence obliged to cull the Portuguese shot in the arsenal to obtain a sufficient supply. However, the energy of Major Dickson overcame every obstacle, and in the beginning of March the battering-guns, 52 in number, the pontoons from Abrantes, and most of the stores from Alcaçer do Sal, were parked at Elvas, where also gabions and fascines were piled in great numbers.

Marmont, having lost his emissaries at Ciudad Rodrigo, and being unable to measure his adversary's talent and energy, had during these transactions again spread his troops that he might the more easily feed them. Three divisions of infantry and part of the cavalry returned to Talavera and Toledo. Souham occupied the country from Zamora and Toro to the banks of the Tormes; and Bonet, after driving the Gallicians back to Senabria and Villa Franca, remained about Benevente and Astorga. The army of Portugal appeared to dread no further operations on the part of the allies, yet from some secret misgiving, Marmont caused General Foy to march through the Guadalupe, by the pass of St. Vincente, to ascertain whether an army could march by that line from the Tagus to the Gadiana.

This scattering of the French relieved Lord Wellington from a serious embarrassment. The constant difficulty of land transport had prevented him from bringing up the clothing of the army, and he was now obliged to send the regiments to those points on the Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus, where the clothing had arrived by boats; hence the march to the Alemtejo was necessarily long and unmilitary, and would have been too dangerous to attempt, if Marmont had kept his troops together on the Tormes, with advanced posts pushed towards Ciudad Rodrigo. The weather was now, however, extremely favourable to the allies, and the new Portuguese commissariat supplied the troops on this march well, and without any of those exactions and oppressions which had always before marked the movements of the native troops; nevertheless the scarcity was so great, that rations of cassava root were served to the Portuguese instead of bread.

The talents of Lord Wellington always rose with his difficulties, but want of specie crippled every operation. A movement into Spain, such as that now intended against Andalusia, could not be effected without magazines when there was no harvest on the ground, except by paying ready money; because it was certain that the Spaniards, however favourably disposed, would never diminish their own secret resources for mere promises of payment. The English general and Mr. Stuart, therefore, endeavoured to get British bank notes accepted as cash by the great merchants of Lisbon and Oporto; and Lord Wellington reflecting that, from the enormous sums spent in Portugal, many persons must needs have secret hoards which they would be glad to invest if they could do it safely, asked for English exchequer-bills to negotiate in the same manner; intending to pay the interest punctually and faithfully, however inconvenient it might prove at the moment. This plan could not be adopted with Portuguese paper, because the finances were faithlessly managed by the regency; but some futile arguments against the proposition were advanced by Lord Liverpool, and money became so scarce, that we shall

find, even in the midst of victory, the war was more than once likely to stop altogether from absolute inability to proceed.

On the 5th of March, the army being well on the way to the Alentejo, Lord Wellington, who had maintained his head-quarters on the Coa to the last moment, that the enemy might not be awakened to his real designs, gave up Ciudad Rodrigo to Castaños. He also in person, and on the spot, explained to Vives, the governor, the plan and intention of the new works; he supplied him with money to complete them; furnished him with six weeks' provision remaining from the field stores of the British troops, and gave him the reserved stores at St. Joa de Pesqueira on the Douro, from whence Carlos d'España undertook to transport them to the fortress.

As Marmont was at this time in Salamanca, and still ignorant of the allies' march, General Victor Alten's brigade of cavalry was posted on the Yeltes, to screen the allies' movement as long as possible, and he was instructed if Marmont advanced to retire on Beira, and cover the magazines at Castello Branco, by disputing all the rivers and defiles with the enemy's advanced parties. At the same time Silveira was directed to fall back upon the Douro to cover Oporto; the militia under Trant and J. Wilson were ordered to concentrate about Guarda; and those of Beira to unite about Castello Branco under Colonel Lecor; the orders of all being the same, namely, to dispute the passage of the rivers and defiles. Trant was to defend those of the Estrella, and Lecor those of Castello Branco, on which town Victor Alten's cavalry was finally to retire if pressed. With these forces, and the Spaniards under Sanchez and España, and with the two fortresses, for Almeida was now capable of defence, Marmont's efforts were not much to be dreaded in that season, after he had lost his battering train in Ciudad.

These things arranged, Wellington set off for Elvas, which he reached the 11th, and prepared to invest Badajos, although neither the troops nor the stores were all arrived; but even this was 10 days later than he had designed, and threw his operations into the violent equinoctial rains, by which the difficulties were augmented two-fold. This was one of the evils produced by the incredibly vexatious conduct of the Portuguese regency. There was no want of transport in the country, but as the government would not oblige the magistrates to do their duty, the latter either refused to procure carts for the army, or obliged the poorer classes to supply them, from which oppression the peasants naturally endeavoured to escape by flight. Thus all the arrangements for the investment of Badajos on the 6th of March had been made, but the rich town of Evora, which had not seen the face of an enemy for more than three years, refused to supply any carriages at all, and the operation was necessarily put off till the 17th.

But it was in vain that Wellington threatened and remonstrated, in vain that he employed his time and wasted his mental powers in devising new laws, or remedies for bad ones; it was in vain that Mr. Stuart exerted himself, with equal vigour, to give energy to this extraordinary government; for whether in matters of small or vital importance, insolent anger and falsehood, disgraceful subterfuges and stolid indifference, upon the part of all civil functionaries, from the highest to the lowest, met them at every turn. The responsibility even in small matters became too great for subordinate officers; and the English general was forced to arrange the most trifling details of the service himself; thus the iron-strength of his body and mind was strained, until all men wondered how they held, and in truth he did fall sick, but recovered after a few days. The critical nature of the war may be here judged of, for no man could have taken his place at such a moment, no man, however daring or skilful, would have voluntarily plunged into difficulties which were like to drive Wellington from the contest.

CHAPTER V.

THE 15th, the pontoons were laid over the Guadiana, about four miles from Elvas, at a place where the current was dull; two large Spanish boats were arranged as flying bridges; and the 16th, Beresford, who had again joined the army, crossed the river, drove in the enemy's posts, and invested Badajos with the third, fourth, and light divisions, and a brigade of Hamilton's Portuguese; in all 15,000 men.

Soult was then before the Isla, Drouet's division of 5000 men was at Villafranca, and Darricau with a like force was at Zalamea de Serena near Medellin; wherefore General Graham passing the Guadiana with the first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry, and two brigades of cavalry, directed his march by Valverde and Santa Martha upon Llerena, while Hill moved from Albuquerque by Merida upon Almodralejos. These covering corps were together 30,000 strong, nearly 5000, including the heavy Germans who were at Estremos, being cavalry; and as the fifth division was now on the march from Beira, the whole army presented about 51,000 sabres and bayonets, of which 20,000 were Portuguese.* Castaños had repaired to Galicia, but the fifth Spanish army under Morillo and Penne Villemur, being about 4000 strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to the Lower Guadiana, intending to fall on Seville when Soult should advance to the succour of Badajos.

As the allies advanced, Drouet marched by his right to Hornaches, in the direction of La Serena and Medellin, with a view to keep open the communication with Marmont by Truxillo. Hill then halted at Almodralejos, and Graham took post at Zafra, placing Slade's cavalry at Villafranca; but Marmont had moved his sixth division from Talavera towards Castile, through the Puerto de Pico, on the 9th, and the four divisions and cavalry quartered at Toledo had recrossed the Tagus and marched over the Guadarama, the whole pointing for Valladolid. Thus it was already manifest that the army of Portugal would not act in conjunction with that of the south.

THIRD ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

This fortress has before been described.† The garrison, composed of French, Hessian, and Spanish troops, was now near 5000 strong, including sick. Phillipon had since the last siege made himself felt in all directions, for he had continually scoured the vicinity of the place, destroyed many small bands, carried off cattle, almost from under the guns of Elvas and Campo Mayor, and his spies extended their researches from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, and from Lisbon to Ayamonte.

He had also greatly improved the defences of the place. An interior retrenchment was made in the castle, and many more guns were there mounted; the rear of Fort Cristoval was also better secured, and a covered communication from the fort itself to the work at the bridge-head was nearly completed. Two ravelins had been constructed on the south side of the town, and a third was commenced, together with counterguards for the bastions; but the eastern front next the castle, which was in other respects the weakest point, was without any outward protection, save the stream of the Rivillas. A *cunette*, or second ditch, had been dug at the bottom of the great ditch, which was also in some parts filled with water; the gorge of the Pardaleras was enclosed, and that outwork was connected with the body of the place, from whence powerful batteries looked into it. The three western fronts were mined, and on the east, the arch of the bridge behind the San Roque was built up to form an inundation, 200 yards wide, which greatly contracted the space by which the place could be approached with troops. All the inhabitants had been obliged, on pain of being expelled, to lay up food for three months, and two convoys with provisions and ammunition had entered the place on the 10th and 16th of February, but Phillipon's stores of powder were still inadequate to his wants, and he was very scantily supplied with shells.

* Appendix, No. 20, section 1.

† Appendix, No. 9.

As the former system of attack against Cristoval and the castle was now impracticable, Lord Wellington desired to assail one of the western fronts, which would have been a scientific operation ; but the engineer represented that he had neither mortars nor miners, nor enough of guns, nor the means of bringing up sufficient stores for such an attack. Indeed, the want of transport had again obliged the allies to draw the stores from Elvas, to the manifest hazard of that fortress, and hence here, as at Ciudad Rodrigo, time was necessarily paid for by the loss of life ; or rather the crimes of politicians were atoned for by the blood of the soldiers.

The plan finally fixed upon was to attack the bastion of Trinidad, because the counterguard there being unfinished, that bastion could be battered from the hill on which the Picurina stood. The first parallel was therefore to embrace the Picurina, the San Roque, and the eastern front, in such a manner that the counter batteries there erected might rake and destroy all the defences of the southern fronts which bore against the Picurina hill. The Picurina itself was to be battered and stormed, and from thence the Trinidad and Santa Maria bastions were to be breached ; after this all the guns were to be turned against the connecting curtain, which was known to be of weak masonry, that a third breach might be made, and a storming party employed to turn any retrenchments behind the breaches in the bastions. In this way the inundation could be avoided, and although a French deserter declared, and truly, that the ditch was there 18 feet deep, such was the general's confidence in his troops, and in his own resources for aiding their efforts, that he resolved to storm the place without blowing in the counterscarp.

The battering train, directed by Major Dickson, consisted of 52 pieces. This included sixteen 24-pound howitzers for throwing Shrapnel shells, but this species of missile, much talked of in the army at the time, was little prized by Lord Wellington, who had early detected its insufficiency, save as a common shell ; and partly to avoid expense, partly from a dislike to injure the inhabitants, neither in this nor in any former siege, did he use mortars. Here, indeed, he could not have brought them up, for besides the neglect of the Portuguese government, the peasantry and even the ordenança employed to move the battering train from Alcaer do Sal, although well paid, deserted.

Of 900 gunners present, 300 were British, the rest Portuguese, and there were 150 sappers volunteers from the third division, who were indeed rather unskilful, but of signal bravery. The engineer's parc was established behind the heights of St. Michael, and the direction of the siege was given to General Picton. General Kempt, General Colville, and General Bowes alternately commanded in the trenches.

In the night of the 17th, 1800 men, protected by a guard of 2000, broke ground 160 yards from the Picurina. A tempest stifled the sound of their pickaxes, and though the work was commenced late, a communication, 4000 feet in length, was formed, and a parallel of 600 yards, three feet deep and three feet six inches wide, was opened. However, when the day broke the Picurina was reinforced, and a sharp musketry interspersed with discharges from some field-pieces, aided by heavy guns from the body of the place, was directed on the trenches.

In the night of the 18th, two batteries were traced out, the parallel was prolonged both on the right and left, and the previous works were improved. On the other hand the garrison raised the parapets of the Picurina, and having lined the top of the covered way with sand-bags, planted musketeers there, to gall the men in the trenches, who replied in a like manner.

The 19th, Lord Wellington, having secret intelligence that a sally was intended, ordered the guards to be reinforced. Nevertheless, at one o'clock some cavalry came out by the Talavera gate, and 1300 infantry under General Vielland, the second in command, filed unobserved into the communication between the Picurina and the San Roque ; 100 men were prepared to sally from the Picurina itself, and all these troops jumping out at once, drove the workmen before them, and began to demolish the parallel. Previous to this outbreak, the French cavalry, forming

two parties, had commenced a sham fight on the right of the parallel, and the smaller party pretending to fly, and answering Portuguese to the challenge of the piquets, were allowed to pass. Elated by the success of their stratagem, they then galloped to the engineer's parc, which was 1000 yards in rear of the trenches, and there cut down some men, not many, for succour soon came, and meanwhile the troops at the parallel having rallied upon the relief which had just arrived, beat the enemy's infantry back even to the castle.

In this hot fight the besieged lost above 300 men and officers, the besiegers only 150; but Colonel Fletcher, the chief engineer, was badly wounded, and several hundred entrenching tools were carried off, for Phillipon had promised a high price for each; yet this turned out ill, because the soldiers, instead of pursuing briskly, dispersed to gather the tools. After the action a squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces were placed as a reserve-guard behind St. Michael, and a signal post was established on the Sierra de Venta to give notice of the enemy's motions.

The weather continued wet and boisterous, and the labour of the works was very harassing, but in the night of the 19th the parallel was opened in its whole length, and the 20th it was enlarged; yet a local obstacle and the flooding of the trenches rendered the progress slow.

In the night of the 20th, the parallel was extended to the left, across the Seville road, and three counter-batteries were commenced; but they were traced in rear of the parallel, partly because the ground was too soft in front to admit of the guns moving; partly for safety, because the batteries were within 300 yards of the San Roque, and as the parallel, 1800 yards long, was only guarded by 1400 men, a few bold soldiers might by a sudden rush have succeeded in spiking the guns if they had been placed in front of the trench. A slight sally was this day repulsed, and a shoulder was given to the right of the parallel to cover that flank.

The 21st, the enemy placed two field-pieces on the right bank of the Guadiana, designing to rake the trenches, but the shoulder, made the night before, baffled the design, and the riflemen's fire soon sent the guns away. Indications of a similar design against the left flank, from the Pardaleras hill, were also observed, and a guard of 300 men, with two guns, was posted on that side in some broken ground.

In the night another battery against the San Roque was commenced, and the battery against the Picurina was finished; but heavy rain again retarded the works, and the besiegers having failed in an attempt to drain the lower parts of the parallel, by cuts, made an artificial bottom of sand-bags. On the other hand the besieged, thinking the curtain adjoining the castle was the true object of attack, threw up an earthen entrenchment in front, and commenced clearing away the houses behind it. A covered communication from the Trinidad gate to the San Roque, intended to take this supposed attack in reverse, was also commenced; but the labour of digging being too great, it was completed by hanging up brown cloth, which appeared to be earth, and by this ingenious expedient, the garrison passed unseen between those points.

Vauban's maxim, that a perfect investment is the first requisite in a siege, had been neglected at Badajos to spare labour, but the great master's art was soon vindicated by his countrymen. Phillipon, finding the right bank of the Guadiana free, made a battery in the night for three field-pieces, which at daylight raked the trenches, and the shots pitching into the parallel, swept it in the most destructive manner for the whole day; there was no remedy, and the loss would have been still greater but for the soft nature of the ground, which prevented the touch and bound of the bullets. Orders were immediately sent to the fifth division, then at Campo Mayor, to invest the place on that side, but these troops were distant, and misfortunes accumulated. In the evening heavy rain filled the trenches, the flood of the Guadiana ran the fixed bridge under water, sank 12 of the pontoons, and broke the tackle of the flying bridges; the provisions of the army could not then be brought over, and the guns and ammunition being still on the right bank, the siege was upon the point of being raised. In a few days, however, the river subsided, some Portuguese craft were brought up to form another flying-bridge, the

pontoons saved were employed as row-boats, and in this manner the communication was secured, for the rest of the siege, without any accident.

The 23rd, the besieged continued to work at the entrenchments covering the front next the castle, and the besiegers were fixing their platforms, when at three o'clock the rain again filled the trenches, the earth, being completely saturated with water, fell away, the works everywhere crumbled, and the attack was entirely suspended.

The 24th, the fifth division invested the place on the right bank of the Guadiana, the weather was fine, and the batteries were armed with 10 twenty-fours, 11 eighteens, and seven five-and-a-half-inch howitzers. The next day, at 11 o'clock, these pieces opened, but they were so vigorously answered, that one howitzer was dismounted and several artillery and engineer officers were killed. Nevertheless the San Roque was silenced, and the garrison of the Picurina was so galled by the marksmen in the trenches, that no man dared look over the parapet; hence, as the external appearance of that fort did not indicate much strength, General Kempt was charged to assault it in the night.

The outward seeming of the Picurina was however fallacious, the fort was very strong; the fronts were well covered by the glacis, the flanks were deep, and the rampart, 14 feet perpendicular from the bottom of the ditch, was guarded with thick slanting pales above; and from thence to the top there were 16 feet of an earthen slope. A few palings had, indeed, been knocked off at the covered-way, and the parapet was slightly damaged on that side, but this injury was repaired with sand-bags, and the ditch was profound, narrow at the bottom, and flanked by four splinter-proof casemates. Seven guns were mounted on the works, the entrance to which by the rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, the garrison was above 200 strong, and every man had two muskets. The top of the rampart was garnished with loaded shells to push over, a retrenched guard-house formed a second internal defence, and finally, some small mines and a loop-holed gallery, under the counterscarp, intended to take the assailants in rear, were begun but not finished.

Five hundred men of the third division being assembled for the attack, General Kempt ordered 200, under Major Rudd, of the 77th, to turn the fort on the left; an equal force, under Major Shaw, of the 74th, to turn the fort by the right; and 100 from each of these bodies were directed to enter the communication with San Roque and intercept any succours coming from the town. The flanking columns were to make a joint attack on the fort, and the 100 men remaining were placed under Captain Powis, of the 83rd, to form a reserve. The engineers, Holloway, Stanway, and Gips, with 24 sappers bearing hatchets and ladders, guided these columns, and 50 men of the light division, likewise provided with axes, were to move out of the trenches at the moment of attack.

ASSAULT OF PICURINA.

The night was fine, the arrangements clearly and skilfully made, and about nine o'clock the two flanking bodies moved forward. The distance was short, and the troops quickly closed on the fort, which, black and silent before, now seemed one mass of fire; then the assailants running up to the palisades in the rear, with undaunted courage endeavoured to break through, and when the destructive musketry of the French, and the thickness of the pales, rendered their efforts nugatory, they turned against the faces of the work and strove to break in there; but the depth of the ditch and the slanting stakes at the top of the brick-work again baffled them.

At this time, the enemy shooting fast, and dangerously, the crisis appeared imminent, and Kempt sent the reserve headlong against the front; thus the fight was continued strongly, the carnage became terrible, and a battalion coming out from the town to the succour of the fort, was encountered and beaten by the party

on the communication. The guns of Badajos and of the castle now opened, the guard of the trenches replied with musketry, rockets were thrown up by the besieged, and the shrill sound of alarm bells, mixing with the shouts of the combatants, increased the tumult. Still the Picurina sent out streams of fire, by the light of which dark figures were seen furiously struggling on the ramparts: for Powis first escalated the place in front where the artillery had beaten down the pales, and the other assailants had thrown their ladders on the flanks in the manner of bridges, from the brink of the ditch to the slanting stakes, and all were fighting hand to hand with the enemy. Meanwhile the axe-men of the light division, compassing the fort like prowling wolves, discovered the gate, and hewing it down, broke in by the rear.* Nevertheless the struggle continued. Powis, Holloway, Gips, and Oates, of the 88th, fell wounded on or beyond the rampart; Nixon, of the 52nd, was shot two yards within the gate; Shaw, Rudd, and nearly all the other officers had fallen outside; and it was not until half the garrison were killed, that Gaspar Thierry, the commandant, and 86 men, surrendered, while some, not many, rushing out of the gate, endeavoured to cross the inundation and were drowned.

The French governor hoped to have delayed the siege five or six days by the resistance of Picurina, and had the assault been a day later, this would have happened; for the loop-holed gallery in the counterscarp, and the mines, would then have been completed, and the body of the work was too well covered by the glacis to be quickly ruined by fire. His calculations were baffled by this heroic assault, which lasted an hour, and cost four officers and 50 men killed, 15 officers and 250 men wounded; and so vehement was the fight throughout, that the garrison either forgot, or had not time, to roll over the shells and combustibles arranged on the ramparts. Phillipon did not conceal the danger accruing to Badajos from the loss of the Picurina, but he stimulated his soldiers' courage, by calling to their recollection, how infinitely worse than death it was to be the inmate of an English hulk!—an appeal which must have been deeply felt, for the annals of civilized nations furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of war than the prison-ships of England.

When the Picurina was taken, three battalions of reserve advanced to secure it, and though a great turmoil and firing from the town continued until midnight, a lodgment in the works, and a communication with the first parallel, were established, and the second parallel was commenced. However at daylight the redoubt was so overwhelmed with fire from the town, that no troops could remain in it, and the lodgment was entirely destroyed. In the evening the sappers effected another lodgment on the flanks, the second parallel was then opened in its whole length, and the next day the counter-batteries on the right of Picurina exchanged a vigorous fire with the town; but one of the besiegers' guns was dismounted, and the Portuguese gunners, from inexperience, produced less effect on the defences than was expected.

In the night of the 27th, a new communication from the first parallel to the Picurina was made, and three breaching-batteries were traced out. The first to contain twelve 24-pounders, occupied the space between the Picurina and the inundation, and was to breach the right face of the Trinidad bastion. The second, to contain eight 18-pounders, was on the site of the Picurina, and was to breach the left flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The third, constructed on the prolonged line of the front to be attacked, contained three Shrapnel howitzers, to scour the ditch and prevent the garrison working in it; for Phillipon had now discovered the true line of attack, and had set strong parties in the night, to raise the counter-guard of the Trinidad and the imperfect ravelin covering the menaced front.

At daybreak these works, being well furnished with gabions and sand-bags, were lined with musketeers, who severely galled the workmen employed on the breaching batteries, and the artillery practice also was brisk on both sides. Two of

the besiegers guns were dismounted; the gabions placed in front of the batteries to protect the workmen were knocked over, and the musketry then became so destructive that the men were withdrawn and threw up earth from the inside.

In the night of the 27th, the second parallel was extended to the right, with the view of raising batteries, to ruin the San Roque, to destroy the dam which held up the inundation, and to breach the curtain behind; but the Talavera road proved so hard, and the moon shone so brightly, that the labourers were quite exposed and the work was relinquished.

On the 28th, the screen of gabions before the batteries was restored, and the workmen resumed their labours outside; the parallel was then improved, and the besieged withdrew their guns from San Roque; but their marksmen still shot from thence with great exactness, and the plunging fire from the castle dismounted two howitzers in one of the counter-batteries, which was therefore dismantled. The enemy had also during the night observed the tracing string, which marked the direction of the sap in front of San Roque, and a daring fellow creeping out just before the workmen arrived, brought it in the line of the castle fire, whereby some loss was sustained ere the false direction was discovered.

In the night the dismantled howitzer battery was re-armed, with 24-pounders, to play on the San Roque, and a new breaching battery was traced out on the site of the Picurina, against the flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The second parallel was also carried by the sap across the Talavera road, and a trench was digged, for riflemen, in front of the batteries.

The 29th, a slight Sally, made on the right bank of the river, was repulsed by the Portuguese, but the sap at the San Roque was ruined by the enemy's fire, and the besieged continued to raise the counter-guard and ravelin of the Trinidad and to strengthen the front attacked. On the other hand, the besiegers during the night carried the sap over the Talavera road, and armed two breaching batteries with 18-pounders, which the next day opened against the flank of Santa Maria; but they made little impression, and the explosion of an expense magazine killed many men and hurt others.

While the siege was thus proceeding, Soult, having little fear for the town, but expecting a great battle, was carefully organizing a powerful force to unite with Drouet and Daricau. Those generals had endeavoured to hold the district of La Serena, with the view of keeping open the communication with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo; but Graham and Hill marched against their flanks and forced them into the Morena by the Cordova roads; and on the other side of the country Morillo and Penne Villemur were lying close on the lower Guadiana, waiting their opportunity to fall on Seville when Soult should advance. Nor were there wanting other combinations to embarrass and delay the French marshal; for in February, General Montes, being detached by Ballasteros from San Roque, had defeated Maransin on the Guadajore river, driving him from Cartama into Malaga. After this, the whole of the Spanish army was assembled in the Ronda hills, with a view to fall on Seville by the left of the Guadiana while Morillo assailed it on the right of that river. This had obliged Soult to send troops towards Malaga, and fatally delayed his march to Estremadura.

Meanwhile Marmont was concentrating his army in the Salamanca country, and it was rumoured that he meant to attack Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord Wellington was somewhat disturbed by this information; he knew, indeed, that the flooding of the rivers in the north would prevent a blockade, and he was also assured that Marmont had not yet obtained a battering train. But the Spanish generals and engineers had neglected the new works and repairs of Ciudad Rodrigo; even the provisions at St. Joa de Pesquiera had not been brought up; the fortress had only 30 days' supply, Almeida was in as bad a state, and the grand project of invading Andalusia was likely to be balked by these embarrassments.

On the 30th, Soult's advance from Cordova being decided, the fifth division was brought over the Guadiana as a reserve to the covering army; but Power's Portuguese brigade, with some cavalry of the same nation, still maintained the investment

on the right bank, the siege was urged forward very rapidly, 48 pieces of artillery were in constant play, and the sap against St. Roque advanced. The enemy was equally active, his fire was very destructive, and his progress in raising the ravelin and counter-guard of the front attacked was very visible.

The 1st of April the sap was pushed close to the San Roque, the Trinidad bastion crumbled under the stroke of the bullet, and the flank of the Santa Maria, which was casemated and had hitherto resisted the batteries, also began to yield. The 2nd, the face of the Trinidad was very much broken, but at the Santa Maria the casemates being laid open the bullets were lost in their cavities, and the garrison commenced a retrenchment to cut off the whole of the attacked front from the town.

In the night a new battery against the San Roque was armed, and two officers with some sappers, gliding behind that outwork, gagged the sentinel, placed powder barrels and a match against the dam of the inundation, and retired undiscovered, but the explosion did not destroy the dam, and the inundation remained. Nor did the sap make progress, because of the French musketeers; for though the marksmen set against them slew many, they were reinforced by means of a raft with parapets, which crossed the inundation, and men also passed by the cloth communication from the Trinidad gate.

On the 3rd, some guns were turned against the curtain behind the San Roque, but the masonry proved hard, ammunition was scarce, and, as a breach there would have been useless while the inundation remained, the fire was soon discontinued. The two breaches in the bastion were now greatly enlarged, and the besieged assiduously laboured at the retrenchments behind them, and converted the nearest houses and garden walls into a third line of defence. All the houses behind the front next the castle were also thrown down, and a battery of five guns, intended to flank the ditch and breach of the Trinidad, was commenced on the castle hill, but outside the wall; the besiegers therefore traced out a counter-battery of 14 Shrapnel howitzers, to play upon that point during the assault.

The crisis of the siege was now approaching rapidly. The breaches were nearly practicable, Soult, having effected a junction with Drouet and Daricau, was advancing; and as the allies were not in sufficient force to assault the place and give battle at the same time, it was resolved to leave two divisions in the trenches, and to fight at Albuera with the remainder. Graham, therefore, fell back towards that place, and Hill, having destroyed the bridge at Merida, marched from the Upper Guadiana to Talavera Real.

Time being now, as in war it always is, a great object, the anxiety on both sides redoubled; but Soult was still at Llerena, when, on the morning of the 5th, the breaches were declared practicable, and the assault ordered for that evening. Leith's division was even recalled to the camp to assist, when a careful personal examination of the enemy's retrenchments caused some doubt in Lord Wellington's mind, and he delayed the storm until a third breach, as originally projected, should be formed in the curtain between the bastions of Trinidad and Maria. This could not, however, be commenced before morning, and during the night the enemy's workmen laboured assiduously at their retrenchments, regardless of the showers of grape with which the besiegers' batteries scoured the ditch and the breach. But the 6th, the besiegers' guns being all turned against the curtain, the bad masonry crumbled rapidly away; in two hours a yawning breach appeared, and Wellington, having again examined the points of attack in person, renewed the order for the assault. Then the soldiers eagerly made themselves ready for a combat, so fiercely fought, so terribly won, so dreadful in all its circumstances, that posterity can scarcely be expected to credit the tale; but many are still alive who know that it is true.

The British General was so sensible of Phillipon's firmness and of the courage of his garrison, that he spared them the affront of a summons, yet, seeing the breach strongly entrenched and the enemy's flank fire still powerful, he would not in this dread crisis trust his fortune to a single effort. Eighteen thousand daring soldiers burned for the signal of attack, and as he was unwilling to lose the service

A hand-drawn sketch of a French Redoubt, showing a star-shaped fortification with bastions and a central area labeled 'Snord blades' and 'Boulders'. The sketch is on aged, yellowed paper. The fortification has a central area with 'Snord blades' and 'Boulders' written above it. The bastions are labeled 'S. Muro' on the left and 'Boulders' on the right. The central area is also labeled 'Snord blades' and 'Boulders'. The fortification is surrounded by a ditch or moat. The sketch is a top-down view of the fortification.

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of any, to each division he gave a task such as few generals would have the hardihood even to contemplate.

On the right, Picton's division was to file out of the trenches, to cross the Rivillas river, and to scale the castle walls, which were from 18 ft. to 24 ft. in height, furnished with all means of destruction, and so narrow at top that the defenders could easily reach and as easily overturn the ladders.

On the left, Leith's division was to make a false attack on the Pardaleras, and a real assault on the distant bastion of San Vincente, where the glacis was mined, the ditch deep, the scarp 30 ft. high, and the parapet garnished with bold troops well provided; for Phillipon, following his old plan, had three loaded muskets placed beside each man, that the first fire might be quick and deadly.

In the centre, the fourth and light divisions, under General Colville and Colonel Andrew Barnard, were to march against the breaches. They were furnished like the third and fifth divisions with ladders and axes, and were preceded by storming parties of 500 men each, with their respective forlorn hopes. The light division was to assault the bastion of Santa Maria; the fourth division to assault the Trinidad and the curtain; and the columns were divided into storming and firing parties, the former to enter the ditch, the latter to keep the crest of the glacis.

Besides these attacks, Major Wilson, of the 48th, was to storm the San Roque with the guards of the trenches, and on the other side of the Guadiana, General Power was to make a feint on the bridge-head.

At first only one brigade of the third division was to have attacked the castle, but just before the hour fixed upon, a sergeant of sappers, having deserted from the enemy, informed Wellington that there was but one communication from the castle to the town, whereupon he ordered the whole division to advance together.

This was the outline of the plan, but many nice arrangements filled it up, and some were followed, some disregarded, for it is seldom that all things are strictly attended to in a desperate fight. Nor were the enemy idle, for while it was yet twilight some French cavalry issued from the Pardaleras, escorting an officer who endeavoured to look into the trenches, with a view to ascertain if an assault was intended; but the piquet on that side jumped up, and, firing as it ran, drove him and his escort back into the works. Then the darkness fell, and the troops only awaited the signal.

ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.

The night was dry but clouded, the air thick with watery exhalations from the rivers, the ramparts and the trenches unusually still; yet a low murmur pervaded the latter, and in the former, lights were seen to flit here and there, while the deep voices of the sentinels at times proclaimed that all was well in Badajos. The French, confiding in Phillipon's direful skill, watched, from their lofty station, the approach of enemies, whom they had twice before baffled, and now hoped to drive a third time blasted and ruined from the walls; the British, standing in deep columns, were as eager to meet that fiery destruction as the others were to pour it down; and both were alike terrible for their strength, their discipline, and the passions awakened in their resolute hearts.

Former failures there were to avenge, and, on either side, such leaders as left no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial; and the possession of Badajos was become a point of honour, personal with the soldiers of each nation. But the strong desire for glory was, in the British, dashed with a hatred of the citizens on an old grudge, and recent toil and hardship, with much spilling of blood, had made many incredibly savage: for these things render the noble-minded indeed averse to cruelty, but harden the vulgar spirit. Numbers, also, like Cæsar's centurion, who could not forget the plunder of Avaricum, were heated with the recollection of Ciudad Rodrigo, and thirsted for spoil. Thus every spirit found a cause of excitement, the wondrous power of discipline bound the whole together as with a band of iron, and, in the pride of arms, none doubted their might to bear down every obstacle that man could oppose to their fury.

At 10 o'clock the castle, the San Roque, the breaches, the Pardaleras, the distant bastion of San Vincente, and the bridge-head on the other side of the Guadiana, were to have been simultaneously assailed, and it was hoped that the strength of the enemy would shrivel within that fiery girdle. But many are the disappointments of war. An unforeseen accident delayed the attack of the fifth division ; and a lighted carcass, thrown from the castle, falling close to where the men of the third division were drawn up, discovered their array, and obliged them to anticipate the signal by half an hour. Then, everything being suddenly disturbed, the double columns of the fourth and light divisions also moved silently and swiftly against the breaches, and the guard of the trenches, rushing forward with a shout, encompassed the San Roque with fire, and broke in so violently that scarcely any resistance was made.

But a sudden blaze of light and the rattling of musketry indicated the commencement of a most vehement combat at the castle. There General Kempt—for Picton, hurt by a fall in the camp, and expecting no change in the hour, was not present—there General Kempt, I say, led the third division ; he had passed the Rivillas, in single files by a narrow bridge, under a terrible musketry, and then re-forming, and running up the rugged hill, had reached the foot of the castle when he fell severely wounded, and being carried back to the trenches met Picton, who hastened forward to take the command. Meanwhile, his troops spreading along the front, reared their heavy ladders, some against the lofty castle, some against the adjoining front on the left, and with incredible courage ascended amidst showers of heavy stones, logs of wood, and bursting shells rolled off the parapet, while from the flanks the enemy plied his musketry with a fearful rapidity, and in front, with pikes and bayonets, stabbed the leading assailants or pushed the ladders from the walls ; and all this attended with deafening shouts, and the crash of breaking ladders, and the shrieks of crushed soldiers answering to the sullen stroke of the falling weights.

Still, swarming round the remaining ladders, these undaunted veterans strove who should first climb, until all being overturned, the French shouted victory, and the British baffled, but untamed, fell back a few paces, and took shelter under the rugged edge of the hill. Here when the broken ranks were somewhat re-formed, the heroic Colonel Ridge, springing forward, called, with a stentorian voice, on his men to follow, and, seizing a ladder, once more raised it against the castle, yet to the right of the former attack, where the wall was lower, and an embrasure offered some facility. A second ladder was soon placed alongside of the first, by the grenadier officer, Canch, and the next instant he and Ridge were on the rampart ; the shouting troops pressed after them, the garrison amazed, and in a manner surprised, were driven fighting through the double gate into the town, and the castle was won. A reinforcement, sent from the French reserve, then came up ; a sharp action followed, both sides fired through the gate, and the enemy retired, but Ridge fell, and no man died that night with more glory—yet many died, and there was much glory.

During these events, the tumult at the breaches was such as if the very earth had been rent asunder, and its central fires were bursting upwards uncontrolled. The two divisions had reached the glacis, just as the firing at the castle had commenced, and the flash of a single musket discharged from the covered way as a signal showed them that the French were ready ; yet no stir was heard, and darkness covered the breaches. Some hay-packs were then thrown, some ladders were placed, and the forlorn hopes and storming parties of the light division, about 500 in all, had descended into the ditch without opposition, when a bright flame shooting upwards displayed all the terrors of the scene. The ramparts, crowded with dark figures and glittering arms, were seen on the one side, and on the other, the red columns of the British, deep and broad, were coming on like streams of burning lava ; it was the touch of the magician's wand, for a crash of thunder followed, and with incredible violence the storming parties were dashed to pieces by the explosion of hundreds of shells and powder-barrels.

For an instant the light division stood on the brink of the ditch, amazed at the terrific sight, then, with a shout that matched even the sound of the explosion, flew down the ladders, or disdaining their aid, leaped, reckless of the depth, into the gulf below; and nearly at the same moment, amidst a blaze of musketry that dazzled the eyes, the fourth division came running in, and descended with a like fury. There were, however, only five ladders for both columns, which were close together, and a deep cut made in the bottom of the ditch, as far as the counter-guard of the Trinidad, was filled with water from the inundation; into this watery snare the head of the fourth division fell, and it is said that above roof of the fusileers, the men of Albuera, were there smothered.* Those who followed checked not, but as if such a disaster had been expected, turned to the left, and thus came upon the face of the unfinished ravelin, which, being rough and broken, was mistaken for the breach, and instantly covered with men; yet a wide and deep chasm was still between them and the ramparts, from whence came a deadly fire wasting their ranks. Thus baffled, they also commenced a rapid discharge of musketry, and disorder ensued; for the men of the light division, whose conducting engineer had been disabled early, and whose flank was confined by an unfinished ditch intended to cut off the bastion of Santa Maria, rushed towards the breaches of the curtain and the Trinidad, which were indeed before them, but which the fourth division were destined to storm.

Great was the confusion, for now the ravelin was quite crowded with men of both divisions, and while some continued to fire, others jumped down and ran towards the breach, many also passed between the ravelin and the counter-guard of the Trinidad, the two divisions got mixed, and the reserves, which should have remained at the quarries, also came pouring in, until the ditch was quite filled, the rear still crowding forward, and all cheering vehemently. The enemy's shouts also were loud and terrible, and the bursting of shells and of grenades, the roaring of the guns from the flanks, answered by the iron howitzers from the battery of the parallel, the heavy roll and horrid explosion of the powder-barrels, the whizzing flight of the blazing splinters, the loud exhortations of the officers, and the continual clatter of the muskets, made a maddening din.

Now a multitude bounded up the great breach as if driven by a whirlwind, but across the top glittered a range of sword-blades, sharp-pointed, keen-edged on both sides, and firmly fixed in ponderous beams, which were chained together and set deep in the ruins; and for 10 feet in front, the ascent was covered with loose planks, studded with sharp iron points, on which the feet of the foremost being set, the planks moved, and the unhappy soldiers, falling forward on the spikes, rolled down upon the ranks behind. Then the Frenchmen, shouting at the success of their stratagem, and leaping forward, plied their shot with terrible rapidity, for every man had several muskets: and each musket, in addition to its ordinary charge, contained a small cylinder of wood stuck full of leaden slugs, which scattered like hail when they were discharged.

Again the assailants rushed up the breaches, and again the sword-blades, immovable and impassable, stopped their charge, and the hissing shells and thundering powder-barrels exploded unceasingly. Hundreds of men had fallen, and hundreds more were dropping, but still the heroic officers called aloud for new trials, and sometimes followed by many, sometimes by a few, ascended the ruins; and so furious were the men themselves, that in one of these charges the rear strove to push the foremost on to the sword-blades, willing even to make a bridge of their writhing bodies, but the others frustrated the attempt by dropping down; and men fell so fast from the shot that it was hard to know who went down voluntarily, who were stricken, and many stooped unhurt that never rose again. Vain, also, would it have been to break through the sword-blades, for the trench and parapet behind the breach were finished, and the assailants, crowded into even a narrower space than the ditch was, would still have been separated from their enemies, and the slaughter would have continued.

* Appendix, No. 18, section 2.

At the beginning of this dreadful conflict, Colonel Andrew Barnard had with prodigious efforts separated his division from the other, and preserved some degree of military array ; but now the tumult was such, that no command could be heard distinctly, except by those close at hand, and the mutilated carcasses heaped on each other, and the wounded, struggling to avoid being trampled upon, broke the formations ; order was impossible ! Yet officers of all stations, followed more or less numerously by the men, were seen to start out, as if struck by a sudden madness, and rush into the breach, which yawning and glittering with steel, seemed like the mouth of some huge dragon belching forth smoke and flame. In one of these attempts, Colonel Macleod, of the 43rd, a young man, whose feeble body would have been quite unfit for war, if it had not been sustained by an unconquerable spirit, was killed. Wherever his voice was heard there his soldiers gathered, and with such a strong resolution did he lead them up the fatal ruins, that when one behind him, in falling, plunged a bayonet into his back, he complained not, and continuing his course was shot dead within a yard of the sword-blades. But there was no want of gallant leaders, or desperate followers.

Two hours spent in these vain efforts convinced the soldiers that the breach of the Trinidad was impregnable ; and as the opening in the curtain, although less strong, was retired, and the approach to it impeded by deep holes, and cuts made in the ditch, the troops did not much notice it after the partial failure of one attack which had been made early. Gathering in dark groups and leaning on their muskets, they looked up with sullen desperation at the Trinidad, while the enemy stepping out on the ramparts, and aiming their shots by the light of the fire-balls which they threw over, asked, as their victims fell, " Why they did not come into Badajoz ? "

In this dreadful situation, while the dead were lying in heaps and others continually falling, the wounded crawling about to get some shelter from the merciless fire above, and withal a sickening stench from the burnt flesh of the slain, Captain Nicholas, of the engineers, was observed by Mr. Shaw, of the 43rd, making incredible efforts to force his way with a few men into the Santa Maria bastion. Shaw having collected about 50 soldiers of all regiments joined him, and although there was a deep cut along the foot of this breach also, it was instantly passed, and these two young officers, at the head of their gallant band, rushed up the slope of the ruins ; but when they had gained two-thirds of the ascent, a concentrated fire of musketry and grape dashed nearly the whole dead to the earth ! Nicholas was mortally wounded, and the intrepid Shaw stood alone ! After this no further effort was made at any point, and the troops remained passive, but unflinching, beneath the enemy's shot, which streamed without intermission ; for, of the riflemen on the glacis, many leaping early into the ditch had joined in the assault, and the rest, raked by a cross fire of grape from the distant bastions, baffled in their aim by the smoke and flames from the explosions, and too few in number, had entirely failed to quell the French musketry.

About midnight, when 2000 brave men had fallen, Wellington, who was on a height close to the quarries, sent orders for the remainder to retire and re-form for a second assault ; for he had just then heard that the castle was taken, and thinking the enemy would still hold out in the town, was resolved to assail the breaches again. This retreat from the ditch was, however, not effected without further carnage and confusion, for the French fire never slackened, and a cry arose that the enemy were making a sally from the distant flanks, which caused a rush towards the ladders ; then the groans and lamentations of the wounded who could not move, and expected to be slain, increased, many officers who had not heard of the order, endeavoured to stop the soldiers from going back, and some would even have removed the ladders but were unable to break the crowd.

All this time the third division was lying close in the castle, and either from a fear of risking the loss of a point which ensured the capture of the place, or that the egress was too difficult, made no attempt to drive away the enemy from the breaches. On the other side, however, the fifth division had commenced the false

attack on the Pardaleras, and on the right of the Guadiana the Portuguese were sharply engaged at the bridge; thus the town was girdled with fire, for General Walker's brigade having passed on during the feint on the Pardaleras, was escalading the distant bastion of San Vincente. His troops had advanced along the banks of the river, and reached the French guard-house, at the barrier-gate, undiscovered, for the ripple of the waters smothered the sound of their footsteps; but just then the explosion at the breaches took place, the moon shone out, and the French sentinels, discovering the columns, fired. The British troops immediately springing forward under a sharp musketry began to hew down the wooden barrier at the covered way, while the Portuguese, being panic-stricken, threw down the scaling-ladders. Nevertheless, the others snatched them up again, and forcing the barrier, jumped into the ditch; but the guiding engineer officer was killed, and there was a *cunette*, which embarrassed the column, and when the foremost men succeeded in rearing the ladders, the latter were found too short, for the walls were generally above 30 feet high. Meanwhile the fire of the French was deadly, a small mine was sprung beneath the soldiers' feet, beams of wood and live shells were rolled over on their heads, showers of grape from the flank swept the ditch, and man after man dropped dead from the ladders.

Fortunately some of the defenders having been called away to aid in recovering the castle, the ramparts were not entirely manned, and the assailants, having discovered a corner of the bastion where the scarp was only 20 feet high, placed three ladders there under an embrasure which had no gun and was only stopped with a gabion. Some men got up, but with difficulty, for the ladders were still too short, and the first man who gained the top was pushed up by his comrades and then drew others after him, until many had gained the summit; and though the French shot heavily against them, from both flanks and from a house in front, they thickened and could not be driven back; half the 4th regiment entered the town itself to dislodge the enemy from the houses, while the others pushed along the rampart towards the breach, and by dint of hard fighting successively won three bastions.*

In the last of these combats, General Walker leaping forward, sword in hand, at the moment when one of the enemy's cannoners was discharging a gun, fell covered with so many wounds that it was wonderful how he could survive, and some of the soldiers immediately after, perceiving a lighted match on the ground, cried out "a mine!" At that word, such is the power of imagination, those troops whom neither the strong barrier, nor the deep ditch, nor the high walls, nor the deadly fire of the enemy could stop, staggered back appalled by a chimera of their own raising, and in this disorder a French reserve, under General Viellande, drove on them with a firm and rapid charge, and pitching some men over the walls, and killing others outright, again cleansed the ramparts even to the San Vincente. There, however, Leith had placed Colonel Nugent with a battalion of the 38th as a reserve, and when the French came up, shouting and slaying all before them, this battalion, about 200 strong, arose, and with one close volley destroyed them.

Then the panic ceased, the soldiers rallied, and in compact order once more charged along the walls towards the breaches, but the French, although turned on both flanks and abandoned by fortune, did not yet yield; and meanwhile the detachment of the 4th regiment which had entered the town when the San Vincente was first carried, was strangely situated, for the streets were empty and brilliantly illuminated, and no person was seen; yet a low buzz and whisper were heard around, lattices were now and then gently opened, and from time to time shots were fired from underneath the doors of the houses by the Spaniards. However, the troops with bugles sounding, advanced towards the great square of the town, and in their progress captured several mules going with ammunition to the breaches; but the square itself was as empty and silent as the streets, and the houses as bright with lamps; a terrible enchantment seemed to be in operation, for they saw nothing

* Appendix, No. 18, section 2.

but light, and heard only the low whispers close around them, while the tumult at the breaches was like the crashing thunder.

There, indeed, the fight was still plainly raging, and hence, quitting the square, they attempted to take the garrison in reverse, by attacking the ramparts from the town-side, but they were received with a rolling musketry, driven back with loss, and resumed their movement through the streets. At last the breaches were abandoned by the French, other parties entered the place, desultory combats took place in various parts, and finally General Viellande, and Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge with a few hundred soldiers, and entered San Cristoval, where they all surrendered early the next morning upon summons to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who had with great readiness pushed through the town to the drawbridge ere they had time to organize further resistance. But even in the moment of ruin the night before, the noble governor had sent some horsemen out from the fort to carry the news to Soult's army, and they reached him in time to prevent a greater misfortune.

Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness, which tarnished the lustre of the soldiers' heroism. All indeed were not alike, for hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the violence, but the madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajos! On the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled. The wounded men were then looked to, the dead disposed of!

Five thousand men and officers fell during this siege, and of these, including 700 Portuguese, 3500 had been stricken in the assault, 60 officers and more than 700 men being slain on the spot. The five generals, Kempt, Harvey, Bowes, Colville, and Picton, were wounded, the first three severely; about 600 men and officers fell in the escalade of San Vincente, as many at the castle, and more than 2000 at the breaches, each division there losing 1200! And how deadly the strife was, at that point, may be gathered from this—the 43rd and 52nd regiments, of the light division, alone lost more men than the seven regiments of the third division engaged at the castle!

Let any man picture to himself this frightful carnage taking place in a space of less than 100 square yards. Let him consider that the slain died not all suddenly, nor by one manner of death; that some perished by steel, some by shot, some by water, that some were crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by the fiery explosions; that for hours this destruction was endured without shrinking, and that the town was won at last—let any man consider this and he must admit that a British army bears with it an awful power. And false would it be to say that the French were feeble men, for the garrison stood and fought manfully and with good discipline behaving worthily. Shame there was none on any side. Yet who shall do justice to the bravery of the soldiers? the noble emulation of the officers? Who shall measure out the glory of Ridge, of Macleod, of Nicholas, or of O'Hare, of the 95th, who perished on the breach, at the head of the stormers, and with him nearly all the volunteers for that desperate service? Who shall describe the springing valour of that Portuguese grenadier who was killed the foremost man at the Santa Maria? * or the martial fury of that desperate soldier of the 95th, who, in his resolution to win, thrust himself beneath the chained sword-blades, and there suffered the enemy to dash his head to pieces with the ends of their muskets? Who can sufficiently honour the intrepidity of Walker, of Shaw, of Canch, or the resolution of Ferguson, of the 43rd, who having in former assaults received two deep wounds, was here, with his hurts still open,

* Appendix, No. 18, section 2.

leading the stormers of his regiment, the third time a volunteer, and the third time wounded ! Nor would I be understood to select these as pre-eminent ; many and signal were the other examples of unbounded devotion, some known, some that will never be known ; for in such a tumult much passed unobserved, and often the observers felt themselves ere they could bear testimony to what they saw ; but no age, no nation, ever sent forth braver troops to battle than those who stormed Badajos.

When the extent of the night's havoc was made known to Lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers.

CHAPTER VI.

THE English general having now achieved the second part of his project, was desirous to fight a great battle in Andalusia, which would have been the crown of this extraordinary winter campaign ; but the misconduct of others would not suffer him to do this. At Ciudad Rodrigo, the Spanish engineers had entirely ceased the repairs of the works ; Carlos d'España, besides neglecting to provision that place, had by his oppressive conduct alarmed all the people of the vicinity, and created a dangerous spirit of discontent in the garrison ; Almeida was insecure, and Marmont's army was already between the Agueda and the Coa.

It was essential to place those fortresses in safety, ere the march into Andalusia could take place ; but the English general, knowing that the danger in Beira was not very imminent, lingered a few days, hoping that Soult, in his anger at the loss of Badajos, would risk a blow on this side of the Morena ; and he was certain, that the French general could not stop more than a few days, because of the secondary armies whose operations were then in progress.

Soult was indeed deeply affected by the loss of Badajos, but he was surrounded by enemies and the contest was too unequal. He had quitted Seville the 1st of April, with 12 regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and one battery of artillery. His march was by Lora del Rio and Constantino upon Llerena ; and, to impose upon the allies, General Gazan moved by the road of Monasterio with the remainder of the artillery and the baggage, escorted by Barois' division of infantry, and some cavalry. But this column turned into the cross roads at Santa de Guillema, and so reached Constantino, whence they followed the main body, and thus the whole army was concentrated at Llerena on the 6th. This circuitous march had been determined by the situation of Drouet and Daricau, who having been before driven into the mountains by the Cordova roads, could not rally upon the side of Monasterio ; now, however, they advanced to Fuentos de Ovejuna, and the allies fell back to Albuera and Talavera Real.

On the 7th, the French reached Villafranca and their cavalry entered Villalba and Fuente del Maestro. The 8th, they were in march to fight, when the horsemen sent by Phillipon from Badajos, during the assault, brought the news of its fall ; at the same moment their general was apprised, by his spies, that Marmont, by whom he expected to be joined, was in the north and could not assist him. He immediately fell back to Llerena, for the allies could then bring 45,000 men into action, and the French army, though strongly constituted and the best troops in Spain, did not exceed 24,000.

Soult had now little time to deliberate, for Penne Villemur and Morillo, issuing out of Portugal with 4000 men, had crossed the Lower Guadiana, and seized San Lucar de Mayor on the 4th. This place was 10 miles from Seville, which was only garrisoned by a Spanish Swiss battalion in Joseph's service, aided by "Escopeteros" and by the sick and convalescent men ; the commandant Rignoux had therefore, after a skirmish, shut himself up in fortified convents. The 6th, the Spaniards had occupied the heights in front of the Triana bridge, and the 7th, attacked the French entrenchments, hoping to raise a popular commotion. But a worse danger was gathering on the other side, for Ballasteros, after the defeat of

Maransin, at Cartama, had advanced with 11,000 men, intending to fall on Seville from the left of the Guadalquivir.

To distract the attention of the French, and to keep Laval from detaching troops to Seville, the Spanish general had sent Copons with 4000 men by Itar to Junquera, which is on the Malaga side of the Ronda; meanwhile he himself entered Los Barios with the rest of his army, and thus threatened at once Grenada and the lines of Chiclana. At the same time all the smaller Partidas of the Ronda were let loose in different directions, to cut the communications, to seize the small French magazines, and to collect the Spanish soldiers, who, at different periods, had quitted their colours and retired to their homes.

Copons remained at Junquera, but Ballasteros with three divisions commanded by Cruz Murgeon, the Marquis de Las Cuevas, and the Prince of Angola, marched to Utrera as soon as Soult had departed from Seville; thus the communication of that city with Cadiz on one side, and with Malaga and Grenada on the other, was cut off. The situation of the French was very critical, and they wanted ammunition, because a large convoy, coming from Madrid, with an escort of 1200 men, was stopped in the Morena by the Partidas from the Ronda and from Murcia.

On the 6th, the Spanish cavalry was within a few miles of Seville, when false information, adroitly given by a Spaniard in the French interest, led Ballasteros to believe that Soult was close at hand, whereupon he immediately returned to the Ronda; the next day Penne Villemur, having received notice from Lord Wellington that the French would soon return, also retired to Gibráleon.

Ballasteros soon discovered the deceit, when, instead of returning to Seville, he on the 9th assaulted the small castle of Zahara in the hills, and being repulsed with considerable loss, made a circuit north of Ronda by Albodonaes, Alcala de Pruna, to Casarbonela, where he was rejoined by Copons. The division of Cuevas then marched against Ossuna, which being only garrisoned by "Escopeteros," was expected to fall at once; but after two days' combat and the loss of 200 killed and wounded, the 3000 patriots retired baffled by 150 of their own countrymen fighting for the invaders.

When Cuevas returned, Ballasteros marched in three columns by roads leading from Casarbonela and Antequera, to attack General Rey, who was posted with 1800 men near Allora, on the Guadaljore river. The centre column was first engaged without any advantage, but when Rey saw the flank columns coming on he retired behind the Guadamedina river close to Malaga, having lost a colonel and 200 men in passing the Guadaljore.

After this action Ballasteros returned to the Ronda, for Soult was now truly at hand, and his horsemen were already in the plains. He had sent Digeon's cavalry on the 9th to Cordoba to chase the Partidas, and had ordered Drouet's division to take post at Fuentes Overjuna; then directing Peyreymont's cavalry upon Usagre, he had come himself by forced marches to Seville which he reached the 11th, hoping to surprise the Spaniards; but the stratagem, which had saved Seville on the 6th, also saved Ballasteros, for General Conroux was coming up on the other side from the Guadalete, and the Spaniards would have been enclosed but for their timely retreat. And scarcely had Soult quitted Llerena when the French met with a disaster near Usagre, which though a strong position had always proved a very dangerous advanced post on both sides.

Sir Stapleton Cotton, while following the trail of the enemy, on the evening of the 10th, had received intelligence that Peyreymont's cavalry was between Villa Garcia and Usagre, and he immediately conceived hopes of cutting it off. To effect this, Anson's brigade then commanded by Colonel Frederic Ponsonby, moved during the night from Villa Franca upon Usagre, and at the same time Le Marchant's brigade marched from Los Santos upon Benvenida to intercept the retreat on Llerena. Ponsonby's advanced guard having commenced the action too soon, the French fell back before Le Marchant could intercept them, but as some heights skirting the Llerena road, prevented them from seeing that general, they again drew up in order of battle behind the junction of the Benvenida road.

The hostile bodies were nearly equal in numbers, about 1900 sabres on each side, but Sir Stapleton soon decided the action; for ably seizing the accidental advantage of ground, he kept the enemy's attention engaged by skirmishing with Ponsonby's squadrons, while Le Marchant secretly passing at the back of the heights, sent the 5th dragoon guards against their flank, and the next moment Ponsonby charged their front. Thus assailed the French gave way in disorder, and being pursued for four miles left several officers and 128 men prisoners, and many were killed in the field. The loss of the British was only 56 men and officers, of whom 45 were of the 5th dragoon guards.

The beaten troops found refuge with Drouet's infantry which had not yet left Llerena: but after this action that general fell back with all his troops behind the Guadalquivir, for Soult was then preparing to fight the allies at Seville.

The Duke of Dalmatia was well aware of Wellington's intention to invade Andalusia. He knew exactly the amount and disposition of his forces, and was resolved to meet him coming out of the Morena with all the French army united; neither did he doubt the final issue, although the failure of the last harvest and the non-arrival of convoys since February had lessened his resources. Wellington's plan was however deferred. He had levelled his trenches, and brought two Portuguese regiments of infantry from Abrantes and Elvas to form a temporary garrison of Badajos, until some Spaniards who had been landed at Ayamonte in March could arrive; then giving over the charge of the repairs to General Hill, who remained with two divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry in Estremadura, he marched himself upon Beira, which Marmont was now ravaging with great cruelty.

That marshal had been anxious to unite with Soult in Estremadura, but the emperor's orders were imperative, that he should make a diversion for Badajos by an irruption into Portugal. On the 14th of March, he ascertained that none of Wellington's divisions were left on the Agueda, and on the 27th he was ready to move. Bonet, reinforced by Carrier's brigade, was then on the Orbijo, in observation of the Gallicians; Ferrier's division was at Valladolid, and Foy's in the valley of the Tagus; but the other five divisions of infantry and one of cavalry had passed the mountains and concentrated on the Tormes, carrying with them 15 days' provisions, scaling ladders, and the materials for a bridge. Both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were therefore in manifest peril, and Almeida, which contained the allies' battering train, was still very incompletely fortified.* Hence on the first rumour of Marmont's movement, Lord Wellington had thrown in two militia regiments with a strong detachment of British artillery-men; the garrison was therefore 3600 strong, and the governor, Colonel Le Mesurier, laboured hard to complete the defences.

Of the northern militia which had been called out before the allies quitted the Coa, 6000 infantry and 300 cavalry were under Silveira, 3000 infantry under Trant, the same number under John Wilson, and 2500 under Lecor. But the law was, that persons liable to serve should be enrolled by classes in rotation, and therefore the present men, with the exception of Silveira's, were raw peasants totally unskilled in the use of arms. All these officers, save Lecor, whose post was at Castello Branco, had been for some time in movement, and Trant and Wilson were on the 22nd at Lamego, where General Bacellar, who commanded the province, fixed his head-quarters. Silveira had the same destination, but his march was slow, and his object rather to draw the wonder of his countrymen; for in his unquenchable vanity he always affected to act as an independent general.

When Trant was assured that Marmont's direction would be on Ciudad and not Oporto, he advanced from Lamego followed by Wilson, intending to take post on the Lower Coa. While in march he received Le Mesurier's despatches which induced him to make a forced march with one brigade to the Cabeça Negro mountain, behind the bridge of Almeida. His design was to break down the

* Appendix, No. 19, section 1.

restored part of that structure, and so prevent the enemy from penetrating to Pinhel, where there was a magazine ; and his march was well timed, for two French divisions were then driving Carlos d'Espana over the plain beyond the Coa. It appeared that Marmont having come close to Ciudad Rodrigo on the 30th, the Spaniards and Victor Alten fell back from the Yeltes before him ; and the latter, who had 600 excellent German cavalry, immediately crossed the Agueda, and neither comprehending the spirit of Lord Wellington's orders, nor the real situation of affairs, retreated at once to Castello Branco, four long marches from Ciudad, thus leaving all the country open to the enemy's marauding parties. Carlos d'Espana, who had 800 infantry, also retreated across the plain of the Cima de Coa to Fort Concepcion, but on the 3rd, the French, having laid their bridge at the ford of Caridad, passed the Agueda and drove him from thence, and he reached the Cabeça Negro in retreat with only 200 men, at the very moment Trant arrived.

The latter seeing no French cavalry on the plain, and being desirous of concerting his operations with Le Mesurier, immediately threw some skirmishers into the vineyards on the right of the road beyond the bridge, then, escorted by some guides whom he had dressed in red uniform, he galloped to the glacis of the fortress, communicated with the governor, received from him a troop of English cavalry, which happened to be in the place, and returned at dusk. The Cabeça Negro was immediately covered with bivouac fires, and in the evening Le Mesurier sallied from the fortress and drove back the enemy's light troops. Two divisions of infantry had come against Almeida with orders to storm it, but these vigorous actions disturbed them ; the attempt was not made, and the general commanding excused himself to Marmont, on the ground that the sudden appearance of Trant indicated the vicinity of British troops. In this false notion he marched the next morning up the Coa towards Alfayates, where Marmont met him with two other divisions, and eight squadrons of cavalry, having left one division to blockade Ciudad.

Trant now sent back the horsemen to Le Mesurier and marched to Guarda to cover the magazines and hospital at Celerico. Here he was joined by Wilson, and here he ought also to have been joined by Silveira ; but that general, instead of crossing the Douro on the 5th, and marching up to Guarda, only crossed it on the 14th, and then halted at Lamego. Thus, instead of 12,000 infantry, and 400 cavalry, who had seen some service, there were scarcely 6000 raw peasants, in a position, strong, if the occupying force had been numerous enough to hold the ridge of Porcas and other heights behind it, but a very dangerous post for a small force, because it could be turned by the right and left, and the line of retreat to the Mondego was not favourable. Neither had Trant any horsemen to scout, for Bacellar, a weak old man, who had never seen an enemy, was now at Celerico, and retained the only squadron of dragoons in the vicinity for his own guard.

This post Trant and Wilson held, with 6000 militia and six guns, from the 9th to the 14th, keeping the enemy's marauders in check ; and they were also prepared to move by the high ridge of the Estrella to Abrantes, if the French should menace that fortress, which was not unlikely. For Marmont had pushed forward on Sabugal, and Victor Alten, abandoning Castello Branco, while the French were still at Memoa, 50 miles distant from him, had crossed the Tagus at Vilha Velha, and it is said had even some thoughts of burning the bridge. The French parties then traversed the Lower Beira in every direction, plundering and murdering in such a shameful manner that the whole population fled before them. However, General Lecor, a good soldier, stood fast with the militia at Castello Branco ; he checked the French cavalry detachments, removed the hospitals and some of the stores, and when menaced by a strong force of infantry on the 12th, destroyed the rest of the magazines, and fell back to Sarnadas, only one short march on the road to Vilha Velha ; and the next day, when the French retired, he followed and harassed their rear.

Marmont's divisions being now spread over the country in search of supplies, Trant formed the very daring design of surprising the French marshal himself in

his quarters at Sabugal. Bacellar's procrastinations fortunately delayed the execution of this project, which was undoubtedly too hazardous an enterprise to undertake with such troops ; for the distance was 20 miles, and it was a keen observation of Lord Wellington's, when Trant adverted to the magnitude of the object, to say that, "In war nothing is so bad as failure and defeat." This would undoubtedly have been the case here ; for in the night of the 13th, that on which Trant would have made the attempt, Marmont having formed the design of surprising Trant, had led two brigades of infantry and 400 cavalry up the mountain. He cut off the outposts, and was actually entering the streets at daybreak, with his horsemen, when the alarm was beaten at Trant's quarters by one drummer ; this being taken up at hazard, by all the other drummers in different parts of the town, caused the French marshal to fall back at the moment when a brisk charge would have placed everything at his mercy, for the beating of the first drum was accidental, and no troops were under arms.

The militia immediately took post outside Guarda, but they had only one day's provisions, and the French cavalry could turn their flank and gain Celerico in their rear, while the infantry attacked their front ; the guns were therefore moved off under cover of the town, and the regiments, withdrawing in succession, retreated over three or four miles of open ground and in good order, although the enemy's cavalry hovered close on the flank, and the infantry followed at a short distance. Further on, however, there was a wooded declivity, leading to the Mondego, and here, while the head of the troops was passing the river below, 40 dragoons, sent up by Bacellar the evening before, were pressed by the French, and galloped through the rear-guard of 800 infantry ; these last, seeing the enemy dismount to fire their carbines, and finding that the wet had damaged their own powder, fled also, and the French followed with hue and cry.

All the officers behaved firmly, and the Mondego was finally passed, yet in confusion and with the loss of 200 prisoners ; and Marmont might now have crossed the river, on the flank of the militia, and galloped into Celerico, where there was nothing to defend the magazines ; instead of which he halted and permitted the disorderly rabble to gain that place. Such, however, was his compassion, that when he found they were really nothing but poor undisciplined peasants he would not suffer his cavalry to cut them down, and no man was killed during the whole action, although the French horsemen were actually in the midst of the fugitives. Bacellar, having destroyed a quantity of powder at Celerico, retreated with Trant's people the next day towards Lamego ; Wilson remained at Celerico, and when the enemy had driven in his outposts, he ordered the magazines to be destroyed, but the order was only partly executed when the French retired, and on the 17th the militia re-occupied Guarda.

This short campaign of the militia I have treated at length, because it produced an undue effect at the time, and because it shows how trifling accidents will mar the greatest combinations ; for here the English general's extensive arrangements for the protection of Beira were utterly disconcerted by the slow advance of Silveira on the one side, and the rapid retreat of General Alten on the other. Again, the French deceived by some red uniforms and by some bivouac fires, on the Cabeça Negro, had relinquished the attack of Almeida to run after a few thousand undisciplined militia men, who were yet saved by the accidental beating of a drum ; and it is curious to find a marshal of France personally acting as a Partizan, and yet effecting nothing against these miserable troops.

The disaster on the Mondego spread consternation as far as Coimbra, and the most alarming reports reached Lord Wellington, whose operations it is now time to notice. When Soult's retreat from Llerena was ascertained, the allied army had marched towards the Tagus, and on the 11th Lord Wellington, hearing of Alten's retreat, sent him orders to recross that river without delay and return to Castelo Branco. The 16th, the advanced guard of the army also reached that town, and the same day a militia officer flying from Coimbra in the general panic, came to head-quarters and reported that the enemy was master of that town ; but the next

hour brought General Wilson's report from Guarda, and the unfortunate wretch whose fears had led him to give the false information, was tried and shot by order of Beresford.

At this time the French army, in number about 28,000, was concentrated, with the exception of Brennier's division which remained near Ciudad Rodrigo, between Sabugal and the ridge of hills overlooking Penamacor. Marmont was inclined to fight, for he had heard of a convoy of provisions which Lord Wellington had some days before sent by the way of Almeida to Ciudad, and intended to cut it off; but the convoy having reached Almeida was safe, and the French general's own position was very critical. Almeida and the militia at Guarda were on his right flank, Ciudad Rodrigo was on his rear, and immediately behind him the Coa and the Agueda rivers were both swelled by heavy rains which fell from the 13th to the 19th, and the flood had broken the bridge near Caridad. There remained only the Puente de Villar on the Upper Agueda for retreat, and the roads leading to it were bad and narrow; the march from thence to Tamames was also circuitous and exposed to the attack of the allies, who could move on the chord through Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont's retreat must therefore have been effected through the pass of Perales upon Coria, and the English general, conceiving good hopes of falling on him before he could cross the Coa, moved forward to Pedrogao; but the rear of the army was not yet across the Tagus, and a sufficient body of troops for the attack could not be collected before the 21st. On that day, however, the Agueda having subsided, the French restored their bridge, the last of their divisions crossed it on the 24th, and Marmont thus terminated his operations without loss. After this he again spread his troops over the plains of Leon, where some of his smaller posts had indeed been harassed by Julian Sanchez, but where the Gallician army had done nothing.

The Portuguese militia were immediately disbanded, and the English general made the greatest exertions to revictual Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, intending when that was effected to leave Picton with a corps upon the Agueda, and march himself against Andalusia, following his original design. The first division, which had only reached Castello Branco, returned to Castello de Vide, and as Foy's division had meanwhile re-occupied Truxillo, Hill advanced to observe him, and the 5th Spanish army returned to Estremadura. But the difficulty of supplying the fortresses was very great. The incursion of Marmont had destroyed all the intermediate magazines, and dispersed the means of transport on the lines of communication; the Portuguese government would not remedy the inconvenience either there, or on the other frontier, and Elvas and Badajos were suffering from the same cause as Ciudad and Almeida.

In this dilemma Lord Wellington adopted, from necessity, a very unmilitary and dangerous remedy. For having declared to the members of the Portuguese government, that on their heads he would throw the responsibility of losing Badajos and Elvas, if they did not immediately victual both, a threat which had its due effect, he employed the whole of the carriages and mules attached to the army to bring up stores to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; meanwhile he quartered his troops near the points of water-carriage, that is to say, on the Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus. Thus the army was spread from the Morena to the Tagus, from the Tagus to the Douro, from the Douro to the Mondego, on a line little less than 400 miles long, and in the face of three hostile armies, the farthest of which was but a few marches from the outposts. It was, however, scarcely possible for the French to assemble again in masses, before the ripening of the coming harvest; and, on the other hand, even the above measure was insufficient to gain time; the expedition against Andalusia was therefore abandoned, and the fifth great epoch of the war terminated.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

IN this campaign the French forces were too much scattered, and they occupied the countries bordering on Portugal rather as a conquered territory than as a field of operations. The movements of the armies of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal, might have been so combined as to present 100,000 men on a field of battle; yet Wellington captured two great fortresses within gun-shot as it were of them all, and was never disturbed by the approach of even 30,000 men. This arose partly from want of union, partly from the orders of the emperor, whose plans the generals either did not or would not understand in their true spirit, and therefore executed without vigour; and yet the French writers have generally endeavoured to fasten the failures on Napoleon, as if he only was mistaken about the war in Spain! It is easy to spurn the dead lion!

The expedition of Montbrun to Alicante has been fixed upon as the chief cause of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. Napoleon, however, did not desire that Montbrun's march should be held in abeyance for a week, upon the strength of some vague rumours relative to the allies' proceedings, and yet be finally sent at precisely the wrong period; neither did he contemplate that general's idle display at Alicante after the city of Valencia had fallen. But ill-executed and hurtful as this expedition doubtless was, the loss of Ciudad Rodrigo cannot be directly traced to it. Montbrun was at Almanza the 9th of January, and the 19th Ciudad was stormed; now, if he had not been at Almanza he would have been at Toledo or Talavera, that is, eight marches from Salamanca, and as the commencement of the siege was not known until the 15th, even at Valladolid, he could not have been on the Tormes before the 25th, which would have been five days too late. The emperor wished to strengthen Suchet at the crisis of the Valencian operations, and his intent was that Montbrun should have reached that city in December, but the latter did not arrive before the middle of January; had he been only a week earlier, that is, had he marched at once from Toledo, Mahi could not have escaped, Alicante would then have fallen, and if Blake had made an obstinate defence at Valencia the value of such a reinforcement would have been acknowledged.

At this period Valencia was the most important point in the Peninsula, and there was no apparent reason why Ciudad should be in any immediate danger; the emperor could not calculate upon the errors of his own generals. It is futile therefore to affirm that Montbrun's detachment was made on a false principle; it was, on the contrary, conceived in perfect accord with the maxim of concentrating on the important point at the decisive moment; errors, extraneous to the original design, alone brought it within the principle of dissemination.

The loss of Ciudad Rodrigo may be directly traced to the Duke of Ragusa's want of vigilance, to the scanty garrison which he kept in the place, to the Russian war, which obliged the emperor to weaken the army of the north; finally, to the extravagance of the army of the centre. Marmont expressly asserts that at Madrid 3000 men devoured and wasted daily the rations of 22,000, and the stores thus consumed would have enabled the army of Portugal to keep concentrated, in which case Wellington could not have taken Ciudad; and if the army of the centre had been efficient, Hill would have incurred great danger and Soult's power been vastly augmented.

It is not Napoleon's skill only, that has been assailed by these writers. Lord Wellington also is blamed for not crushing Souham's division at Tamames between the 23rd and the 26th of January; although Souham, a good general, never entered Tamames, except with cavalry scouts, and kept his main body at Matilla, whence one forced march would have placed him behind the Tormes in safety! In such a shallow manner have the important operations of this period been treated. Nor

will the causes commonly assigned for the fall of Badajos better bear examination.

"Marmont, instead of joining Soult in Estremadura, followed a phantom in Beira." "It was his vanity and jealousy of the Duke of Dalmatia that lost Badajos." Such are the assertions of both French and English writers; nevertheless the Duke of Ragusa never anticipated any success from his movement into Beira, and far from avoiding Soult, earnestly desired to co-operate with him; moreover this invasion of Beira, which has been regarded as a folly, was the conception of Napoleon, the greatest of all captains! and it is not difficult to show that the emperor's design was, notwithstanding the ill result, capacious and solid.

Let us suppose that Marmont had aided Soult, and that the army of the centre had also sent men. If they had made any error in their combinations the English general would have defeated them separately; if they had effected their junction, he would have retreated, and Badajos would have been succoured. But then 80,000 French would have been assembled by long marches in the winter rains, to the great detriment of their affairs elsewhere, and, unless they came prepared to take Elvas, without any adequate object; for Lord Wellington could, after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, have repeated this operation as often as he pleased, which, besides the opening thus made for insurrection in Spain, would have stamped a character of weakness on the French arms, extremely injurious, since character is half the strength of an army.

The emperor judged better; he disliked such timid operations, he desired that his powerful armies should throw the allies on the defensive, and he indicated the means of doing so. Wellington, he said, expecting an effort to retake Ciudad Rodrigo, had called Hill across the Tagus, and to prevent that movement Soult was directed to send 20,000 men against the Alemtejo. The fall of Ciudad had thus, by obliging the allies to defend it, given the French their choice of ground for a battle, and at a distance from the sea; it was for Marmont to avail himself of the occasion, not by marching to aid Soult, who had 80,000 excellent troops, and at the worst could be only driven from Andalusia upon Valencia or Madrid; whereas if the army of Portugal or a part of it should be defeated on the Guadiana the blow would be felt in every part of Spain. Marmont's business was, he said, first to strengthen his own position at Salamanca, as a base of operations, and then to keep the allies constantly engaged on the Agueda until he was prepared to fight a general battle. Meanwhile Soult should either take the fortresses of the Alemtejo, or draw off Hill's corps from Wellington, who would then be very inferior to Marmont, and yet Hill himself would be unequal to fight Soult.

"Fix your quarters," said the emperor, "at Salamanca, work day and night to fortify that place—organize a new battering train—form magazines—send strong advanced guards to menace Ciudad and Almeida—harass the allies' outposts, even daily—threaten the frontier of Portugal in all directions, and send parties to ravage the nearest villages—repair the ways to Almeida and Oporto, and keep the bulk of your army at Toro Zamora, Benevente, and Avila, which are fertile districts, and from whence, in four days, you can concentrate the whole upon Salamanca. You will thus keep the allies in check on the Agueda, and your troops will repose, while you prepare for great operations. You have nothing to do with the south. Announce the approach of your new battering train, and if Wellington marches to invest Badajos with a few divisions Soult will be able to relieve it; but if Wellington goes with all his forces, unite your army, march straight upon Almeida, push parties to Coimbra, overrun the country in various directions, and be assured he will return. Twenty-four hours after the receipt of this letter you should be on your way to Salamanca, and your advanced guards should be in march towards Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida."

Now, if Marmont had thus conceived the war himself, he could have commenced operations before the end of January; but this letter, written the 15th of February, reached him in the latter end of that month, and found him desponding and fearful even in defence. Vacillating between his own wishes and the emperor's orders, he

did nothing ; but had he, as his despatch recommended, commenced his operations in 24 hours, his advanced posts would have been near Ciudad early in March, that is, at the moment when the allies were, as I have before shown, disseminated all over Portugal, and when only the fifth division was upon the Coa to oppose him. The works of Almeida were then quite indefensible, and the movement upon Badajos must have necessarily been suspended.* Thus the winter season would have passed away uselessly for the allies unless Wellington turned to attack Marmont, which was a difficult operation in itself, and would have been dangerous to the Alemtejo while Soult held Badajos, for that marshal, as we have seen, had received orders to attack Hill with 20,000 men. Here, then, the errors were of execution, not of design, and the first part of the emperor's combinations was evidently just and solid. It remains to test the second part which was to have been executed if Lord Wellington invested Badajos.

It must be remembered that Marmont was so to hold his army that he could concentrate in four days ; that he was to make an incursion into Beira the moment Wellington crossed the Tagus ; that Oporto was to be menaced, Almeida to be attacked, Coimbra to be occupied. These operations would, undoubtedly, have brought the allies back again at the commencement of the siege, because the fall of Badajos could not be expected under three weeks, which would have been too long to leave Beira and the fortresses at the mercy of the invader. Now Marmont did not reach the Agueda before the 31st March, when the siege of Badajos was approaching its conclusion ; he did not storm Almeida, nor attack Ciudad Rodrigo, nor enter Coimbra, nor menace Oporto ; and yet his operation, feebly as it was executed, obliged Lord Wellington to relinquish his meditated attack on Andalusia, and return to the assistance of Beira. Again, therefore, the error was in the execution. And here we may observe how inferior in hardihood the French general was to his adversary. Wellington, with 18,000 men, had escalated Badajos, a powerful fortress and defended by an excellent governor with 5000 French veterans ; Marmont, with 28,000 men, would not attempt to storm Ciudad, although its breaches were scarcely healed, and its garrison disaffected. Nor did he even assail Almeida, which, hardly meriting the name of a fortress, was only occupied by 3000 militia, scarcely able to handle their arms ; and yet if he had captured Almeida, as he could scarcely have failed to do with due vigour, he would have found a battering train with which to take Ciudad Rodrigo, and thus have again balanced the campaign.

The Duke of Ragusa was averse to serving in the Peninsula ; he wished to be employed in the Russian expedition, and he had written to the emperor to desire his recall, or that the whole of the northern district from Sebastian to Salamanca, including Madrid, should be placed under his orders. Unless that were done, he said he could only calculate the operations of his own troops. The other generals would make difficulties, would move slowly, and the king's court was in open hostility to the French interest. The army of the north had in retiring from Leon scrupulously carried away everything that could be useful to him, in the way of bridge, or battering equipages, or of ammunition or provisions, although he was in want of all these things.

Then he painted all the jealousies and disputes in the French armies, and affirmed that his own force, care being had for the posts of communication and the watching of the army of Galicia, would not furnish more than 34,000 men for the field ; a calculation contradicted by the imperial muster rolls, which on the 1st of March bore 60,000 fighting men present with the eagles. He also raved the allies at 60,000, well provided with everything and ready to attack him, whereas the returns of that army gave only 52,000 men, including Hill's corps ; about 35,000 only could have passed the Agueda, and their penury of means had, as we have seen, prevented them from even holding together on the northern frontier. In like manner he assumed that two of the allied divisions were left upon the Agueda when

the army marched against Badajos, whereas no more than 600 cavalry remained there. All these things prove that Marmont, either from dislike to the war or natural want of vigour, was not equal to his task, and it is obvious that a diversion, begun so late and followed up with so little energy, could have had little effect upon the siege of Badajos ; it would have been far better to have followed his own first design of detaching three divisions to aid Soult, and retain the other two to menace Ciudad Rodrigo.

It is fitting now to test the operations of the armies of the south and of the centre. The latter is easily disposed of. The secret of its inactivity is to be found in Marmont's letter. Everything at Madrid was confusion and intrigue, waste and want of discipline ; in fine, the union of a court and an army had destroyed the latter. Not so at Seville. There the hand of an able general, an indefatigable administrator, were visible, and the unravelling the intricate combinations, which produced such an apparent want of vigour in the operations of the Duke of Dalmatia, will form at once the apology for that general and the just eulogium of Lord Wellington.

First, it must be held in mind that the army of the south, so powerful in appearance, did not furnish a proportionate number of men for field service, because the reinforcements, although borne on the rolls, were for the most part retained in the northern governments. Soult had 67,000 French and 6000 "Escopeteros" present under arms in September ; but then followed the surprise of Girard at Aroyo de Molinos, the vigorous demonstrations of Hill in December, the failure of Godinot at Gibraltar, the check sustained by Semélé at Bornos, and the siege of Tarifa, which diminished the number of men, and occasioned fresh arrangements on the different points of the circle. The harvest of 1811 had failed in Andalusia, as in all other parts, and the inhabitants were reduced to feed on herbs ; the soldiers had only half rations of bread, and neither reinforcements of men, nor convoys of money, nor ammunition, nor clothes, had come either from France or from Madrid for a long period.

It was under these circumstances that Soult received the order to send 20,000 men against the Alentejo. But the whole of the Polish troops, and the skeletons of regiments, and the picked men for the imperial guards, in all 15,000, after being collected at the Despeñas Peros while Suchet was before Valencia, had now marched to Talavera de la Reyna on the way to France ; at that moment also Ballasteros appeared with the 4th Spanish army, 12,000 strong, in the Ronda, and his detachments defeated Maransin at Cartaña, which of necessity occasioned another change in the French dispositions. Moreover, the very successes of Suchet had at this time increased Soult's difficulties, because all the fugitives from Valencia gathered on the remains of the Murcian army ; and 15,000 men, including the garrisons of Carthage and Alicante, were again assembled on the frontier of Grenada, where, during the expedition to Estremadura, the French had only three battalions and some cavalry.

Thus the army of the south was, if the garrison of Badajos be excluded, reduced to 48,000 French sabres and bayonets present with the eagles, and this at the very moment when its enemies were augmented by 25,000 fresh men. Soult had indeed besides this force 5000 artillerymen and other attendant troops, and 6000 "Escopeteros" were capable of taking the field, while 30,000 civic guards held his fortified posts. Nevertheless, he was forced to reduce all the garrisons, and even the camp before the Isla, to the lowest numbers consistent with safety, ere he could bring 24,000 French into the field for the succour of Badajos, and even then, as we have seen, he was upon the point of losing Seville. These things prevented him from coming against the Alentejo in March, when his presence with an army would have delayed the commencement of the siege until a battle had been fought : but he was the less fearful for the fortress because Marmont, on the 22nd of February, and Foy, on the 28th, had announced that, if Badajos should be menaced, three divisions of the army of Portugal, then in the valley of the Tagus, would enter Estremadura ; and these divisions, uniting with Dariau's and Drouet's troops,

would have formed an army of 30,000 men, and consequently would have sufficed to delay the operations of the allies. But Marmont, having subsequently received the emperor's orders to move into Beira, passed the Gredos mountains instead of the Tagus river, and thus unintentionally deceived Soult; and whether his letters were intercepted or carelessly delayed, it was not until the 8th of April, that the Duke of Dalmatia was assured of his departure for Salamanca.

On the other hand, Lord Wellington's operations were so rapidly pushed forward, that Soult cannot be censured for false calculations. No general could suspect that such an outwork as the Picurina would be taken by storm without being first battered; still less that Badajoz, with its lofty walls, its brave garrison, and its celebrated governor, would in like manner be carried before the counterscarp was blown in and the fire of the defences ruined. In fine, no man accustomed to war could have divined the surpassing resolution, and surpassing fortune also, of the British general and his troops; neither is it impertinent to observe here that, as the French never use iron ordnance in a siege, their calculations were necessarily formed upon the effect of brass artillery, which is comparatively weak and slow: with brass guns the breaches would have been made three days later.

The fall of Badajoz may therefore be traced partly to the Russian war, which drew 15,000 men from the army of the south, partly to the irresolution of Marmont, who did neither execute the emperor's plan nor his own; finally, to the too great extent of country occupied, whereby time and numbers were swallowed. And here the question arises, if Soult, acting upon the principles laid down in his letter to Joseph, just before the battle of Talavera, should not have operated against the allies in great masses, relinquishing possession of Grenada, Malaga, in fine, everything save Seville and the camp before the Isla. If beaten, he would have lost Andalusia and fallen back on Suchet, but then the head of the French invasion might have been more formidable at Valencia than at Seville, and Marmont could have renewed the battle. And such a chequered game, Lord Wellington's political situation both in England and Portugal being considered, would have gone near to decide the question of the British troops remaining in the latter country. This, however, is a grave and difficult matter to resolve.

In whatever light this campaign is viewed, the talent of the English general is conspicuous. That fortune aided him is true, but it was in the manner she favours the pilot, who, watching every changing wind, every shifting current, makes all subservient to his purpose. Ascertaining with great pains the exact situation of each adversary, he had sagaciously met their different modes of warfare, and with a nice hand had adapted his measures to the successive exigencies of the moment. The army of the centre, where disorder was paramount, he disregarded; Marmont, whose temperament was hasty, he deceived by affected slowness; and Soult he forestalled by quickness. Twice he induced the Duke of Ragusa to send his divisions into distant quarters when they should have been concentrated, and each time he gained a great advantage; once when he took Ciudad Rodrigo, and again when, using a like opportunity, to obviate the difficulties presented by the conduct of the Portuguese government, he spread his own troops over the country in an unmilitary manner, that he might feed and clothe them on their march to the Alentejo. This he could not have done if the French had been concentrated; neither could he have so well concealed that march from the enemy.

In Estremadura, he kept his force compact and strong to meet Soult, from whose warfare he expected a powerful opposition, hard indeed to resist, yet not likely to abound in sudden strokes, and therefore furnishing more certain ground for calculation as to time; and then he used that time so wonderfully at the siege, that even his enemies declared it incomprehensible, and he who had hitherto been censured for over caution was now dreaded as over daring! This daring was, however, in no manner allied to rashness; his precautions multiplied as his enterprises augmented. The divisions of the army of Portugal quartered in the valley of the Tagus could, by moving into Estremadura in March, have delayed if not prevented the siege; Lord Wellington had, therefore, with forecast of such an

event, designed that Hill should, when the allies entered the Alemtejo, make a forced march to surprise the bridge and forts at Almaraz, which would have obliged the French divisions to make a long circuit by the bridges of Arzobispo and Talavera to reach the scene of action in Estremadura.

This bold and skilful stroke was balked by the never-ceasing misconduct of the Portuguese government with respect to means of transport ; for the battering-guns intended for Hill's enterprise were thus prevented passing Evora. Nevertheless the siege was commenced, because it was ascertained that Marmont was still ignorant of the allies' march, and had made no change in his extended quarters, indicating a design to aid Soult ; Hill also soon drove Drouet back towards the Morena, and, by occupying Merida, intercepted the line of communication with Almaraz, which answered the same purpose. But the best testimony to the skill of the operation is to be found in the enemy's papers. "So calculated," said Soult, "was this affair (the siege of Badajos) that it is to be supposed Lord Wellington had intercepted some despatches which explained to him the system of operations and the irresolution of Marmont."

Nor when the Duke of Ragusa was ravaging Beira, and both Almeida and Ciudad appeared in the utmost danger, did Lord Wellington's delay in Estremadura arise from any imprudence : he had good grounds for believing that the French would not attempt the latter place, and that the loss of a few days would not prove injurious. For when the first intelligence that the army of Portugal was concentrating on the Tormes reached him, he sent Captain Colquhoun Grant, a celebrated scouting officer, to watch Marmont's proceedings. That gentleman, in whom the utmost daring was so mixed with subtlety of genius, and both so tempered by discretion, that it is hard to say which quality predominated, very rapidly executed his mission ; and the interesting nature of his adventures on this occasion will perhaps excuse a digression concerning them.

Attended by Leon, a Spanish peasant of great fidelity and quickness of apprehension, who had been his companion on many former occasions of the same nature, Grant arrived in the Salamanca district, and passing the Tormes in the night, remained, in uniform, for he never assumed any disguise, three days in the midst of the French camp. He thus obtained exact information of Marmont's object, and more especially of his preparations of provisions and scaling ladders, notes of which he sent to Lord Wellington from day to day by Spanish agents. However, on the third night, some peasants brought him a general order, addressed to the French regiments, and saying, that the notorious Grant being within the circle of their cantonments, the soldiers were to use their utmost exertions to secure him, for which purpose also guards were placed as it were in a circle round the army.

Nothing daunted by this news, Grant consulted with the peasants, and the next morning, before daylight, entered the village of Huerta, which is close to a ford on the Tormes, and about six miles from Salamanca. Here there was a French battalion, and on the opposite side of the river cavalry videttes were posted, two of which constantly patrolled back and forward, for the space of 300 yards, meeting always at the ford. When day broke, the French battalion assembled on its alarm-post, and at that moment Grant was secretly brought with his horse behind the gable of a house, which hid him from the infantry, and was opposite to the ford. The peasants standing on some loose stones, and spreading their large cloaks, covered him from the cavalry videttes, and thus he calmly waited until the latter were separated to the full extent of their beat ; then putting spurs to his horse he dashed through the ford between them, and receiving their fire without damage, reached a wood, not very distant, where the pursuit was baffled, and where he was soon rejoined by Leon, who in his native dress met with no interruption.

Grant had already ascertained that the means of storming Ciudad Rodrigo were prepared, and that the French officers openly talked of doing so, but he desired still further to test this project, and to discover if the march of the enemy might not finally be directed by the pass of Perales towards the Tagus ; he wished also

to ascertain more correctly their real numbers, and therefore placed himself on a wooded hill, near Tamames, where the road branches off to the passes, and to Ciudad Rodrigo. Here lying perdué, until the whole French army had passed by in march, he noted every battalion and gun, and finding that all were directed towards Ciudad, entered Tamames after they had passed, and discovered that they had left the greatest part of their scaling-ladders behind, which clearly proved that the intention of storming Ciudad Rodrigo was not real. This it was which allayed Wellington's fears for that fortress.

When Marmont afterwards passed the Coa, in this expedition, Grant preceded him with intent to discover if his further march would be by Guarda upon Coimbra, or by Sabugal upon Castello Branco; for to reach the latter it was necessary to descend from a very high ridge, or rather succession of ridges, by a pass, at the lower mouth of which stands Penamacor. Upon one of the inferior ridges in the pass, this persevering officer placed himself, thinking that the dwarf oaks, with which the hills were covered, would effectually secure him from discovery; but from the higher ridge above, the French detected all his movements with their glasses; in a few moments Leon, whose lynx-eyes were always on the watch, called out "The French! the French!" and pointed to the rear, whence some dragoons came galloping up. Grant and his follower instantly darted into the wood for a little space, and then suddenly wheeling, rode off in a different direction; yet at every turn new enemies appeared, and at last the hunted men dismounted and fled on foot through the thickest of the low oaks; but again they were met by infantry, who had been detached in small parties down the sides of the pass, and were directed in their chase by the waving of the French officers' hats on the ridge above. At last Leon fell exhausted, and the barbarians who first came up killed him in despite of his companion's entreaties.

Grant himself they carried, without injury, to Marmont, who, receiving him with apparent kindness, invited him to dinner. The conversation turned upon the prisoner's exploits, and the French marshal affirmed that he had been for a long time on the watch, that he knew all his haunts, and his disguises, and had discovered that, only the night before, he had slept in the French head-quarters, with other adventures, which had not happened, for this Grant never used any disguise; but there was another Grant, a man also very remarkable in his way, who used to remain for months in the French quarters, using all manner of disguises; hence the similarity of names caused the actions of both to be attributed to one, which is the only palliative for Marmont's subsequent conduct.

Treating his prisoner as I have said, with great apparent kindness, the French general exacted from him an especial parole, that he would not consent to be released by the Partidas, while on his journey through Spain to France, which secured his captive, although Lord Wellington offered 2000 dollars to any guerilla chief who should rescue him. The exaction of such a parole, however harsh, was in itself a tacit compliment to the man; but Marmont also sent a letter, with the escort, to the governor of Bayonne, in which, still labouring under the error that there was only one Grant, he designated his captive as a dangerous spy, who had done infinite mischief to the French army, and whom he had only not executed on the spot, out of respect to something resembling a uniform which he wore at the time of his capture. He, therefore, desired, that at Bayonne, he should be placed in irons and sent up to Paris.

This proceeding was too little in accord with the honour of the French army to be supported, and before the Spanish frontier was passed Grant, it matters not how, was made acquainted with the contents of the letter. Now the custom at Bayonne, in ordinary cases, was for the prisoner to wait on the authorities, and receive a passport to travel to Verdun, and all this was duly accomplished; meanwhile the delivering of the fatal letter being, by certain means delayed, Grant, with a wonderful readiness and boldness, resolved not to escape towards the Pyrenees, thinking that he would naturally be pursued in that direction. He judged that if the governor of Bayonne could not recapture him at once, he would for his own

security suppress the letter in hopes the matter would be no further thought of; judging, I say, in this acute manner, he on the instant inquired at the hotels if any French officer was going to Paris, and finding that General Souham, then on his return from Spain, was so bent, he boldly introduced himself, and asked permission to join his party. The other readily assented; and while thus travelling, the general, unacquainted with Marmont's intentions, often rallied his companion about his adventures, little thinking that he was then himself an instrument in forwarding the most dangerous and skilful of them all.

In passing through Orleans, Grant, by a species of intuition, discovered an English agent, and from him received a recommendation to another secret agent in Paris, whose assistance would be necessary to his final escape; for he looked upon Marmont's double dealing, and the expressed design to take away his life, as equivalent to a discharge of his parole, which was moreover only given with respect to Spain. When he arrived at Paris he took leave of Souham, opened an intercourse with the Parisian agent, from whom he obtained money, and by his advice avoided appearing before the police to have his passport examined. He took a lodging in a very public street, frequented the coffee-houses, and even visited the theatres without fear, because the secret agent, who had been long established and was intimately connected with the police, had ascertained that no inquiry about his escape had been set on foot.

In this manner he passed several weeks, at the end of which, the agent informed him that a passport was ready for one Jonathan Buck, an American, who had died suddenly, on the very day it was to have been claimed. Seizing this occasion, Grant boldly demanded the passport, with which he instantly departed for the mouth of the Loire, because certain reasons, not necessary to mention, led him to expect more assistance there than at any other port. However, new difficulties awaited him and were overcome by fresh exertions of his surprising talents, which fortune seemed to delight in aiding.

He first took a passage for America in a ship of that nation, but its departure being unexpectedly delayed, he frankly explained his true situation to the captain, who desired him to assume the character of a discontented seaman, and giving him a sailor's dress and forty dollars, sent him to lodge the money in the American consul's hands as a pledge, that he would prosecute the captain for ill usage when he reached the United States; this being the custom on such occasions, the consul gave him a certificate which enabled him to pass from port to port as a discharged sailor seeking a ship.

Thus provided, after waiting some days, Grant prevailed upon a boatman, by a promise of 10 Napoleons, to row him in the night towards a small island, where, by usage, the English vessels watered unmolested, and in return permitted the few inhabitants to fish and traffic without interruption. In the night the boat sailed, the masts of the British ships were dimly seen on the other side of the island, and the termination of his toils appeared at hand, when the boatman, either from fear or malice, suddenly put about and returned to port. In such a situation, some men would have striven in desperation to force fortune, and so have perished; the spirits of others would have sunk in despair, for the money which he had promised was all that remained of his stock, and the boatman, notwithstanding his breach of contract, demanded the whole; but with inexpressible coolness and resolution, Grant gave him one Napoleon instead of 10, and a rebuke for his misconduct. The other having threatened a reference to the police, soon found that he was no match in subtlety for his opponent, who told him plainly that he would then denounce him as aiding the escape of a prisoner of war, and would adduce the great price of his boat as a proof of his guilt!

This menace was too formidable to be resisted, and Grant in a few days engaged an old fisherman, who faithfully performed his bargain; but now there were no English vessels near the island; however the fisherman cast his nets and caught some fish, with which he sailed towards the southward, where he had heard there was an English ship of war. In a few hours they obtained a glimpse of her, and

were steering that way, when a shot from a coast-battery brought them to, and a boat with soldiers put off to board them; the fisherman was steadfast and true; he called Grant his son, and the soldiers by whom they expected to be arrested were only sent to warn them not to pass the battery, because the English vessel they were in search of was on the coast. The old man, who had expected this, bribed the soldiers with his fish, assuring them he must go with his son or they would starve, and that he was so well acquainted with the coast he could always escape the enemy. His prayers and presents prevailed; he was desired to wait under the battery till night, and then depart; but under pretence of arranging his escape from the English vessel, he made the soldiers point out her bearings so exactly, that when the darkness came, he ran her straight on board, and the intrepid officer stood in safety on the quarter-deck.

After this Grant reached England and obtained permission to choose a French officer of equal rank with himself, to send to France, that no doubt might remain about the propriety of his escape; and great was his astonishment to find, in the first prison he visited, the old fisherman and his real son, who had meanwhile been captured notwithstanding a protection given to them for their services. Grant, whose generosity and benevolence were as remarkable as the qualities of his understanding, soon obtained their release, and having sent them with a sum of money to France, returned himself to the Peninsula, and within four months from the date of his first capture was again on the Tormes, watching Marmont's army! Other strange incidents of his life I could mention, were it not more fitting to quit a digression, already too wide; yet I was unwilling to pass an occasion of noticing one adventure of this generous and spirited, and yet gentle-minded man, who having served his country nobly and ably in every climate, died, not long since, exhausted by the continual hardships he had endured.

Having now shown the prudence of Lord Wellington with respect to the campaign generally, it remains to consider the siege of Badajos, which has so often been adduced in evidence that not skill but fortune plumed his ambitious wing; a proceeding indeed most consonant to the nature of man; for it is hard to avow inferiority, by attributing an action so stupendous to superior genius alone. A critical scientific examination would be misplaced in a general history, but to notice some of the leading points which involve the general conception will not be irrelevant. The choice of the line of attack has been justified by the English engineers, as that requiring least expenditure of means and time; but this has by the French engineer been denied. Colonel Lamarre affirms that the front next the castle was the one least susceptible of defence; because it had neither ravelin nor ditch to protect it, had fewer flanks, and offered no facility of retrenching behind it; a view which is confirmed by Phillipon, who being the best judge of his own weak points, did for many days imagine that this front was the true object of the allies' approaches. But Lamarre advances a far more interesting question, when he affirms that the English general might have carried Badajos by escalade and storm, on the first night of the siege, with less difficulty than he experienced on the 7th of April. On that night, he says, the defences were not so complete, that the garrison was less prepared, and the surprise would have availed somewhat; whereas at the second period the breaches were the strongest part of the town, and as no other advantage had been gained by the besiegers, the chances were in favour of the first period.

This reasoning appears sound, yet the fact is one which belongs, not to the rules but the secrets of the art, and they are only in the keeping of great captains. That the breaches were impregnable, has indeed been denied by the English engineers. Colonel Jones affirms that the centre breach had not the slightest interior retrenchment, and that the sword-blades in the Trinidad might have been overturned by the rush of a dense mass of troops. This opinion is quite at variance with that of the officers and men engaged; it is certain also that all the breaches were protected by the sword-blades, and if the centre breach was not retrenched it was rendered very difficult of approach by the deep holes digged in front, and it was more powerfully

swept by flank-fire than the others were. It is also a mistake to suppose that no dense rush was made at the great breach. Engineers intent upon their own art sometimes calculate on men as they do on blocks of stone or timber, nevertheless, where the bullet strikes the man will fall. The sword-blades were fitted into ponderous beams, and these last, chained together, were let deep into the ground; how then was it possible for men to drag, or push them from their places, when behind them stood resolute men whose fire swept the foremost ranks away? This fire could not be returned by the soldiers engaged in removing the obstacles, nor by those in rear, because from the slope of the breach they could not see their own comrades of the front ranks; and then the dead bodies, and the struggling wounded men, and still more the spiked planks, rendered a simultaneous exertion impossible. The breaches were impregnable!

And why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable difficulties? Why were men sent thus to slaughter, when the application of a just science would have rendered the operation comparatively easy? Because the English ministers so ready to plunge into war, were quite ignorant of its exigencies; because the English people are warlike without being military, and under the pretence of maintaining a liberty which they do not possess, oppose in peace all useful martial establishments. Expatriating in their schools and colleges, upon Roman discipline and Roman valour, they are heedless of Roman institutions; they desire, like that ancient republic, to be free at home and conquerors abroad, but start at perfecting their military system, as a thing incompatible with a constitution, which they yet suffer to be violated by every minister who trembles at the exposure of corruption. In the beginning of each war, England has to seek in blood for the knowledge necessary to insure success, and like the fiend's progress towards Eden, her conquering course is through chaos followed by death!

But it is not in the details of this siege we must look for Wellington's merits. The apportioning of the number of guns, the quantity of ammunition, the amount of transport, the tracing of the works, and the choice of the points of attack, are matters within the province of the engineer; the value and importance of the place to be attacked in reference to other objects of the campaign, the time that can be spared to effect its reduction, the arrangements necessary to elude or to resist the succouring army, the calculation of the resources, from whence the means of attack are to be drawn, these are in the province of the general. With him also rests the choice of shortening the scientific process, and the judging of how much or how little ought to be risked, how much trusted to the valour and discipline of his army, how much to his own genius for seizing accidents whether of ground, of time, or of conjunction, to accelerate the gain of his object.

Now all armies come to the siege of a town; with great advantages for, first, the besieged cannot but be less confident than the assailants; they are a few against a many, and being on the defensive, are also an excised portion of their own army, and without news, which damps the fiery spirit. They are obliged to await their adversary's time and attack, their losses seem more numerous in proportion to their forces, because they are more concentrated, and then the wounded are not safe even in the hospitals. No troops can hope to maintain a fortress eventually without the aid of a succouring army; their ultimate prospect is death or captivity. The besiegers, on the contrary, have a certain retreat, know the real state of affairs, feel more assured of their object, have hope of profit, and a secure retreat if they fail, while the besiegers faintly look for succour, and scarcely expect life. To this may be added that the inhabitants are generally secret enemies of the garrison as the cause of their own sufferings.

The number of guns and the quantity of ammunition in the fortress are daily diminished; the besiegers' means, originally calculated to overpower the other, may be increased. Time and materials are therefore against the besieged, and the scientific foundation of the defence depends on the attack, which may be varied, while the other is fixed. Finally, the firmness and skill of the defence generally depends upon the governor, who may be killed, whereas many officers amongst the

besiegers are capable of conducting the attack ; and the general, besides being personally less exposed, is likely, as the chief of the army, to be a man of more spirit and capacity than a simple governor. It follows, then, that fortresses must fall if the besiegers sit down before them according to the rules of art ; and when no succouring army is nigh, the time necessary to reduce any place may be calculated with great exactness. When these rules cannot be attended to, when everything is irregular and doubtful, when the general is hurried on to the attempt, be it easy or difficult, by the force of circumstances, we must measure him by the greatness of the exigency, and the energy with which he acts.

This is the light in which to view the siege of Badajos. Wellington's object was great, his difficulties foreseen, his success complete ! A few hours' delay, an accident, a turn of fortune, and he would again have been foiled ! Aye ! but this is war—always dangerous and uncertain, an ever-rolling wheel and armed with scythes ! Was the object worth the risk ?—did its gain compensate the loss of men ?—was it boldly, greatly acquired ? These are the true questions, and they may be answered thus. Suchet had subjugated Aragon by his mildness, Catalonia and Valencia by his vigour. In Andalusia, Soult had tranquillized the mass of the people, and his genius, solid and vast, was laying the deep foundation of a kingdom close to Portugal. He was forming such great establishments, and contriving such plans, as would, if permitted to become ripe, have enabled him to hold the Peninsula, alone, should the French armies fail in all other parts. In the centre of Spain the king, true to his plan of raising a Spanish party, was likely to rally round him all those of the patriots whom discontent, or weakness of mind, or corruption, might induce to seek a plausible excuse for joining the invaders ; and on the northern line the French armies, still powerful, were strengthening their hold of the country by fortifying all the important points of Leon and Old Castile. Meanwhile the great army which the emperor was carrying to Russia, might or might not be successful, but in either case, it was the only moment when an offensive war, against his army in Spain, could have been carried on with success.

But how could any extensive offensive operation have been attempted while Badajos remained in the enemy's possession ? If Wellington had advanced in the north, Soult, making Badajos his base, would have threatened Lisbon ; if Wellington marched against the French centre, the same thing would have happened, and the army of the north would also have acted on the left flank of the allies or have retaken Ciudad Rodrigo. If an attempt had been made against Soult, it must have been by the Lower Guadiana, when the French army of Portugal coming down to Badajos could have either operated against the rear of the allies, or against Lisbon.

Badajos was therefore the key to all offensive operations by the allies, and to take it was an indispensable preliminary. Yet how take it ? By regular or by irregular operations ? For the first a certain time was required, which from the experience of former sieges it was not to be expected that the enemy would allow. What, then, would have been the result, if thus, year after year, the allies showed they were unable even to give battle to their enemies, much less to chase them from the Peninsula ? How was it to be expected that England would bear the expense of a protracted warfare, affording no hope of final success ? How were the opposition clamours to be replied to in Parliament ? How were the secret hopes of the continental governments to be upheld if the military power of England, Portugal, and Spain united was unable to meet even a portion of the secondary armies of Napoleon, while with 400,000 men he stalked, a gigantic conqueror, over the wastes of Russia ? To strike irregularly, then, was Wellington's only resource. To strike without regard to rules, trusting to the courage of his men and to fortune to bear him through the trial triumphant. Was such a crisis to be neglected by a general who had undertaken on his own judgment to fight the battle of the Peninsula. Was he to give force to the light declamation of the hour, when general officers in England were heard to say that every defeat of the French was a snare to decoy the British further into Spain ! Was he, at such a moment,

to place the probable loss of a few thousand men, more or less, in opposition to such a conjuncture, and by declining the chance offered, show that he despaired of success himself? What if he failed? He would not have been, save the loss of a few men, worse off than if he had not attacked. In either case, he would have been a baffled general with a sinking cause. But what if he succeeded? The horizon was bright with the coming glory of England!

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

SECTION I.—GENERAL STATE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN THE PENINSULA, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

King Joseph commanding, 1st Oct., 1809.

| Present under arms. | | Detached. | | Absent. | | Effective. | Horses. | |
|----------------------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|------------|----------|--------|
| Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | Hospital. | Prison. | Men. | Cavalry. | Draft. |
| 180,814 | 28,091 | 10,407 | 3165 | 46,109 | 4124 | 237,330 | 23,196 | 8060 |
| Deduct for the governments | | | | | | 10,407 | 3165 | |
| Real total | | | | | | 226,927 | 28,091 | |

15th July, 1810.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------|--------|--------|------|--------|------|---------|--------|--------|
| 273,403 | 52,336 | 29,462 | 7846 | 47,107 | 4915 | 349,972 | 41,848 | 18,334 |
|---------|--------|--------|------|--------|------|---------|--------|--------|

In march to join

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------|--------|--------|------|--------|------|---------|--------|--|
| 6121 | 736 | — | — | 636 | — | 6757 | 736 | |
| 279,524 | 53,072 | 29,462 | 7846 | 47,743 | 4915 | 356,729 | 60,918 | |

15th August, 1810.

| | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|--------|--------|------|--------|------|---------|--------|--------|
| 270,639 | 52,063 | 25,340 | 6017 | 46,982 | 5995 | 351,961 | 41,446 | 16,634 |
| In march to join | | | | | | 1957 | 681 | 511 |

Total effective in Spain 353,918 42,127 17,145

Troops destined for Spain, quartered on the frontier 16,006 1447 —

Grand total 369,924 43,574 17,145

Note.—By this state it appears that allowance being made for casualties, the re-inforcements for Spain, in consequence of the peace with Austria, were not less than 150,000 men.

15th Jan., 1811.

| Present under arms. | | Detached. | | Absent. | | Effective. | Horses. | |
|---------------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|--|------------|----------|--------|
| Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | Hospital. | | Men. | Cavalry. | Draft. |
| 295,227 | 52,462 | 17,780 | 4714 | 48,831 | | 361,838 | 41,189 | 15,987 |

15th April, 1811.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------|--------|--------|------|--------|--|---------|--------|--------|
| 276,575 | 46,990 | 15,121 | 2166 | 40,079 | | 331,776 | 37,855 | 11,301 |
|---------|--------|--------|------|--------|--|---------|--------|--------|

These states show a decrease of nearly 30,000 men in three months. During this period the siege of Badajos, the retreat of Massena, the battles of the Gebora, Barrosa, and Fuentes Onoro took place. Hence, if the deaths in hospital be added to the losses sustained in those operations we shall find that, at the period of its greatest activity, the guerilla system was more harassing than destructive to the French army.

SECTION II.—STATE OF THE ARMY OF PORTUGAL.

April, 1810.—Head-quarters Caceres: Massena, Prince of Essling, commanding.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospl. Prisons. | | Effective. | | Horses. | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------------|------|------------|--|---------|--------|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Men. | Men. | | Cav. | Draft. |
| 2nd corps d'armée | 18,372 | 4449 | 1119 | 132 | 1628 | 7 | 21,126 | | 3520 | 1061 |
| 6th ditto . . . | 33,759 | 10,159 | 496 | 110 | 5086 | 349 | 39,690 | | 3140 | 3129 |
| 8th ditto . . . | 28,045 | 7070 | 25 | — | 5976 | 99 | 34,145 | | 5312 | 1758 |
| Total active army | 80,176 | 21,678 | 1640 | 242 | 12,690 | 455 | 94,961 | | 15,972 | 5948 |
| Imperial guards | 17,380 | 3800 | 174 | 15 | 733 | — | 18,287 | | 2831 | 954 |
| Province of St. Ander . . . | 13,464 | 752 | 276 | — | 1774 | 377 | 15,891 | | 15,752 | — |
| Province of Valladolid . . . | 4509 | 124 | 123 | — | 859 | 145 | 6136 | | — | 126 |
| Total under Massena's command. } | 116,029 | 26,254 | 2213 | 257 | 16,056 | 977 | 135,275 | | 19,555 | 7056 |

15th May, 1810.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|------|------|--------|-----|--------|--------|------|
| Etat major et gen- d'armes . . . | 229 | 241 | — | — | — | — | 229 | 241 | — |
| 2nd corps, Reynier | 16,903 | 2921 | 992 | 231 | 1337 | 42 | 19,232 | 2186 | 966 |
| 6th do. Ney . . | 28,883 | 5421 | 1224 | 964 | 4940 | 357 | 35,067 | 2152 | 4233 |
| 8th do. Junot . . | 30,782 | 4228 | 7 | 30 | 5642 | 75 | 2643 | 2142 | 2116 |
| Reserve of cavalry. Montbrun | 4776 | 4851 | 246 | 189 | 95 | — | 5117 | 5040 | 11 |
| Total active army | 71,573 | 17,662 | 2489 | 1414 | 12,014 | 474 | 86,076 | 11,761 | 7315 |

15th August, 1810.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------|--------|------|------|--------|------|---------|--------|------|
| Etat major, etc. | 199 | 222 | — | — | 3 | — | 202 | 222 | — |
| 2nd corps . . . | 16,418 | 2894 | 2494 | 397 | 3006 | — | 21,918 | 1969 | 1304 |
| 6th corps . . . | 23,456 | 2496 | 1865 | 577 | 5541 | 190 | 30,862 | 1701 | 1372 |
| 8th corps . . . | 18,803 | 1959 | 436 | 169 | 4996 | 98 | 24,235 | 2016 | 1112 |
| Reserve of cavalry | 4146 | 4322 | 1138 | 831 | 157 | 31 | 5441 | 4907 | 246 |
| Artillerie et genie et du siege . . . | 2724 | 2969 | 206 | 159 | 409 | — | 3339 | 108 | 3128 |
| Total active army | 65,746 | 15,862 | 6139 | 2119 | 14,112 | 302 | 85,997 | 10,815 | 7162 |
| 6th Government Valladolid. Division Serras. Asturias et St. Ander, Bonet . . . | 12,693 | 3045 | 639 | 20 | 1775 | 641 | 15,107 | 2931 | 134 |
| Total under Mas- sena . . . | 91,352 | 18,907 | 8172 | 2154 | 17,465 | 1050 | 115,989 | 13,746 | 7296 |
| 9th corps, Drouet Comte D'Erlon . . | 19,144 | 2436 | 24 | — | 3147 | — | 22,315 | 2436 | — |
| General total . . | 110,496 | 21,343 | 8196 | 2154 | 20,612 | 1050 | 138,304 | 16,616 | 7296 |

Army of Portugal, 27th September, 1810. The 9th corps to the 15th October.

The reserve of cavalry and the artillery of siege to the 1st September only.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospital. | | Effective. | | Horses. | |
|---|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|------|------------|------|---------|--------|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Men. | Men. | Men. | Cav. | Draft. |
| Etat major | 192 | 219 | — | — | 4 | — | 196 | — | 219 | — |
| 2nd corps | 16,575 | 2921 | 2397 | 287 | 2214 | — | 21,186 | — | 1872 | 1336 |
| 6th do. | 23,224 | 2478 | 1708 | 600 | 5418 | — | 30,350 | — | 1730 | 1348 |
| 8th do. | 18,807 | 2958 | 663 | 140 | 4656 | — | 24,126 | — | 2027 | 1071 |
| Reserve of cavalry . | 4146 | 4322 | 1138 | 831 | 157 | — | 5441 | — | 4907 | 246 |
| Artilleries of siege . | 3022 | 3115 | 206 | 159 | 409 | — | 3637 | — | 146 | 3128 |
| Battalion of march which quitted Bayonne the 2nd of October . . } | — | — | 474 | 16 | — | — | 474 | — | 16 | — |
| Total | 65,966 | 16,013 | 6586 | 2033 | 12,858 | — | 85,410 | — | 10,917 | 7129 |
| 9th corps | 19,062 | 2072 | 413 | — | 3516 | — | 22,991 | — | 1755 | 317 |
| Division Serras . . | 8586 | 1015 | 269 | 35 | 1750 | — | 10,605 | — | 1050 | — |
| Grand total | 93,614 | 19,100 | 7268 | 2068 | 18,124 | — | 119,006 | — | 13,722 | 7446 |

Army of Portugal.—1st January, 1811.

Head-quarters, Torres Novas.

2nd Corps, Head-quarters, Santarem.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospital. | | Effective. | | Horses. | |
|---|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|------|------------|------|---------|--------|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Men. | Men. | Men. | Cav. | Draft. |
| Merle's division, 9 bat- talions | 4368 | — | 150 | — | 1549 | — | 6067 | — | — | — |
| Heudelet's do. 12 do. . | 5718 | — | 451 | — | 2046 | — | 8815 | — | — | — |
| Light cavalry, Soult, 15 squadrons . . . | 1146 | 993 | 523 | 537 | 231 | — | 1900 | — | 1530 | — |
| Artillery and engineers | 1284 | 1121 | 52 | 9 | 189 | — | 1425 | — | 112 | 1018 |
| Total | 12,516 | 2114 | 1176 | 546 | 4515 | — | 18,207 | — | 1642 | 1018 |

6th Corps, Thomar.

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--------|------|------|-----|------|---|--------|---|------|------|
| Marchand, 11 battalions | 4987 | 28 | 529 | — | 1121 | — | 6637 | — | 28 | — |
| Mermet, 11 do. . . . | 6252 | — | 743 | — | 1077 | — | 8104 | — | — | — |
| Loison, 12 do. . . . | 4589 | — | 1037 | — | 3291 | — | 8917 | — | — | — |
| Light cavalry, Lamotte, 7 squadrons | 652 | 651 | 663 | 663 | 117 | — | 1432 | — | 1314 | — |
| Artillery and engineers, 28 companies | 1769 | 1372 | 47 | 78 | 165 | — | 1981 | — | 52 | 1398 |
| Total | 18,272 | 2051 | 3019 | 741 | 5771 | — | 27,094 | — | 1394 | 1398 |

8th Corps, Pernes.

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------|------|------|-----|------|---|--------|---|------|-----|
| Clausel, 11 battalions | 4007 | 18 | 484 | — | 3989 | — | 8627 | — | 18 | — |
| Solignac, 14 do. . . . | 4997 | — | 1953 | — | 3337 | — | 10,346 | — | — | — |
| St. Croix's dragoons, 12 squadrons | 981 | 1024 | 698 | 698 | 239 | — | 1917 | — | 1722 | — |
| Artillery and engineers | 1106 | 859 | 24 | 4 | 359 | — | 1522 | — | 151 | 712 |
| On leave | — | — | — | — | — | — | 206 | — | — | — |
| Total | 11,108 | 1901 | 3159 | 702 | 7956 | — | 22,605 | — | 1191 | 712 |

Montbrun, Ourem.

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|-----|---|------|---|------|---|
| Reserve of cavalry, 24 squadrons with ar- tillery | 2729 | 2871 | 1486 | 1466 | 178 | — | 4533 | — | 4337 | — |
| Artillery, engineers, and equipage of the army | 1546 | 614 | — | — | 283 | — | 2090 | — | 514 | — |

| 9th Corps, Leiria. | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|
| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospital. | Effective. | Cavalry |
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | | | |
| Claparede, 15 battalions, Almeida | 7863 | 11 | 369 | — | 482 | 8714 | — |
| Couroux's 12 battalions, Leiria | 7592 | 27 | 447 | — | 1299 | 9338 | 27 |
| Fournier's cavalry, 7 squadrons at Toro | 1698 | 1591 | 60 | 67 | 114 | 1872 | 1658 |
| Artillery and engineers, Ciudad Rodrigo | 670 | 464 | — | 72 | 742 | — | 464 |
| Total | 17,823 | 2093 | 876 | 139 | 2637 | 19,924 | 2149 |

Note.—Salamanca constituted a government containing the towns of Alba de Tormes, Penaranda, and Salamanca, in which were deposited the sick men, stragglers, equipages, and depôts, of the army of Portugal. The total amounting to 2354 men and 1102 horses.

| | | | | Present under arms. | |
|---|--|--|--|---------------------|---------|
| | | | | Men. | Horses. |
| General total of the army of Portugal in the position of Santarém | | | | 46,171 | 9551 |
| 9th corps | | | | 17,823 | 2093 |
| | | | | 63,994 | 11,644 |
| Deduct troops of the 9th corps not in Portugal | | | | 10,231 | 2066 |
| Real number under Massena | | | | 53,763 | 9578 |

Army of Portugal—1st April, 1811.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospital. | Effective. | Horses. |
|---|---|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | | | |
| 8th corps, Junot | 13,448 | — | 992 | — | 5719 | 20,159 | — |
| 6th do., Marmont | 13,984 | — | 1374 | — | 1576 | 16,934 | — |
| 2nd corps, Reynier | 10,837 | — | 1350 | — | 4318 | 16,505 | — |
| Mont-brun- { | Dragoons, 23 squadrons | 4173 | 4404 | — | — | 4173 | 4404 |
| | Light cavalry, 14 squadrons | 3636 | 3906 | — | 38 | 3636 | 3906 |
| | 1 squadron of gens d'armes | 190 | 72 | — | 5 | 102 | 72 |
| | Fort { Almeida } artil- { and } lery. { Rodrigo } | 936 | — | — | 88 | 1055 | — |
| Artillery and Engineers. | Horse artillery of the train | 410 | 425 | — | 23 | 453 | 425 |
| | Workmen | 2181 | 2378 | — | 237 | 2448 | 2378 |
| | Engineers | 259 | — | — | 25 | 295 | — |
| | Engineers | 1448 | 60 | — | 140 | 1623 | — |
| | Military equipage | 596 | 897 | — | 60 | 668 | 897 |
| <hr/> | | | | | | | |
| Total artilleries, engineers, etc | 5969 | 3335 | — | — | 573 | 6542 | 2760 |
| Total of infantry | 37,269 | — | 3716 | — | 11,613 | 53,598 | — |
| Total of cavalry | 7999 | 8382 | — | — | 43 | 7911 | 8382 |
| General Total | 51,237 | 11,717 | 3716 | — | 12,229 | 68,051 | 11,142 |

Note.—In the imperial rolls there was no state of the army of Portugal for May. Two divisions of the 9th corps, directed to be added to the army of Portugal, are included in the state for April, and the Prince of Esling was empowered to distribute the cavalry as he pleased, provided the brigade of General Fournier, from the 9th corps, was kept in the reserve. The

detached men were in the government of Salamanca. On the 1st of June, however, the army of Portugal is returned as present under arms 44,548 men, 7253 horses, and 4620 men detached. Hence, I have estimated the number of fighting men and officers, including the imperial guards, at Fuentes Onoro at 45,000, a number, perhaps, too great, when the artificers, engineers, etc., are deducted.

SECTION III.—ARMY OF THE SOUTH, SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA, COMMANDING.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospital. | Effective. | Horses. | |
|--|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|--------|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | | | Cav. | Draft. |
| 1st of January . . . | 55,602 | 12,092 | 5744 | 1999 | 6412 | 67,758 | 10,868 | 3223 |
| 15th of May . . . | 75,133 | 13,124 | 3915 | 1336 | 11,420 | 90,468 | 12,156 | 2304 |
| Deduct the troops of the 9th corps in march from the north | 11,917 | 1619 | — | — | — | 13,310 | 1220 | 399 |
| Real total of the army of the South . . . | 63,216 | 11,505 | 3915 | 1336 | 11,420 | 77,158 | 10,936 | 1905 |

SECTION 4.

5th Corps, 15th January.

| Under arms. | | Detached. | |
|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|
| Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. |
| 18,766 | 6158 | 3035 | 640 |

16th December, 1810, le Duc de Dalmatie, va faire le siège de Badajos, avec tout le 5em corps d'armée, 8 regimens de cavalerie formant 2600 chevaux pris dans les 1ere et 5em corps d'armée sous les ordres de General Latour Maubourg, 900 hommes du 63em regiment de ligne, 2 compagnies d'artillerie légère, 4 compagnies de sappeurs, 1 compagnie de mineurs, et 3 escadrons de cavalerie Espagnols.

SECTION V.

1st Corps before Cadiz.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospital. | Effective. | Horses. | |
|---|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|--------|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | | | Cav. | Train. |
| 15th February, 1811 . | 20,572 | 1886 | 1331 | 681 | 1254 | 23,457 | 1495 | 1072 |
| Reinforcement on the march from the Go- vernments . . . | 5209 | 775 | — | — | 743 | 5952 | 712 | 62 |
| Total . . . | 25,781 | 2661 | 1331 | 681 | 1997 | 29,409 | 2207 | 1035 |
| 4th corps, 15th February | 16,703 | 4007 | 741 | 397 | 1699 | 19,143 | 3612 | 792 |
| Reinforcement on the march from the Go- vernments . . . | 6620 | 1457 | — | — | 878 | 6854 | 1451 | — |
| Total . . . | 22,723 | 5464 | 741 | 397 | 2577 | 25,993 | 5069 | 793 |

Note.—A reinforcement of more than 1000 men likewise joined the 5th corps while in front of Badajos.

SECTION 6.—ARMY OF THE NORTH—BESSIERES, DUKE OF ISTRIA, COMMANDING.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | Hospital. | Effective. | Horses. | |
|------------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|-----------|------------|----------|--------|
| | Men. | Horses. | | | | Cavalry. | Train. |
| 1st February, 1811 . . | 58,515 | 8874 | 1992 | 6860 | 67,767 | 7979 | 1073 |
| 15th April, 1811 . . . | 53,148 | 6930 | 2221 | 5350 | 60,719 | 6065 | 879 |

SECTION VII.—ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE DU MIDI DE L'ESPAGNE IME. CORPS

Situation des présens sous les armes à l'époque du 22nd Mars, 1811.

| Division. | Designation des Régimens. | Etat des présens sous les armes. | Dans les Forts et Redoutes. | Emplacement des Troupes dans les Forts et Redoutes. | Disposeables. |
|---------------------|---|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|---|
| 1 | { 9me. Infanterie ligne 24me. do. do. 96me. do. do. } | 1000 | 400 | Depuis et compris le Fort St. Catherine jusqu'au Rio St. Petro | 1000 Sta Maria. |
| | | 800 | | | 400 Do. |
| | | 1100 | | | 1100 Do. San Lucar, Esta, Chiona la Viala Atta. |
| | | | | | — Porte Reale au Trocadero. |
| 2 | { 16me. do. do. 8me. do. do. 45me. do. do. } | 350 | 350 | Xeres et la Cartuxa | 712 |
| | | 713 | 744 | Depuis et compris le Fort Napoleon jusqu'à Cluiese fe | 328 Port Reale. |
| | | 1072 | | | 820 Chiclana. |
| | | | | | 236 Do. |
| 3 | { 54me. do. do. Bataillon d'Elite 27me. Infanterie ligne 63me. do. do. 94me. do. do. } | 820 | 650 | Depuis et compris la Redoute jusqu'à cette de Vellati | 1400 Do. |
| | | 236 | | | 845 Port Reale. |
| | | 1400 | | | 850 Chiclana. |
| | | 845 | | | 942 Do. |
| Régiment de Marine. | { 43me Bataillons de marine 2e. do d'Ouvriers do. 5e. Chasseurs . 1e. de Dragons 2e. do. do. à pied à Cheval } | 1414 | 472 | Arcos, Medina, Vejer, et Conil | |
| | | 900 | 900 | An Trocadero | |
| | | 615 | 615 | Do. | |
| | | 320 | 50 | De Montesa, Alcazar de Xeres | 320 Vejer et Conil. |
| Cavalerie. | { 1e. de Dragons 2e. do. do. à pied à Cheval } | 230 | 72 | Do. et à la Cartuxa | 180 Xeres. |
| | | 218 | 500 | Sur la ligne du Blocus | 146 Arcos. |
| | | 678 | | | 178 Santa Maria, Puerto Reale, et Chiclana. |
| Artil | { Sapeurs . Mineurs . } | 323 | 323 | Au Trocadero | |
| | | 77 | 77 | Do. | |
| | | 14,611 | 5153 | | 9458 |

By this return, which is not extracted from the imperial rolls, but was found amongst Colonel Lejune's intercepted papers, it appears that Victor had above 9000 disposable troops 17 days after the battle of Barosa. He must, therefore, have had about 11,000 disposable before that action, and Cassagne's detachment being deducted leaves about 9000 for the battle of Barosa.

SECTION 8.—STATE OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN TROOPS ON THE COA, 25TH APRIL, 1811,
EXTRACTED FROM THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S RETURNS.

| | Under arms. Men. | Sick. Men. | Detached. Men. |
|--|---------------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Cavalry, 4 regiments | 1525 | 274 | 542 |
| Infantry, 41 battalions | 20,700 | 8880 | 3214 |
| Artillery | 1378 | 144 | 1156 |
| Total of all arms | 23,613 | 9298 | 4912 |
| Guns 24 British, 18 Portuguese Total | | 42 | |

Note.—There are no separate returns of the army engaged in the battle of Fuentes Onoro. Hence, the above is only an approximation to the numbers of British and German troops; but if the Portuguese and the Partidas of Julian Sanchez be added, the whole number in line will be about 35,000 men of all arms.

NO. II.—EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

SECTION I.

“November 30, 1809.

“I enclose copies and extracts of a correspondence which I have had with Mr. Frere on the subject of the co-operation of the British army with the corps of the Duke of Albuquerque and the Duke del Parque in this plan of diversion.

“Adverting to the opinion which I have given to his Majesty’s ministers and the ambassador at Seville, it will not be supposed that I could have encouraged the advance of General Areizaga, or could have held out the prospect of any co-operation by the British army.

“The first official information which I had from the government of the movement of General Areizaga was on the 18th, the day before his defeat, and I gave the answer on the 19th regarding the plan of which I now enclose a copy.

“I was at Seville, however, when the general commenced his march from the Sierra Morena, and in more than one conversation with the Spanish ministers and members of the Junta, I communicated to them my conviction that General Areizaga would be defeated. The expectation, however, of success from this large army, stated to consist of 50,000 men, was so general and so sanguine that the possibility of disappointment was not even contemplated, and, accordingly, your lordship will find that, on the 10th only, the Government began to think it necessary to endeavour to make a diversion in favour of General Areizaga, and it is probable that it was thought expedient to make this diversion only in consequence of the fall of the general’s own hopes, after his first trial with the enemy on the night of the 10th instant.”—“I am anxious to cross the Tagus with the British army and to station it on the frontiers of Old Castile, from thinking that the point in which I can be of most use in preventing the enemy from effecting any important object, and which best answers for my future operations in the defence of Portugal. With this view, I have requested Mr. Frere to urge the Government to reinforce the Duke D’Albuquerque’s corps, in order to secure the passage of the lower part of the Tagus. And, although the state of the season would render it desirable that I should make the movement at an early period, I do not propose to make it till I shall see most clearly the consequences of that defeat, and some prospect that the city of Seville will be secure after I shall move.”

SECTION II.

“December 7, 1809.

“———I had urged the Spanish Government to augment the army of the Duke D’Albuquerque to 20,000 men, in order that it might occupy, in a sufficient manner, the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz and the passes through the mountains leading from Arzobispo

to Truxillo, in which position they would have covered effectually the province of Estremadura, during the winter at least, and would have afforded time and leisure for preparations for farther opposition to the enemy, and I delayed the movement, which I have long been desirous of making, to the northward of the Tagus, till the reinforcements could be sent to the Duke D'Albuquerque which I had lately recommended should be drawn from the army of the Duke del Parque. During the discussions upon the subject, the Government have given orders to the Duke D'Albuquerque to retire with his corps behind the Guadiana, to a position which he cannot maintain, thus leaving open the road into Estremadura, and incurring the risk of the loss of that province whenever the enemy choose to take possession of it."

SECTION III.

"January 31, 1810.

"———There is no doubt that, if the enemy's reinforcements have not yet entered Spain, and are not considerably advanced within the Spanish frontiers, the operation which they have undertaken is one of some risk, and I have maturely considered of the means of making a diversion in favour of the allies, which might oblige the enemy to reduce his force in Andalusia, and would expose him to risk and loss in this quarter. But the circumstances, which are detailed in the enclosed copy of a letter to Mr. Frere, have obliged me to refrain from attempting this operation at present. I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it, and I propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances will permit."

SECTION IV.

"January 12, 1811.

"My former despatch will have informed your lordship that I was apprehensive that the Spanish troops in Estremadura would not make any serious opposition to the progress which it was my opinion the enemy would attempt to make in that province; but as they had been directed to destroy the bridges on the Guadiana, at Merida and Medellin, and preparations had been ordered for that purpose, and to defend the passage of the Guadiana as long as was practicable, I was in hopes that the enemy would have been delayed at least for some days before he should be allowed to pass that river. But I have been disappointed in that expectation, and the town and bridge of Merida appear to have been given up to an advanced guard of cavalry."

SECTION V.

"January 19, 1811.

"At the moment when the enemy entered Estremadura from Seville, General Ballasteros received an order from the Regency, dated the 21st December last, directing him to proceed with the troops under his command into the Condado de Niebla. The force in Estremadura was thus diminished by one-half, and the remainder are considered insufficient to attempt the relief of the troops in Olivenza."

"The circumstances which I have above related will show your lordship that the military system of the Spanish nation is not much improved, and that it is not very easy to combine or regulate operations with corps so ill organised, in possession of so little intelligence, and upon whose actions so little reliance can be placed. It will scarcely be credited that the first intelligence which General Mendizabel received of the assembly of the enemy's troops at Seville was from hence; and if any combination was then made, either for retreat or defence, it was rendered useless, or destroyed by the orders from the Regency, to detach General Ballasteros into the Condado de Niebla, which were dated the 21st of December, the very day on which Soult broke up from Cadiz, with a detachment of infantry, and marched to Seville."

SECTION VI.

"February 2, 1811.

"The various events of the war will have shown your lordship that no calculation can be made on the result of any operation in which the Spanish troops are engaged. But if the same number of troops of any other nation (10,000) were to be employed on this operation, (the

opening the communication with Badajos, I should have no doubt of their success or of their ability to prevent the French from attacking Badajos with the forces which they have now employed on this service."

SECTION VII.

"February 9, 1811.

"General Mendizabel has not adhered to the plan which was ordered by the late Marquis de la Romana, which provided for the security of the communication with Elvas before the troops should be thrown to the left of the Guadiana. I don't believe that the strength of the enemy, on either side of the Guadiana, is accurately known, but if they should be in strength on the right of that river, it is to be apprehended that the whole of the troops will be shut up in Badajos, and I have reason to believe that this place is entirely unprovided with provisions, notwithstanding that the siege of it has been expected for the last year."

SECTION VIII.

"February 23, 1811.

"Although experience has taught me to place no reliance upon the effect of the exertions of the Spanish troops, notwithstanding the frequent instances of their bravery, I acknowledge that this recent disaster has disappointed and grieved me much. The loss of this army and its probable consequences, the fall of Badajos, have materially altered the situation of the allies in this part of the Peninsula, and it will not be an easy task to place them in the situation in which they were, much less in that in which they would have been, if that misfortune had not occurred. I am concerned to add to this melancholy history, that the Portuguese brigade of cavalry did not behave much better than the other troops. Brigadier-General Madden did everything in his power to induce them to charge, but in vain." "The operations of the Guerillas continue throughout the interior; and I have proofs that the political hostility of the people of Spain towards the enemy is increasing rather than diminishing. But I have not yet heard of any measure being adopted to supply the regular funds to pay and support an army, or to raise one."

SECTION IX.

"March 21, 1811.

"It (Campo Mayor) had been given over to the charge of the Marquis of Romana, at his request, last year. But, lately, the Spanish garrison had been first weakened and then withdrawn, in a manner not very satisfactory to me, nor consistent with the honourable engagements to defend the place into which the marquis entered when it was delivered over to his charge. I am informed, however, that Marshal Bessieres has collected at Zamora about 7000 men, composed principally of the imperial guard, and of troops taken from all the garrisons in Castile. He thus threatens an attack upon Galicia, in which province there are, I understand, 16,000 men under General Mahi; but, from all I hear, I am apprehensive that that general will make no defence, and that Galicia will fall into the hands of the enemy."

SECTION X.

"May 7, 1811.

"Your lordship will have observed, in my recent reports of the state of the Portuguese force, that their numbers are much reduced, and I don't know what measure to recommend which will have the effect of restoring them. All measures recommended to the existing government in Portugal are either rejected, or are neglected, or are so executed as to be of no use whatever; and the countenance which the prince regent of Portugal has given to the governors of the kingdom, who have uniformly manifested this spirit of opposition to every thing proposed for the increase of the resources of the government and the amelioration of their military system, must tend to aggravate these evils. The radical defect, both in Spain and Portugal, is want of money to carry on the ordinary operations of the Government, much more to defray the expenses of such a war as that in which we are engaged."

"I have not received the consent of Castaños and Blake to the plan of co-operation which

I proposed for the siege of Badajos ; and I have been obliged to write to Marshal Beresford to desire him to delay the siege till they will positively promise to act as therein specified, or till I can go to him with a reinforcement from hence."

"Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be, upon which point I have never altered my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commander must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities ; by which means alone he will be enabled to draw some resources from the country and some assistance from the Spanish armies."

SECTION XI.

"May 22, 1811.

"On the night of the 15th instant I received, from Marshal Sir William Beresford, letters of the 12th and 13th instant, which reported that Marshal Soult had broken up from Seville about the 10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwithstanding the reports which had been previously received, that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville, and the approaches to that city, by works, and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia."

SECTION XII.

Letter from SIR J. MOORE to MAJOR-GENERAL M'KENZIE, commanding in Portugal.

SIR,

Salamanca, 29th November, 1808.

The armies of Spain, commanded by Generals Castaños and Blake, the one in Biscay and the other in Aragon, have been beaten and dispersed. This renders my junction with Sir David Baird's corps impracticable, but if it were, I cannot hope, with the British alone, to withstand the formidable force which France has brought against this country ; and there is nothing else now in Spain to make head against it.

I have ordered Sir David Baird to fall back on Coruña, re-embark, and proceed to the Tagus ; I myself, with the corps which marched from Lisbon, mean to retire by Ciudad Rodrigo or Almeida, and, by taking up such positions as offer, endeavour to defend, for a time, the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon. But, looking forward that this cannot be done for any considerable time against superior numbers, it becomes necessary for me to give you this notice, that you may embark the stores of the army, keeping on shore as little as possible that may impede a re-embarkation of the whole army both now with you and that which I am bringing.

We shall have great difficulties on the frontier for subsistence ; Colonel Murray wrote on this subject to Colonel Donkin yesterday, that supplies might be sent for us to Abrantes and Coimbra. Some are already at Oporto, and more may be sent. I have desired Sir D. Baird, if he has with him a victualler, of small draft of water, to send her there. On the subject of provisions the commissary-general will write more in detail, and I hope you will use your influence with the government of Portugal to secure its aid and assistance. It will be right to consider with the Portuguese officers and engineers what points may be immediately strengthened and are most defensible, and what use you can make of the troops with you to support me in my defence of the frontiers, and I shall be glad to hear from you upon this subject. I cannot yet determine the line I shall take up, but generally it will be Almeida, Guarda, Belmonte, Baracal, Celerico, Viseu. The Portuguese, on their own mountains, can be of much use, and I should hope, at any rate, that they will defend the *Tras os Montes*. Mr. Kennedy will probably write to Mr. Erskine, who now had better remain at Lisbon ; but, if he does not write to him, this, together with Colonel Murray's letter to Colonel Donkin, will be sufficient for you and Mr. Erskine to take means for securing to us not only a supply of biscuit and salt provisions, but the supplies of the country for ourselves and horses, etc. In

order to alarm as little as possible, it may be said that more troops are expected from England, to join us through Portugal : this will do at first, but gradually the truth will, of course, be known. I am in great want of money, and nothing else will secure the aid of the country.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

J. MOORE.

P.S.—Elvas should be provisioned.

NO. III.—EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF A FIELD-OFFICER OF ENGINEERS,
EMPLOYED AT CADIZ.

SECTION I.

"May 7, 1810.

"We have at last broke ground for some works, but I am almost at a loss to explain to you the cause of our delay. The truth is, we left England so ill provided with tools and other requisites for beginning works that till lately it has been positively impossible to commence, even on a small scale, from our own resources and number of men. These facts, with the backwardness of the Spaniards to contribute either stores or workmen to the general cause, have kept us so long inactive. We have now 1300 men at work, and the Board of Ordnance has supplied us with more tools."

SECTION II.

"Isla, June 1, 1810.

"We might defy the power of France to expel us by force from hence if all were done that might be done, or even what is projected, but we have only British troops at work on this important position, and our numbers will not permit the progress which the exigency of affairs requires."—"We have in our respected General (Graham) a confidence which is daily on the increase. He has a mind and temper well adapted to encounter difficulties which less favoured dispositions could not bear. We may possibly maintain our ground. If we do, although our success may have none of the brilliancy of victory, yet his merits, who, by patience, prudence, and self-possession, shall have kept all quiet within our lines, preserved tolerable harmony, and kept an enterprising enemy off with very inadequate means, should be rewarded by his country's good opinion, although none but those who have witnessed can fully estimate the value of his exertions. On the whole, our situation may be said to inspire hope, though not security: to animate resistance, though not to promise victory."

SECTION III.

"June 29, 1810.

"I have been attending a committee of Spanish engineers and artillery officers, to settle some determinate plan for taking up the ground near the town of La Isla; but they will enter into no views which include the destruction of a house or garden. They continue to propose nothing but advanced batteries upon the marsh in front of the town, the evident object of which is to keep the shells of the enemy rather farther from the houses. At a general attack, all this would be lost and carried, by small parties coming in on the flanks and gorges. Instead of deepening the ditches and constructing good redoubts at every 700 yards, this is what they propose, although we offer to perform the labour for them. On a barren spot they will agree to our working; but of what service is one redoubt, if unsupported by a collateral defence, and if a general system is not attended to? We have now been here three months, and although they have been constantly urged to construct something at that weak tongue of low land, St. Petri, still nothing of importance is begun upon, nor do I imagine they will agree to any work of strength at that point. I am almost in despair of seeing this place strongly fortified, so as to resist an army of from 50,000 to 100,000 men, which I am convinced it is capable of."—"We have now 1300 labourers of the line and 80 carpenters, but, for the latter, the timber we are

supplied with from our ally, is so bad that these artificers produce not more than one-fifth or one-sixth what they would be capable of if the materials were good. To judge from their conduct it is impossible to suppose them determined to oppose a vigorous resistance even in La Isla, and I have no idea of there ever being a siege of Cadiz itself."—"Of our seven subalterns of engineers two are generally ill; we are obliged, therefore, to get assistance from the line. The consequence is that the work is neither so well nor so speedily executed. We ought to have many more (engineers). It is not economy in the governments; and with Lord Wellington they have hardly any with the army."

EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL ABSTRACT OF MILITARY REPORTS FROM THE BRITISH
COMMANDERS AT CADIZ.

SECTION IV.

GENERAL WILLIAM STEWART, *March 13, 1810.*

"The enemy's force was supposed to be diminished, but no advantage could be taken of it, on account of the inefficient state of the Spanish troops."

GENERAL GRAHAM, *March 26, 1810.*

"The isle of Leon required for its defence a larger force than had been assigned. Its tenure was, in the then state of the defences, very precarious.

May, 1810.

"General Blake, appointed to command the Spanish forces, introduced some degree of activity and co-operation, in which the Spaniards had been very deficient."

October, 1810.

"The progress made by the enemy at the Trocadero assumed a very formidable character; while the Spaniards persisted in their apathy, and neglected to fortify the most vulnerable points of their line."

GENERAL GRAHAM to LORD LIVERPOOL, *Cadiz, January 2, 1811.*

"——— As far as the exertions of the British engineers and soldiers under my command have been concerned, I have every reason to be satisfied. I can by no means say the same of the Spaniards, for, besides the reluctance with which some of the most essential measures of the defence were agreed to, our people were not permitted to carry into execution the plan for the intrenchment of the left part of the Cortadura de St. Fernando until after much delay and very unpleasant contests."

NO IV.--EXTRACTS FROM KING JOSEPH'S CORRESPONDENCE.

SECTION I.

The DUKE of SANTA FE to the KING, Paris, June 20, 1810.—(Translation from the Spanish.)

"Will your majesty believe that some politicians of Paris have arrived at saying that in Spain there is preparing a new revolution, very dangerous for the French; and they assert that the Spaniards attached to your majesty will rise against them. Let your majesty consider if ever was heard a more absurd chimera, and how prejudicial it might be to us if it succeeded in gaining any credit. I hope that such an idea will not be believed by any person of judgment, and that it will soon subside, being void of probability."

SECTION II.

Ministerial letter from the KING to the MARQUIS of ALMENARA.—(Translation from the Spanish.)

"September 21, 1810.

"The impolitic violence of the military governors has attacked not only men, and fields, and animals, but even the most sacred things in the nation, as the memorials and the actions of families, in whose preservation those only are interested to whom they belong, and from which strangers cannot reap the least fruit. In this class are the general archives of the kingdom, called the archives of Simancas, which are found in the province of Valladolid; the governor, Kellerman, has taken possession of them." "Those archives, from the time of their institution, for centuries past, have contained the treaties of the kings since they were known in Castile; also, ancient manuscripts of the kindred of the princes, the descents and titles of families, pleadings in the tribunals, decisions of the Cortes; in short, all that is publicly interesting to the history of the nation, and privately to individuals."

SECTION III.

The Spanish secretary of state to the DUKE of SANTA FE.

"Madrid, September 12, 1812.

"—— Si l'Andalusie n'est pas entièrement pacifiée; si la junte de Cadix exista encore et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence, on doit l'attribuer en grande partie aux machinations, et aux trames ourdies par la junta et l'Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Février, qui établit des gouvernemens militaires dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l'Aragon, et la Catalogne. Quelques gouverneur Français ayant traité ces provinces comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie."

"—— Mais combien n'est il pas démenti par la conduite de certains gouverneurs qui paraissent s'obstiner à prolonger l'insurrection d'Espagne plutôt qu'à la soumettre! Car dans plusieurs endroits on ne se contente pas d'exclure toute idée de l'autorité du roi, en faisant administrer la justice au nom de l'empereur mais ce qui est pire, on a exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Palencia, prêtassent serment de fidélité et d'obéissance à sa majesté impériale comme si la nation Espagnole n'avait pas de roi."

SECTION IV.

Memorial from the DUKE of SANTA FE and MARQUIS of ALMENARA to the PRINCE of WAGRAM.—(Translated from the Spanish.)

"Paris, September 16, 1810.

"—— The decrees of his Majesty the emperor are the same for all the generals. The Prince of Esling, who has traversed all the provinces to the borders of Portugal, who appears to be forming immense magazines, and has much greater necessities than the governors of provinces, has applied to the Spanish prefects, who have made the arrangements, and supplied him with even more than he required; and this speaks in favour of the Spanish people, for the Prince of Esling receives the blessings of the inhabitants of the provinces through which his troops pass. Such is the effect of good order and humanity amongst a people who know the rules of justice, and that war demands sacrifices, but who will not suffer dilapidations and useless vexations."

SECTION V.

Intercepted letter of COMTE DE CASA VALENCIA, counsellor of state, written to his wife, June 18, 1810.

"Il y a six mois que l'on ne nous paie point, et nous périssons.

"—— Avant hier j'écrivis à Almenara lui peignant ma situation et le priant de m'accorder quelque argent pour vivre; de me secourir, si non comme ministre, du moins comme ami. Hier je restai trois heures dans son antichambre esperant un reponse, je le vis enfin et elle fut qu'il n'avait rien."

"—— Rien que la faim m'attend aujourd'hui."

No. V.

EXTRACTS OF LETTERS FROM LORD WELLINGTON.

SECTION I.

"Celerico, May 11, 1810.

"——— I observe that the minister Don Miguel Forjas considers the inconvenience, on which I had the honour of addressing you, as of ordinary occurrence, and he entertains no doubt that inconveniences of this description will not induce me to desist from making the movements which I might think the defence of the country would require. It frequently happens that an army in operation cannot procure the number of carriages which it requires, either from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to supply them, or from the deficiency of the number of carriages in the country. But it has rarely happened that an army, thus unprovided with carriages, has been obliged to carry on its operations in a country in which there is literally no food, and in which, if there was food, there is no money to purchase it; and, whenever that has been the case, the army has been obliged to withdraw to the magazines which the country had refused or been unable to remove to the army. This is precisely the case of the allied armies in this part of the country; and, however trifling the difficulty may be deemed by the regency and the ministers, I consider a starving army to be so useless in any situation, that I shall certainly not pretend to hold a position or to make any movement in which the food of the troops is not secured. I have no doubt of the ability or of the willingness of the country to do all that can be required of them, if the authority of the Government is properly exerted to force individuals to attend to their public duties rather than to their private interests in this time of trial. I have written this same sentiment to the Government so frequently, that they must be as tired of reading it as I am of writing it. But if they expect that individuals of the lower orders are to relinquish the pursuit of their private interests and business to serve the public, and mean to punish them for any omission in this important duty, they must begin with the higher classes of society. These must be forced to perform their duty, and no name, however illustrious, and no protection, however powerful, should shield from punishment those who neglect the performance of their duty to the public in these times. Unless these measures are strictly and invariably followed, it is vain to expect any serious or continued exertion in the country, and the regency ought to be aware, from the sentiments of his Majesty's Government, which I have communicated to them that the continuance of his Majesty's assistance depends not on the ability or the inclination, but on the actual effectual exertions of the people of Portugal in their own cause. I have thought it proper to trouble you so much at length upon this subject, in consequence of the light manner in which the difficulties which I had stated to exist were noticed by Monsieur de Forjas. I have to mention, however, that, since I wrote to you, although there exist several causes of complaint of different kinds, and that some examples must be made, we have received such assistance as has enabled me to continue till this time in our positions, and I hope to be able to continue as long as may be necessary. I concur entirely in the measure of appointing a special commission to attend the head-quarters of the Portuguese army, and I hope that it will be adopted without delay. I enclose a proclamation which I have issued, which I hope will have some effect. It describes nearly the crimes, or rather the omissions, of which the people may be guilty in respect to the transport of the army; these may be as follow:—1st, refusing to supply carts, boats, or beasts of burthen, when required; 2nd, refusing to remove their articles or animals out of the reach of the enemy; 3rd, disobedience of the orders of the magistrates to proceed to and remain at any station with carriages, boats, etc.; 4th, desertion from the service, either with or without carriages, etc.; 5th, embezzlement of provisions or stores which they may be employed to transport. The crimes or omissions of the inferior magistrates may be classed as follows:—1st, disobedience of the orders of their superiors; 2nd, inactivity in the execution of them; 3rd, receiving bribes, to excuse certain persons from the execution of requisitions upon them."

SECTION II.

LORD WELLINGTON to M. FORJAS.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,

Gouvea, September 6, 1810.

I have received your letter of the 1st of this month, informing me that you had placed before the government of this kingdom my despatch of the 27th of August, announcing the melancholy and unexpected news of the loss of Almeida, and that the government had learned with sorrow that an accident unforeseen had prevented my moving to succour the place, hoping, at the same time, that the depression of the people, caused by such an event, will soon vanish, by the quick and great successes which they expect with certainty from the efforts of the army. I have already made known to the government of the kingdom that the fall of Almeida was unexpected by me, and that I deplored its loss and that of my hopes, considering it likely to depress and afflict the people of this kingdom. It was by no means my intention, however, in that letter, to state whether it had or had not been my intention to have succoured the place, and I now request the permission of the government of the kingdom to say that, much as I wish to remove the impression which this misfortune has justly made on the public, I do not propose to alter the system and plan of operations which have been determined, after the most serious deliberation, as best adequate to further the general cause of the allies, and, consequently, Portugal. I request the government to believe that I am not insensible to the value of their confidence as well as that of the public; as, also, that I am highly interested in removing the anxiety of the public upon the late misfortune; but I should forget my duty to my sovereign, to the prince regent, and to the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system and plan of operations which I have adopted, after mature consideration, and which daily experience shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end. (Signed) WELLINGTON.

SECTION III.

Gouvea, September 7, 1810.

— In order to put an end at once to these miserable intrigues, I beg that you will inform the government that *I will not stay* in the country, and that I will advise the king's government to withdraw the assistance which his majesty affords them, if they interfere in any manner with the appointment of Marshal Beresford's staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the army, or with any of the points which, with the original arrangements with Marshal Beresford, were referred exclusively to his management. I propose, also, to report to his majesty's government, and refer to their consideration, what steps ought to be taken, if the Portuguese government refuse or delay to adopt the civil and political arrangements recommended by me, and corresponding with the military operations which I am carrying on. The preparatory measures for the destruction of, or rather rendering useless the mills, were suggested by me long ago, and Marshal Beresford did not write to government upon them till I had reminded him a second time of my wishes on the subject. I now beg leave to recommend that these preparatory measures may be adopted not only in the country between the Tagus and the Mondego, laying north of Torres Vedras, as originally proposed, but that they shall be forthwith adopted in all parts of Portugal, and that the magistrates and others may be directed to render useless the mills, upon receiving orders to do so from the military officers. I have already adopted this measure with success in this part of the country, and it must be adopted in others in which it is probable that the enemy may endeavour to penetrate; and it must be obvious to any person who will reflect upon the subject, that it is only consistent with all the other measures which, for the last twelve months, I have recommended to government to impede and make difficult, and if possible prevent, the advance and establishment of the enemy's force in the country. But it appears that the government have lately discovered that we are all wrong; they have become impatient for the defeat of the enemy, and, in imitation of the Central Junta, call out for a battle and early success. If I had had the power I would have prevented the Spanish armies from attending to this call; and

if I had, the cause would now have been safe; and, having the power now in my hands, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless suggestions of the Portuguese government. I acknowledge that I am much hurt at this change of conduct in the government; and, as I must attribute it to the persons recently introduced into the government, it affords additional reason with me for disapproving of their nomination, and I shall write upon the subject to the prince regent, if I should hear any more of this conduct. I leave you to communicate the whole or any part of this letter that you may think proper to the regency. (Signed) WELLINGTON.

SECTION IV.

Rio Mayor, October 6, 1810.

— You will do me the favour to inform the regency, and above all the Principal Souza, that his majesty and the prince regent have entrusted me with the command of their armies, and likewise with the conduct of the military operations. I will not suffer them or any body else, to interfere with them; that I know best where to station my troops, and where to make a stand against the enemy, and I shall not alter a system formed upon mature consideration, upon any suggestion of theirs. I am responsible for what I do, and they are not; and I recommend to them to look to the measures for which they are responsible, which I long ago recommended to them, viz., to provide for the tranquillity of Lisbon, and for the food of the army and of the people, while the troops will be engaged with the enemy. As for Principal Souza, I beg you to tell him, from me, that I have had no satisfaction in transacting the business of this country since he has been a member of the government; that, being embarked in a course of military operations, of which I hope to see the successful termination, I shall continue to carry them on to the end, but that no power on earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment after I shall have obtained his majesty's leave to resign my charge, if Principal Souza is to remain either a member of the government or to continue at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I will: and, if I should be obliged to go, I shall take care that the world, or Portugal at least, and the prince regent, shall be made acquainted with my reasons. From the letter of the 3rd, which I have received from Monsieur Forjas, I had hoped that the government was satisfied with what I had done, and intended to do, and that, instead of endeavouring to render all farther defence fruitless, by disturbing the minds of the populace at Lisbon, they would have done their duty by adopting measures to secure the tranquillity of the town; but I suppose that, like other weak individuals, they add duplicity to their weakness, and that their expressions of approbation, and even gratitude, were intended to convey censure.

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—All I ask from the Portuguese regency is tranquillity in the town of Lisbon, and provisions for their own troops while they will be employed in this part of the country. I have but little doubt of success; but, as I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any one is not certain, even with the best arrangements, I am anxious that the government should adopt preparatory arrangements, and take out of the enemy's way those persons and their families who would suffer if they were to fall into their hands.

SECTION V.

Pero Negro, October, 28, 1810.

The cattle, and other articles of supply, which the government have been informed have been removed from the island of Lizirias, are still on the island, and most probably the secretary of state, Don M. Forjas, who was at Alhandra yesterday, will have seen them. I shall be glad to hear whether the government propose to take any and what steps to punish the magistrates who have disobeyed their orders and have deceived them by false reports. The officers and soldiers of the militia, absent from their corps, are liable to penalties and punishments, some of a civil, others of a military nature: first, they are liable to a forfeiture of all their personal property, upon information that they are absent from their corps without leave;

secondly, they are liable to be transferred to serve as soldiers in the regiments of the line, upon the same information; and, lastly, they are liable to the penalties of desertion inflicted by the military tribunals. The two first are penalties which depend upon the civil magistrate, and I should be very glad to have heard of one instance in which the magistrates of Lisbon, or in which the government had called upon the magistrates at Lisbon to carry into execution the law in either of these respects. I entreat them to call for the names of the officers and soldiers absent without leave from any one of the Lisbon regiments of militia, to disgrace any one or more of the principal officers, in a public manner, for their shameful desertion of their posts in the hour of danger, and to seize and dispose of the whole property of the militia soldiers absent without leave, and to send these men to serve with any of the regiments of the line. I entreat them to adopt these measures without favour or distinction of any individuals in respect to any one regiment, and to execute the laws *bonâ fide* upon the subject; and I shall be satisfied of their good intentions, and shall believe that they are sincerely desirous of saving the country; but, if we are to go on as we have hitherto, if Great Britain is to give large subsidies and to expend large sums in support of a cause in which those most interested sit by and take no part, and those at the head of the government, with laws and powers to force the people to exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed, are aware of the evil but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws in execution, I must believe their professions to be false, that they look to little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his allies can place no confidence. In respect to the military law, it may be depended upon that it will be carried into execution, and that the day will yet come on which those military persons who have deserted their duty in these critical times will be punished as they deserve. The governors of the kingdom forget the innumerable remonstrances which have been forwarded to them on the defects of the proceedings of courts martial, which, in times of active war, render them and their sentences entirely nugatory. As an additional instance of these defects, I mention that officers of the Olivera regiment of militia, who behaved ill in the action with the enemy at Villa Nova de Fosboa, in the beginning of August last, and a court martial was immediately assembled for this trial, are still, in the end of October, under trial, and the trial will, probably, not be concluded till Christmas. In like manner, the military trial of those deserters of the militia, after assembling officers and soldiers at great inconvenience, for the purpose, cannot possibly be concluded till the period will have gone by in which any benefit might be secured from the example of the punishment of any one or number of them. The defect in the administration of the military law has been repeatedly pointed out to the government, and a remedy for the evil has been proposed to them, and has been approved of by the prince regent. But they will not adopt it; and it would be much better if there was no law for the government of the army than that the existing laws should continue without being executed.——

WELLINGTON.

SECTION VI.

October 29, 1810.

—— In answer to Lord Wellesley's queries respecting the Portuguese regency, my opinion is that the regency ought to be appointed by the prince regent, but during his pleasure; they ought to have full power to act in every possible case, to make appointments to offices, to dismiss from office, to make and alter laws, in short, every power which the prince himself could possess if he were on the spot. They ought to report, in detail, their proceedings on every subject, and their reasons for the adoption of every measure. The prince ought to decline to receive any application from any of his officers or subjects in Portugal not transmitted through the regular channels of the government here, and ought to adopt no measure respecting Portugal not recommended by the regency. The smaller the number of persons composing the regency the better; but my opinion is that it is not advisable to remove any of the persons now composing it excepting Principal Souza, with whom I neither can nor will have any official intercourse. The patriarch is, in my opinion, a necessary evil. He has

acquired a kind of popularity and confidence through the country which would increase if he was removed from office, and he is the kind of man to do much mischief if he was not employed. If we should succeed in removing the principal (which *must* be done), I think the patriarch will take warning, and will behave better in future. In respect to military operations, there can be no interference on the part of the regency or anybody else. If there is I can no longer be responsible. If our own government choose to interfere themselves, or that the prince regent should interfere, they have only to give me their orders in detail, and I will carry them strictly into execution, to the best of my abilities; and I will be responsible for nothing but the execution; but, if I am to be responsible, I must have full discretion and no interference on the part of the regency or anybody else. I should like to see Principal Souza's detailed instructions for his "*embuscados*" on the left bank of the Tagus. If Principal Souza does not go to England, or somewhere out of Portugal, the country will be lost. The time we lose in discussing matters which ought to be executed immediately, and in the wrong direction given to the deliberations of the government, is inconceivable. The gentlemen destined for the Alemtejo ought to have been in the province on the evening of the 24th, but instead of that, three valuable days of fine weather will have been lost because the government do not choose to take part in our arrangements, which, however undeniably beneficial, will not be much liked by those whom it will affect; although it is certain that, sooner or later, these persons must and will be ruined, by leaving behind them all their valuable property, and, as in the case of this part of the country, everything which can enable the enemy to remain in the country. In answer to Mr. de Forjas' note of the 22nd, enclosed in yours (without date), I have to say that I know of no carriages employed by the British army excepting by the commissary-general, and none are detained that I know of. I wish that the Portuguese government, or its officers, would state the names of those who have detained carriages, contrary to my repeated orders: or the regiment, or where they are stationed; but this they will never do. All that we do with the carriages is to send back sick in them, when there are any. It will not answer to make an engagement that the wheel-carriages from Lisbon shall not come farther than Bucellas, Montachique, etc.; many articles required by the army cannot be carried by mules, and the carriages must come on with them here. In many cases the Portuguese troops in particular are ill provided with mules, therefore this must be left to the commissary-general of the army, under a recommendation to him, if possible, not to send the Lisbon wheel-carriages beyond the places above mentioned. I wish, in every case, that a regulation made should be observed, and the makers of regulations should take care always to frame them as that they can be observed, which is the reason of my entering so particularly into this point.

WELLINGTON.

SECTION VII.

Pero Negro, October 31, 1810.

— I am glad that the gentlemen feel my letters, and I hope that they will have the effect of inducing them to take some decided steps as well regarding the provisions in the Alemtejo as the desertion of the militia. The *ordenanza* artillery now begin to desert from the works, although they are fed by us with English rations and taken care of in the same manner as our own troops. Your note, No. , of 29th, is strictly true in all its parts; the French could not have stayed here a week if all the provisions had been removed, and the length of time they can now stay depends upon the quantity remaining of what they have found in places from which there existed means of removing everything, if the quantity had been ten times greater. They are stopped effectually; in front all the roads are occupied, and they can get nothing from their rear; but all the military arrangements which have been made are useless if they can find subsistence on the ground which they occupy. For what I know to the contrary, they may be able to maintain their position till the whole French army is brought to their assistance. It is heart-breaking to contemplate the chance of failure from such obstinacy and folly!

WELLINGTON.

SECTION VIII.

Pero Negro, November 1, 1810.

I have no doubt that the government can produce volumes of papers to prove that they gave orders upon the several subjects to which the enclosures relate, but it would be very desirable if they would state whether any magistrate or other person has been punished for not obeying those orders. The fact is that the government, after the appointment of Principal Souza to be a member of the regency, conceived that the war could be maintained upon the frontier, contrary to the opinion of myself and of every military officer in the country, and, instead of giving positive orders preparatory to the event which was most likely to occur, viz., that the allied army would retire, they spent much valuable time in discussing, with me, the expediency of a measure which was quite impracticable, and omitted to give the orders which were necessary for the evacuation of the country between the Tagus and the Mondego by the inhabitants. Then, when convinced that the army would retire, they first imposed that duty on me, although they must have known that I was ignorant of the names, the nature of the offices, the places of abode of the different magistrates who were to superintend the execution of the measure, and, moreover, I have but one gentleman in my family to give me any assistance in writing the Portuguese language, and they afterwards issued the orders themselves, still making them referable to me, without my knowledge or consent, and still knowing that I had no means whatever of communicating with the country, and they issued them at the very period when the enemy was advancing from Almeida. If I had not been able to stop the enemy at Busaco he must have been in his present situation long before the order could have reached those to whom it was addressed. All this conduct was to be attributed to the same cause, a desire to avoid to adopt a measure which, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, was likely to disturb the habits of indolence and ease of the inhabitants, and to throw the odium of the measure upon me and upon the British government. I avowed, in my proclamation, that I was the author of that measure, and the government might have sheltered themselves under that authority, but the principle of the government has lately been to seek for popularity, and they will not aid in any measure, however beneficial to the real interests of the country, which may be unpopular with the mob at Lisbon. I cannot agree in the justice of the expression of the astonishment by the secretary of state that the measures should have been executed in this part of the country at all. The same measure was carried into complete execution in Upper Beira; notwithstanding that the army was in that province, and the means of transport were required for its service, not a soul remained, and, excepting at Coimbra, to which town my personal authority and influence did not reach, not an article of any description was left behind; and all the mills upon the Coa and Mondego, and their dependent streams, were rendered useless. But there were no discussions there upon the propriety of maintaining the war upon the frontier. The orders were given, and they were obeyed in time, and the enemy suffered accordingly. In this part of the country, notwithstanding the advantage of having a place of security to retire to, notwithstanding the advantage of water-carriage, notwithstanding that the Tagus was fordable in many places at the period when the inhabitants should have passed their property to the left of the river, and fortunately filled at the moment the enemy approached its banks: the inhabitants have fled from their habitations as they would have done under any circumstances, without waiting orders from me or from the government; but they have left behind them everything which could be useful to the enemy, and could subvert their army, and all the mills untouched; accordingly, the enemy still remain in our front, notwithstanding that their communication is cut off with Spain and with every other military body; and if the provisions which they have found will last, of which I can have no knowledge, they may remain till they will be joined by the whole French army in Spain. I believe that in Santarem and Villa Franca alone, both towns upon the Tagus, and both having the advantage of water-carriage, the enemy found subsistence for their army for a considerable length of time. Thus will appear the difference of a measure adopted in time, and the delay of it till the last moment; and I only wish that the country and the allies may not experience the evil consequences of the ill-fated propensity of the

existing Portuguese regency to seek popularity. In the same manner the other measure since recommended, viz., the removal of the property of the inhabitants of Alemtejo to places of security, has been delayed by every means in the power of the government, and has been adopted at last against their inclination: as usual, they commenced a discussion with me upon the expediency of preventing the enemy from crossing the Tagus, they then sent their civil officer to me to receive instructions, and afterwards they conveyed to him an instruction of the ———, to which I proposed to draw the attention of his royal highness the prince regent and of his majesty's government. His royal highness and his majesty's government will then see in what manner the existing regency are disposed to co-operate with me. The additional order of the 30th of October, marked 5 in the enclosures from Mr. Forjas, show the sense which the regency themselves entertained of the insufficiency of their original instructions to the Disembargador Jacinto Paes de Matos. I may have mistaken the system of defence to be adopted for this country, and Principal Souza and other members of the regency may be better judges of the capacity of the troops and of the operations to be carried on than I am. In this case they should desire his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of the army. But they cannot doubt my zeal for the cause in which we are engaged, and they know that not a moment of my time, nor a faculty of my mind, that is not devoted to promote it; and the records of this government will show what I have done for them and their country. If, therefore, they do not manifest their dissatisfaction and want of confidence in the measures which I adopt by desiring that I should be removed, they are bound, as honest men and faithful servants to their prince, to co-operate with me by all means in their power, and thus should neither thwart them by opposition, nor render them nugatory by useless delays and discussions. Till lately I have had the satisfaction of receiving the support and co-operation of the government; and I regret that his royal highness the prince regent should have been induced to make a change which has operated so materially to the detriment of his people and of the allies. In respect to the operations on the left of the Tagus, I was always of opinion that the ordenança would be able to prevent the enemy from sending over any of their plundering parties; and I was unwilling to adopt any measure of greater solidity, from my knowledge, that, as soon as circumstances should render it expedient, on any account, to withdraw the troops, which I should have sent to the left of the Tagus, the ordenança would disperse. The truth is, that, notwithstanding the opinion of some of the government, every Portuguese, into whose hands a firelock is placed, does not become a soldier capable of meeting the enemy. Experience, which the members of the government have not had, has taught me this truth, and in what manner to make use of the different description of troops in this country; and it would be very desirable if the government would leave, exclusively, to Marshal Beresford and me, the adoption of all military arrangements. The conduct of the governor of Setuval is, undoubtedly, the cause of the inconvenience now felt on the left of the Tagus. He brought forward his garrison to the river against orders, and did not reflect, and possibly was not aware as I am, that if they had been attacked in that situation, as they probably would have been, they would have dispersed; and thus Setuval, as well as the regiment, which was to have been its garrison, would have been lost. It was necessary, therefore, at all events, to prevent that misfortune, and to order the troops to retire to Setuval, and the ordenança as usual dispersed, and the government will lose their five hundred stand of new arms, and, if the enemy can cross the Tagus in time, their 3-pounds. These are the consequences of persons interfering in military operations who have no knowledge of them, or of the nature of the troops which are to carry them on. I am now under the necessity, much to the inconvenience of the army, of sending a detachment to the left of the Tagus.

SECTION IX.

December 5, 1810.

All my proceedings have been founded on the following principles: First, That by my appointment of marshal-general of the Portuguese army with the same powers as those vested in the late Duc de la Foëns, I hold the command of that army independent of the local

government of Portugal. Secondly, That by the arrangements made by the governors of the kingdom with the king's government, when Sir William Beresford was asked for by the former to command the Portuguese army, it was settled that the commander-in-chief of the British army should direct the general operations of the combined force. Thirdly, That, supposing that my appointment of marshal-general did not give me the independent control over the operations of the Portuguese army, or that as commander-in-chief of the British army, I did not possess the power of directing the operation of the whole under the arrangement above referred to ; it follows that either the operations of the two armies must have been separated, or the Portuguese government must have had the power of directing the operations of the British army. Fourthly, It never was intended that both armies should be exposed to the certain loss which would have been the consequence of a disjointed operation ; and, undoubtedly, his majesty's government never intended to give over the British army to the government of the kingdom, to make ducks and drakes of. The government of the kingdom must, in their reply to my letter, either deny the truth of these principles, or they must prove that my charge against them is without foundation, and that they did not delay and omit to adopt various measures, recommended by me and Marshal Beresford, calculated to assist and correspond with the operations of the armies, upon the proposition and under the influence of Principal Souza, under the pretence of discussing with me the propriety of my military arrangements.

WELLINGTON.

SECTION X.

"Cartaxo, January 18, 1811.

It is necessary that I should draw your attention, and that of the Portuguese government, upon the earliest occasion, to the sentiments which have dropped from the patriarch, in recent discussions at the meeting of the regency. It appears that his eminence has expatiated on the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, 'which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' It must be recollected that these discussions are not those of a popular assembly—they can scarcely be deemed those of a ministerial council—but they are those of persons whom his royal highness the prince regent has called to govern his kingdom in the existing crisis of affairs. I have always been in the habit of considering his eminence the patriarch as one of those in Portugal who are of opinion that all sacrifices are to be made, provided the kingdom could preserve its independence ; and, I think it most important that the British government, and the government of the prince regent, and the world, should be undeceived, if we have been mistaken hitherto. His eminence objects to the adoption of measures which have for their immediate object to procure funds for the maintenance of his royal highness's armies, because a war may exist in the heart of the kingdom, but I am apprehensive the patriarch forgets the manner in which the common enemy first entered this kingdom, in the year 1807, that in which they were expelled from it, having had complete possession of it in 1808, and that they were again in possession of the city of Oporto, and of the two most valuable provinces of the kingdom in 1809, and the mode in which they were expelled from those provinces. He forgets that it was stated to him in the month of February, 1810, in the presence of the Marquis of Olhao, of Don M. Forjas, and of Don Joa Antonio Salter de Mendoza, and Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, that it was probable the enemy would invade this kingdom with such an army as that it would be necessary to concentrate all our forces to oppose him with any chance of success, and that this concentration could be made with safety in the neighbourhood of the capital only, and that the general plan of the campaign was communicated to him which went to bring the enemy into the heart of the kingdom ; and that he expressed before all these persons his high approbation of it. If he recollected these circumstances he would observe that nothing had occurred in this campaign that had not been foreseen and provided for by measures of which he had expressed his approbation, of whose consequences he now disapproves. The Portuguese nation are involved in a war not of aggression, or even defence on their parts, not of alliance, not in consequence of their adherence to any political system, for they abandoned all alliances and all

political systems in order to propitiate the enemy. The inhabitants of Portugal made war purely and simply to get rid of the yoke of the tyrant whose government was established in Portugal, and to save their lives and properties; they chose this lot for themselves, principally at the instigation of his eminence the patriarch, and they called upon his majesty, the ancient ally of Portugal, whose alliance had been relinquished at the requisition of the common enemy, to aid them in the glorious effort which they wished to make, and to restore the independence of their country, and to secure the lives and properties of its inhabitants. I will not state the manner in which his majesty has answered the call, or enumerate the services rendered to this nation by his army; whatever may be the result of the contest, nothing can make me believe that the Portuguese nation will ever forget them; but when a nation has adopted the line of resistance to the tyrant under the circumstances under which it was unanimously adopted by the Portuguese nation in 1808, and has been persevered in, it cannot be believed that they intended to suffer none of the miseries of war, or that their government act inconsistently with their sentiments when they expatiate on 'the inutility of laying fresh burthens on the people, which were evidently for no other purpose than to nourish a war in the heart of the kingdom.' The patriarch in particular forgets his old principles, his own actions which have principally involved his country in the contest when he talks of discontinuing it, because, it has again, for the third time, been brought into 'the heart of the kingdom.' Although the patriarch, particularly, and the majority of the existing government approved of the plan which I explained to them in February, 1810, according to which it was probable that this kingdom would be made the seat of war which has since occurred, I admit that his eminence, or any of those members, may fairly disapprove of the campaign and of the continuance of the enemy in Portugal. I have pointed out to the Portuguese government, in more than one despatch, the difficulties and risks which attended any attack upon the enemy's position in this country, and the probable success not only to ourselves but to our allies of our perseverance in the plan which I had adopted, and had hitherto followed so far successfully, so that the allies have literally sustained no loss of any description, and this army is, at this moment, more complete than it was at the opening of the campaign in April last. The inhabitants of one part of the country alone have suffered and are continuing to suffer. But without entering into discussions which I wish to avoid on this occasion, I repeat, that if my counsels had been followed these sufferings would have been at least alleviated, and I observe that is the first time I have heard that the sufferings of a part, and but a small part of any nation have been deemed a reason for refusing to adopt a measure which had for its object the deliverance of the whole. The patriarch may, however, disapprove of the system I have followed, and I conceive that he is fully justified in desiring his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of these armies. This would be a measure consistent with his former conduct in this contest, under the circumstances of my having unfortunately fallen in his opinion, but this measure is entirely distinct from the refusal to concur in laying those burthens upon the people which are necessary to carry on and to secure the object of the war. It must be obvious to his eminence, and to every person acquainted with the real situation of the affairs of Portugal, unless a great effort is made to render the resources more adequate to the necessary expenditure all plans and systems of operation will be alike, for the Portuguese army will be able to carry on none. At this moment although all the corps are concentrated in the neighbourhood of their magazines, with means of transport, easy, by the Tagus, the Portuguese troops are frequently in want of provisions because there is no money to pay the expense of transport, and all the departments of the Portuguese army, including the hospitals, are equally destitute of funds to enable them to defray the necessary expenditure, and to perform their duty. The deficiencies and difficulties have existed ever since I have known the Portuguese army, and it is well known that it must have been disbanded more than once, if it had not been assisted by the provisions, stores, and funds, of the British army. It may likewise occur to his eminence that in proportion as the operations of the armies would be more extended, the expense would increase, and the necessity for providing adequate funds to support it would become more urgent, unless, indeed, the course of their operations should annihilate at one

blow both army and expenditure. The objection then to adopt measures to improve the resources of the government go to decide the question whether the war should be carried on or not in any manner. By desiring his majesty and the prince regent to remove me from the command of their armies, his eminence would endeavour to get rid of a person deemed incapable or unwilling to fulfil the duties of his situation. By objecting to improve the resources of the country he betrays an alteration of opinion respecting the contest, and a desire to forfeit its advantages, and to give up the independence of the country, and the security of the lives and properties of the Portuguese nation. In my opinion the patriarch is in such a situation in this country that he ought to be called upon, on the part of his majesty, to state distinctly what he meant by refusing to concur in the measures which were necessary to insure the funds to enable this country to carry on the war; at all events, I request that this letter may be communicated to him in the regency, and that a copy of it may be forwarded to his royal highness the prince regent, in order that his royal highness may see that I have given his eminence an opportunity of explaining his motives either by stating his personal objections to me, or the alteration of his opinions, his sentiments, and his wishes, in respect to the independence of his country.

WELLINGTON.

NO VI.—EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE BY THE DUKE OF DALMATIA TO THE PRINCE OF WAGRAM AND OF NEUFCHATEL.

SECTION I.

Seville, August 4th, 1810.

“Par une décision de l'Empereur du mois de Fevrier dernier S. M. détermine qu'à compter du 1er. Janvier toutes les dépenses d'administration générale du Genie et de l'artillerie seraient au compte du gouvènement Espagnol; aussitôt que j'en fus instruit je sollicitai S. M. C. d'assigner à cet effet une somme; mais je ne pus obtenir que 2,000,000, de réaux (533,000 f.) et encore la Roi entendait il que les paiements ne remontassent qu'au mois de Fevrier; cette somme était de beaucoup insuffisante. Je n'ai cessé d'en faire la représentation, ainsi que Monsr. l'Intendant Général; nos demandes n'ont pas été accueillies, et pour couvrir autant que possible la différence j'ai du avoir recours aux recettes extraordinaires faites sans la participation des ministres Espagnols. J'espère que ce moyen réussira, déjà même il a produit quelques sommes. L'état que je mets ci joint fait connaître les recouvrements qui ont été opérés sur les fonds de 533,000 f. du crédit mensuel à l'époque du 1er. Août lesquels forment la somme de 3,731,000 f. mais indépendamment il y a eu des recettes extraordinaires pour au moins 500,000 f. qui ont reçu la même destination (les dépenses d'administration générale) antérieurement à cette époque. J'avais fait mettre à la disposition de Monsr. l'Intendant Général des Valeurs pour plus d'un million qui devait servir à payer une partie de l'armée. Mr. l'Intendant Général justifie de l'emploi de toutes ces sommes dans ses comptes généraux. Les ministres de S. M. C. n'admettent pas les comptes que je presente; d'abord ils ne veulent pas allouer la somme de 500,000 f. qui a été reportée à l'article des dépenses d'administration générale, s'appuyant sur ce sujet sur la décision du roi qui ne fait remonter ces dépenses que jusqu'au mois de Fevrier, quoique l'empereur ait expressement entendu que le mois de Janvier devait aussi y être compris, ils ne veulent pas non plus reconnaître les recettes extraordinaires, où ils prétendent en précompter le produit sur le crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. il n'est pas dans mon pouvoir d'admettre leurs motifs, la décision de l'empereur est expresse et tant que je serai dans la situation délicate où je me trouve, mon devoir m'obligera de pourvoir aux besoins du service par tous les moyens praticables. Les recettes qui ont eu lieu en Andalousie ont servi à toutes les dépenses de l'artillerie, du genie, des état majors et de l'administration générale qui sont vraiment immenses, et quoiqu'on ait absolument rien reçu de France ni de Madrid, j'ai en même temps pu faire payer trois mois de solde à l'armée, c'est sans doute bien peu quand il est du 8 à 10 mois d'arriéré à la troupe et que l'insuffisance des moyens oblige à augmenter

encore cet arrière, mais ne recevant rien je crois qu'il m'était impossible de mieux faire. V. A. en sera elle même convaincue si elle veut s'arrêter un moment sur l'aperçu que je vais lui donner des charges que l'Andalusie supporte. On consomme tous les jours près de 100,000 rations de vivres et 20,000 rations de fourrage ; il y a 2000 malades aux hôpitaux. La forteresse de Jaen, le fort de Malaga, l'Alhambra de Grenade, au dessus duquel on a construit un grand camp retranché ; tous les châteaux sur les bords de la mer depuis le cap de Gata jusqu'à Fuengirola, le château d'Alcala la Réal, la place de Ronda, les anciens châteaux d'Olvera et de Moron, le château de Belalcazar, le château de Castillo de Los Guardias et plusieurs autres portes sur les frontières de l'Estremadura qu'on a dû aussi occuper. On a pourvu aux dépenses que les travaux devant Cadix et la construction d'une flottille occasionnent. On a établi à Grenade une poudrière et une fabrique d'armes, laquelle jusqu'à présent a peu donné, mais qui par la suite sera très utile. On a rétabli et mis dans une grande activité la fonderie et l'arsenal de Seville où journellement 1500 ouvriers sont employés. Nous manquions de poudre et de projectiles de feu et d'affûts. J'ai fait rétablir deux moulins à poudre à Seville et fait exploiter toutes les nitrières de l'Andalusie, à présent on compte aussi à Seville des projectiles de tous les calibres, jusqu'aux bombs de 12 pouces, tout le vieux fer a été ramassé, on a construit les affûts nécessaires pour l'armement des batteries devant Cadix. On a fait des réquisitions en souliers et effets d'habillement dont la troupe a profité. J'ai fait lever dans le pays 2000 mules qui ont été données à l'artillerie, aux équipages militaires et au Génie. J'ai fait construire et organiser un équipage de 36 pièces de montagnes, dont 12 obusiers, de 12 qui sont portés à dos de mulets et vont être repartis dans tous les corps d'armée. La totalité de ces dépenses ainsi qu'une infinité d'autres dont je ne fais pas l'énumération sont au compte du gouvernement Espagnol, et le pays les supporte indépendamment du crédit mensuel de 533,000 f. et des recettes extraordinaires que je fais opérer lorsqu'il y a possibilité dont l'application a lieu en faveur de l'administration générale de l'armée, du Génie, de l'artillerie, des états majors, des frais de courses et des dépenses secrètes. Ces charges sont immenses et jamais le pays n'aurait pu les supporter si nous n'étions parvenus à mettre de l'ordre et la plus grande régularité dans les dépenses et consommations ; mais il serait difficile de les augmenter, peut-être même y aurait il du danger de chercher à le faire ; c'est au point que malgré que nous soyons à la récolte il faut déjà penser à faire venir du blé des autres provinces, le produit de l'Andalusie étant insuffisant pour la consommation de ses habitans et celle de l'armée. Cependant S. M. C. et ses ministres qui sont parfaitement instruits de cette situation ne veulent attirer à Madrid les revenus de l'Andalusie : je dis les revenus car leurs demandes dépassaient les recettes ; des ordres ont même été expédiés en conséquence aux commissaires Royaux des Préfectures et je me suis trouvé dans l'obligation de m'opposer ouvertement à l'effet de cette mesure dont l'exécution eut non seulement compromis tous les services de l'armée, mais occasionné peut être, des mouvemens séditieux ; d'ailleurs il y avait impossibilité de la remplir, à ce sujet j'ai l'honneur de mettre sous les yeux de V. A. extrait d'une lettre que j'eus l'honneur d'écrire au roi le 13 Juillet dernier et copie de celle que j'adressai à Monsieur le Marquis d'Almenara, ministre des finances, le 30 du même mois pour répondre à une des siennes, où il me peignait l'état désespérant des finances de S. M. C. Je supplie avec instance V. A. de vouloir bien rendre compte du contenu de ces lettres et du présent rapport à S. M. l'empereur.

“J'aurai voulu pour que S.M. fut mieux instruite de tout ce que s'est fait en Andalusie pouvoir entrer dans des détails plus étendus ; mais j'ai dû me borner à traiter des points principaux, les détails se trouvent dans ma correspondance, et dans les rapports de Monsieur l'intendant général sur l'administration. Cependant d'après ce que j'ai dit S.M. aura une idée exacte des opérations administratives et autres qui ont eu lieu, ainsi que de l'état de ses troupes et des embarras de sa situation : elle est telle aujourd'hui que je dois supplier avec la plus vive instance S.M. au nom même de son service de daigner la prendre en considération : j'ai des devoirs à remplir dont je sais toute l'étendue, je m'y livre sans réserve mais la responsabilité est trop forte pour que dans la position où je me trouve je puisse la soutenir ; en effet j'ai à combattre des prétentions et des intérêts qui sont évidemment en opposition avec ceux

de l'armée et par conséquent avec ceux de l'empereur ; je suis forcé par mes propres devoirs de m'opposer à l'exécution des divers ordres que le roi donne et faire souvent le contraire. J'ai aussi constamment à lutter contre l'amour propre des chefs militaires, que souvent peuvent différer d'opinion avec moi et naturellement prétendent faire prévaloir leurs idées. Toutes ces considérations me font regarder la tâche qui m'est imposée comme au dessus de mes forces et me portent à désirer que S.M. l'empereur daigne me faire connaître ses intentions ou pourvoir à mon remplacement et mettre à la tête de son armée dans le midi de l'Espagne, un chef plus capable que moi d'en diriger les opérations. Je me permettrai seulement de faire observer à ce sujet que le bien du service de l'empereur commande impérieusement que toutes les troupes qui sont dans le midi de l'Espagne depuis le Tage jusqu'aux deux mers suivant le même système d'opérations, et soient par conséquent commandés par un seul chef lequel doit être dans la pensée de l'empereur, et avoir ses instructions afin que le cas se présentant où il lui serait fait opposition d'une manière quelconque, il puisse se conduire en conséquence et parvenir au but qui lui sera indiqué ; tout autre système retardera la marche des affaires et occasionnera inévitablement des désagréments qu'on peut autrement éviter.

"J'ai l'honneur, etc.,

“(Signe)

LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.”

SECTION II.

Intercepted Letter from MARSHAL MORTIER to the EMPEROR, 13th July, 1810.

SIRE,

L'état de nullité où je suis depuis que Monsieur le Duc de Dalmatie, major-général, a pris l'initiative de tous les movemens meme le plus minutieux de seme corps rend ici ma presence tout a fait inutile, il ne me reste que le chagrin de voir d'excellentes troupes animées du meilleur esprit, disséminées dans toute l'Andalusie et perdant tous les jours de braves gens sans but ni resultat. Dans cet état des choses je prie V.M. de vouloir bien me permettra des me retirer à Burgos pour y attendre des ordres s'il ne juge pas à propos de m'accorder un congé pour retourner en France, congé que reclame ma santé à la suite d'une maladie grave dont je suis à peine convalescent.

J'ai l'honneur, etc., etc.

LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE TREVISE.

No. VII.

SECTION I.

Extracts from an intercepted despatch of MASSENA, dated July 10, 1810.

“Generals Romana and Carrera have gone to Lord Wellington's head-quarters, but the latter has not abandoned his lines.”

General P. BOYER to S. SWARTZ, July 8.

“We are covering the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, a place strong by its position and works, and which has been attacked with but little method. The English army is opposite ours, but, for good reasons, does not move ; we compose the corps of observation ; we are on the look-out for them.”

Extrait du Journal du C. DE B. PELET, premier aide-de-camp du MARÉCHAL PRINCE D'ESSLING.

“1810. 5 Août, à Ciudad Rodrigo.—Le capitaine du génie Boucherat arrive du 2e corps ; il a fait la campagne du Portugal, 1807. Beaucoup causé avec lui sur ce pays. Il a fait la route de Lisbonne à Almeyda avec M. Mairet, et me remet un itinéraire qu'il en a dressé. Il prétend ces routes très difficiles ; les rivières très encaissées, et inabordable sur les deux rives

du Mondego. Celui-ci a peu d'eau, doit être guéable presque partout; et une partie de ses rives bien difficiles, et en certains endroits il n'y a pas plus de 20 toises de largeur; un seul pont sans chemin (je crois à Fornos); mais la rivière n'est pas un obstacle aux communications des deux rives. La route d'Idanha, Castelbranco, etc. mauvaise, cependant non absolument impraticable à des pièces légères. Tage, très escarpé, rocailleux, profond jusqu'à Abrantès * * * * Au dessous de cette ville, ou plutôt au confluent du Zézère, le pays devient plat; le lit du Tage s'élargit; il n'y a plus que des collines même éloignées, et tout est très praticable. Les montagnes de Santarem sont des collines peu élevées, praticables, accessibles sur leur sommet, peu propres à être défendues ce qui est commune jusqu'à la mer pour celles de Montachique, qui sont des plateaux arrondis, accessibles à toute les armes; et on pourrait marcher ou manœuvrer dans toutes les directions. J'ai fait copier cet itinéraire."

"1810. 7 Octobre, à Leyria.—Causé avec le Général Loison des position de Montachique, ensuite avec le prince."

"1810. 9 Octobre, à Riomajor. On dit que l'ennemi se retranche à Alhandra et Bucella. Les généraux Reynier et Foy ont une carte de Riomajor à Lisbonne; espèce de croquis fait à la hâte, d'après de bons matériaux, mais où la figure est très mauvaise. Je le fais copier."

SECTION III.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL PRINCE D'ESSLING. *Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heure ½.*

J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser une lettre que je viens de recevoir du Général Reynier et copie d'une réponse.

Vous trouverez également ci-joint une lettre du Général Reynier adressée à votre excellence.

Je vous renouvelle, prince, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ELCHINGEN.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ELCHINGEN. *St. Antonio, le 26 Septembre, à 8 heure du matin.*

Depuis que le brouillard est dissipé, on aperçoit sur le Serra au delà de St. Antonio, cinq bataillons Portugais qui étoient à mi-côte et qui sont montés sur la crête à mesure que le brouillard s'est éclairci. Il y a de plus au col où passe le chemin, 6 pièces de canon et un détachement d'infanterie Anglaise, et à mi-côte une ligne de tirailleurs partie Anglais qui s'étend depuis le chemin qui monte du village de Carvailha à ma gauche, jusques vis-à-vis des postes du 6e corps, on voit des troupes sur les sommités qui font face au 6e corps; mais comme on ne les aperçoit que de revers, ou ne peut juger de leur nombre.

On ne peut deviner s'il y a des troupes en arrière, mais d'après l'organisation de la montagne dont les crêtes, sont étroites, et qui a des pentes rapides de chaque côté il ne doit pas avoir de terrain pour y placer de fortes réserves et manœuvres. Cela me paraît une arrière garde mais la position est forte, et il faut faire des dispositions pour l'attaquer avec succès. J'attends des nouvelles de ce que l'ennemi fait devant vous pour faire aucun mouvement; si vous jugez que c'est une arrière garde et que vous l'attaquiez, j'attaquerai aussi. Si vous jugez convenable d'attendre les ordres de Monsieur le Maréchal Prince d'Essling, j'attendrai aussi, comme je pense qu'il viendra vers votre corps, je vous prie de lui faire parvenir le rapport ci-joint avec les vôtres.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier, Monsieur le Maréchal, d'agréer l'hommage de mon respect.

(Signé) REYNIER.

A MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL REYNIER. *Sur la hauteur en arrière de Moira, le 26 Septembre, 1810, à 10 heures ½ du matin.*

Je reçois à l'instant, mon cher général, votre lettre de ce jour. Je pense qu'une grande partie de l'armée Anglo-Portugaise a passé la nuit sur la crête des montagnes qui domine toute la vallée de Moira. Un paysan dit qu'il existe de l'autre côté de ces montagnes une

plaine assez belle d'une demi-lieue d'étendue, et très garnie d'Oliviers. Depuis ce matin, l'ennemi marche par sa gauche, et semble diriger ses colonnes principales sur la route d'Oporto; cependant il tient encore assez de monde à la droite du parc qui couvre le couvent des minimes nommé Sako; et il montre une 12me de pièces d'artillerie. Le chemin de Coïmbre passe très près de ce courent.

J'ai envoyé ce matin un de mes aides-de-camp au Prince d'Essling pour lui dire que nous sommes en présence, et qu'il serait nécessaire qu'il arrivât pour prendre un parti. Si j'avais le commandement, j'attaquerais sans hésiter un seul instant; mais je crois, mon cher général, que vous ne pouvez rien compromettre en vous échelonnant sur la droite de l'ennemi; et en poussant ses avant-postes, car c'est véritablement par ce point qu'il faudrait le forcer à faire sa retraite.

Je vous renouvelle, etc.

(Signé)

LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ELCHINGEN.

SECTION 4.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL PRINCE D'ESSLING, Commandant-en-Chef, l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 4 Decembre, 1810.

Monsieur le Prince d'Essling, le Général Foy que vous avez expédié est arrivé à Paris le 22 Novembre; il a fait connaître à sa majesté et dans le plus grand détail ce qui s'est passé et votre situation.

Dès le 4 Novembre le général Gardanne était en avant d'Almeida avec un corps de 6,000 hommes. Le Compte d'Erlon avec les divisions Claparède, Conroux, et la division Fournier a dû se trouver à Guarda vers le 20 Novembre.

L'Empereur, prince, a vu par les journaux Anglais, que vous aviez établi des ponts sur le Tage et que sous en avez un sur le Zézère, défendu sur les deux rives par de fortes têtes de pont. Sa majesté pense que vous devez vous retrancher dans la position, que vous occupez devant l'ennemi; qu'Abrantès se trouvant à 800 toises du Tage, vous l'aurez isolé de son pont et bloqué pour en faire le siège. L'Empereur vous recommande d'établir deux ponts sur le Zézère, de défendre ces ponts par des ouvrages considérables, comme ceux de Spitz devant Vienne. Votre ligne d'opérations et de communications devant être établie par la route de Garda, partant du Zézère, passant par Cardigos, suivant la crête des montagnes par Campinha et Belmonte, vous aurez toujours la route de Castelbranco et Salvatera pour faire des vivres.

Je viens de donner de nouveau l'ordre déjà réitéré plusieurs fois au Duc de Dalmatie, d'envoyer le 5me corps sur le Tage entre Montalveo et Villafior, pour faire sa jonction avec vous. L'Empereur croit qu'il serait nécessaire de semparer d'Alcantara, de fortifier et de consolider tous les ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage, d'assurer toutes vos communications en saisissant les points favorables que peuvent offrir les localités pour fortifier de petites positions; des châteaux ou maisons qui, occupées par peu de troupes, soient l'abri des incursions des milices.

Vous sentirez, Monsieur le Prince d'Essling, l'avantage de régulariser ainsi la guerre, ce qui vous mettra à même de profiter de la réunion de tous les corps qui vont vous renforcer, pour marcher sur Lord Wellington et attaquer la gauche de sa position, soit pour l'obliger à se rembarquer en marchant sur la rive gauche du Tage, ou enfin, si tous ces moyens ne réussissaient pas, vous serez en mesure de rester en position pendant les mois de Décembre et de Janvier, en vous occupant d'organiser vos vivres et de bien établir vos communications avec Madrid et Almeyda.

L'armée du centre qui est à Madrid, ayant des détachements sur Placentia, vos communications avec cette capitale ne sont pas difficiles.

Deux millions 500 mille francs destinés à la solde de votre armée sont déjà à Valladolid; deux autre millions partent en ce moment de Bayonne. Ainsi votre armée sera dans une bonne situation.

Votre position deviendra très embarrassante pour les Anglais, qui, indépendamment d'une consommation énorme d'hommes et d'argent, se trouveront engagés dans une guerre de système, et ayant toujours une immensité de bâtimens à la mer pour leur rembarquement. Il faut donc, Prince, travailler sans cesse à vous fortifier vis-à-vis de la position des ennemis, et pouvoir garder la vôtre avec moins de monde; ce qui rendra une partie de votre armée mobile et vous mettra à même de faire des incursions dans le pays.

Vous trouverez ci-joint des moniteurs qui donnent des nouvelles de Portugal, parvenues par la voie l'Angleterre, datées du 12 Novembre.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,

(Signe)

ALEXANDRE.

SECTION V.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL PRINCE D'ESSLING, *Commandant-en-Chef, l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 22 Décembre, 1810.*

Je vous expédie, Prince, le Général Foy que l'Empereur a nommé général de division; je vous envoie les moniteurs; vous y verrez que nous apprenons par les nouvelles d'Angleterre qu'au 1^{er} Décembre, vous fortifiez dans votre position de Santarem.

L'Empereur met la plus grande importance à ce que vous teniez constamment en échec les Anglais, à ce que vous ayez des ponts sur le Zézère et sur le Tage; la saison va devenir bonne pour les opérations militaires, et vous aurez le moyen de harceler les Anglais et de leur faire éprouver journellement des pertes. Par les nouvelles des journaux Anglais, il paraît qu'il y a beaucoup de malades dans leur armée, ils ne comptent que — 27 à 23 mille hommes sous les armes et un effectif de 31 milles, y compris la cavalerie et l'artillerie. La situation de l'armée Anglaise en Portugal tient Londres dans une angoisse continuelle, et l'Empereur regarde comme un grand avantage de tenir les Anglais en échec, de les attirer et de leur faire perdre du monde dans des affaires d'avant-gardes, jusqu'à ce que vous soyez à même de les engager dans une affaire générale. Je réitère encore au Maréchal Duc de Trévise l'ordre de marcher sur le Tage avec le 5^{me} corps.

Le Comte d'Erlon, qui réunit son corps à Ciudad Rodrigo, va profiter de ce moment où les pluies cessent pour reprendre l'offensive et battre tous ces corps de mauvaises troupes que se trouvent sur vos communications et sur vos flancs.

Vos ponts étant bien assurés sur le Zézère, la ligne de vos opérations la plus naturelle paraît devoir être par la rive gauche de cette rivière.

Le Général Foy, à qui l'Empereur a parlé longtems vous donnera plus de détails.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,

(Signe)

ALEXANDRE.

SECTION VI.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL D'ESSLING, *Commandant-en-Chef, l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 16 Janvier, 1811.*

Je vous prévien Prince, que par décret impérial, en date du 15 de ce mois, l'Empereur a formé une armée du Nord de l'Espagne, dont le commandement est confié à Monsieur le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie qui va établir son quartier général à Burgos.

L'arrondissement de l'armée du Nord de l'Espagne est composé :—

1. De la Navarre formant le 3^e gouvernement de l'Espagne.
2. Des trois provinces de la Biscaye et de la province de Santander, formant le 4^e gouvernement.
3. De la province des Asturies.
4. Des provinces de Burgos, Aranda, et Soria, formant le 5^e gouvernement.
5. Des provinces de Palencia, Valladolid, Leon, Benevente, Toro, et Zamore, formant le 6^e gouvernement.

6. De la province de Salamanque.

Ainsi cet arrondissement comprend tout le pays occupé par les troupes Françaises entre la mer, la France, le Portugal, et les limites de l'arrondissement des armées du centre et de l'Aragon.

Cette disposition en centralisant le pouvoir, va donner de l'ensemble et une nouvelle impulsion d'activité aux opérations dans toutes les provinces du Nord de l'Espagne ; et Monsieur le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie mettra un soin particulier à maintenir les communications entre Valladolid, Salamanque, et Almeida.

Je vous engage, Prince, à correspondre avec Monsieur le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie toutes les fois que vous le jugerez utile au service.

D'après les ordres de l'Empereur je prévins Monsieur le Duc d'Istrie que dans des circonstances imprévues, il doit appuyer l'armée de Portugal et lui porter du secours ; je le prévins aussi que le 9^{me} corps d'armée serait sous ses ordres dans le cas où ce corps rentrerait en Espagne.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,

(Signe)

ALEXANDRE.

SECTION VII.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE, *Paris, le 24 Janvier, 1811.*

Vous verrez par le moniteur d'hier, Monsieur le Duc de Dalmatie, que les armées de Portugal étaient à la fin de l'année dernière dans la même position. L'Empereur me charge de vous renouveler l'ordre de vous porter au secours du Prince d'Essling, qui est toujours à Santarem ; il a plusieurs ponts sur le Zézère, et il attend que les eaux soient diminuées pour en jeter un sur le Tage. Il paraît certain que le 9^{me} corps a opéré sa jonction avec lui par le Nord, c'est-à-dire, par Almeida.

L'Empereur espère que le Prince d'Essling aura jeté un pont sur le Tage ; ce que lui donnera des vivres.

Les corps insurgés de Valence et de Murcie vont se trouver occupés par le corps du Général Suchet, aussitôt que Tarragone sera tombé entre nos mains, comme l'a fait la place de Tortose ; alors Sa Majesté pense que le 5^{me} corps et une partie du 4^{me} pourront se porter au secours du Prince d'Essling.

Le Major-Général,

(Signe)

ALEXANDRE.

SECTION VIII.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL PRINCE D'ESSLING, *Paris, le 25 Janvier, 1811.*

Je vous prévins, Prince, que Monsieur le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie s'est mis en marche dans les premiers jours de Janvier avec le 9^{me} corps d'armée, un corps de cavalerie, et un équipage de siège pour se porter sur Badajoz et faire le siège de cette place. Ces troupes ont dû arriver le 10 de ce mois devant Badajoz ; je mande au Duc de Dalmatie qu'après la prise de cette place il doit se porter sans perdre de temps sur le Tage avec son équipage de siège pour vous donner les moyens d'assiéger et de prendre Abrantès.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel,
Major-Général,

(Signe)

ALEXANDRE.

SECTION IX.

AU PRINCE DE WAGRAM ET DE NEUCHÂTEL, *Major-Général, Paris, le 6 Février, 1811.*

Mon cousin, je pense que vous devez envoyer le moniteur d'aujourd'hui au Duc de Dalmatie, au Duc de Trévise, au Général Belliard, au Duc d'Istrie, aux commandans de Ciudad Rodrigo et d'Almeida, aux Généraux Thiébaud, et aux Généraux Dorsenne, Cafarelli, et Reille. Ecrivez au Duc d'Istrie en lui envoyant le moniteur, pour lui annoncer qu'il y trouvera les dernières

nouvelles du Portugal, qui paraissent être du 13; que tout paraît prendre une couleur avantageuse; que si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, le Duc de Dalmatie a pu se porter sur le Tage et faciliter l'établissement du pont au Prince d'Essling; qu'il devient donc très important de faire toutes les dispositions que j'ai ordonnées afin que le Général Drouet avec ses deux divisions puisse être tout entier à la disposition du Prince d'Essling. Ecrivez en même temps au Duc de Dalmatie pour lui faire connaître la situation du Duc d'Istrie, et lui réitérer l'ordre de favoriser le Prince d'Essling pour son passage du Tage; que j'espère que Badajoz aura été pris dans le courant de Janvier; et que vers le 20 Janvier sa jonction aura eu lieu sur le Tage, avec le Prince d'Essling; qu'il peut, si cela est nécessaire, retirer des troupes du 4me corps; qu'enfin tout est sur le Tage. Sur ce je prie Dieu, mon cousin, qu'il vous ait dans sa sainte et digne garde.

(Signe)

NAPOLEON.

P.S. — Je vous renvoie votre lettre au Duc d'Istria, faites le partir

SECTION X.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL PRINCE D'ESSLING, Commandant-en-Chef l'armée de Portugal, Paris, le 7 Février, 1811.

Je vous envoie, prince, le moniteur du 6, vous y trouverez les dernières nouvelles que nous avons du Portugal; elles vont jusqu'au 13 Janvier, et annoncent que tout prend une tournure avantageuse. Si Badajoz a été pris dans le courant de Janvier, comme cela est probable, le Duc de Dalmatie aura pu faire marcher des troupes sur le Tage, et vous faciliter l'établissement d'un pont. Je lui en ai donné et je lui en réitère l'ordre; l'Empereur espère que la jonction des troupes de ce maréchal a eu lieu maintenant avec vous sur le Tage.

Les deux divisions d'infanterie du corps du Général Drouet, vont rester entièrement à votre disposition d'après les ordres que je donne à Monsieur le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie, commandant-en-chef l'armée du nord de l'Espagne; je lui mande de porter son quartier général à Valladolid, d'établir des corps nombreux de cavalerie dans la province de Salamanque afin d'assurer d'une manière journalière sure et rapide la correspondance entre Almeyda, Ciudad Rodrigo et Valladolid, et nous envoyer promptement toutes les nouvelles qui pourront parvenir à l'armée de Portugal.

Je lui prescris de tenir à Ciudad Rodrigo, un corps de 6000 hommes qui puisse éloigner toute espèce de troupe ennemie de Ciudad Rodrigo et d'Almeida, faire même des incursions sur Pinhel et Guarda, empêcher qu'il se forme aucun rassemblement sur les derrières du 9me corps et présenter des dispositions offensives sur cette frontière du Portugal.

De réunir une forte brigade de la garde impériale vers Zamora d'où elle sera à portée de soutenir le corps de Ciudad Rodrigo, et où elle se trouvera d'ailleurs dans une position avancée pour agir suivant les circonstances.

De réunir une autre forte brigade de la garde à Valladolid où elle sera en mesure d'appuyer la première et de réunir le reste de la garde dans le gouvernement de Burgos.

Par ces dispositions, prince, les deux divisions d'infanterie du 9me corps, seront entièrement à votre disposition et avec se secours vous serez en mesure de tenir longtemps la position que vous occupez; de vous porter sur la rive gauche du Tage; ou enfin d'agir comme vous le jugerez convenable sans avoir aucune inquiétude sur le nord de l'Espagne, puisque le Duc d'Istrie sera à portée de marcher sur Almeyda et Ciudad Rodrigo et même sur Madrid, si des circonstances inattendues le rendaient nécessaire.

Dès que le Duc d'Istrie aura fait ses dispositions il enverra un officier au Général Drouet, pour l'en instruire et lui faire connaître qu'il peut rester en entier pour vous renforcer.

Le Général Foy a dû partir vers le 29 Janvier de Ciudad Rodrigo, avec four bataillons et 300 hommes de cavalerie pour vous rejoindre.

Le Prince de Wagram et d'Neuchâtel, Major-Général,

(Signe)

ALEXANDRE.

SECTION XI.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ISTRIE, *Guarda, le 29 Mars, 1811.*

Mon cher Maréchal, vous aurez appris notre arrivée aux frontières du Portugal, l'armée se trouve dans un pays absolument ruiné ; et avec toute ma volonté et la patience de l'armée, je crains de n'y pouvoir tenir 8 jours, et je me verrai forcé de rentrer en Espagne.

J'écris à Mr. le Cte. d'Erlon pour qu'il fasse approvisionner Almeyda et Rodrigo ; ces deux places n'auraient jamais dû cesser d'avoir pour three mois de vivres aux quels ou n'aurait pas dû toucher sous aucun prétexte ; et ma surprise est extrême d'apprendre qu'il n'y a que pour ten jours de vivres à Almeyda, Je lui écris aussi de prendre une position entre Rodrigo, et Almeyda, avec ses deux divisions ; vous sentez combien il est nécessaire, qu'il se place à portée de marcher au secours d'Almeyda.

Si je trouvais des vivres, je ne quitterais pas les frontières d'Espagne et du Portugal, mais comme je vous l'ai dit, je ne vois guère la possibilité d'y rester.

(Signe)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XII.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ISTRIE, *Alfayates, le 2 Avril, 1811.*

Mon cher Maréchal, le pays que l'armée occupe ne pouvant en aucune manière le faire vivre, je me vois forcé de la faire rentrer en Espagne. Voici les cantonnements que je lui ai assignés et l'itinéraire de marche de chaque corps d'armée.

(Signe)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XIII.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ISTRIE, *Rodrigo, le 5 Avril, 1811.*

Mon cher Maréchal, je suis arrivé avec toute l'armée sur Ciudad Rodrigo, mes troupes depuis plusieurs jours sont sans pain ; et je suis obligé de faire prendre sur les approvisionnements de Rodrigo 200 mille rations de biscuit, que je vous prie d'ordonner de remplacer avec les ressources qui peuvent se trouver à Salamanque et Valladolid. Nous partirons ensuite pour les cantonnements que j'ai eu soin de vous faire connaître. J'espère que vous aurez bien voulu faire donner des ordres aux intendans de province, d'y faire préparer des vivres, seul moyen d'y faire maintenir l'ordre.

Je compte séjourner 3 à 4 jours ici pour voir si l'ennemi ne s'approcherait pas de places.

(Signe)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XIV.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ISTRIE, *Salamanque, le 15 Avril, 1811.*

Mon cher Maréchal, ma position devient toujours plus allarmante ; les places appellent des secours ; je ne reçois pas de réponses de vous à aucune de mes demandes ; et si cet état de chose se prolonge, je serai forcé de faire prendre à l'armée des cantonnements où elle puisse vivre, et d'abandonner les places que je ne suis pas chargé de défendre et encore bien moins d'approvisionner, mes troupes manquant absolument de vivres.

(Signe)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XV.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ISTRIE, *Paris, le 3 Avril, 1811.*

Le Général Foy est arrivé, Monsieur le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie, ainsi que les deux aides-camp du Maréchal Prince d'Essling, le Capitaine Porcher, et le chef d'escadron Pelet. Il paraît que le Prince d'Essling avec son corps d'armée prend position à Guarda, Belmonte, et Alfuyates. Ainsi il protège Ciudad Rodrigo, Almeyda, Madrid, et l'Andalousie. Ses communications doivent s'établir facilement avec l'armée du midi par Alcantara et Badajoz. Si ce qu'on ne prévoit pas, le Prince d'Essling étoit vivement attaqué par l'armée Anglaise, l'empereur pense que *vous pourriez le soutenir avec une 15ue de milles hommes.* L'armée du centre doit

avoir poussé un corps sur Alcantara. L'armée du midi sera renforcée par ce que vous aurez déjà fait partir, et d'après le Prince d'Essling, elle va se trouver assez forte pour ne rien craindre de l'ennemi. . . .

(Le reste est sans intérêt.)

(Signe)

Le Major Général, ALEXANDRE.

SECTION XVI.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ISTRIE, *Salamanque, le 17 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL,

Le Général Reynaud, commandant supérieur à Rodrigo, ainsi que le Général Marchand, qui est avec sa division autour de cette place, me rendent compte que 2 divisions Portugaises avec une division Anglaise ont pris position aux environs d'Almeyda. Quoique cette place ait encore des vivres pour une zone de jours, et que les Anglais et les Portugais meurent de faim dans leurs positions, il faut faire des dispositions pour les chasser au delà de la Coa, et pour ravitailler cette place. Je vous propose en conséquence, mon cher Maréchal, de mettre à ma disposition 12 à 1500 chevaux, ceux de l'armée de Portugal n'étant en état de rendre aucun service ; je vous demande de plus une division d'infanterie pour placer en réserve. Vers le 24 ou le 29, ces forces se joindront aux 6 divisions que je compte réunir de l'armée de Portugal pour attaquer l'ennemi, s'il nous attend dans ses positions et le chasser au delà de la Coa. Il est impossible de faire le moindre mouvement à toutes ces troupes, du moins à celles de l'armée de Portugal pour attaquer l'ennemi ; si on ne peut leur faire distribuer pour 10 jours de biscuit et avoir de l'eau de vie à la suite de l'armée. Je vous demande encore 15 à 18 pièces d'artillerie bien attelées, celles à mes ordres étant hors d'état de marcher. Avec ces moyens, nul doute que l'ennemi ne soit déposé et chassé hors des frontières de l'Espagne et au delà de la Coa. Mon cher Maréchal, je vis ici au jour le jour ; je suis sans le sol, vous pouvez tout ; il faut donc nous envoyer du biscuit, de l'eau de vie, du pain et de l'orge. Ce sera avec ces moyens que nous pourrions manœuvrer. Il ne faut pas perdre un instant. Il est très urgent de marcher au secours d'Almeyda. C'est à vous à donner vos ordres ; et vous me trouverez porté de la meilleure volonté à faire tout ce qui sera convenable aux intérêts de S. M.

(Signe)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XVII.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ISTRIE, *Salamanque, le 22 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL,

J'ai reçu votre dépêche. Toutes vos promesses de vous réunir à moi s'évanouissent donc dans le moment où j'en ai besoin, ravitailler Almeida et Rodrigo est la 1re. opération et la seule qui peut nous donner la faculté de rendre l'armée de Portugal disponible, lorsqu'on n'aura plus rien à craindre sur le sort des places. En y jettant pour 3 à 4 mois de vivres, on peut ensuite établir plusieurs colonnes mobiles ; on peut envoyer des troupes à Avila et Ségovie ; on peut au besoin appuyer le mouvement de l'armée d'Andalousie. Mais ne serait il pas honteux de laisser rendre une place faute de vivres, en présence de deux maréchaux de l'Empire ? Je vous ai déjà prévenu de la nullité de ma cavalerie, de l'impossibilité où se trouvent les chevaux d'artillerie de rendre aucun service. Vous savez aussi que je dois envoyer le 9me corps en Andalousie ; je voulais aussi le faire concourir avant son départ au ravitaillement des places. Pouvez vous, mon cher Maréchal, balancer un seul instant à m'envoyer de la cavalerie et des attelages d'artillerie ? Si vous voulez garder votre matériel ? Ne vous ai-je pas prévenu que je commencerais mon mouvement le 26 ? et vous paraissiez attendre le (22) une seconde demande de ma part. Vous le savez aussi bien que moi, perdre un ou deux jours à la guerre est beaucoup ; et ce délai peut avoir des suites fâcheuses qu'on ne répare plus.

Quand je vous ai dit que je ne réunerais que 6 divisions ; c'était pour ne pas tout dégarnir des points importants occupés par les corps d'armée ; mais de la cavalerie et de l'artillerie sont un secours dont je ne puis me passer. Je vous prie en conséquence, mon cher Maréchal, de me faire arriver de la cavalerie et des attelages d'artillerie à marches forcées. Réfléchissez

qu'une fois les places réapprovisionnées je pourrai disposer des $\frac{2}{3}$ de l'armée, et que cette opération passe avant tout.

En m'offrant de nous envoyer les attelages pour 16 pièces, vous aurez bien entendu, sans doute, mon cher Maréchal y comprendre ceux nécessaires pour les caissons des pièces.

(Signe.)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XVIII.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ISTRIE, *Salamanque, le 24 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL,

Je me rends demain à Ciudad Rodrigo, où toute l'armée sera réunie le 26. Le ravitaillement de la place d'Almeida est du plus haut intérêt pour les armes de S. M. ; et il eut été bien à désirer que les secours que j'ai en l'honneur de vous demander nous eussent été envoyés. L'ennemi paraît avoir de 20 à 29 mille hommes autour de cette place. Vous dire que je n'aurai en cavalerie que 15 à 1800 hommes, et seulement 20 pièces de canon pour toute l'armée, c'est vous faire sentir, mon cher maréchal, combien votre secours m'eut été nécessaire au moins sous deux rapports, pour votre armée même et pour la tranquillité du nord de l'Espagne. Je n'ai pas ménagé mes instances auprès de vous. Si mes efforts n'étaient pas heureux ; votre dévouement pour le service de l'Empereur, vous ferait certainement regretter de ne pas les avoir secondés avec les moyens que vous m'aviez fait espérer, avant que j'en eusse besoin.

(Signe.)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XIX.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC D'ISTRIE, *Rodrigo, le 29 Avril, 1811.*

MON CHER MARÉCHAL,

Vos lettres sont inconcevables. Dans celle du 20, vous me dites que vous ne pouvez me donner aucun secours. Par celle du 22, vous me dites que le 25 ou le 26 vous me joindrez partout où je serai, et que la tête de votre colonne arrivera à Salamanque le 26. Par celle que je reçois à l'instant, vous me dites, que votre cavalerie et votre artillerie se trouvent encore le 27 à une journée en arrière de Salamanque ; et vous concluez que mon mouvement doit être fini ; et vous me témoignez vos regrets de n'avoir pu y coopérer. Convenez, mon cher Maréchal, que si l'armée de Portugal recevait un échec, vous auriez bien des reproches à vous faire. Je vous ai demandé de l'artillerie et des attelages et encore plus positivement de la cavalerie ; vous avez sous différens prétextes éludé ma demande. Toutes les troupes qui sont en Espagne, sont de la même famille. Vous êtes, jusques à ce qu'il y ait de nouveaux ordres, chargé de la défense et de l'approvisionnement des places d'Almeida et de Rodrigo. Je n'aurais pas mieux demandé que d'employer l'armée de Portugal sous mes ordres à défendre ces places, à marcher au secours de l'armée du midi ; mais comment puis-je le faire sans vivres ?

Je compte faire mon mouvement demain matin. J'ignore quelle pourra être l'issue de ce mouvement ; si ma lettre vous arrive dans la journée de demain ; votre cavalerie et votre artillerie pourraient toujours se mettre en mouvement dans la nuit pour arriver après demain 1^{er} Mai à Cabrillas. Je vous prie de faire filer sans s'arrêter le biscuit, la farine, le grain que vous n'aurez pas manqué de réunir à la suite de vos troupes. Il est instant que ces ressources comme beaucoup d'autres, arrivent à Rodrigo ; cette place n'aura pas pour 15 jours de vivres. A mon départ d'ici, il faudra que des convois considérables y soient envoyés.

(Signe.)

LE PRINCE D'ESSLING.

SECTION XX.

A MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE RAGUSE, *Paris, le 20 Avril, 1811.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC DE RAGUSE,

Vous trouverez ci-joint l'ordre de l'Empereur qui vous donne le commandement de l'armée de Portugal. Je donne l'ordre au Maréchal Prince d'Essling de vous remettre le commandement de cette armée. Saisissez les rênes d'une main ferme ; faites dans l'armée les changemens qui deviendraient nécessaires. L'intention de l'Empereur est que le Duc d'Abrantes

et le Général Reynier restent sous vos ordres. S. M. compte assez sur le dévouement que lui portent ses généraux, pour être persuadé qu'ils vous seconderont de tous leurs moyens.

L'Empereur ordonne, Monsieur le Duc de Raguse, que le Prince d'Essling en quittant l'armée n'emène avec lui que son fils et un de ses aides-de-camp. Mais son chef d'état-major, le Général Fririon, le Colonel Pelet, ses autres aides-de-camp, tous les officiers de son état-major doivent rester avec vous.

Toutefois, Monsieur le Duc, je vous le répète S. M. met en vous une confiance entière.

(Signe.)

Le Major-Général, etc.,

ALEXANDRE.

NO. VIII.

Les Officiers Français Prisonniers de Guerre, détenus à la Maison, Rue S. Jean, à
MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL TRANT, Gouverneur de la Ville et Province d'Oporto.

MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,

Chacun des officiers Français prisonniers de guerre, détenus à la maison rue S. Jean, pénétré des obligations qu'il vous a désirerait vous offrir individuellement l'expression de sa reconnaissance. C'est nous que ces messieurs ont choisi pour être auprès de vous leur organes et nous sommes d'autant plus flattés de cette commission agréable qu'il n'y en a pas un parmi nous qui dans son particulier n'ait reçu de vous des services importants. Nous osons nous flatter que vous agréerez favorablement ce faible témoignage de notre gratitude et les sincères remerciements que nous venons vous présenter pour toutes les bontés que vous avez eues pour nous. Ce n'est pas sans un vif regret que nous envisageons le moment de votre départ, mais ce que déjà vous avez fait pour nous, nous fait espérer que votre sollicitude s'étendra au delà de votre séjour et que pendant votre absence nous continuerons à en éprouver les effets.

Ce n'est pas, monsieur le général, d'après l'étendue de notre lettre qu'il faudra mesurer celle de notre reconnaissance; nous sommes mieux en état de sentir que d'exprimer ce que nous vous devons et lorsque des circonstances plus heureuses nous ramèneront vers notre patrie, nous nous ferons un devoir et une satisfaction de faire connaître la manière dont nous avons été traités et les peines que vous vous êtes données pour adoucir notre sort. Nous nous recommandons à la continuation de votre bienveillance, et nous vous prions d'agréer l'assurance de gratitude et de haute considération avec lesquelles nous avons l'honneur d'être, monsieur le général, vos très humbles et très obéissants serviteurs.

Au nom des officiers Français, prisonniers de guerre.

FALLOT,

Docteur médecin de armées Françaises attaché au
grand quartier général de l'armée de Portugal.

Le colonel sous inspecteur aux revues des troupes Françaises,

CATELOT.

H. DELAHAYE,

Com. de la marine.

NO. IX.

SECTION I.

Letter from LIEUT.-GENERAL GRAHAM, *to the* RIGHT HONOURABLE HENRY WELLESLEY,
Isla de Leon, 24th March, 1811.

SIR,—You will do justice to my reluctance to enter into any controversy for the purpose of counteracting the effects of that obloquy which you yourself and many others assured me my conduct was exposed to by the reports circulated, at Cadiz, relative to the issue of the late expedition.

But a copy of a printed statement of General La Peña having been shown to me, which, by implication at least, leaves the blame of the failure of the most brilliant prospects on me, it becomes indispensably necessary that I should take up my pen in self-defence.

Having already sent you a copy of my despatch to the Earl of Liverpool with a report of the action, I will not trouble you with a detail of the first movements of the army, nor with any other observation relative to them, than that the troops suffered much unnecessary fatigue by marching in the night, and without good guides.

Considering the nature of the service we were engaged in, I was most anxious that the army should not come into contest with the enemy in an exhausted state, nor be exposed to the attack of the enemy but when it was well collected; and, in consequence of representations to this effect, I understood that the march of the afternoon of the 4th was to be a short one, to take up for the night a position near Conil; to prepare which, staff-officers, of both nations, were sent forward with a proper escort.

The march was, nevertheless, continued through the night, with those frequent and harassing halts which the necessity of groping for the way occasioned.

When the British division began its march from the position of Barrosa to that of Bermeja, *I left the general on the Barrosa height, nor did I know of his intentions of quitting it*; and, when I ordered the division to countermarch in the wood, I did so to support the troops left for its defence, and believing the general to be there in person. In this belief I sent no report of the attack, which was made so near the spot where the general was supposed to be, and, though confident in the bravery of the British troops, I was not less so in the support I should receive from the Spanish army. The distance, however, to Bermeja is trifling, and no orders were given from head-quarters for the movement of any corps of the Spanish army to support the British division, to prevent its defeat in this unequal contest, or to profit of the success earned at so heavy expense. The voluntary zeal of the two small battalions (Walloon guards and Ciudad Real), which had been detached from my division, brought them alone back from the wood; but, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, they could only come at the close of the action.

Had the whole body of the Spanish cavalry, with the horse artillery, been rapidly sent by the sea-beach to form in the plain, and to envelop the enemy's left; had the greatest part of the infantry been marched through the pine-wood, in our rear, to turn his right, what success might have been expected from such decisive movements? The enemy must either have retired instantly, and without occasioning any serious loss to the British division, or he would have exposed himself to absolute destruction, his cavalry greatly outnumbered, his artillery lost, his columns mixed and in confusion; a general dispersion would have been the inevitable consequence of a close pursuit; our wearied men would have found spirits to go on and would have done so, trusting to finding refreshments and repose at Chiclana. This moment was lost. Within a quarter of an hour's ride of the scene of action, the general remained ignorant of what was passing, *and nothing was done!* Let not, then, this action of Barrosa form any part of the general result of the transactions of the day; it was an accidental feature; it was the result of no combination, it was equally unseen and unheeded by the Spanish staff; the British division, left alone, suffered the loss of more than one-fourth of its number, and became unfit for future exertion. Need I say more to justify my determination of declining any further co-operation in the field towards the prosecution of the object of the expedition? I am, however, free to confess that, having thus placed myself and the British division under the direction of the Spanish commander-in-chief in the field (contrary to my instructions), I should not have thought myself justified to my king and country to risk the absolute destruction of this division in a second trial. But I have right to claim credit for what would have been my conduct from what it was; and I will ask if it can be doubted, after my zealous co-operation throughout, and the ready assistance afforded to the troops left on Barrosa height, that the same anxiety for the success of the cause would not have secured to the Spanish army the utmost efforts of the British division during the whole of the enterprise, *had we been supported as we had a right to expect?*

There is not a man in the division who would not gladly have relinquished his claim to glory, acquired by the action of Barrosa, to have shared, with the Spaniards, the ultimate success that was within our grasp as it were.

The people of Spain, the brave and persevering people, are universally esteemed, respected, and admired by all who value liberty and independence; the hearts and hands of British soldiers will ever be with them; the cause of Spain is felt by all to be a common one.

I conclude with mentioning that the only request expressed to me at head-quarters, on the

morning of the 6th, on knowing of my intention to send the British troops across the river St. Petri, was *that the opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops, during the night, was lost*; and on my observing that, after such a defeat, there was no risk of attack from an enemy, a very contrary opinion was maintained.

In point of fact, no enemy ever appeared during several days employed in bringing off the wounded and burying the dead. It may be proper to remark on the report published relative to the enemy's number at St. Petri (4500 men of Villat's division), that, by the concurrent testimony of all the French officers here, General Villat's division had charge of the whole line—what, then, must be the strength of the division to have afforded 4500 men to St. Petri alone? In order to establish, by authentic documents, facts which may have been disputed, and to elucidate others, I enclose, by way of appendix, the reports of various officers of this division.

I have the honour to be, etc., etc., etc.,

(Signed.)

THOS. GRAHAM, Lt.-General.

P.S.—I must add this postscript distinctly to deny my having spoken, at head-quarters, in the evening of the 5th, of sending for more troops, or for provisions from the Isla. My visit was a very short one, of mere ceremony. I may have asked if the Spanish troops expected were arrived. This error must have arisen from the difficulty of conversing in a foreign language.

With this I send you a sketch of the ground, etc., of the action of Barrosa; by which it will be seen how impossible, according to my judgment, it would be for an enemy to expose his left flank, by making a direct attack through the wood on the Barmaja position, while that of Barrosa was occupied in force by the allied army.

SECTION II.

Adjutant-General's state of the troops assembled at Tarifa, under the command of
LIEUT.-GENERAL GRAHAM, 25th Feb., 1810.

| Designations. | Number of Bayonets. | Commanders. |
|---|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Two squadrons of 2d German Hussars | — | Major Busche. |
| Detachment of artillery | ... | Major Duncan. 10 guns. |
| Detachment of engineers | 47 | Captain Birch. |
| Brigade of guards, reinforced by a detachment of the 2nd battalion 95th rifles | 1221 | Brigadier-Gen. Dilkes. |
| 1st battalion 28th foot; 2nd battalion 67th; 2nd battalion 87th; reinforced with two companies of the 20th Portuguese | 1764 | Colonel Wheatley. |
| Flank battalion composed of detachments of the 3rd battalion 95th rifles and two companies of 47th foot | 594 | { Lt.-Col. A. Barnard, 95th regt. |
| Two companies of 2nd battalion 9th regt.; two companies of 1st battalion 28th regt.; two companies of 2nd battalion 82nd regt. | 475 | Lt.-Col. Brown, 28th regt. |
| One company of the royal staff corps | 33 | Lieutenant Reid. |
| Total number of bayonets | 4114 | |
| The hussars were about | 180 | |
| Total of sabres and bayonets | 4294, | with 10 guns. |

SECTION III.

Extract from a letter of GENERAL FREDERICK PONSONBY.

"I proceeded rapidly towards the entrance of the wood, found the Germans, and conducted them along the right flank of our little army. We came in contact with the French dragoons, whom we found nearly abreast of our front line and about 300 yards apart from it on our right flank; our line had just halted and the fire was gradually decreasing at the same time we charged. I do not imagine the French dragoons much exceeded us in number, they behaved well, but if we had had half a dozen stout squadrons, the mass of beaten infantry would not have returned to their camp."

SECTION IV.—STATE OF THE FIRST CORPS.

| | | Tués. | | | | | | | |
|------------------|---|----------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|------------|-------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|
| | | Generaux de Brigade. | Colonels. | Chefs de Br. ou Escadron. | Capitaines | Lieute- nants. | Sous Lieute- nants. | Sous Officiers et Soldats. | Total. |
| St. Petri, 4 | { | 95 de Ligne..... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3 | 3 |
| | | Etat Major | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | Etat Major | I | I | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2 |
| | | 9 Infr. Ligne ... | ... | ... | ... | I | ... | 14 | 15 |
| | | 24 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | I | I | 33 | 35 |
| I | { | 96 Ligne | ... | I | ... | I | ... | 39 | 41 |
| | | 1 Br. Elite | ... | ... | ... | I | ... | ■ | 2 |
| | | Etat Major | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | 45 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | 3 | ... | 7 | 8 |
| | | 8 Ligne | ... | I | 2 | 2 | ■ | 3 | 63 |
| 5 Mars | { | 54 Ligne | ... | ... | I | ... | ... | 26 | 29 |
| | | Etat Major | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| | | 27 Infr. Ligne... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ■ | 20 | 21 |
| | | 94 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | ... | ■ | 9 | 10 |
| | | 95 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | I | I |
| Dragoons | { | 1 Regt. | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2 | 2 |
| | | 2 Regt. | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3 | 3 |
| | | Artillerie | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 16 | 16 |
| | | 45 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 10 | 10 |
| | | Artillerie | ... | ... | ... | I | ... | ■ | ■ |
| Puerte St. Maria | { | 94 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4 | 4 | |
| Médina, 9 Mars, | { | 95 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4 | 4 | |
| 8 Dr. | { | 95 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4 | 4 | |
| | | I | 3 | 3 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 255 | 281 |

STATE OF THE FIRST CORPS.—(Continued.)

| | | Restes sus les Champ grièvement Blessés. | | | | | | |
|------------------|----------|--|-----------|------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------|-------------------|
| | | Generaux de Division. | Colonels. | Capitaines | Sous Lieute- nants. | Sous Officiers et Soldats. | Total. | Total general. |
| St. Petri, 4 | | 95 de Ligne..... | ... | ... | ... | ■ | ■ | 42 |
| | | Etat Major | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3 |
| | | Etat Major | I | ... | ... | ... | I | 3 |
| I | | 9 Infr. Ligne .. | ... | ... | I | 18 | 19 | 108 |
| | | 24 Ligne | ... | 2 | I | 21 | 24 | 280 |
| | | 96 Ligne | ... | I | I | I | 3 | 249 |
| | | 1 Br. Elite | ... | I | ... | 59 | 60 | 203 |
| | | Etat Major | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 2 |
| 5 Mars | 2 | 45 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | 3 | 3 | 55 |
| | | 8 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | 19 | 19 | 726 |
| | | 54 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 323 |
| | | Etat Major | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | I |
| 3 | | 27 Infr. Ligne... | ... | ... | ■ | 21 | 23 | 201 |
| | | 94 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 62 |
| | | 95 Ligne | ... | ... | ... | I | I | 34 |
| | | 1 Regt. | ... | I | ... | 3 | 4 | 42 |
| | | 2 Regt. | ... | ... | ... | 4 | 4 | 19 |
| | Dragoons | Artillerie | I | ... | ... | ... | I | 51 |
| Puerte St. Maria | | 45 Ligne | ... | ... | I | 27 | 28 | 81 |
| | | Artillerie | ... | ... | ... | 6 | 6 | 7 |
| Médina, 9 Mars, | | 94 | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | 33 |
| 8 Dr. | | 95 | ... | ... | ... | I | I | 24 |
| | | I | I | 5 | 6 | 189 | 202 | 2551 |

Total 2551
Note by the Editor.—Deduct affair of the 4th about Santa Petri 45
 " " at Puerta Santa Maria 81
 " " at Medina 64

190

Remains loss at Barrosa... 2361

Certified copy by Count Gazan.

SECTION V.

Intercepted papers of COLONEL LEJEUNE.

ORDRE.

Il est ordonné à Monsieur le Colonel Baron le Jeune, mon A. D. C. de partir sur le champ en poste pour porter les ordres ci-joints et parcourir l'Andalousie et l'Estramadure.

Monsieur le Colonel le Jeune se rendra d'abord à Grenade auprès de Monsieur le Général Sebastiani, commandant du 4me corps d'armée, et il lui remettra les ordres qui le concernent.

De Grenade, Monsieur le Jeune se rendra par Séville devant Cadix, et verra par lui-même la situation des choses, afin de pouvoir à son retour en rendre un compte détaillé à l'Empereur. Monsieur le Jeune remettra à Monsieur le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, les dépêches qui lui sont destinées, soit à Séville, soit à Cadix, soit partout où il sera. Il se rendra ensuite au 5me corps d'armée commandé par Monsieur le Maréchal Duc de Trévise en Estremadure: le corps doit être à Badajos, ou même sur le Tage.

Monsieur le Jeune perdra une connaissance exacte de sa position, et de celle des troupes de l'armée du centre commandée par le Général qui sont réunies sur le Tage. Il verra si ces corps sont en communication avec l'armée de Portugal, et recueillera les nouvelles que l'on pourrait avoir de cette armée de ce côté.

Monsieur le Jeune prendra tous les renseignemens nécessaires pour pouvoir répondre à toutes les questions de l'Empereur, sur la situation des choses en Andalossie, devant Cadiz, et en Estremadure, d'où il viendra me rendre compte de sa mission.

LE PRINCE DE WAGRAM ET DE NEUFCHÂTEL,
Major-Général.

Paris, le 14 Février, 1811.

SECTION VI.

Extracts from LEJEUNE'S reports.

CADIZ.

"Montagnes de Ronda foyer d'insurrection entre le 4^{me} corps et le premier."

"Les obusiers à la villantros portent à 2560 toises : l'obus doit peser 75 livres, et contient 11 à 12 onces de poudre : on charge l'obusier à poudre d'un $\frac{1}{3}$ du poids de l'obus pour obtenir cette distance. Il n'y en a que le 4 en batterie : à la redoute Napoléon on en a 12 en fondus : mais il manque de projectiles et de la poudre en suffisante quantité. Toutes les obus n'éclatent pas en ville."

"Le pont de St. Pesti a été traversé le jour de l'affaire par un sergent du 24^{me}. qui est revenu avec les Espagnols que l'on a pris. Le moment eut été favorable pour s'emparer de l'Isle."

"Le Duc de Bellune, bien ennuyé, désire beaucoup retourner : bon général mais voyant les choses trop en noir."

SECTION VII.

Puerto Real, 20 Mars, 1811.

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,

Enfin après 15 jours des plus cruelles souffrances je me trouve en état de reprendre la plume et de continuer le récit que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser dans ma lettre du 6 au 7 de ce mois.

L'une des choses qui mérite d'abord de fixer votre attention, est la composition de cette armée combinée dont nous avons été tout-à-coup assaillis. J'ai déjà dit que le 26 Février une flotte de 180 voiles était sortie de Cadiz portant 1500 hommes de débarquement, et que de ce nombre étaient environ 4000 Anglais et 1000 Portugais. Cette flotte se dirigea vers Tarifa où le débarquement se fit le lendemain sans aucun accident. Il paraît que les Anglais en réunissant les garnisons d'Algéciras et de Gibraltar à quelques restes de troupes venues récemment de Sicile, avaient déjà formé à Tarifa un petit corps de 1000 Anglais et de 2000 Portugais commandé par le Général Stuart, et qui forma avec 2 ou 300 hommes de cavalerie, l'avant garde de l'expédition dirigée contre nous. Cette armée ainsi composée de 10 à 12,000 Espagnols bien ou mal équipés, de 4 à 5000 Anglais et de 3000 Portugais se mit enfin en campagne, et vint nous attaquer le 5. Il paraît que Monsieur le Maréchal Victor ne fut instruit que tard de la vraie direction prise par l'armée ennemie. Il arriva à Chiclana le 5 entre 8 et 9 heures du matin, suivi des bataillons de la 1^{re} et 2^{de} division : le plan d'opérations auquel il s'arrêta fut d'envoyer sur le champ la division Villate avec un régiment de cavalerie aux lignes de St. Petri, avec ordre de laisser arriver l'ennemi, de lui résister faiblement pour l'engager à suivre notre mouvement de retraite et de l'attirer ainsi sous la position St. Anne, où il ne pouvait manquer de se trouver dans une situation extrêmement désavantageuse. Pendant cette manœuvre Monsieur le Maréchal Victor s'était lui-même porté avec la 1^{re} et 2^{de} division entre Conil et St. Petri, à peu près à la hauteur de la Torre Barrosa avec l'intention de couper à l'ennemi la retraite des montagnes. Là, rencontrant la queue de l'armée, qui finissait de se filer, il la fit attaquer vigoureusement, culbuta tout ce qui se recontra devant lui et accula les Espagnols à la mer, mais les Anglais que cette manœuvre hardie mettaient entre deux feux, et dans l'impossibilité de regagner Conil, revinrent sur leurs pas, et attaquant avec la rage du désespoir, ils forcèrent à la retraite nos deux divisions, qui ne formaient pas ensemble 5000 hommes.

Cependant Monsieur le Maréchal Victor se croyait si sur de la victoire qu'avant d'attaquer il envoya ordre aux troupes qui étaient à Médina, de se porter entre Veger et Coñil, pour ramasser le reste des trainards ; les bagages, et les trains de munitions qu'ils pouvaient rencontrer.

Le projet d'attirer l'ennemi sur le feu de St. Anne n'avait pas mieux réussi du côté de la division Villatte ; car si cette division fut d'abord assaillie par presque toute l'armée combinée, les généraux Anglais et Espagnols, avertis de bonne heure que Monsieur le Maréchal les tournaient avec un corps de troupes, arrêterent leurs colonnes sur la rive gauche du ruisseau qui touche au Moulin d'Almanza, et là naturellement retranchés derrière ce marais, ils n'eurent à garder que le pont et le Moulin, les seuls endroits par lesquels on pouvait les attaquer. Quelque chose de plus malheureux, fut, que dès le commencement de l'action, nos lignes de St. Petri, n'étant pas défendues, il sortit par le pont de Radeaux 5000 hommes de troupes fraîches de la Isla, lesquels se plaçant en bataille devant la division Villatte, et couverts par le ruisseau du Moulin d'Almanza laissèrent au reste de l'armée combinée la liberté de se retourner tout entière contre l'attaque de Monsieur le Maréchal Victor. Ainsi se termina la bataille du 5, l'ennemi coucha sur son champ de bataille, sans poursuivre les divisions Laval et Rufin dans leur retraite. Je vous ai déjà fait part de notre perte. Le Général Rufin que nous croyons tué par une balle, qui lui a traversé la tête, a été porté par les Anglais à la Isla, où après deux jours de léthargie, il a donné signes de vie ; on dit qu'il va mieux.

La perte de l'ennemi a été à peu près de 3000 Anglais ou Portugais, et de 5 à 600 Espagnols, tués ou blessés ; les Anglais ont eu beaucoup des officiers mis hors de combat, on croit les Généraux *Grām* et Stuart ainsi que le Général Pêna blessés. Le 6 à la pointe du jour nous nous attendions bien à une attaque générale qui pouvait nous-être très funeste ; mais l'ennemi se contenta d'occuper avec 2000 hommes, le fort de Médina, que nous avions un peu imprudemment abandonnés ; la flotille ennemie fit aussi des démonstrations d'attaque sur le Trocadero, mais sans effet. Elle débarqua 6 à 700 hommes entre le Port de St. Marie, et le fort St. Cataline, qui fût sommé de se rendre ; on répondit à coups de canons. Un officier Anglais vint chez le gouverneur de St. Marie le prévenir qu'il allait prendre possession de la ville, mais il avait laissé ses troupes à la porte. Elles courent faire une action d'éclat en brulant et réduisant la petite redoute St. Antoine, qui n'était point gardée ; enchantés de ce succès ils se rembarquèrent. M. le maréchal s'attendait bien à être attaqué le 6 à Chiclana, il avait donné des ordres en conséquence, ces ordres furent mal interprétés, et on endommagea mal-à-propos dans la nuit quelques uns de nos ouvrages, mais ils furent sur le champ réparés. Lui-même était venu à Puerto Real avec la division Laval, et avait envoyé la 1re division à St. Marie pour reprendre la ligne de Blocus comme avant la bataille du 5. Le 5me regiment de chasseurs fut envoyé entre Puerto Real et Médina à la ferme de Guerra en reconnaissance ; il y rencontra une poste de cavalerie ennemie, et la tailla en pièces. Le 6 au soir, on essaya de reprendre le fort de Médina, mais sans succès. Le 7 il fallut y envoyer plus de monde, et les Espagnols l'évacuèrent sans opposer de résistance.

Dans la nuit du 5 les Espagnols avaient rasés nos lignes de St. Petri, ils employèrent pendant plusieurs jours et plusieurs nuits 6000 hommes, à transporter à la Isla, du bois, dont ils manquaient, quelques jours après, nous avons fait cesser ces approvisionnements, en reprenant la position de St. Petri, où on ne trouva personne ; les Espagnols craignant une répétition de l'affaire du 2 Mars, ont détruits eux-même de fort bonne grace leur tête de pont, et replié leur pont de Radeaux, dès ce moment chacun resta chez soi, comme avant les hostilités.

Du 21 Mars, 1811.

Il est surprenant que l'armée combinée ne nous ait pas poursuivis le 5, bien plus surprenant encore qu'elle ne nous ait point attaqués le 6 au matin ; on en conçoit plusieurs raisons. On conjecture d'abord que la principale perte de la bataille étant tombée sur les Anglais, qui ont eu un grand nombre d'officiers et même leurs généraux mis hors de combat, les Espagnols n'ont pas osé venir seuls nous attaquer. Le Général *Grām* voulait cependant les y contraindre le lendemain, mais sur leur refus formel, il les a traités de lâches, de gens indignes d'être secourus. Ils ont répondu qu'ils feraient une sortie de la Isla si l'on voulait mettre le

tiers d'Anglais ou Portugais avec les deux tiers d'Espagnols, le général Anglais a répondu qu'il n'exposerait plus un seul de ses soldats avec des troupes de cette espèce, et sur le champ il a donné ordre aux Anglais et Portugais de se retirer.

A Cadix ou dans la ville de la Isla. Il paraît même que le lendemain les Anglais se sont embarqués pour se rendre à Gibraltar ou peut-être à Lisbonne. Les gens du pays donnent pour certain que le Général *Grām*, en envoyant ces jours derniers à Londres trente-trois officiers des moins blessés, n'a pas dissimulé qu'il les chargeait d'exposer à son gouvernement quelle folie il y avait de sacrifier de braves gens pour soutenir en Espagne un parti sans moyens, sans bravoure et sans moralité. Si ce qui précède n'est pas vrai, au moins sommes nous certains qu'une grande mésintelligence règne entre les Espagnols et leurs alliés. Le 20, les Espagnols ont encore essayé une sortie de la Carraca mais sans succès; ils s'y prennent un peu tard. Nous sommes à présent très à mesure pour les recevoir. Ils font semblant d'embarquer continuellement des troupes qui n'agissent pas et qui ne peuvent plus nous nuire. Il est arrivé à Médina quelques bataillons du 4^{me} corps, deux bataillons du soixante-trois sont aussi venus de Séville. Nous apprenons avec la prise de Badajos, que M. le Maréchal Soult est à Séville. La blessure de M. le commandant Bompar et les miennes vont un peu mieux.

LEGENTIL.

Excusez les imperfections de cette longue lettre, j'écris de mon lit, dans une posture gênante.

Monsieur le général de division Lery, à Séville.

SECTION VII.

Extracts from the intercepted report of GÉNÉRAL GARBÉ, commanding the French engineers, at the blockade of Cadiz.

25 Mars, 1811.

"On avait aperçu le 26 de Février au matin un grand convoi partant de la baie de Cadiz, pour se diriger sur Tarifa. Ce convoi portait à peu près 6 ou 7000 hommes des troupes de débarquement, qui allait joindre celles qui étaient déjà réunies sur la Barbate et dans les environs de l'Alcala de los Gazules. Le 2 Mars à la pointe du jour, l'ennemi commença son opération sur Caza Vieja, qui fut évacué, et en même temps, il effectua vers l'embouchure de St. Petri, un passage pour faciliter l'établissement d'un pont de radeaux et d'une tête de pont. Il fit aussi débarquer des troupes dans l'Isletta del Coto, et s'occupa d'y établir deux batteries. Le 3, on fit marcher la division du Général Rufin, qui prit position à moitié chemin de Puerto Real à Médina Sidonia. Celle du Général Laval, s'établit en avant de Puerto Real, et le Général Vilatte garda ses positions auprès de Chiclana. Ce jour on n'aperçut aucun mouvement de l'ennemi. Tous les ouvrages de la ligne étaient gardés par les garnisons qu'on avait désignées auparavant. Santa Marie fut évacué et le pont replié sur la rive gauche.

"Puerto Real était défendu par une compagnie de sapeurs, deux du 45^{me} régiment, et par tous les réfugiés Français qu'on avait armés.

"Le 4 Monsieur le Maréchal fit attaquer à la pointe du jour l'ennemi dans sa tête de pont de Santi Petri. Cette attaque se fit par 4 compagnies du 95^{me} régiment qui s'emparèrent de l'ouvrage, firent prisonniers 500 hommes, et enlevèrent un drapeau. Il est certain que si on eut employé dans cette opération 2 ou 3000 hommes on enlevait le pont et l'Isle de Léon. L'ennemi fut si disconcerté qu'il avait abandonné ses batteries et ses ouvrages fermés. Un pareil résultat paraissait être d'un très bon augure pour les grandes opérations. Un fit partir le même jour de Médina une reconnaissance sur Casa Vieja. On reçut avis dans la nuit que cette reconnaissance n'avait rencontré personne, et que les colonnes ennemies se dirigeant sur Conil, le mouvement ne pouvait avoir pour but que d'opérer la jonction de ce corps d'armée, avec celui qui était resté dans l'île. Le 5, avant le jour, on se mit en marche de la position qu'on occupait à moitié chemin de Médina pour se porter sur Chiclana. Arrivé dans cet endroit, Monsieur le Maréchal donna l'ordre au Général Villatte de rassembler toute sa division vers les flèches de St. Petri, pour y maintenir l'ennemi qui y

paraissait en force, pendant qu'il dirigeait sur la route de Conil, les divisions de Laval et Rufin, et le peu de cavalerie qu'il avait avec lui. Il se porta de ce côté, et ne tarda pas à rencontrer une forte colonne, qui marchait le long de la mer entre St. Petri et Conil, et se dirigeait sur le premier de ses endroits. Les troupes arrivées à portée de canon se formèrent. Le Général Rufin prit la gauche pour aller occuper un mamelon où l'ennemi paraissait s'établir. Quand les deux divisions furent formées, ille se trouvèrent en présence d'une armée, beaucoup plus nombreuse qu'on ne l'avait cru d'abord. L'artillerie n'était pas encore arrivée, et celle de l'ennemi commençait à jour de toute parts. Le Général Vilatte n'avait pu garder les flèches de St. Petri, qui étaient au moment d'être prises, n'étant alors défendues que par un seul bataillon du 27^{me} d'infanterie légère.

Cette division fut obligée de ce replier et de repasser le ravin dans lequel roulent les eaux du Moulin d'Almanza. Ce mouvement empêcha le Général Vilatte de se réunir aux deux autres divisions, qui n'ayant en tout que dix bataillons, essayaient un feu terrible de la part de l'ennemi. Nos pertes devenaient d'autant plus sensible que le nombre des combattans n'était que le tiers de celui de l'ennemi. Des corps entiers se trouvaient accablés avant qu'on eut pu entamer la ligne des Anglais. Il n'y avait point de réserve. Le deux mille hommes de Médina Sidonia étaient en marche pour Conil. Il fallut penser à la retraite qui se fit en bon ordre, jusque sur les hauteurs en avant de Chiclana, où l'on fit camper une division pendant la nuit. Les Anglais firent leur jonction avec les troupes de l'île de Léon, et les Espagnols continuèrent d'occuper notre position du Moulin d'Almanza et de St. Petri. Si l'ennemi voulant continuer ses opérations offensives dans la journée du 6, se fut présenté de bonne heure, il est probable que dans la situation où nous nous trouvions après la journée du 5 nous étions obligés d'évacuer le terrain jusqu'à Puerto Real, où on aurait pris la position dont j'ai parlé plus haut, pour y livrer une seconde bataille, mais les opérations ont manqué d'ensemble. Il s'est contenté de rentrer dans l'île et pendant ce temps un très petit corps de troupes Anglaises opéraient un débarquement entre St. Marie, et la pointe de St. Catherine, qui n'eut d'autre résultat que d'enlever une batterie défendue par quinze hommes et de se promener une ou deux heures dans les rues de St. Marie. Monsieur le Maréchal ne voyait aucun mouvement offensif, ordonna de rétablir les grandes communications par St. Marie, chacun rentra dans ses portes et cette mesure produisit beaucoup plus d'effet, sur l'armée et les habitans du Pays, que les dispositions qu'on auraient pu prendre."

No. X.

EXTRACTS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CAPTAIN SQUIRES, OF THE ENGINEERS.

SECTION I.

"March 1, 1811.

"I have been employed in constructing batteries, opposite the mouth of the Zezere, for 25 guns! though we have only one brigade of 9-pounders to arm them.

"Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these batteries from the first, in my reports which were sent to Lord Wellington, and now I verily believe the marshal himself is ashamed of their construction. Punhete, you know, is situated precisely at the confluence of the Zezere with the Tagus, the enemy's bridge is about half a mile from the mouth of the river, and one mile, by measurement, from the nearest of our heights, which we have crowned with an eight-gun battery."

SECTION II.

"I was truly sorry to hear that the Spaniards were so thoroughly routed near Badajos, but Mendizabel was an idiot. On the 18th February, the enemy threw a bridge over the Guadiana, above Badajos. Don Carlos España, an active officer, whom I know very well, reconnoitred the bridge, and made his report to Mendizabel, who was playing at cards. Very well, said the chief, we'll go and look at it to-morrow! At daybreak the Spanish army was surprised."

SECTION III.

"May 17, 1811.—I reconnoitred the ground in front of Cristoval, and was pressed, by Colonel Fletcher, who was on the other side of the Guadiana, to commence our operations that evening. The soil was hard and rocky, and our tools infamous. I made, however, no difficulties, and we began our battery on the night of the 8th, the moon being at the full: our work was barely 400 yards from Cristoval. In spite, however, of a most destructive fire of musketry, and shot, and shells, from various parts of the body of the place, we succeeded in completing our battery on the night of the 10th; and, on the morning of the 11th, at four a.m., its fire was opened. The enemy's fire was, however, very superior to our own; and, before sunset, the three guns and one howitzer were disabled, for against our little attack was the whole attention of the enemy directed. On the other side of the river the intended attack had not yet been begun, and we sustained the almost undivided fire of Badajos! I told the marshal, when I saw him on the 11th, that to continue to fight our battery was a positive sacrifice; he did not, however, order us to desist until our guns were silenced. If doubt and indecision had not governed all our operations, and had we begun even on the night of the 9th, I am satisfied that our plan of attack was excellent, and that we should have entered the place on the 15th. It is true that two distant batteries were erected on the left bank of the river against the place, but they scarcely excited the enemy's attention; our little corps bore the brunt of the enemy's exertions, which were great and spirited. Including those who fell in the sortie, our loss has been from 600 to 700 men. Both officers and men were exhausted, mind and body; they felt and saw that they were absurdly sacrificed."

No. XI.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM GENERAL CAMPBELL TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

"Gibraltar, October 23, 1810.

"The troops at Malaga, with the exception of 300 men, moved upon Fuengirola, of which Lord Blayney was apprised; but, in place of his lordship taking advantage of this fortunate event, he wasted two days in a fruitless attack on the fort of Fuengirola, cannonading it from 12-pounders, although he perceived that no impression had been made on it by the fire of the shipping and gun-boats, the artillery of which were double the calibre. In this situation he was surprised by an inferior force, and, whilst he was on board of a gun-boat, his guns taken and the whole thrown into confusion; at this moment he was informed of the disaster, and, so far to his credit, he retook his guns, but, immediately after, conceiving a body of French cavalry to be Spaniards, he ordered the firing to cease, when he was surrounded and made prisoner; his men, losing confidence, gave way, and, hurrying to the beach, relinquished their honour and the field."

No. XII.

JUSTIFICATORY PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE STATE OF SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS.

SECTION I.—NORTHERN PROVINCES.

CAPTAIN IRBY to MR. CROFT.

*"H. M. S. Amelia,
"Coruña, May 6, 1810.*

"I have been cruising for these two months past between Bayonne and Santona."

"In addition to the troops I have observed under arms, there has been a great proportion of armed peasantry at Baquio, a small place to the westward of Rachidaes; as our boats were returning from destroying some batteries, they were attacked by armed peasantry alone, who were dispersed by shot from the ship, and also since they have assisted the French troops, when we captured a vessel laden with military stores from St. Andero."

MR. STUART to GENERAL WALKER.

"Lisbon, February 20, 1811.

"I own that from the various appointments which have lately taken place in their armies, I forebode little advantage in the course of the ensuing campaign; it is perhaps needful to tell you that my fears are grounded on the nomination of the Duke of Albuquerque to Galicia, Castaños to Estremadura, Mahi to Murcia, Coupigny to Valencia, and the brother of O'Donnel to Catalonia."

SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS to LORD WELLINGTON.

"Villafranca, January 4, 1812.

"Each chief is allowed three servants, a captain two, a subaltern one; the number of soldiers employed in this way is certainly not *under* the regulation, and all officers resident in the interior likewise have this excessive indulgence. The officers' servants never do duty, or attend any drill or review. The cooks are in general changed weekly, and are never present at drill or review; one cook is allowed besides to every three serjeants. These two items certainly take 5000 choice men from the ranks of this army."

"Some very violent recriminations have been brought on by the imprudent reply of the military press, to some observations published in a Coruña paper extolling the Guerillas, and at the same time intended to convey a censure on the conduct of the army. I have had frequent conversations with General Abadia on the spirit of disunion which these two papers are sowing. He has at length prohibited the military press from publishing anything but professional papers. I was present when he gave the order—he engaged me in the conversation, and I could not avoid observing, that what was lost could only be regained by the sword, not the pen. In this I alluded to the Asturias, where certainly reputation and public confidence were sacrificed."

"The truth is, the army is oppressive and expensive, as well as inefficient, from its disorganized state, particularly in the departments of supply; and it is a very unpleasant circumstance to hear it generally admitted, that a Spanish corps is much more destructive to the country than an equal French army. There are also violent dissensions between the juntas of Leon and Galicia: inclosure No. 6 will show this state of feeling."

SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS to SIR H. WELLESLEY.

"Coruña, March 1, 1812.

"On the 20th ultimo I had the honour to despatch to your excellency a copy of my letter of that date to Lord Wellington, in which I acquainted his lordship that three battalions of the army of Galicia are preparing for embarkation for America, and that I had positively declined making, and would not permit the delivery of any British arms or stores for that service. I have now discovered, that in addition to these troops it is intended to send a division of horse-artillery, to equip which, orders have been given to transfer appointments from the cavalry of the army, and a demand is made for funds to prepare the ordnance, and even to adapt to colonial service more of the field-artillery which I lately delivered for the use of the sixth Gallician army. This measure has never been openly avowed by the government of Cadiz, it has never been communicated to the junta of this province by the regency. It has, I imagine, been concealed from your excellency, and it has only come to my knowledge, by the arrangements no longer to be hidden, which General Abadia is making to carry it into effect."

SECTION II.—CATALONIA.

Extract of a Letter from DON ANTONIO ROCCA.

(Translated.)

"Reus, January 20, 1811.

"While we have venal men, ignorant men, and perfidious men in our government, no good can befall us. He must be mad who can expect our condition to ameliorate. The venal are those who, without being called, seemingly abandon their own affairs, and introduce

themselves into the different branches of administration with no other view than to enrich themselves at the public expense. The ignorant are those who think themselves wise, and who either obtain by intrigue or accept without reluctance employments the duties of which they are not capable of discharging. The perfidious are all those who are indifferent spectators of this bloody struggle, and who care not for the issue, as they will equally submit to any master. Place no confidence, my friend, in these sort of persons, nothing can be expected from them, and yet by an inconceivable fatality which is attached to us, to the ruin of all parties, it would appear that the provinces employ none but these very people. Those who commend us are either venal or ignorant, or indifferent; at least the more we search for the remedy, the more our evil increases."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR CHARLES COTTON.

"April 24, 1811.

.... "With respect to the proposed plan of admitting supplies of grain in neutral vessels from the ports of the enemy, etc., I have no hesitation in saying I do not see sufficient reason to justify it in the present circumstances of this part of the Peninsula, as I have always found bread for sale at the different places on the coast, at the rate of above *two pounds and three quarters for the quarter of a dollar*, at which price I yesterday bought it at Escala. And as there has been of late more corn at Tarragona than money to purchase, I presume the latter has been the greater desideratum of the two."

.... "The difficulty of allowing a free passage of provisions from one part of the coast to the other would be lessened by being limited to vessels above the size of common fishing-boats, in which I have reason to believe considerable quantities have been carried to Barcelona; and Captain Bullen, I understand, found even a mortar in a boat of this description."

GENERAL C. DOYLE to CAPTAIN BULLEN.

"Ripol, April, 1811.

"Can you believe that in this town, *the only fabric of arms, six months* have passed without a firelock being made!!! They begin to-morrow, and give me two hundred and fifty every week, etc."

[Note.—The italics and notes of admiration are in the original.]

ADMIRAL FREEMANTLE to CAPTAIN CODRINGTON.

"Mahon, May 19, 1811.

"The uncertainty of everything connected with Spanish affairs is such, that I am tired of writing and explaining all that arises from their inconsistency and want of energy.

"Until eight o'clock I had understood that the intendant had procured 1000 quintals of biscuit for the army at Tarragona, which number I find on inquiry has dwindled to 57 bags. I have therefore been under the necessity of sending 500 bags, which we can very ill spare, from our own stores with a proportion of rice. I cannot tell you how much I have been worried and annoyed the last three days, particularly as I feel the very great importance Tarragona is to the Spaniards, and how much this island is connected with the event of the fall of that fortress. The intendant here has wrote that he has sent 232 bags of bread. You will have the goodness to explain that only 57 were procured by him, which I have engaged to pay for, and that all the rest comes immediately from our own stores, and are consequently at the disposal of the British authorities at Tarragona."

Extract of a Letter from SIR EDWARD PELLEW to CAPTAIN CODRINGTON.

"H.M. Ship *Caledonia*, July 22, 1811.

"The indecision, inactivity, and apparent disunion amongst the Spanish leaders has been the great cause of failure throughout the whole of this arduous contest, and is especially observable in the late events in Catalonia; nor until the patriots are directed by pure military councils and more energy and decision, can I permit myself to think that any effectual stand can be made against the invaders."

SIR EDWARD PELLEW to CAPTAIN CODRINGTON.

"August 2, 1811.

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, etc. The information therein conveyed affords me a very melancholy view of the affairs of the patriots, and gives me little reason to hope better things from their future exertions." . . . "A despatch which reached me by the same opportunity from the superior junta of Catalonia contains a proposal for occupying a position on the coast as a naval depôt, and the selection of Palamos is presented to my choice. It does not appear to me that the junta possesses at present resources for defending any such position, and from the measures being submitted to my determination, it seems to be expected that I should provide means of defending them while employed in securing themselves in their new station." "Yet whilst the noble spirit of this ill-fated people remains unsubdued, it would not be just to expect a total failure, although the loss of all confidence between them and the privileged orders, and the want of leaders among themselves who possess either skill or competency to guide them, afford but a very precarious prospect of their doing anything effectual to stop the invaders.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR E. PELLEW.

"November 1, 1811.

"By a letter from Captain Strong it seems the people of Cadagues in the early part of October openly refused assistance to the governor of the Medas islands, declaring that they only acknowledged the strongest party, and therefore paid their subscriptions to the French; and that upon the Bustard's going with a party of Spanish troops to enforce obedience, they rang the alarm-bell as the signal for the approach of an enemy, and sent to Rosas for assistance."

Extract of a Letter from CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to E. H. LOCKER, ESQ.

"February 7, 1812.

"Whilst the French pay the poor, who serve their purpose, at the expense of the rich, the Spaniards deal out severity to the lower classes, and oblige them to serve without pay and without clothes; and the debauched and profligate of higher life are in many instances rewarded, for imbecility, ignorance, and indifference to the fate of their country never yet exceeded, without one single example being made of the many traitors which have been discovered in the persons of priests, officers of rank, or what are termed gentlemen."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to GENERAL LACY.

"February 18, 1812.

"Being an eye-witness of the discontent of the people, which has arisen from their being partially disarmed, and knowing how fatal have been the consequences which have followed these practices on former occasions, I must own I cannot offer to the admiral my conviction of all that benefit arising from his good intentions in which I should otherwise have confided. The officers and men of the French army are walking about this part of the coast unarmed, because *the juntas and justices have concealed the muskets they had* at their disposal, and refused the people permission to attack the enemy. In the mean time the poor people, whose hearts are burning with patriotism, are starving for want of bread, and the richer citizens of this devoted country are supplying the enemy with corn and other species of provisions."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR E. PELLEW.

"Villa Nueva, February 22, 1812.

"I fear things are going on very ill in this principality from the sudden change in the system of General Lacy, and the consequent destruction of that confidence on the part of the people which was certainly the cause of his former successes. Nor can there be any doubt of the sound reason which guides the conduct of the Catalans on this occasion; for the mode in which General Lacy effected the dishonourable breach of faith of which they complain, bespeaks a mind practised in deception. He ordered the patriotic companies to be sent to

particular points in subdivisions, at which points General Sarsfield was to take forcible possession of them, and attach them to different corps of the regular army. And the discovery of this treachery was made by the letter to General Sarsfield falling by mistake into the hands of the officer who commanded the whole division of patriotic companies. In the mean time the discontent of the people gains ground with their sufferings, and instead of the Spanish army being increased by the late arbitrary mandate according to its avowed object, and not less probably in consequence of the late extraordinary conduct of General Sarsfield, many of the Catalan soldiers have actually passed over to the enemy."

"The letter of the Baron de Eroles in the gazette No. 10, shows that he was again deceived in the promised support of General Sarsfield on the 24th, and I am told he says publicly it was part of a settled plan to sacrifice him and his whole division."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR E. PELLEW.

"Villa Nueva de Sitjes, February 22, 1812.

"Nothing but a total change can produce permanent good; for the villanies of the intendant and commissary departments are so thoroughly organized, that not one link of the chain can be left with safety. I have good reason to think that even the money furnished by England is so employed in the traffic of corn, by the individuals through whose hands it passes, as to be the direct means of supplying the enemy."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to MR. H. WELLESLEY.

"March 1, 1812.

"The change of the regency will I trust produce a radical change of that diabolical system by which plunder has been openly licensed, and despotism and injustice towards the people, and even treachery itself, in those of a higher class, have hitherto passed with impunity."

SECTION III.—VALENCIA AND MURCIA.

The councillor of state, MARIANO ORQUIJO, to KING JOSEPH.

"Madrid, Decembre 4, 1810.

"Je viens de voir le proviseur et vicaire général qui fut arrêté à Logrogne par les insurgés. Son opinion prononcée en faveur de V. M. lui a attiré toutes sortes de mauvais traitements et de disgraces, mais enfin il est parvenu à se sauver de Valence. Il m'a rapporté que l'esprit public de cette capitale a beaucoup changé depuis que le Général Caro (frère de Romana) s'est livré aux vexations et aux dilapidations de toute espèce, et que son opinion est qu'on n'y éprouvera aucune résistance. L'Archevêque de Valence, qui jouit à présent d'une grande influence, lui a souvent parlé en secret d'une manière favorable de V. M. et de ses ministres. C'est à l'Archevêque qu'il est redevable de son evasion. Ce prélat m'ayant connu ainsi que à M. de Montarco dans d'autres tems le chargea de nous voir. Le Général Bassecourt n'était nullement considéré. Le proviseur ajoute qu'à Alicant d'où il est parti le 14 Novembre, tout était rempli, de réfugiés de Cadix. D'après tout ce qu'il m'a dit, je conte qu' aussitôt la prise de Tortoze, Valence se rendra sans coup férir. J'ai renvoyé ce proviseur à Monsieur de Santa Fé qui la protégé en sa qualité de ministre des affaires ecclesiastiques et qui fut très sensible au malheur qui lui arriva à Logrogne."

GENERAL DOYLE to MR. STUART.

"March 8, 1811.

"There is a strong French party in Valencia. It is a sad thing that we cannot *sacar Partido* of that kingdom, in which are more resources than in all the other provinces of Spain. With my head I answer for it that in one month 2000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry, independent of the existing army, which is 1500 effective cavalry and 11,000 infantry, could be raised, and there is money enough within the city to pay them for six months, and without looking elsewhere for assistance to clothe them. There is abundance of cloth, and provisions in

abundance, yet Valencia is doing nothing ! and this time so precious, while Massena draining all the rest of the Peninsula gives us time to organize. We want a Robespierre in the government, and another in every province ! !”

COLONEL ROCHE to MR. STUART.

“Carthagera, June 20, 1811.

“After three years leaving them to themselves, this army (the Murcian) is everywhere in a worse state absolutely than it was in the commencement of the revolution.”

“The fact is that the Spaniards have no confidence in their general, nor he in them, and thus Freire apprehends if he fights his people will disperse. Valencia, with an immense population and great resources, is doing little. Bassecour retired to Cuenca. The same indolence, lassitude, and egotism prevails through the country, and I see little stimulus produced by the establishment of the cortes ; that feeling of enthusiasm which existed is fast dying away. The thing in the world most agreeable to the Spaniards at this moment would be to be allowed to be neuter, and that England and France should fight the battle and pay all the expenses.”

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to the HONOURABLE H. WELLESLEY.

“September 8, 1811.

“After ascertaining that much art was employed to disgust the army with General Blake, and at the same time to prejudice the people against their officers, I relied upon the purity of my motives, and opened the subject to the general with the candour and freedom it required. I had great satisfaction in finding him well aware of all that was passing, and upon his guard as to the consequences. Upon my mentioning that certain hand-bills were posted up, he produced and gave me the enclosed copies. He told me that upon obtaining them he went to the Marquis of Palacios, who, necessarily agreeing in their evil tendency, consented to accompany the general to the palace of the archbishop, where I trust measures were adopted to prevent a repetition of the misconduct of the Padre Igual and his numerous bigoted coadjutors. I submitted to the general's attention the fatal effects of his quitting this part of the Peninsula, while the minds of the people were in such a state of fermentation, and allowing the supreme authority to revert to the Marquis of Palacios. He assured me that he clearly saw the danger which would arise from it; he had determined on no account to do so until the marquis was removed by the government from his present situation.”

MR. TUPPER'S report to SIR H. WELLESLEY.

(Extract.)

“January, 27, 1812.

“The scandalous behaviour of the members of the junta will have more influence upon the public mind, will dishearten the people even more than the fall of Valencia and the dispersion of the army. For seeing their representatives return to their respective districts, it will give an example to follow that all is lost, and having no authority to protect them or to look to, the people have no other resource left than to submit to the yoke of the enemy.”

Extracts from MR. TUPPER'S report to SIR H. WELLESLEY from 22 to 27 January, 1812.

“Blake with his immense resources remained altogether inactive, and contented himself with observing the movements of the enemy, and his progress in fortifying himself under the walls of the city.”

“With Blake's approbation I had raised a corps of about 180 men to act as guerillas, and by beginning a plan of offensive operations I expected to see the example followed. I also demanded the direction of the chief battery, that of Santa Catalina, from whence the French camp might be much annoyed, and for the space of thirty successive days caused the French considerable damage in killed and wounded. Excepting this battery, that of St. Joseph contiguous to it, and that of the Puente del Mar, everything else remained in a state of complete inactivity. Blake, lulled into a state of confidence that the enemy would not attack without reinforcements, had taken no measures whatever.”

"The junta of Valencia was composed of members, as per list enclosed, of which only the first remained, the others having before retired and shamefully gone to their respective homes; but upon the fall of the capital where they had their property, those remaining sent in their resignation to Mahi, and without being competent to do so, gave up the only representative authority of the province which had been confided to them, and have thus thrown the whole country into a state of anarchy, abandoning it altogether at the will of the enemy; yet I am persuaded the spirit of the people is the same, great resources are left in the province, immense riches still remain in the churches, convents, diezmos, etc., etc." . . . "I am however sorry to say that since the fall of the capital, nay, since the battle of the 26th ultimo, not a single step has been taken, and at this moment outside the walls of Alicante the province does not exist.—Mahi has objected to Padre Rico, the only man in my opinion, and in that of everybody, capable of giving activity and soul to the resources of the country."

. . . "I am sorry to inform your excellency that after repeated interviews with Mahi and the intendant Rivas, on the subject of the commission I had proposed, I am now clearly of the opinion from the repeated delays and studied objections that no authority will be established." . . . "In short nothing has been done, and nothing will be done."

"I am firmly of opinion that the people now in authority are disposed, by leaving public affairs in their present abandoned state, to submit to the French yoke."—"On the 16th ultimo, when Montbrun made his appearance, the Ayuntamiento desired the Syndico Personero to give a petition in the name of the people to enter into a capitulation; he refused; but I am informed there was some arrangement between the governor and the Ayuntamiento, the members whereof remain in office notwithstanding their traitorous conduct on the 16th."

SECTION IV.—ANDALUSIA.

GENERAL GRAHAM to MR. STUART.

"9th May, 1810.

"Nothing new here; the regency and the junta are as usual more asleep than awake, and I can augur nothing good from the government remaining in such hands—let their intentions be ever so good. Nothing but the assembly of the cortes, and from thence springing up a revolutionary system, overturning abuses and interesting the people in their own cause by solid and permanent, instead of contingent and prospective reforms, calling forth talents if to be found for the chief situations, and enforcing vigour and rousing enthusiasm. Nothing but some great change (such as we might in the beginning have assisted in bringing about) can carry on this war to any good result. The people are obstinate in their hatred of the French, and from that alone spring the fits of patriotism and loyalty which keep alive the flame in some place or another. That it is so one cannot doubt from the effects, but it is never to be met with where one is, at least I have never yet seen enthusiasm though I have heard of it. Hence the bulk of the people seem to be completely indifferent to what is going on, and all seem most unwilling to submit to the deprivation of any comfort, and to the sacrifices which a state of siege requires. They would be very well pleased to have anything done for them, and to see the enemy driven away, that they might go to eat strawberries at Chiclana, and they are much disposed to blame our inactivity, especially that of the navy, in permitting the enemy to have advanced so near on the point of Trocadero. The destruction of these two forts at first was certainly a great error in Admiral Purvis; had they been kept up and well garrisoned as they support one another, it would have been a very tedious operation to have reduced them. Meanwhile you will hear that the improvidence of the junta, and their denial of any such risk to Mr. Wellesley, placed the bread provision of the town in much too precarious a situation; in short, they completely deceived him by their assurances of the most ample means of subsistence, and both flour and wheat have been sent away since he came."

MR. WELLESLEY to MR. STUART.

"Isla de Leon, February 5, 1811.

"Blake is becoming very unpopular, and I think his reign will be short. He is supposed to be by no means partial to the English. I know not whether you will approve of the

appointments to Estremadura and Galicia, but I am sure you will be surprised to hear that General Mahi is appointed to command the army of the centre. I communicated confidentially to General Blake the copy of the letter which you forwarded to me from General Walker, taking care to conceal General Walker's name, so that Blake was fully apprised of our opinion of General Mahi previously to his appointment of him to the command in Murcia."

MR. VAUGHAN to MR. STUART.

"Cadiz, February 27, 1811.

"It grieves me to see from day to day how little is done by the Spaniards, and how little is likely to be done. The cortes have not given a new impulse to the war as was expected. They look to their regency for plans of reform for their armies, and their regency is worse than any former government. Blake, of whom I know that you as well as the world in general have a good opinion, does nothing. He refuses to reform abuses that are pointed out to him, passes his days in deliberation upon questions of no moment, and is in my opinion decidedly adverse to the English. Whittingham's plan (disciplining a separate corps), which was approved of before his arrival, he has endeavoured by every kind of trick to reject or render useless."

"The cortes is full of priests, who, united with the Catalans, are for preserving the old routine of business, and adverse to everything that can give energy and vigour to the operations of government. Fanaticism and personal interest direct their opinions; Arguelles and his party are anxious that something should be done to remedy the disgraceful state of their armies. I have no doubt but that they would remove the present government, though the friends of Blake, if there was any chance of the Catalan party permitting them to elect a better."

"Be assured, my dear Stuart, that the cortes is, as at present constituted, anything but revolutionary or jacobinical. They love their monarchy, and are anxious to maintain the inquisition in all its forms, the only branch of government to which they seem disposed to communicate any energy. If there is not soon some new spirit infused into the cortes, it will become an overgrown junta, meddling with every paltry detail of police, and neglecting the safety of their country—and the regency will be content to reign (very badly) over Cadiz and the Isla."

MR. VAUGHAN to MR. STUART.

"Cadiz, August 5, 1811.

"The temper of the public mind at Cadiz is very bad, the press has lately teemed with publications filled with reproaches of the English."

"The regency and cortes have lost all influence everywhere, and the distress for money added to the general depression here after the campaign in Estremadura may possibly throw us into a state of anarchy."

"I am somewhat alarmed by the state of the Serrano de Ronda; the Spanish generals have been quarrelling, and the peasants declare they are tired of the abuses committed there, and that it is reported they mean to capitulate with the French."

GENERAL GRAHAM to MR. STUART.

"Isla de Leon, April 24, 1811.

"The Spanish government has published an official narrative of the expedition (Barosa) full of misrepresentations and blinking the question of the cause of failure entirely—this has obliged me to add something to what I wrote before to Mr. Wellesley. There are some instances of impudence supporting falsehood beyond example. The *proud* Spaniard is no less *vain* I think."

GENERAL GRAHAM to MR. STUART.

"Isla, May 6, 1811.

"The government here supported by the cortes seemed to be determined to adhere with blind obstinacy and pride to a system that has nearly brought the cause to ruin, and notwithstanding Lord Wellington's great efforts, they are playing Buonaparte's game so positively that I despair of any great good."

COLONEL AUSTIN to MR. STUART.

"Faro, March 24, 1811.

"Whether Ballasteros is authorized by his government to pursue the steps he has taken, I know not, but I certainly cannot but consider them as just and necessary. The junta de Seville is a mere farce supported at an immense expense without the least utility or benefit, and preserving in its train a number of idle characters who ought to be employed in the defence of the nation, but who now only add to its burthens. I have had many negotiations with the junta, and though I have always kept up appearances through policy, yet I have found, in the room of the honour and candour which ought to characterize it, nothing but chicanery and dissimulation."

GENERAL CARROL to MR. STUART.

"Olivenza, April 29, 1811.

"Would to Heaven that the Spanish armies, or, more properly speaking, the skeletons of the Spanish armies, were under his lordship's (Wellington's) command; we might in that case do great things, but alas! our pride seems to increase with our misfortunes, and is only equalled by our ignorance!"

MR. STUART to LORD WELLESLEY.

"July 13, 1811.

"I have endeavoured to throw together the numbers, etc., of the different guerillas, etc., which clearly demonstrate the false exaggerations circulated respecting that description of force; though their appearance in different parts has most unreasonably increased the alarm of the enemy and proportionable confidence of the Spaniards, they cannot be calculated to exceed in the aggregate 25,000 or 30,000 men at the utmost."

Note.—Here follows a list of the Partidas, with their numbers and stations, too long to insert.

MR. WELLESLEY to MR. STUART.

"Cadiz, July 31, 1811.

"Nothing can be more wretched than the state of affairs here; the regents are held in universal contempt, and such is the want of talent, I can hardly hope that a change will make any improvement: the treasury is empty, and no probability of the arrival of any money from America, so that affairs are really in a worse state than they have been at any time since the commencement of the war."

*Extract from the manifesto of the Spanish regency.**"January 23, 1812.*

"There have reached the government the cries of the armies which defend us, depicting their painful privations; the groans of the inhabitants of districts ready to fall under the yoke of the barbarous invaders; the complaints of the provinces already occupied, always loyal though oppressed and laid waste."

"Cease now, and henceforward, all personal pretensions; the ill-understood feelings of interest dictated by provincial spirit; exemptions unjustly demanded at this period of desolation, writings which, while they ought to create the most ardent patriotism, to unite and enlighten the nation, appear inspired by the enemy for the purpose of enslaving it."

SECTION V.—PRIVATEERS.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR E. PELLEW.

"Arens de Mar, August 23, 1811.

"I have numberless complaints of the Spanish privateers that come upon the coast, and I am sure it would be a benefit to the country if they were all deprived of their commission. They do nothing but plunder the inhabitants of those places which are occasionally overrun by the French armies, and who embrace the opportunity of their absence to carry on a little trade with other parts of the Peninsula."

DITTO to SIR H. WELLESLEY.

"Valencia, September 8, 1811.

"I trust some decisive measures will be taken to abolish altogether a system of privateering nothing short of piracy; and in which the vessels from Gibraltar seem to take the lead. I have great reason to believe that they plunder the unfortunate vessels of all countries by hoisting whatever colours may answer their purposes of assumed national hostility; and as we never hear of their attacking each other, I have no doubt that the British and French flags are often united in furtherance of this predatory warfare. The numberless complaints which I receive from all parts of the coast, and the difficulty of trading betwixt Catalonia and Valencia, on account of the privateers which swarm in these seas, drive many into an intercourse with Barcelona and other places in the occupation of the enemy, in order to get a livelihood."

DITTO to ADMIRAL PENROSE, *Valencia.*

"The depredations of the Gibraltar privateers have been carried on to such an extent, in all parts of the Mediterranean, as to bring serious reflections upon the British flag."

SECTION VI.—FRENCH PRISONERS AT CABRERA.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to E. LOCKER, ESQ.

"September 18, 1811.

"I cannot at all events think it a wise measure to receive into Colonel Whittingham's corps the prisoners at Cabrera, who have long ago withstood the offers of General Roche, *when naked as they were born, and fighting for each other's miserable rations to prolong an existence inconceivably wretched, in hopes of rejoining the French.*"

SIR H. WELLESLEY to CAPTAIN CODRINGTON.

"October 10, 1811.

"With regard to the French prisoners at Cabrera, I procured from the Spanish government long since an order to the governor of the Balearic Islands to suspend all negotiations with the French on that subject, and not on any account to consent to exchange them."

No. XIII.

SECTION I.—SIEGE OF TARRAGONA.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR C. COTTON.

"Tarragona, May 15, 1811.

"During the panic which seems to have prevailed upon the unexpected arrival of the French army, the greatest exertions and the most extensive sacrifices appear to have been readily submitted to. But from the present apathy and indifference in those who should set an example of activity, and from the general deficiency of ordnance stores, I by no means consider the place in that state of security which the strength of its works and position would otherwise lead me to expect."

"A well-planned sortie was made yesterday, but failed through the backwardness of some

of the officers employed in it."—"I had the satisfaction of being assured by an officer, who conspicuously did his duty on this occasion, and who was outflanked by the enemy, from the backwardness of the column directed to support him, that he attributes the salvation of his troops entirely to the fire from the shipping."

DITTO to DITTO.

"Blake, off Villa Nueva, June 15, 1811.

"Leaving Tarragona on the 16th (May), we reached Peniscola in the forenoon of the 17th."
—"From thence General Doyle wrote to General O'Donnel an account of the situation of Tarragona and of my detaining Captain Adam at Peniscola, in readiness to receive any reinforcement which he might be pleased to send to that garrison. Upon our arrival off Murviedro, we found General O'Donnel had already ordered the embarkation of 2300 infantry and 211 artillery-men."—"Delivering to General O'Donnel 2000 stand of arms, accoutrements, and clothing to enable him to bring into the field as many recruits already trained as would supply the place of the regular soldiers; thus detached from his army, we proceeded to Valencia and landed the remainder of our cargo, by which means the troops of General Villa Campa, then dispersed as peasantry for want of arms, were enabled again to take the field, and the corps of Mina and the Empecinado completed in all the requisites of active warfare."

"At Alicant we proceeded to take in as many necessary materials for Tarragona as the ship would actually stow, besides 80 artillery-men and a considerable quantity of powder, ball-cartridge, etc., sent in the *Paloma* Spanish corvette from Carthage in company with a Spanish transport from Cadiz deeply laden with similar supplies."

"After returning to Valencia, where we landed the additional arms, etc., for the Aragonese army, we moved on to Murviedro, where the Conde of Bispal proceeded from Valencia to join us in a consultation with his brother, although, on account of his wound, he was very unfit for such a journey. The result of this conference was a determination on the part of General O'Donnel to commit to my protection, for the succour of Tarragona, another division of his best troops under General Miranda, consisting of 4000 men, whilst he himself would move forward with the remainder of his army to the banks of the Ebro."

"The frequent disappointments which the brave Catalan army had heretofore met with from Valencian promises, made the sight of so extensive and disinterested a reinforcement the more truly welcome, because the less expected, and the admiration which was thus created in the besieged appeared to produce proportionate anxiety on the part of the enemy."

"I shall direct the whole of my attention to the neighbourhood of Tarragona, in readiness for harassing the retreat of the French, if General Suchet should unfortunately be obliged to raise the siege, and for re-embarking and restoring to General O'Donnel whatever may remain of the Valencian troops, according to the solemn pledge he exacted from me before he would consent thus to part with the flower and strength of his army. He even went so far as to declare, in the presence of General Miranda, the principal officer of his staff, General Doyle, Captain Adam, Captain White, and myself, that he considered me as entirely answerable for the safety of the kingdom of Valencia, and that if I failed in redeeming my pledge he would resign his command for that particular account."

"It is but justice to myself, however, that I should tell you that I did most distinctly warn General O'Donnel, that I would in no case answer for his army if placed under the immediate command of Campo Verde, for any distant inland operation, more particularly as I knew that in addition to his own deficiency in ability, he was surrounded by people whose advice and whose conduct was in no case to be relied on."

DITTO to DITTO.

"Blake, Tarragona, June 22, 1811.

"I found upon my last return here an arrangement made, that in case of the enemy gaining the Puerto, General Sarsfield should retire to the Mole with part of his division, from whence I had only to assist, but was much astonished to find, by a message, through Colonel

Green, from General Contreras, that although he had heard of such a disposition being made by General Sarsfield, and assented to by the English squadron, it had not his official knowledge or approbation."—"I understand that an order had arrived in the morning from the Marquis of Campo Verde for General Velasco to take the command of the Puerto, and for General Sarsfield to join his army, that the latter had given up his command to some colonel at about three o'clock, who was, by his own confession, totally unfit for it, and that General Velasco only arrived in time to find the Spanish troops flying in confusion from the want of being properly commanded, and the French assaulting the place."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR E. PELLEW.

"Mataro, November 1, 1811.

"Having stated in a letter to Sir Charles Cotton, on the 22nd June last, that I understand General Sarsfield had quitted the Puerto and embarked without the knowledge of General Contreras (which indeed was the substance of a message sent me by General Contreras himself), I owe it to an officer of General Sarsfield's high military character to declare my conviction that the statement there made by General Contreras is absolutely false and unfounded, and I beg leave to enclose in justification of my present opinion—1st, a passport sent by General Contreras to General Sarsfield in consequence as he alleged of an order from the Marquis of Campo Verde. 2nd. An abstract from the manifesto of the marquis, in which he disavows having any knowledge of the passports. 3rd. A letter from General Contreras to General Sarsfield in answer to one written by the latter requesting to see the order by which he was directed to quit the Puerto at such a critical moment, in which he says 'that he cannot send him a copy of that letter, because it is confidential, but that his presence is necessary at the head-quarters to assist in the operations about to take place for the relief of the garrison, and that he has not a moment to lose.' 4th. The copy of another letter written on the same day by General Contreras to the superior junta, in which he says that General Sarsfield quitted the Puerto without his knowledge !!!"

GENERAL DOYLE to COLONEL ROCHE.

"June 23, 1811.

"Is it possible to conceive anything so absurd, and I could almost say *wicked*, as the conduct of the junta or captain-general of Carthagena in taking away the firelocks from the regiments *they sent with such a parade of their patriotism to relieve Tarragona*? Two thousand men are already in this city without firelocks, such is the daily destruction of arms by the enemy's fire and the getting out of repair from constant use."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR CHARLES COTTON.

"Off Tarragona, June 23, 1811.

"Another regiment arrived from Carthagena yesterday under convoy of the Cossack, but, as on a former occasion, their arms were taken from them by Colonel Roche, upon their going to embark, and therefore, as being of no use to the garrison, I have by desire of the general sent them to Villa Nueva, and as there are already 2000 men in the place without arms, I have sent the *Termagant* to Carthagena, to endeavour to procure those which have been thus inconsiderately taken from the troops belonging to that place."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR C. COTTON.

(Extract.)

"June 29, 1811.

"The *Regulus*, with five transports including a victualler, arrived with Colonel Skerrett and his detachments on the 26th. The surf was so great on that day that we had no other communication in the forenoon than by a man swimming on shore with a letter, and upon Colonel Skerrett putting questions to General Doyle and myself upon the conduct he should pursue according to his orders, we agreed in our opinion that although the arrival of the troops before

the Puerto (lower town) was taken would probably have saved the garrison, it was now too late, and that their being landed, if practicable, would only serve to prolong the fate of the place for a very short time at the certain sacrifice of the whole eventually. This opinion was grounded on a number of different circumstances, and was in perfect coincidence with that of Captains Adam and White. In the evening the surf abated sufficiently for General Doyle, Colonel Skerrett, and some of his officers, as well as the captains of the squadron and myself, to wait upon General Contreras, who repeated his determination to cut his way out and join the Marquis of Campo Verde *the instant the enemy's breaching battery should open*, and which he expected would take place the following morning, and who agreed the English ought not to land with any view of defending the town, although he wished them to join in his meditated sortie."

Extracts from GENERAL CONTRERAS' report.

(Translated.)

"I saw myself reduced to my own garrison."—"I considered if my force was capable of this effort (defending the breach), one of the most heroic that war furnishes, and to which few men can bring themselves. I recollected however that *I had still 8000 of the best and most experienced troops in Spain.*"—"All conspired against this poor garrison. Campo Verde in quitting the place promised to come back quickly to its succour, but he did not, although he daily renewed his promises. The kingdom of Valencia sent Miranda with a division which disembarked, and the day following re-embarked, and went to join Campo Verde.

"An English division came on the 26th, Colonel Skerrett, who commanded them, came in the evening to confer with me and to demand what I wished him to do. *I replied that if he would disembark and enter the place, he should be received with joy and treated as he merited; that he had only to choose the point that he wished to defend and I would give it to him, but that all was at his choice, since I would neither command nor counsel him.* The 27th, the English commandants of artillery and engineers came to examine the front attacked, and being convinced that the place was not in a state to resist, returned to their vessels, and then all went away from the place they came to succour.

"*This abandonment on the part of those who came to save was the worst of all; it made such an impression on the soldiers, that they began to see that they were lost, became low-spirited, and only resisted from my continual exhortations, and because they saw my coolness and the confidence I had that if they executed my orders the French would fail. But this only lasted a few hours, the notion of being abandoned again seized them and overcame all other ideas.*"

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR C. COTTON.

"12th July, 1811.

"The vacillating conduct of General Contreras regarding the defence of Tarragona is a principal feature in the loss of that important fortress."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR E. PELLEW.

"12th July, 1811.

"The marquis blames Generals Caro and Miranda, whilst the latter retort the accusation; and I am inclined to think that in giving full credit to what each says of the other, neither will suffer ignominy beyond that to which his conduct has entitled him."

DITTO to MR. WELLESLEY.

(Extract.)

"20th July, 1811.

"The disasters which have befallen the principality will produce material accusations against the generals who lately commanded in it, without, I fear, any of them meeting the punishment which is their due. Some of the enclosed papers may help you to form a just opinion of their conduct and that of the Spanish marine; and those respecting the arms for which I sent to Carthagená will show how far Colonel Roche is entitled to the merit which he so largely assumes on that occasion."

"To enable you to form a correct opinion of General Contreras I must refer you to General Doyle, as from his ignorance of our service, the various requests and proposals which arose from the vacillations in what he called his determinations, were signified to me through him. It does not appear to me that he ever visited the works himself, or it would not have fallen to the lot of Captain Adams and myself to remove two boats, two large stages, sixteen gun-carriages, and a mortar from the mole, long after the French were advanced beyond the Francoli battery, and two nights previous to their gaining the Puerto; an accidental visit to the mole one night, just after placing the gun-boats and launches, discovered to me this mortar with no less than 12 guns in readiness for forming a battery; and upon General Doyle, by my request, representing this to the general of artillery, he talked of *inquiring into it to-morrow*."

"It would be a waste of words to describe further the conduct of the general of artillery, or I might find sufficient subject in the events of every passing day from the first investment of the place."—"I shall be very ready to come forward personally in aid of that justice which is due to the numberless brave men who fell a sacrifice to the criminality of the persons alluded to who have so grossly misconducted themselves."

SECTION II.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR E. PELLEW.

"29th July, 1811.

"Had Colonel Green, the military agent appointed to succeed General Doyle, adopted the plan of his predecessor of continuing at the head-quarters of the army and in personal communication with the captain-general instead of retiring to Peniscola with the money and arms remaining, we should not be left as we are to the precarious source of mere accidental communications for receiving intelligence."

DITTO to DON F. SAVARTES, vocal of the Junta.

"28th July, 1811.

"—Colonel Green, the British military agent, being at Peniscola, I have opened the letter from the junta to him."—"Had I not in this instance opened the letters to the admiral and the military agent, the junta would have received no answer to them until it would have been too late to execute their object."

CAPTAIN THOMAS to CAPTAIN CODRINGTON.

(Extract.)

"H. M. S. Undaunted, off Arens, 7th Oct., 1811.

"Having observed, in the *Catalonia Gazette* of the 24th of September, the copy of a letter said to be written by Colonel Green, to his excellency General Lacy, relative to our operations on the Medas Islands, from the surrender of the castle to the period of our quitting them, I beg leave to state to you my surprise and astonishment at seeing facts so grossly misrepresented, and request you will be pleased to contradict in the most positive manner the assertions there made use of. To prove how inconsistent this letter is with real facts, it may be necessary for me only to say that Colonel Green, in the presence and hearing of all the English officers, on my asking him a question relative to the practicability of keeping the island, did declare that he had nothing to do with the expedition; that my instructions pointed him out as a volunteer only; but immediately after, in the hearing of all, did declare it to be his opinion that the island was not tenable.

"As I understood it was intended to form an establishment on the larger island, I judged it proper to retire from it for a short time and destroy the remains of the castle, which might induce the enemy to withdraw from the works he had thrown up, and thereby afford our ally an opportunity whenever he chose to occupy them again, to fortify himself without molestation; and this supposition it has appeared was well grounded. But while the ruins of the castle stood, it was an object of jealousy to the French; nor would they in my opinion have

quitted the ground they occupied, nor the Spaniards have been enabled to settle themselves, had this measure not been adopted. I therefore gave orders for embarking the guns and stores.

"If necessary, I could say much more on the subject of this most extraordinary letter; the few remarks I have made will, I think, be sufficient. As an act of courtesy to Colonel Green, on landing the marines I directed the marine officers to receive their orders from him; but military aid was not necessary, for you may recollect before the expedition sailed, on your informing me that General Lacy had offered some Spanish troops, and asking how many I thought would be necessary, my answer was 'about forty;' and I have no hesitation in declaring that without the assistance of even a single soldier the castle would have fallen into our hands as speedily as it did on this occasion.

SECTION III.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON'S orders to CAPTAIN ADAM, of the *Invincible*.

"July 1st, 1811.

"You are hereby directed, in consequence of a representation made to me by General Doyle, to proceed towards Majorca in search of the Spanish frigates *Prueba*, *Diana*, and *Astrea*, which the general reports to be going to that island (contrary to orders) with the treasure, archives of the province, and the vessels laden with stores and ammunition destined for the inland fortresses of Catalonia, together with the officers and soldiers who were saved from Tarragona, and who are required to join the army immediately. Upon meeting them you are to deliver the accompanying order for them to return here, and you are, if necessary, to enforce obedience."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR CHARLES COTTON.

"Villa Nueva, 3rd July, 1811.

"I should feel the more hurt by being driven to adopt such a measure had not the whole conduct both of the *Prueba* and *Diana* made their captains a disgrace to the situation they hold. These two frigates remained quiet spectators of the British squadron engaging the batteries of the enemy on the 22nd of last month, and never attempted to give any assistance to the garrison, except by now and then sending a gun-boat to join those manned by the English. They did not assist in the embarkation of the numberless women, children, and wounded soldiers, until goaded into it by the orders of General Contreras, after I had already sent above 2000 to this place; and even when I had no longer any transports for their reception, the captain of the *Prueba* refused to receive some wounded officers.

DITTO to DITTO.

"18th July, 1811.

"I cannot describe to you the difficulties which I have been put to by the misconduct of all the Spanish ships and vessels of war which I have had to communicate with upon the coast with exception of the *Astrea* frigate and the *Paloma* corvette. In the others I have seen neither courage to oppose the enemy nor humanity to alleviate the distresses of their countrymen."—"I have heard also that the *Algeiras*, which lately arrived at Arens, has landed the stores and ammunition with which she was charged, at the risk of their falling into the hands of the enemy, and has quitted the station!"

SECTION IV.

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR E. PELLEW.

"12th July, 1811.

"General Milans is collecting a mixture of troops, consisting of those who have escaped the enemy."

"He speaks loudly of his indifference to a command, while he boasts that if he were captain-general he would raise 40,000 men and clear the country of the enemy! But in the midst of this disgusting rhodomontade it is not difficult to see that self-interest is the main-

spring of all his actions, and that instead of raising an army he is more likely, by the system he has adopted, to shake the stability of that which is still left for the defence of the principality."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to SIR H. WELLESLEY.

"September 1, 1811.

"The affair of General Milans" (namely, the sending of corn to Barcelona under his passport) "which I mentioned to you in my last private letter, is still involved in mystery, which I hope however to penetrate upon my return to Arens de Mar. The Mataro papers reported that two soldiers were shot and a serjeant flogged at Arena for suffering corn to pass their guard at Mongat on its way to Barcelona. The *fact* of the punishment is I believe truly stated but the *cause* no less falsely, entirely as I suspect with the view of terminating my investigation into this nefarious traffic. General Lacy, instead of answering my letter, refers me by word of mouth to the junta, and the deputation from the junta, who went to Mataro (as they assured me) purposely to investigate the business, now tell me that it is an affair purely military, and refer me to General Milans himself.

SECTION V.

Extract from a minute made by CAPTAIN CODRINGTON.

"Mattaro, July 6, 1811.

"Colonel O'Ronan, aide-de-camp to the Marquis of Campo Verde, arrived, and informed me that he came from the marquis, who was on his march to this town or Arens, for the purpose of embarking all the infantry not Catalans, and the whole of the remaining cavalry, leaving the horses on the beach. Colonel O'Ronan said this determination was the result of a junta, composed of the marquis, General St. Juan, General Caro, General Miranda, the general of artillery, Brigadier Santa Cruz, Velasco, and Sarsfield; that after the thing had been proposed and discussed a long time, Sarsfield was the first to give his vote, and he rose from his seat and said, 'Any officer who could give such an opinion must be a traitor to his country, and that he and his division would stand or fall with the principality.' Every other officer was of a contrary opinion, except the marquis (it afterwards appeared that Santa Cruz also supported Sarsfield), who thought with Sarsfield, and yet it seems he allowed himself to be led on by the other generals. *In short, it appears he was resolved to abandon the principality.*

"I told him, without hesitation, that to embark the Valencians I felt a duty to General O'Donnel, to the kingdom of Valencia, and to the whole nation, but that I felt it equally my duty upon no account to embark the army of Catalonia, and thus become a party concerned in the abandonment of a province I had been sent to protect."—"The colonel, who could not venture on shore again lest he should be murdered by the inhabitants of Mattaro, for having been the bearer of a commission to arrest Brigadier Milans about a month ago, sent to the marquis my answer."

Extract from a minute of information given by the BARON D'EROLES.

"July 9, 1811.

"The Baron d'Eroles was appointed Captain-General of Catalonia by the junta of general officers, of which the Marquis of Campo Verde was president, and by the voice of the people. His reply was, that so long as the army continued in the principality, and that there was a senior general officer, he would not admit it, but that the moment the army passed the frontier (it was then at Agramunt, in full march to Aragon), he would accept the command, unmindful of the dreadful situation in which he should place himself, but he would do so in order to continue the struggle, and to prevent anarchy and confusion. In this state things were when General Lacy arrived. The baron instantly sought him, could not find, but met one of his aide-de-camps, by whom he wrote to him to say what had occurred, but that he was resolved to support General Lacy in his command, not only with all his local influence, but by his personal exertions, and that he would immediately join him to put this resolution in practice."

Extract from GENERAL DOYLE'S Letter after seeing the above.

"The Valencian division, that is to say, 2400 of the 4300 soldiers who disembarked in this province, are now on board to return to Valencia. General Miranda says the desertion took place in consequence of the marquis's determination to proceed to Aragon, which made them believe they would not be embarked. In short, most disgraceful has been the conduct of this division, and the marquis, as you will see by this letter to me, attaches to it no small portion of blame."

CAPTAIN CODRINGTON to the MARQUIS of CAMPO VERDE.

"Blake, July 5, 1811.

"I have to remind you that by ordering the Valencian division out of Tarragona, in breach of the terms by which I bound myself when I brought them, you yourself broke the pledge given by me, and dissolved the contract."

Extracted from CAPTAIN CODRINGTON'S papers.

"Minute of a conference betwixt Generals Caro and Miranda with General Doyle and myself this day.

"July 9, 1811.

"About eight o'clock Generals Caro and Miranda came on board the *Blake*. After being seated in the cabin with General Doyle and myself, General Caro begged General Doyle would explain to me, that they were come in consequence of my promise, to request I would embark the division of Valencian troops which I had brought from Peniscola. I desired to know what promise General Caro understood me to have made? He answered, that I would take the above troops back to Valencia. I denied positively that I had made any promise to re-embark them if they should ever join the Marquis of Campo Verde, although I had deeply pledged myself to restore them to General O'Donnel if they joined in a sortie from the garrison, which I was very confident would be decisive of its success. I then referred General Miranda to a similar explanation, which I gave to him, through General Doyle, on the day after our quitting Peniscola, when he had said he was ordered, both by his written instructions and by verbal explanation from General O'Donnel, not to land within the garrison. General Miranda instantly repeated that so he was; upon which General Doyle, to whom he had shown those instructions jointly with myself, after leaving Tarragona for Villa Nueva, when under a difficulty as to how he should proceed, referred him to them again, when it appearing that he was therein positively ordered 'Desembarear en la plaza de Tarragona,' General Doyle stopped.

"General Miranda. 'Ah! but read on.'

"General Doyle. 'No, sir, there is the positive proof of your receiving such an order.'

"General Miranda. 'Well, but read on.'

"General Doyle. 'No, sir. This (*pointing to the paper*) is the positive proof of your receiving such an order, which we wanted to establish, because you positively denied it.'

"Upon this General Caro, shrugging up his shoulders, said, 'he was not aware of there being any such order.' And General Miranda again requested General Doyle would read on.

"General Doyle. 'For what purpose?'

"General Miranda. 'To prove that I was not to shut myself up with the division in the plaza de Tarragona.'

"General Doyle. 'There is no occasion, sir, for any proof of that, for it was a part of the very stipulation made by Captain Codrington when he strongly pledged himself to General O'Donnel.'

"General Doyle continued—'And now, General Caro, that we have proved to you that General Miranda had orders to land in Tarragona, and that Captain Codrington is bound by no such promise as you had imagined, I must inform you that he has been eight days upon the coast with all the ships of war and transports which are wanted for other services, for the sole purpose of embarking these troops; and he desires me to add that in consideration of

what is due to the liberal and exemplary assistance afforded by General O'Donnel and Valencia in aid of Tarragona, but not at all on account of any pledge he has been said to have given, that he will use the same exertion in re-embarking and restoring the troops which he would have done if so bound by his word of honour."

MR. WELLESLEY to LORD WELLESLEY.

"July 28.

"The morning of 30th of June, a few hours after the arrival of the British Squadron and Spanish vessels in the roadstead of Villa Nueva, 5000 French infantry and 500 cavalry surprised the place by a night-march, and seized all the property of Tarragona, which had been sent there before the siege. Twenty-five thousand dollars for each of the next three months was demanded, but no violence or plunder allowed. Eroles narrowly escaped. Lacy, appointed to command in Catalonia, arrived 1st July at Villa Nueva, the 6th went to Igualada to join Campo Verde."

"Desertion in the army at Mataro has been carried to a most alarming extent since the fall of Tarragona; the first night 1500 men disappeared, nearly 300 cavalry had likewise set off towards Aragon; and these desertions are to be attributed to the gross neglect and want of activity on the part of the officers."—"The only division that keeps together in any tolerable order is that of General Sarsfield, of about 2000 men."—"He had, however, disputes with Eroles, and the people called for the latter to lead them."

NO XIV.

SECTION I.

POLITICAL STATE OF KING JOSEPH.

SPANISH MINISTER'S COMPLAINTS OF THE FRENCH GENERALS.

From the councillor of state, MARIANO LUIS ORQUIJO, to KING JOSEPH.

"Madrid, 22 Juillet, 1810.

"SIRE—Le commissaire royal de Cordoue me mande, que le Duc de Dalmatie lui a fait écrire officiellement de ne remettre aucune somme d'argent à la capitale lors même que le ministre des finances le demanderait, jusqu'à ce que les dépenses de l'armée des régimens qu'on lève et des employés de la province, etc., furent pleinement couverts, et que le duc prendrait les mesures convenables, dans le cas que cette détermination ne fut pas suivie."

"Madrid, 3 Agosto de 1810.

"Le Général Sabastiani a fait voir au commissaire royale à Grenade, un ordre du Duc de Dalmatie, qui lui enjoint de la manière la plus expresse, de le mettre en état d'arrestation si pour le 1er Août lui et le préfet de Malaga ne mettent au pouvoir de Sabastiani quatre millions de réaux. L'exorbitance de cette somme, pour une province qui a déjà payé son contingent, et le court terme de huit jours désigné pour le payement, donnent à croire que cette somme une fois livrée on en demandera une plus forte. Selon toutes les apparences, et d'après les conversations particulières, il s'agit de profiter de l'absence du roi pour mettre les Andalouses sur le même pied que les provinces de Biscaye, Burgos, etc. Il se peut néanmoins qu'on ait voulu inspirer ces craintes dans des idées tout-à-fait différentes. Quoiqu'il en soit il serait scandaleux de voir un commissaire qui représente la personne du roi arrêté dans une de ses provinces."

From MARIANO LUIS ORQUIJO to KING JOSEPH.

"Madrid, 7 Août, 1810.

"Monsieur d'Aranza m'écrit en date du 22 Août dans une lettre particulière les paroles suivantes, en les soulignant pour mieux fixer l'attention : *Le Maréchal Soult est très content, mais il ne fera usage de son autorité que pour le bien : il aime le roi et la nation : ce pays lui plaît beaucoup.*"

DITTO to DITTO.

Madrid, 13 Août, 1810.

"Parmi les lettres que m'a porté le courrier d'Andalousie arrivé hier, j'en remarque une de Monsieur Aranza écrite dans un stile étudié et que je soupçonne redigée d'accord avec le Duc de Dalmatie. C'est un panégyrique à la louange de ce Maréchal dans lequel Monsieur d'Aranza porte aux nues l'intelligence et la zèle du Duc de Dalmatie dans la partie administrative; la considération qu'il donne aux autorités espagnoles; son extrême adresse à manier les esprits, et l'habilité de ses dispositions militaires, dans un pays couvert d'insurgés. M. d'Aranza termine en formant le vœu que le maréchal ne soit aucunement troublé dans l'exécution de ses plans, et que le sort de l'Andalousie soit mis entièrement à sa discretion."

DITTO to DITTO.

"Madrid, le 23 Août, 1810.

"Par ma correspondance avec l'Andalousie j'ai appris; de Cordone: que M. Angulo a reçu les lettres qui l'appellent à Madrid, et qu'il se dispose à suivre le grand convoi sorti de Seville le 11 du courant. De Seville: qu'un corsaire Française s'étant emparé d'un paquebot qui allait de Cadiz à Alicante, on y avait trouvé entr'autres dépêches une lettre de Campmany, grand partisan des Anglais, et un des Coryphées de la revolution. Il avouait à son ami, Don Anselmo Rodriguez de Ribas, intendant de l'armée du centre, qui s'était plaint à lui des excès que commettaient certaines juntes, que Cadiz n'offrait pas un spectacle moins digne de pitié: que les Anglais qu'il avait appris à connaître s'arrogèrent peu à peu toute l'autorité: que le commerce libre accordé aux ports d'Amerique excitait à Cadiz un mécontentement général, et que Venegas allait au Mexique en qualité de viceroi: il parle en outre de l'arrestation de plusieurs personnes connues, et de la de considération dans laquelle est tombée la regence."

DITTO to DITTO.

"Madrid, 27 Septembre, 1810.

"Le Maréchal Victor permet le passage à beaucoup de femmes qui veulent se réunir à leurs maris, les femmes en contant les choses telles qu'elles sont, détruisent bien des erreurs dans lesquelles on a généralement été entraîné par le gouvernement actuel. L'ennemi permit ces jours derniers l'entrée dans l'île à plusieurs femmes qui voulaient passer par Chiclana pour se réunir à leurs parents, mais dernièrement elles furent contenus à coups de canon, et un boulet emporta la tête de celui qui les accompagnait. Le gouvernement Anglais preside à toutes les opérations, et crainte cette espèce des communications."

"Valladolid, le 11 Août, 1810.

"SIRE—Je suis arrivé à Valladolid, où je n'ai pas trouvé le Général Kellermann. Il paraît que les Espagnols ont cerné un détachement de Français qui se trouve à la Puebla de Sanabria, et que ce général y eu allé pour le débloquer. Les guerrilles ont été hier aux portes de Valladolid, et il y a cinq à six jours que soixante dix Français ont été détruits à Villalon; la terreur s'est emparée de tous les esprits, et l'on croit que trois cent hommes ne suffisent pas pour faire paner un courrier: malgré cela, je parlerai demain, escorté par deux cent hommes avec un convoi de prisonniers de Ciudad Rodrigo, donc le nombre n'est pas considérable, parcequ'ici on leur accorde la liberté moyennant une somme qu'on règle avec le Général Kellermann pour les frais de la guerre.

"Toutes les autorités du pays sont venues me visiter, et me consulter sur la conduite qu'elles doivent tenir depuis les derniers ordres du Général Kellermann pour qu'elles n'obeissent ni ne correspondent avec d'autre autorité que la sienne. C'est la chancellerie qui se trouve plus embarrassée que toute autre, parce-qu'elle ne peut concilier l'administrat de la justice au nom de votre majesté avec l'impossibilité de correspondre avec son ministre.

"Je n'ai pas reçu le moindre égard du Général Dufrene qui est à la place du Général Kellermann. Il ne m'a pas visité, ni même accordé un factionnaire; tout le monde s'en est aperçu, et cette conduite a confirmé l'opinion que l'on a conçue que votre majesté ne règne point dans ce pays. J'ai tâché de détruire une idée qui décourage les véritables sujets de

votre majesté, et soutient les espérances de ses ennemis. Les généraux ne s'aperçoivent pas du mal qu'ils produisent en ferant croire que le service de l'empereur, et ses intérêts peuvent être en contradiction avec ceux de votre majesté.

"Si le Général Dufréne s'était borné à ne rien faire pour faciliter mon voyage, j'aurais moins de motifs de plainte contre lui, mais il a retenu l'escorte de cavalerie que le Général Tilly m'avait donnée. De toutes les manières, Sire, je ferai tout ce qui sera en mon pouvoir pour accélérer, mon voyage, et répondre à la confiance avec laquelle votre majesté a daigné me distinguer.

"LE MARQUIS ALMENARA."

ORQUIJO to JOSEPH, *relating his conference with the French ambassador.*

(Extract.)

"Madrid, Août 22, 1810.

"Je lui dis de s'adresser sur ces deux points au ministre des relations extérieures, il me répondit qu'un désagrément qu'on éprouvait avec lui était l'obligation de lui donner à tout bout de champ des notes écrites, qu'à Vittoria il l'avait compromis en présentant à votre majesté ces notes comme officielles, que le bon vieux duc (ce sont ses propres expressions) étourdissait dans l'instant, qu'il n'entendait point, ou ne voulait point entendre ce qu'on lui disait, et qu'il demandait qu'on lui donnât par écrit ce qui n'était pas nécessaire d'écrire. Je lui répétais toujours qu'il devait s'adresser au duc puisque c'était le seul canal par lequel il devait diriger ses demandes, que je ne me mêlais point de ces affaires, et que je n'en entretiendrais votre majesté à moins que votre majesté ne m'en parlat la première, mais comme simple particulier je l'assurai de l'inviolabilité des promesses de votre majesté et de ses idées libérales. L'ambassadeur ajouta que dans la matinée du jour de St. Napoleon, et les jours suivants, le Général Belliard, Borelli, et leurs alentours avaient parlé fort mal des expressions de votre majesté sur ses premiers devoirs, et qu'il ne doutait pas qu'ils n'en eussent écrit à Paris; qu'il n'avait pas pu se dispenser de transmettre à sa cour ces paroles; mais qu'il les avait présentés comme une conséquence du premier discours tenu par votre majesté et une nuance nécessaire pour adoucir le mauvais effet qu'avait produit ici l'article du *Moniteur* sur les mots de l'empereur au Duc de Berg. Je le lui avais présenté de cette manière en sortant de l'appartement de votre majesté, et je lui montrai en même temps un rapport venu de la Navarre dans lequel on dépeignait le fâcheux état de ce royaume en proie aux excès des bandes de brigands et aux dilapidations des gouvernemens militaires. Si l'ambassadeur a écrit dans ces termes comme il me l'a dit, autant par honneur que par attachement à votre majesté, à son pays et au notre, il a bien rempli ses devoirs. Quoiqu'il en soit, je me lui cru obligé de donner connaissance à votre majesté de ces faits ainsi que de la surprise que, selon l'ambassadeur, a causé à l'empereur et au ministère Français le silence du Duc de Santa Fé qui ne s'explique sur rien. L'ambassadeur se plaint d'avoir été compromis par lui, car à sa demande et en conséquence des conversations fréquentes qu'il eut avec lui pendant les trois jours qu'il passa à Madrid, il écrivit à sa cour que le Duc de Santa Fé était chargé de négocier sur la situation de votre majesté et celle de notre pays, que l'ambassadeur lui-même disait ne pouvoir pas durer. C'est à la lettre ce que c'est dit entre l'ambassadeur et moi." Etc., etc.

DITTO to DITTO.

"Madrid, le 13 Novembre, 1810.

"Monsieur Pereyra a reçu du Maréchal Soult une réponse extrêmement aigre. Ce commissaire royal persiste dans son opinion que les mesures indiquées par le Duc de Dalmatie pour l'approvisionnement de l'armée ne rempliront pas le but qu'il se propose; mais le maréchal veut être obéi. D'un autre côté le Général Sebastiani l'a contraint à lui donner onze cent mille réaux. Placé entre ces deux écueils, Monsieur Pereyra a perdu courage et demande à votre majesté de le rappeler à Madrid. Le Général Dufour a pris le commandement de Grenade.

"MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO."

DITTO to DITTO.

"Madrid, 19 de Decembre, 1810.

"Monsieur le Comte de Montarco était le 11 courant à Manzanares, il m'écrivit que les habitans de la Manche se plaignent de ce que les troupes qui retrouvent dans la province ne les protègent pas autant que leur nombre le leur permet, que les brigands viennent leur enlever leurs grains pour les transporter dans les royaumes de Valence et de Murcie, ou dans l'Estremadoure. Ils craignent une disette et désirent ardemment qu'il se forme de grands dépôts de grains dans des places à l'abri des incursions des partis d'insurgés. Les commandants des troupes Françaises sont d'une exigence et d'une hauteur insupportables, et les rapports faits au Comte de Montarco par toutes les autorités légales du pays confirment complètement ceux que l'intendant de la Manche necesse de faire aux divers ministères depuis plusieurs mois."

"Madrid, le 15 Février, 1811.

"SIRE,—Le préfet de Santander me remèt, en date du 16 Janvier, copie des offices qu'il a reçus pour la réunion de cette province au gouvernement militaire de Biscaye. J'ai l'honneur de les mettre sous les yeux de votre majesté en lui observant que cette mesure a été prise sur la proposition du Général Caffarelli.

"On a demandé au préfet de Santander un état des employés civils et militaires, des moines, du clergé, et des appointemens dont ils jouissent. Il croit en conséquence que des attributions ainsi que celles des employés seront nulles des que la province sera gouvernée à l'instar de celle de Biscaye. Il ajoute que lui et les chefs principaux de l'administration sont décidés à ne travailler que sous les ordres de votre majesté et demandent avec instance que votre majesté ne les abandonne pas.

"Le sous-préfet de Logrogne me dit en date du 22 Janvier que l'opinion publique s'est améliorée depuis qu'on y a appris les nouvelles du Portugal, et qu'on y connaît le peu de moyens de défense qu'offre Valence dans le désordre extrême qui y règne. La Rioja ne renferme plus de bandes complètes d'insurgés, mais on y trouve encore quelques brigands épars et des voleurs de grands chemins.

"MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO."

SECTION II.

*(Relating to Joseph's abdication.)**Vindication of the King.*

Le ministre secrétaire d'état à MONSIEUR LE DUC DE SANTA FÉ, et en son absence à MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS D'ALMENARA.

Palais de Madrid, le 12 Septembre, 1810, Paris."

EXCELLENCE,—Le courrier de cabinet, Don Martin Estenoz, qui partit de Paris le 22 Juillet, a remis les lettres écrites par V. E. le même jour et les copies de celles que vous envoyâtes le 19 Juin par le courrier Alvarez, qui furent interceptées. Le roi les a lues avec la plus grande attention, et après s'être bien pénétré des communications faites à V. E. au nom de l'empereur, par monsieur le Duc de Cadore, et les observations particulières de ce ministre, S. M. desirant détruire d'un seul trait, les craintes et la défiance que des personnes, tout au moins mal instruites, se sont efforcées d'inspirer, m'a ordonné d'entrer en explication sur tous les points dont elles traitent. Mais je dois avant tout faire connaître à V. E. que le roi s'est montré satisfait de la juste interprétation donnée à ses idées, et à ses sentimens dans la réponse que V. E. a faite au Duc de Cadore, relativement à la protection dont S. M. I. désire que le commerce Français jouisse dans les réglemens des douanes, en offrant d'assurer une faveur réciproque dans ses états aux productions d'Espagne. L'empereur ne peut ignorer les vues liberales de son auguste frère, et si S. M. I. a été exactement informée sur ce point, elle saura que, dès son avènement au trône, le roi a écarté bien des obstacles opposés à l'industrie française qu'il s'agit de favoriser encore par de nouvelles dispositions.

Il est bien douloureux pour le roi d'avoir à se justifier de plusieurs imputations auxquelles on a dû croire puisqu'on les a communiquées à V. E. L'une d'elles est que le roi a rendu à

leurs propriétaires, ou disposé à son gré, d'une partie des biens confisqués par l'empereur. Cela supposerait de la part de S. M. un oubli de la parole donnée à l'empereur, de ne se mêler en aucune manière de ces confiscations ; mais c'est un infame imposture, et son auteur mérite un châtiment exemplaire. Qu'on cite une propriété un pouce de terrain confisqué par l'empereur, et dont on ait disposé : on ne le pourra point si dans une pure question de fait on en impose ainsi à l'empereur, que sera ce lorsqu'on ne parle que par conjectures et présomption ? Le roi porte à un si haut degré son respect pour les décrets de confiscations de S. M. I. qu'ayant besoin d'un des édifices qui y sont compris pour y placer des établissemens publics, il n'a même pas voulu s'en servir provisoirement. S. M. n'a-t-elle pas, en conséquence, le droit de réclamer, pour son honneur, la punition de ses detracteurs ? S. M. I. s'est expliquée sur la direction donnée à la guerre et la manière dont elle a été faite.

L'empereur écrivit au roi pour lui représenter la lenteur des opérations, et l'inaction des armées. Aussitôt S. M. entreprit la conquête de l'Andalousie. Le Duc de Cadore a dit à V. E. que la soumission de cette province était illusoire, puisqu'elle se trouve inondée de partis d'insurgés et de bandes de brigands. Qu'on considère la vaste étendue de l'Andalousie ; le petit nombre de troupes françaises que l'obstination de Cadix permet d'y repandre ; des pièges de toute espèce que tendent les Anglais et leurs continuelles attaques : qu'on parcourt l'histoire de toutes les guerres contre l'Angleterre et l'on verra qu'indépendamment des vingt mille Espagnols constamment stationnés à St. Rocq, il était encore nécessaire d'entretenir sur cette côté un nombre considérable de troupes pour les opposer aux entreprises partielles de l'ennemi. Si ces précautions étaient indispensables dans un tems de calme et de tranquillité, qu'elles doivent être les espérances et les moyens de l'Angleterre dans l'agitation actuelle de l'Espagne et la nature de la guerre dont elle est le théâtre ? Le roi peut dire avec vérité que la conquête militaire et morale de l'Andalousie est son ouvrage, et que ses paroles, sa conduite, et les sages mesures qu'il a prises, ont préparé la tranquillité dont elle jouit. S. M. y a organisé des gardes civiques chargées de défendre leurs foyers, et malgré le voisinage de cette province avec l'Estremadure et les instigations continuelles de la junte de Cadix et des Anglais, l'Andalousie renferme beaucoup moins de partis ou de bandes d'insurgés que la Castille, la Biscaye, et la Navarre, qui ont été placés sous le régime militaire. Enfin l'on trouve en Andalousie une organisation complète de compagnies de Miguelettes, qui veillent à la tranquillité des villes et à la sûreté des chemins. Leurs services sont tellement utiles que le Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie a donné le plus de développement possible à cette institution.

Si l'Andalousie n'est pas entièrement pacifiée, si la junte de Cadix existe encore, et si les Anglais y exercent leur fatale influence, on doit l'attribuer en grande partie aux machinations et aux trames ourdies par la junte et l'Angleterre au moment où parvint à leur connaissance le décret du 8 Février qui établit des gouvernemens militaires dans la Navarre, la Biscaye, l'Aragon, et la Catalogne. Quelques gouverneurs français ayant traité ces provinces comme si elles étaient absolument détachées de la monarchie, les membres de la junte de Cadix et les Anglais en profitèrent pour souffler de nouveau le feu de la discorde et refuter les expressions du roi qui répétait sans cesse, 'Que la nation conserverait son intégrité et son indépendance : que ses institutions s'amélioreraient sous la protection d'un trône soutenu par les relations intimes du roi avec l'empereur ; qu'elle n'aurait à combattre que l'ennemi qui voulait s'arroger l'empire exclusif des mers.' Voilà le sens qu'on a toujours donné en Espagne aux mots indépendance et intégrité. Ce langage est celui dont s'est servi S. M. I. non seulement avec les Espagnols, mais à la face de l'univers : il ne peut donc être odieux ni criminel dans la bouche du roi. Mais combien n'est-il pas démenti par la conduite de certains gouverneurs qui paraissent s'obstiner à prolonger l'insurrection d'Espagne à l'annihiler ou la détruire plutôt qu'à la soumettre ! car dans plusieurs endroits on ne se contente pas d'exclure toute idée de l'autorité du roi en faisant administrer la justice au nom de l'empereur, mais ce qui est pire, on a exigé que les tribunaux civils de Valladolid et de Valencia prêtassent serment de fidélité et d'obéissance à S. M. I. comme si la nation Espagnole n'avait pas de roi.

Monsieur le Duc de Cadore se plaint de l'indulgence dont on en a usé en Andalousie ; S. M. a montré contre ses ennemis, dans les champs de Talavera et Ocana toute la fermeté

de son caractère ; mais serait-il juste, conviendrait-il à ses intérêts et aux vues de l'empereur, que S. M. deployât de la rigueur contre des vaincus, des prisonniers qui doivent être ses sujets ? Si le Maréchal Ney eut suivi ce généreux exemple dans les villes de Galice où il fut reçu à bras ouverts, et n'eut pas au contraire opprimé et saccagé cette province, elle serait heureuse et soumise, et non livrée aux maux de l'insurrection comme tant d'autres à qui l'on a fait éprouver le même sort. Cette conduite de S. M. dans des pays soumis est vraisemblablement ce que le Duc de Cadore appelle des grâces accordées aux insurgés de préférence aux personnes attachées à la cause du roi. Les insurgés n'ont obtenu d'autres grâces que celles qui leur furent offertes dans les proclamations pour dissiper l'erreur dans laquelle les Anglais les avaient induits. Si le sequestre mis sur les biens invendus de quelques habitans ou réfugiés, a été levé postérieurement, cet exemple d'indulgence a eu d'heureux résultats, puisqu'il a attiré un grand nombre de personnes à l'obéissance du roi : et qu'on ne croye pas que ces individus n'aient point subi le chatiment qui leur était dû pour le retard qu'ils ont mis à se soumettre, car s'ils possédaient des billets royaux, il les ont perdus pour ne les avoir pas présentés à tems au timbre sec ; et s'ils sont porteurs d'autres titres de créances sur l'état, ils doivent, pour les valider, solliciter un décret particulier.

Les avantages de la formation des corps Espagnols sont à la portée de tout le monde : leur présence a influé plus qu'on ne pense sur l'heureuse issue de la bataille d'Ocaña et de l'expédition d'Andalousie. En y admettant un grand nombre d'officiers, on est parvenu à éloigner de l'insurrection des hommes inquiets qui seraient devenus chefs de brigands, et tout en avouant que la désertion a eu lieu parmi les soldats, et qu'il en est résulté quelques maux, on peut hardiment affirmer que la somme des biens est infiniment plus grande, et qu'il n'y a pas de moyens qu'on ne doive employer pour faire revenir de son égarement une nation de douze millions d'âmes qu'il n'est pas facile d'assujettir par la force des bayonnettes, et dont on veut d'ailleurs faire une amie et une alliée.

On a parlé du mauvais emploi des ressources de l'Espagne, et du dénuement dans lequel ont été laissées les troupes françaises. Les soldats ont eu en Espagne des vivres en abondance : les hôpitaux français ont été les mieux pourvus, il a fallu pour cela exiger des contributions extraordinaires et des emprunts forcés, et vaincre le grand obstacle de l'interception des communications de province à province, et souvent de ville à ville. L'Espagne se trouve divisé en gouvernemens militaires de sorte que S. M. est à peine maître de la capitale et de sa banlieue : n'est ce donc point par une espèce de miracle qu'elle y fait subsister des troupes, et qu'elle y soutient des hôpitaux. Les gouverneurs français imposent, il est vrai, des contributions extraordinaires sur leurs provinces, mais ils les vexent et les ruinent, et certes ce n'est pas là le moyen de les maintenir dans l'obéissance, ni un exemple bien attrayant pour les provinces soulevées : cette ressource est d'ailleurs précaire et insuffisante comme le prouvera bientôt l'expérience. S. M. se flatte de ce que les intentions de l'empereur en faveur de la nation seraient mieux remplies et ses troupes mieux dirigées, si toutes celles qui sont en Espagne étaient sous ses ordres, et si les propositions qu'il a faites à son auguste frère étaient acceptées. Le Duc de Cadore a évalué à plusieurs millions les confiscations de marchandises anglaises, et enlèvement de l'argenterie des églises et des couvents qu'on aurait dû faire en Andalousie. Les confiscations eurent lieu par ordre des généraux français à leur entrée dans chaque ville, et si leur valeur fut exagérée, dans le principe, pour donner plus d'éclat aux entreprises militaires, on reconnut dès qu'on en vint à l'examen l'erreur dans laquelle on était tombé ; et dans le fait comment ne pas appercevoir qu'après la bataille d'Ocaña l'invasion d'Andalousie devant être prévue, chacun avait grand soin de faire refluer les marchandises confiscables sur les points les plus capables de résistance, afin de les mettre hors de la portée du vainqueur. L'argenterie d'église a beaucoup d'apparence et fort peu de valeur. On a pris dans les couvents, où il en restait très peu, ainsi que dans les églises toute celle qui n'a pas été jugée nécessaire pour la decence du culte, et comme le roi ne voulait ni ravager ni détruire, mais bien pacifier et conserver, il a dû régler sa conduite sur ce principe.

Monsieur le Duc de Cadore parle de dépenses, c'est vraiment une fatalité qu'il soit si mal informé de faits généralement connus. Le trésor public est ouvert à quiconque voudra

s'assurer de la vérité. On y verra que S. M. a reçu à peine chaque mois le cinquième de l'assignation de la liste civile : qu'il a dû se réduire à la plus stricte économie, et que non seulement il s'est vu faute de pouvoir donner aux acteurs une légère avance, dans l'obligation de supprimer le théâtre Italien qui était son unique délassement, mais encore de vendre sa vaisselle plate, et de ce défaire des choses les plus nécessaires à l'ornement de sa cour. Aussi dans le repas que S. M. donna, à l'occasion de la fête de l'empereur, à ses ministres, aux grands officiers de la couronne, et à l'ambassadeur de France, la table fut elle servie en fayence semblable à celle qu'avait S. M. au camp de Boulogne. Certainement l'embarras et la confusion que cette excessive simplicité causait au roi n'aura pas échappé à l'ambassadeur. Au milieu de tant de privations, et dans une situation aussi contraire à sa dignité S. M. a la douleur de voir que ses ministres, le conseil d'état, les tribunaux de la capitale, et les employés civils, qui sont en petit nombre, ne perçoivent pas leur traitement depuis plus de sept mois. Ce sont là les faveurs que S. M. a dispensés avec tant de prodigalité. Le roi a donné, il est vrai, quelques cédules aux officiers de sa maison, et à quelques individus attachés à sa personne, pour les aider à acheter des biens nationaux : on donne à ces bienfaits le nom de prodigalité, et d'un autre côté l'on se plaint de l'abandon dans lequel S. M. laisse d'autres individus, ce qui serait incompatible avec la façon de penser du roi et la connaissances de ses devoirs comme homme et comme monarque. C'est l'unique chose dont le roi puisse disposer dans la situation où il se trouve et outre le but politique de ces donations, S. M. a cru que c'était le seul moyen d'assurer à ces individus une médiocre existence, et encore sa prévoyance à cet égard a-t-elle été trompée, car les revenus des terres et des biens que se trouvent dans les personnes soumises au gouvernement militaire dont les limites s'étendent jusqu'aux portes de Madrid, où ne se payent pas, tant est grande la misère des fermiers, où les biens ne s'afferment pas de crainte d'extorsions de la part des gouverneurs, où, enfin, les revenus se trouvent absorbés par les contributions extraordinaires. Les faits sont évidens, ils parlent d'eux-mêmes, et toute personne impartiale peut en faire l'examen.

Mais il faut qu'elle soit de meilleure foi que celle qui a voulu imputer à S. M. l'aliénation des biens confisqués par l'empereur, et les griefs auxquels on vient de répondre. S. M. pourrait, à bien plus juste titre, se plaindre de la conduite des gouverneurs Français : de celle du Général Dufour, par exemple, qui a exigé des dix membres dont il composa à sa manière ce conseil de Navarre qu'on s'est vu bientôt obligé de dissoudre, qu'ils rédigeassent une adresse à l'empereur dans laquelle ils demandaient à S. M. I. un code des lois, et se mettaient à sa discrétion. Trois de ces membres refusèrent de signer, les autres cédèrent à la violence. S. M. pourrait citer encore une foule d'actes qui ont exaspéré les esprits, fourni des armes à l'insurrection, et donné aux Anglais des prétextes pour supposer des projets qui n'existent pas, et rendre la guerre interminable. Qu'on compte le nombre des bandes de brigands et d'insurgés en Espagne, et l'on verra combien il s'est accru depuis l'institution des gouvernemens militaires. S. M. ne peut elle se plaindre avec autant de justice de la situation équivoque dans laquelle elle se trouve ? qu'on en juge par le fait suivant. Le nouveau ministre de finances venait d'entrer en fonction, et il s'agissait déjà de réunir les plus forts capitalistes de la place pour les engager à avancer une bonne somme d'argent, lorsque le payeur de l'armée, Monsieur Crouchart, et l'intendant-général, Monsieur Denniers, assurèrent au ministre que des employés venaient de Paris avec des lettres cachetées qu'ils avaient l'ordre de n'ouvrir qu'à Madrid. On prétendit aussitôt qu'ils devaient se charger de l'administration civile, que les rentrées seraient invariablement affectées à l'entretien et à la solde de l'armée, et le surplus seulement, à la liste civile. C'était annoncer la dissolution de l'état. Des bruits de cette nature répandus dans toute la ville par les employés français parvenus à la connaissance de l'ambassadeur de S. M. I. et appuyés par des malveillans qui abondent toujours dans les capitales surtout à la suite des guerres d'opinions, ne pouvait produire que de malheureux effets. La confiance de ce petit nombre d'hommes qui aurait pu faire des avances s'éteignit à l'instant, et toutes les portes furent fermées. S. M. ignorait l'arrivée des nouveaux employés du trésor de France, et il n'a connu comme le dernier de ses sujets, le contenu des lettres dont ils étaient porteurs qu'à leurs ouvertures.

Dans cet état de choses il est facile de se faire l'idée de la confiance que peut inspirer le roi, et lorsque S. M. se trouve hors d'état de faire le bonheur du pays qu'il doit gouverner et de concourir à la réalisation des vues de son auguste frère : qu'il voit enfin sa dignité avilée, doit-on s'étonner qu'il ait manifesté l'impossibilité de vivre plus long temps dans une situation aussi précaire? Monsieur le Duc de Cadore tout en reconnaissant les hautes qualités du roi, a prétendu, que les personnes qui approchent S. M. lui ont conseillé et lui conseillent sans cesse de se maintenir dans l'indépendance de la France, et que ce principe se suivait avec trop de rigueur. Monsieur le Duc de Cadore sait que S. M. dans aucune époque de sa longue et glorieuse carrière n'a eu besoin de conseils et ne s'est soumis à aucune influence, surtout s'il s'est agi de détruire 'son système inaltérable d'amitié sincère et éternelle avec son auguste frère l'empereur; d'alliance et de bienveillance affectueuse envers la nation Espagnole à la tête de laquelle il est placé, et dont il s'efforcera de conserver la splendeur et le bien-être, avec l'indépendance et l'intégrité de territoire. Les vœux les plus constants de son cœur sont que les deux nations unies entr'elles par les mêmes liens que leur monarques concourent d'une manière uniforme à la félicité commune en forçant leur ennemie à abandonner le sceptre des mers.'

Le Prince Don Fernando, ajoute le Duc de Cadore, se prêterait à céder les provinces qui conviennent à l'empereur et à toutes les conditions qu'il voudrait lui imposer. Le roi ne veut entrer en comparaison avec personne; mais il observera que ce ne fut pas dans ces sentimens ni dans cette croyance qu'il accepta la couronne d'Espagne en déposant celle de Naples : que l'empereur ni la France ne devraient avoir confiances en des offres que la nation repousserait, et qui ne pourrait avoir d'ailleurs qu'une exécution passagère; car comme le sait très bien Monsieur le Duc de Cadore, les nations humiliées dissimulent leur haine en attendant le moment favorable de venger leurs outrages. Une semblable conduite serait incompatible avec le façon de penser du roi, avec son noble caractère et celui de la nation que S. M. gouverne. Elle est diamétralement en opposition avec les assurances données par S. M. I. à la nation Espagnole 'qu'il était nécessaire pour son bonheur qu'elle se régénérât sous sa dynastie, et sous le prince qu'elle lui donnait égal en tout à son auguste personne.' A cette occasion le Duc de Cadore parle du peu d'avantages que rapporte à la France la guerre d'Espagne en proportion des sacrifices immenses qu'elle a faits. Certes le roi ne les ignore pas, et sa reconnaissance éclatera quand S. M. se trouvera en état de les récompenser. Dans ce moment cela lui est impossible; mais S. M. I. pourrait mettre le comble à ses bons offices en s'offrant pour garant de l'emprunt ouvert en Hollande sous les mêmes conditions que celui de Prusse, ou du moins en lui donnant son assentiment comme à celui d'Autriche. S. M. I. se convaincra facilement que les liens du sang, les relations les plus intimes et les plus sûres d'une étroite amitié entre les deux nations, et enfin la position même de ces armées seront les meilleurs garants de l'exactitude des remboursements quelques sacrifices qu'ils exigent.

Quant aux avantages futurs que promettent les sacrifices actuels de la France, ce serait faire injure aux lumières du Duc de Cadore que de la fatiguer en les lui développant. Lorsque S. M. I. crut nécessaire l'établissement en Espagne de sa dynastie, l'expérience lui avait démontré que survenant des troubles dans le nord, il ne pouvait jamais compter sans ce changement, sur la sûreté d'une des plus importantes frontières de son empire. Un siècle d'amitié presque non interrompue depuis le règne en Espagne et en France de la maison de Bourbon, le pacte de famille et la tournure différente que prirent les relations entre les deux pays après l'exclusion de la maison d'Autriche, sont les témoignages les plus authentiques de l'utilité des efforts et des sacrifices de la France pendant six ans, au commencement du siècle dernier. La résistance opiniâtre de presque toute l'Europe et surtout celle de l'Angleterre, qu'elle renouvelle dans cette guerre avec un plus grand développement de moyens démontrent l'importance de cet événement pour la France. Ses meilleurs écrivains politiques ont indiqué avec la plus grande clarté les avantages qui en ont résulté pour le commerce Français et les richesses qu'il a procurées à la nation. Que ne doit elle pas attendre aujourd'hui de la réunion des deux couronnes dans la même famille, de analogie de leurs codes politiques et de leurs institutions, des qualités d'un roi sage et éclairé qui aime tendrement son auguste frère et la

France, et qui est pénétré de la nécessité d'abattre l'orgueil de l'Angleterre ! n'est ce pas le plus grand fruit qu'elle puisse retirer de cette résolution et de tels résultats ne valent ils pas les sacrifices momentanés qu'elle s'impose ?

Il a été bien sensible pour S. M. que les rapports mensongers de personnes peu intéressées à l'union et à l'amitié des deux frères et des deux pays, ayant pu inspirer à S. M. I. un seul instant de doutes. Quoique le roi a déjà écrit à l'empereur son auguste frère, S. M. veut que V. E. ou en votre absence le Marquis d'Almenara, remette une copie de cette lettre à Monsieur le Duc de Cadore, dans l'espérance que V. E. développera à S. M. I. avec sa sagacité ordinaire les causes qui ont influé sur la conduite du roi dans les affaires d'Espagne, que S. E. lui peindra l'état véritable de la nation, et qu'elle contribuera de cette manière à l'exécution des intentions des deux monarques qui n'ont été, et qui ne peuvent être que les mêmes.

Le ministre secrétaire d'état,

(Signe)

MARIANO LUIS D'ORQUIJO.

Letters from KING JOSEPH to his ministers.

10 Février, 1811.

Je suis peiné que l'empereur ait cru nécessaire d'employer des formes diplomatiques avec moi et même avec la reine. Qu'il me fasse clairement connoître sa volonté et je n'aurai rien de plus agréable que de m'y conformer puisqu'elle ne peut être ni compatible avec mon honneur qui me paroît inséparable du sien, comme mon intérêt. Le fait est que je désire complaire, à la fois, à l'empereur et à mon frère ; il m'a fait reconnoître roi de Naples, roi d'Espagne, et a garanti mon existence politique sans que je l'aie demandé. Je n'ai pas sollicité le trône j'y suis monté parcequ'il l'a voulu, aujourd'hui l'empereur désire-t-il qu'il rentre dans la retraite. Je suis d'autant plus prêt à le faire que les événemens de trois années ont levé bien des scrupules et empêcher venir bien des regrets.

J'ai dû croire que l'empereur vouloit que je quittasse l'Espagne dès que j'ai vu graduellement mon existence y devenir humiliant, impossible, et qu'il doit savoir que je ne puis pas supporter longtemps de me voir dégradé : dans ce cas je désire partir pour France. L'ordre publique sera assuré ici, je m'entendrai avec mon frère, ou pour mieux dire je lui porterai moi-même mon blanc-seing.

Je m'abandonne entièrement à sa justice et à ses sentimens paternels pour ma famille, aussi point de négociations particulières ; je retourne dès ce moment à l'empereur tous les droits qu'il m'a transmis sur l'Espagne si son ambassadeur juge que je puisse partir demain pour Morfontaine, et s'il eu autorisé à croire que l'empereur verra ce parti sans déplaisir.

L'empereur veut-il réellement que je reste au trône d'Espagne ? Je reste quelques jours les désagrémens indépendant de la volonté qui m'y attendent. Mais il faut que je n'éprouve que ceux qu'il ne peut m'éviter ; je le répète jamais les intérêts politiques ne me diviseront avec lui, qu'il me fasse connoître sa volonté. Si l'empereur venir ici, tout s'arrangera entre nous ; s'il ne vient pas en Espagne, qu'il me laisse aller le voir à Paris. S'il juge ce voyage inopportun, qu'il rende mon existence tolérable pendant la guerre : il sait mieux que personne ce qu'il doit faire pour cela.

Il faut un changement marqué dans tout, avancer ou reculer, vous connoissez l'état actuel ; j'ignore comment je pourrai gagner le mois nécessaire pour connoître le détermination de l'empereur.

(The following abdication, by Joseph, was drawn up but never made public.)

L'expérience de trois années nous ayant convaincu que l'ordre social ne peut être recomposé en Espagne qu'en cumulant dans les mêmes mains les droits de souveraineté dont nous sommes investés, et les moyens de force et de puissance militaire dont dispose notre auguste frère l'empereur des Français, de qui nous tenons les droits que nous exerçons aujourd'hui sur la monarchie Espagnole, nous avons résolu de notre pleine et libre volonté de rétrocéder à notre frère l'empereur des Français les droits qu'il nous a remis et en vertu des quels nous sommes entré dans ce royaume en 1808 à la suite de la constitution que nous avons signée à Bayonne dans la même année.

C'est pourquoi par les presents signées de notre main nous declaronz céder, transporter, et remettre à notre dit frère l'empereur des Français, tous les droits qu'il nous transmi en 1808 sur la monarchie d'Espagne et des Indes dans toute leur integrité et tels qu'il les reçut lui-même du roi Charles Quatre.

Nous entendons que la présente rétrocession n'ait de force et valeur que ce l'epoque ou nous aurons pleine et entière connoissance de l'acceptation de la présente rétrocession de la part de notre frère l'empereur des Français : et comme nous ne sommes portés à cet acte par aucune considération particulière, mais par l'unique considération que nous avons exprimée plus haut et qu'en quittant le trône d'Espagne nous n'avons en vue que le plus grand bien du peuple Espagnol que nous ne pourrions pas rendre aussi heureux que nous voudrions, et que nous n'avons d'autre ambition que celle de rentrer dans la vie privée et dans la retraite la plus absolue. Nous nous abandonnons entièrement à la justice de notre frère l'empereur des Français pour le sort des personnes qui nous sont attachées au sentimens de la gloire qui garantit ses efforts pour le bonheur de l'Espagne et à ses sentimens paternels pour nos enfans, pour la reine, notre épouse, et pour nous.

Nous nous engagerons à faire revêtir de toutes les formes qui pourroient paroître plus authentiques le présent acte écrit, rédigé, st signé de notre propre main. Ayant jugé que le plus grand secret était indispensable jusqu'à ce que nous ayons connoissance de l'acceptation de S. M. l'empereur des Français, roi d'Italie.

Fait à Madrid, etc., etc.

Paris, 1811.

Depuis la conversation que j'ai eu avec vous sur ma position, elle ne s'est pas améliorée ; elle est telle aujourd'hui que je me voir forcé d'embrasser le seul pratique qui me reste à prendre, celui de la retraite la plus absolue en France. Je serois déjà parti si je ne venois d'être instruit que S. M. l'empereur qui a sù que j'avois donné ordre d'acheter au de louer une terre a cent lieues de Paris, avoit disapprouvé cette demarche, et qu'il trouvoit plus convenable, si je persistois dans ma resolution, qui je me rendisse à ma terre de Morfontaine après vous avoir prévenu de ma détermination, et avoir assuré ici l'ordre publique après mon départ. Je dirai en partant que je vais m'entendre avec l'empereur pour les affaires d'Espagne, et je ferois les mêmes dispositions par rapport aux provinces qui entourent Madrid que je fit lorsqu'il y a un an je partis pour l'expédition d'Andalousie ; cet état dura six mois sans nul désordre, et je ne doute pas que les choses n'aillent de la même manière et ne donnent le tems à l'empereur de prendre les dispositions définitives.

Je suis prêt à rendre l'empereur les droits qu'il me rémit à Bayonne sur la monarchie d'Espagne et des Indes si ma position ici ne change pas ; parceque je dois croire que c'est le désir de l'empereur puisqu'il est impossible qu'il veuille que je reste roi d'Espagne, et qu'il m'ôte tous les moyens d'existence. Il en peut être malheureux que l'empereur ait voulu me reconnoître roi de Naples, il y a six ans lorsqu'à la tête de ses troupes je fis la conquête de ce royaume ; ce fut malgré moi, et mes instances pour rester au commandement de son armée avec la simple qualité de son lieutenant furent le sujet d'une lettre dont je me rappelle très-bien.

Lorsqu'en 1808 je fus proclamé roi d'Espagne, je l'ignorois encore ; cependant arrivé à Bayonne je fis tout ce que voulus l'empereur, je signerais une constitution, je le signai appuyée par sa garantie. Les événemens n'ayant pas répondu à nos espérances est ce ma faute ? Est celui qui en est le plus victim qui doit en porter la peine ? Cependant tant que la guerre dure je me suis soumis a tout ce que l'on a voulu, mais je ne puis pas l'impossible ; je ne puis pas rester ici plus longtems si l'empereur ne vient à mon secours. En ordonnant qu'il soit versé dans mon trésor à Madrid un million de francs par mois, les autres provinces doivent contribuer aux besoins de la capitale. Les troupes françoises qui sont dans les provinces du centre (elles sont peu nombreuses) doivent être soldées par le trésor de France.

A la pacification générale l'empereur exigera des indemnités ; s'entendre alors il possède de fait presque toutes les provinces aujourd'hui, il sera bien le maître de ne les évacuer qu'à

mesure qu'il croira que l'Espagne aura satisfait aux obligations qu'il lui aura imposées. En résumé je suis prêt à faire la volonté de l'empereur pourvu que je la connoisse.

1. Veut-il que je reste roi d'Espagne, je reste dès qu'il m'en donne la possibilité, et je supporte tous les gouvernemens militaires qu'il a établis puisqu'il les croit indispensables pendant la guerre.

2. Préférerait-il que je rentrasse dans la sein de ma famille à Morfontaine d'abord et l'hiver dans le midi. Je suis prêt à partir dès que je connoîtrai sa volonté. J'ajoute de plus que le parti de la retraite me conviendra beaucoup plus que l'autre dès que je saurai qu'il lui convient. Je suis sur alors qu'il aura quelques bontés pour les Français qui se sont attachés à mon soit, et que je ne serai pas à même de rendre aussi heureux qu'ils le méritent. Quant à moi, à la reine, et à mes enfans, l'empereur me font payer mon traitement de Prince Français, nous en aurons assez, mon intention étant de vivre dans la retraite en m'occupant de l'éducation des mes enfans, laissant à l'empereur le soin de leur établissemens, car je ne doute pas si ce projet se vérifie que je ne retrouve le cœur de mon frère, et que dans les intervalles où il se rappellera qu'il est homme, il ne trouve encore quelque consolation en retrouvant mon cœur pour lui aussi jeune qu'il y a trente ans.

Enfin j'aime mieux vivre sujet de l'empereur en France que de rester en Espagne roi nominal, parceque je serai bon sujet en France, et mauvais roi en Espagne, et que je veux rester digne de l'empereur, de la France, et de moi-même.

MARQUIS OF ALMENARA to the minister secretary of state. Translated from a deciphered Spanish letter.

"Fontainebleau, Novembre 4, 1810.

"This government is very uneasy about the military operations in Portugal, from whence they receive no accounts except through England, described therefore factitiously and with the strongest hopes of resisting the French forces that oppose their army. This problem will probably be already solved and its conclusion will decide what is interesting to Spain. It is therefore very important that our government should write all it knows, and what will prove that it takes part in what belongs to both countries, because here I am often asked what is said in Madrid on this subject, and people are surprised that we limit ourselves entirely to the urgent points of our negociation. This explains the proofs of affection which the prince royal of Sweden desired that the king should give to the emperor, being convinced that the letters of his majesty, written in his own familiar style when he explains his sentiments, produce a great sensation with the emperor."

SECTION III.

Letters from the PRINCE DE NEUFCHÂTEL to KING JOSEPH.

Paris, 28 Janvier, 1811.

SIRE,—J'ai l'honneur de prévenir votre majesté que l'empereur par sa décision du 21 Janvier a fixé les traitemens extraordinaires qui pourront être payés en Espagne à date du 1^{er} de l'année 1811, dans l'arrondissement des armées du midi, du nord, de l'Aragon, etc. Ces traitemens sont déterminés ainsi qu'il suit.

Savoir :

| | Fr. par mois. |
|---|---------------|
| Les généraux gouverneurs dans les quatre gouvernemens comprises dans l'arrondissement de l'armée du nord | 4000 |
| Le général chef de l'état major général de l'armée | 3000 |
| Généraux de division..... | 1800 |
| Généraux de brigade, inspecteurs aux revues et commissaires ordonnateurs | 1200 |
| Adjudans commandans, colonels, et sous-inspecteurs aux revues..... | 750 |
| Officiers de santé principaux | 500 |
| Chefs de bataillons, d'escadrons, commissaires de guerre, et chefs d'administration des différens services..... | 400 |
| Commandans de place occupant dans l'armée un grade in- } capitaines..... | 400 |
| férieur à ceux cidessus désignées, savoir } lieutenans et sous-lieuts. | 300 |

Au moyen de ces indemnités il ne sera rien alloué au dessus des sommes fixées ni pour dépenses de bureaux ou de table, ni pour frais extraordinaires de quelque nature qu'ils soient et sous quelque prétexte que ce puisse être, et cette décision n'a aucun effet rétroactif. J'écris à MM. les maréchaux et généraux commandant en Espagne, pour leur faire connoître que d'après les intentions de l'empereur, tout militaire Français, qui à l'avenir aurait exigé ou reçu des traitemens extraordinaires plus forts que ceux fixés par la décision du 21 Janvier, et qui s'en serait fait payer sans une ordonnance régulière des intendans généraux ou commissaires ordonnateurs, sera suspendu de ces fonctions et qu'il en sera rendu compte dans les vingt-quatre heures pour prendre les ordres de l'empereur. Votre majesté jugera sans doute convenable de donner ses ordres au Général Belliard pour que cette disposition soit suivie dans l'arrondissement de l'armée du centre. Je prie votre majesté d'agréer l'hommage de mon respect.

Paris, 14 Février, 1811,

SIRE,—L'empereur ne m'a encore donné aucun ordre relatif à l'objet de la lettre apportée par votre aide-de-camp le Colonel Clermont Tonnere. On pense que Valence ne se soumettra que par l'approche d'une armée, et après la prise de Tarragone le corps du Général Suchet sera disponible.—Les affaires paroissent s'améliorer en Portugal, le Duc d'Istrie va établir l'ordre dans le nord de l'Espagne. J'envoie mon aide-de-camp le Colonel Le Jeune voir l'état des choses à Grénade, Malaga, Cadiz et Badajos. Je prie votre majesté d'avoir des bontés pour lui. L'empereur est en bonne santé, l'impératrice est bientôt à terme, et nous espérons un roi des Romains. L'empereur affermit de plus en plus le grand empire. Votre majesté le seconde mais nous apprécions ses peines et ses privations. Une nouvelle armée de deux-cent-milles hommes se forme dans le nord de la France, et l'empereur est en position d'en imposer à qui tenteroit de contrarier ses grandes conceptions, tout est bien et va bien en France.

Paris, le 11 Avril, 1811.

SIRE,—J'ai eu l'honneur de mander votre majesté, que l'empereur avoit donné des ordres pour qu'il lui fut envoyé, chaque mois cent mille francs, et je lui ai fait connoître combien il étoit important que les troupes destinées pour l'Andalusie y arrivassent sans retard.

L'empereur pense qu'il seroit utile de chercher à tirer parti de bons Espagnols pour réunir de vrais cortez qui pourroient avoir de l'influence sur les esprits : l'intégrité de l'Espagne peut encore être maintenue si les cortez operoient une réaction dans l'opinion : le Perou et le Mexique se sont déjà déclarés independant, et toutes les autres colonies sont échapper à l'Espagne : les vrais Espagnols doivent savoir combien les Anglais les maltraitent. On voit par les gazettes Anglaises que les cortez rassemblés dans l'île de Leon ne furent qu'une miserable canaille et des gens obscures qui n'ont autre projet que d'aller végéter dans les tavernes de Londres il ne peut y avoir rien à faire avec de pareils hommes. Sa majesté trouve qu'il y auroit un grand avantage à former des cortez tirer de toutes les provinces de l'Espagne occupées par les armées françaises. Une discussion éclairée qui s'établirait auroit beaucoup d'influence sur les esprits. L'empereur est obligé d'abandonner le projet qu'il avoit de s'entendre avec les cortez de l'île de Leon, puisque ce n'est qu'un composé de gens sans aveu : ce ne seroit donc qu'avec des cortez formé d'hommes tirés de toutes les parties de l'Espagne qu'on pourroit éclairer l'opinion des Espagnols qui aiment leur pays.

L'ambassadeur de l'empereur a transmis de plaintes sur votre major-général. Votre majesté commande l'armée du centre. Par conséquent la hiérarchie militaire ne peut pas permettre qu'il s'écarte de ses devoirs. Si je correspond souvent avec le Général Belliard, c'est que votre majesté est un général roi, et que je dois lui éviter des details qu'un major-général lui soumet.

Aucun village d'Espagne n'a été réuni à la France, et l'empereur tient à ce que votre majesté ait en Espagne tout la considération qui lui est due. Tout depend encore du parti qu'on peut tirer de la nation. Ce qu'il y a de certain, c'est que les Anglais n'ont qu'un but ;

celui de ruiner la péninsule, de la détruire, parcequ'ils sentent bien qu'elle doit finir par appartenir à la France ou à un prince de la maison de l'empereur, et qu'ils trouvent un grand avantage à diviser un pays qu'il savent ne pouvoir garder.

Je présente à votre majesté l'hommage avec mon respect.

Le Prince Neufchâtel, Major-Général,

ALEXANDRE.

Paris, ce 6 Mai, 1811.

SIRE,—J'ai montré à l'empereur la lettre de votre majesté, en date du 21 Avril par laquelle elle fait connoître qu'elle se met en route pour Paris : l'empereur ne s'attendoit pas à cette resolution ; votre majesté lui ayant promis de ne pas quitter l'Espagne sans être convenu à l'avance des mesures à prendre et qu'exige une pareille détermination. L'empereur trouve que dans ces circonstances le départ de votre majesté devoit être précédé de l'évacuation de l'Andalousie afin de concentrer les armées. Car dans la position des choses, le départ de votre majesté va donner une secousse défavorable à la situation des armées de l'empereur. Si votre majesté avoit quitté l'Espagne au mois de Janvier, où les armées étoient en position sans agir, cela auroit eu moins d'inconvénient. Dans ce moment votre arrivée met l'empereur dans de grandes inquiétudes, en vous considérant comme roi d'Espagne, et comme général-en-chef, l'empereur voit que votre retour sera interprété selon l'esprit et la tournure que les Anglais voudront y donner, et fera un mauvais effet ; qu'il est pénible que votre majesté se soit portée à cette démarche dont il ne peut résulter aucun avantage, et qui peut avoir beaucoup d'inconvénients, car dans ce moment d'agitation, l'Espagne va se trouver sans chef. Votre majesté ne voulant pas rester à Madrid, l'empereur trouve qu'il auroit surtout été très utile qu'elle allât passer la revue de l'armée de Portugal ou de l'armée d'Andalousie ; l'influence de votre majesté auroit surtout été bien utile pour procurer à l'armée de Portugal tout ce qui lui est nécessaire. L'empereur, sire, est dans une grande anxiété de savoir à qui vous avez donné le commandement de l'armée du centre ; si vous avez prévenu le Duc de Dalmatie de votre départ, et qui étant aux mains avec l'ennemi trouvera ses embarras augmentés, n'ayant aucune direction sur ses derrières. S'il étoit possible que votre majesté reçut cette lettre encore en Espagne, l'empereur m'ordonne d'engager votre majesté à sentir les inconvénients de son retour si contraire aux circonstances. L'empereur n'a aucune nouvelle ni de l'armée d'Andalousie ni de l'armée du centre. J'expédie à votre majesté un de mes aides-de-camp. Etc. etc.

ALEXANDRE.

Paris, le 1 Juin, 1811.

SIRE,—L'empereur a examiné attentivement les observations que votre majesté lui a adressées, et me prescrit de me rendre auprès d'elle pour avoir l'honneur de lui donner connoissance de ce qu'il juge le plus convenable sur les divers points qui en sont l'objet. L'empereur pense, sire, que votre majesté peut partir de Paris quand elle le jugera à-propos, et même sans attendre son retour, si cela entraine dans les intentions de votre majesté. L'armée du centre en Espagne est pleinement entièrement sous les ordres de votre majesté, le Général Belliard ne doit point prendre le titre de major général, mais celui que lui ont toujours attribué les ordres émanés de l'empereur, *de chef d'état major de l'armée du centre*. Si votre majesté n'est pas content de ce général, je vous engage, sire, à en proposer un autre qui ait votre confiance. C'est à votre majesté, sire, qu'il appartient de suspendre, de renvoyer, de traduire même à des commissions militaires quand il y a lieu, les généraux et officiers de l'armée du centre ; d'administrer les provinces comprises dans l'arrondissement de cette armée comme votre majesté le jugera le plus convenable au bien du service. A l'armée du nord de l'Espagne, l'empereur a besoin d'un maréchal qui soit chargé du commandement des troupes stationnées dans les provinces formant l'arrondissement de cette armée. Le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie exerce maintenant ce commandement ; dans le cas, sire, où ce maréchal ne conviendrait pas à V. M. l'empereur ne serait pas éloigné de le remplacer par le Maréchal Jourdan, si cette disposition étoit agréable à votre majesté et à ce maréchal. Mais l'empereur ne juge pas qu'on puisse rien

changer à l'organisation de l'armée du nord ; il est essentiel que cette organisation reste telle qu'elle est, si ce n'est de mettre cette armée sous les ordres d'un maréchal français qui possède d'avantage la confiance de votre majesté. Dans les gouvernemens qui forment l'arrondissement de cette armée, c'est au nom de votre majesté, sire, que la justice doit se rendre ; le commandant doit envoyer des rapports journaliers à V. M. l'intendant Général M. Dudon doit envoyer à V. M. l'état de la perception des contributions et de leur emploi. L'empereur pense que V. M. doit avoir auprès du général-en-chef de l'armée du nord un commissaire Espagnol pour veiller à ce que le quart du revenu des provinces de l'arrondissement de cette armée, soit versé à Madrid pour le service de votre majesté et pour secourir l'armée du centre. L'empereur consent à ce que toutes les fois que les provinces auraient les moyens nécessaires pour se garder et se garantir des incursions des guerillas, elles puissent rentrer entièrement sous l'administration Espagnole en ne fournissant que ce qui sera convenu. Quant à l'armée du midi de l'Espagne, l'empereur approuve qu'ainsi qu'à l'armée du nord, le maréchal qui commande envoie des rapports à V. M. et l'instruire de tout ce qui se passe ; les budgets en recettes et en dépenses des différentes provinces de l'armée du midi, doivent aussi être envoyés à votre majesté, qui y tiendra un commissaire pour percevoir le quart des revenus.

La même méthode sera pareillement appliquée à l'armée d'Aragon. L'empereur, sire, satisfait aussi aux désirs exprimés par V. M. Quant à ce qui concerne le commandement général de ses armées en Espagne, sa majesté ne croit pas pouvoir donner un tel commandement qui doit être simple et un ; votre M. sentira qu'il est dans la nature des choses qu'un maréchal résident à Madrid et dirigeant les opérations voudrait en avoir la gloire avec la responsabilité, et que dans ce cas, les commandans des armées du midi et de Portugal se croyant moins réellement sous les ordres de votre M. que sous de son chef d'état major, pourraient ne pas obéir, ou exécuter ce qui leur serait prescrit. Mais indépendamment du commandement de l'armée du centre, V. M. sire, aurait le commandement des troupes qui entreraient dans l'arrondissement de cette armée. Si l'armée du Midi se repliait sur l'armée du centre, elle serait dès-lors sous les ordres de V. M. et il en serait de même pour l'armée du centre.

Dans celles des armées où V. M. se rendrait, elle aurait les honneurs du commandement ; mais, sire, l'empereur juge très important de ne rien changer au commandement militaire ni à l'armée du nord, ni à l'armée d'Aragon, ni aux armées du midi et de Portugal, excepté ce qu'il est nécessaire d'établir pour que V. M. ait des rapports de tout ce qui se passe, connaisse tout et puisse se servir de ces relations, dans sa position centrale, pour instruire les autres généraux : sa majesté pense que cette communication de renseignemens, d'observations, de conseils, peut même avoir lieu par le canal du ministre de la guerre de V. M. L'empereur désire, sire, que V. M. veuille bien correspondre directement avec moi par des lettres signées de sa main ; j'aurai l'honneur d'adresser directement les miennes à V. M. l'empereur désire également qu'elle s'en réserve l'ouverture et fasse connaître ensuite à son chef d'état-major ce qu'elle jugera convenable. Je prie votre M. de vouloir bien donner ses ordres pour que tous les comptes rendus en états de situation me soient adressés, que les rapports soient très exacts et que je sois instruit de tout ce qui peut intéresser le service de l'empereur comme cela est d'usage dans une armée. D'après les ordres de l'empereur une somme de cinq cent mille francs par mois sera envoyée à V. M. jusqu'au 1^{er} Juillet, et à compter du 1^{er} Juillet, cet envoi sera d'un million par mois pendant le reste de l'année.

L'empereur, sire, me prescrit d'avoir l'honneur de concerter avec votre majesté les mesures qu'elle jugera convenables à l'organisation de l'armée du centre ainsi que pour en retirer les généraux qui ne conviendraient pas à votre majesté, faire des exemples de ceux qui auroient commis des dilapidations, leur faire restituer les sommes qu'ils auraient dilapidées ; enfin, sire, l'empereur se repose essentiellement sur votre majesté du soin de maintenir les officiers de son armée dans la discipline convenable et de faire des exemples, et il désire que V. M. envoie journellement des rapports détaillés sur tout ce qui est important. Votre majesté, sire, reconnaîtra dans ces dispositions que le désir de l'empereur est de faire tout ce qui peut donner un nouvel éclat à l'entrée de V. M. en Espagne, en maintenant d'ailleurs dans leur

intégrité, ainsi que sa majesté le gage indispensable, l'organisation de l'armée d'Andalousie et des autres armées de l'Espagne. Etc.

Observations faites par le ROI D'ESPAGNE sur la lettre du major-général, de la 1ère Juin, 1811.

Le roi demande.

1. Que messrs. les maréchaux commandant-en-chef les armées de l'empereur, à l'armée du nord, du Portugal, de midi, et de l'Aragon, ne puissent augmenter les impôts existant à ce jour, ni lever aucune contribution extraordinaire sans l'autorization du roi, ou de l'empereur.

2. Le roi désire que le Maréchal Jourdan remplace le Maréchal Duc d'Istrie dans le commandement de l'armée du nord.

3. Que les maréchaux commandant les armées de l'empereur et les intendans général ne puissent vendre aucune bien national ou communal sans l'autorization du roi ; qu'il en soit de même pour les plombs et vif argent appartenant à l'état.

4. Que les administrations Espagnoles dans l'arrondissement des armées du nord, du midi, de l'Aragon, resteront telles qu'elles sont, et que si des changemens paroissent utiles, ils seront demandés au roi.

5. Qu'il soit spécifié que le quart des revenues des provinces occupées par les armées de l'empereur, en Espagne, sera versé net dans le trésor du roi à Madrid, et que les trois autres quartes seront employés aux besoins de l'armée dans les dites provinces, et en payement des traitemens des administrations Espagnoles.

6. Le roi se trouvant avoir l'honneur du commandement près des armées ou il se trouve, pense qu'il est dans les intentions de votre majesté qu'il puisse voir et réunir les autorités Espagnoles comme bon lui semblera pour leur parler dans l'intérêt des affaires d'Espagne : ce que le roi trouve utile de faire dans les lieux où il l'arrêtera pour se rendre à Madrid.

7. Il paroît entendu que le maréchal commandant l'armée de Portugal rendra compte au roi des toutes les opérations, aussi que doivent le faire les autres maréchaux.

8. Le roi trouve utile pour les intérêts des affaires d'Espagne de pouvoir s'attacher des officiers Espagnols ou autres qui se trouveroient parmi les prisonniers, et qui par des motifs particuliers il jugeroit convenable d'employer.

9. Le roi de Westphalie qui ne peut pas recruter les regimens qu'il a en Espagne est disposé à mettre le petit nombre d'hommes qui restent aux drapeaux à la disposition du roi d'Espagne pour être à la solde et à son service ; le roi d'Espagne les placeroit utilement dans la garde.

10. Le roi désire que le Général Maurice Mathieu remplace le Général Lorge.

11. Qu'il ne reste à Madrid que l'administration nécessaire pour l'armée du centre, et que cette grande quantité d'administrateurs appartenant à l'administration générale qui n'existe plus à Madrid soit envoyée à Burgos ou en France.

12. Que la solde des troupes françaises faisant partie de l'armée du centre continue n'être payée par le trésor de France.

13. Sa majesté conservera le Général Belliard comme chef de son état major.

14. Le roi désire pouvoir prendre toutes les mesures politiques qu'il jugera convenable, et faire toutes autres dispositions à l'égard de cortez en se conformant aux vues contenues dans la lettre que j'ai écrite d'après l'ordre de V. M. pour cet objet.

15. Sur les 500,000 francs que V. M. met à la disposition du roi à Madrid on en retient 100,000 francs pour l'arrière. Le roi demande que cette somme soit pour le service courant.

Paris, le Juin, 1811.

SIRE,—L'empereur m'ordonne de vous envoyer la copie de la lettre que j'adresse au Duc d'Istrie : j'écris à-peu-près dans les mêmes termes aux autres commandants. Je n'ai pas encore vu le Maréchal Jourdan : je le verrai demain et immédiatement après il partira pour Madrid, où l'empereur apprendra avec plaisir qu'il est employé comme gouverneur.

Le Duc de Raguse mande qu'il est en marche sur le Tage. L'empereur désire que V. M. donne ses ordres pour qu'on lui procure tous les secours dont il peut avoir besoin : il a avec lui vingthuit mille bayonnettes, trois mille hommes de cavalerie, et trent-six pièces de canon. L'empereur désire que V. M. puisse l'appuyer avec dixhuit cent chevaux, quinze à dixhuit pièces de canon et deux à trois mille hommes d'infanterie : ce corps pourroit être placé à proximité afin de pouvoir rejoindre et aider le Duc de Raguse, s'il devoit donner bataille aux Anglais. L'empereur verroit avec plaisir, Sire, qu'après votre arrivée à Madrid vous vous rendissiez à l'armée de Portugal, pour la passer en revue, l'animer, et prendre dans votre revue l'état des emplois vacans.

J'écris au Duc de Raguse que si l'on pouvoit retrancher Alcantara et faire une tête de pont sur la rive droite, ce seroit une bonne opération. Si l'armée de Portugal arrivoit à tems pour secourir l'armée du midi devant Badajoz, le petit corps de reserve dont je viens de parler ci-dessus à votre majesté ne pourroit être que de la plus grande utilité.

Le siège de Tarragone a déjà attiré une partie des bandes qui étoient dans l'arrondissement de l'armée du centre. Deux divisions de l'armée de reserve que forme l'empereur arriveront l'une à Pampelune, l'autre à Vittoria vers le 14 Juillet : cela mettra à même d'envoyer encore aux armées du midi et de Portugal environ douze milles hommes qui sont en Vavarre, et qui passeront par Madrid.

L'empereur ne peut qu'engager votre majesté à envoyer à l'armée du midi tout ce qui lui appartient, car c'est là que se portent les grands coups et qu'ont lieu les opérations les plus importantes.

Etc., etc.

ALEXANDRE.

To the DUKE of ISTRIA.

Paris, Juin, 1811.

J'ai prévenu, Monsieur le Maréchal, le Général Monthion, les Généraux Caffarelli et Dorsenne directement les dispositions dont je vais vous entretenir, et qui ont rapport aux intentions de l'empereur relativement au retour de Roi d'Espagne dans ses états.

Le roi commande en chef l'armée du centre, mais l'intention de l'empereur est que vous correspondiez avec S. M. C. en lui faisant le rapport de ce qui se passe afin de la mettre à même de connoître l'ensemble des événemens en Espagne comme les autres généraux en chef ont l'ordre d'en agir de même, le roi sera dans le cas de pouvoir comme point central vous faire des communications qui contribueront au succès des armes de l'empereur.

S. M. L. m'ordonne aussi de vous faire connaître, Monsieur le Duc, que son intention est que pendant le voyage du roi dans son retour à Madrid, tous les honneurs lui soient rendus dans les gouvernemans et dans l'arrondissement de l'armée du nord comme si S. M. commandait cette armée. Le roi donnera l'ordre et recoevra les honneurs du commandement. Les gouverneurs l'accompagneront dans leur gouvernement et lui feront fournir toutes les escortes qui lui seront nécessaires. Il est à présumer que le roi séjournera quelque tems à Vittoria et à Burgos, et qu'il profitera de son séjour pour rassembler les notables du pays les éclairer sur la situation des affaires, et améliorer l'esprit public. Vous seconderez, monsieur le maréchal, les mesures que le roi pourra prendre pour rendre les villes et les villages responsables des abus qui se commettent sur leur territoire. Vous agirez de même si le roi accorde le pardon à quel ques bandes de guerillas qui se rendraient. Vous devez aider de tous vos moyens les mesures que S. M. prendra pour le rétablissement de l'ordre et de la tranquillité publique. Du reste les troupes composant l'armée du nord doivent rester sous le commandement respectif de leurs chefs et vos ordres doivent continuer à être exécutés sans qu'aucun ordre de qui que ce soit puisse les changer. Quant à l'administration du pays, elle doit continuer à marcher dans la direction donnée par les instructions et les ordres de l'empereur ; les fonds doivent être destinées aux besoins de l'armée, à l'entretien des hôpitaux, et vous devez défendre et empêcher toute espèce d'abus. Le roi ayant plus particulièrement encore que vous, les moyens de connaître les abus qu'ont

lieu, l'empereur ordonne que vous profiteriez des lumières que le roi pourra vous donner à cet égard pour les réprimer. Il est nécessaire, Monsieur le Duc, que vous me fassiez connaître le budget des ressources et des dépenses afin de savoir la partie des revenus qui pourront être versés à Madrid, dans la caisse du gouvernement pour le service du roi et pour l'armée du centre.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous répéter que la justice doit se rendre au nom du roi ; cela a toujours dû avoir lieu ; le droit de faire grace ne vous appartient pas pour les individus condamnés par les tribunaux ; vous n'êtes autorisé qu'à suspendre l'exécution dans les cas que vous jugerez gracieux. Le droit de faire grace n'appartient qu'au roi. Vous n'avez pas non plus le droit de nommer à aucune place du clergé ; le roi y nomme dans toutes les parties de son royaume.

Si le roi juge à propos de tenir près de vous et des gouverneurs un commissaire Espagnol pour connaître les recettes et les dépenses, vous devez donner à ce commissaire les renseignemens dont il aura besoin pour remplir sa mission. Vous aurez soin, monsieur le maréchal, de me rendre compte journellement de ce qui se sera fait pendant le séjour du roi afin que j'en informe l'empereur."

Etc., etc.

Paris, le 24 Août, 1811.

SIRE,—J'ai l'honneur d' informer votre majesté que d'après les ordres de l'empereur, je viens de faire connaître à M. le Maréchal Duc de Raguse que l'armée de Portugal doit prendre désormais sa ligne de communication sur Madrid ; je lui mande que c'est là que doit être son centre de dépôt, et que toute opération que l'ennemi ferait sur la Coa ne peut déranger cette ligne ; que si l'ennemi veut prendre l'offensive il ne peut la prendre que dans l'Andalousie parceque de ce côté il a un objet à remplir, qui est de faire lever le siège de Cadix, tandis que ses efforts dans le nord s'avança-t-il même jusqu'à Valladolid, n'aboutiraient à rien puisque les troupes que nous avons dans ces provinces en se repliant lui opposeraient une armée considérable et qu' alors l'armée de Portugal devrait faire pour l'armée du nord ce qu'elle ferait pour l'armée du midi. Je le préviens que l'objet important est que sa ligne d'opérations soit sur Talavera et Madrid parceque son armée est spécialement destinée à protéger celle du midi. Je lui fais observer que l'armée de Portugal étant attaquée de front, son mouvement de retraite est encore sur Madrid parceque dans tous les cas possibles ce doit être sa ligne d'opérations, qu'il faut donc que tous les dépôts quelconques appartenant à l'armée de Portugal soient dirigés sur Talavera et Madrid. Je donne l'ordre impératif au Général Dorsenne de faire partir dans les 24 heures tous les dépôts et détachemens qu'il appartenant à l'armée de Portugal ; tout ce qui est en état de servir sera dirigé en gros détachemens par Avila sur Placencia, et quant aux hommes qui ne sont pas pour le moment en état de servir, le Général Dorsenne les fera diriger sur Madrid, et aura soin d'en informer à l'avance votre majesté, de manière qu'il ne lui restera plus un seul homme appartenant à l'armée de Portugal, sauf la garnison de Ciudad Rodrigo qu'il fera relever et rejoindre aussitôt après l'arrivée des renforts qui vont se rendre à l'armée du nord.

Etc., etc.

Boulogne, le 20 Sept., 1811.

SIRE,—L'empereur m'a demandé si j'avois reponse à la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à V.M. en lui rendant compte de la reddition de Figueras. L'empereur m'ordonne d'annoncer à V.M. que son intention est d'étendre à toute la rive gauche de l'Ebre la mesure qu'elle a jugé devoir adopter pour la Catalogne. L'empereur pense que V. M. témoin de la resistance qui éprouvent les armées et des sacrifices des toutes espèces que la France est obligé de faire, est trop juste pour ne point apprecier les motifs de la conduite l'empereur, et je suis autorisé à assurer V. M. des sentimens d'intérêt et d'amitié qui continuent à animer l'empereur pour V. M. mais il ne peuvent pas faire negliger à S. M. I. et R. ce qu'elle doit à la sureté de son empire et à la gloire de son règne.

Etc., etc.

No. XV.

SECTION I.

CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

Extract from MR. CANNING'S instructions to MR. STUART and MR. DUFF, 1808.

To MR. STUART.

"You are to enter into no political engagements."

To JAMES DUFF, ESQ.

"July 26, 1808.

"You will embark on board his majesty's ship *Stately*; on board of that ship are embarked to the amount of one million of Spanish dollars, three-fourths in dollars and one-fourth in bars, which sum is consigned to your care and is destined by his Majesty for the use of the kingdom of Andalusia and the provinces of Spain connected with them.

"His majesty has no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary assistance which he furnishes to Spain."

"Military stores to a considerable amount are now actually shipping for Cadiz, and the articles required for the clothing of the Andalusian army will follow."

"It was only by a direct but secret understanding with the government of Spain, under the connivance of France, that any considerable amount of dollars has been collected in England."

"Each province of Spain made its own application with reference to the full amount of its own immediate necessities, and to the full measure of its own intended exertions, but without taking into consideration that similar necessities and similar exertions lead to similar demands from other parts, and that though each separate demand might in itself be reasonably supposed to come within the limits of the means of Great Britain, yet that the whole together occasion a call for *specie* such as never before was made upon this country at any period of its existence."

"In the course of the present year it is publicly notorious that a subsidy is paid by Great Britain to Sweden of one million two hundred thousand pounds, the whole of which, or nearly the whole, must be remitted in specie, amounting to at least seven million dollars. One million of dollars has already been sent to Gihon, another to Coruña *in part* of the respective demands of the principality of Asturias and the kingdom of Galicia, and the remainder of these demands as already brought forward would require not less than eight million dollars more to satisfy them."—"An application from Portugal has also been received for an aid, which will amount to about twelve or thirteen hundred thousand dollars, one million, as has been stated, goes in the ship with you to Cadiz, and the remainder of the Andalusian demand would require between three and four millions of dollars more. Here, therefore, there are not less than three and twenty millions of dollars, of which near sixteen millions for Spain and Portugal required to be suddenly drawn from the British treasury."

"In addition to this drain it is also to be considered that the British armies are at the same moment sent forth in aid of the same cause, and that every article of expense to be incurred by them on foreign service in whatever country they may be employed, must be defrayed by remittances in silver."—"You will be particularly careful in entering upon the

* *Note by Editor.*—Nevertheless Sir John Moore had only £25,000 in his military chest, and Sir David Baird only £8000 which were given him by Sir John Moore.

ADMIRAL DE COURCY to MR. STUART, October 21, 1808.

"Mr. Frere will have told you that the *Semiramis* has brought a million dollars in order to lie at his disposal, besides £50,000 in dollars, which are to be presented to the army of the

explanation with the junta of Seville, to avoid any appearance of a desire to overrate the merit and value of the exertions now making by Great Britain in favour of the Spanish nation, or to lay the ground for restraining or limiting those exertions within any other bounds than those which are prescribed by the limits of the actual means of the country."

MR. CANNING to MR. STUART.

"July 27, 1808.

"Already the deputy from Coruna has added to his original demand for two millions of dollars, a further demand for three millions on learning from the Asturian deputies that the demand from Asturias had amounted to five millions in the first instance. Both profess in conversation to include a provision for the interests of Leon and of Old Castile in the demand. But this has not prevented a direct application from Leon."

"It is besides of no small disadvantage that the deputies from the Asturias and Galicia having left Spain at so early a period are really not competent to furnish information or advice upon the more advanced state of things in that country."—"I have already stated to you that in application for succours, there is an underground appearance of rivalry, which with every disposition to do everything that can be done for Spain, imposes a necessity of perpetual caution with respect to the particular demands of each province. The Asturias having been rebuked by their constituents for not having applied for pecuniary aid as quickly as the Gallicians, are bent upon repairing this fault, and the Gallician having been commended for promptitude, is ambitious of acquiring new credit by increasing the amount of his demand. Whatever the ulterior demands these several provinces have to make, will be made with infinitely more effect through you and Mr. Hunter respectively, as they will then come accompanied with some detailed and intelligible exposition of the grounds and objects of each particular application."

MR. STUART's despatches to MR. CANNING.

"Coruña, July 22, 1808.

"Accounts of advantages in the quarters, which from the present state of things can have little or no communication with this place, appear to be numerous in proportion as the north of Spain is barren of events agreeable to the existing government; and I am disposed to consider unauthenticated reports of success in Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia, to be a mode of concealing or palliating disasters in Leon, Castile, and the Montana."

"July 24, 1808.

"One thousand men, under De Ponte, is the utmost force the Asturias have yet organized or sent into the field, and the contingents of Leon are very trifling.

"Thirty thousand men, of which 20,000 are regular troops under Blake, were united to 10,000 Castilian recruits under Cuesta. They went to Rio Seco to march against Burgos, and cut off Bessieres' retreat to France, but they lost 7000 men at Rio Seco.

"The Estremadura army under Gallegos is at Almaraz, consisting of 24,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, but the battle of Rio Seco has cut the communication which has been before kept up to Andalusia."

Abstract of information sent to MR. CANNING by MR. STUART.

"July 26, 1808.

"The 29th of May the inhabitants of Coruña appointed a provisional junta of 40 members taken from the notables of the place, and this junta despatched circulars to the seven provinces of St. Jago, Betanços, Coruña, Mondonedo, Orense, Lugo, and Tuy,

Marquis of Romana."—"In the mean time the British troops remain in their transports at Coruña, uncertain whether they shall be invited to the war, and without a shilling to defray their expences."

desiring that deputies from each should come to Coruña to form a junta for Galicia entire. Seven persons came and immediately seized the government and dissolved the local junta; the troops marched to the frontier, deputies went to England, and all seemed to proceed well until contributions were demanded. Then the provinces demurred saying, their deputies were empowered only to signify their approbation of what had past, but not to seize the government, and St. Jago insisted upon sending more deputies, and having additional votes as being of more consequence. It was then arranged that two deputies from each province should be sent to Coruña with more power. The archbishop and Mr. Freire came from St. Jago, and others were arriving when the first deputation resolved not to submit, and declared the second to be an ordinary junta, chosen for the mere purpose of raising money, and subordinate to themselves. The archbishop and the bishop of Orense refused to act in such a capacity; but a letter from the latter painting the true state of things being intercepted, he was arrested and confined in the citadel. A body of troops was sent to St. Jago, it was uncertain whether to seize the archbishop or to awe the people; but Mr. Stuart was secretly assured it was for the former purpose. The archbishop thought so also and came immediately to Coruña. This transaction was studiously concealed from the English envoy, but he penetrated the secret. The people were discontented at this usurpation of the junta of seven, but the lavish succours sent to them by Mr. Canning and the presence of Mr. Stuart induced them to submit, as thinking the junta were supported by England.

"This junta of seven adopted no measures in common with any neighbouring province, but willingly entered into close alliance with the insurgents of Portugal as one independent state with another; and they withheld any share of the English supplies for the armies of Asturias and Leon.

"The archbishop was an intriguing, dangerous man, and secretly wrote to Blake to march with the army against the junta; his letter being intercepted six voted to arrest him, but the seventh, with the assistance of Mr. Stuart, persuaded them to avoid so violent a measure as tending towards a civil commotion. Tumults, however, did take place, and the English naval officers were requested and consented to quell a riot, and it proved that they had more influence over the people than the junta.

"In August the archbishop was commanded to leave Coruña; he obeyed, and the Bishop of Orense was, after some resistance, made a member of the junta."

MR. STUART to MR. CANNING.

"August 7.

"There is no common plan, and consequently no concert in their proceedings. No province shares the succour granted by Great Britain with its neighbour, although that advantage may not be useful to themselves. No gun-boats have been sent from Ferrol to protect St. Andero on the coast of Biscay, and the Asturians have in vain asked for artillery from the depots of Galicia.

"The stores landed at Gihon, and not used by the Asturians, have remained in that port and in Oviedo, although they would have afforded a reasonable relief to the army of Blake.

"The money brought by the *Pluto* for the province of Leon, which has not raised a man and was till this moment in the hands of the French, remains unemployed in the port where it was landed. Estremadura is said to have 9000 cavalry, which are of little service since the French quitted that province. Yet they have not sent a man to Blake, who cannot prudently stir from his present position without cavalry. General Cuesta also has deprived him of 600 horse and his flying artillery, with which he has actually quitted Salamanca on his way to join the Estremadura army."

DITTO to DITTO.

(Abstract.)

"August 12.

"The Duke of Infantado reached Blake's quarters, after escaping from France. Blake gave him his confidence and sent him to Madrid to form a council of war, and to persuade

Cuesta to send 2000 cavalry to the army of Galicia. The junta did not approve of this ; they suspected Infantado as a double-dealer and in the French interest.

"After Baylen, the juntas of Seville and Murcia wished to establish a despotism, differing in nothing from that of Charles III. and Charles IV. save that Florida Blanca was to be the head of a regency. But in the north they were all for liberty, and put forward the British constitution as a model. The army spoke of Infantado as regent, but the civilians disliked him. All the English guns sent out for Galicia went by mistake to the Asturias, the succours were absurdly distributed, and everything was in confusion."

MR. STUART to MR. CANNING.

"Coruña, August 9.

"I am placed at the very extremity of the kingdom where I cannot possibly obtain any sort of information respecting other provinces, and my presence has very materially contributed to cherish the project of separation from the rest of the peninsula in the minds of the Galicians.

"Besides the constant communication of the navy with the junta, a military mission is placed here, consisting of several persons who communicate regularly with the government and the admiralty, and whose correspondence with England being a mere duplicate of my own, renders the one or the other perfectly useless.

"The packet instead of coming weekly only arrived every fortnight, being sent to Gihon to carry home Mr. Hunter's letter, who I understand has no order to report to me !

"The admiral having no official notice of my situation here on the part of government, cannot be expected to detach vessels for the purpose of sending my despatches at a time when he is occupied in sending his own accounts of the events taking place in Spain to the admiralty."

SECTION II.

LORD WELLESLEY'S INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. STUART.

(Extracts.)

"January 5, 1810.

"In return for these liberal supplies, his majesty is entitled to claim from the Portuguese government every assistance which can be afforded to the British commander and troops, a faithful and judicious application of the funds granted for the support of so large a portion of the Portuguese force, which must otherwise be supplied from the exclusive resources of Portugal."

"I am commanded to signify to you the expectation that the extraordinary efforts of his majesty's government for the aid of Portugal, and the consequent pressure upon the British resources, will be met with corresponding exertions on the part of the regency, and that all local and temporary prejudices will be submitted to the urgent necessity of placing the finances of the kingdom in that state which may render them available for its defence in the approaching danger. You will direct your immediate and vigilant attention to this most important object, nor will you refrain from offering, or even from urging, your advice on any occasion which may open the prospect of effecting any useful reduction in the civil charges, or augmentation in the revenues or military resources of the country."

"In addition to these arrangements his majesty will expect to receive regular monthly accounts of the expenditure of the sums applicable to the military charges of Portugal, under the orders issued to Lord Wellington, as well as accurate returns of the state and condition of the several corps receiving British pay."—"It is also desirable that his majesty should be acquainted with the state and condition of that part of the Portuguese force which is to be maintained from the revenues of Portugal."—"The crisis demands the most unreserved confidence and communication between his majesty's ministers and the local government of the prince regent. No jealousy or suspicion should be harboured under such a pressure of common danger ; the great sacrifices which we have made for the interests of our ally must

not be frustrated by any consideration inferior to the main purpose of our mutual security, nor must we now hesitate to take the lead in any measures necessary to enable Portugal to contribute a just share of their own efforts and resources for the accomplishment of their own safety."

"The governing power in Spain does not derive its authority from the appointment of the sovereign; the disposition of some of its leading members is at least equivocal, and its conduct has not satisfied any expectations either of the Spanish nation or of the allies."—"In Spain, the assembly of the cortes is the only remedy to which that country can resort for the purpose of investing the government with a regular force or a national spirit, nor can any hope be entertained of a sufficient exertion of the military resources of Spain, until a governing power shall be so framed as to unite a due representation of the crown with a just security for the interests and welfare of all the estates of the realm."

SECTION III.

CONDUCT OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT.

LORD WELLINGTON to MR. STUART.

"*Visen, March 30, 1810.*

"I don't understand the arrangements which government have made of the command of the troops there. I have hitherto considered them as part of this army, and from the arrangements which I made with the Spanish government they cost us nothing but their pay, and all the money procured at Cadiz for bills was applicable to the service in this country. Their instructions to General Graham alter this entirely, and they have even gone so far as to desire him to take measures to supply the Spaniards with provisions from the Mediterranean, whereas I had insisted that they should feed our troops. The first consequence of this arrangement will be, that we shall have no more money from Cadiz. I had considered the troops at Cadiz so much part of my army, that I had written to my brother to desire to have his opinion whether, if the French withdrew from Cadiz when they should attack Portugal, he thought I might bring into Portugal at least the troops which I had sent there. But I consider this now to be out of the question."

GENERAL GRAHAM to MR. STUART.

"*Isla, May 22, 1810.*

"I add this note merely as a postscript to my last, to tell you that Lord Liverpool has decided the doubt, by declaring this a part of Lord Wellington's army, but saying it is the wish of government that, though I am second in command to him, I should be left here for the present. This is odd enough. I mean that it should not have been left to his judgment to decide where I was to be employed; one would think he could judge fully better according to circumstances than people in England."

No. XVI.

SECTION I.

MARMONT AND DORSENNE'S OPERATIONS.

Intercepted letter from FOY to GIRARD, translated from the cypher.

"*Truxillo, 20 Août, 1811.*

"MONSIEUR LE GÉNÉRAL,—Wellington bloque Rodrigo avec quarante mille hommes; son avant garde occupe la Sierra de Francia. On assure que l'artillerie du train arrive de Porto pour faire le siège de cette place. C'est approvisionnée pour trois mois. Marmont va se porter vers le nord pour se réunir avec l'armée commandée par le Général Dorsenne et

attaquer l'ennemi. Ma division partira le vingt six pour passer le Tage et suivre le mouvement de Marmont. Huit mille hommes de l'armée du centre nous remplaceront à Placentia et au Pont d'Almaraz.

"Monsieur le Maréchal Duc de Raguse me charge de vous écrire que c'est à vous à contenir quatre mille Espagnols qui sont en ce moment réunis devant Truxillo. Etc. etc.

"Foy."

Intercepted letter from GENERAL WATTIER to the general commanding at Ciudad Rodrigo.
(Extract.)

"Salamanca, September 1, 1811.

"L'armée Espagnol de Galice, honteusement chassée de ses positions de la Baneza et de Puente de Orvigo et poursuivie par l'avant garde au delà de Villa Franca, s'est retirée en grande hâte sur la Coruñe. Le général-en-chef après avoir nettoiyé ces parages, vient ici sous six jours avec vingt-cinq mille hommes de la garde, et nous irons tous ensemble voir s'il plaît à ces illustres Anglais de nous attendre, et de nous permettre de rompre quelques lances avec eux. Le Duc de Raguse à qui j'envoie de vos nouvelles est autour de vous à Baños, Val de Fuentes, Placentia, etc., et nous agirons de concert avec lui."

Intercepted letter from MARMONT to GIRARD.

"Placentia, Septembre, 1811.

"GÉNÉRAL,—Je vous ai écrit pour vous prier de faire passer une lettre que j'adressai au Maréchal Duc de Dalmatie. Les Anglais ont réuni toutes leurs forces auprès de Rodrigo, les corps Espagnols même qui étoient sur la rive gauche du Tage passent en ce moment cette rivière; vous n'avez presque personne devant vous. Il serait extrêmement important que pendant que la presque totalité de l'armée va se porter sur Rodrigo vous puissiez faire un mouvement pour opérer une diversion utile et rappeler un portion de la force ennemie de votre côté. J'ignore quelles sont vos instructions, mais je ne doute pas que ce mouvement n'entre dans les intentions du Duc de Dalmatie."

Du MARÉCHAL MARMONT au général de division, Foy.

"Talavera, Octobre 21, 1811.

"GENERAL,—Je reçois seulement dans ce moment votre lettre du 18me avec la copie de celle du Général d'Aultanne. Pour instruction générale vous ne devez obéir à aucun ordre qui vous serait donné au nom du roi lorsqu'elles sont contraires à mes intentions particulières. Ne vous départez jamais de ces dispositions. L'armée de Portugal ne doit point servir aux escortes, ni à la communication de l'armée du midi,—nos troupes auront bien assez de courses à faire pour assurer la rentrée de nos approvisionnements. Le roi a parau désirer que je n'occupe point Illescas, à cause de son voisinage de Madrid; par ce motif et plus encore en raison de l'éloignement et du service pénible des troupes, je ne veux point l'occuper. Mon intention étoit de ne point occuper Aranjuez; mais puisque les ministres du roi ont pris la mesure inconsiderée d'ordonner la vente des magasins, ne perdez pas un seul instant pour envoyer un détachement occuper Aranjuez, où le préfet de Toledo fera faire le plus de biscuit possible. Prenez la même mesure pour tous les points où il y a des magasins.—Emparez vous en,—et que personne n'y touche.—L'empereur a indiqué la province de Toledo et non la préfecture; ainsi ce sont les ressources de toute la province qui nous sont affectés.—Emparez vous en,—et que le préfet administre tous le pays. Dites bien au préfet qu'à quelque titre que ce soit aucun des réssources en blé, argent de quelque source qu'elles préviennent ne doit être distraits pour Madrid, et qu'elles doivent toutes être conservés pour l'armée de Portugal. A la fin du mois la division de dragons arrivera dans les environs de Toledé.—J'espère qu'elle éloignera les guerillas. Dans le cas ou ils resteroient dans le voisinage on leur donnera la chasse. Voyez à obtenir du préfet de Toledé qu'il fasse un effort extraordinaire pour envoyer à Talavera le blé et l'orge qui lui ont été demandés, attendu que comme ici on est obligé de faire des expéditions en avant, nous sommes dans un besoin très pressant.

Je désirerois rentrer dans la possession de tout le blé qui a été vendu. On renverroit les acheteurs par devant le gouvernement Espagnol pour être indemnisés,—s'il y a possibilité engagez le préfet à prendre des mesures conservatoires en attendant que je prenne un arrêt à cet égard sur le rapport que vous me ferez. Je me rends à Madrid où je passerai deux jours dans l'espérance d'éclairer le roi sur la conduite que ses véritables intérêts lui commandent de tenir envers l'armée française. De là je me rends à Tolède. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous recommander, général, d'envoyer à Aranjuez un officier sage et ferme, qui exécute ponctuellement les ordres qui lui seroient donnés, qui se fasse obéir et qui mette le plus grand soin à faire especter l'habitation du roi."

Intercepted letter in cypher from GENERAL MONTEBRUN to the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo.

Val de Fuentes, Septembre, 1811.

Je reçu le—du courant, mon cher général votre réponse du—à la lettre que je vous écrivis le—, et je m'empressai d'en communiquer le continue à S. E. le Maréchal Duc de Ragusa, qui me charge de me mettre en communication avec vous. Je m'en acquitterai avec plaisir puisque c'en est toujours un nouveau pour moi de recevoir de vos nouvelles. Je vous annonce qu'un approvisionnement très considérable se prépare à Salamanque par les soins du Général-en-chef Dorsenne, le maréchal, sur lequel vous pouvez compter aussi fait des préparatifs pour vous envoyer des vivres. Tous les convois partiront sous bonne escorte, et se mettront en marche d'après ce que je presume du—au—du courant au plus tard. Dans tous les cas ne vous impatientez pas. Nous sommes prêts à venir à votre secours de toutes les manières. Vous ne sauriez trop de votre côté nous mettre au courant de la force de la position et enfin vous ne pourriez nous donner trop de détails sur l'armée Anglo-Portugaise.

Je reçois à l'instant le billet que vous avez écrit hier au Général Boyer, par lequel vous nous faites connoître que d'après tous les renseignements que vous avez obtenus, vous croyez que les sept divisions Anglaises sont dans vos parages. Il importe de s'en assurer positivement de connoître leur position, et, s'il est possible, leur composition. Il paraît que vous n'avez pas beaucoup de monde dans votre place sur qui vous puissiez compter. Proposez à l'homme que je vous envoie d'aller reconnoître les Anglais à Gallegos et Fuente Guinaldo, et de révenir par Elbodon, et vous me le renverriez ensuite. Dites lui que je le paierai bien s'il veut faire cette tournée, mais s'il s'y refuse je vous prie de ne pas l'y contraindre. Etc., etc.

GENERAL WALKER to LORD WELLINGTON.

"Coruña, September 4, 1811.

"I saw the whole of the troops with him (General Abadia) in and about a league in front of Astorga, having their advanced posts on the Esla, the whole not amounting to above 7000 men, independent of a reserve of about 1500 near Foncebadon and Bemibre or on the road from Lugo; the force of the enemy in his front when collected being estimated at about 13,000 men. The wretched situation of the Gallician troops, in want almost of everything, one-third part at least without shoes, and dependent on the precarious subsistence that can day by day be collected, certainly does credit to their patience and good inclination."

—"In consequence of this movement (Abadia's retreat), the great road by Manzanal and Bemibre being left open or nearly so, the French pushed forward on it so rapidly that shortly after my arrival here (Coruña) intelligence was received of their having got possession of the important pass of Villa Franca, and that the Gallician troops thus cut off from it, had been obliged to make their retreat by the Valdes Orres. Without any correct information of the force of the enemy, and the entrance of Galicia thus left entirely in his hands, a very considerable alarm was for some time occasioned here, of which I took every advantage to urge upon the junta the necessity of a full compliance with the recommendation and wishes of the general to enable him to put the troops in such a state of equipment as might render them, either for defence or attack, in every way disposable in his hands; and at the same time to put Coruña into temporary security by withdrawing to it all the guns (amounting to no less

than 1500) of the indefensible arsenal of Ferrol, which would otherwise become a sure dépôt for the enemy in any attack he might contemplate on this place, and who might not otherwise venture to bring with him heavy artillery on so distant an excursion."

SECTION II.

Official letters from the PRINCE of NEUCHÂTEL to MARSHAL MARMONT, extracted from the DUKE of ROVIGO's Memoirs.

L'empereur me charge de vous faire connaître, monsieur le maréchal, que l'objet le plus important en ce moment est la prise de Valence. L'empereur ordonne que vous fassiez partir un corps de troupes qui, réuni aux forces que le roi détachera de l'armée du centre, se dirige sur Valence pour appuyer l'armée du Maréchal Suchet jusqu'à ce qu'on soit maître de cette place.

Faites exécuter sans délai cette disposition de concert avec S.M. le Roi d'Espagne, et instruisez-moi de ce que vous aurez fait à cet égard. Nous sommes instruits que les Anglais ont vingt mille malades, et qu'ils n'ont pas vingt mille hommes sous les armes, en sorte qu'ils ne peuvent rien entreprendre; l'intention de l'empereur est donc que douze mille hommes, infanterie, cavalerie et sapeurs, marchent de suite sur Valence, que vous détachiez même trois à quatre mille hommes sur les derrières, et que vous, monsieur le maréchal, soyez en mesure de soutenir la prise de Valence. Cette place prise, le Portugal sera près de sa chute, parcequ'alors, dans la bonne saison, l'armée de Portugal sera augmentée de vingt cinq mille hommes de l'armée du midi et de quinze mille du corps du Général Reille, de manière à réunir plus de quatre-vingt mille hommes. Dans cette situation, vous recevriez l'ordre de vous porter sur Elvas, et de vous emparer de tout l'Alemtejo dans le même temps que l'armée du nord se porterait sur la Coa avec une armée de quarante mille hommes. L'équipage de pont qui existe à Badajoz servirait à jeter des ponts sur le Tage; l'ennemi serait hors d'état de rien opposer à une pareille force, qui offre toutes les chances de succès sans présenter aucun danger. C'est donc Valence qu'il faut prendre. Le 6 Novembre nous étions maîtres d'un faubourg; il y a lieu d'espérer que la place prise en Décembre, ce qui vous mettrait, monsieur le duc, à portée de vous trouver devant Elvas dans le courant de Janvier. Envoyez moi votre avis sur ce plan d'opérations, afin qu'après avoir reçu l'avis de la prise de Valence, l'empereur puisse vous donner des ordres positifs.

Le Prince de Wagram et de Neuchâtel, major-général.

(Signe)

ALEXANDRE.

Paris le 15 Février, 1812.

Sa majesté n'est pas satisfaite de la direction que vous donnez à la guerre. Vous avez la supériorité sur l'ennemi, et au lieu de prendre l'initiative, vous ne cessez de la recevoir. Quand le Général Hill marche sur l'armée du midi avec quinze mille hommes c'est ce qui peut vous arriver de plus heureux; cette armée est assez forte et assez bien organisée pour ne rien craindre d'armée Anglaise, aurait-elle quatre cinq divisions réunies.

Aujourd'hui l'ennemi suppose que vous allez faire le siège de Rodrigo; il approche le Général Hill de sa droite afin de pouvoir le faire venir à lui à grandes marches, et vous livrer bataille réunis, si vous voulez reprendre Rodrigo. C'est donc au Duc de Dalmatie à tenir vingt mille hommes pour le contenir et l'empêcher de faire ce mouvement, et si Général Hill passe le Tage, de se porter à sa suite, ou dans l'Alemtejo. Vous avez le double de la lettre que l'empereur m'a ordonné d'écrire au Duc de Dalmatie le 20 de ce mois, en réponse à la demande qu'il vous avait faite de porter des troupes dans le midi; c'est vous, monsieur le maréchal, qui deviez lui écrire pour lui demander de porter un grand corps de troupes vers la Guadiana, pour maintenir le Général Hill dans le midi et l'empêcher de se réunir à Lord Wellington. . . Les Anglais connaissent assez l'honneur français pour comprendre que ce succès (la prise de Rodrigo) peut devenir un affront pour eux, et qu'au lieu d'améliorer leur position, l'occupation de

Ciudad Rodrigo les met dans l'obligation de défendre cette place. Ils nous rendent maîtres du choix du champ de bataille, puisque vous les forcez à venir au secours de cette place et à combattre dans une position si loin de la mer. . . . Je ne puis que vous répéter les ordres de l'empereur. Prenez votre quartier-général à Salamanque, travaillez avec activité à fortifier cette ville, réunissez-y un nouvel équipage du siège pour servir à armer la ville, formez-y des approvisionnements, faites faire tous les jours le coup de fusil avec les Anglais, placez deux fortes avant gardes qui menacent, l'une Rodrigo, et l'autre Almeida; menacez les autres directions sur la frontière de Portugal, envoyez des partis qui ravagent quelques villages, enfin employez tout ce qui peut tenir l'ennemi sur le qui-vive. Faites réparer les routes de Porto et d'Almeida. Tenez votre armée vers Toro, Benavente. La Province d'Avila a même de bonnes parties où l'on trouverait des ressources. Dans cette situation qui est aussi simple que formidable, vous reposez vos troupes, vous formez des magasins, et avec de simples démonstrations bien combinées, qui mettent vos avant-postes à même de tirer journellement des coups de fusil avec l'ennemi, vous aurez barre sur les Anglais, qui ne pourront vous observer. . . . Ce n'est donc pas à vous, Monsieur le Duc, à vous disséminer en faveur de l'armée du midi. Lorsque vous avez été prendre le commandement de votre armée elle venait d'éprouver un échec par sa retraite de Portugal; ce pays était ravagé, les hôpitaux et les magasins de l'ennemi étaient à Lisbonne; vos troupes étaient fatiguées, dégoutées par les marches forcées, sans artillerie, sans train d'équipages. Badajoz était attaqué depuis long temps; une bataille dans le midi n'avait pu faire lever le siège de cette place? Que deviez vous faire alors? Vous portez sur Almeida pour menacer Lisbonne? Non, parceque votre armée n'avait pas d'artillerie, pas de train d'équipages, et qu'elle était fatiguée. L'ennemi à cette position, n'aurait pas cru à cette menace; il aurait laissé approcher jusqu'à Coimbre, aurait près Badajos, et ensuite serait venu sur vous. Vous avez donc fait à cette époque ce qu'il fallait faire; vous avez marché rapidement au secours de Badajoz; l'ennemi avait barre sur vous, et l'art de la guerre était de vous y commettre. Le siège a été levé, et l'ennemi est rentré en Portugal; c'est ce qu'il y avait à faire. . . . Dans ce moment, Monsieur le Duc, votre position est simple et claire, et ne demande pas de combinaisons d'esprit. Placez vos troupes de manière qu'en quatre marches elles puissent se réunir et se grouper sur Salamanque; ayez-y votre quartier-général; que vos ordres, vos dispositions annoncent à l'ennemi que la grosse artillerie arrive à Salamanque, que vous y former des magasins. . . . Si Wellington se dirige sur Badajoz, laissez le aller; réunissez aussitôt votre armée, et marcher droit sur Almeida; poussez des partis sur Coimbre, et soyez persuadé que Wellington reviendra bien vite sur vous.

Ecrivez au Duc de Dalmatie et sollicitez le roi de lui écrire également, pour qu'il exécute les ordres impératifs que je lui donne, de porter un corps de vingt mille hommes pour forcer le Général Hill à rester sur la rive gauche du Tage. Ne pensez donc plus, Monsieur le Maréchal, à aller dans le midi et marchez droit sur le Portugal, si Lord Wellington fait la faute de se porter sur la rive gauche du Tage. . . . Profitez du moment où vos troupes se réunissent pour bien organiser et mettre de l'ordre dans le nord. Qu'on travaille jour et nuit à fortifier Salamanque qu'on y fasse venir de grosses pièces, qu'on fasse l'équipage de siège; enfin qu'on forme des magasins de subsistances. Vous sentirez, Monsieur le Maréchal, qu'en suivant ces directions et en mettant pour les exécuter toute l'activité convenable vous tiendrez l'ennemi en échec. . . . En recevant l'initiative au lieu de la donner, en ne songeant qu'à l'armée du midi qui n'a pas besoin de vous, puisqu'elle est forte de quatre-vingt mille hommes des meilleures troupes de l'Europe, en ayant des sollicitudes pour les pays qui ne sont pas sous votre commandement et abandonnant les Asturies et les provinces qui vous regardent, un combat que vous éprouveriez serait une calamité qui se ferait sentir dans toute l'Espagne. Un échec de l'armée du midi la conduirait sur Madrid ou sur Valence et ne serait pas de même nature.

Je vous le répète, vous êtes le maître de conserver barre sur Lord Wellington, en plaçant votre quartier-général à Salamanque, en occupant en force cette position et poussant de fortes reconnaissances sur les débouches. Je ne pourrais que vous rédire ce que je vous ai déjà

expliqué ci-dessus. Si Badajoz était cerné seulement par deux ou trois divisions Anglaises, le Duc de Dalmatie le débloquent ; mais alors Lord Wellington, affaibli, vous mettrait à même de vous porter dans l'intérieur du Portugal, ce qui secourrait plus efficacement Badajoz que toute autre opération Je donne l'ordre que tout ce qu'il sera possible de fournir vous soit fourni pour compléter votre artillerie et pour armer Salamanque. Vingt-quatre heures après la réception de cette lettre l'empereur pense que vous partirez pour Salamanque, à moins d'événemens inattendus ; que vous changerez une avant garde d'occuper les débouchés sur Rodrigo, et une autre sur Almeida : que vous aurez dans la main au moins la valeur d'une division ; que vous ferez revenir la cavalerie et artillerie qui sont à la division du Tage. . . . Réunissez surtout votre cavalerie, dont vous n'avez pas de trop et donc vous avez tant de besoin. . . .

Au PRINCE DE NEUCHÂTEL.

Valladolid, le 23 Février, 1812.

MONSIEUR, — J'ignore si sa majesté aura daigné accueillir d'une manière favorable la demande que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre altesse pour supplier l'empereur de me permettre de faire sous ses yeux la campagne qui va s'ouvrir ; mais qu'elle que soit sa décision je regarde comme mon devoir de lui faire connaître, au moment où il semble prêt à s'éloigner, la situation des choses dans cette partie de l'Espagne.

D'après les derniers arrangemens arrêtés par sa majesté, l'armée de Portugal n'a plus le moyen de remplir la tâche qui lui est imposée, et je serais coupable, si, en ce moment, je cachais la vérité. La frontière se trouve très affaiblie par le départ des troupes qui ont été rappelées par la prise de Rodrigo, qui met l'ennemi à même d'entrer dans le cœur de la Castille en commençant un mouvement offensif : ensuite par l'immense étendue de pays que l'armée est dans le devoir d'occuper, ce qui rend toujours son rassemblement lent et difficile, tandis qu'il y a peu de temps elle était toute réunie et disponible.

Les sept divisions qui la composent s'élèveront, lorsqu'elles auront reçu les régimens de marche annoncés, à quarante-quatre mille hommes d'infanterie environ ; il faut au moins cinq mille hommes pour occuper les points fortifiés et les communications qui ne peuvent être abandonnés ; il faut à peu près pareille force pour observer l'Esla et la couvrir contre l'armée de Galice, qui évidemment, dans le cas d'un mouvement offensif des Anglais, se porterait à Bénavente et à Astorga. Ainsi, à supposer que toute l'armée soit réunie entre le Duero et la Tormes, sa force ne peut s'élever qu'à trente-trois ou trente-quatre mille hommes, tandis que l'ennemi peut présenter aujourd'hui une masse de plus de soixante mille hommes, dont plus de moitié Anglais, bien outillés et bien pourvus de toutes choses : et cependant que de chances pour que les divisions du Tage se trouvent en arrière ! Qu'elles n'aient pu être ralliées promptement, et soient séparées de l'armée pendant les momens les plus importans de la campagne ; alors la masse de nos forces réunies ne s'élèverait pas à plus de vingt-cinq mille hommes. Sa majesté suppose, il est vrai, que, dans ce pas l'armée du nord soutiendrait celle de Portugal par deux divisions ; mais l'empereur peut-il être persuadé que, dans l'ordre de chose actuel, ces troupes arriveront promptement et à temps ?

L'ennemi paraît en offensive : celui qui doit le combattre prépare ses moyens ; celui qui doit agir hypothétiquement attend sans inquiétude, et laisse écouler en pure perte un temps précieux ; l'ennemi marche à moi, je réunis mes troupes d'une manière méthodique et précise, je sais à un jour près le moment où le plus grand nombre au moins sera en ligne, à qu'elle époque les autres seront en liaison avec moi, et, d'après cet état de choses, je me détermine à agir ou à temporiser ; mais ces calculs, je ne puis les faire que pour des troupes qui sont purement et simplement à mes ordres. Pour celles qui n'y sont pas, que de lenteurs ! que d'incertitudes et de temps perdu. J'annonce la marche de l'ennemi et je demande des secours, on me répond par des observations ; ma lettre n'est parvenue que lentement parce que les communications sont difficiles dans ce pays ; la réponse et ma réplique vient de même, et l'ennemi sera sur moi. Mais comment pourrai-je même d'avance faire des calculs raisonnables sur les mouvemens de troupes dont je ne connais ni la force ni l'emplacement ? Lorsque je ne

sais rien de la situation du pays ni des besoins de troupes qu'on y éprouve. Je ne puis raisonner que sur ce qui est à mes ordres, et puisque les troupes qui n'y sont pas me sont cependant nécessaires pour combattre, et sont comptées comme partie de la force que je dois opposer à l'ennemi, je puis en fausse position, et je n'ai les moyens de rien faire méthodiquement et avec connaissance de cause.

Si l'on considère combien il faut de prévoyance pour exécuter le plus petit mouvement en Espagne, on doit se convaincre de la nécessité qu'il y a de donner d'avance mille ordres préparatoires sans lesquels les mouvemens rapides sont impossibles. Ainsi les troupes du nord m'étant étrangères habituellement, et m'étant cependant indispensables pour combattre, le succès de toutes mes opérations est dépendant du plus ou du moins de prévoyance et d'activité d'un autre chef : je ne puis donc pas être responsable des événemens.

Mais il ne faut pas seulement considérer l'état des choses pour la défense du nord, il faut la considérer pour celle du midi. Si Lord Wellington porte six divisions sur la rive gauche du Tage le Duc de Dalmatie a besoin d'un puissant secours ; si dans ce cas, l'armée du nord ne fournit pas de troupes pour relever une partie d'armée de Portugal dans quelques-uns des postes qu'elle doit évacuer alors momentanément, mais qu'il est important de tenir, et pour la sûreté du pays et pour maintenir la Galice et observer les deux divisions ennemies qui seraient sur l'Agueda, et qui feraient sans doute quelques démonstrations offensives ; si dis-je l'armée du nord ne vient pas à son aide, l'armée de Portugal, trop faible, ne pourra pas faire un détachement d'une force convenable, et Badajoz tombera. Certes, il faut des ordres pour obtenir de l'armée du nord un mouvement dans cette hypothèse, et le temps utile pour agir ; si on s'en tenait à des propositions et à des négociations, ce temps, qu'on ne pourrait remplacer, serait perdu en vaines discussions. Je suis autorisé à croire ce résultat.

L'armée de Portugal est en ce moment la principale armée d'Espagne ; c'est à elle à couvrir l'Espagne contre les entreprises des Anglais ; pour pouvoir manœuvrer, il faut qu'elle ait des points d'appui, des places, des forts, des têtes-de-pont, etc.

Il faut pour cela du matériel d'artillerie, et je n'ai ni canons ni munitions à y appliquer, tandis que les établissemens de l'armée du nord en sont tout remplis ; j'en demanderai, ou m'en promettra, mais en résultat je n'obtiendrai rien.

Après avoir discuté la question militaire, je dirai un mot de l'administration. Le pays donné à l'armée de Portugal a des produits présumés le tiers de ceux des cinq gouvernemens.

L'armée de Portugal est beaucoup plus nombreuse que l'armée du nord ; le pays qu'elle occupe est insoumis ; on n'arrache rien qu'avec la force, et les troupes de l'armée du nord ont semblé prendre à tâche, en l'évacuant, d'en enlever toutes les ressources. Les autres gouvernemens, malgré les guérillas, sont encore dans la soumission, et acquittent les contributions sans qu'il soit besoin de contrainte. D'après cela il y a une immense différence dans le sort de l'une et de l'autre et comme tout doit tendre au même but, que partout ce sont les soldats de l'empereur, que tous les efforts doivent avoir pour objet le succès des opérations, ne serait-il pas juste que les ressources de tous ces pays fussent partagées proportionnellement aux besoins de chacun ; et comment y parvenir sans une autorité unique ?

Je crois avoir démontré que, pour une bonne défense du nord, le général de l'armée de Portugal doit avoir toujours à ses ordres les troupes et le territoire de l'armée du nord, puisque ces troupes sont appelées à combattre avec les siennes, et que les ressources de ce territoire doivent être en partie consacrées à les entretenir.

Je passe maintenant à ce qui regarde le midi de l'Espagne. Une des tâches de l'armée de Portugal est de soutenir l'armée du midi, d'avoir l'œil sur Badajoz et de couvrir Madrid ; et pour cela, il faut qu'un corps assez nombreux occupe la vallée du Tage ; mais ce corps ne pourra subsister et ne pourra préparer des ressources pour d'autres troupes qui s'y rendraient pour le soutenir, s'il n'a pas un territoire productif, et ce territoire, quel autre peut-il être que l'arrondissement de l'armée du centre ? Quelle ville peut offrir des ressources et des moyens dans la vallée du Tage si ce n'est Madrid ? Cependant aujourd'hui l'armée de Portugal ne possède sur le nord du Tage, qu'un désert qui ne lui offre aucune espèce de moyens, ni pour les hommes ni pour les chevaux, et elle ne rencontre de la part des autorités de Madrid, que

haine, qu'animosité. L'armée du centre, qui n'est rien, possède à elle seule un territoire plus fertile, plus étendu que celui qui est accordé pour toute l'armée de Portugal ; cette vallée ne peut s'exploiter faute de troupes, et tout le monde s'oppose à ce que nous en tirions des ressources. Cependant si les bords du Tage étaient évacués par suite de la disette, personne à Madrid ne voudrait en apprécier le véritable raison, et tout le monde accuserait l'armée de Portugal de découvrir cette ville.

Il existe, il faut le dire, une haine, une animosité envers les Français, qu'il est impossible d'exprimer, dans le gouvernement espagnol. Il existe un désordre à Madrid qui présente le spectacle le plus révoltant. Si les subsistances employées en de fausses consommations dans cette ville eussent été consacrées à former un magasin de ressources pour l'armée de Portugal, les troupes qui sont sur le Tage seraient dans l'abondance et pourvues pour long-temps ; on consomme 22 mille rations par jour à Madrid, et il n'y a pas 3000 hommes : c'est qu'on donne et laisse prendre à tout le monde, excepté à ceux qui servent. Mais bien plus, je le répète, c'est un crime que d'aller prendre ce que l'armée du centre ne peut elle-même ramasser. Il est vrai qu'il paraît assez conséquent que ceux qui, depuis deux ans, trompent le roi, habillent et arment chaque jour des soldats qui, au bout de deux jours, vont se joindre à nos ennemis, et semblent en vérité avoir ainsi consacré un mode régulier de recrutement des bandes que nous avons sur les bras, s'occupent de leur réserver des moyens de subsistances à nos dépens.

La seule communication carrossable entre la gauche et le reste de l'armée de Portugal est par la province de Ségovie, et le mouvement des troupes et des convois ne peut avoir lieu avec facilité, parceque, quoique ce pays soit excellent et plein de ressources, les autorités de l'armée du centre refusent de prendre aucune disposition pour assurer leurs subsistances.

Si l'armée de Portugal peut être affranchie du devoir de secourir le midi, de couvrir Madrid, elle peut se concentrer dans la Vieille-Castille, et elle s'en trouvera bien ; alors tout lui devient facile ; mais si elle doit au contraire remplir cette double tâche, elle ne le peut qu'en occupant la vallée du Tage, et dans cette vallée elle ne peut avoir les ressources nécessaires pour y vivre, pour y manœuvrer, pour y préparer des moyens suffisants pour toutes les troupes qu'il faudra y envoyer, qu'en possédant tout l'arrondissement de l'armée du centre et Madrid. Ce territoire doit conserver les troupes qui l'occupent à présent, afin qu'en marchant à l'ennemi, l'armée ne soit obligée de laisser personne en arrière mais qu'au contraire elle en tire quelque secours pour sa communication. Elle a besoin surtout d'être délivrée des obstacles que fait naître sans cesse un gouvernement véritablement ennemi des armes françaises ; quelles que soient les bonnes intentions du roi, il paraît qu'il ne peut rien contre l'intérêt et les passions de ceux qui l'environnent ; il semble également que jusqu'à présent il n'a rien pu contre les désordres qui ont lieu à Madrid, contre l'anarchie qui règne à l'armée du centre. Il peut y avoir de grandes raisons en politique pour que le roi réside à Madrid, mais il y a mille raisons positives et de sûreté pour les armes françaises, qui sembleraient devoir lui faire choisir un autre séjour. Et en effet, ou le roi est général et commandant des armées, et dans ce cas il doit être au milieu des troupes, voir leurs besoins, pourvoir à tout, et être responsable ; ou il est étranger à toutes les opérations, et alors, autant pour sa tranquillité personnelle que pour laisser plus de liberté dans les opérations, il doit s'éloigner du pays qui en est le théâtre et des lieux qui servent de points d'appui aux mouvements de l'armée.

La guerre d'Espagne est difficile dans son essence, mais cette difficulté est augmentée de beaucoup par la division des commandemens et par la grande diminution des troupes que cette division rend encore plus funeste. Si cette division a déjà fait tant de mal, lorsque l'empereur, étant à Paris, s'occupant sans cesse de ses armées de la péninsule, pouvait en partie remédier à tout, on doit fremir du résultat infallible de ce système, suivi avec diminution de moyens, lorsque l'empereur s'éloigne de trois cents lieues.

Monseigneur, je vous ai exposé toutes les raisons qui me semblent démontrer jusqu'à l'évidence la nécessité de réunir sous la même autorité toutes les troupes et tout le pays, depuis Bayonne jusques et y compris Madrid et la Manche ; en cela, je n'ai été guidé que par mon amour ardent pour la gloire de nos armes et par ma conscience. Si l'empereur ne trouvait pas convenable d'adopter ce système j'ose le supplier de me donner un successeur dans le

commandement qu'il m'avait confié. J'ai la confiance et le sentiment de pouvoir faire autant qu'un autre, mais tout restant dans la situation actuelle la charge est au-dessus de mes forces. De quelques difficultés que soit le commandement général, quel-qu' imposante que soit la responsabilité qui l'accompagne, elles me paraissent beaucoup moindres que celles que ma position entraîne en ce moment.

Quelque flatteur que soit un grand commandement, il n'a de prix à mes yeux que lorsqu'il est accompagné des moyens de bienfaire : lorsque ceux-ci me sont enlevés, alors tout me paraît préférable, et mon ambition se réduit à servir en soldat. Je donnerai ma vie sans regret, mais je ne puis rester dans la cruelle position de n'avoir pour résultat de mes efforts et de mes soins de tous les momens, que la triste perspective d'attacher mon nom à des événemens facheux et peu dignes de la gloire des nos armes.

(Signé) LE MARÉCHAL DUC DE RAGUSE.

JOSEPH to NAPOLEON.

Madrid, May 18, 1812.

SIRE,—Il y a aujourd'hui un mois et demi que j'ai reçu la lettre du Prince de Neuchâtel en date du 16 Mars dernier, qui m'annonce que votre majesté impériale et royale me confiait le commandement de ses armées en Espagne, et me prevenait que les généraux-en-chef des armées du nord, de Portugal, du midi, et de l'Aragon recevaient les ordres convenables.

Depuis cette époque il m'a été impossible de remplir les intentions de V. M. impériale et royale. Le général-en-chef de l'armée du nord s'est refusé à m'envoyer aucune rapport disant et écrivant qu'il n'avait aucun ordre à cet égard. M. le maréchal commandant en chef l'armée du midi n'a encore répondu à aucune des lettres que je lui ai écrites ou fait écrire depuis cette époque. Monsieur le maréchal commandant en chef l'armée d'Aragon ne m'envoie aucune rapport, et reste entièrement isolé de moi. Monsieur le maréchal commandant en chef l'armée de Portugal m'a fait beaucoup de demandes auxquelles il savait parfaitement que je ne pouvais satisfaire, comme celles des troupes de l'armée du nord, des vivres, etc. Sa conduite est tellement indécente qu'elle n'est pas concevable. V. M. I. et R. pourra en juger par mes dépêches au Prince de Neuchâtel.—Sire, en acceptant le commandement des armées françaises à l'époque où je l'ai reçu, j'ai cru remplir un devoir que tous les liens qui m'attachent à V. M. I. et R. et à la France m'imposaient parceque j'ai pensé pouvoir être utile, mais j'étais persuadé que V. M. I. et R. me confiant un dépôt si précieux les généraux-en-chef s'empresseraient d'obéir à la volonté de V. M. Il n'en est pas ainsi je m'adresse donc à elle pour qu'elle veuille bien écrire ou faire écrire aux généraux-en-chef qu'elle est sa volonté pour qu'elle leur fasse déclarer que leur désobéissance à mes ordres les mettrait dans le cas d'être renvoyés en France où ils trouveraient un juge juste mais sévère dans V. M. I. et R. Si V. majesté ne trouve pas le moyen de persuader à ces messieurs que sa volonté est que je sois obéi, je la supplie de considérer que le rôle auquel je suis exposé est indigne de mon caractère et du nom de V. M. Si la guerre du nord a lieu, je ne puis être utile ici qu'autant que je suis obéi, et je ne puis être obéi qu'autant que ces messieurs sauront que j'ai le droit de les remplacer ; je ne puis infliger, moi, d'autre punition que celle là à un général-en-chef. Si je ne suis pas obéi, et que V. M. aille au nord, l'Espagne sera évacuée honteusement par les troupes impériales, et le nom que je porte aura présidé inutilement à cette époque désastreuse.

Le mal est grand, mais il n'est au-dessus ni de mon devouement ni de mon courage. C'est à votre majesté à les rendre efficaces par la force dont il est indispensable qu'elle m'entoure ; le salut des armées impériales et de l'Espagne indépendant.

No. XVII.

TARIFA.

[The anonymous extracts are from the memoirs and letters of different officers engaged in the siege. The Roman characters mark different sources of information.]

SECTION I.

Number and conduct of the French.

A.

"As to the numbers of the French; the prisoners, the intercepted letters, the secret information from Chiclana, all accounts, in fact, concurred in stating that the troops employed *exceeded nine thousand men!*"

Extracts from COLONEL SKERRETT'S despatch.

"The enemy's force employed in the siege is stated at *ten thousand; probably, this is in some degree exaggerated.*"

B.

"The fact of the enemy, with *eleven thousand experienced soldiers*, not having made another effort after his assault of the 31st," etc.

LORD WELLINGTON'S despatch.

"January 19, 1812.

"By accounts which I have from Cadiz to the 27th December, I learn that the enemy invested Tarifa with a force of *about five thousand men*, on the 20th December, covering their operation against that place by another corps at Vejer."

Conduct of the French.

A.

"There was not, on the part of the leading French officer (an old lieutenant of the 94th) or of his followers, any appearance of panic or perturbation. Their advance was serene, steady, and silent, worthy of the 5th corps, of their Austrian laurels, of their *vieilles moustaches.*"

SECTION 2.

Conduct of the Spanish soldiers.

B.

"At the assault General Copons himself was the only person who showed his head above the parapet. The precaution of out-flanking him by three companies of the 47th regiment remedied the chance of evil which so lamentable a want of chivalry might have occasioned; but the knights of older times were probably better fed than were our poor distressed friends."

SECTION III.

Conduct of COLONEL SKERRETT.

A.

"It is necessary to advert to the 18-pounder mounted on Gusman's tower, as Southey's History contains some strange misrepresentation on the subject." "The French made the 18-pounder an early object of attack, but they did not succeed in crushing it. Unfortunately, one of the spherical case shot, not precisely fitting its old and worn calibre, burst in passing over the town, and killed or wounded a person in the street. This produced some alarm and complaint amongst the inhabitants for a moment, and in the first feeling of that moment, Skerrett, with characteristic impetuosity, directed the gun to be placed *hors de service.* There

was no ambiguity in his command—*‘Let it be spiked.’* “Had he referred the case to the commanding officer of artillery, the order would not have been executed; means would have been found to remove the first impression and tranquillize the people, without the sacrifice of the gun, which might have added materially to the offensive powers of the garrison, particularly if the siege had been prolonged.”

B.

“On the 29th of December, Colonel Skerrett, with a rare activity, dismounted a 32-pound carronade, that looked into the enemy’s batteries at the distance of about 400 yards, and he succeeded in spiking and knocking off the trunnion of an 18-pounder, borrowed from the *Stately*. This gun was mounted on the tower of the *Gusmans*.”

GENERAL CAMPBELL to LORD LIVERPOOL.

“January 3, 1812.

“Annexed is a letter received last night from Colonel Skerrett; and, notwithstanding the despondency therein expressed, which has been equally so in other letters that I have received from him, my opinion remains the same as formerly.”

A.

“At the crisis produced by Skerrett’s desire to retire from the town, and desire to leave the island also, General Campbell sent express instructions that the town should not be abandoned without the concurrence of the commanding officers of artillery and engineers; and accompanied these instructions with a positive command that every officer and soldier belonging to Gibraltar should, in future, be stationed in the island, to insure at all events the preservation of that port.”

SECTION IV.

SIR C. SMITH’S conduct.

“Smith never tolerated the idea of surrender—never admitted the possibility of defeat.”

“Comprehending from the first the resources and capabilities of his post, and with a sort of intuition anticipating his assailant, he covered the weak points while he concealed its strength; and so conducted the skirmish which preceded the investment, that he, as it were, dictated the whole plan of attack, and in reality pointed out with his finger the position of the breaching battery.”

“Had the dictates of his vigorous mind and enterprising spirit been duly listened to within, the defence would have been more active and more brilliant.”

SECTION V.

(Extracts.)

LORD WELLINGTON to LORD LIVERPOOL.

“January 9, 1812.

“From the accounts which I have received of the place (Tarifa) it appears to me quite impossible to defend it when the enemy will be equipped to attack it. The utmost that can be done is to hold the island contiguous to Tarifa; for which object Colonel Skerrett’s detachment does not appear to be necessary. I don’t believe that the enemy will be able to obtain possession of the island, without which the town will be entirely useless to them; and, indeed, if they had the island as well as the town, I doubt their being able to retain these possessions, adverting to the means of attacking them with which General Ballasteros might be supplied by the garrison of Gibraltar, unless they should keep a force in the field in their neighbourhood to protect them.”

LORD WELLINGTON to MAJOR-GENERAL COOKE.

“February 1, 1812.

“SIR,—I have omitted to answer your letters of the 27th December and of the 7th January, relating to the correspondence which you had had with the governor of Gibraltar upon the

conditional orders which you had given Colonel Skerrett to withdraw from Tarifa, because I conclude that you referred that correspondence to the secretary of state, with whom alone it rests to decide whether it was your duty to recall Colonel Skerrett, and whether you performed that duty at a proper period, and under circumstances which rendered it expedient that you should give Colonel Skerrett the orders in question. From the report of Colonel Skerrett and Lord Proby and other information which I had received respecting Tarifa, I concurred in the orders that you gave to Colonel Skerrett, and my opinion on that subject is not at all changed by what has occurred since. We have a right to expect that his Majesty's officers and troops will perform their duty upon every occasion ; but we have no right to expect that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in every direction, and unprovided with artillery, and the walls scarcely cannon-proof. The enemy, however, retired with disgrace, infinitely to the honour of the brave troops who defended Tarifa, and it is useless to renew the discussion. It is necessary, however, that you should now come to an understanding with General Campbell regarding the troops which have been detached from Cadiz, and this army under Colonel Skerrett."

DITTO to DITTO.

"February 25, 1812.

"I have already, in my letter of the 1st instant, stated to you my opinion regarding Tarifa. I do not think that Captain Smith's letter throws new light upon the subject. The island appears still to be the principal point to defend, and the easiest to be defended at a small expense and risk of loss. Whether the town and the hill of Santa Catalina can be made subservient to the defence of the island depends upon circumstances upon which it would be possible to decide only by having a local knowledge of the place. It is very clear to me, however, that the enemy will not attack Tarifa in this spring, and that you will not be called upon to furnish troops to garrison that place so soon as you expect. If you should be called upon either by the Spanish government or by the governor of Gibraltar you must decide the question according to the suggestions which I made to you in my despatch of the 15th instant. If you should send a detachment from Cadiz at the desire of the Spanish government for purposes connected with the operations of General Ballasteros, I conceive that the governor of Gibraltar has nothing to say to such detachments ; if you should send one to Tarifa at the desire of the governor of Gibraltar, or of the Spanish government, it is better not to discuss the question whether the detachment shall or shall not obey the orders of the governor of Gibraltar. He has occupied Tarifa permanently, and he is about to improve the defences of the place, which he conceives to be under his orders ; but, according to all the rules of his Majesty's service, the senior officer should command the whole. I have nothing to say to the division of the command of the island and town of Tarifa, which I conclude has been settled by the governor of Gibraltar."

Extract from the notes of an officer engaged in the siege.

"Though the Duke of Wellington yielded to the opinions and wishes of General Cooke, Colonel Skerrett, and Lord Proby, yet his characteristic and never-failing sagacity seems to have suggested to him a fear or a fancy, that part of the case was kept concealed. A local knowledge was necessary, not only to judge of the relation and reciprocal defences and capabilities of the town and island, but to estimate the vast importance of the post, the necessity, in fact, of its possession. It was my impression then, and it amounts to conviction now, that the island, particularly during the winter, half fortified as it was, and totally destitute of shelter from bombardment or from weather, could not have been maintained against an enemy in possession of the town, the suburb, and the neighbouring heights. But even if it had, by means of British bravery, resolution, and resource, been provisioned and defended, still the original and principal objects of its occupation would have been altogether frustrated, namely, the command and embarkation of supplies for Cadiz and the fostering of the patriotic flame. It is demonstrable that, had the Duke of Dalmatia once become possessor of the

old walls of Tarifa, every city, village, fort, and watch-tower on the Andalusian coast, would soon have displayed the banner of King Joseph, and the struggle in the south of Spain was over."

GENERAL CAMPBELL to LORD LIVERPOOL.

"Gibraltar, April 2, 1812.

"MY LORD,--I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of the 8th of February last, and I beg leave to refer your lordship to the documents herewith, particularly to the report of Captain Smith, royal engineers, which I trust will prove that the defence of the town of Tarifa was not taken up on slight grounds, and that the detachment from Cadiz under the orders of Colonel Skerrett, together with the troops from hence which formed the garrison of the town, were never in any danger of being cut off, as their retreat would have been covered by the castle of the Guzmans, the redoubt of Santa Catalina, and the island; the two first of these points being connected by a field-work, and the whole mounting 29 pieces of cannon and mortars exclusively of what remained in the town: the enemy's batteries being completely kept in check during such an operation by the island and the castle of the Guzmans. My lord, Colonel Skerrett stood alone in his opinion respecting this post, and in direct opposition to my own and that of Captain Smith, royal engineers, who is considered by his corps as an officer of first-rate professional abilities. Major-General Cooke must therefore have acted on the reports of the colonel when he authorized him to abandon his post, for the major-general was unacquainted with its resources: besides, my lord, I had a right to expect that troops sent to that point to assist in its defence should not be withdrawn without my consent. Had the place been lost, my lord, by such misrepresentation, it would have been attributed to any other than the real cause, and the odium would have been fixed upon me, as having taken up the position. I am happy, however, that its capability has been proved whilst it remained under my orders, and that by interposing my authority the valuable possession of Tarifa has been saved from the grasp of the enemy. I was besides deeply concerned in the fate of the place; a great quantity of military stores and provision having been embarked on that service by my authority, from a conviction that they were fully protected by this additional force.

"After the execution of a service, my lord, from which I concluded I was entitled to some consideration, it is no small mortification for me to find that my conduct should be deemed questionable; but I flatter myself that if the government of his royal highness the prince regent will do me the justice to read the annexed papers, they will perceive that if I had done less his majesty's arms must have been dishonoured. In regard to the assumption of command on that occasion, I have only to observe that, considering the post of Tarifa as a dependency of Gibraltar, having occupied it exclusively for these two years past, and that a commandant and staff were appointed from my recommendation, with salaries annexed, and this with the approbation of both governments—these circumstances, added to what I have seen on similar occasions, put it past a doubt in my mind, and Colonel Skerrett having applied to me for 'precise orders' shows that he was aware that such was the case. If, my lord, I ever had a right to exercise an authority over the post of Tarifa from what I have stated, the entry of troops from another quarter, unless actually commanded by an officer senior to myself, could not, according to the custom of our service, deprive me of it; and I have heard that the case has been referred to Lord Wellington, who was of the same opinion. This, however, I only take the liberty to advance in justification of my conduct, and not in opposition to the opinion formed by the government of his royal highness the prince regent. I trust, therefore, I shall be excused in the eyes of government in declaring, without reserve, that if I had not retained the command, the place would not now be in our possession, and the wants of our enemies would have been completely supplied by its affording a free communication with the states of Barbary. I have the honour to report that I have made the necessary communication with Major-General Cooke, in consequence of its being the wish of government that Tarifa shall be occupied by troops from Cadiz. The major-general informs me, in answer thereto, that he has communicated with Lord Wellington, as he has not

received orders to that effect, nor has he the means at present to make the detachment required, and your lordship is aware that I have it not in my power to reinforce that post in case of need," etc., etc.—"P.S. Should your lordship wish any further information with respect to that post, it will be found on referring to my report made after I had visited Tarifa, where Commodore Penrose and Col. Sir Charles Holloway, royal engineers, accompanied me."

Extract from CAPTAIN C. F. SMITH'S report.

"Tarifa, December 14, 1811.

"I do not hesitate to declare that I place the utmost reliance on the resources of the place, and consider them as such as ought to make a good and ultimately successful defence."

DITTO.

"December 24, 1811.

"My opinion respecting the defences of this post is unalterable, and must ever remain so,—that till the island is more independent in itself, there is a necessity of fairly defending the town as an outwork."

NO. XVIII.

STORMING OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOZ.

[The anonymous extracts are taken from the memoirs and journals of officers engaged in, or eye-witnesses of, the action described. The Roman characters mark different sources of information.]

SECTION I.

CIUDAD RODRIGO.

A.

"The Duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the convent of Francisco, pointed out to Colonel Colborne and to Major Napier,* commanding the storming-party of the light division, the spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said, '*Now do you understand exactly the way you are to take so as to arrive at the breach without noise or confusion?*' He was answered, '*Yes, perfectly.*' Some one of the staff then said to Major Napier, '*Why don't you load?*' He answered, '*No, if we can't do the business without loading we shall not do it at all.*' The Duke of Wellington immediately said, '*Leave him alone.*'

— "The caçadores under Colonel Elder were to carry hay-bags to throw into the ditch, but the signal of attack having been given, and the fire commencing at the great breach, the stormers would not wait for the hay-bags, which, from some confusion in the orders delivered, had not yet arrived; but from no fault of Colonel Elder or his gallant regiment; they were always ready for and equal to anything they were ordered to do.

"The troops jumped into the ditch; the *fausse braye* was faced with stone, so as to form a perpendicular wall about the centre of the ditch; it was scaled, and the foot of the breach was attained. Lieutenant Gurwood had gone too far to his left with the forlorn hope, and missed the entrance of the breach; he was struck down with a wound on the head, but sprang up again, and joined Major Napier, Captain Jones 52d regt., Mitchell 95th, Ferguson 43rd, and some other officers, who at the head of the stormers were all going up the breach together."

— "Colonel Colborne, although very badly wounded in the shoulder, formed the 52nd on the top of the rampart, and led them against the enemy."

"The great breach was so strongly barricaded, so fiercely defended, that the third

* Brother to the author of this work.

division had not carried it, and were still bravely exerting every effort to force their way through the obstacles when Colonel M'Leod, of the 43rd, poured a heavy flank fire upon the enemy defending it.

B.

The third division having commenced firing, we were obliged to hurry to the attack. The forlorn hope led, we advanced rapidly across the glacis and descended into the ditch near the ravelin, under a heavy fire. We found the forlorn hope placing ladders against the face of the work, and our party turned towards them, when the engineer officer called out, "*You are wrong, this is the way to the breach, or the fausse braye which leads to the breach you are to attack.*"

— "We ascended the breach of the fausse braye, and then the breach of the body of the place, without the aid of ladders" — We were for a short time on the breach before we forced the entrance. A gun was stretched across the entrance, but did not impede our march. Near it some of the enemy were bayoneted, amongst the number some deserters, who were found in arms defending the breach."

— "Major Napier was wounded at the moment when the men were checked by the heavy fire and determined resistance of the enemy about two-thirds up the ascent. It was then that the soldiers, forgetting they were not loaded, as the major had not permitted them, snapped all their firelocks."

— "No individual could claim being the first that entered the breach; it was a simultaneous rush of about twenty or thirty. The forlorn hope was thrown in some degree behind, being engaged in fixing ladders against the face of the work, which they mistook for the point of attack."

"Upon carrying the breach, the parties moved as before directed by Major Napier; that is, the 52nd to the left, the 43rd to the right. The 43rd cleared the ramparts to the right, and drove the enemy from the places they attempted to defend, until it arrived near the great breach at a spot where the enemy's defences were overlooked. At this time the great breach had not been carried, and was powerfully defended by the enemy. The houses being on it were loop-holed, and a deep trench lined with musketry bearing directly upon it; the flanks of the breach were cut off, and the descent into the town from the ramparts at the top of it appeared considerable, so as to render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to force it without some other aid than a front attack."

— "The moment the light division storming-party arrived at the spot described, they opened a heavy enfilading fire of musketry upon the trench, which was the main defence of the great breach, and drove the enemy from it with the aid of the storming-party of the third division that now entered. I was wounded at this time, and retired a short way back on the rampart, when I saw the first explosion on the rampart near the great breach. It was in my opinion next to impossible, as I have said before, to force the great breach by a front attack as long as the enemy held their defences, but the moment the light division turned their defences the breach was instantly carried."

Abstract of the journal of GENERAL HARVEY, Portuguese service.

"I stood on rising ground and watched the progress of the attack. The great breach was attacked first. At the top of it the third division opened their fire heavily, and it was returned heavily, but there was a distressing pause. The small breach was carried first, and there was one considerable explosion and two or three smaller ones on the ramparts."

SECTION II.

BADAJOS.—ASSAULT OF PICURINA.

C.

"An engineer officer, who led the attack, told me, two days after, 'that the place never would have been taken had it not been for the intelligence of these men (a detachment from the light division) in absolutely walking round the fort, and finding out the gate, which was

literally beaten down by them, and they entered at the point of the bayonet. Lieutenant Nixon, of the 52nd, was shot through the body by a Frenchman a yard or two inside the gate."

D.

ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.

"For the descent of the light and fourth division into the ditch only *five ladders* were placed, and those five ladders were close to each other. The *advance* (or storming party) of the eighth division preceded that of the fourth division, and I believe that no part of the fourth division was up in time to suffer from the first great explosion, and the storming-party only had entered when that explosion took place; but observe that although the *advance* of the light division, preceded the *advance* of the fourth division, I only mean by that, that the head of the light division entered the ditch sooner than the *head* of the fourth division, for the main bodies of the two divisions joined at the ladders, and were descending into the ditch at the same time."

"I consider that the centre breach at Badajos was never seriously attacked. I was not at the centre breach on the night of the assault, therefore I cannot positively assert what took place there. But there were not bodies of dead and wounded at the centre or curtain breach in the morning to indicate such an attack having been made upon it, and being in the curtain it was far retired from the troops, and the approach to it was made extremely difficult by *deep cuts*, and I think it passed unobserved except by a struggling few."

"I consider that *chevaux de frise* were placed upon the summit of the centre breach during the assault. I was there at daybreak. The approach to it was extremely difficult, both from the difficulty of finding it, and from the deep holes that were before it, which to my recollection resembled the holes you see in a clay-field, where they make bricks. Another great obstruction was the fire from the faces and flanks of the two bastions, which crossed before the curtain."

*Extract from a memoir by CAPTAIN BARNEY, Chasseurs Britanniques,
acting-engineer at the siege.*

"The explosion of the *Barriques foudroyantes* resembled *fougasses*, and I expected the bastion would have crumbled to pieces. At this moment I perceived one person in the midst of fire, who had gained the top of the breach in the face of the bastion; he seemed impelling himself forward towards the enemy in an offensive position when he sank down, apparently destroyed by the fire. On examining this breach at daylight I found a Portuguese grenadier, whom I suppose to be the person, as he lay dead the foremost on this breach."

— "Twice the bugle sounded to retire from the breaches. The fire diminished, and passing along the glacis of the ravelin I hastened to the attack of General Picton, and found but *two ladders*, one only just long enough to reach the embrasure, and the other with several of the upper rounds destroyed. The castle was full of men, and had the enemy thrown shells among them, I do not think it could have been kept possession of. Major Burgh came to ascertain the result of the attack, and the reserves were ordered up. On coming down from the castle I met General Picton, and told him the castle was full of men, but they had not advanced into the town. He immediately ordered sorties to be made to clear the breach, and a good look-out to be kept towards Christoval." — "Passing in front of the battery where Lord Wellington was, I went on the right bank of the inundation till I could cross, and going towards the breach, I was overtaken by the Prince of Orange, carrying an order for Colonel Barnard to occupy the breach. The enemy's fire had ceased, yet none of the storming-party knew whether we were successful or not. I told the prince I was just come from the castle, which was occupied in force. As we approached the breach the stench of burnt hair and scorched flesh was horrible, and on the crest of the glacis the dead and wounded lay in such numbers it was impossible to pass without treading on them."

"Here I also found but *three ladders*, one broken so as to render it useless. On arriving at the *curtain-breach*, some men of the light division assisted me in removing from the top the *chevaux de frise* of sword-blades and pikes."

Extract from a memoir on the escalade of St. Vincent, by CAPTAIN EDWARD P. HOPKINS, 4th regiment.

"The column halted a few yards from a breast-work surmounted with a stockade and a *chevaux de frise* concealing a guard-house on the covered way, and at this moment a most awful explosion took place, followed by the most tremendous peals of musketry. 'That is at the breaches' was the whisper amongst our soldiers, and their anxiety to be led forward was intense, but their firmness and obedience were equally conspicuous. The moon now appeared. We could hear the French soldiers talking in the guard-house, and their officers were visiting the sentries. The engineer officer who preceded the column, said, '*Now is the time*;' the column instantly moved to the face of the gateway. It was only at this moment that the sentry observed us, and fired his alarm-shot, which was followed by musketry. The two companies of Portuguese carrying the scaling-ladders threw them down, and deaf to the voices of their officers, made off. This occurrence did not in the least shake the zeal and steadiness of our men, who occupied immediately the space left, and shouldering the ladders moved on. We could not force the gate open, but the breast-work was instantly crowded, and the impediments cut away sufficiently to allow of two men entering abreast."—"The engineer officer was by this time killed. We had no other assistance from that corps, and the loss was most severely felt at this early period of the attack."

—"The troops were now fast filling the ditch; they had several ladders, and I shall never forget the momentary disappointment amongst the men when they found that the ladders were too short."—"The enemy took advantage of this to annoy us in every way, rolling down beams of wood, fire-balls, etc., together with an *enfilading* fire."

"We observed near us an embrasure unfurnished of artillery, its place being occupied by a gabion filled with earth. A ladder was instantly placed under its mouth, and also one at each side. This allowed three persons to ascend at once, but only one at a time could enter in at the embrasure. The first several attempts were met with instant death. The ladders were even now too short, and it was necessary for one person to assist the other by hoisting him up the embrasure." "Some shots were fired from a building in the town, and Colonel Piper was sent with a party to dislodge the enemy, while General Walker, at the head of his brigade, attempted to clear the rampart to the right," etc. etc.

"The enemy retired from the building on our approach, and Colonel Piper did not return to the ramparts, but moved into the body of the town. Could we have divested our minds of the real situation of the town it might have been imagined that the inhabitants were preparing for some grand fête, as all the houses in the streets and squares were brilliantly illuminated, from the top to the first floor, with numerous lamps. This illumination scene was truly remarkable—not a living creature to be seen, but a continual low buz and whisper around us, and we now and then perceived a small lattice gently open and re-shut, as if more closely to observe the singular scene of a small English party perambulating the town in good order, the bugleman at the head blowing his instrument. Some of our men and officers now fell wounded; at first we did not know where the shots came from, but soon observed they were from the sills of the doors. We soon arrived at a large church facing some grand houses, in a sort of square. The party here drew up, and it was at first proposed to take possession of this church, but that idea was abandoned. We made several prisoners, leading some mules laden with loose ball-cartridges in large wicker baskets, which they stated they were conveying from the magazines to the breaches. After securing the prisoners, ammunition, etc., we moved from the square with the intention of forcing our way upon the ramparts. We went up a small street towards them, but met with such opposition as obliged us to retire with loss. We again found ourselves in the square. There an English soldier came up to us who had been confined in the jail, probably a deserter. He said our troops had attacked the castle, and had

failed, but that the French troops had afterwards evacuated it. At this period rapid changes took place. Several French officers came into the square; the town belonged to the English; the great Wellington was victorious. A scene of sad confusion now took place; several French officers of rank, their wives, and children, ran into the square in a state of frenzy, holding little caskets containing their jewels and valuables, and their children in their arms. The situation of these females was dreadful; they implored our protection, and I believe this party escaped the plunder and pillage which was now unfortunately in progress. The scene that now commenced surpassed all that can be imagined; drunkenness, cruelty, and debauchery, the loss of many lives, and great destruction of property, was one boon for our victory. The officers had lost all command of their men in the town; those who had got drunk and had satisfied themselves with plunder congregated in small parties and fired down the streets. I saw an English soldier pass through the middle of the street with a French knapsack on his back; he received a shot through his hand from some of the drunkards at the top of the street; he merely turned round and said—'Damn them, I suppose they took me for a Frenchman.' An officer of the Brunswickers, who was contending with a soldier for the possession of a canary bird, was shot dead by one of these insane drunkards. Groups of soldiers were seen in all places, and could we have forgotten the distressing part of the scene, never was there a more complete masquerade. Some dressed as monks, some as friars, some in court-dresses, many carrying furniture, cloth, provisions, money, plate from the churches: the military chest was even got at by the soldiers."

NO XIX.

SECTION I.

ENGLISH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT'S AND MARMONT'S OPERATIONS.

COLONEL LE MESURIER, *commandant of Almeida*, to BRIGADIER-GENERAL TRANT.

"Almeida, March 2^d, 1812.

"When I took possession of the fortress ten days since, I found not a single gun in a state for working; either owing to the want of side-arms or the ill assortment of shot and ammunition, not a single platform was laid down, and scarcely a single embrasure opened in any part of the newly repaired fronts. My powder was partly in an outwork, partly in two buildings scarcely weather-proof, only one front of my covered way palisaded, and the face of one of my ravelins without any revêtement whatever; the revêtement throughout the whole of the nearly repaired fronts not being more than one-third or one-fourth of its former height. Many of these defects have been remedied; we have platforms and embrasures throughout the new fronts, the guns posted with their proper side-arms and shot-piles, and with a proper assortment of ammunition in the caissons; the bulk of our powder and ordnance-cartridge being distributed in bomb proofs; we have formed a respectable entrenchment on the top of the breach of the mined ravelin, which it is proposed to arm with palisades, but the almost total want of transport has prevented our being able to complete more than two fronts and a half of our covert way with those essential defences. From this sketch you will collect that, though the fortress is not to be walked into, it is yet far from being secure from the consequences of a resolute assault, particularly if the garrison be composed of raw and unsteady troops."

Extract from a memoir of GENERAL TRANT.

"Now it so happened that on this same night Marmont had marched from Sabugal in order to attack me in Guarda; he had at the least 5000 infantry—some reports made his force 7000—and he had 500 or 600 cavalry. My distrust of the militia with regard to the execution of precautions such as I had now adopted, had induced me at all times to have a drummer at my bed-room door, in readiness to beat to arms; and this was most fortunately the case on

the night of the 13th April, 1812, for the very first intimation I received of the enemy being near at hand was given me by my own servant, on bringing me my coffee at daybreak of the 14th. He said such was the report in the street, and that the soldiers were assembling at the alarm rendezvous in the town. I instantly beat to arms, and the beat being as instantly taken up by every drummer who heard it, Marmont, who at that very moment was with his cavalry at the very entrance of the town (quite open on the Sabugal side more than elsewhere), retired. He had cut off the outposts without their firing a shot, and, had he only dashed headlong into the town, must have captured Wilson's and my militia divisions without losing probably a single man. I was myself the first out of the town, and he was not then 400 yards from it, retiring at a slow pace. I lost no time in forming my troops in position, and sent my few dragoons in observation. When at a couple of miles distant Marmont drew up fronting Guarda, and it turned out, as I inferred, that he expected infantry."

LORD WELLINGTON to SIR N. TRANT.

"Castello Branco, April 17, 1812.

"DEAR SIR,

"I arrived here about two hours ago. Marshal Beresford received your letter of the 13th upon the road, and I received that of the 12th from General Bacellar this morning. We shall move on as soon as the troops come up: it would appear that the French are collecting more force upon the Agueda and Coa. You should take care of yourselves on Guarda if they should collect two divisions at or in the neighbourhood of Sabugal: Guarda is the most treacherous position in the country, although very necessary to hold. I should prefer to see an advance guard upon it, and the main body on the Mondego behind. Have you saved my magazines at Celerico? I enclose a letter for the commissary there and one for Don Carlos d'Espagna. Pray forward both; the former is to order forward fresh supplies to Celerico. Show this letter to General Bacellar: I don't write to him as I have no Portuguese with me." Etc., etc.

"WELLINGTON."

DITTO to DITTO.

"Pedrogao, April 21, 1812.

"DEAR SIR,

"I have received your letter of the 15th, and you will see by mine of the 17th, written as soon as I knew that your division and that of General Wilson were on Guarda, that I expected what happened, and that I wished you to withdraw from that position. In fact, troops ought not to be put in a strong position in which they can be turned if they have not an easy retreat from it; and if you advert to that principle in war, and look at the position of Guarda, you will agree with me that it is the most treacherous position in Portugal. I can only say that, as Marmont attacked you, I am delighted that you have got off so well; which circumstance I attribute to your early decision not to hold the position, and to the good dispositions which you made for the retreat from it.

"As to your plan to surprise Marmont at Sabugal, you did not attempt to put it in execution, and it is useless to say anything about it. I would observe, however, upon one of your principles, viz., that the magnitude of the object would justify the attempt, that in war, particularly in our situation and with such troops as we, and you in particular, command, nothing is so bad as failure and defeat. You could not have succeeded in that attempt, and you would have lost your division and that of General Wilson. I give you my opinion very freely upon your plans and operations as you have written me upon them, begging you at the same time to believe that I feel for the difficulty of your situation, and that I am perfectly satisfied that both you and General Wilson did everything that officers should do with such circumstances, and that I attribute to you the safety of the two divisions. I shall be at Sabugal to-morrow or the next day; and I hope to see you before we shall again be more distant from each other." Etc., etc.

"WELLINGTON."

SECTION II.

FRENCH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT'S AND MARMONT'S OPERATIONS.

*Translated. Extracts from SOULT'S intercepted despatches.**"Seville, April 14, 1812.*

"I enclose copies of a letter from the Duke of Ragusa, dated 22nd February, and another from General Foy, dated Velvis de Jara, 28th February, which announced positively that three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry of the army of Portugal would join me if Badajos was attacked; but those divisions, fifteen days afterwards, marched into Old Castile at the moment when they knew that all the English army was moving upon Badajos, and at the instant when I, in virtue of your highness's (Berthier's) orders, had sent five regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, and my skeleton regiments to Talavera. It is certain that if those three divisions had remained in the valley of the Tagus the enemy would not have attacked Badajos, where they could have been fought to advantage.

"The contrary has arrived. I have been left to my own forces, which have been reduced by 15,000 men, as I have stated above, and not even a military demonstration has been made, much less succour, because the attack on Beira could not influence the siege, and did not."—"Badajos fell by a *coup de fortune*, because it was not in human foresight to think that 5000 men defending the breach successfully, would suffer a surprise on a point where no attack was directed, and when I was within a few marches with 24,000 men strongly organized.

"If I had received your highness's letter when I was before the English, I might, although unaided by M. Marmont and numerically inferior, have given battle to save Badajos; but I should probably have been wrong, and I should have lost the force I left in Andalusia, where not only Seville was invested and my communications cut, but a general insurrection was commencing. Happily I heard in time of the fall of Badajos; but I have not even yet opened my communications with New Castile, Grenada, or Malaga. I have, however, prepared in time to deliver a great battle on my own ground—Andalusia.

"The emperor, of course, cannot foresee all things, and in his orders naturally meant that his generals should act with discretion on such occasions; hence if Marmont had only made demonstrations on Beira with a part of his army, and had crossed the Tagus to unite with my troops, the siege would have been raised before the breach was practicable. Marmont had nothing before him, and he knew Wellington had passed the Guadiana and commenced the siege: I say that all the English army had passed the Guadiana, and this was its disposition.

"General Graham commanding the first corps of observation had the sixth and seventh divisions of infantry and Cotton's cavalry 2500 strong, with 30 guns. This corps pushed my right wing to Granja and Azagua at the *debouche* of Fuente Ovejuna, while Hill, with the second and third divisions, 1200 cavalry under Erskine, and 12 guns, moved on my extreme right in the direction of La Lerena from Belendenzer.

"Wellington carried on the siege in person, having the fourth division, part of the third division, a Portuguese corps; and I am assured he has also 2000 or 3000 Spaniards, which made round the place 18,000 men.

"The fifth division remained at first on the right bank of the Tagus with a brigade of cavalry; but they were also called up and came to Elvas on the 4th or 5th of April. The best accounts gave Wellington 30,000 men, and some make him as high as 40,000, at the moment when I was before him at Villalba; and if the army of Portugal had joined me with 25,000 men, Badajos would have been saved or retaken: and a great victory would throw the English back into their lines. I was not strong enough alone; and besides the loss I should have suffered, I could not have got back in time to save my troops in Andalusia.

"The English did not hide their knowledge that Marmont was gathering in Leon; but they knew he had no battering-train, and that the wasted state of the country would not permit him to penetrate far into Portugal. So measured, indeed, were their operations, that

it is to be supposed they had intercepted some despatch which explained the system of operation and the irresolution of Marmont.

"Your highness tells me I 'should not have left Hill after his last movement in December on Estremadura, nor have permitted him to take my magazines.' I say he has taken nothing from me. The advanced guard at Merida lived from day to day on what was sent to them from La Llerena. I know not if some of this has fallen into his hands; but it can be but little. But at this period Wellington wished to besiege Badajos, and only suspended it because of the rain, which would not let him move his artillery, and because three divisions of the army of Portugal were in the valley of the Tagus. If they had remained the siege would not have been undertaken, and Marmont knew this; for on the 22nd February he wrote to me to say that, independent of those three divisions under Foy, which he destined to send to the aid of Badajos, he himself would act so as to surmount the difficulties which the state of his munitions opposed to his resolution to defeat the enemy's projects.

"If your highness looks at the states of the 14th April, you will see that I had not, as you suppose by your letter of 19th February, 40,000 men; I had only 35,000, including the garrison of Badajos, out of which I had brought with me 24,000, the rest being employed before Cadiz, at Seville, in Grenada and Murcia, and against Ballasteros. You must consider that fifteen days before the English passed the Guadiana I had sent five regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and many skeletons upon Talavera, in all 15,000 men; and since two years I have sent many other skeleton regiments to France, being more than 15,000 men changing their destination or worn out, without having yet received the troops from the interior destined for my army, although these are borne on the states: besides which, I have 4000 men unfit for the field, who ought to go to France, but I am forced to employ them in the posts. Ballasteros has, besides the army of Murcia, 10,000 men; and in Murcia the Spaniards are strong, because the fugitives from Valencia had joined two divisions which had not been engaged there, and thus, including the garrisons of Alicante and Carthage, they had 15,000 men. Suchet's operations have certainly produced great results, but for the *moment* have hurt me, because all who fly from him come back upon my left flank at a moment when I have only three battalions and 400 cavalry to oppose them at Grenada only. I have sent my brother there in haste to support them. The English, Portuguese, and Spanish at Cadiz, Gibraltar, and on the ocean, could also at any time descend with 10,000 or 12,000 men on any part of my line, and I want at least as many to oppose them and guard my posts. I may therefore be accused of having carried too many men to the relief of Badajos; and that army was not strong enough, though excellent in quality.

"I cannot hold 20,000 men, as your highness desires, on the Guadiana, unless I am reinforced, especially since the fall of Badajos; but as soon as I know the English have repassed that river, all my right under d'Erlon, *i.e.*, nine regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, and 12 guns, shall march into the interior of Estremadura, and occupy Medellin, Villafranca, and even Merida, and, if possible, hold in check the garrison of Badajos and the English corps left in Alentejo, and so prevent any grand movement up the valley of the Tagus against Madrid.

"Since my return here the demonstrations of the English appear directed to invade Andalusia, so far as to have obliged me to unfurnish many points, and even in a manner raise the siege of Cadiz. Graham has come to Llerena, and Cotton to Berlanga, where we had an affair and lost sixty men."—"I have ordered d'Erlon to repass the Guadalquivir and come to me to fight the English if they advance; if not, he shall go on again, and I think the English general will not commit the fault of entering the mountains, though he says he will!"

No. XX.

SECTION I.

SUMMARY OF THE FORCE OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY AT DIFFERENT PERIODS,
EXCLUSIVE OF DRUMMERS AND ARTILLERY-MEN.

October 1, 1811.—Cavalry.

| | Present. | Sick. | Command. | Prisoners. | Total. |
|-------------------------|----------|-------|----------|------------|--------|
| British | 3571 | 1114 | 947 | 298 | 5930 |
| Portuguese | 1373 | 256 | 1140 | — | 2769 |
| Total Cavalry | 4944 | 1370 | 2087 | 298 | 8699 |

Infantry.

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|------|------|--------|
| British | 29,530 | 17,974 | 2663 | 1684 | 51,851 |
| Portuguese | 23,689 | 6009 | 1707 | 75 | 31,480 |
| Total Infantry | 53,219 | 23,983 | 4370 | 1759 | 83,331 |

General total, including sergeants, 58,263 sabres and bayonets in the field.

January 8, 1812.—Cavalry.

| | Present. | Sick. | Command. | Prisoners. | Total. |
|-------------------------|----------|-------|----------|------------|--------|
| British | 4949 | 841 | 741 | — | 6531 |
| Portuguese | 613 | 43 | 275 | — | 391 |
| Total Cavalry | 5562 | 884 | 1016 | — | 7462 |

Infantry.

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|------|----|--------|
| British | 30,222 | 11,414 | 2827 | — | 44,463 |
| Portuguese | 20,455 | 4849 | 2360 | 51 | 27,715 |
| Total Infantry | 50,677 | 16,263 | 5187 | 51 | 72,178 |

General total, including sergeants, 56,239 sabres and bayonets in the field.

NOTE.—The abuses and desertions in the Portuguese cavalry had been so great that one division was suppressed.

April 5, 1812.—Cavalry.

| | Present. | Sick. | Command. | Prisoners. | Total. |
|-------------------------|----------|-------|----------|------------|--------|
| British | 4299 | 564 | 755 | 3 | 6048 |
| Portuguese | 347 | 9 | 492 | — | 808 |
| Total Cavalry | 4646 | 573 | 1247 | 3 | 6896 |

Infantry.

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|------|----|--------|
| British | 26,897 | 11,452 | 2799 | 2 | 40,703 |
| Portuguese | 20,224 | 5532 | 1507 | 18 | 27,281 |
| Total Infantry | 47,121 | 16,984 | 4286 | 20 | 67,984 |

| | |
|------------------------------------|--------|
| Sabres and bayonets | 51,767 |
| Field artillerymen | 1980 |
| Gunners in the batteries | 900 |

General total 54,647

NOTE.—The heavy German cavalry were in the rear at Estremos, and two Portuguese regiments were in Abrantes.

TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF BADAJOS, April, 1812.

| British. | | | | | |
|---------------------|---|---|---|---|---------------|
| Light division | . | . | . | . | 2679 |
| Third division | . | . | . | . | 2882 |
| Fourth division | . | . | . | . | 2579 |
| Fifth division | . | . | . | . | 2896 |
| | | | | | <u>11,036</u> |
| Portuguese. | | | | | |
| Hamilton's division | . | . | . | . | 4685 |
| Light division | . | . | . | . | 858 |
| Third division | . | . | . | . | 976 |
| Fourth division | . | . | . | . | 2384 |
| Fifth division | . | . | . | . | 1845 |
| | | | | | <u>10,748</u> |
| Total | . | . | . | . | <u>21,784</u> |

ALLIED COVERING CORPS in April, 1812.

Cavalry under General Hill.—Left Wing.

| | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| British | . | . | . | . | 783 |
| Portuguese | . | . | . | . | 347 |
| | | | | | <u>1130</u> |

Infantry ditto.

| | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| British | . | . | . | . | 6156 |
| Portuguese | . | . | . | . | 2385 |
| | | | | | <u>8541</u> |

Total under General Hill 9671

Cavalry under General Graham.—Right Wing.

| | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| British | . | . | . | . | 3517 |
| Portuguese | . | . | . | . | — |
| | | | | | <u>3517</u> |

Infantry ditto.

| | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|---|---|---------------|
| British | . | . | . | . | 10,154 |
| Portuguese | . | . | . | . | 5896 |
| | | | | | <u>16,050</u> |

Total under General Graham 19,567

General total of the covering army, exclusive of the artillerymen and the heavy German cavalry, who remained in the rear at Estremos, 29,238 sabres and bayonets.

SECTION II.

SUMMARY OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT BADAJOS, 1812.

ASSAULT.

British Loss.

| | Killed. | | Wounded. | |
|-----------|-----------|----------|-----------|-----------|
| Generals | . | — | . | 5 |
| Staff | . | 1 | . | 11 |
| | Officers. | | Soldiers. | |
| Artillery | . | 2 | . | 20 |
| Engineers | . | 5 | . | 5 |
| Total | . | <u>7</u> | . | <u>25</u> |

Light division.—*Line.*

| | Officers. | Soldiers. | Total. | |
|---------------------|-----------|-----------|--------|-------|
| 43rd . . . | 18 . . . | 329 . . . | 347 | } 670 |
| 52nd . . . | 18 . . . | 305 . . . | 323 | |
| 95th (1st bat.) . . | 14 . . . | 179 . . . | 193 | |
| 95th (3rd bat.) . . | 8 . . . | 56 . . . | 64 | |
| Total . . . | 58 | 849 | 927 | |

Third division.

| | | | | |
|------------|----------|-----------|-----|-------|
| 5th . . . | 4 . . . | 41 . . . | 45 | } 490 |
| 45th . . . | 14 . . . | 83 . . . | 97 | |
| 74th . . . | 7 . . . | 47 . . . | 54 | |
| 77th . . . | 3 . . . | 10 . . . | 13 | |
| 83rd . . . | 8 . . . | 62 . . . | 70 | |
| 88th . . . | 10 . . . | 135 . . . | 145 | |
| 94th . . . | 2 . . . | 154 . . . | 173 | |
| | 48 | 442 | 490 | |

Fourth division.

| | | | |
|------------|----------|-----------|-----|
| 7th . . . | 17 . . . | 163 . . . | 180 |
| 23rd . . . | 17 . . . | 134 . . . | 151 |
| 27th . . . | 15 . . . | 170 . . . | 185 |
| 40th . . . | 16 . . . | 124 . . . | 140 |
| 48th . . . | 19 . . . | 154 . . . | 173 |
| | 84 | 745 | 829 |

Fifth division.

| | | | |
|------------|----------|-----------|-----|
| 1st . . . | 2 . . . | — . . . | 2 |
| 4th . . . | 17 . . . | 213 . . . | 230 |
| 9th . . . | — . . . | — . . . | — |
| 30th . . . | 6 . . . | 126 . . . | 132 |
| 38th . . . | 5 . . . | 37 . . . | 42 |
| 44th . . . | 9 . . . | 95 . . . | 104 |
| | 39 | 471 | 510 |

| | | | |
|---------------------|---------|----------|----|
| 60th* . . . | 4 . . . | 30 . . . | 34 |
| Brunswick Oels* . . | 2 . . . | 33 . . . | 35 |

* These regiments were attached by companies to the third, fourth, and fifth divisions.

Total British loss at the assault.

| Officers. | Sergeants. | Soldiers. | Total. |
|-----------|------------|--------------|--------|
| 51 . . . | 40 . . . | 560 killed | } 1022 |
| 213 . . . | 153 . . . | 1983 wounded | |
| — . . . | 1 . . . | 21 missing | |

Total Portuguese loss at the assault.

| | | | |
|----------|----------|-------------|-------|
| 8 . . . | 6 . . . | 141 killed | } 730 |
| 45 . . . | 32 . . . | 468 wounded | |
| — . . . | — . . . | 30 missing | |

| | | | | |
|---------------|-----|-----|------|------|
| Grand total . | 317 | 232 | 3203 | 3752 |
|---------------|-----|-----|------|------|

British loss during the whole siege.

| Officers. | Sergeants. | Soldiers. | Total. |
|-----------|------------|--------------|--------|
| 60 . . . | 45 . . . | 715 killed | } 3860 |
| 251 . . . | 178 . . . | 2578 wounded | |
| — . . . | 1 . . . | 32 missing | |

Portuguese loss during the whole siege.

| | | | |
|----------|----------|-------------|-------|
| 12 . . . | 6 . . . | 137 killed | } 965 |
| 55 . . . | 38 . . . | 687 wounded | |
| — . . . | — . . . | 30 missing | |

| | | | | |
|-----------------|-----|-----|------|------|
| General total . | 378 | 268 | 4179 | 4825 |
|-----------------|-----|-----|------|------|

SECTION III.

SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Absent. | | Effective. | |
|-----------------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|-------|------------|--------------|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | Hospital. | Pris. | Men. | Horses. |
| August, 1811 . | 262,276 | 37,669 | 50,502 | 10,869 | 41,452 | — | 354,418 | 35,348 |
| Reinforcements | | | | | | | | |
| in March . | 17,361 | 3929 | 81 | — | 981 | — | 18,423 | 13,190 train |
| Total . | 279,637 | 41,598 | 50,583 | 10,869 | 42,433 | — | 372,841 | 52,467 |
| January, 1812 . | 258,156 | 41,049 | 22,805 | 5434 | 42,056 | — | 324,933 | 42,348 |
| April, 1812 . | 240,654 | 36,590 | 12,224 | 3814 | 33,504 | — | 286,440 | 40,461 |
| Reserve at | | | | | | | | |
| Bayonne . | 4038 | 157 | 36 | 35 | 865 | — | 4939 | 192 |
| Total . | 244,692 | 36,747 | 12,260 | 3849 | 34,369 | — | 291,379 | 40,653 |

Observation.—In September, 1811, an army of reserve, consisting of two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, with artillery, in all 20,287 under arms, was formed for the armée du midi.

1st August, 1811.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospital. | Effective. | | |
|------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|------------|--|--|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | | Men. | Horses. | |
| Armée du Midi . | 50,597 | 10,008 | 32,043 | 5359 | 11,836 | 94,508 | 1195 — 3413 3236 — 557 6692 — 2234 3667 — 2439 3531 — 4294 1268 — 253 | 4608 3793 8926 6106 12,825 1521 |
| du Centre . | 16,540 | 3729 | 391 | 64 | 1781 | 18,712 | | |
| de Portugal . | 38,392 | 5826 | 7901 | 3100 | 10,424 | 56,733 | | |
| de Aragon . | 45,102 | 5718 | 1397 | 388 | 5458 | 51,957 | | |
| du Nord . | 88,092 | 11,020 | 7617 | 1805 | 6654 | 102,413 | | |
| de Catalogne . | 23,553 | 1368 | 1153 | 153 | 5305 | 30,095 | | |
| Total . | 262,276 | 37,669 | 50,502 | 10,869 | 41,452 | 354,418 | 35,348 13,190 39,277 13,190 | 48,538 52,467 |
| Reinforcements . | 17,361 | 3929 | 81 | — | 981 | 18,423 | | |
| General total . | 279,637 | 41,598 | 50,583 | 10,869 | 42,433 | 372,841 | | |

STATE OF THE IMPERIAL GUARDS.

15th August, 1811.

| Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospital. | Effective. | |
|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|
| Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | | Men. | Horses. |
| 12,797 | 3193 | 3944 | 14 | 1189 | 17,613 | 3179 |

STATE OF THE GARRISON OF BADAJOS.

16th May, 1811.—Fifth battalion.

| | | | | | | |
|------|-----|-----|---|-----|------|-----|
| 2887 | 239 | 361 | — | 380 | 3725 | 239 |
|------|-----|-----|---|-----|------|-----|

1st March, 1812.

| | | | | | | |
|------|----|---|---|-----|------|----|
| 4393 | 44 | — | — | 478 | 5034 | 44 |
|------|----|---|---|-----|------|----|

STATE OF THE GARRISON OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

15th December, 1811.

| | | | | | | |
|------|----|---|---|-----|------|----|
| 1764 | 19 | — | — | 130 | 1956 | 19 |
|------|----|---|---|-----|------|----|

Return of numbers, by armies, 1st October, 1811.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Absent. | | Effective. | |
|----------------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|-------|------------|---------|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | Hospital. | Pris. | Men. | Horses. |
| Armée du Midi | 66,912 | 11,757 | 7539 | 2232 | 13,398 | — | 88,033 | 9251 |
| | | | | | | | train | 3393 |
| du Centre | 19,125 | 6262 | 511 | 84 | 1685 | — | 21,321 | 5190 |
| | | | | | | | | 553 |
| de Portugal | 50,167 | 11,662 | 1283 | 858 | 10,012 | — | 61,462 | 6909 |
| | | | | | | | | 4706 |
| d'Aragon | 28,966 | 5303 | 6583 | 308 | 4424 | — | 39,953 | 3322 |
| | | | | | | | | 1960 |
| du Nord | 87,913 | 10,821 | 6201 | 1069 | 9414 | — | 10,528 | 6769 |
| | | | | | | | | 4186 |
| de Catalogne | 26,954 | 1365 | 993 | 163 | 11,186 | — | 39,241 | 1150 |
| | | | | | | | | 289 |
| Total | 280,107 | 47,273 | 23,110 | 4717 | 50,119 | — | 353,538 | |
| Reinforcements | 9232 | 689 | | | 1226 | — | 10,458 | |
| General total | 289,249 | 47,959 | 23,110 | 4717 | 51,345 | — | 363,996 | |

15th April, 1812.

| | Under arms. | | Detached. | | Hospital. | Effective. | |
|-------------------|-------------|---------|-----------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|
| | Men. | Horses. | Men. | Horses. | | Men. | Horses. |
| Armée du Midi | 55,777 | 11,014 | 2498 | 70 | 6065 | 64,360 | 11,714 |
| du Centre | 19,148 | 3293 | 144 | 51 | 624 | 19,916 | 4044 |
| de Portugal | 56,937 | 8108 | 4394 | 2278 | 7706 | 69,037 | 10,386 |
| d'Aragon | 14,786 | 3269 | 2695 | 658 | 1467 | 18,948 | 3927 |
| de l'Ebre | 16,830 | 1873 | 21 | 8 | 3425 | 20,276 | 1879 |
| de Catalogne | 28,924 | 1259 | 1163 | 49 | 5540 | 35,627 | 1308 |
| du Nord | 48,232 | 7074 | 1309 | 72 | 8677 | 58,276 | 7213 |
| Total | 240,654 | 36,590 | 12,224 | 3814 | 33,534 | 286,440 | 40,461 |
| Reserve à Bayonne | 4038 | 157 | 36 | 35 | 865 | 4939 | 192 |
| Grand total | 244,692 | 36,747 | 12,260 | 3849 | 34,369 | 291,379 | 40,653 |

THE FRENCH ARMY AT ALBUERA.

IN a recent controversy, I have expressed my belief that the French army at Albuera, instead of being more, was less numerous, than I had represented it in my account of that battle. The following letter, since procured, decides the question :—

Extrait d'une lettre écrite de Seville le 4 Mai, 1811, par M. LE MAL. DUC DE DALMATIE, général-en-chef de l'armée du midi, à S. A. S. LE PRINCE DE WAGRAM ET DE NEUF-CHÂTEL, major-général.

LE Général Latour Maubourg a été obligé de se replier sur Constantina et Alamis, Cordove est menacée par un corps Anglais, Portugais, et Espagnol, beaucoup de troupes se concentrent en Estramadure; Badajoz est investie. Le Général Blake a réuni sur l'Odiel une armée de quinze à seize mille hommes, et paroît se préparer à marcher sur Seville. Le restant du quatrième corps est en opérations contre les troupes qui ont débauché de Murcie. Si j'énumère bien, je suis en cet instant attaqué sur divers points par plus de soixante mille hommes indépendamment de troupes qui sont restées à Cadiz et à l'isle de Léon, et de celles qu'il y a à Tarrifa, à Algesiras, et à Gibraltar, que je dois contenir, le danger est pressant, je dois faire face de tous côtés assurer de nouveaux triomphes aux armées de S. M. l'empereur, et éviter les fâcheux événemens, que l'on prépare contre l'armée du midi. J'espère réussir, mais le succès sera complet si les secours que j'attends arrivent apropos; voici mes dispositions. Je pars dans quatre jours avec *vingt mille hommes, trois mille chevaux, et trente pièces de canon*, pour rejeter au delà de la Guadiana les corps ennemis qui se sont répandus en Estremadure, dégager Badajoz et faciliter l'arrivée du Général Comte d'Erlon. Si les troupes que ce général amène peuvent se réunir avec celles que je conduirai et si les troupes qui sont parties des armées du nord et du centre, dont j'ai en partie disposé, arrivent à tems, j'aurai en Estremadure trente-cinq mille hommes, cinq mille chevaux, et quarante pièces de canon de campagne; alors je livre bataille aux ennemis quand bien même toute l'armée Angloise qui est sur le continent y seroit réunie, et ils seront vaincus.

Si une partie des renforts que j'attends manquent je ferai avec ce que j'aurai, tout ce que pourrai vers le but proposé.

Le général-en-chef de l'armée impériale du midi,

(Signe)

MAL. DUC DE DALMATIE.

Pour extraits conformes.

TO HER GRACE THE DUCHESS OF ABRANTES.

MADAM,

September 11, 1833.

In the eighth volume of your "*Mémoires*," which I have only just seen, I find the following passages :—

"Toutefois, pourquoi donc m'étonner de la conduite des Portugais? N'ai je pas vu *ici, en France*, un des frères d'armes de Junot souffrir, qu'on imprimât, dans un ouvrage traduit de l'Anglais, de choses revoltantes de fausseté sur lui et sur le Maréchal Ney? . . . Cet ouvrage, fait par un Colonel Napier, et qui a trouvé grâce devant le ministère de la guerre parce qu'il dit du bien du ministre, m'a été donné à moi, à moi le veuve de Junot, comme renfermant des documents *authentiques*. J'ai du y lire une indécente attaque contre la vie privée d'un homme dont on ne pouvait dire aucun mal comme militaire dans cette admirable

affaire de la Convention de Cintra, puisque les Anglais ont fait passer à une commission militaire ceux qui l'avaient signée pour l'Angleterre; et les beaux vers de Childe Harold suffisent seuls à la gloire de Junot, quand l'original de cette convention ne serait pas là pour la prouver. Heureusement que je le possède, moi, cet original, et même dans les deux langues. Il n'est pas dans M. Napier;"—

It is not permitted to a man to discover ill-humour at the expressions of a lady; yet when those expressions are dishonouring to him, and that reputation and talents are joined to beauty to give them a wide circulation, it would indicate insensibility to leave them unnoticed.

To judge of the talents of a general by his conduct in the field has always been the undisputed right of every military writer. I will not therefore enter upon that subject, because I am persuaded that your grace could not mean to apply the words "*revolting falsehoods*" to a simple judgment of the military genius of the Duke of Abrantes. Indeed you intimate that the offensive passages are those directed against his private life, and touching the Convention of Cintra. I think, however, your grace has not perused my work with much attention, or you would scarcely have failed to perceive that I have given the Convention of Cintra at length in the Appendix.

But, in truth, I have only alluded to General Junot's private qualities when they bore directly upon his government of Portugal, and, by a fresh reference to my work, you will find that I have affirmed nothing of my own knowledge. The character of the late Duke of Abrantes, as drawn by me, is that ascribed to him by the Emperor Napoleon (see *Las Cases*), and the authority of that great man is expressly quoted. It is against Napoleon, therefore, and not against me, who am but a repeater of his uncontradicted observations, that your resentment should be directed.

If your grace should deign to dispose of any further thought upon me or my work, I would venture to suggest a perusal of the Portuguese, and English, and Spanish, and German histories of the invasion of Portugal; or even a slight examination of only a small part of the innumerable, and some of them very celebrated, periodicals which treat of that event. You will be then convinced that, so far from having wantonly assailed the character of General Junot, I have made no slight effort to stem the torrent of abuse with which he has been unjustly overwhelmed; and, believe me, madam, that the estimation in which an eminent man will be held by the world is more surely to be found in the literature of different countries than in the fond recollection of his own family. I admired General Junot's daring character, and having enough of the soldier in me to like a brave enemy, I have, wherever the truth of history would permit, expressed that feeling towards him and towards other French generals whose characters and whose acts have been alike maligned by party writers in this country: such indeed has been my regard for justice on this point, that I have thereby incurred the charge of writing with a French rather than a national bias, as your grace will discover by referring to my Lord Mahon's History of the War of the Succession, in which his lordship has done me the honour to observe that I have written "*by far the best FRENCH account yet published of the Peninsular War.*"

For my own part I still think that to refrain from vulgar abuse of a gallant enemy will not be deemed un-English, although Lord Mahon considers it wholly French; but his lordship's observation incontestibly proves that I have discovered no undue eagerness to malign any of the French generals; and with respect to the Duke of Abrantes, I could show that all the offensive passages in my work rest upon the published authority of his own countrymen, and especially of his great master, the Emperor Napoleon, and that they are of a milder expression than those authorities would have warranted. It is, however, so natural and so amiable in a lady to defend the reputation of her deceased husband, that rather than appear to detract in any manner from the grace of such a proceeding, I choose to be silent under the unmitigated severity of your grace's observations.

Not so, however, with respect to that part of your remarks which relate to Marshal Ney.

After carefully re-examining every sentence I have written, I am quite unable to discover the slightest grounds for your grace's accusations. In all parts of my work the name of Ney is mentioned with praise. I have not, indeed, made myself a partisan of Marshal Ney in relating his disputes with Marshals Soult and Massena, because I honestly believed that he was mistaken; neither have I attributed to him unbounded talents for the higher parts of war, but this is only matter of opinion which the world is quite capable of appreciating at its true value; and upon all other points I have expressed admiration of Marshal Ney's extraordinary qualities, his matchless valour, his heroic energy!

In the hope that your grace will now think it reasonable to soften the asperity of your feelings towards my work, I take my leave, with more of admiration for your generous warmth in defence of a person so dear to you, than of any sentiment of resentment for the harsh terms which you have employed towards myself.

And I remain, madam,

Your very obedient servant,

WILLIAM NAPIER, COLONEL.

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